Hindutva

[ramana]

Ram Madhav's speech at UPenn India’s Political Scene After the 2004 Election: Where does Hindutva stand?

This is the speech that caused some controversy. Please read and ruminate.

[Shambhu]

My own take on the RSS issue:

A short list of one page, with carefully chosen points, has to be put up and adhered to. Like:

What "Hindu" religion stands for: the core: if u are not the body, who are "you"? This is your "soul" as some say so, who is this "you"? I am talking about who "you" is, not the possessions of "you". We say it is God, and God can be visualized in myriad ways: but not is exclusivist ways). Short and sweet, good enuf for Westerners (with and without a brown skin)

The chronology of Partition, kashmir neither here nor there for some time, then Pak invasion, Kashmir accession, political and mass approval for accession, massive involvement of Pak in the "indigeneous Kashmir struggle" (more than Pak is involved in Pak). The folly of trusting a murderous nation TSP on the realities of Kashmir.

..


..

Start like you are teaching a kid. Do not make it long. And persevere.

Ask them to Google to verify. (no, don't laugh at me.)

Last of all, persevere.

[Bharatvarsh]

Well what's so extreme about that speech, it's close to p-secularism. I am sure if they heard my views on Hindutva the organisers will have a heart attack because of my extremist views.

[Guest]

What was the p-secism part about the speech?

[Bharatvarsh]

Well for one the statement about the meeting with Jamait-e-Islami in which we he says we should respect plurality (in which he includes Islam) is not acceptable to me. I can accept plurality with other tolerant religions like Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism etc but I can neither respect nor accept criminal ideologies like Christianity or Islam.

And further more I don't regret post-godhra riots and neither do I see the need to condemn them, every single day Hindu blood is spilled in the subcontinent and I never see Muslims apoligising for their horrific atrocities against Hindus (like ethnic cleansing Hindu Kashmiris) so why should we apoligise for the riots. Repect is a 2 way street, if Muslims can't respect us then they shouldn't expect us to respect them.

You do not have to go far to see where the loyalty of Muslims lies, just read their largest english newspaper online (milligazette or something) it looks more like a Pakistani paper in it's contents and propaganda, not Indian.

[Bharatvarsh]

I didn't know where to put this but sign the following petition for restoring Savarkar's plaque at Andaman island's:

http://www.petitiononline.com/Abhijit/

[acharya]

http://www.cpsindia.org/art_kinectic.html

Articles —
Hindutva: the kinetic effect of Hindu Dharma
by S. Gurumurthy

Introduction

Hindu Dharma is a relatively new name for what has been timelessly known as Sanatana Dharma. Hindu Dharma is geographically Indian, or Bharatiya, but it is universally valid because, unlike other schools of thought, it accepts all other and diverse thoughts without rejecting any. This all-inclusive school of thought was a nameless philosophy that did not need to distinguish itself from others, as there was no other thought system from which it needed to be distinguished. It was a thought that did not need an identity different from other thoughts as it accepted all other thoughts as valid. It is only when exclusive schools of thoughts emanated from the Abrahamic stable, which rejected the validity of all thoughts other than those of the concerned Abrahamic school, Sanatana Dharma needed to distinguish itself form the exclusive Abrahamic thoughts. It is not Hindu Dharma which rejected the Abrahamic thoughts, but it is the Abrahamic thoughts which rejected the Hindu Dharma. With the result that the Sanatana Dharma had to acquire and accept a name to distinguish itself; not because it was an exclusive thought but because it was an inclusive thought and all other thoughts exclusive. This is how the word Hindu evolved to distinguish the exclusive Abrahamic thoughts from Hindu Dharma or Sanatana Dharma. The name was meant not so much to distinguish Hindu Dharma from others as it was to distinguish the newly emerged exclusive thoughts from the inclusive Hindu Dharma.


Conclusion

What follows from this discussion is that Hindutva is the kinetic form of Hindu Dharma. This form is an evolution dictated by the absence of organised strength in Hindu Dharma. Its evolution was necessitated by the fact that Hindu Dharma had no conflict with other religions and therefore it was non-combative in character. Since Hindu Dharma was non-conflicting and non-combative in nature, it lacked the aggression needed to face the aggressive Semitic faiths that had a global mission to convert the whole world to their faiths. Since Hindu Dharma accepted the validity of all faiths, it could not deny that validity and legitimacy to the Semitic faiths also, despite the fact that they denied not just validity to Hindu dharma, but also theologically denied it the right to exist as a religion.

With these structural weaknesses arising out of its inclusiveness, the adherents of Hindu Dharma evolved over centuries a facet of Hindu Dharma that responded to the onslaught of others; that is how the kinetic form of Hindu Dharma, namely Hindutva, was born. The entire freedom movement was in substance powered by the implicit kinetics of Hindutva.

But free and Independent India, which was hijacked by those who believed in the secularism practised in Christendom, turned the secular Indian allergic to Hindu Dharma. This distortion confounded the mind and polity of India for over four decades.

The Ayodhya movement evolved as a corrective to this distortion and brought balance to the polity of India. Now the kinetic form of Hindu Dharma, Hindutva, is the mainline thought despite the fact that the political idiom of India remains secularist; but the secularism that was practised for the first four decades is not the secularism that is being practiced now. What was once understood as ‘dharmanirapekshata’ or neutrality of the state towards religious faith, which approximated to the Christendom’s view of secularism, is now recognised as ‘sarvapantha samabhava’ or equal protection to all religions, which is the very essence of Hindu Dharma. So the kinetic form of Hindu Dharma, that is Hindutva, has forced a reinterpretation of secularism to make it consistent with the Hindu Dharma.

[acharya]

Spare Us These Hindu-Sympathisers
The Weekend Observer, January 31, 1998
Spare Us These Hindu-Sympathisers
J. K. Bajaj and M. D. Srinivas
------------------------------------
Review of
Bharatiya Janata Party
vis-à-vis Hindu Resurgence
by Koenraad Elst
Published by Voice of India
pp. 177. Rs. 90
-------------------------------------
We have got into the habit of looking at ourselves and the world from other’s perspective. Few of us have dared to see things in the light of our own self-interest and our own understanding of man and the universe. Shri Ram Swarup and Shri Sita Ram Goel are amongst the rare Indian scholars and public figures who have tried to do just that. And they have not done it merely as an academic exercise for themselves; instead, having looked at the world from an Indian perspective, they have tried to educate Indians about what they have seen. They have told us about the essential nature of the alien religions and ideologies with which we are surrounded, and some of which have taken root in India. They have shown us how these religions and ideologies militate against the essential Indian ways of comprehending and living in the world.

Later, in the early 1980’s, they started “Voice of India”, an intellectual organization aimed at, as they put it, “providing an ideological defense of Hindu society and culture through a series of publications”. And since then they have published a number of books, explaining the nature and practice of Hindu thought, and that of Islam and Christianity. They have continuously meditated on defending the essence of Hinduism, from both the ignorance of Hindus themselves and the designs of alien religions and cultures.

Theirs is indeed a stupendous effort. To think seriously about Indian religion, culture and civilization and about ways of defending it against alien incursions at a time when most of thinking India had decided to forget about herself and to learn the new secular ways of the modern West, required extraordinary courage and commitment. Many of the books that they have written during this period offer an enlightening experience of the immense depth of Indian thought, and about the immensity of the effort mounted by Islam and Christianity to subdue the Indian way of thinking and being.

Sri Ram Swaroop and Sri Sita Ram Goel have been proposing a considered approach of their own to these questions. And it is probably true that the answers they have proposed and the dangers that they have pointed out have not been adequately addressed by those who ought to be concerned about such issues. Being the elders of our society, they indeed have the right to be angry and even to rebuke the present day Hindus for being careless and lazy.
http://www.cpsindia.org/art_symp.html

[Bharatvarsh]

I read the whole review and I disagree with some points of the author which I will highlight below:

"Thus he makes fun of the principle of non-violence, as practiced by Indians in general and Mahatma Gandhi in particular, and tells us that the ahimsa that classical Indian texts talk about is something else than what Indians have understood. He claims that even Mahatma Gandhi did not understand what that ahimsa meant, and what he practiced in the name of ahimsa was “a morbid kind of personal asceticism” and “passive masochism”.

He is absolutely right, ahimsa has been perverted to such a level today that Hindus are not even willing to defend themselves in the name of ahimsa and Gandhi greatly contributed to this perversion. The Gita does not ask us to sing and dance while our women are being raped (like Gandhi advised Hindus to do) it asks us to perform our duty, the highest duty of a person is to uphold Dharma not ahimsa.

"Mahatma Gandhi in fact comes for heavy abuse at the hands of Mr. Elst; he makes the term “Gandhian” sound like an abuse, and devotes two chapters on expounding how the Sangh Parivar has gotten into error by trying to follow Gandhi. Here he also tells us that the ambivalence of Mahatma Gandhi, and perhaps of much of Indian society, about modern technology and science, was decidedly un-Hindu, and Gandhiji had got “his retro-mania from Christian romantics like Thoreau and Tolstoy”.

He is absolutely right again, Gandhi's philosophy has screwed us over and caused us to lose 30% of our land and millions of Hindu and Sikh lives. There is nothing rational about Gandhian nonviolence, it's essentially a suicidal policy which will cost us dearly if we don't discard it, Gandhi as Elst said got most of his beliefs after being influenced by Tolstoy and Christianity. If anyone has any doubt they can read the following article:

http://www.sulekha.com/printer.asp?ctid=2000&cid=305975

"He even manages to accuse Gandhiji of being politically ignorant and hints that the Mahatma might have been seeking medals of loyalty from the British. In the process, he betrays lack of real acquaintance with Indian history"

Yet again he is right about Gandhi's ignorance about politics, we can just see this from the fact that Gandhi supported Khilafat movement and giving 50 crores to Pakis after they invaded Kashmir.

Atleast Elst for all his patronising attitude doesn't go around making false claims like Islam being a religion of peace like the Sangh Parivar and BJP do, he speaks the truth about Islam without mincing words. He could have followed the current anti hindu trend and followed the marxist line of history which would have got him a nice academic position but he chose to write truthful history (something even Hindus refuse to do) which i appreciate.

All that said, i agree that there is a patronising attitude from even pro hindu westerners which they could cut out of their writings, but most of the blame lies with us Hindus who refuse to face truth about Islam and Christianity after all these years of slavery (which is what causes westerners to adopt this patronising attitude).

[Guest]

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IndianCivili...n/message/76072

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->From: "ewynants" <ewynants@...>
Date: Wed Jun 8, 2005  10:34 am
Subject: Savarkar;  ewynants
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A question, which forms part of the title of Savarkar's 1923 work, is
at the heart of ideas of Hindu nationalism. It is a question that may
be related directly to those processes of objectification we have
noted above associated with the development of Hinduism. Indeed, the
difficulties experienced by elites in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century in conceptualising Hinduism as a religion, and the
tensions that subsequently emerged, were highly influential in the
development of major lines of Hindu nationalist thought. This is
because these were, in the absence of any theological coherence,
debates about the parameters of Hinduism as a social phenomenon. Where
one drew the boundaries of Hinduism and how its shape was articulated,
formed key underlying questions in the contest over whether and how
the religion needed to be `reformed' or `regenerated'. Two broad
patterns of response emerged: one which sought to articulate the idea
of Hinduism through the restructuring of society, as exemplified by
some elements within the Arya Samaj; and one which sought to
articulate the idea of Hinduism through the consolidation of the
existing structures of society, emphasising the `organic' unity of the
component parts.

Savarkar answers his own question by emphasising and extending the
latter response. Hindutva/Who is a Hindu? constructs a notion of Hindu
nationality that is catholic, embracing a broad range of religious and
cultural systems. This catholicity is characteristic of the spiritual,
universalist approach to Hinduism and Hindu culture developed in the
nineteenth century by figures such as Vivekananda. At the same time,
however, Savarkar's notion works obsessively on the boundaries of this
range, producing some formulaic models through which an individual or
a group may be identified as Hindu or not. There is, for example, the
widely recognised formula of pitribhum-punyabhum (fatherland-holy
land) (Savarkar Hindutva/Who is a Hindu? Bombay: 1989: 111). Whoever
can identify India as both may be considered as Hindu. In consonance
with this formula, he develops the idea of rashtrayat=sanskriti
(nation-race-culture), as components of Hinduness (Savarkar 1989:
116). Identification with the Hindu race and nation is encompassed by
the recognition of pitribhum; whereas identification with culture is
encompassed by the recognition of punyabhum. On this reckoning,
Savarkar's key social exclusions are of Muslims and Christians, in
that they locate their holy land, their cultural identity, outside
India. This formulaic approach has proven to be remarkably resilient,
turning up in later Hindu nationalist works, although not always
attributed to Savarkar.

Golwalkar develops a similar approach in We, Or Our Nationhood
Defined. He developed a formula based around what he terms the `famous
five unities' (We or Our Nation Defined, Nagpur: Bharat Prakashan
1944: 18) of territory, race, religion, culture and language. These
may be related to the Savarkian formula of pitribhum (territory, race)
- punyabhum (religion, culture, language), and they follow the same
pattern of emphasising a broad, catholic approach to cultural and
religious iden­tity, while identifying exclusions in a quite
uncompromising manner. Golwalkar also identifies Muslims and
Christians as key exclusions, although he moves on to encompass
communists as anti-national or an `internal threat' (Golwalkar Bunch
of Thoughts, Bangalore: Vikram Prakashan 1966: 187ff.). This reflects
a developing concern, in the immediate pre- and post-Independence era,
with the strength of the left in Indian politics.

The quality of inclusion and exclusion formulas identifying Hinduness
forms the basis for a consistent area of Hindu nationalist action:
resisting conversion. The critical exclusions exemplified in the
pitribhumpunyabhum formula mean that conversion to Islam or
Christianity amounts to a process of 'de-nationalisation'. Indeed,
this term was used by the RSS organiser, Kishore Kant, to describe the
activities of Christian missionaries in northeastern states during the
1990s (The Asian Age 1998: 1 January). At the same time, there has
always been recognition of the vulnerability of certain groups to the
`threat' of conversion. These are principally low caste and tribal
groups, those who exist on the fuzzy margins of Hinduness - in a way
that Savarkar would have regarded as anathema - and who suffer
oppression precisely because of their status within Hindu society
(Zavos Conversion and the assertive margirts: an analysis of Hindu
nationalist discourse and the recent attacks on Indian Christians',
South Asia, 24(2):73-89. 2001).

The success of conversion campaigns among low caste or tribal groups,
then, appears both as an indication of the fragility of Hindu society,
and a confirmation of fears about the erosion of Hindu identity. As
such, resisting conversion has always been a key concern of Hindu
nationalism because it operates as a means of affirming and
consolidating the idea of a broad notion of Hindu identity, on the
basis of the pitribhum-punyabhum and other associated formulas.





(ii) Hinduness - a question of culture

In a rather paradoxical fashion, we can see that as well as
rationalising exclusion, the formulaic approach is designed to
encompass a broad range of traditions, including such historically
resistant traditions as Buddhism and Jainism. Savarkar is able to do
this because he begins with the idea that Hinduness - or Hindutva as
he coins it - is not so much a reli­gious as a cultural signifier,
based on an identified continuity of blood in the Hindu `race'.
`Hinduism,' he says, `is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of
Hindutva' (1989: 3). Through this distinction, Savarkar is able to go
on to construct a grand, catholic vision of Hindu identity as diverse,
yet unthreatened by that diversity. The diversity itself is perceived
as characteristic of Hindu culture.

As a model of cultural development, we can relate this idea to some
classic accounts of Indian syncretism and tolerant, such as Jawaharlal
Nehru's Discovery of India. Nehru notes that `the mind of India' has
been occupied for millennia by `some kind of a dream of unity'. Within
this idea of unity, he states that `the widest tolerance of belief and
custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even
encouraged' (1985: 62). Of course, Nehru is insistent on embracing
Muslim and Christian communities within this model, but the premise of
`unity in diversity' is similar to that of Savarkar. The latter's
ideas about Hindu culture, then, to a certain extent reflect a broader
discourse about the Indian nation.

Interestingly, Golwalkar almost reverses Savarkar's formulation of the
relationship between Hinduism and Hinduness. He claims that culture is
`but a product of our all-comprehensive Religion, a part of its body
and not distinguishable from it' (1944: 22). This difference is partly
explained by the use of contrasting conceptions of religion. Savarkar
works with a narrow definition of religion, based on the idea of
individual commitment and spiritual fulfilment. Golwalkar works with a
different kind of concept altogether, a broad, all-encompassing
concept, which provides a kind of framework for belief, culture and
social organisation. Indeed, Golwalkar criticises the narrow
conception of religion in We or Our Nationhood Defined. It is possible
that this critique is aimed at Savarkar, the `secular Hindu';
certainly there is a reverse echo of Savarkar's statement quoted
above, when Golwalkar states that the individual spiritual fulfilment
view is `but a fractional part of Religion' (1944: 23).

Golwalkar's conception of religion is rather as a broad framework,
which `by regulating society in all its functions, makes room for all
individual idiosyncrasies, and provides suitable ways and means for
all sorts of mental frames to adapt, and evolve' (1944: 23).
Golwalkar, then, is equally able to encompass diversity in the
tradition, by broadening the idea of religion in the context of India
and articulating it as `the elastic frame­work of our dharma' (1966:
101). It is this very elasticity, he goes on, which operates to
`protect and maintain the integrity of our people', as various sects
had emerged to counter threats to the framework; Sikhism, for example,
`came into being to contain the spread of Islam in Punjab' (1966:
103). This is highly reminiscent of Savarkar's idea of diversity as a
defining feature of Hindu culture.

Ultimately, both Savarkar and Golwalkar produce approaches that
attempt to resolite the threat posed by doctrinal diversity and
fragmentation within Hindu identity by reference to `framework' ideas,
which endorse this diversity as archetypal. This approach, following
Savarkar's articulation, has emerged in contemporary Hindu nationalism
as a valorisation of Hindu culture; indeed, despite the tension noted
between Savarkar and the Sangh Parivar, the idea of Hindutva has been
fully adopted and is used freely in Sangh literature (although again,
it is rarely attributed to Savarkar).

What, though, characterises this framework of Hindu culture or
Hinduty*Both Savarkar and Golwalkar locate the idea of Hinduness by
reference to history. Even taking into account its diversity,
Hinduness is rooted in Aryan civilisation and the establishment of the
Vedic tradition. According to Savarkar, there was a gradual expansion
of Aryan influence, leading eventually to the religious, cultural and
political unification of the subcontinent under Lord Ram (1989: 11-12).

These then followed periods of relative Hindu and Buddhist ascendancy,
which in turn were superseded by the `human sahara' of Muslim
incursion, the beginning of a long period of struggle to maintain
Hindu identity in the face of `foreign invasion' (1989: 42-6). This
interpretation of history was based on some familiar elements of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Hindu worldviews. The idea of the
Vedic civilisation of the Aryans was used as a reference point by a
whole host of movements and individuals involved in conceptualising
Indian religion and society (e.g. Dayananda, Jotiba Phule); Ram Rajya
also had a distinctive resonance as indicative of perfect governance
and a harmonious society (e.g. Gandhi). And the idea of `Muslim' rule
creating a decisive break in Indian history was most familiar, and had
been institutionalised in James Mill's influential early
nineteenth-century History of British India (1817). There is nothing
distinctive, then, in the use of these ideas to characterise the
quality of Hinduness. They serve again to emphasise the embeddedness
of the Hindu nationalist approach in developing ideas about Indian
culture during the first half of the twen­tieth century.

This version of history is nevertheless used as the basis for the
development of some further key elements of Hinduness as Indian
culture. Perhaps most significant is the valorisation of the geography
of India.' This key feature is clearly indicated by the emphasis on
the land in Savarkar's pitribhum-punyabhum formula. He writes:

Yes, this Bharat bhumi, this land of ours that stretches from Sindhu
to Sindhu is our Punyabhumi, for it was in this land that the Founders
of our faith and the seers to whom `Veda' the Knowledge was revealed,
from Vaidik seers to Dayananda, from Jina to Mahavir, from Buddha to
Nagasen, from Nanak to Govind, from Banda to Basava, from Chakradhar
to Chaitanya, from Ramdas to Rammohun, our Gurus and Godmen were born
and bred. The very dust of its paths echoes the footfalls of our
Prophets and Gurus.

(Savarkar 1989: 112)

Here, Savarkar articulates archetypal diversity as indicative of
Hinduness through the land itself - the dust of its paths is
representative of Hindu culture. Golwalkar, who delineates Bharat as
`a land with divinity ingrained in every speck of its dust ... the
holiest of the holy, the centre of our utmost devotion' (1966: 86),
reiterates this kind of reverential approach. Again, this reverence is
present in a broader dlourse on the Indian nation during this period.
Varshney has used the example of Jawaharlal Nehru's will, in which he
expresses a desire for some of his ashes to be thrown into the Ganga,
because that river has been `a symbol of India's age-long culture and
civilization, ever-changing, ever-flowing, and yet ever the same
Ganga' (Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India,
New Haven: Yale University Press. 2002: 63).

Varshney makes a distinction between Nehru's view of the river, and
that encompassed by Hindu nationalism, on the basis that Nehru's
vision of sacred geography was `metaphorical', rather than `literal'.
The quality of this distinction is not clear, particularly since he
goes on to say that the `emotions and attachment generated by the
geography were equally intense' (2002: 63). Rather than emphasising
difference, we can see here again the way in which Hindu nationalist
thought has emerged within a broader complex of ideas about the
emerging nation, and that the idea of polarisation between these ideas
is apparently untenable.

One further aspect of Hinduness as Indian culture needs emphasising at
this point. This is the focus on Ram and Sita, the heroes of the
Ramayana, as archetypal Indians. There has been a fair amount of work
in recent years on the developing ways in which these figures have
been represented in art, film and other media. The emphasis of this
work has been on the representation of Ram as a martial hero,
defending the honour of Hinduism with the aid of a mighty bow (Kapur
1993). Sita has operated increasingly as the site of that defence, a
meek and pure individual who needs protection from violation (Basu
`Feminism inverted: the gender imagery and real women of Hindu
nationalism', in T. Sarkar and U. Butalia (eds) Women and the Hindu
Right: A Colection of Essays, New Delhi: Kali for Women1995: 158-80.).
In the context of Hindutva, these figures are national, rather than
religious. Hence, the desire in recent times to build a temple at the
proclaimed `birthplace' of Ram in Ayodhya is perceived as a national
project, and resistance to this project is interpreted as
anti-national, regardless of your religious persuasion.

This valorisation of Ram and Sita is indicative of a wider point on
the idea of Hinduness or Hindutva. It denotes a set of ideas that is
consciously articulated as cultural, rather than religious, and yet
there is constant slippage into what we might perceive as more clearly
religious territory. On the one hand, this appears to be a reflection
of slippage in the original pitribhumi-punyabhumi formulation, which
claims to include on the basis of cultural space, but clearly excludes
on the basis of religious identity. On the other hand, it is also a
reflection of the problematic identification of Hindu nationalism as
religious nationalism, if religion is defined as a discrete category,
in the manner critiqued by Golwalkar as noted above. To an extent,
this is a set of ideas that exists in broader discursive fields than
those signified by such a category.





(iii) Sangathan -ordering society

Nothing demonstrates this latter point more clearly than what has
emerged as the most influential organisation propagating Hindu
nationalism during the twentieth century: the RSS. As is well
documented, the Sangh emerged in the mid-1920s with specific cultural
objectives. It was established in Nagpur in Central Provinces, a city
with a minimal Muslim minority, and its first formal public action was
at the Ram Navami festival at nearby Ramtek. The Sangh volunteers, led
by the founder of the organisation Dr. KB. Hedgewar, engaged in a form
of crowd control, enforcing queues, providing drinking water, and
keeping an eye on commercial activity at the festival, among other tasks.

This first public action is interesting because it exemplifies two
significant features of Hindu nationalist thought. First, as we have
just noted, Ram was an important cultural symbol of the nascent Hindu
nation. Here was an intervention in a festival dedicated to Ram.
However, the Sangh was apparently not interested in the form of
religious practice articulated at the mela (festival); rather, it
pursued the objective of establishing a sense of order within this
environment. Not only does this reiterate the idea of the focus on Ram
as a cultural, rather than an explicitly religious symbol, it also
points us towards the second significant feature: the estab­lishment
of a sense of order, discipline and organisation in Hindu social and
cultural relations. This idea, expressed in Hindi as sangathan, has
emerged as a fundamental Hindu nationalist concern.

The specific trajectory of this concern with discipline and
organisation. Sangathan is significant because it is directed at the
organisation of society. A Hindu nationalist vision of the Hindu
nation is intim­ately bound up with the progressive realisation of a
society which operates harmoniously, in an integrated fashion. Most
generally, this vision has been articulated as a kind of organicist
approach: society operates like a body, each component part having its
own valuable function. Golwalkar comments:

All the organs, though apparently of diverse forms, work for the
welfare of the body and thus subscribe to its strength and growth.
Likewise is the case with society. An evolved society, for the proper
functioning of various duties, develops a multitude of diverse
functional groups. Our old social order laid down a specific duty for
each group and guided all the individuals and groups in their natural
line of evolution just as the intellect directs the activities of the
innumerable parts of the body.(1966: 100)

The ideal Hindu, then, knows his place in this organism. Fulfilling
one's function in the organism, in a disciplined and orderly manner,
is each individual's dharmic duty. Members of thAangh organisation -
to a certain extent the swayamsevaks (volunteers), but more
specifically the pracharaks (full-time workers) - act both as a
vanguard working to bring this society into being, and as examples of
how to conduct oneself in accordance with dharma. In fact, the Sangh
itself has been described as a model for Hindu society; the RSS
ideologue M.G. Vaidya, for example, has described the Sangh as `not an
organization in society, but of society' (Zavos 2000: 196).

Such a vision, of course, entails addressing the issue of caste, and
Hindu nationalism is rather ambivalent on this issue. At times, a
fullfledged defence of the caste system has been articulated; at
others, a `return' to varnashrama dharma5 is advocated; at others, the
Sangh's vision is perceived as the eradication of caste altogether. A
consistent element in this position, however, is a non-confrontational
approach to established caste structures. Any transformation of caste
structure is perceived as occurring through `organic' development,
rather than as requiring radical change. This approach reflects the
development of Hindu nationalist thought in high caste, middle class
social groups, and explains the strong antipathy to any forms of
independent low caste assertion (Zavos Conversion and the assertive
margins: an analysis of Hindu nationalist discourse and the recent
attacks on Indian Christians', South Asia, 24(2):73-89.2001).

This refers us back, of course, to the concerns noted earlier over the
shape of Hinduness in the modern world. The organisation of society
emerges as a key means of articulating this shape. As an institution,
the RSS has consistently focused on this objective and rationalised
its actions in relation to it. Indeed, one way of understanding the
Sangh Parivar is as a project to establish a focused presence within
the various spaces of society, with the objective of demonstrating the
Sangh's vision of organisation in microcosm and in relation to
specific issues. Politics and the state may be regarded as one of the
identified spaces.

(iv) Integral humanism - the politics of social order

The argument that politics must be seen as a component space within
the Hindu nationalist conception of society is exemplified by the idea
of integral humanism. This term enjoys a prominent profile in the
BJP's main website (along with the notion of Hindutva), and it refers
to a set of ideas developed in lie 1950s and 1960s by Deendayal
Upadhyaya.6

Upadhyaya was an RSS pracharak who had been influential in the
Bharatiya Jana Sangh since it was established in 1951 as the Sangh
Parivar's first venture into the world of post-Independence politics.
Integral humanism was fully articulated as a political programme in
1965. In a series of lectures, Upadhyaya sought to pitch this
programme into what he perceived as a sea of cynicism and opportunism
in politics. `Parties and politicians have neither principles nor aims
nor a standard code of conduct,' he opined. In particular, he pointed
to Congress as lacking any kind of ideological coherence. `If there
can be a magic box which contains a cobra and a mongoose,' he
continues, `it is Congress' (1965: Ch. 1).

The set of ideas which he went on to develop are based around a series
of key themes. First, the need to articulate specifically Indian
answers to modern problems (through, for example, promoting swadeshi
and small scale industry); second, the need for politics to be
practised in consonance with the chiti (specific essence) of the Hindu
nation; and lastly, the need to sustain the `natural' balance between
the individual and different institutions in society - institutions
like the family, caste and the state - by acting in accordance with
principles of dharma. This set of themes has been interpreted as an
incorporation of Gandhian idioms into Hindu nationalist politics, in
order to enhance the potential for forging alliances with other
anti-Congress forces, after twenty years of total domination of the
polity by that party. Integral humanism, then, may be interpreted as a
means of increasing the possibilities of power. As it so happens, new
possibilities were created in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
particularly in association with the Gandhian political leader, J.P.
Narayan. The involvement of Hindu nationalist forces in Narayan's
anti-Indira agitations undoubtedly gave the Jana Sangh the credibility
to take a share in power in the post-Emergency Janata Party coalition
government . It is quite possible, then, to view this key element of
Hindu nationalist ideology in terms of electoral strategy, a resolve
to bid for power in the late 1960s. A similar interpretation of the
VHP strategy around the issue of the Babri Masjid in the 1980s is also
well established (Jaffrelot The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian
Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building,
Implantation and Mobilisation (with Special Reference to Central
India), London: Hurst & Company. 1996). In these interpretations,
Hindu nationalism as ideology is framed to support the primary
interest of an organisation or set of organisations in state power.

The trajectories of Hindu nationalist thought discussed so far in this
chapter, however, must lead us to consider a different kind of
interpretation in relation to integral humanism. In particular,
Upadhyaya's ideas appear to follow the logic of the emphasis on the
organisation of society as a principal objective. This may be seen in
the key role he gave to the concept of dharma (duty) in his lectures.
Dharma, that is, in the same sense noted in relation to the Hindu
nationalist vision of society: a harmonious, integrated system in
which each individual and group has a specific function or duty.
Although Upadhyaya presents dharma as part of an integrated regulation
of human activity based on purushartha (the four universal objectives
of humanity), in his discussion he demonstrates this integration by
referring each objective (and in particular the `worldly', political
objectives of artha (gain) and kama (pleasure) to dharma. 'Dharma,' he
says, `defines a set of rules to regulate the social activity, Artha
and Kama, so as to progress in an integral and harmonious way, and
attain not only Kama and Artha but also Moksha eventually . Without
reference to dharma, then, other objectives may not be reached.

The invocation of dharma indicates a further articulation of the idea
of order or organisation of society as central to a Wdu nationalist
world­view. Upadhyaya interprets dharma as a kind of dynamic network
of inter­related regulations by which life should be led. It is these
regulations that govern social relations. Upadhyaya seeks authority
from the Mahabharata to argue that in the kritayuga (the first of the
four eras of the world), `there was no state or king. Society was
sustained and protected mutually by practicing dharma' (1965: Ch. 3).
In subsequent yugas (epochs), he explains, `disorganisation came into
existence', and as a result, the state was introduced as an additional
form of regulation, but the state was only ever legitimate if it
operated in accordance with dharma. The primacy of society, then, is
clear here, and the state exists as an institution - `an important
one, but not above all other' (1965: Ch. 3) - which is framed and
governed by this idea.

This approach locates integral humanism within the context of
developing Hindu nationalist ideas focused primarily on the
transformation of society, rather than viewing it as an
instrumentalist appropriation of Gandhian idioms designed to increase
the possibility of power. There is cer­tainly evidence of the
appropriation of Gandhian idioms, if not ideas, in Upadhyaya's
lectures, but what this demonstrates primarily is interaction in ideas
about the development of society. I have argued elsewhere that
Gandhian idioms, ideas, and strategies were quite significant in the
articu­lation of Hindu nationalism in the 1920s (Zav6s 2000: 189-91).
This significance was not because of instrumentalist appropriation, or
indeed because Gandhi was a surrogate Hindu nationalist. Rather,
Gandhian ideas and Hindu nationalist ideas developed in the same
discursive spaces, drawing on a similar range of ideas about and
experiences of history, culture and political mobilisation.

Whether in the 1920s or the 1950s, the dialogue between Gandhian and
Hindu nationalist ideas has to be viewed as a straightforward element
of the development of ideological forms. These are, after all,
perspectives on the world which exist primarily in what Stuart Hall
has called the `mental frameworks' of people, both individually and in
groups. These individuals and groups exist in time and space, and they
for­mulate their `mental frameworks' in accordance with the
`languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought and systems
of representation' which are available to them. In this context, the
blending of ideological forms, the borrowing of idioms and symbols,
the adaptation of existing ideas has to be perceived as the way in
which meaning is constructed.

The structure of Indian politics, with its sharp division between the
secular and the communal, does not help us to recognise this point.





Recognising the shapes of Hindu nationalism

A key conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that Hindu
nationalist ideas about identity, culture and politics draw on and to
some extent reflect the construction of ideas about the Indian nation
and its cultural heritage in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Nevertheless, I have suggested that the use of formulas and
explicit religious symbols to draw the boundaries of national identity
may be construed as distinctive. Two lines of thought - the obsessive
concern with conversion and the aggressive asser­tion of ownership
over sites projected as sacred - are indicative of this distinctiveness.

Yet even here, there is a degree of embeddedness in broader fields of
thought. Perhaps the clearest post-independence example of this point
is the restoration of the Somnath temple in 1947/8. This was carried
out under the auspices of an INC government, with the Home Minister
Sardar Patel noting that `the restoration of the idols would be a
point of honour and sentiment with the Hindu public' Jaffrelot 1996:
84). INC involvement in this project is often perceived as indicative
of the presence of `Hindu traditionalists' in the party, a group who
are distinguished from Hindu nationalists through the comparative
weakness of their ideological commitment, or through their primary
concern for the promotion of culture rather than opposition to the
other (both ideas are expressed in Jaffrelot 1996: 83-4). This
distinction is, I feel, rather over-wrought. The ideas underpinning
the approach of Patel and others in the INC during this period are
clearly informed by the same kind of concern for Hinduness overrun by
Muslim `invaders' as those noted earlier as indicative of Hindu
nationalism. Again, we get an indication of the fuzzy boundaries of
this field of thought, rather than its clear distinctiveness from
Congress nationalism.

Conversion issues also indicate a broader reach for ideas associated
with Hindu nationalism than the formal organisations of the Sangh
Parivar. The conversion of some Dalits to Islam in Meenakshipuram in
1981 is a good example of this, in that the concerns expressed about
this event were far broader than those generated by the Sangh.
Jaffrelot notes that `leading articles in newspapers not known for
their support of Hindu nationalism suggested that the converts had
been paid sums of money', and that the whole process had been
sponsored by rich Arab nations inspired by pan-Islamism (1996: 341).
This view was also taken by certain sections of the INC Government,
and the Indian Express published a poll revealing that as many as 78
per cent of north Indian urban Hindus wanted the government to ban
conversions in the wake of Meenakshipuram (Jaffrelot 1996: 341). Such
figures, of course, need to be taken with a pinch of salt, but these
responses do indicate again a degree of embeddedness of some key ideas
associated with Hindu nationalism in Indian political life. The shapes
of Hindu nationalism, in this sense, are not The shapes of Hindu
nationalism necessarily constrained by the limits of the Sang-Parivar
and other overtly Hindu nationalist organisations.

A further conclusion concerns the focus on society rather than the
state, through the realisation of correct dharma. Formal politics and
the control of the state is significant, but it needs to be placed
within the context of this broader focus, which conceptualises society
as a range of segmented areas and `functional groups', as Golwalkar
would have it. This point is graphically demonstrated by the network
of organisations that constitute the Sangh Parivar. These
organisations focus on a variety of issues, from tribal welfare to
education to labour relations, and this is an expanding network across
areas of social and cultural life.

The RSS - the `parent organisation' - maintains a loose, rather
infor­mal sense of control over the Sangh network. The current
sarsanghchalak (leader) of the RSS, KS. Sudarshan, explained the
relationship in a recent interview. `For the overall development of
society', full time RSS workers are encouraged to enter `different
fields according to their abilities'. Their general objective is
common: `to try to find solutions to prob­lems in those assigned
areas, under the Hindutva ideology'. Although the organisations are
independent, Sudarshan continues, the RSS maintains a guiding
relationship with its workers, who remain swayamsevaks (RSS cadre)
(Outlook 2003: 30 June). It is well known, for example, that the Prime
Minister and his deputy during the NDA's tenure, A.B. Vajpayee and L.K
Advani, have remained as swayamsevaks. Other key figures in the BJP,
for example, Gopinath Munde and Murli Manohar Joshi, have also
followed this path. Key leaders in the VHP, such as the international
secretary, Ashok Singhal, are also swayamsevaks, as are other key
Sangh figures such as the leader of the Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM, an
affiliate of the RSS set up in 1992 to oppose economic
liberalisation), Dattopant Thengadi.
Joshi and Singhal demonstrate the route taken by ambitious
swayamsevaks. Joshi joined the RSS, at the age of 10, in 1944. While
pursuing academic studies, which culminated in a PhD in Spectroscopy
from Allahabad University, he became increasingly involved in the
Sangh's student organisation, the ABVP, achieving the status of
General Secretary of this organisation in the early 1950s. In 1957, he
joined the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and enjoyed increasing prominence in
the Uttar Pradesh hierarchy of this organisation; before becoming
General Secretary of the BJP in the 1980s, President in the early
1990s, and a key cabinet minister in Vajpayee's admin­istration, first
as Home Minister, then taking charge of three ministries: Human
Resources Development (including education), Science and Technology
and Ocean Development. It is in the HRD ministry where he has really
made his mark, instigating policy initiatives in the education sector,
which demonstrate the Sangh's desire to shape national consciousness.7

Singhal also hails from Uttar Pradesh, having been born in Allahabad
in 1927. He also pursued a technical education, achieving a BSc from
Benares Hindu University in Metallurgical Engineering. He joined the
RSS as a swayamsevak, before becoming a pracharak (full-time worker),
and eventually being assigned to the VHP in 1980. At this dynamic
period of the organisation's history, Singhal rose quickly to become
its general secretary in 1986. Singhal later indicated the role the
RSS had to play in the development of different areas of social life
by calling them `ascetics in the real sense'. He identified `service'
as `the key word of our culture, and Sangh's swayamsevaks are symbols
of service. Today in all spheres of activity such workers are needed'
(cited in Katju Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics, Hyderabad:
Orient Longman. 2003: 68).

The complexity of the Sangh network has increased over time, as new
institutional layers are created. For example, the VHP established the
Bajrang Dal, initially as a sort of youth wing. Over time, the Bajrang
Dal has developed into a kind of confrontational front for the VHP,
providing foot soldiers in key campaigns such as that over the Ram
temple in Ayodhya. The Bajrang Dal also operates as a continuous
activist presence in local situations, providing its own version of
'socio-religious policing' to guard the honour of local Hindu girls,
protect local cattle and local temples, and so on (Katju 2003: 52).
Likewise, the SJM is another organisation which has gone on to develop
more focused organisations, such as the Centre for Bharatiya Marketing
and Development and the Swadeshi Vichar Kendra.'

Given these developing, dynamic networks, it is not surprising that
the Sangh has developed a diversity of approaches to the idea of
`finding solu­tions to problems' using 'Hindutva ideology'. Nothing
has brought this diversity into focus more than the period of NDA
rule. The BJP's perceived inability to find the kind of solutions
demanded by different Sangh organisations has induced sharp criticism.
Ashok Singhal, for example, commented in 2003 that 'Atal and Advani
have backstabbed the VHP' because of the government's reticence over
temple construction in Ayodhya (Free Press journal 2003). Also in
2003, national convenor of the SJM, Muralidhar Rao, described the
Vaj­payee government's economic policies as `dubious, deviant,
diluted', particularly in relation to disinvestment and the World
Trade Organisation (Telegraph (Calcutta) 2003). As a result of this
divergence, the BJP was not able to rely fully on the grassroots cadre
of other Sangh organisations during the 2004 general election
campaign. At the BJP's National Executive meeting held in July 2004 to
review election performance, L.K. Advani stated that there had been `a
sense of alienation in our Parivar and a weakening of the emotional
bond with our core constituency' .

As if to reinforce this point organisations such as the SJM and the
VHP have shed few tears at the fall of the NDA Government. Muralidhar
Rao has gone so far as to welcome the Common Minimum Programme of the
incoming INC-led United Progressive Alliance, commenting that the NDA
had `lost touch with the masses' . It appears from this evidence,
then, that the constraints of coalition government have caused a
fracturing - and therefore weakening - of Hindu nationalism as a
political force.

The arguments presented here, however, suggest that any assessment of
the influence of Hindu nationalism in political terms needs to
recognise that this is a set of ideas which is located in a much
broader space than that represented by the BJP. Because they overlap
and blend with other key discourses on Indian society, culture and
identity, these are ideas which are manifested in a wide range of
political actions and articulations. In addition, the focus identified
here on social relations and social devel­opment demands a broader
understanding of what constitutes politics. For example, in tribal
areas of states such as Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, the Sangh affiliate
Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad has been increasingly active, reshaping tribal
religious practices within a Hindu framework (Frontline 2004b). In the
arena of education, the Sangh now has a network of schools, many run
by the Vidya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Shiksha Sansthan. The Vidya
Bharati system supervises over 18,000 schools across India, with 1.8
million students and 80,000 teachers focusing on Sanskrit, moral and
spiritual education, yoga and physical development.' The political
impact of Hindu nationalism really needs to be measured in terms of
its continu­ing activism in such arenas, where politics is manifested
not in terms of formal state institutions, but as a contest for power
in a network of localised institutions and practices (Zavos et al.
`Deconstructing the nation: politics and cultural mobilization in
India', in J. Zavos, A. Wyatt and V. Hewitt (eds) Politics of Cultural
Mobilization in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 1-16. 2004:
3).

An approach which focuses on the political impact of organisations
such as Vidya Bharati can also help us to locate Hindu nationalism in
the context of government. It is no coincidence that one of the most
signific­ant areas of policy development during the NDA's tenure has
been in the area of education. From the National Council for
Educational Research and Training (NCERT) to the Indian Council for
Historical Research, Hindu nationalist approaches have been vigorously
promoted; further reshaping ideas about Indian history and society in
a wide range of schools, colleges and universities.10 In order to
recognise Hindu national­ism as a feature of the NDA Government, then,
we need to look particularly at those policy areas, such as education,
which impact on the structure and development of social relations.

Hindu nationalism continues to be an influential force in the
development of worliviews in India, through the interaction and
overlap of ideas as highlighted above, and the vigorous, diversifying
development of Sangh activities through its affiliate organisations.
In the final analysis, the shapes of Hindu nationalism cannot really
be contained in the arena of formal politics. Recognising the impact
of Hindu nationalism means looking beyond this arena, beyond the state
and the immediate problems posed by coalition politics, to the ways in
which its key ideas resonate in the broad spaces of Indian social and
cultural life.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[Guest]

The dispossession of the Hindus


Komal Chheda is one among the hundreds devotees from Mumbai who applied to go for the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra this year. He was told his spouse who was accompanying him would be allotted the same batch.

But like many others he was driven from pillar to post and no one had a moment to listen to him. The staff at the tiny Kailash Manasarovar cell in South Block are rude and unavailable to the pilgrims and the government has chosen to let the Yatra begin without the usual symbolic farewell gesture.

When the BJP-led government was in power at the Centre, some states had started giving subsidies to the Yatra pilgrims, but that too was stopped at least in Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal. Apart from Gujarat and Delhi -- which has continued what Sahib Singh Verma started during his tenure -- the Kailash Yatra has become an apology for the government's secular credentials. It would like to have the Yatra completed as a hush-hush affair.

That is what lies in store for the Hindus in their homeland, at the hands of a terrified, de-Hinduised bureaucracy and political leadership. Finally the man who began a lively debate on pseudo-secularism has certified Jinnah as a secular leader. With this the process of the dispossession of Hindus in India has arrived at a maturing point.


It is obvious that any leader who is visiting the mausoleum of the father of the nation of a host country should be nice and say decent words in his memory. Jinnah could have been justifiably appreciated without getting into the minefield of historically hysterical points.

Hindus wanted a united India; they voted against Partition but Partition did happen. They wanted to retain Kashmir, the land of Maharishi Kashyap and seat of Sharda Vidya, but two-thirds of Kashmir was snatched from them and from what remained, Hindus were driven out, thus dispossessing them of their home and hearth in a truncated, nay, Independent India.

They had three great deities -- or rather three dreams -- in the words of socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia -- Ram, Krishna and Shiva. All the three holy places associated with them, had mosques built over them by the invaders.

After Independence, the Hindus naturally wanted to have their places of worship returned to them as a goodwill gesture by Muslims who otherwise got India partitioned and had no qualms razing mosques for roads and hospitals in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

But not only were they snubbed and humiliated for such a demand, even the greatest of their leaders in politics declared the day of a first Hindu resistance and effort to possess what historically belonged to them, as the saddest day of his life.

The Partition of the motherland and the resultant mayhem was not his saddest day but the day of repossessing a place of great significance to the Hindus became the 'most unfortunate' day for the man whom the world considered a Hindu nationalist leader.

So finally Hindus were dispossessed of their political leadership also, who would speak for them straight and unapologetically.

In comparison, one must salute the contemporary Pakistani leadership for their single-minded missionary zeal to improve relations with India without compromising on their issues. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/rolleyes.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='rolleyes.gif' /><!--endemo--> President Pervez Musharraf visited Rajghat, but didn't say anything about Gandhi's secularism or his struggle to help newly born Pakistan despite facing disapproval from both Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/rolleyes.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='rolleyes.gif' /><!--endemo-->

They remain committed to the theory of an Islamic Pakistan as envisioned by Jinnah, the qaid-e-azam, to make Kashmir a core issues between the two nations, to get the Hurriyat leaders without a passport or visa to Pakistan and declare it an evidence of India's recognition of Kashmir as a disputed territory. They are never -- even in a light 'mood' -- apologetic or sad about Kargil.

Their firebrand leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman visited India and met RSS leaders in Jhandewala, New Delhi, but never spoke a single word in praise of the RSS or its founder Dr Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. He didn't find it necessary to say so for the sake of friendship. He was careful not to express regret on the demolition of hundreds of Hindu temples in Pakistan in the wake of the December 6 demolition of the Babri Masjid and even earlier.

He said all good things, expressed decent gestures, evoked friendly amiable body language -- a smiling and affectionate face -- but not an inch was given on the core issues. The Pakistanis are never apologetic about having a two-tier constitutional arrangement for Hindus and other non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which makes them virtually second class citizens.

It is not necessary to covert to win friendship. Stand up firmly and uncompromisingly on your issues and yet strive for friendship. That alone lasts. The 'converted' can only have pity and a 'protectionist' smile, but not a friendly relationship based on parity. That is the policy which makes Pakistanis a solid block and successful on Kashmir.

Hindus wanted a say in politics and matters of governance as they had borne the brunt of all foreign invasions and barbaric torture for centuries. At last, Somnath was rebuilt and so should be our other places of importance.

<b>But not a single Hindu pilgrim centre, with the sole exception of Vaishnodevi -- that too due to the personal efforts of Jagmohan, then Jammu and Kashmir governor, a non-BJP person though -- was made into an ideal model of a place of worship, even by those who declared themselves the sole repository of all Hindu wisdom and activism.</b>

<b>UP was in their hands and so was Uttaranchal, which had the most revered pilgrim centres like Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri, Yamunotri, Mathura, Vrindavan, Kashi and Ayodhya. Not a single religious township or temple got the attention of the Hindu nationalists.</b>

<b>Gangotri, visited by lakhs from all over the world, does not have power supply even today or a workable telephone connection. Ayodhya, Mathura and Vrindavan are the filthiest towns and its temples remain badly mismanaged under government control. Though they demand that Hindu temples be freed from State control, not a single Hindu nationalist state government has yet started a plan to de-control Hindu temples in their states and make them a 'shining example' of their 'vision, agenda, programme' and all that which gets an entry into their idea of Ram Rajya.</b>

At least now they are not bound by an NDA agenda, as was their alibi for not doing what they didn't want to do. Even though they had always demanded an enquiry into the mysterious deaths of their two great stalwarts, Syama Prasad Mookerji and Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, but once in power they felt shy to do it themselves.

One of their influential leaders in Manipur, who spoke courageously for Hindu issues was shot dead by insurgents and the man who would become home minister later had gone there to offer condolences and led a protest march with a strong demand to have a CBI inquiry in a written recorded statement, but ignored the memorandums of the slain leader's family members to do it, when he could have ordered it with a stroke of his pen.

After a highly pitched struggle of five decades to create a niche for their aspirations, Hindus feel dispossessed of their political clout. They are not a vote bank, but vote as Yadavs and Rajputs and backwards. They are not religiously organised as their so-called leaders have missed the bus and gone into a rhetoric which a normal, common Hindu does not relate to.

<b>They cannot teach their children anything that would make them proud Hindus as the drive to detoxify is primarily aimed at them alone. They are insulted for expressing fears of a decline in their population and their dead are simply not counted though NGOs flourish on an extraordinarily inflated statistics of the riots affecting non-Hindus.</b>

The conversion from Hinduism to other faiths is hailed as a hallmark of secularism and fair governance, but any effort to 'bring back' the converted is opposed as blatant communalism and an affront to minority rights.

Hindus have become so dispossessed of their self pride that an assault on the Shankaracharya, disapproved by the highest court of the land, is seen as something against Brahmins alone and the mastermind behind it celebrates it with an electoral win.

[ramana]

Folks, Please read Savarkar's letters from Andaman before joining the recent debate on LKA and Jinnah. In my reading Savarkar was the following- Scholar of the West and India in that order, he was a well versed in both Hindu scriptures and traditions and the Bible. He was also a historian and an analyst. His insight can be seen from his worry about the formation of Andhra Mahasabha and possible regional tendencies. His sinlge minded goal was the rise of the Indian nation. He was the first o call the 1857 as First War of Independence and drew the right lessons. It was till then called a Mutiny and best a revolt. He termed it a revolution that wanted to change the exisiting British order.

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Savarkar's letters from Andaman <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Where I can find?

[ramana]

June 18th.

[acharya]

Self-Respect’ Marriage Proposal Provokes Hindutva Ire

Yoginder Sikand

The irony cannot be more striking. Known for their fierce opposition to reforms in Hindu law that sought to ameliorate the conditions of Hindu women, Hindutva groups present themselves as ardent champions of Muslim women. The image of Muslim women as oppressed by their men and their religion is central to Hindutva discourse, buttressing the Hidutva-walas’ claim of Islam and Muslims being inherently and unrepentantly ‘obscurantist’ and ‘barbaric’. This explains the hypocritical defence by Hindutva ideologues of Muslim women’s rights, while at the same time the pogroms they unleash lead to the death and rape of Muslim women in their thousands.

While Hindutva ideologues present themselves as saviours of Muslim women from what they describe as the ‘tyranny’ of Islam, they are fiercely opposed to any measures that might threaten Brahminical Hindu patriarchy. Thus, the cover story of the latest issue of Organiser, the RSS’ official English weekly, protesting against a move to reform Hindu marriage, should come as no surprise. Titled, ‘ A Mischievous Proposal to Tinker With Hindu Faith’, and written by a certain R. Balashankar, the article furiously denounces the proposal put forward by the Tamil politician, M. Karunanidhi, leader of the anti-Brahmin Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham, to allow for ‘self-respect’ marriages that do without a mandatory priest, who is generally a Brahmin.

The article refers to a letter sent recently by Karunanidhi to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh demanding an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in order legalise at the all-India level marriages without a priest. Presently, such marriages are recognized only in Tamil Nadu. This demand has been a long-standing one, and was first put forward by E.V.Periyar Ramaswamy Naicker, the pioneer of the anti-Brahmin movement in Tamil Nadu. Periyar was a bitter critic of Brahminical Hinduism, seeing it as a thinly-veiled guise for Aryan, North Indian, ‘upper’ caste Hindu hegemony. He regarded Hinduism as a creation of wily Brahmins to assert their control over the ‘low’ caste majority whom they had reduced to servitude. He believed that the non-Brahmins could effectively challenge Brahmin hegemony only if they developed a sense of self-respect and refused to consider the Brahmins as ‘gods on earth’, a status that the Brahmins claimed for themselves. As part of the comprehensive plan for cultural revolution that Periyar laid out, non-Brahmins would dispense completely with Brahmins to officiate over their religious and social functions. In particular, the use of Brahmins to conduct the marriage of Hindu couples was to be strictly avoided. In this way, non-Brahmins would be able to assert their equality with the Brahmins and would, at the same time, be saved from paying the Brahmins the hefty fees that they charged as ritual specialists. In place of Brahmin-officiated marriage ceremonies, Periyar launched what he called ‘self-respect’ marriages, which were conducted without any priest at all. Unlike the Brahminical marriage, in which the bride is explicitly recognized as subordinate to the husband and is given away as a commodity to him, the ‘self-respect’ marriage was an egalitarian one. In contrast to the Brahminical marriage, the ‘self-respect’ marriage did not entail any dowry.

That the RSS, and the Hindutva brigade as a whole, are simply a new face of Brahminism is well-known. Little wonder, then, that the Organiser spies in Karunanidhi’s proposal for state recognition of ‘self-respect’ marriages throughout India a conspiracy to ‘meddle with Hindu religion’, going so far as to denounce it as ‘promot[ing] atheism by deritualising and de-Hinduising Hindu marriages’. Clearly, it recognizes that marriages that dispense with Hindu priests, mostly Brahmins, are a potent challenge to Brahminism. It is, however, careful not to register its protest in a way that reveals its own Brahminical agenda. Instead, it denounces such marriages as ‘anti-Hindu’, as ‘intimidation of Hindu religion’, and as calculate to ‘to spite the religious sentiments of the Hindu majority’. The fact that the vast majority of ‘Hindus’ are non-Brahmins, who might well believe that they are equally capable as Brahmins to conduct their own marriages, is, of course, ignored. So, too, is the fact that many Dalit castes and Tribals, whom the RSS seeks to include within the ‘Hindu’ fold in order to augment ‘Hindu’ numbers, continue to conduct their marriage ceremonies without Brahmin priests and dispensing with Brahminical ceremonies.

Any critique of Brahminism, therefore, is interpreted as an attack on Hinduism as such by the RSS. Any move that might challenge the hegemony of the Brahmin minority or make a dent in the citadel of Brahminism is presented as an attack on the ‘Hindu majority’ and ‘Hinduism’, even if such moves as ‘self respect’ marriages might work in favour of the non-Brahmin majority. As defenders of Brahminical or ‘upper’ caste privilege, Hindutva ideologues see every issue from the point of view of the Brahminical elites. Hence, the reasonableness of Karunanidhi’s demand is completely dismissed, without any recognition of the fact that it might well help the majority of the ‘Hindus’, who are from the oppressed castes, victims of Brahminism. The Organiser sees no merit in the proposal at all, and, instead, makes the ridiculous suggestion that it might be a communist-inspired conspiracy to ‘wean away Hindu youth from the fold of family and religion and make them tools of atheist, anti-Hindu tirade’.

The Organiser ends its vehement denunciation of Karunanidhi’s proposal with by insisting that, ‘as a declared non-believer, Karunanidhi and the [sic.] likes have no right to talk on Hindu religious affairs’. ‘It is for Hindu religious leaders and social reformers to talk on the religion’, it insists. If that is the case, then why, one must ask, do the Hindutva-walas appear to take such an inordinate interest in the ‘plight’ of Muslim women? If non-Hindus and self-declared non-believers have no right to talk about Hindu religious matters, what gives the RSS and its affiliates in the Hindutva camp the right to talk about Islam and shed crocodile tears over the ‘oppression’ of Muslim women?

It is striking how, despite their visceral hatred of each other, Muslim and Hindu fundamentalists think alike on a range of issues. Both speak of religious identity as a monolith, conveniently ignoring the obvious fact that the interests of the elites they champion have little in common with those of the poor. On the issue of gender, too, both are firm upholders of patriarchal privilege. Like their counterparts among the Muslim clerics, the Hindutva-walas see patriarchal control as essential to their vision of religion, and hence any step that threatens to challenge it is regarded as a sinister anti-religious plot, as the Orgniser’s furious reaction to Karunanidhi’s sensible and very welcome proposal makes amply clear.

[acharya]

Book Review

Name of the Book: Hindutva—Treason and Terror

Author: I.K.Shukla

Publisher: Pharos Media, New Delhi (www.pharosmedia.com)

Year: 2005

Pages: 181

Price: Rs. 130 (Euros 10, US $15)

ISBN: 81-7221-026-4

Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand



Hindutva, the Indian version of fascism, has been much written about. This collection of essays by I.K. Shukla focuses particularly on the politics of Hindutva, linking this to its underlying agenda of seeking to transform India into what the author calls a ‘fascist theocracy’.



Shukla argues that the notion of a singular, homogenous ‘majority’ ‘Hindu’ community, which Hindutva organizations claim to represent, is nothing but a fiction. The word ‘Hindu’ is itself absent in all the classical ‘Hindu’ texts, which suggests that the ancient ‘Hindus’ did not think of themselves as members of a single community. What is today regarded as the ‘Hindu’ community is actually a motley collection of castes and sects, often mutually opposed to each other, hierarchically divided as they are on the basis of the principle of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’. Hence, they cannot be collectively referred to as a single community. Shukla opines that the construction of the notion of a single Hindu ‘community’ was a project jointly undertaken by Orientalists, British colonial officers and the ‘upper’ caste elites. For the ‘upper’ castes, a minority among the ‘Hindus’, the project helped bolster their own claims to authority, for it enabled them to assert their claims as the ‘representatives’ of this imagined community (The same could be said of the process of the construction of the notion of a single pan-Indian Muslim ‘community’ that transcended sectarian, ethnic, linguistic and caste divisions). Hinduism, as it came to be constructed as an ‘organised’ religion thus was inseparable from the interests of the ‘upper’ caste minority. The same holds true in the case of Hindutva, which, Shukla tells us, essentially represents the interests of the dominant castes/classes.



Preserving ‘upper’ caste/class interests, rather than the interests of India as a whole, is the major agenda of the Hindutva project, Shukla argues. This is reflected in the fact that the Hindutva organizations played no role in India’s freedom struggle, and, instead, actually collaborated with the British to oppose the joint Hindu-Muslim movement for India’s independence. Indeed, Shukla notes, the Hindu Mahasabha, the progenitor of today’s myriad Hindutva groups, came up with the theory of Hindus and Muslims being two separate and hostile nations even before the Muslim League did, and many years before Pakistan came into being on the basis of Muslim nationalism. Hindutva’s indifference, if not hostility, to the interests of India as a whole, Shukla argues, is also amply evident from the fact that Hindutva organizations have no agenda for the poor (other than perpetuating their subordination), from their willingness to ransom India’s economy to foreign multinational corporations and from their close nexus with American neoconservative groups and with Israel.



Violence is intrinsic to the Hindutva project. Indeed, Shukla shows, violence, such as directed against ‘low’ castes and dissenters, is deeply ingrained in the Brahminical Hindu texts themselves. In this sense, then, the large-scale violence perpetrated by Hindutva groups is not a new development, a deviation from a presumed ‘non-violent’ Brahminical Hinduism. The Hindutva project is based on fortifying the myth of a ‘Hindu’ monolith transcending caste and class divisions, for which purpose organized massacres, particularly of Muslims, serve as a major mobilisational device. Dalits and Tribals, victims of ‘upper’ caste/class Hindu oppression, are routinely instigated by Hindutva groups to launch anti-Muslim pogroms, as most recently evidenced in Gujarat. In Hindutva propaganda Muslims are inevitably portrayed as ‘enemies’ of the ‘Hindus’ (including the ‘lower’ castes) and as the principal cause of all their ills. Pitting the ‘lower’ castes against the Muslims is, Shukla rightly points out, a well-thought out strategy to prevent the former from challenging ‘upper’ caste hegemony.



While the book’s basic theses are valid, what it lacks is a well thought-out strategy to counter the Hindutva challenge. Shukla does note the importance of a broad based unity between various marginalized communities in India—the Bahujan Samaj—although he notes that this is easier said than done. But precisely how this unity can come about is something that Shukla fails to deal with. That, however, should not detract from the merits of this thought-provoking book.

[acharya]

HISTORICAL WRONG BY THE EXTREME RIGHT

A G NOORANI is a scathing and incisive critic of the Sangh Parivar. In this chapter, Demolition of the Babri Masjid, excerpted from his book 'The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labour', he argues that the three Bharatiya Janata Party Union ministers - Home Minister L K Advani, Human Resources Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi and Sports Minister Uma Bharati- chargesheeted in the Babri Masjid demolition on December 6, 1992, were criminally, not politically motivated (as they and the Sangh Parivar are arguing).

New Delhi, December 5

The instant and widespread reaction to the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 was that it was a crime as grave and poignant as the assassination of Gandhi on January 30, 1948. Nathuram [Godse] assumed full responsibility for his crime. The chronicle of the lies and prevarication by the perpetrators of the crime at Ayodhya is of enormous and abiding moral, legal and political relevance for the nation.

The BJP wants to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. It simultaneously acknowledges as well as denies its involvement in the crime. Jaswant Singh, a senior BJP leader, claimed in 1996: ãWe have accepted our responsibility directlyä (Economic Times June 11). He cited Kalyan Singhâs resignation as Uttar Pradeshâs Chief Minister and statements ãfrom Atal Behari Vajpayee to L K Advani to the Sarsanghchalak [of the RSS] that this was not the right thing to happen.ä Kalyan Singh, on the other hand, expressed his pride in the deed; Advani first blamed Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao and, next, acclaimed the event as a historic one. Vajpayee made noises of regret, only to sail along with Advani. BJP Vice-President Sunder Singh Bhandari called it a ãcrimeä on December 6. Jaswant Singh asserted, ãIt should not have happened. I mean, in the sense that the BJP was one of the participants, the BJP has direct responsibility.ä Ashok Singhal, as always, did not agree. He told his admirers in London that the kar sevaks had removed a stigma attached to the Hindu community. This was a matter of pride for Hindus the world over. It was like Hanuman setting fire to Lanka.

Why did it take two-and-a-half years for Vajpayee to admit what was known to the entire world÷the identity and affiliations for the people who actually ãdid pull downä the mosque? Organiser of May 7, 1995 published an article by Vajpayee: ãBut we did pull down the structure in Ayodhya. In fact, it was a reaction to the Muslim vote bank Now, I think the Hindu society has been regenerated, which was the task of the RSS. Earlier, Hindus used to bend before an invasion but not now. This change in Hindu society is worthy of welcome.ä True to form, he explained two days later that ãhe meant that the Hindus pulled down the structure, not the RSS workers.ä But why did it take two-and-a-half years for Vajpayee to admit what was known to the entire world÷the identity and affiliations for the people who actually ãdid pull downä the mosque? The need was perpetrated in broad daylight in the presence of the then BJP President, Murli Manohar Joshi, his predecessor and successor L K Advani, the VHPâs Ashok Singhal, Giriraj Kishore and V H Dalmia, not to forget Vijayaraje Scindia, Vinay Katiyar of the Bajrang Dal, Uma Bharati, Sadhvi Ritambhara and others.

LIES ALL AROUND

Advani and Joshi arrived in Lucknow from Ayodhya on the evening of December 6, 1992 but refused to explain the events of the day to a shocked nation through the press corps assembled there. The Indian Express reported that ãAdvani was heard ordering sealing of all entry points to Ayodhya to prevent Central forces from entering the town. This was around 2 pm when men were hammering away atop the domes of the structure.ä The Hindu reported identically. The first dome was brought down at 2.45 pm. The two others collapsed at 4.30 pm and 4.45 pm. Advani refused permission to Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Kalyan Singh to resign at 12.30 pm, and even at 2 pm. He resigned only at 5.30 pm. With classic duplicity, Advani was to write to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha a few hours later from Lucknow: ãI deeply regret the happenings at Ayodhya today I feel sorry that I could not prevent the occurrence.ä When the news of the demolition reached the BJPâs office in New Delhi, Vice-President Sunder Singh Bhandari described the act as ãunfortunate, unexpected, unjustifiedä. He added, ãThis is a crime.ä Bhandari went further still: ãHe said a group had all of a sudden gone out of control. He said his party was not able to identify who all were involved but it would certainly carry out the identification exercise and take action if any party member was involved.ä He was not forgiven for this.

Three years later, the Shiv Senaâs chief Bal Thackeray ãaccused the BJP of implicating the Sena in the demolition of Babri Masjid. Naming Mr Sunder Singh in this regard, Mr Thackeray said while [the BJP] was afraid to acknowledge the role of the Bajrang Dal in the destruction and passing the buck on to the Shiv Sena, he said he was not ashamed of taking pride in the actä His resentment at the BJPâs caddish breach of the honour among thieves is understandable. His man, Moreshwar Save, owned up to the deed immediately on December 6. Parivar men were vying with one another to spin yarns. Another vice-president of the BJP, K R Malkani, said that the demolition could have been the work of ãagents provocateursä. The VHP attributed it to ãanti-social elements who had infiltrated the ranks of the kar sevaksä. Ashok Singhal said it was ãnot preplannedä and the kar sevaks action was but the ãsurfacing of suppressed pent-up feelingä. For Vajpayee, the event was ãunfortunateä. But this poet and man of refined feelings was quick to dismiss it as of little consequence. ãIt was a disputed structure and it was being used as a temple.ä Contrast his remarks with those of RSS chief Balasaheb Deoras:

BJP leaders soon went about looking for plausible defences. Bhandari, K L Sharma, Sikander Bakht, M L Khurana and J P Mathur blamed ãsome mysterious elements who had evidently decided on mischiefä I can understand the anger and anguish of our Muslim brothers due to the demolition. But they must also consider the fact that if they could be so incensed over the demolition of a mosque which had no significance for them and where ãnamaazä was not being read [sic], the sentiments of the Hindus must also be equally strong over the disputed structures at Ayodhya, Mathura and Varanasi.

BJP leaders soon went about looking for plausible defences. Bhandari, K L Sharma, Sikander Bakht, M L Khurana and J P Mathur blamed ãsome mysterious elements who had evidently decided on mischiefä. Inconsistently enough, they spoke of provocation to the kar sevaks and tried indirectly to justify the demolition, arguing that it had a background that needed to be understood. Advani returned to Delhi on December 7 and was arrested the next morning on charges of spreading communal disharmony. He claimed, ãWe could not gauge the intensity of the peopleâs feelings over Ayodhya.ä Only 500-600 directly participated in the demolition out of the 5,000-6,000 involved in it in a crowd of two lakh. A day later, he said: And today, when an old structure which ceased to be a mosque over 50 years back is pulled down by a group of people exasperated by the tardiness of the judicial process, and the obtuseness and myopia of the executive, they are reviled by the President, the Vice-President, and political parties as betrayers of the nation, destroyers of the Constitution and what not.

Thus, on December 8, only two days after the demolition, Advaniâs defence had crystallised. Vajpayee, too, remained unrepentant: ãThis is not the first time a place of worship has been demolished.ä On December 8, Kalyan Singh echoed the now established party line÷that of a spontaneous outburst of mass indignation. RSS general secretary Rajendra Singh, however, made a significant admission the following day: ãIn the sense that so many kar sevaks gathered, it may be called preplanned.ä The Organiser (December 13) revealed some details of what was clearly a meticulously laid-out plan: ãIt was decided to devise a strategy [to buy time by filing an assuring affidavit in the Supreme Court] The game plan was not to allow the Centre to pre-empt the arrival of kar sevaks at Ayodhya by dismissing the U P government and deploying paramilitary forces Kalyan Singh had even selected a house to which he planned to shift within hours of his dismissal.ä

Advani and Joshi ãwere asked to set out on yatras commencing from Varanasi and Mathuraä to explain the tactic to ãthe rank and fileä. Vajpayee decided to switch to the ãmoderateä stance a week later (December 13): ãOn the first day I did say that [sic] let us condemn the happenings in Ayodhya, but others did not help me.ä But he did not condemn it either. It was no more than a ãmisadventureä and ãthe worst miscalculationä. It was not preplanned though some kar sevaks were ãvery, very [sic] determined to do away with the structureä. A section of them ãwent out of controlä.

Mark this promise: ãWe are trying to find out who masterminded the whole thing, if there was any agency or group. We are trying to ascertain the facts and see that such things are not repeated.ä But Shrikant Joshi, private secretary to Deoras, confidently asserted that ãkar sevaks had nothing to do with itä and alleged that it was officials from the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) ãdisguised as karsevaks who first ran towards the structure and began demolishing it.ä Malkani opined in his book The Politics of Ayodhya and Hindus-Muslim Relations, published later in the year, ãShrikant could well be right only those opposed to the Sangh parivar could have done it.ä

Kalyan Singh, who knew better, said on December 16, ãI do not have any regrets and repentance for the happenings in Ayodhya on December 6 and the disturbances that followed afterwards as the demolition of the disputed structure was a spontaneous outburst of pent-up Hindu sentiments.ä That very day, the RSS-linked Hindi daily, Swadesh, published from Bhopal, carried an interview with a Bajrang Dal activist, Dharmendra Singh Gurjar, in which he described in detail how his 100-strong squad had undergone training and done the job at Ayodhya. Other such disclosures began to appear in the press shortly thereafter.

Kalyan Singh was most blatant. He faced a choice ãbetween contempt o court and contempt of Godä in which he would not go against the will of Shri Ram himselfä. He had had a ãtelephonic conversation with Ram Lallaä Parliament, Vajpayee and colleagues adopted a standard form of regret: ãExtremely sorry.ä Vajpayee said that (December 17) those who demolished the structure must come forward, own up their deed and accept punishment. ãThe temple for Ram shall be built on truth.ä But there was not a trace of regret in the BJP National Executiveâs resolution on December 24. It simply blamed the Centre. The BJPâs whizkid, K N Govindacharya, had no inhibitions about confirming on December 31 the calculated strategy of mobilising the mob revealed earlier by Organiser. What Advani said at [his] first press conference after his release was significant: the events of December 6, he said, were the intensification of the ideological debate that began in 1990.

By now, all trace of regret had vanished. ãWe have no regrets,ä M M [Murli Manohar] Joshi said on January 24, explaining that the BJP had always wanted ãthe structureä to go. Advani was certain that the demolition would change the course of Indian history. Providence had ordained it. Kalyan Singh was even more blatant. He faced a choice ãbetween contempt of court and contempt of Godä in which he would not go against the will of Shri Ram himselfä. He had had a ãtelephonic conversation with Ram Lallaä, and he was convinced that the demolition was an act of God. December 6, 1992, he said, was Kranti Divas (Revolution Day) on which the foundation of a new India was laid. The demolition was an act of ãnational prideä. ãWith the cries of Jai Sri Ram, the kar sevaks performed their job and I resigned.ä The BJPâs White Paper on Ayodhya (April 1993) was more circumspect. The demolition was the result of ãan emotive outburstä in the face, inter alia, of ãthe highly provocative structureä.

Correspondents of repute who were at Ayodhya and a host of other witnesses who deposed before the Inquiry Commission comprising Kamala Prasad (chairman) and five academics, and the Citizenâs Tribunal on Ayodhya, comprising two former Supreme Court Judges (O Chinnappa Reddy and D A Desai) and a former Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court (D S Tewatia) testified to prior planning. The Commission and the Tribunal came to the same conclusion. ãThere was undoubtedly a conspiracy to destroy the Babri Masjid,ä the Tribunal held.

This is too terrible a truth to be admitted. It will entail enormous moral, political and legal consequences. Hence, the lies and prevarication. But, the entire Ayodhya movement launched by the Sangh parivar has been based on sheer fraud and force from the very beginning, something that devout Hindus have never failed to acknowledge. As Madhav Godbole, who was Union Home Secretary during the demolition, records in his memories, Unfinished Innings: I visited Ayodhya on 29 December 1992 in connection with the proposed acquisition of land and to review the law and order arrangements in the light of the earlier decision to permit darshan. Unlike other visitors from Delhi in the past [like S B Chavan and Naresh Chandra] who took darshan at the Ram Lalla temple and offered pooja there, I did not do so, nor did I accept any prasad. Though a devout person myself, I believe that oneâs religion is a personal matter. In any case, I had enough of Ayodhya and sincerely believed that God could not reside in that temple, the construction of which was associated with so much deceit and wanton violence.

It is about this temple that Vajpayee had claimed in the Lok Sabha: ãThe temple for Ram shall be built on truth.ä The demolition and the charge-sheet It is absolutely incontrovertible that the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 was (a) wrongful act. Ram Jethmalani, who went on to become the Law Minister in Vajpayeeâs cabinet, had opined, while Advaniâs rath yatra was on:

Failure to prosecute the perpetrators of the crime, which disgraced India before the world and will ever be a blot on its record in history, will only signify that the rule of law no longer governs the country The Indian Penal Code makes it a serious criminal offence to pull down any place of worship. It is no defence in law that the place of worship was constructed five hundred years ago on the site of another demolished place of worship belonging to the community of the accused. The throngs that threaten to converge on Ayodhya and pull down the mosque will in the eye of law be an unlawful assembly determined to commit offences of mischief, criminal trespass, wounding of religious feelings, and desecration of a holy place. Grievous injury and killings as possible consequences will be within the reasonable contemplation of its members. It would be the plain duty of the government to tackle the situation according to the law of land. The law doubtless requires the state to use all the force at its command to disperse the unlawful assembly and prevent the commission of the threatened offences. The resulting mayhem and loss of life will only be legitimate consequences of the execution of legal and constitutional duty. Every sane person must therefore pause and do a bit of rational introspection while there is still some time left÷however short.

The time bomb is ticking away. When it explodes communal harmony and national integration will be the prime casualties. The nation will not emerge stronger but weakened and debilitated beyond measure. Mr L K Advani is a Member of Parliament. He has sworn to uphold the law and the Constitution. While he will lead the assembly of law-breakers what does he expect the UP government to do? Its Ministers are also sworn to uphold the law and Constitution. The police force is statutorily committed to neutralise the marching hordes even though composed of sadhus, acharyas, and otherwise respectable political leaders. There is no loophole or ambiguity in the law. (Indian Express October 16, 1990) Soon after the demolition, Jethmalani said on January 1, 1993 that ãthe BJP should have first come to power and made the act a permissible one under the law. The premature act is a violation of the existing law of the land.ä On December 17, Vajpayee told the Lok Sabha that those who demolished the structure must accept punishment. Why all the squealing now? It is clearly a criminal offence under the Indian Penal Code. Can its perpetrators be permitted to go scot-free? This is not only a legal question. It is a moral question of profound implications for the future of Indiaâs polity. Failure to prosecute the perpetrators of the crime, which disgraced India before the world and will ever be a blot on its record in history, will only signify that the rule of law no longer governs the country.

On October 5, 1993 the day the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed the charge-sheet, K L Sharma, BJP General Secretary, denounced it as ãpolitically motivatedä and accused the CBI of ãsleeping over the issue for so longä. One of the persons cited as accused, the former Chief Minister of U P, Kalyan Singh, said the same day that the charges were ãbaselessä. On October 8, Advani said the case was ãfactually spurious, legally untenable and politically mala fide.ä Advani added, ãThe demolition was a regrettable surprise. I could not share the elation of many on that day. But the charge-sheet is good for the BJP.ä Having said that, he professed to see ãa gulfä between the BJPâs appreciation of the situation and that of the ãcommon Hinduä and quoted from K R Malkaniâs book to say that the demolition had come as a ãmighty pleasant surpriseä to most Hindus. The truth is the very opposite of this assertion. The common Hindu was shocked and saddened. The Sangh Parivar was jubilant. The charge-sheet is mostly based on admissions by kar sevaks and leaders themselves. On March 30, 1993, Uma Bharati said the demolition was part of a ãpreconceived plan and she was the pivot of the plan and gave the signal to break the Babri Masjid.ä Santhosh Dubey of the Shiv Sena said on October 7, 1993: ãThe remnants of the demolished structure are still with us. If the government has guts, it should arrest me.ä The following day, one of the accused, the Senaâs state unit chief Pawan Pandey, said: ãWe have repeatedly admitted out part in the act. We donât bother about the Governmentâs court. Our only concern is the verdict of the people.ä Kalyan Singh has been repeatedly quoted as gloating over the demolition: ãSh Kalyan Singh has made admissions/statements to the media as well as in his public speeches made at intervals which are clearly indicative of his complicity in the demolition of the disputed structureä Several of his speeches are quoted: ãThat on 4.5.93 at Hamirpur he said, ÎI am thankful to you, you have demolished the thousand years old structureâäSOn 19.2.93 at Mainpuri he said that the structure of slavery was demolished and the structure of Ram temple has been erected.ä

The charge-sheet adds:

The immediately after the demolition of the Babri Masjid disputed structure Jai Bhagwan Goel admitted that he and Shri Moreshwar Save were in charge and commanding the demolition That all the preparations were done by them and they demolished the Babri Masjid.

The Organiser says that ãAdvani and Joshi were asked to set out on rath yatras The BJP leaders sent signals to the quarters concerned that the party might enlarge its area of confrontation if the Centre did not allow kar seva at Ayodhya on December 6 SThat Shri Bala Saheb Thackeray admitted to the said video magazine that he was proud of his boys if they had demolished the Babri Masjid structure and that it was a constructive work of his people. He also said that if he would have been the Prime Minister of India, he would have demolished the disputed structure officially instead of leaving it to the Shiv Sainiks.

That accused Moreshwar Save admitted to The Independent newspaper that the demolition of the Babri Masjid was planned and executed in a military precision by 500 Shiv Sainiks who were trained in the Chambal valley for a fortnight.

The charge-sheet says: The investigation also revealed that on 5.12.1992, a secret meeting was held at the residence of Shri Vinay Katiyar, which was attended by S/Shri L K Advani, Pawan Pandey, etc wherein a final decision to demolish the disputed structure was taken. During the same period Sh Kalyan Singh, when contracted by a witness, told him that ãRok construction par lagi hai, destruction par nahin". [It is construction which has been restrained (by the Supreme Court), not destruction.]

That in furtherance of the abovesaid criminal conspiracy kar seva mobilisation journey was purposely undertaken by Shri L K Advani from Varanasi and Shri Murli Manohar Joshi from Mathura on 1.12.1992 which finally culminated at Ayodhya on 5.12.1992 and in the course of such journeys, which involved public speeches,SShri Advani vehemently asserted repeatedly that the kar seva to be held from 6.12.92 at Ayodhya would not mean only bhajan and kirtan, but would as well involve construction of Shri Ram Temple. It would be done with bricks and shovels. He further asserted on 2.12.1992 to the Jansatta that the BJP will break the law for the construction of Ram Janam Bhoomi Temple at Ayodhya.ä

But, then, this was revealed by none other than Organiser in its issue of December 13 which carried a telephonic report of the operations at Ayodhya. In sheer jubilation it revealed its ãgame planä÷negotiations through journalist-mediators; the false affidavits in the Supreme Court÷to buy time to collect crowds. The filing of affidavits is called a ãtactical moveä: ãThe game plan was not to allow the Centre to pre-empt the arrival of the kar sevaks at Ayodhya by dismissing the UP Government and deploying paramilitary forces in and around Ayodhya.ä In law, such a ãgame planä constitutes a criminal conspiracy.

Why was all the elaborate charade of negotiations and affidavits undertaken unless the object was the demolition of the mosque? Who all were privy to what Organiser calls ãthe game planä? ãKalyan Singh,ä we are told, ãhad taken all preliminary steps and had even selected a house to which he planned to shift within hours of his dismissal.ä Which Chief Minister sworn to uphold the law has ever contemplated so strange a step? Organiser further reveals that ãL K Advani and Dr M M Joshi were asked to set out on yatra commencing from Varanasi and Mathura respectivelySThe BJP leaders sent signals to the quarters concerned that the party might enlarge its area of confrontation if the Centre did not allow kar seva at Ayodhya on December 6.ä They were thus privy to the ãgame planä revealed by Organiser itself. The charge-sheet recites details of preparations÷ training of a VHP outfit in Ahmedabad from September 22 onwards, the closing ceremony being attended by Ashok Singhal, Moropant Pingle (RSS) and Giriraj Kishore (VHP); the Bajrang Dal youth training in the Chambal valley; and the role of Moreshwar Save, who made the infamous public admission of planning and preparation. The rehearsal at Naltila Ram Katha Kunja, 500 metres from the mosque, is mentioned. So is the equipment placed in the hands of the kar sevaks.

There is more: It was 6.12/1992 that Shri L K Advani in a public speech in the proximity of the disputed structure shortly before the actual demolition of the disputed site amongst other facts duly projected by him had also emphasised that ãAaj kar seva ka akhiri din hai, kar sevak aaj akhiri kar seva karengeä (It is the final day for the kar seva today. The kar sevaks will be doing the final kar seva today). When the demolition of the disputed structure was in progress, he also told that the Central forces were moving from Faizabad towards Ayodhya, but they were not afraid of it and instructed the public to block the national highway straightway so that forces do not reach Ram Janam Bhoomi. The investigation also disclosed that as and when demolition was in progress, Shri L K Advani in fact advised the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Shri Kalyan Singh, not to tender his resignation to the Governor of UP till the demolition of the disputed structure stands completed. This bit came out in the evidence before the Citizensâ Commission too.

A minister who provides moral help to militants up in arms against the state is a certifiable security risk. If he happens to be Home Minister, in charge of national security as well, he deserves the boot from the President Clearly, there is a case to answer and not for the accused alone. Kuldip Nayyar reported in The Statesman of February 24, 1993 that the RSS boss, Balasaheb Deoras, ãat Nagpur received the call himself. It was as if he was anxiously awaiting something important. The two Marathi words communicated were: Fateh zali (work completed). He is said to have felt relieved.ä The Hinduâs correspondent reported (November 2, 1992) that the VHPâs ãconfrontationist path on the Ayodhya issue was the direct outcome of the hardline stance adopted by the RSS at its recent Ujjain conclaveä. That conclave ended on October 27, 1992. The rest is history.

Union home minister as an accused

A minister in government who provides moral help to militants up in arms against the state is a certifiable security risk. If he happens to be Home Minister in charge of national security as well, he deserves the boot from the President. Advani faces a charge-sheet prepared by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which is now under his control. Dated October 5, 1993, it alleges, after a through investigation, that he participated in a conspiracy to demolish the masjid on December 6, 1992 and committed grave offences in pursuance of that conspiracy. It also charged two other ministers, Murli Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharati. On February 4, 1994, the Supreme Court issued notice for contempt of court against Advani and others. On August 27, 1994, Special Judicial Magistrate Mahipal Sirohi found that a prima facie case existed which warranted committal of those accused by the CBI to trial by a Sessions Court which alone could pass sentence in a grave case like this.

On September 9, 1997, Jagdish Prasad Srivastava, Additional Sessions Judge (Ayodhya Episode), Lucknow, ãconcluded that in the present case, a criminal conspiracy to demolish the disputed structure of Ram Janam Bhoomi/Babri Masjid was hatched by the accused persons in the beginning of 1990 and was completed on 6.12.1992. Shri Lal Krishan [sic] Advani and others hatched criminal conspiracies to demolish the disputed premises on different times at different places. Therefore, I find a prima facie case to charge Shri Bala Saheb Thakre [sic], Shri Lal Krishan Advani, Shri Kalyan Singh, Shri Vinay Katiyarä and others under Section 147, 153(A), 153(B), 259, 295(A) and 505 read with Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code.

Thus, the case was found proved prima facie warranting a regular trial. Matters had gone far beyond a charge-sheet filed in a court by the police. Two judicial officers, the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge found that a prima facie case was established on the facts. However, one formality remained for the trial to begin. Section 228 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down that where the Sessions Judge ãframes any charge,ä as in the Ayodhya case, ãthe charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charge or claims to be tried.ä In short, the accused must himself be physically present in order that his or her plea to the charge is recorded. The lawyerâs presence will not suffice. Accordingly Judge Srivastava ordered: ãAll the accused persons are directed to be presented in the Court on 17-10-1997 for framing of the charges.ä By filing revision applications in the Allahabad High Court and absenting themselves, the accused have averted the opening of the trial for a full two years since October 17, 1997.

The Sessions Judgeâs 61-page order is a public document which has been published in full as a CPI (M) publication entitled Ayodhya Conspiracy of Saffron Brigade Unmasked. The Sessions Judgeâs order recorded: ãOn 5-12-1992 a secret meeting was held at the house of Sh Vinay Katiyar which was attended by Sh. Lal Krishan Advani, Pawan Kumar Pandey and a final decision to demolish disputed structure was taken. Their argument was that there was a ban on construction not on demolition and accused No 1 to 38 assembled near Ram Janam Bhoomi/Babri Masjid on 6-12-92 and Sh Lal Krishan Advani categorically said in his public speech before the demolition of disputed structure that Îtoday is the last day of Kar Seva. Kar Sewaks would perform last Kar Seva.ä When he came to know that central force was proceeding from Faizabad to Ayodhya then he [Advani] asked the public to block National highway so that central forces do not reach Ram Janambhoomi. Prosecution has also contended that when disputed structure was being pulled down Sh. Advani asked Kalyan Singh not to tender his resignation till the disputed structure is completely pulled down.ä

What was Advaniâs defence? ãNo masjid existed on the spot, as no Namaz was ever held there. Disputed structure was a mandir for centuries. The court had restrained from constructing mandir. There was no injunction against demolition of the mandir.ä And the Sessions Judgeâs finding? ãOn a careful perusal of evidence produced by the prosecution in the present case, I have come to conclusion that the prima facie evidence as alleged against the accused persons is made out.ä

It is disgraceful that in order to save Advaniâs tarnished skin, he and the Prime Minister should dishonestly stretch the law and set a dangerous precedent for use by law-breakers in power in the future and armed militants on the rampage at present In paragraph 36, he traced Advaniâs movement just prior to the offence and concluded (para 37) that he was very much a party to the conspiracy. In a later interview (Outlook, December 20, 1999), Advani said: ãI had nothing to do with the demolition.ä The Judgeâs Order, however, recorded, ãAs per Ms Ruchira Gupta, PW-145 that Shri Advani declared that CRPF may arrive at any time. Therefore, all the people should raise barricade on the main roads so as to prevent CRPF from coming near the spot.ä This was also reported by correspondents of The Hindu and Indian Express (December 7, 1992).

Advani says that the demolition of the Babri Masjid was a ãpolitical offenceä. What will be say to the militants who indulge in acts of violence in, say, Kashmir or the North-East? ãAs for the demand for my resignation,ä says Advani, Îthere is a clear distinction between a political case and being charge-sheeted in any other case, however motivated it may have been.ä The hawala case, over which he resigned from the Lok Sabha on being charge-sheeted, ãinvolved moral turpitude of sorts, relating to corruptionä. The implication is plain the demolition of a house of worship does not involve ãmoral turpitudeä. Prime Minister Vajpayee sang the same tune on December 7, 1999. ãThere is no corruption charge against them, nor any allegation of misuse of office. You know there is a difference between charges of corruption and this kind of case.ä Can the demolition of a house of worship be characterised as a ãpolitical offenceä at all as the ex-pression is understood in the civilised world?

By all established definitions of ãterrorismä, the demolition of the Babri mosque was a ãterrorist actä. By all established definitions of a ãpolitical offenceä, terrorism falls far outside it. Were Advaniâs Vajpayeeâs test to pass muster, the armed militants in Kashmir and in northeastern India, the Peopleâs War Group (PWG) and other Naxalite groups would be beyond the reach of the law. It is disgraceful that in order to save Advaniâs tarnished skin, he and the Prime Minister should dishonestly stretch the law and set a dangerous precedent for use by law-breakers in power in the future and armed militants on the rampage at present. To both of them, as well as the other charge-sheeted ministers, one would pose a simple question: what about the assassins of Gandhi, led by the RSSâs own Nathuram Godse, and those of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi? Were they also political offenders like L K Advani, Murli Mahohar Joshi and Uma Bharati?

The day after The Narasimha Rao government lost no time in shutting the stable doors after it had allowed the communal beast to flee. On December 10, 1992, notifications were issued under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 banning the RSS, the VHP, the Bajrang Dal, and, in a show of balance, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic Sewak Sangh. On June 4, 1993 Justice P K Bahri of the Delhi High Court, sitting on the Tribunal appointed under the Act, upheld the ban on the VHP but quashed the ones against the RSS and the Bajrang Dal. He however, spoke of ãthe laudable objects being pursued by VHP.ä If the Government sought consciously to have its cosmetic ban on the RSS quashed by a judge whose ãpublic philosophyä was manifestly sympathetic to these bodies, it could not have prepared the case for the bans with greater ineptitude. (See the writerâs critiques in Frontline, July 2 and September 10, 1993.) The Governmentâs counsel rightly said, ãThe BJP is a political wing of the RSS.ä

The evidence on this linkage before the Tribunal itself was overwhelming. If RSS supreme Balasaheb Deoras was a trustee of the VHP, Singhal of the VHP was a member of the RSS. A VHP publication Virat Hindu Sammelan refers to the RSSâs acticities and those of the ãsisterä organisations. Singhal attended most meetings of the RSSâs executive bodies from 1989 to 1992. The VHP admitted to the Tribunal that the RSS ãis a kind of universityä which produces ãgreat nationalistsä. RSS leader Rajendra Singh used other metaphors: ãtraining instituteä and ãa fatherâs house.ä Acharya Giriraj Kishore of the VHP told the Tribunal that his press release of December 2 ãhad mentioned that the kar sevaks would be functioning [on December 6] within in the discipline to be enforced by RSS workers.ä Formally, both the RSS and the VHP asserted that they were ãnot inter-relatedä or ãinter-linkedä. The RSS has in its reply denied the contents of the speeches imputed to the leaders of the VHP and the Bajrang Dal and in some cases tried to justify them.

The evidence on this linkage before the Tribunal itself was overwhelming. If RSS supreme Balasaheb Deoras was a trustee of the VHP, Singhal of the VHP was a member of the RSS. Why then did the Tribunal completely ignore the evidence on this point? Rajendra Singh excelled himself: ãHe deposed that he had little knowledge of the working of the VHP and the Bajrang Dal and whatever knowledge he has is derived from news reports.ä But the RSS reply cited facts pertaining to the VHP and the Bajrang Dal ãbased on personal knowledge of this witnessä and ãprepared on his instructions aloneä. A book brought on the record by the RSS itself, RSS: A Vision in Action, referred to the Sangh parivar and the VHP as its members.

Why then did the Tribunal completely ignore the evidence on this point? Justice Bahriâs own outlook is anything but enlightened: ãThe laudable objects being pursued by VHP cannot be objected, for strengthening the various Hindu sects for uniting themä (p 284). He proceeded to refer to invasions by Muslim rulers, conversions to Islam (p 284) and to British policies ãso that those Muslims should not get assimilated in the mainstream of the culture of this countryä (p 285). This is the very view which the Sangh parivar espouses.

Presidentâs rule was imposed on December 15, 1992 in three BJP-ruled States÷Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Kalyan Singh and invited this action by resigning on December 6. The Supreme Court upheld the three contested Proclamations under Article 356 of the Constitution on March 11, 1994 in S R Bommai vs Union of India & Ors ([1994] 3 Supreme Court Cases page 1). Seven of the nine judges who decided the case held that secularism is part of the unamendable ãbasic structureä of the Constitution. Justices P B Sawant and Kuldip singh cited the BJPâs 1991 Election Manifesto among the ãprofessions and acts which are evidently against the Constitutionä.

Particularly noteworthy were Justice P B Jeevan Reddy's observations: Shri Parasaran is right in his submission that what happened on December 6, 1992 was no ordinary event, that it was the outcome of a sustained campaign carried out over a number of years throughout the country and that it was the result of the speeches, acts and deeds of several leaders of BJP and other organisations. The event had serious repercussions not only within the country but outside as well. It put in doubt the very secular credentials of this nation and its Government÷and those credentials had to be redeemed. The situation had many dimensions, social, religious, political and international. Rarely do such occasions arise in the life of a nation. The situation was an extraordinary one, its repercussions could not be foretold at that time. Nobody could say with definiteness what would happen and where? The situation was not only unpredictable, it was a fast-evolving one. The communal situation was tense. It could explode anywhere at any time. One the material placed before us, including the reports of the Governors we cannot say that the President had no relevant material before him on the basis of which he could from the satisfaction that the BJP governments of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh cannot dissociate themselves from the action and its consequences and that these Governments, controlled by one and the same party, whose leading lights were actively campaigning for the demolition of the disputed structure, cannot be dissociated from the acts and deeds of the leaders of BJP. In the then prevailing situation, the Union of India thought it necessary to ban certain organisations including RSS and here were Governments which were headed by persons who ãswore by the values and traditions of the RSSä and were giving ãovert and covert support to the associate communal organisationä (vide report of the Governor of Madhya Pradesh).

The Governor of Himachal Pradesh reported that "the Chief Minister himself is a member of RSS". The Governor of Rajashtan reported that the ban on RSS and other organisations was not being implemented because of the intimate connection between the members of the Government and those organisations. The three Governors also spoke of the part played by the members of the Government in sending and welcoming back the kar sevaks. They also express the opinion that these Governments cannot be expected, in the circumstances, to function objectively and impartially in dealing with the emerging law and order situation, which had all the ominous makings of a communal conflagration. [...] .

A G Noorani is a lawyer, columnist, author and political commentator. His most recent book is Constitutional Questions in India. He is currently working on another book, The Kashmir Question Revisited

[Guest]

Can somebody please tell Sikand that Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists etc marriages also come under the "hindu marriage act" ? All MuKa was trying to do is pull a dravidianist stunt in that he was trying to have his (periyar) style of marriage recognised as "hindu marriage". And not 'reform' hindu marriage act ? And where the heck does it say in "hindu marriage act" that there has to be dowry involved ? What a nut.. <!--emo&<_<--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/dry.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='dry.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Guest]

http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/jun/19rss.htm

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->RSS chief praises Indira Gandhi, blames Nehru for India's ills


June 19, 2005 16:01 IST
Last Updated: June 19, 2005 20:22 IST

After his recent controversial remarks criticising former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh chief K S Sudershan on Sunday praised Indira Gandhi for her courage and determination, and her role in the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan.

He also criticised India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, saying the 'English-minded' PM was responsible for the ills facing the country.

"Indira Gandhi was a lady of firm determination unlike today's central leadership which lacks the same," Sudershan said at the Sangh Shiksha Varg on the bank of river Gomti in Lucknow.

"With courage and determination, she managed to get Bangladesh separated from Pakistan in the 1971 war," the RSS chief said.

Sudershan's remarks assume significance as they come in the backdrop of his criticism of Vajpayee's performance as prime minister and his assessment that he was not among the best of prime ministers India has had.

Criticising Nehru, the RSS chief said, "If we go to the root of the problems being faced by the country, we find that Nehru is responsible for it."

Sudarshan said Nehru was 'English-minded' and the erstwhile British Raj wanted their 'own man' at the helm as prime minister so that their interests were protected.

"Nehru had said, 'I would be the last Englishman to rule India'," Sudarshan claimed.

Contending that the RSS was being misprojected as anti-Muslim, Sudarshan said the Muslims should not be called a minority as India was their home and their roots were in this country. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The article refers to a letter sent recently by Karunanidhi to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh demanding an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in order legalise at the all-India level marriages without a priest. Presently, such marriages are recognized only in Tamil Nadu. This demand has been a long-standing one, and was first put forward by E.V.Periyar Ramaswamy Naicker, the pioneer of the anti-Brahmin movement in Tamil Nadu. Periyar was a bitter critic of Brahminical Hinduism, seeing it as a thinly-veiled guise for Aryan, North Indian, ‘upper’ caste Hindu hegemony. He regarded Hinduism as a creation of wily Brahmins to assert their control over the ‘low’ caste majority whom they had reduced to servitude. He believed that the non-Brahmins could effectively challenge Brahmin hegemony only if they developed a sense of self-respect and refused to consider the Brahmins as ‘gods on earth’, a status that the Brahmins claimed for themselves. As part of the comprehensive plan for cultural revolution that Periyar laid out, non-Brahmins would dispense completely with Brahmins to officiate over their religious and social functions. In particular, the use of Brahmins to conduct the marriage of Hindu couples was to be strictly avoided. In this way, non-Brahmins would be able to assert their equality with the Brahmins and would, at the same time, be saved from paying the Brahmins the hefty fees that they charged as ritual specialists. In place of Brahmin-officiated marriage ceremonies, Periyar launched what he called ‘self-respect’ marriages, which were conducted without any priest at all. Unlike the Brahminical marriage, in which the bride is explicitly recognized as subordinate to the husband and is given away as a commodity to him, the ‘self-respect’ marriage was an egalitarian one. In contrast to the Brahminical marriage, the ‘self-respect’ marriage did not entail any dowry.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Someone should tell that clown above (sorry for the disrespect, but sometimes I flip when this anti-hindu tirade goes to an extreme) that Karunanidhi himself used priests at his daughter's wedding, and that his family members conduct religious rituals regularly. Karunanidhi is hypocrite and a scheming politician who criticizes Hinduism and other religions very liberally, but is careful to keep christianity out of the picture, lest the evangelists and christian maffia in TN assassinate him for saying anything against christianity and church practices. It is well-known that most DMK members and their families go to church and perform religious rituals for their own private benefits. But in public they will all attack hinduism, mock it and deride it, simply for political reasons and because it is the most defenseless religion and refuses to fight back.

Christianity itself is very priest-centered. A christian marriage without the sanctioning and blessing of a priest is not considered a holy union and is unheard of. If it is a church marriage, then for sure it has to have a priest! I have never heard of a relative or friend conducting a christian marriage for the family member in a church instead of the church padre himself, unless this relative or friedn himself is a priest. Baptism, communion, marriage, confirmation, funerals all require the christian priest to conduct the rituals and offer blessings.

The importance of priest or the pastor in all key life events (baptism, marriage, funeral) is not only in catholicism but also in other christian denominations. So, why is the person above picking on Hindu rituals only - why not the christian marriage practices, especially why not the Indian christian marriage practices since they tend to be more pious and church-centered then many western christians. This joker surely knows which side his bread is buttered!

I strongly propose that henceforth all christians in India should not marry in a church; instead go for a civil marriage. Do not have your children baptized by a priest, and have funeral services conducted in churches with priests. Do not go for sermons every sunday to church because it entails a priest or padre or pastor - however the particular domination refers to their so-called "messangers of god."

If you can't stop your church-centered activities all of which entail a priest; then shut up about hindu practices!