Partition Of India To India/pakistan In 1947

[Guest]

Paki's view- Interesting read
In Full, i am not sure whether they archive.
<b>The Two-Nation Theory Part 2: Are Muslims and Hindus Socially, Culturally and Economically One?</b> <!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->By Mohammad Ashraf Chaudhry
Pittsburg, CA
Are Muslims and Hindus socially, culturally and economically one?
One wishes they were, but they are not. Even the encounter between them stretching over 1,200 years could not make them one.
Diversity is viewed in Islam as a mercy of God and God sent His men in all ages and in all places. Thus, Muslims even as rulers in India did not have much problem with the Hindus. It is true that Muslims and Hindus have been influenced by each other profoundly, and they have met each other at a thousand points, and in the words of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, in his book The Emergence of Pakistan “on battlefields and at festivals, around market places and in homes, on spiritual heights and in the lowlands of mundane affairs. They have learnt from each other, interacted with each other, and penetrated each other; their tongues have mixed to produce new and rich languages; in music and poetry, painting and architecture, in styles of dress, and in ways of living they have left their mark on each other. And yet they have remained distinct with an emphasis on their separateness. They have mixed but never fused; they have coexisted but have never become one. Hindu and Muslim families that have lived in the same neighborhood for generations can be distinguished at a glance from one another. The clothes, the food, the household utensils, the layout of homes, the manner of speech, the words of salutation, the postures, the gestures, everything about them will be different and will immediately point to their origin. These outer differences are only the reflection of an inner divergence ... it is difficult to imagine a more striking contrast than that between a Hindu and Muslim social organization and Weltanschauung.” In the words of Robert Frost, “two roads diverged in a wood, and I took the one less traveled by; and that has made all the difference”.
It was the Muslims’ defiance of colonialism, rather than their sense of loss of the “Lost Glory”, which actually held them back in all fields in the Imperial India. Those who accuse them of conniving with the British to secede from India in order to “taste power and to regain their lost glory” and the British who encouraged them to do so because the British would also gain through this division by establishing a “buffer state” between an independent India and a communist USSR, better straighten their records.

<b>The 1857 struggle that ended in disaster virtually destroyed Muslim nobility and middle classes</b>. In the words of W. W. Hunter, 1871, “ For some reason or other they, the Muslims, have held aloof from our system, and the changes in which the more flexible Hindus have cheerfully acquiesced, are regarded by them, the Muslims, as deep personal wrongs”. In the words of Mr. Ram Gopal, “Hindus poured into official life with a joy which knew no bounds and hailed the British as their great benefactors”. Muslims caught between the British colonialism and the Hindus exclusiveness got totally crushed. In the words of Mr. Hunter, “… it is a people with great traditions and without a career”.
<b>The language policy of 1835, which introduced English in place of Persian, came as a boom to the Hindus. In 1880-81, while there were 36,686 Hindus studying English in high schools, there were only 363 Muslim pupils learning English; and in 1878, “there were 3155 Hindus as against 57 Muslims holding graduate and post-graduate degrees”. </b>
Muslims either defied colonialism, or just went into seclusion. Hindus hailed the British as “superior beings”. So who strengthened the hands of colonialism, the Muslims or the Hindus?
In later years when it became clear that the British would finally be packing up, it were the Hindus who dubbed them as “sinful usurpers”, and Muslims asking for some safeguards for their rights under a Hindus majority, as traitors, delaying the departure of the British. Was it not the Hindus agitation of 1867, demanding the replacement of Urdu, a common heritage of Hindus and Muslims, by Hindi written in the Devnagri script that for the first time convinced Sir Syed that “the two communities could not live together as a single nation…I am convinced that the two communities will not sincerely cooperate in any work…” With this backwardness in education and their abysmal under-representation in the administration, what future the Muslims in perpetual minority could envisage for themselves in an independent India? Religion always played a major role in the Indian politics, and it came to the forefront when the minorities such as the Muslims asked for separate electorate and the Hindus insisted on joint electorate. Muslims always stood a chance of being accused as unpatriotic, and “communalist”, if their leadership ever endeavored to promote the welfare of the backward community they represented. And is this not true even today?
As a child I often saw my father playing host to many a Hindu friend in our village home in Jullundhur. I could hear them laughing most heartily and talking aloud till late at night, and staying together in most ways, sharing their hopes and dreams. But I could never understand when my mother would, near the meal times, draw out some dry flour, ghee, sugar and vegetables and send me to drop them at Lal Chand’s house, the only Hindu in our village. It was not the practice that would upset me, but the burden of walking all the way to Lal Chand’s house. Nevertheless, if ever I asked her why couldn’t the visiting Lalla eat our food, after all it was our “atta and ghee”, her innocent answer invariably used to be, “Hindu hay na. Ai sadhi roti nai khanday”(“he is a Hindus, and Hindus don’t eat food cooked by us”).
While playing with home-made “khido”, a kind of soft ball, with Lal Chand’s son, if I ever stepped on Lal Chand’s outdoor cooking plateform, I was often shoed away rather rudely, not that they did not like my playing with Deepak, their son, but because, “Now Deepak’s mother has had to re-plaster the area with mud mixed with husk and cow dung”. The wrong was with our karma. They would play with us, laugh with us, and eat with us, but with a feeling of separateness. The dung of a cow was purer than the hands of my mother! There was nothing wrong with the food-grain they ate; the wrong lay with the hands that touched it. National Geographic, June 2003 on India’s Untouchables writes, “Many untouchables, particularly educated ones, would love to knock Gandhi off his pedestal”. Was it not on many occasions that Gandhi ji loved to address himself as the “Hindus’ Hindu”. Striking at the two-nation theory on the basis that it enshrined in itself a religious bias, especially with relation to Pakistan is neither fair, nor justifiable. Are India, Israel, and for that matter, most countries of the world above any kind of religious bias? Why pick and choose Pakistan alone?
Here in America, a few years ago, on the death of Mehta, a local resident of our area, when the Pujari did not turn up to perform his last funeral rites, I thought that the priest got stuck in a traffic grid-lock somewhere. A Hindu friend, himself upset at the development, came to correct me rather gingerly, “ He has done it deliberately. Pujaris that perform funeral rites considerably lose their chances for being called upon to perform the conjugal, marriage rituals.”
A few weeks ago when I went to attend the birthday function of a Bhagat, Shri Ravidas, in a temple named after him, I was really surprised to learn that what Shri Ravidas stood for was what we Muslims believe in, and beautifully articulated by the Holy Prophet in his last address. All Human beings are equal, irrespective of their color, cast or language… The high-priest of the Gurdwara was highly critical of the practices of discrimination being carried out against the followers of Shri Ravidas because the Bhagat came from a low-cast, and held a low profession.
Life lived in the midst of such discriminations which get their sanction from the religion you follow, is hell on earth, be he a fanatic Muslim clad in the green, or a Hindu donning saffron. Pakistan is not free from such practices, an off-shoot and a natural outcome of the little assimilation that took place as a consequence of a 1,200 year co-existence in India’s cast system; but no priest and no feudal lord can claim his superiority as his right when present in the house of God.
It would be wrong not to acknowledge that now the crudest and most overt forms of discrimination have largely disappeared from the big cities of India as a result of the sporadic reform movements after 1947, and untouchables have made progress. Even one of them became the President of India. Perhaps gone are also the days when they were beaten if their shadow touched a higher caste person, and they had to wear bells to warn of their approach, and had to carry buckets so their spit couldn’t contaminate the ground. The Laws of Manu, prescribing what to eat, whom to marry, how to earn money, when to fight, how to keep clean, whom to avoid etc. might have been amended. But we are talking here of the pre-partition days.
Was it not Dr. Ambedkar, the genius who wrote the Indian constitution, and who after his failure to get a separate electorate for the untouchables, felt so disgruntled that he just changed his religion and converted to Buddhism. “Give the untouchables separate electorate,” Gandhi cried, “and you only perpetuate their status for all time”.
Where did the Muslims stand? A little above the untouchables. In the words of Romila Thapar, (A History of India. Vol. One), “Had the Muslims remained a foreign community, there would have been a readier acceptance of their ideology by high-caste Hindus”. Her logic is that Muslims failed to assimilate because most of the converts in their midst were low-caste Hindus. The logic is interesting because it proves that if the assimilation did not take place, it was not due to Muslims, but due to the strict adherence of Hindus to a caste hierarchically graded society. Second, Islam never looked for conversions, in fact, the Indian Muslim Sultans discouraged it because conversions deprived them of their collections. Thirdly, even after a total or partial rule of 1,200 years, Muslims in India did not rise above a percentage of at best 20% of the total population, a living proof that Hindus did well under their rule. It were the dejected and the disgruntled Girdharilal Mauryas whose attackers would justify such beatings by stating, “His sins are many. He has bad karma. Why else would he, like his ancestors, be born an untouchable, if not to pay for his past lives?’ If Islam embraced such down-cast people, as did Christianity in the colonial days, it is not the fault of these two religions. The fault lies somewhere else.
Assimilation between the Muslims and Hindus always remained skin-deep. The devotional songs of Chaitanya, and Mirabai; the mystical verses of Lalla of Kashmir; the heart-rending hymns of blind-poet Surdas, the joint efforts of all the three schools of Sufism, the Chistis, the Suharwardys, and the Firdausis, and the attempts made by the Bukti leaders, the combined influence of Sidi Maula, Kabir and Nanak, and the tampering of Emperior Akbar with Islam and creating a new Din-e-Ilahi, and of many more ultimately failed in a country whose basic ethos was non-Muslim, and all along the two people existed as two distinct and separate communities. The Hindus could not compromise on their laws of Manu, and the Muslims would not on their concept of Tawhid.
Mr. Kuldip Nayyar says that Pakistan gets fixated on BJP when it has to justify its two-nation theory. Asking for the secession of Kashmir from India is to re-open old wounds. He contends that the delegation he led to Pakistan, consisting of three MPs, gave a warning at Lahore and Karachi to those who attended that it was silly on the part of Pakistan to be more interested in 800,000 living in Kashmir than the 150 million Muslims living in the rest of India. Jinnah used the two-nation theory for the division, and it was a one-time stunt. Now it has outlived its validity and relevance. Mr. Advani’s Hindutva slogan is a poll issue and India by ethos, culture and religion is pluralistic. Conclusion, Hindus and Muslims are one nation. Is this much different from what Mr. Karamatullah K. Ghori has sarcastically written about the two-nation theory?

Mr. Robert G. Wirsing in his book “India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute” on page 230 says that one recurring theme echoed over and over again in more recent studies by Indian authors is:

1. If Pakistan tries to liberate Kashmir, or if Kashmir breaks away with its help, Pakistan runs the risk of endangering the welfare of 100, (now 150) million Muslims in India… willy-nilly, because of the way Pakistan was carved out of India to represent a Muslim homeland, Indian Muslims became implicated in Pakistan’s action…
2. But… here’s the rub…if permitting greater autonomy and decentralization is to be effective and peaceful, it must realistically stop short of the option of secession of Kashmir from the Indian Union… Pakistan in self-interest must not risk arousing, much less provoking, the monsters of secession and communalism in India. With three million unassimilated Afghans, Pakistan cannot accommodate another massive wave of refugees.
3. Independence, either for part or all of J&K, is equally unrealistic… encouraging new religious divides would have repercussion in India and Pakistan and even in Bangladesh… undoing the sub-continent by seeking to promote unviable solutions in J&K would be folly….Verghese, “Kashmir”: The Fourth Option. Pg.65
A nation of over billion, seeking a seat on the Security Council of the UN, holds 15% of its own loyal, patriotic and useful citizens as hostage, threatening them ejection from the land they were born in, coercing them to either Indianize by compromising with their religion, or make their way to the Arabian Sea; or face obliteration on the scale of the Hutu/Tutsi genocide, or be ready to meet the fate the Bosnian Muslims met in Serbia. The Gujrat massacre, they contend was just a trailer. Who is threatening whom here?

President Musharraf is the best thing that has happened to Pakistan as for as relations with India are concerned. He underpins one and only one problem that has and can be responsible for injecting bitterness in the relationship between these two neighbors, the Kashmir dispute. It is a man-made problem, and it can be resolved by man. But this is not what Indian scholars and intellectuals and officials in their intelligence department seem willing to buy. For them, the real problem, the fountain-head of all evils, especially after the 9/11 tragedy, is the two-nation theory. T. N. Seshan, in his book “The Regeneration of India” ( my favorite man from India), sadly disappoints when he talks about Pakistan in rather a very arrogant and haughty fashion, but feels no compunction in asserting, “How long did it take us to recognize that the Jews had a right to exist as a nation?”, forgetting completely that Palestinians too are humans and have a right to exist as a nation. Israel as an ideological nation is closer to India these days, than Pakistan holding a similar ideological base. Why?

The peace process initiated by both the countries has been overdue and it must continue all the time and at all levels. That it is irreversible is a good commitment made by the leadership of both the countries. India can never make Pakistan blink, and Pakistan can never conquer India. Both are not brothers either, but both certainly can live like good neighbors. Which country on earth than Pakistan could claim to have awarded more safeguards and rights to the minorities than President Musharraf’s government in Pakistan? Once it was the issue of joint versus separate electorate that pushed the two communities to secede. The present-day Pakistan gives the best of the Lucknow Pact of 1916, then acceptable to the Muslim minority, and best of the Nehru Report, that enshrined the wishes of the majority Hindus, and much more to the minorities.

Yes, circumstances and destiny, both did provide at least two chances to the Indian leadership to squeeze out the two-nation theory from the hearts of the Muslims. Good governance after the elections of 1936-1937 during the pre-partition days, and good governance in the post-independence era in Kashmir, could easily have convinced Muslims that living with majority Hindus was a blessing of God. Hindus and Muslims living in the United States of America as minorities are not only happy, but are also desirious of living here forever. Alas, this did not happen in India. Victory in elections make a jubilant Nehru pronounce, “There are only two forces in India today- the British imperialism and the Indian Nationalism as represented by the Congress”. The Muslims and their Muslim League just fizzled out in the air. Discrimination against the minorities, especially the Muslims became more rampant and pronounced.
In Bombay, Mr. F.K. Nariman, an acknowledged leader of the local Congress, being a Parsi, was deprived of his right to be the Chief Minister. Instead, Mr. G. B. Kher was given the post. Mr. Nariman died soon after as a heart-broken person.
Muslims’ due share in administration was withheld. Soon in the government institutions, symbols of Hindus Raj and of Hindu culture became more conspicuous; Hindu temples and Hindu learning centers were opened everywhere; saluting to the Congress flag, and opening a day with anti-Muslim taranas became mandatory. Urdu was replaced with Hindi, and Urdu teaching schools were closed or replaced by Hindu schools.
As if this was not enough, steps of far-reaching consequences - promoting division between the two communities - were taken. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where Muslims belonged to the landlord class, the Congress government pressed forward with legislation to eliminate this class, and took credit for its progressive policies. A good step, taken with ill-intentions. In Bengal, where the landlord class consisted of Hindus, the same Congress opposed and brought the land reforms to a standstill. In Punjab where the Hindu moneylenders ruthlessly exploited the peasantry, the Congress tooth and nail opposed the legislation meant to provide relief to the rural people suffering under indebtedness. The Congress’ insistence on adult suffrage clearly meant reducing Muslim voting majority to minority in provinces where they were in majority, especially in the North and in Bengal, because universal adult suffrage was not in vogue in those days. Voting right was tied to property ownership and to a certain level of education.
The performance of Congress in Kashmir after partition had never been satisfactory. It would have been very easy for the government in Delhi to satisfy the Kashmiris, and furnish a rebuff to the Pakistani lovers of the Kashmir cause, had it governed the Kashmiris to their satisfaction. The results are too obvious to warrant any details.

CONCLUSION

India and Pakistan are two sovereign countries and their people share many a thing. The founding fathers of both countries could be disagreed with, but they certainly were Titans, magnanimous and larger than life in every walk of life. They all stood committed to their respective ideologies. India is a rising mini-super power, and Pakistan is India’s Canada, both share much, by remaining clearly distinct. We as Muslims, must live up to the nobility and compassion of Islamic ideals of peace and tolerance; and Hindus to their own, inclusive of a commitment to accept the creation of Pakistan, not as a defeat of India, but as a fact of history, a good and friendly addition in its neighborhood. The Great Divide has given hope to the two people of the sub-continent to shape and live their lives as they wish, not as two foes, but as two great friends and neighbors. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[Bharatvarsh]

I have a question regarding partition, I have read in some articles that Lahore was Hindu majority but was given away by Congress, when they say Lahore was Hindu majority do they mean the city of Lahore or the district of Lahore (if there was such a district), can someone enlighten me on this point, thanks. By the way the following is one article where I read this:

"like why Hindu-majority areas like Lahore, Sylhet and Chittagong were given away to Pakistan by Nehru [63]."

http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper883.html

Also does anyone here have the religious demographic statistics of Lahore before partition.

[Guest]

Yes, its is true regarding Lahore and other towns. You can find more information in below link. Go through G.Subramaniam post. They are very informative.
Link to more information on partition

[G.Subramaniam]

Bharatvarsh

Lahore was 60% muslim
Sylhet was 60% muslim
Chittagong hill tracts was 97% non-muslim

Tharparker in Sindh was 51% muslim

Hindus gained Gurdaspur - 51% muslim

Hindus traded Khulna - 51% hindu for Murshidabad - 55% muslim
because Murshidabad controlled the head waters of the Ganges

[Mitra]

Actually Sylhet was 57% hindu. Currently the erstwhile Sylhet region has been divided into 2 districts in Bangladesh - Sylhet and Maulavibazar. The full name of JN Mondal was Jogindranath Mondal and his Namahshudra Movement sided with Muslim League against the upper and Middle caste hindus. Then they found out what dar-ul-islam really is The Hindus of Sylhet also had a large component of Asamiya hindus who abstained from voting. This was done at the behest of Gopinath Bardoloi, a Congress leader of Assam. Sylhet is st the extreme NE fringe of Esat Bengal, so it it joined india it would have been added to Assam not W Bengal. Bardoloi feared that if that happened the Bengali hindus might become more than 40% of the population of Assam and the Asamiyas would loose control. Unfortunately hindu infighting has always the greatest enemy of the hindus. Others just exploited it to full measure.

[G.Subramaniam]

Mitra you are wrong
I have census details from both Dr.Ambedkar's book
"Pakistan or the partition of India" as well as the MD.Srinivas book based on Indian census records
My numbers are based on hard facts
Your numbers are based on hearsay

I will agree, that Gopinath Bardoloi was happy to let Sylhet go to get rid of bengalis
I also agree that JN.Mandal was a Dalit stooge of jinnah
The fact is that the Jamaat-Ulema-Hind,
( Deobandis ) who were opposed to partition, ( because they wanted to islamise all of India )
swung some muslim votes to India
and India lost the referendum 47% to 53%, even though the census shows 60% muslim

G.S

[Bharatvarsh]

G.Subramaniam I think Sylhet is Hindu majority, this is what Varsha Bhosle says in one of her columns:

"Take the Partition-time tale of Cachar, theBengali-speaking region of Assam bordering Bangladesh: The Hindu majority border region of Sylhet went to East Pakistan because the Assam Congress leadership didn't want a Bengali dominated region in Assam. Naturally, riots and persecution across the border led to a mass exodus of Bengali Hindus into Cachar (which already had a sizable Bengali population), turning it into a Bengali-majority region."

http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/apr/23varsha.htm

[G.Subramaniam]

Varsha Bhosle, while I admire her for many things is not a demographics expert like me

She is right, the Ahom dominated congress was glad to be rid of Sylhet
However Sylhet was muslim majority

During Partition, the muslims first demanded all of Assam ( all of north east )
They had a referendum which muslims lost 33% to 67%

Then they demanded a mini-referendum in Sylhet because they were a local majority in Sylhet and they won this
53% to 47%


http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/

Then Click on Appendix 6 which has census data for Assam, based on 1931 census

Sylhet - Muslims 60%

In the actual referendum, the vote for pakistan was 53% - 47%

Out of the 60% muslims, 7% voted for India since they wanted to islamise all of
India

The main unfair deal of partition was Chittagong hill tracts, 97% non-muslim which was given to pakistan

G.S

[Bharatvarsh]

G.Subramaniam I have a question, in that census when it says Scheduled Castes does it also include Sikh scheculed castes in the Punjab census like mazhabhi sikhs or just Hindu scheduled castes.

[G.Subramaniam]

Sikh scheduled castes were counted as sikhs

[Bharatvarsh]

G.Subramaniam I also read that the non muslim population of Pakistan was going up before partition, are there any specific reasons for this, was it because of higher birth rate or the shuddhi movement by Arya Samaj.

[G.Subramaniam]

The hindus and sikhs of punjab breeded almost as fast as muslims
More importantly, they got their widows remarried, through a tradition called Kalrewa
This still is operational in punjab, haryana etc
What this means is that any widow gets immediately remarried to the next available male on her dead husband's family

The hindus and sikhs did not out breed the muslims, but rather matched muslim breeding

Next, the british created a lot of irrigation canals and gave lots of lands to sikhs in
the area west of Lahore and a lot of sikhs migrated from east punjab to west punjab

Next the most important cause for the de-islamification of pakistan in the pre-partition times was the Arya Samaj, which did large scale shuddi even in muslim majority areas

But keep in mind, to solve the muslim problem, you have to do both reconversion as well as match muslim breeding

[acharya]

http://www.sacw.net/partition/june2004IshtiaqAhmed.pdf

[acharya]

http://www.sacw.net/partition/index.html

[Bharatvarsh]

Shows what decades of commie brainwashing can achieve:

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->After 1947, things started deteriorating rapidly and most of our Hindu neighbours started selling their houses and crossing over to India. Some houses were also forcibly occupied by Muslims. Communal tension was palpable most of the time. My father had passed away in the meanwhile. I completed my schooling in 1951 and left Dhaka for Calcutta that year. My mother stayed on with my two elder brothers. When the 1951 riots began, I was not there. My family didn’t think it safe to stay on in our house any longer. They moved to a relative’s place near Sadarghat in Dhaka. Soon after, my brothers tried to exchange our property for a house in Park Circus, Calcutta. When the exchange was complete, my mother and brothers moved here.

But all of my relatives were not so lucky. My mother’s younger sister and her husband lived in a village in Bikrampur near Dhaka. My aunt fell seriously ill in 1955 and died due to lack of medical aid. Communal violence had made it impossible for my uncle to procure medicines for her or to take her to Dhaka for treatment. My uncle was a doctor and had many Muslim patients. But he couldn’t save his wife; communal animosity had reached such a pass by then.

Very early in life, the stabbing of Abbas-dadu showed me how divisive religion could be when controlled by fanatics. I also knew we were paying the price of depriving the Muslims of Bengal for a century or more.

http://www.littlemag.com/ghosts/antaradevsen5.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
This is like the Jews blaming themselves for the holocaust, people like these should have died back then itself and hopefully they will die a horrible death at the hands of Muslims in a future riot.

[acharya]

Parity and Communal veto - what did these terms mean in numbers?

To understand the kind of Congress-League and Hindu-Muslim settlement which was being sought by the Muslim League in demanding parity and the communal veto, it is educative to look closer at some numbers.

Parity in the Interim government discussions

What did Jinnah's demand of Congress-League parity in the interim government in 1946 mean?

The Congress had won all but nine seats of General quota(ie 201 out of 210) in the Constituent Assembly and Muslim League won all but five of the Muslim seats(73 out of 78) in the Constituent Assembly. This was without counting the members from princely states.

So Congress-League parity meant a parity between 201 Congress legislators and 73 League legislators.

In the 1946 parleys for the Interim government, Jinnah would not accept caste Hindu-Muslim parity, a formula offered by some Congress leaders in 1945. One ostensible reason for Jinnah's refusal was that Congress had swept most Scheduled Caste seats in the 1946 elections and Congress could legitimately lay claim to appointing at least one Scheduled Caste appointee. That meant that if caste Hindu-Muslim parity were maintained, Congress could legitmately have at least one seat more than the League in the interim government.

So Jinnah refused caste Hindu -Muslim parity(ref. CMP(10)) and insisted on Congress-League parity so that Congress caste Hindus, Congress Scheduled Castes and any Congress minorities would all be squeezed into parity with the Muslim League.

When that formula was not accepted, Jinnah insisted on the right to be consulted in the appointment of Scheduled Castes and other minority members(in addition to the right to appoint all the Muslims, of course).

Maulana Azad wrote to the Viceroy objecting to this pointing out that with these conditions Jinnah was not only demanding that Congress be denied the right to appoint any Muslim within its own quota but Jinnah was also demanding to exert a veto on whom else the Congress appointed in its quota as well. [From Gwyer and Appadorai].

On the day before Direct Action Day in August 1946, Nehru visited Jinnah at Jinnah's home and offered the League 5 seats out of 14(Congress would have 6). Jinnah refused the offer saying that Muslims would be in a minority and that Congress would be free to appoint a Muslim in its own quota. In the event, Congress finally agreed not to appoint a Congress Muslim from its own quota when the Congress-League interim government finally took office in September 1946.

It is interesting to note that an year earlier during the first Simla Conference in 1945 Jinnah had refused a Congress-League parity offer to Indianize the Executive Council on the excuse that Muslims did not get 50% of total seats on the council.

According to Durga Das in 'India from Nehru to Curzon and after', the formula Jinnah rejected was
Congress 5(2 Hindus + 1 Muslim + 1 Christian + 1 Parsee)+
League 5 Muslims +
2 Viceroy nominated Scheduled Caste +
1 Viceroy nominated Sikh +
1 Viceroy nominated Unionist Muslim,

resulting in 7 Muslims in a Council of 14 and a clear minority of Hindus.

According to Durga Das Jinnah said he refused because of the inclusion of a Congress Muslim. Durga Das writes that Jinnah told him the real reason he refused because he had been secretly offered 'Pakistan on a platter' by some British civil servants for sabotaging the Wavell effort.


According to Viceroy Wavell (The Transfer of Power, ed. Nicholas Mansergh and Moon) the final formula which was rejected in 1945 Simla Conference was actually
4 Congress(all Hindus) +
4 League(all Muslims) +
1 Viceroy nominated Hindu +
1 Viceroy nominated Muslim(Unionist) +
2 Viceroy nominated Scheduled Caste +
1 Viceroy nominated Sikh +
1 Viceroy nominated Christian

resulting in 5 Muslims in a Council of 14

The Viceroy wrote that Jinnah refused this formula because of inclusion of the Unionist Muslim and because Muslims did not have parity with all the rest combined, ie Muslims did not get 50% or 7 berths.

It is to be remembered that during this period, Muslims constituted 25% of the population.


Communal veto in Central legislature

Under para 15(2) of the Cabinet Mission Plan(ref. CMP(3)),

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all members present and voting.


The Congress supported the provision of such a commmunal veto in the Union Constituent Assembly, but not in any future Union legislature. Jinnah was against the existence of any Union legislature, but wanted such a veto if such a Union legislature existed(CMP(2)).

A communal veto meant that a majority of each community, i.e., a majority of Hindus AND a majority of Muslims had to vote in favor of a measure for that measure to be passed in the legislature.

Here is an example of what separate communal voting in legislature implied in real numbers.

Suppose there were 78 Muslims and 214 General+ Sikh in a hypothetical future Union Legislative Assembly, taking same numbers as constituted the Constituent Assembly without the princely states.

Now suppose some country approached the Pakistan section of the Indian Union and promised it aid, and convinced it of the need to wage jihad in Afghanistan( a not inconceivable possibility). But though a majority of the Union legislature voted against it, 'Pakistani' Muslims, though a minority, went ahead and adopted the jihad policy and the Union of India could not stop them.

How did this happen? Under para 15(2) of the Cabinet Mission Plan.

The way it happened was
a)'Pakistani' Muslims said that the issue of whether to wage jihad in Afghanistan was a major communal issue.

So under para15 (2) separate communal voting had to be held in Union legislature (which decided matters on three subjects only - defence, foreign affairs and communications related to defence).

b)During this vote, 214 General+sikh voted against since they did not favor waging jihad in Afghanistan.

c)Some Muslims also voted against it but 'Pakistani' Muslims who were the majority of the 78 Muslims in Legislature voted FOR waging jihad.

d) Since the measure couldnot be passed unless a majority of both communities voted for it, the measure in favor of jihad did not pass.

e)But Muslims had had 50% weight in voting. Pakistani Muslims who had first brought up the issue said "islam was in danger again, because who the heck are nonMuslims to disallow jihad which is our farz and the Union can not stop us anyway".

Muslim League had already gotten the Indian Army dissolved and reconstituted on two-nation basis as Jinnah had demanded. So Pakistan and the Pakistan Army decided to launch jihad in Afghanistan against the wishes of the majority of India and the Union which could not prevent it.


f)Again, why couldn't the anti-jihad majority prevent it? Because the nonMuslim part of that dissenting majority though holding 214 seats had had only 50% say in the matter and the Muslim part of the dissenting majority was outvoted by the Pakistani Muslims in their section of 78 seats.

The Muslims and nonMuslims who opposed jihad though an overall overwhelming majority combined were forbidden from such combining by para 15(2) rule of Cabinet Mission Plan's insistence on separate communal voting.

Under this rule their votes were to be counted separately - the nonMuslims' no go votes counted for only 50% and the dissenting Muslims no go votes were outvoted by the Pakistani Muslims.

So the majority could not together garner a anti-jihad majority consensus to empower the Union government to prevent the minority Pakistani Muslims/Army from waging jihad in Afghanistan.

What were the numbers?

Under para 15(2), if only a majority of the Muslim members, in other words, 78/2+1 = 40 Muslims out of a total Union legislature of 292 voted in favor of Pakistani Army waging jihad in Afghanistan, no one in United India could stop them under the Cabinet Mission Plan.

Clearly it didn't matter what were the absolute numbers, one more than exactly half of the total Muslim members , whatever their number, were all that were needed.

In other words, the majority could not have the foreign policy it wanted but the minority could pursue the foreign policy it wanted in defiance of the majority and Union government. There is no meaning in such a federation and this situation would lead to an end of the federation.



http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/Parit...to_numbers.html

[acharya]

CMP(16) Intelligence assessment about Jinnah's options and the threat of civil war- September 1946.

Document included

* Intelligence Bureau (Home Department) enclosure sent by Viceroy Wavell to Lord Pethick-Lawrence. From 'The Transfer of Power 1942-47',Vol VIII, Mansergh and Moon, 1979(full text)


page 577, Enclosure to No. 360(full text)
Field Marshal Viscount Wavell to Lord Pethick-Lawrence 24 September 1946

Intelligence Bureau (Home Department)

Secretary has asked me for an appreciation of possible moves in the Muslim League field and of the consequences that might flow from them. In attempting this I necessarily base it on the assumption that Mr. Jinnah's talks with His Excellency the Viceroy have once again ended in failure to achieve agreement. An appreciation would otherwise be unnecessary.

2. Mr. Jinnah would appear to have before him the choice of three alternatives; first, to resile with such grace as he can muster from the precipice of civil war, secondly, to stall for time in which to improve his organisation, and, thirdly, to take a plunge into direct action.

3. The reasons that might prompt him to flinch from the third alternative are:-
(a) Fear or dislike of the bloodshed and butchery and, it may be, the chaos which will result.
(b) The hesitance of some of his immediate subordinates, not all of whom are men of action or wholly irresponsible.
© The proof afforded by the Calcutta carnage that it is the poor, including the Muslim poor, who suffer most from the savagery and from the aftermath of disorder.
(d) The realisation that his weapon is double-edged and that slaughter in East Bengal, West Punjab and in Sind of Hindus must be counterpoised by the slaughter of Muslims in other parts of India.
(e) The narrowness, if we exclude for the moment the basic irreconcilability of the one-nation and two-nation theories, of the present disagreement between Congress and the League.
(f) The recognition, through the lesson of Calcutta, that mutual murder need not ultimately and necessarily result in a strengthening of the League, but may instead prompt the thought of coalition among men of sober or sobered mind.
(g) The danger, ever present in the Punjab, of a competent riposte to League disorder from the turbulent Sikh minority.


4. On the other hand, the reasons which may prompt Mr. Jinnah to elect to fight are as strong, if not stronger. They include:-
(a) the matter of his personal pride and prestige which are heavily involved and which, if lowered, must weaken the League and invite defections.
(b) the thought that for the enforcement of a political principle so vital to the Muslims, bloodshed and butchery may well be a cheap price to pay.
© the inability to resist the impetus of a movement which he himself has so skilfully fostered and which is gathering powerful force from Muslim resentment and from religious incitement by Muslim Pirs;
(d) his confident reliance on the readiness of the vast bulk of Muslims in Government service, inclusive of the police and the army, to abandon service at his behest or to assist direct action in other ways;
(e) the pressure of some of his more hot-headed immediate subordinates particularly Mamdot and Daultana;
(f) his probable reliance on the support of Muslims in tribal territory which could without difficulty be induced to join in a jehad which promises the excitements of an incursion into North-Western India and of looting; and
(g) his possible hopes of support of the League from a section of the Scheduled Castes.

5. In brief, Mr. Jinnah may be tempted by the knowledge of his possession of a very strong weapon which, though double-edged, can inflict deep wounds on his opponent. If he feels that the threat of its use is unavailing, he may well employ its reality. It is strange to think that, in the present century, the settlement of a dispute can be contemplated through the arbitrament, not merely of civil war, but of an insane butchery which spares neither women nor children.

Nevertheless, the ghastly reality is there and it is beyond doubt that "jehad" is still an emotion of the Muslim mind and that relatively few Muslims will be found to resist its call, or to resist the pressure which sustains it. If, therefore, Mr. Jinnah does decide to plunge, the consequences will be of the gravest. The League has proclaimed its intention to keep "direct action" on the non-violent plane of non-co-operation and, until it announces its plans, it would perhaps be unwise to exclude absolutely its ability to do so; but, in the ordinary run of things, violence must result and must probably take on at least something of the character of a jehad.

6. The possibility continues that Mr. Jinnah may take the middle course of stalling for time. What may incline him in this direction is the very dreadfulness of any decision to fight and also need to discipline and improve his organisation for his purposes. There has been some talk of his going to England to place his case more directly before the British Cabinet and to canvass the support of British public opinion. If he does stall, there is some remote prospect of a lowering of the temperature of present Muslim agitation and of dissidence within the League. But it is far more likely that steps will taken to maintain the intensity of the movement even while he is out of India.

7. If we are to envisage the worst, as for the purposes of this appreciation we must, it becomes of importance to attempt to forecast the possible lines, both initial and as they develop, of direct action. So far, it would appear that nothing definite has been decided upon, but such indications as we have point to the use of some or all of the following methods:-
(a) Non-payment of land revenue and taxes, most probably in Muslim Majority areas and in strong minority areas of the type of Bombay City.
(b) Defiance of prohibitory orders.
© Boycott of Central and Provincial Assemblies.
(d) Picketing in one form or the other.
(e) Boycott of British goods.
(f) Use of the existence of Provincial League Governments to divorce connection with the Centre.
(g) Sabotage, the collection of arms and ammunition and acts of terrorism.

Not all of these methods must necessarily result in an immediate outbreak of violence, but most of them would and their sum total must provoke this effect. In this lies the weakness and perhaps the spuriousness of the League's protestation of non-violence. It must also be recognised clearly that any attempt by the Provincial Governments or the Centre to suppress this allegedly non-violent "direct action" must inevitably precipitate a physical decision, particularly in the Muslim-majority areas. An indefinite avoidance of suppressive action must equally induce, even though it postpones, ultimate disorder.

8. If such a situation develops, the police almost certainly require the strong support of troops from the outset. If the police and the troops stand firmly to their task, the situation, though very grave, would not, I think, be uncontrollable, although we might reasonably expect a repetition of Calcutta or worse in several areas. If we are extremely fortunate, these outbreaks of violence may produce their own reaction towards a peaceful adjustment. In Provinces under League Governments the position would not be so healthy, if I can so misapply this adjective.

The risk that Muslim troops and Muslim police functioning in Muslim-majority areas would break and even join the League in active disorder is very great. But, in respect of troops, my opinion cannot have the weight of that of D.M.I.

9. If Muslim police and Muslim troops abandon their functions and join in the general disorder, then an entirely different situation supervenes which becomes, or may be the prelude to, civil war. The fact that the forces behind the League would not have the support of British officers, of a General Staff which is wholly British and of certain ancilliary units, must tend to reduce their endeavour from formal operational warfare to the tactics of a guerilla army. If the forces behind the Central Government also lacked this support, they would suffer from an equal handicap. It is not for me to venture an opinion on the likely policy of His Majesty's Government in this context or on the resulting position militarily. But it is clear that developments in India may compel His Majesty's Government, and possibly at an early date, to state its policy.

10. Unless my appreciation up to this point has been unsound, it is not impossible that the Central Government may be faced with the need for a decision whether or not to attempt to use troops against the League in the knowledge that this might involve the disintegration of the Indian Army. The alternative of leaving the individual Hindu, Sikh or Muslim to defend himself by his individual prowess in the hope that, after bloodshed, sanity may return to men's minds, is horrific. Government may have in mind the use of economic or other sanction against revolting areas coupled with the suppression of trouble by force in Provinces where Muslim resistance is relatively weak. If so, it is desirable that the matter of such possible sanctions should be examined. It is for consideration, also, whether troops(not necessarily British) should not now be so disposed in areas where the gravest trouble is anticipated, as to afford the most effective insurance against an outbreak and the strongest means of dealing with it. A move of troops may precipates conflict by giving ground for it. But, if at any time trouble appears inevitable, it might be wiser to be forearmed than politic. But I am trespassing on ground which is not my own.

11. On the assumption that Muslim police and Muslim troops do not break under the religious urge of a jehad, measures to deal with "direct action" would probably follow very generally the lines adopted by past Governments in dealing with Congress mass action. I have not had opportunity or time to examine any Provincial text-book of such action but from my recollection the methods adopted would include:-
(a) declaration of branches of the League as unlawful associations under the Criminal Law Amendment Act. It hs to be remembered that, as the law now stands, the provisions of the Act are administered by Provincial Governments and not by the Centre;
(b) arrest of Mr. Jinnah and members of the League Working Committee;
© arrest of other leaders of Provincial importance;
(d) prohibition of meetings and processions. Such prohibition will be pointless unless the meetings and processions are actually broken up. Also, past experience is clearly shown that, if decisive action has to be taken, it should be taken at the earliest possible moment, before contempt of law and order feeds on its own immunity;
(e) suppression of the Muslim Press in so far as it advocates the cause of "direct action";
(f) confiscation and sale of property attached by reason of the non-payment of rent or land revenue;
(g) heavy extension of jail accomodation and heavy increase of jail staff;
and
(h)heavy increase in the number of police. Recruitment might not be easy in Muslim-majority areas.

12. It is for the Central Government to decide whether it will face up to the dangers of executing these measures and the risk that, in executing them, the uncontrollable situation of civil war may develop through the excitement of the Muslim servants of Government. The point has to be taken clearly that the past history of mass movements affords no accurate analogy with the present. The Governments of that time could rely on their own machinery of troops and army. This is not absolutely the case now. The appalling awkwardness of decision lies with Mr. Jinnah; but with him also rests the initiative. If he flinches, well and good; and there is some ground to hope for this. But, if not, Government are confronted with a most dangerous situation.

N.P.A. SMITH
Director.

(end quote)

Comment
A note on the 'reliability' of the Indian fighting Services with respect to a)Congress-inspired disturbances, b)'communal trouble not amounting to a Jehad' and c)'communal trouble amounting to a Jehad' was sent out by Commander-in-Chief General Auchinleck a few months earlier on May 2 1946, which can be found in 'The Transfer of Power', Vol VII 186 page 406.

http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/CMP16...ntCivilWar.html

[acharya]

http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/index.html

It is worthwhile for those interested in India's constitutional question in the pre-independence era to read for themselves primary sources on the Cabinet Mission Plan and related materials.

I have typed out full text and excerpts of discussions, letters, statements and speeches of the primary actors of that period- Congress, Muslim League and the British, and uploaded these to this website to make them accessible to a larger audience..

The main sources I have drawn from are

1. 'The Transfer of Power 1942-7' Eds, Nicholas Mansergh, E.W.Lumby and Penderel Moon.

2. 'Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47'. Selected by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, 1957

3. 'Speeches, 'Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam', Ed.Khurshid Yusufi, Bazm-i-Iqbal, Lahore.

My own thesis is that the Congress Party had to accept Partition of India as the best of only two bad choices offered by the Plan- a truncated sovereign Pakistan right then or a larger sovereign Pakistan after the British left, whose boundaries would pass through the outskirts of Delhi.

This is borne out by the British and Jinnah's insistence that Congress accept those provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan which specified the compulsory grouping of provinces into separate sections and those which specified that the proposed Indian Union have not one but two or more separate Constitution making bodies for all subjects except only three Union subjects defence, foreign affairs and communications.

These provisions meant that under the Cabinet Mission Plan the Pakistan sections B and C would for all practical purposes constitute an independent state with Hindustan/section A unable to prevent its secession at any point of time. The only way for Congress to prevent such a larger sovereign Pakistan from coming into being was to stress that grouping of provinces should not be compulsory. When that position was not accepted by the British or Jinnah, the Congress settled for the lesser evil, the smaller truncated Pakistan.

I believe the primary material supports my thesis of these being essentially the only two choices before the Congress and of Congress leaders including Gandhi, Maulana Azad, Nehru and Patel's being collectively aware of such.







Note: This collation would not have been possible without the help of my brother. Without his patient guidance and steady involvement it might have been impossible for me to navigate the oceans of material on this subject. The beautiful picture above was shot by him(click on it to enlarge).

11/05

[Mitra]

The Great Calcutta Killings of August 1946.

http://globalwebpost.com/farooqm/study_res...cutta_riot.html
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
The Great Calcutta Killing
(16th to 20th August)

Sir Francis Tuker

Courtesy: While Memory Serves
(London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 152-166



At the end of July 1946 I was ordered to Quetta to take part in a series of tactical  discussions, the prelude to more detailed discussions to be held at Camberley in mid-August under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Thereafter I was to take leave in England.
As I stepped into the home-bound 'plane at Karachi on the 4th August I was handed a newspaper, and with apprehension read on the front page that a new government had been installed in India-the Interim Government, under the leadership of Pandit Nehru. Some Muslims had been invited to accept office in this government. Nevertheless, Muslim feeling would without any doubt be inflamed against what they would consider to be their betrayal to a Hindu-led government. I knew then that all our forebodings of the months before would now be fulfilled. We had had our warnings of more trouble to come in Calcutta and I had, before I left Calcutta, ordered into that town reinforcements from outside-the 7th Worcestershire Regiment from Ranchi, the 1/3rd Gurkhas from Chittagong and 3/8th Gurkhas from north Bengal, Parbatipur. Before the storm broke the first two had arrived and the third was ready to entrain.

Political 'met' reports had kept trace of a pile-up of the weather ever since the February riots until now when brown cu-nimbus clouds were all about the sky.

I will first of all tell the tale of the Calcutta Killing1 for historical purposes in order to record the sequence of events. Thereafter, so that those who read may be able to absorb a little of the atmosphere which pervaded those dread events and so that they may be able to picture the people who were concerned in them, I tell some of the tale in extracts, in Appendix V, from the personal experiences of two of my officers. It is my object to present a truthful picture, a presentation of affairs in India hitherto only too seldom permitted to be seen by foreigners. Henceforth, with the end of British rule, these presentations will occur even less frequently than before. Only those who believe in living in a fool's paradise will attempt to push Reality into the wings, for its rightful place is in the centre of the stage and assuredly it will in good time, perhaps inconveniently, occupy that place. It is both leading player and central theme round which any human play must be written. One great reality of Indian politics has for years been communalism. But unfortunately the Congress Party hid it from the world, with the inevitable result that India today is decisively parted into at least two nations.

To shrink from perceiving the natural tendency of Hindustan towards an Asiatic form of Communism will lead to even greater catastrophe.

From February onwards communal tension had been strong.  Anti-British feeling was, at the same time, being excited by interested people who were trying to make it a substitute for the more important communal emotion. The sole result of their attempts was to add to the temperature of all emotions, and those emotions turned fatally towards heightening the friction between Hindus and Muslims. Biased, perverted and inflammatory articles and twisted reports were appearing in Hindu and Muslim newspapers, while the leading politicians and labour leaders continued no less irresponsible in their public utterances. All this boiled to fever pitch after Mr. Jinnah had announced on the 29th July that Direct Action would be observed throughout India on the 16th August. Direct action in India could only mean action by force as a protest against the decrees of the existing Government, that is, against what was considered to be inequitable treatment of the Muslims in the interests of the Hindus.

Every one of us fully understood that Direct Action Day would certainly be a day of extreme stress in Calcutta. Reports were flowing into our Intelligence Centres in Calcutta showing the ever mounting emotions of the two communities. Nevertheless, neither civil nor military officials thought that feeling would run any higher or take any more dire course than it had taken for the past month or two, for there had been many crises and at each one serious outbreaks had been expected but had not occurred. On the 9th August the Congress Party had celebrated Remembrance Day, which was to commemorate the start of the 1942 riots in Bengal, Bihar and the U.P.- riots which had nearly brought our armies to a standstill, fighting the Japanese on the Assam border. Remembrance Day had passed off peacefully.

For the first half of August, speeches of public men of both Congress and Muslim League at large meetings in Calcutta were inflammatory and violent in their character, all directed against the opposite community. On the 15th August, an acid debate took place in the Bengal Assembly when the Bengal government had announced its decision to make the 16th August, Direct Action Day, a public holiday. The debate showed how bitterly the Hindus resented this order. One of the causes for their resentment was that, up till now, the Congress had more or less possessed monopoly rights for imposing and enforcing hartals (the closing of shops), paralysing the whole of Calcutta's transport, and for strikes: they thus strongly resented the prospect of any other competitor, especially so formidable a bidder as the Muslim League, entering this highly coveted field of political exploitation.

Of the reports coming in to us about public speeches at this time, the following are three selections which show the sort of oratory that was being displayed.

Mr. Nazimuddin,2 l speaking to a Muslim meeting on the 11th August, was reported to have said that the Interim Government, without the support of the Muslim League, would before long certainly bring about a very serious clash between the communities. Although, he said, final plans for direct action had not yet been settled, there were scores of ways well known to Calcutta Muslims by which the League could make a thorough nuisance of themselves, not being bound to non-violence as was the Congress.

As a counter-blast to this, Mr. K. Roy, leader of the Congress Party in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, addressing a meeting at Ballygunge on the 14th, said that it was stupid to think that the holiday for Direct Action Day was being decreed by the Muslim Bengal government in order to avoid commotions. The holiday, with its idle folk, would create trouble, for it was quite certain that those Hindus who, still wishing to pursue  their business, kept open their shops, would be compelled by force to close them. From this there would certainly be violent djsturbance. But he advised the Hindus to keep their shops open and to continue their business and not to submit to a compulsory hartal. So Mr. Roy himself was setting the stage for the very clash that he feared. It is in the nature of all too many of the people of India that they are wont to provoke trouble rather than to be discreet and to compromise.

It was now the turn of the Sikhs, so at the same meeting a prominent local Sikh leader in a fighting address, recalled to the memory of the audience how in the communal riots of 1926 the Muslims had been soundly beaten. He announced that if rioting did start the Sikhs would back the Congress and between them they would give the Muslims a good thrashing. From this it would appear that he rather looked forward to a little battle.

So it can be seen that all those who were principally concerned were doing their best to prepare the lists for the coming joust. They could hardly have done better if they had had a combined committee to arrange the grisly tournament. As I have said, I had issued orders in July to bring three more battalions into Calcutta in order to see that the rules of the tourney were obeyed. From the examples of the riots of the previous November and February we thought that this considerable reinforcement would suffice.

On the 12th August Brigadier Mackinlay, commanding the Fortress, ordered all those units which were on an Internal Defence role to be confined to barracks and drastically restricted military movement in Calcutta for the 16th. Later, he confined all troops to barracks from the early morning of the 16th August.

'Caterpillar' broadcasts, which were our usual Internal Defence information broadcasts to all troops in Calcutta, started before 8 a.m. on the 16th and went on throughout the disturbances. August 16th, a warm, sticky, familiar day in the monsoon, broke quietly over Calcutta. The buses, taxis and rickshaws plied their trade as usual. The trams were not running as the Tramway Workers' Union always managed to add to our difficulties and to the crowd on the pavements by declaring a one-day strike whenever trouble was coming, so that their employees might not miss the spectacle.

At 7:30 a.m. we heard that Hindus had erected barricades at the Tala and Belgachia bridges to prevent Muslims from entering the city and taking their processions to the middle of the town to the Ochterlony Monument where a mammoth Muslim assembly was to be addressed at 3 p.m. by Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, the Chief Minister of Bengal. Brigadier Mackinlay, as usual, visited Police Headquarters at Lal Bazaar about 9 a.m., finding the police not unduly worried and forecasting that, though there would be incidents, violence would not be on a great scale. The worst time was expected to be in the afternoon when the meeting broke up. During the morning the anticipated incidents occurred. Houses were burned in the north and east of Calcutta, probably due to Muslim leaders compelling Hindu shopkeepers to close their shops, and the rank and file pulling people off their bicycles and off the buses. The Hindus, on their side, were trying to prevent Muslim processions from marching through Hindu quarters of the city on their way to the meeting. Brigadier Mackinlay's impressions as to the likely extent of the trouble were confirmed on his visit about midday to the civil officials, the Inspector General, Deputy Commissioner and the Additional Secretary to the Government. The police were satisfied, although the incidents were widespread at the time, that they could deal with whatever was to come without aid from the soldiers.

Up to two o'clock the crowds were gathering round the Ochterlony Monument and our Intelligence patrols were out covering the town. Incidents were occurring. The police about Sealdah and Bow Bazaar at the north side of the city had opened fire once and used tear-gas to disperse violent mobs bent oil communal strife. Just before 3 p.m., on application from the police, the Fortress Commander ordered the York and Lancaster Regiment to be ready at once to move to Sealdah. At 3 p.m. Brigadier Sixsmith, acting as Area Commander, met the Governor and the Commissioner of Police. The last named said that the situation was out of hand because, although the police could disperse the crowds, they re-formed directly his patrols had passed on. The Governor at once set off with Brigadier Sixsmith and the Commissioner of Police to have a look at the town for himself. They saw hooliganism but nothing yet to warrant the application of military force; however, they found good reason why the soldiers should be held ready to move directly they were required. All agreed that when the soldiers came in they would keep open the main roads, freeing the police from these roads for other and more detailed work. The York and Lancaster Regiment was therefore sent at once to a position of readiness in the Sealdah Transit Camp.

Meanwhile, an immense Muslim crowd was gathered about the Ochterlony Monument and Mr. Suhrawardy was addressing them. Our patrols reported that he said that the Cabinet Mission was a bluff, and that he would see how the British could make Mr. Nehru rule Bengal. Direct Action Day would prove to be the first step towards the Muslim struggle for emancipation. He advised them to return home early and said that he had found Muslims peaceful in the course of his passage through the town and that he had made all arrangements with the police and military not to interfere with them.

Our intelligence patrols noticed that the crowd included a large number of Muslim goondas, and that these slipped away from the meeting from time to time, their ranks being swelled as soon as the meeting ended. They made for the shopping centres of the town where they at once set to work to loot and burn Hindu shops and houses.

Hitherto, south Calcutta had remained comparatively quiet, as it had been in the February riots. But shops were closed and feelings were tense.

At 4.15 p.m. Fortress H.Q. sent out the codeword 'Red' to indicate that there were incidents all over Calcutta.

There was now the usual demand on the part of the administration for more troops and for the troops to picket all over the town. This demand has been put forward in every big riot I have ever witnessed. Brigadier Sixsmith gave Mr. Suhrawardy the usual reply that the troops best fulfilled their task by keeping open the main routes and increased their effectiveness most economically by throwing out mobile patrols from these main arteries. In this way the greatest number of police were released for their proper duty of preventing crowds uniting on the main routes and at the nodal points.

The situation was clear in the neighbourhood of the areas dominated by the troops but, as was later apparent, obscure, for lack of information, in the bustee (slum) areas.

At 6 p.m. curfew was clamped down allover the riot-affected districts. At 8 p.m. the Area Commander received a sudden demand for troops in the Howrah area. He brought in the 7th Worcesters and the Green Howards from their barracks in the north of the town. This is what they saw.

As they drove in they found CoIlege Street Market ablaze, the few unburnt houses and shops completely sacked; the road outside was strewn with charred embers, empty shoe boxes, broken furniture and other litter; the air was heavy with the fumes of gas shells the police were using to disperse the crowds. In Amherst Street looters had dragged a safe into the road and had succeeded in opening it before they were disturbed. In Upper Circular Road 'fire-bugs' were dragging lighted pieces of kerosene-soaked sacking across the road to start fresh fires, the remainder of the mob cheering them on and looting until the fires became too hot. At this time there was no evidence of the terrible killings that had taken place; the streets were clear of bodies.

At one place in Harrison Road an agitated man dashed out of a garage and after stopping the Company Commander's carrier, proceeded to pick shotgun pellets out of his leg with a penknife, the while he told how his petrol pumps had been raided by goondas. After concluding his story he solemnly presented the officer with the pellets and, with a prayer that the troops keep a close eye on his garage, disappeared into the bosom of his family, who were apparently unhurt, but who wailed loudly and incessantly either in support of his story or in sympathy for his injury. Later on, at about 5 a.m., things seemed much quieter, and it was not until well after daybreak that dead bodies began to appear in the streets and killings started afresh. It often happened that one passed along a clear street but on return five minutes later discovered several bodies, sometimes in the road, sometimes loaded on coolie barrows. Many of the bodies were newly dead, but not a killing was actually witnessed at that time.

At 3.30 p.m. the three British battalions then operating performed a combined sweep and entirely dominated the centre of the city. Curfew was imposed and at 10 p.m. we withdrew one of the battalions to Fort William to rest before further operations on the following day.

Night brought with it little cessation of the rioting, only the Roza celebrations, the daylong fast, drawing Muslims off the streets for their meals after dark. The storm had burst and this time brought with it a torrent. February's killings had shocked us all but this was different: it was unbridled savagery with homicidal maniacs let loose to kill and kill and to maim and burn. The underworld of Calcutta was taking charge of the city.

The York and Lancaster Regiment cleared the main routes about Sealdah and threw out patrols to free the police for work in the bustees. But the looting and murder went on in the alleys and kennels of the town. The police were not controlling it. Daylight showed not a sign of bus or taxi : rickshaws were battered and burnt: there were no means for clerks to get to their work. With the banks on strike for this one day, the 17th, there were all the more idle men loafing about the town.

In the middle of the morning, Sir Frederick Burrows set out with Brigadier Sixsmith, Brigadier Mackinlay and a military patrol to tour the afflicted areas. In Harrison Road they found big fires burning and large mobs assembled. The patrol went at them and quickly dispersed them, driving straight on through rioters carrying loaded sticks and sharpened iron bars. They scattered to right and left and the Governor's party drove through, but it was obvious that their mood was thoroughly dangerous. Returning by another route, the party saw a man being beaten to death less than a hundred yards away and ordered the police to take action at once. The police were slowto get out of their vehicles and before they had come into action three people were beaten down and lay dead on the road. A British police sergeant dispersed the mob with one shot.

At 11.30 a.m. the escort to the Governor stopped at the junction of Harrison Road and Amherst Street. There was a large crowd to the south in Amherst Street which dispersed as troops and police debussed and advanced towards them. To demonstrate to the Governor how the mobs re-formed, the police and troops withdrew to their vehicles, out of sight in Harrison Road, upon which the people came out of the side streets again and advanced to within thirty yards of the Governor's party. Troops and police appeared once more and the mob rapidly retreated, leaving a freshly-stabbed man in the middle of the road where they had been standing.

The night's rioting had been fierce but the bloodiest butchery of all had been between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. on the 17th, by which time the soldiers got the worst areas under control. During this period the south of Calcutta was set ablaze with the fury that had caught the north and centre: swords were being used and the crowds were charging madly hither and thither. Motor patrols of the 1/3rd Gurkhas drove into the melee. More and more dead lying in the flood of spouting watercocks were seen by our Intelligence patrols as they scoured the city. Police reports were coming in of heavy fighting allover the town and of police intervention with bullets and gas. The pall of smoke from burning buildings spread overhead between the horror below and the light monsoon clouds of heaven. The dust and the sickening noise of killings rolled out from Garden Reach, Kidderpore, Metia Bruz, Beliagatia and along Lower Circular Road. Looting and destruction were in full blast all about Park Street. European householders could not leave their houses: there they and their families sat, besieged and living on the tinned foods of their store cupboards.

C.D.L. tanks with strong searchlights joined the troops at dusk and the eerie flickering of their lights as they passed from street to street playing on the dead and on the devastation in which they died, made a Dore's Inferno of Calcutta.

In the early hours of the 18th, the 1/3rd Gurkhas moved into the Dock area. From then onwards the area of military domination of the city was increased. Static guards took over from police guards and a party of troops under Major Littleboy, the Assistant Provost-Marshal, did valuable work in the rescue organisation for displaced and needy persons. Outside the 'military' areas, the situation worsened hourly. Buses and taxis were charging about loaded with Sikhs and Hindus armed with swords, iron bars and firearms.

At midday, the Governor and the Army Commander set out on a tour of the city with the Chief Secretary and Mr. Suhrawardy, escorted by a combined police and military patrol. Except in the bustee areas there were no fresh mobs, but in the bustees looting, arson and murder held their horrible sway. Wherever the party stopped, hostile crowds closed in on them and heads appeared on the housetops above. One Muslim shouted to the Chief Secretary, , But you must not shoot: you will disturb the peace of our city'!

Mr. Suhrawardy was eager to expose the depredations of Hindus against his co-religionists, pointing an accusing finger at peaceful men and charging them with lying in wait for Muslims. He was asked why Hindus and Muslims could not live in friendship in civil life when they managed so well in the Army. Mr. Suhrawardy replied that Hindu and Muslim unity would not exist very much longer in the Army. He was right and we knew it. Directly the British officer left the mixed mess of Hindu and Muslim officers would part into two cliques and the parting would soon be reflected among the men.

Police and soldiers were getting tired, and the load of quelling the violence was falling more and more on the troops as the police wearied and lost heart. Raj Mohan, Jorasanko and Tarachand Dutta Streets and Baowanipore in the south fell into pandemonium. Military patrols rushed in and opened fire, wounding two of the crowd. At 3 p.m. the Command ordered the 5th Division to reinforce Calcutta from Ranchi and ordered the Norfolks in from Ramgarh and the 3/8th Gurkhas from Parbatipur in North Bengal.

On Sunday, 18th August, the York and Lancaster Regiment  again left the Fort to relieve a battalion in the dominated area. However, just as they were moving out they learnt of serious trouble in north Calcutta, in the Shampuka and Jorabagan Thanas, and received their orders to move to that area and to take over control. Everything was quiet and seemed normal until they crossed Vivekananda Road, going north of Chitpur Road. The state of things from there on beggared description. Furniture, bedding, boxes and  household articles of all kinds littered the road so that even the two light tanks which were leading the column had to pick their way; indeed some of the wheeled vehicles had to stop to clear debris before they could pass. Corpses became more frequent, and on the Gray Street-Chitpur Road crossing the leading tanks had to stop so that troops mounted on them could clear some of the bodies to one side to give room for vehicles to pass and disperse a fighting mob. Over one hundred and fifty bodies were cleared from this cross-road the next day and it was here that one of the chief goondas of Calcutta died fighting with a knife in each hand. His green three-ton truck was standing in Gray Street and proved of great use in the street clearing which was soon to follow. Three hundred yards farther up the Chitpur Road there had been another pitched battle and over a hundred bodies remained to witness the fact. In Central Avenue, by a Hindu temple and in the surrounding street entrances, there were another forty dead. All in all there had been what must have been the worst carnage in the city.

Early in the evening our men found a small Muslim bustee in the Bag-Bazaar Street which had been burnt down; the occupants had either fled or had been killed, the dead bodies of three children bearing evidence of the crime. The interesting part of this incident is that from three different sources we were informed that the burning of this bustee was the work of nine goondas who were paid by a named person living in the neighbourhood.

On closer inspection of the bodies in this area we found that many were horribly mutilated and in one particular place a man had been tied by his ankles to a tramway electric junction box, his hands were bound behind his back and a hole had been made in his forehead so that he bled to death through the brain. He was such a ghastly sight that it was a wonder that the soldiers who were ordered to cut him down and cover him with a nearby sack,  were not ill on the spot.

The rest of that night passed without incident and in the morning the battalion had  opportunity to probe beyond the streets which had occupied all its attention in the remaining hours of daylight the previous day.

This probing brought to light only one important fact that had not been discovered the previous night. There were the odd bodies in sacks and dustbins that were beginning to make their presence known, but the big discovery was that of the wholesale slaughter in the Sobhabazaar Market. The Market itself was strewn with bodies, and the tiny hovels of the shopkeepers which bounded it held gruesome evidence of the awful conflict. One room contained fifteen corpses and another twelve, but those two rooms were outstanding. At the western end of the bazaar there had been a rickshaw stand. The rickshaws had been smashed to bits and it appeared that the pullers had been massacred in toto. From among this shambles we rescued two live children, both wounded and one already gangrenous. As might be expected they were dazed and seemed half-witted; their mental and moral  systems must have sustained a shock which might easily have driven them mad. They would never be the normal people they could have been. The doctor did his best with their  wounds and sent them into hospital. Bodily they would mend, but mentally-a shrug of the shoulders was his verdict. Most of the dead in that market had not had the remotest idea what was happening or why.

On the afternoon and night of the 18th August the Calcutta garrison made one supreme effort and gained complete control of north Calcutta. With this success they then turned their hand to clearing the city of its dead, shepherding lost persons into the Refugee Camp and restoring confidence.

The next day, with encouragement from officers and men, shopkeepers started cautiously to open their shops and efforts were made to induce tramway workers to return to duty. Incidents continued throughout the day but it did seem that the lunatic fury of Calcutta's population had worn itself out. The stench of their murderous work of barely three days was terrible, particularly about Sealdah station, the area of which Major Livermore tells in his story in Appendix V.

On the 19th more work was done in clearing the streets and in general rescue work of destitute and injured. The Chief Minister, who throughout was more critical than helpful, alleged that the Military Rescue Service was ineffective. This meant that his staff had to be taken round to be shown what that Service was doing before they could be convinced.

The south flared up and the East Lancashire Regiment was sent there to damp it down.

In the evening the 4/7th Rajput Regiment and 3/8th Gurkhas arrived: our anxieties were now at an end. There were fresh troops to replace the tired battalions. Indian Pioneer Companies were ordered in to help clear the streets.

Bit by bit police patrols were taken out by the military and hour by hour by this means the police gained confidence and resumed their duties in the streets.

That is the bare outline of this manifestation of berserk fury. The one thing that stressed itself time and again was that had the police only known the extent of the strife that raged in the gullies and bustees on the night of the I6/I7th and on the morning of the I7th itself,  troops would have been demanded earlier and the tumult more quickly quelled. In the palmy days of the Calcutta police, this information would have been gained and passed back far sooner than it was.

I do not know-no one knows-what the casualties were. On one night alone some four hundred and fifty corpses were cleared from the streets by the three British battalions. For days afterwards bodies were being recovered from sewers and tanks. All one can say is that the toll of dead ran into thousands.

By the 22nd August, despite the continuance of isolated killings, and the occasional dispersal of growing crowds, Calcutta was quiet.

The Army had had a grim time, the grimmest being the clearing of dead from the battlefield. It had served Calcutta well, not only by the use of force on the streets but also in its rescue and medical work. Our doctors had issued 7,500,000 units of anti-tetanus serum to the Surgeon General of Bengal. To no small extent our administrative services had helped to feed the city. For a short time the city was grateful to the soldiers but not for long. Newspaper attacks on the Army, unfounded allegations, began once more to appear in due time.

Trouble was now raising its head in Eastern Bengal and the 1/3rd Gurkhas were ordered off to Chittagong on the 22nd August. The Battalion reached Chittagong on the 24th to find that place in a highly inflamed condition, casualties up to the previous evening amounting to forty-five. 

Notes:

See Map No. 2, p. 155.
See p. 380.
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[Bharatvarsh]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Horrors Of Noakhali Massacre Of October, 1946

By:V.S. Godbole

150,000 unarmed Hindu men women and children were massacred by fully
armed Mohammedans in Chittagong and Noakhali (now in Bangladesh) in
October, 1946. After reading the news, Mr. Vishnupant Karkare of
Nagar, Maharashtra decided to travel to Noakhali to bring help to
the victims of the atrocities. He was joined by 11 other volunteers
(6 from Maharashtra, 1 from Punjab and 4 from Bengal). On his return
he published a booklet in December 1946. Here is a summary of his
eye-witness account.

* I traveled from Nagar to Nagpur, then to Raipur, addressed a
meeting of 7,000 in Raipur, got extracts from Savarkar's drama
Sanyast Khadga (Abandoned Sword) printed in Hindi as a message for
Bengali Hindus.

* I traveled from Nagpur to Calcutta. I soon realized how the Muslim
League government was harassing those Hindus who were trying to help
those affected by Moslem riots. Such helpers were not even released
on bail! I attended the relief center at Budge Budge - a suburb of
Calcutta. The refugees were grateful to receive clothing from
Maharashtra. I met an old Brahmin priest from Noakhali. Eight
members of his family were killed by Moham-medans. Only his mother
and the two children of his brother survived.

* The game of badminton was popular in Calcutta at the time. Despite
the news of Noakhali there was no suspension of badminton playing. I
visited two/three clubs and discussed the Noakhali riots with the
members. They said: "Oh well, the British rulers are behind these
riots. There is not much we can do." Despite having witnessed Moslem
riots in Calcutta itself just three months earlier, they were quite
unconcerned about the fate of the Hindus of Noakhali.

* I was shocked by the reception given to us by Dr. Shyamaprasad
Mookerjee. Even after learning that Karkare and the others had come
all the way from Maharashtra, hundreds of miles away to help, he
said: "Have you come to see a cinema? Do you want to write a story?
and so on." After calming down, he said: "What we need are fearless
volunteers who would go to riot affected areas. I welcome persons
like you. The irony is that it is the Hindu Mahasabha which is
offering all the help, but if elections were held today, the same
people would vote for the Congress party!"

* With my group I went to the Sealdah station to catch the
Chittagong Mail to Noakhali. At the station, I saw hundreds of
Moslem guards (of Jinnah). But there were also Hindu relief centers
flying the Bhagwa Dhwaj and working fearlessly alongside. There were
centers run by Veer Abhimanyu Sangh, Bharat Seva Sangh, National
Youth Center, Marwari Hindu Society and the Arya Samaj. The Congress
Party ran no such relief centers.

* Ours was the first batch of volunteers to go to the help of the
Hindus at Noakhali. The Mohammedans were surprised to see Hindu
Mahasabha flags and the slogans of Hindutva. The last railway
station was Goalundo. We traveled to Chandpur by boat. The first
batch of volunteers sent by the Hindu Mahasabha included an editor
of a Daily Newspaper of Calcutta. He had noted:

"Many people flocked to Chandpur after the Moslem inspired riots in
Noakhali. They were stranded, some four days waiting for a boat to
Calcutta. Boats had a limited capacity. The people were starving.
Hindus of Chandpur tried to give them food, but the Muslim League
government threatened them by saying: "If you give them food it will
mean that you have plenty of food and you will lose your ration
cards." Many refugees had no change of clothing. The only clothes
were those that they had on their persons when they fled.

"I was astonished to see the barbarity of Moslems even in Chandpur.
They distributed poisoned bananas (called chavai) to hungry refugees
who ate them eagerly. The poison had the effect of increasing body
heat, caused a burning sensation. Many died this way; there were
many children among the dead.

"Some 7,000 refugees starved to death at Faridganj. I saw Hindu
shops and properties looted and burnt. Moslems threatened that
anyone giving medical help to the Hindus will be killed."

Karkare continues:

* At Chandpur, we distributed whatever clothes we had with us. We
translated important parts of Veer Savarkar's play Sanyasta Khadga,
from Marathi to Bengali and distributed thousands of copies to
Hindus. However, people had been so brainwashed by the preaching of
non-violence for the last 25 years that they just could not believe
that Hindus could resist aggression.

* After Chandpur, we visited Daulatganj, Vipula, Sonaimuro and other
villages. Not one Hindu was alive in those places. At Sonaimuro, all
Hindus who had refused to embrace Islam were killed and buried.
Mohammedans proudly opened up the ditches and showed us the recently
buried dead bodies. They said: "This is how we will take Pakistan."

* We traveled to Chaumuhanis and Lakhipur - where the atrocities
surpassed those of Chengiz Khan and Aurangzeb. 25 Hindu virgins were
stripped naked and paraded in town. They were subjected to
indescribable violations. One and a half mile away there is a
village called Dalal Bazar. One famous Hindu Roy family lived there.
He had at least 80 kilos of gold and diamonds and valuables worth
millions. It is incredible that although he had 7 licensed guns in
his house, he fled without firing a single shot and left his women
and children in the hands of the Mohammedan hoodlums.

* I visited the following villages around Laxmapuri - Nandigram,
Hajiganj, Shreepur, Badalpur, Dattapara, Khilpada, Paikpada,
Ratanpur, Raipur, Panchamgwada, Langchar, Korpara, Gayagram,
Sapalipara, Silchur, Bamani, Karava, Mashinpur, Chandpur, Dharmapur,
Vasantpur, Bhavanipur, Samcharbad, Daxnahamchandi, Ababil, Rampur
and Shreeramganj.

The fantasy of economic fight:

* I must emphatically state that the riots and the massacre of
Hindus had no economic basis. It was purely and simply an attack on
Hindus by the Mohammedans. The affected Hindus came from all
backgrounds; there were congressites, socialists, communists,
followers of the Hindu Mahasabha; rich and poor; educated as well as
illiterate. The attackers were all Moslems of all kinds: ex-MLAs
like Golam Sarwar, government officers of all ranks and laborers.
They were united solely by the hatred for Hindus.

Some inspiring incidents:

* Paniala is a small village in Ramganj thana. One Priya Lal was a
simple middle class man. His wife was beautiful. A Mohammedan
hoodlum demanded that he should give away his wife to him. Priya Lal
was enraged. He snatched the sword of the hoodlum and killed him. A
fight ensued. As Priya Lal was outnumbered, his wife pleaded with
him to kill her first to save her from dishonor. Priya Lal did that
and later killed himself.

* Pachgaria is another village nearby. Babu Upendra Kumar Roy was a
wellknown Hindu. He was not a follower of the Hindu Mahasabha. He
was told to embrace Islam and let his beautiful niece Arati Devi
marry a Mohammedan youth. If they had fled, all the Hindus of the
entire village would be killed. He tried to buy off the Mohammedan
hoodlums. They accepted the money but still inisted on their
demands. All the members of the family decided to commit suicide.
Moslems intervened. Arati was forcibly married to the Mohammedan
youth in the presence of police superintendent Abdullah. The
District Officer Macmillan was stunned by the affair. He intervened
and saved the lady and her family from dishonor.

* Veer Rajendra Lal Roy Chowdhari:

Korpara, Post Ramganj, District Noakhali. Chowdhari was Chairman of
the Bar Association. After the massacre of Hindus in Calcutta
(August 16, 1946) it was only a matter of time when similar calamity
would befall Noakhali where Hindus were only 12% of the population.
On Sept. 9, 1946, Mohammedans under Golam Sarwar came barging in
Korpara. Chowdhari's Mohammedan servants asked him to run away to a
place of safety. He refused. Next day, the Moslems attacked his
house. Rajendra Lal and Swami Tryambakanand bluntly said: "We will
fight to the finish." Chowdhari used his gun. The Swami escaped with
his wife, led her to the safety of Ramganj police station and sent
telegrams to the Viceroy and important officials. 11 members of the
Chowdhari family died fighting. 9-year-old Dilipkumar was saved by
servant Yashoda Day. All the family members died fighting or were
burnt to death. They did not surrender.

* Shayestanagar:

Chittaranjan Das Gupta. He removed his wife and children to a place
of safety. But his mother refused to escape. Gupta fought with
Mohammedan attackers, killed 168 Moslems with his rifle. When only
two bullets were left, he shot his mother Durgadevi and then shot
himself to death.

THERE ARE MANY SUCH EXAMPLES OF HINDU HEROISM. WE SHOULD ALWAYS
REMEMBER THEM.

* Example of a courgeous Hindu woman:

In Lengchar, a Hindu woman was kidnapped by seven Mohammedan thugs.
They used to lock her up in a house and rape her at night. Somehow
our message of resistance to aggression reached her. She made a
cunning plan. One night she prepared a nice meal for all the thugs.
When they were fast asleep, she set the house on fire. She stood by
at the door and did not let any one escape. Her message was
clear; "if you dare kidnap a Hindu woman, you will have to pay for
it with your life." It was understood by the Mohammedans, at least
in this instance. It was such heroic deeds and Hindu reprisals in
Bihar that stopped Moslem fanticism, not Gandhi's non-violence.

............................................

Acharya Kripalani - President of the Congress Party, after his tour
of Noakhali wrote:

"A MESSAGE TO BENGAL"

I am clearly of the opinion that whatever the Government,
Provincial or Central, may or may not do, every Bengalee, male or
female, has to defend himself or herself by whatever means he or she
can think of. In this connection, I could keep before every Bengalee
the example of Shri Rajendra Lal Roy and his family who defied a mob
for full two days and fell fighting. Even as a believer in the
absolute non-violence, I hold that the resistance offered by Shri
Rajendra Lal Roy and his family, was the nearest approach to non-
violence.

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