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Orientalism
#1
The Dysfunction of Orientalism: An Immoral Paradigm

As Americans, we are the inheritors of a dangerous cultural and historical paradigm of misrepresentation that has been constructed over long centuries; one that has ingrained itself in our society as a base of both knowledge and power. In the current state of the world, and the possible war we now face, this essentialist presupposition threatens to inspire choices, reactions, and even human casualties beyond the scope of moral reason. Edward Said, in his 1978 book titled by the same name, called this system “Orientalism,” an interdependent series of systems by which the “West” establishes its own essence over that of the “East,” governing social, political, and academic issues involving “European culture…setting itself off against the “Orient” as a sort of surrogate and even underground self; an ongoing discourse perpetuated by the basic assumption of the Orient as mysterious, unchanging, unable to represent itself, and ultimately inferior” (Said 4-5). As a global capitalist system forms, there remains a conspicuously Western framework patterned along legacies of imperialism and colonization, which can be shown through logical argument to be morally unsustainable.

The proposed argument consists of the following premises:

1) The established paradigm of “Orientalism” enables and perpetuates glaringly inconsistent political action and social views on the part of America that comprise the root of unnecessary suffering endured by Arab and Asiatic peoples.

2) Any system that enables and perpetuates glaringly inconsistent political action and social views on the part of America that comprise the root of unnecessary suffering endured by Arab and Asiatic peoples is an immoral system.

3) “Orientalism” is an immoral system.

The two theoretical entities of the “West” as “Self” and the “East” as “Other” have long been assumed by Americans to be ultimate and irreducible, comprising an assumed cultural essence contained in the constructed representation of the “Western mind” differentiated from the “Oriental mind” (Northrop 455). This very assumption guides many interdependent and related American foundations of knowledge and power, including the multimedia, mass culture, and the foreign policy decisions of the American government. This influential ideological force is the inheritance of a long history of cultural interaction between Europe and Asia, involving anti-Muslim crusades, imperialism and colonization (Pannikar 481). From the beginning of this interaction, a dichotomy was set into place: even with the later historical developments of nationalism, Marxism, and capitalism, social identities worldwide remained largely a matter of Eurocentric discourse (Prakash 1475).

The world since WW II has undergone a colonial aftermath in which newly independent states were formed by the dozens. In the wake of this blossoming of worldwide nationalism, an Orientalist outlook on behalf of America led quickly to sustained invasion and occupation of Palestinian Arab land. The Arabs were quickly marginalized and stereotyped, their autonomy and birthright to the inherent human freedoms America claims to uphold being steadily denied in the face of Zionism. To this day American Orientalist representations involving dehumanization of Arab people reveals a disproportionate and inconsistent foreign policy that runs contrary to international law.

Asia also was an inheritor to the enforcement of Orientalist doctrine. The world quickly became an arena for ideological pugilism with American capitalism in one corner facing Russian communism in the other. Both voices were matters of Eurocentric discourse, and all other voices in Asia were subsequently categorized and forced to place bets. While Ho Chi Minh carried a copy of the American Declaration of Independence to France, stating the independent ideal of his homeland, America fervently denied this right, while having fervently enforced it on Japan for already a decade. The Orientalist paradigm enabled such policy decisions through the basic perpetuation of a mentality that Marx himself even adhered to: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Said 1).

These inconsistencies lead all the way up to the present day, from the military backing of the ruthlessly fundamentalist Afghani Taliban in their struggle against Russia to the backing of thoroughly corrupt political entities such as the Iranian Shah and the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Any morally consistent paradigm would not overturn itself in a matter of two decades, but the Orientalist mindset of containment and forced representation requires such shifts, exemplified in all three of the above nations. Thus, the premise of inconsistency caused by the current paradigm is shown; the suffering, malnutrition, poverty, and amount of civilian deaths as a result of these chess-game maneuvers is unmistakably a disproportionate amount sustained by Arab and Asian peoples.

If the Orientalist mindset was not the basic framework for American global hegemony or for a global capitalist system defined, led, and perpetuated by America’s self-justified conspicuous consumption, then various human cultures around the globe would be approached on an equal footing. As one among dozens of equal human cultures engaging in coexistence, America would claim no rightful domain over any Arab or Asian people, and certainly would no longer feel required to represent, rule, or use military force in distant battlefields the world over. Thus, the policies, impacts, and results of musical-chair military intervention could all be laid to rest in an emerging community of globally-informed, moral communities, perfectly capable of defining and carrying out their own pursuit of freedom. A moral option not of isolationism, but of mutual respect and noninterference, is within human reach and can be realized; as Foucault said, “To unlearn is one of the important tasks of self-cultivation” (Foucault 97).

However, even though the current American paradigm of Orientalism can be shown to be morally inconsistent and can lead to profoundly negative and arbitrary international impacts, the process of dismantling such an ingrained view is daunting. A newspaper photograph of the Holy Koran appears after an act of terrorism, and Arabs across America are subject to assault, abuse, and even murder. One editorial appears about the Arab and/or Asian disregard for American, individualistic definitions of freedom and human rights, and a view of the people in question as hopelessly backwards, inferior, and dangerous is set into motion. The biggest potential immorality enabled and perpetuated by American Orientalism may indeed be the oncoming retaliatory war in response to the terror attacks of New York and Washington.

This paradigm is as cumbersome and self-perpetuating as it is morally flawed, falling into Foucault’s definition of a “discursive practice” which “takes shape in technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioral schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, in pedagogical forms that both inform and maintain them” (Foucault 12). As Americans, the views of our media and our government, our academia and our own mindsets are being informed and maintained by a paradigm with significant moral flaws. “Orientalism,” since the initial engagement of Arab and Asian societies elsewhere in the world, has been soaked in the blood and the misery of the “Other” by which we have defined the “Self.”
Works Cited

Foucault, Michel. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Trans. Robert Hurley. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1997.

Northrop, F.S.C. The Meeting of East and West. New York: Collier Books, 1966.

Panikkar, K.M. Asia and Western Dominance. New York: The John Day Co., 1946.

Prakash, Gyan. “Subaltern Studies As Postcolonial Criticism.” The American Historical Review. 99 (1994): 1475-1490.

Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.

-Fall 2001

http://www.mindground.net/orientalism.html

http://www.mindground.net/westphil.html
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->“Orientalism” and the West: The Carriage and Its Driver

              As Americans, we are the inheritors of a dangerous cultural and historical paradigm of misrepresentation that has been constructed over long centuries; one that has ingrained itself in our society as a base of both knowledge and power.  In the current state of the world, and the “war against terrorism,” this presupposition threatens to inspire choices, reactions, and even human casualties beyond the scope of moral reason.  Edward Said, in his 1978 book titled by the same name, called this system “Orientalism,” an interdependent series of systems by which the “West” establishes its own essence over that of the “East,” governing social, political, and academic issues involving “European culture…setting itself off against the “Orient” as a sort of surrogate and even underground self; an ongoing discourse perpetuated by the basic assumption of the Orient as mysterious, unchanging, unable to represent itself, and ultimately inferior” (Said 4-5).  As a global capitalist system forms, there remains a conspicuously Western framework patterned along legacies of imperialism and colonization, which can be shown through logical argument to be morally unsustainable.

              The proposed argument consists of the following premises:

1)        The established paradigm of “Orientalism” enables and perpetuates glaringly inconsistent political action and social views on the part of America that comprise the root of unnecessary suffering endured by Arab and Asiatic peoples.

2)      Any system that enables and perpetuates glaringly inconsistent political action and social views on the part of America that comprise the root of unnecessary suffering endured by Arab and Asiatic peoples is an immoral system.

3)      “Orientalism” is an immoral system.

                The two theoretical entities of the “West” as “Self” and the “East” as “Other” have long been assumed by Americans to be ultimate and irreducible, comprising an assumed cultural essence contained in the constructed representation of the “Western mind” differentiated from the “Oriental mind” (Northrop 455).  This very assumption guides many interdependent and related American foundations of knowledge and power, including the multimedia, mass culture, and the foreign policy decisions of the American government.  This influential ideological force is the inheritance of a long history of cultural interaction between Europe and Asia, involving anti-Muslim crusades, imperialism and colonization (Pannikar 481).  From the beginning of this interaction, a dichotomy was set into place: even with the later historical developments of nationalism, Marxism, and capitalism, social identities worldwide remained largely a matter of Eurocentric discourse (Prakash 1475).

                The world since WW II has undergone a colonial aftermath in which newly independent states were formed by the dozens.  In the wake of this blossoming of worldwide nationalism, an “Orientalist” outlook on behalf of America led quickly to sustained invasion and occupation of Palestinian Arab land.  The Arabs were quickly marginalized and stereotyped, their autonomy and birthright to the inherent human freedoms America claims to uphold being steadily denied in the face of Zionism.  To this day American “Orientalist” representations involving dehumanization of Arab people reveals a disproportionate and inconsistent foreign policy that runs contrary to international law.

                Asia also was an inheritor to the enforcement of “Orientalist” doctrine.  The world quickly became an arena for ideological pugilism with American capitalism in one corner facing Russian communism in the other.  Both voices were matters of Eurocentric discourse, and all other voices in Asia were subsequently categorized and forced to place bets.  While Ho Chi Minh carried a copy of the American Declaration of Independence to France, stating the independent ideal of his homeland, America fervently denied this right, while having fervently enforced it on Japan for already a decade.  The “Orientalist” paradigm enabled such policy decisions through the basic perpetuation of a mentality that Marx himself even adhered to:  “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Said 1).

                These inconsistencies lead all the way up to the present day, from the military backing of the ruthlessly fundamentalist Afghani Taliban in their struggle against Russia to the backing of thoroughly corrupt political entities such as the Iranian Shah and the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.  Any morally consistent paradigm would not overturn itself in a matter of two decades, but the “Orientalist” mindset of containment and forced representation requires such shifts, exemplified in all three of the above nations.  Thus, the premise of inconsistency caused by the current paradigm (the second premise in this argument) is shown; the suffering, malnutrition, poverty, and amount of civilian deaths as a result of these chess-game maneuvers is unmistakably a disproportionate amount sustained by Arab and Asian peoples.

                If the “Orientalist” mindset was not the basic framework for American global hegemony or for a global capitalist system defined, led, and perpetuated by America’s self-justified conspicuous consumption, then various human cultures around the globe would be approached on an equal footing.  As one among dozens of equal human cultures engaging in coexistence, America would claim no rightful domain over any Arab or Asian people, and certainly would no longer feel required to represent, rule, or use military force in distant battlefields the world over.  Thus, the policies, impacts, and results of musical-chair military intervention could all be laid to rest in an emerging community of globally-informed, moral communities, perfectly capable of defining and carrying out their own pursuit of freedom.  A moral option not of isolationism, but of mutual respect and noninterference, is within human reach and can be realized; as Foucault said, “To unlearn is one of the important tasks of self-cultivation” (Foucault 97).

                However, even though the current American paradigm of “Orientalism” can be shown to be morally inconsistent and can lead to profoundly negative and arbitrary international impacts, the process of dismantling such an ingrained view is daunting.  A newspaper photograph of the Holy Koran appears after an act of terrorism, and Arabs across America are subject to assault, abuse, and even murder.  One editorial appears about the Arab and/or Asian disregard for American, individualistic definitions of freedom and human rights, and a view of the people in question as hopelessly backwards, inferior, and dangerous is set into motion.  The biggest potential immorality enabled and perpetuated by American “Orientalism” may indeed be the ongoing retaliatory war in response to the terror attacks of New York and Washington.

                This paradigm is as cumbersome and self-perpetuating as it is morally flawed, falling into Foucault’s definition of a “discursive practice” which “takes shape in technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioral schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, in pedagogical forms that both inform and maintain them” (Foucault 12).  As Americans, the views of our media and our government, our academia and our own mindsets are being informed and maintained by a paradigm with significant moral flaws.  “Orientalism,” since the initial engagement of Arab and Asian societies elsewhere in the world, has been soaked in the blood and the misery of the “Other” by which we have defined the “Self.”

                A critic of my position might offer the following argument:

1)        The system of “Orientalist” discourse is driven by issues of capitalism and nationalism which contain their own moral worth (or lack of it), and the definition of the “West” and the “East” is informed along the way without itself containing a certain moral value.

2)      Any system that is driven by issues which contain their own moral worth (or lack of it) without itself containing a certain moral value cannot be said to be immoral.

3)      Therefore, “Orientalism” cannot be said to be immoral.

This argument claims that the dichotomy of Orient and Occident emerges out of a neutral moral state, a misrepresentation that is itself a natural process in all cultures in dealing with the initial strangeness of other cultures.  It is apparent that many political actions and social views of America inconsistently favor and sustain, inflict and cultivate unnecessary suffering endured by Arab and Asiatic peoples. The roots of this bias, however, deal with a complex interflow between systems of capitalism, wealth distribution, and nationalist issues of power, as opposed to an oversimplified ideological discourse, according to the above argument.  In this sense, “Orientalism” is not something that can be isolated and cursed on its own.  Rather, the “horse” that pulls this “carriage” controls its moral direction; the carriage itself is stationary and morally neutral.

                This neutral carriage is comprised of the initial definitions of “Self” and “Other” involved with an “Orientalist” view that leads to other dichotomous attributes,such as “known/ mysterious,” “West/East,” “frontier/homeland,” etc.  However, no moral evaluation can be made until this view begins to apply both quantitative and qualitative values to the equation, such as “rich/poor,” “fortunate/downtrodden,” “advanced/backward,” or “superior/inferior.”  These evaluations are made only when the initial theory of “Orientalism” becomes informed by factors which contain certain amounts (or deficiencies) of morality.  These factors invariably include both capitalism and nationalism, world systems that transcend the bounds of any region-specific view such as “Orientalism,” while informing such views to the extent that they are overshadowed by these larger forces at play.

                Departing from the value claims intrinsic to “Orientalist” theory may at first seem like a process of deconstruction or dissection of the original ideas of Said and others.  But a close look can illustrate that the very fuels that drove and continue to drive “Orientalism” as a whole do not leave it as an independent entity that can be judged or evaluated on its own grounds.  The various world systems through which we are informed of our “Western Selves” and, concurrently, define the “Eastern Others” simultaneously transcend and steer these perceptions, presenting the illusion that the original dichotomy is to blame.

                For example, some of the most fundamental driving factors in “Orientalism” as it is practiced by the “West”, such as colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and nationalism, take place on a worldwide scale that renders “West vs. East” as only a small aspect of a much larger equation.  The empire of Japan is one of the most prominent examples.  Japan cannot be attributed a wholly “Western” status, neither through geographical location nor through its unique culture.  Yet, this country has had a long legacy of colonial and imperial impulses in Asia, and even today follows the winds of global capital and consumer culture very closely, while still retaining a very particular form of nationalism.  Every inconsistent political action and social view on the part of America that could be said to perpetuate “Orientalism” has been practiced and perpetuated in its own way in Japan.  Examples are replete, from the puppet government of Manchukuo during WWII (to rule over the “inferior” Chinese people) to the rape of the forests of Malaysia (forests with infinitely less importance than Japan’s own), from the sexual enslavement of “comfort women” who were kidnapped all across Asia during the war (who have yet to receive an apology) to consistent discrimination against both the indigenous Ainu people of North Japan and the internal lower caste known as the Bakumin (ancient family lineages stigmatized for their trade in leather goods, thought of as an unclean Japanese race).

                Other world issues that run on “Orientalist” fuels yet remain beyond the realm of such a discourse, bringing into question the moral accountability of the discourse in and of itself, include the political action and social views America has employed towards Central, Latin, and South America.  From brutal and oppressive puppet regimes to notorious sweat shops, from an ingrained preference of power for half-white “mestizo” races to fervent support of aggressive capitalist policies, every tendency that could be described as “Orientalist” has been practiced towards this world region, which is a marginalized “Western” region, but certainly not an example of America’s representational model of the “Orient.”

                The ideological horses pulling the carriage of “Orientalism” as it is practiced by America, therefore, can only be morally evaluated on a worldwide basis.  The same Americans who killed Panamanian civilians are now killing Afghani civilians.  The same irrational preference for and support of corrupt or sadistic governments to achieve unrealistic ideals can be seen in both Columbia and Israel.  An inconsistent amount of suffering, malnourishment, poverty, and death perpetuated by American foreign policy is indeed sustained by Asian and Arab peoples; tragically, however, this trend extends well beyond American concepts of “Eastern” or “Oriental” cultures, and such injustice is employed by any country that wields enough power, as can be seen in the example of Japan.

                Therefore, a process for positive change in regard to America’s “Orientalist” foreign policies must take into account that its very moral questionability does not lie in the simple dichotomy of “Self” and “Other,” “East” and “West,” which incidentally are necessary for discourse between regional cultures to continue.  Instead, the moral accountability of the larger forces at hand must be brought to the scrutiny of a larger justice, including those of global capitalism, nationalistic narrow-mindedness, and cultural delusions of superiority.  All three of these horses pull the carriage, without which “Orientalism” would remain on the morally neutral ground of one culture engaging in discourse with another.

                Although this second argument is a valid one, and constructs a solid framework for the concept that “Orientalism” itself cannot be said to be immoral, the initial analogy and subsequently the first premise can be shown to be unsound.  The “carriage” of “Orientalism” is undeniably pulled by the “horses” of capitalism, nationalism, and cultural superiority, but these horses are guided and informed in certain directions by an intrinsic part of the carriage that does contain a certain moral value: the driver.

                Said’s claim from the very beginning is that European culture is both the builder and the driver of the carriage of “Orientalism,” giving focus and drive to the horses mentioned above.  The quantitative and qualitative values mentioned in my critic’s argument, such as “rich/poor,” “fortunate/downtrodden,” “advanced/backward,” or “superior/inferior,” are thoroughly infused with the original and neutral dichotomy of “Self” and “Other” because of the “Self” involved, mainly European/American culture.  In this way, the assertion in the first premise of my critic’s argument, that “the definition of the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ is informed along the way without itself containing a certain moral value,” is unsound.  The very definition is informed upon its creation, namely by the culture claiming Selfhood as opposed to Otherness.

                The initial dichotomy therefore absorbs the same moral value of the driver’s horses; “Orientalism,” created by the West, is inevitably infused with a certain context of capitalistic, nationalistic, and cultural values.  It actually is the horses themselves, capitalism itself, nationalism itself, etc., that cannot be said to contain their own moral worth (or lack of it); for they are harnessed, controlled, maintained and guided not by a stationary carriage, but by its driver and builder.

                As far as my critic’s examples of Japan and America’s Southern Hemisphere go, they do indeed fall outside or beyond “Orientalist” discourse; this is undeniable.  But Imperial Japan could be said to have raised its own horses of colonialism and nationalism; likewise, European and American culture may have built more than one carriage, more than one ideological justification to uphold its own drive towards dominance.

                Through these observations, the original argument holds up; “Orientalism” cannot be said to be morally neutral, and in fact enables and perpetuates glaringly inconsistent political actions and social views on the part of America that comprise the root of unnecessary suffering endured by Arabic and Asian peoples.  The logical conclusion is that the carriage itself, “Orientalism” itself, built and driven by the driver, running on the strength and motion of the horses of capitalism, nationalism, and cultural superiority, is an immoral system. With well-oiled wheels, the carriage is logically traveling in the same direction as the horses and the carriage.  Examples such as the “war on terrorism,” the blind support of Israel’s breaching of international law, and the arbitrary embargos and bombing of Iraq, show that “Orientalism” is raging full-speed ahead, with severe repercussions in store for the Frankenstein who constructed this monster. 


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#2
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RESEARCH ON ISLAM

Performative Simplicity: Warnings Against Greed and Desire in the Qur’an and the Wudeng

Surrendering Through Signs For The Wise: A Comparison of Ideals in the Qur’an and the Wudeng

The Dysfunction of Orientalism: An Immoral Paradigm

Cursing the Carriage For Not Pulling the Horse: The Neutrality of “Orientalism”

“Orientalism” and the West: The Carriage and Its Driver

Dr. Ali Shariati and the Role of Sacred Morality

http://www.mindground.net/budresearch.html
Research On Buddhism

Statelessness: The Case For A Buddhist Anarchism

The Trickster’s True Face: A Comparison of Native American and Chinese Chan Buddhist Imps and Heroes

Heresies of Ensoulment: Upanishadic and Yogic Teachings and the Wudeng

Performative Simplicity: Warnings Against Greed and Desire in the Qur’an and the Wudeng

Surrendering Through Signs For The Wise: A Comparison of Ideals in the Qur’an and the Wudeng


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#3
Heresies of Ensoulment: Upanishadic and Yogic Teachings and the Wudeng

As Buddhism arose within the cultural context of Hinduism in India, it directly addressed the ideal of the self known as atman, a notion that was interpreted, represented, reacted to, and soundly dismissed by the Buddha himself. As his doctrine of anatman, or “not-self,” marks a clear departure from such notions, the Mahayana ideals that developed among Chinese schools recorded in the Wudeng Huiyan (Compendium of Five Lamps) suggest new developments and variations on this theme. These variations, and the original contrast that they developed from, provide important insights on how the Buddhist notion of selfhood or ensoulment underwent gradual changes throughout its development in China.

The original dichotomy involves an assertion in the Upanishads that “the sage eventually discovers that within everyone is an eternal, unchanging essence, an immortal soul referred to as the ‘self’ (atman) (Fieser and Powers 5). This self “alone survives death,” and “has been reborn countless times in an infinite variety of different bodies, while itself remaining unchanged by the multiple entities [developed] in successive lifetimes” (ibid.) In the Samyutta-Nikaya of the Pali Canon, the Buddha directly interprets and rejects this claim: “All formations are transient; all formations are subject to suffering; all things are without an Ego-entity. Form is transient, feeling is transient, perception is transient, mental formations are transient, consciousness is transient. And that which is transient is subject to suffering; and of that which is transient and subject to suffering and change, one cannot rightly say:-This belongs to me; this am I; this is my Ego.” (Goddard 27).

This dichotomy, however, is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. Paradigms such as reincarnation and karma as pervasive natural laws still influenced the claims that the Buddha made, or perhaps more importantly, refused to make, as can be seen in another passage of the Samyutta-Nikaya: “And it is impossible that any one can explain the passing out of one existence and the entering into a new existence, or the growth, increase and development of consciousness, independent of bodily form, feeling, perception and mental forms” (Goddard 26). This passage, while addressing and dismissing certain yogic claims about a separation between consciousness and matter, also clearly refuses to deny outright the possibility of reincarnation, or some other manifestation of karma. The traditional yogic separation was presented concisely by Patanjali, who contended “that both matter (prakriti) and spirit (purusha) are real entities, and the goal of his system is separation (kaivalya) of spirit from matter” (Fieser and Powers 5). The Buddha seems here, through the denial of the possibility of making a claim about it, since he refuses to say that reincarnation is an impossibility, involving a transcendental form of consciousness that may not involve typical notions of what a soul consists of, or what it may represent.

The Wudeng Huiyan, a compilation of dialogues and commentaries by a Chinese Buddhist monk named Puji (1179-1253), hints at a tense interplay within this uncertainty, reflected in the recorded discussions of masters of various Chan Buddhist schools and lineages. One of the traditional Chinese Chan schools of the time was known as Wei-Shih (Mind-Only or Consciousness-Only), a school that claimed that there was an eternal essence of mind not unlike the Hindu atman, that existed beyond the transient state of typical mental formations (Puji 13). Wei-Shih was known as a southern school, but was criticized by some as not being true to the teachings of the Buddha. The claim of an atman, an immortal soul, is addressed in the following passage by Nanyang Huizhong (675-775 AD), a master trained in the Vinaya tradition who was known as “National Teacher” because he taught three Tang Dynasty emperors:

“The National Teacher asked a monk, ‘Where are you from?’ The monk said, ‘From the South.’ The National Teacher said, ‘Are there any teachers there?’

The monk said, ‘A great many.’ The National Teacher said, ‘What is it that they teach people?’ The monk said, ‘In that place, worthies directly impart the teaching ‘mind is Buddha’ to their students:

‘Right now, you completely possess the nature of conscious perception. This benevolent nature can cause the raising of an eyebrow and the twinkling in an eye. It is employed when coming or going, and it pervades the body. If you tap your head, the head knows it. If you stamp the feet, the feet know it. The ancients called it ‘pervasive consciousness.’ Aside from this, there is no other Buddha. This body is subject to birth and annihilation, but the nature of mind is beginningless, and does not undergo birth and death. The body subject to birth and death is like a dragon that loses and regrows its bones, or a snake that sheds its skin, or a human that leave his old home. The body is impermanent, but its nature is eternal.’

National Teacher Huizhong criticized this, saying, ‘If that’s so, then their teaching is no different from the heretical Senika doctrine. Teachers of that doctrine said, ‘Within the body is a spirit. Although this spirit can know the body’s affliction, when the body expires the spirit departs from it. If I am burned up, this spiritual host moves on. Although I am not eternal, this host is eternal.’ With such an understanding, true and false can’t be distinguished.’” (Puji 53-54)

Yet there remains in the Wudeng extensive examples of karma as it travels from one incarnation to the next, as in Baizhang Huaihai’s (720-814 AD) story of a monk who was destined to be reborn as a fox 500 times for claiming that he was independent of cause and effect (Puji 80). Other references include an assertion that in 100 years a certain monk will be reborn as an ox in a nearby field (Puji 114).

It is interesting to note, however, that the monks and teachers of monks who refused to make claims about the role of reincarnation or karmic retribution in a schema that left no option for a self or an immortal soul all had training in Vinaya lineages before they came to practice Chan. Vinaya study involves not only strict observance of the formal rules for monks described in the Pali Canon, but intense study of the scriptures and sutras as well. A classic example of this tendency is “Old Teacher Wang,” Nanquan Puyuan (748-835 AD): “Why is it that phenomenal existence is empty? If there is nothing within mind, then how does one explain how the myriad things arise? Isn’t it as if shadowy forms differentiate emptiness? This question is like someone grasping sound and placing it in a box, or blowing into a net to fill it with air. Therefore some old worthy said, ‘It’s not mind. It’s not Buddha. It’s not a thing.’ Thus we just teach you brethren to go on a journey” (Puji 105). When Old Teacher Wang passed away, his final words asserted this mystery while continuing to refuse to lay claim to an absolute solution: “The stars’ light is dim but eternal. Don’t say that I’m coming or going” (Puji 107). This reflects the uncertainty of the Buddha’s comments on reincarnation mentioned earlier.

Therefore, the Hindu concept of ensoulment seemed to undergo a rebirth with the Wei-Shih school in ancient Chinese Chan Buddhism, but for the most part was denied by an assertion of uncertainty dating from the time of the Buddha himself. While he made other knowledge claims, he did not pretend to know what exactly survived the death of the body.

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#4
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->At UB, Sreenivasan teaches a graduate seminar on "Religion and State in South Asia, 1200 to 1800" and an undergraduate course on "Islam and Muslims in Modern South Asia."

She offers several reasons for the growing interest in such courses at universities across the United States.

First, a migration to the United States of professional, middle-class South Asians in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the growth of South Asian course offerings on American campuses, Sreenivasan says, because now the children of those immigrants are attending college and want to learn about their heritage. She notes that in addition to courses offered through the history department, UB also offers instruction in Arabic, Hindi and Sanskrit.

Several other factors have contributed to the growth of interest in South Asian history in the U.S., Sreenivasan says. One is the United States' interest in developing or sustaining long-term relationships with countries like Pakistan and India. Another is that nationally, she says, there is some government support for expanding South Asian course offerings—in the same way Chinese history expanded dramatically in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.

Sreenivasan says tensions between religious communities in South Asia have increased dramatically in the past 20 years. Why? "It's the million-dollar question for social science," she says. "There is an immediate political imperative to try and understand what's happening so we can combat it."

Sreenivasan is engaged in groundbreaking research with a group of scholars from the University of Arizona, Rutgers and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who are working on a collaborative history of slavery in South Asia—shedding new light on a long-shrouded topic.

Her own research for this project centers on a group of women and children who served as domestics in the elite Rajput society in India between the 17th and 19th centuries.

Sreenivasan says history always has enriched itself by documenting that which has been left out. "If we are striving to move toward equality of access, then I think it is important to recover earlier histories of oppression, to document how the inequality of access was established," she says.

Sreenivasan's area of special interest is historical memory-the ways in which particular communities in South Asia remember their pasts, dating from the 16th to 20th centuries. She looks at a community's understanding of history in both literary and historical accounts, and then traces how the memory of some of these communities ends up being incorporated as a nation's history, while the history of other communities becomes marginalized.

She currently is researching the Rajput, an elite, military, aristocratic society in northern India. This particular community of proto-nationalists resisted being integrated in empires. Tourists who visit India typically are herded through the Rajput's old fortresses and palaces, which are now archaeological sites.

"My undergraduates come in with the notion that colonialism is evil and oppressive," says Sreenivasan. "Of course, it is morally wrong, but there are more interesting questions to be asked: Why did it succeed? Clearly, it had to have some local allies. Who gained and who lost ground?"<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Interest in "South Asian" history
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#5
I have a question although there probably isnt a readymade answer for it. Question is -> in the US how many social-science researchers of indian-origin are females ? What is the percentage as compared to males ? Have the percentages more or less remained the same over last century ? what is the trend ?
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#6
<!--QuoteBegin-rajesh_g+Oct 12 2006, 07:07 AM-->QUOTE(rajesh_g @ Oct 12 2006, 07:07 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->I have a question although there probably isnt a readymade answer for it. Question is -> in the US how many social-science researchers of indian-origin are females ? What is the percentage as compared to males ? Have the percentages more or less remained the same over last century ? what is the trend ?
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A start?
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06319/
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