06-21-2005, 07:31 AM
We remain blind to reality
The Asian Age India | Govind Talwalkar
The propensity of our politicians, past and present, not to see and face the reality, is phenomenal although there were times when some of our leaders rose to the occasion to face the same. This refusal to come to terms with the reality is also true about several historians and commentators. The storm which BJP president L.K. Advani is facing because of some of his remarks is the latest instance of this tendency. Advani did not say that Jinnah was a secular leader. He said Jinnah wanted a secular Constitution. This is a matter of public record. So why the furore?
Nevertheless, by commending Jinnah's Constituent Assembly speech, Advani has indirectly admitted the desirability of such a Constitution in preference of the philosophy which he has been professing all his life. Though the Sangh Parivar might have felt betrayed because of this, Advani for a moment has admitted the reality. But this does not guarantee that he would stick to this position and would not revert to rousing the rabid communal elements, his mainstay in politics.
As Advani has declared, the partition of the country is a settled fact, and he might induce a renewed discussion of this phenomenon along with the Hindu-Muslim problem.
The Hindu-Muslim problem dogged our leaders from the inception of the Indian National Congress. They made it an inclusive organisation, and in spite of strong opposition from Sayyid Ahmed, scores of Muslim leaders joined this national endeavour. However, after two decades, as political reforms were in the offing, Muslims and other minorities staked their separate claims. The Muslim League was formed and when Gokhale was meeting John Morley, secretary of state for India, Amir Ali, a retired judge and a staunch Leaguer, was prevailing upon the bureaucrats in the secretary of state's office to concede special status to Muslims.
Gokhale had the courage to admit this reality, and so he accepted a separate electorate. His colleagues like Surendranath Banerjea initially endorsed the new scheme but at Congress sessions separate electorates were strongly denounced even by Banerjea.
As for Lokmanya Tilak, after his release from Mandalay prison, he did not oppose separate electorates but signed a pact in Lucknow with the Muslim leaders including Jinnah. This pact gave Muslims reserved seats in the provincial legislatures and also in the central legislative assembly. But within some months several leaders from both of the communities moved away from the Lucknow Pact. By this time Mahatma Gandhi had started playing a leading role in national politics.
Muslim leaders were agitated over the British treatment of the Sultan of Turkey who was also a Khalifa. Mahatma Gandhi joined them and started the Non-Cooperation Movement. Mahatma Gandhi's objective was noble. He thought that this movement would forge Hindu-Muslim unity. But Jinnah was not enthusiastic about Khilafat and was opposed to mass agitation and the total boycott of the government including courts and educational institutions. At Congress' Nagpur session, Jinnah was ridiculed which he could not forget for a long time.
It is noteworthy that though Hindu-Muslim unity and the removal of untouchability were the two main planks of the Mahatma, he failed to garner the support of the two most important Muslim and Dalit leaders â Jinnah and Dr B.R. Ambedkar.
While considering the political developments after the advent of Mahatma Gandhi, several factors are lost sight of, or not given proper importance, including the personal prejudices and predilections of the leaders and also their egos. Besides, though the Mahatma revolutionised politics, India did not follow the path of armed revolution. It was civil disobedience, and not revolution. Thus, the Satyagraha movements ended in a compromise and not the overthrow of the British government. The 1930 and 1932 movements resulted in the Round Table conferences and the Act of 1935, which brought in provincial autonomy.
While Gandhiji thought that his civil disobedience movements and emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity would bring the two major communities together, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was quite certain that it was not religion but economic conditions and urges that would unite Hindus and Muslims. Both Gandhi and Nehru were inspired by noble vision, but the problem was that of a share in the power, which the constitutional reform measures offered. Since the ensuing negotiations had to involve several parties, including the British government and a compromise had to be arrived at, an ideal solution could not be found.
Elections to the provincial Assemblies under the 1935 Act brought in Congress ministries in several provinces and the League in none. In the United Province, the Congress and the League leaders had prolonged negotiations with a view to form a coalition government. The Congress agreed to include Khaliq-uz-Zaman but declined to accept Nawab Ismail Khan, who represented the zamindars. As the Congress was wedded to land reforms, it could not accommodate Ismail Khan. Besides, the League refused to abide by the principle of collective responsibility. Jinnah demanded 33 per cent of seats in the ministry. Afterwards Khaliq-uz-Zaman wrote to Nehru objecting to the Congress putting up Muslim candidates in the reserved constituencies. This resulted in the failure of the negotiations, and a coalition ministry could not be formed.
Nehru was blamed for this failure, which was totally wrong. Even Maulana Azad held Nehru responsible, forgetting that it was he and Govind Ballav Pant who held negotiations with the League. It was not that Nehru alone opposed the inclusion of Nawab Ismail Khan in the ministry; UP Congress was not so inclined either. Moreover, Congress did not want to concede the demand of giving up the principle of collective responsibility. As the League did not form a ministry in any province, Jinnah adopted an extremist position and started playing the communal card contrary to his politics of previous decades.
The Second World War came in 1940; and the League, under the leadership of Jinnah, demanded a separate state for the Muslims. This Pakistan resolution was vague but it evoked strong feelings among the Muslim masses. Nehru, under the influence of Marxism, dismissed the demand as reactionary and thought that the interests of the Muslim masses were economic. Later he predicted that even if Pakistan came into being, it would dissolve with the first touch of reality. But Nehru's socialist beliefs made him oblivious of the reality. He could not gauge the strength of the appeal of religion. Jinnah's position became unassailable because of the appeal to the religious feelings of the Muslim masses, being bolstered by the policies of the British government.
Nehru and Sardar Patel were mainly held responsible for the partition of the country. Dr Lohia branded them as the "guilty men" and Lohiaites to this day are carrying on that pathological legacy, being vengeful not only against Nehru but also against his family. But in reality, Nehru and Patel represented Congress' policies and accepted partition, as there was no alternative. Lohia wanted us to believe that Gandhiji was opposed to partition. Gandhiji, of course, tried his best to avoid partition but Jinnah was not willing to oblige. It should also be remembered that after the Pakistan resolution was adopted by the League, Gandhi declared that if Muslims were bent upon exercising the right of self-determination, he, as a democrat, would not oppose it.
The demand for partition was based on the right of self-determination. This same right was accepted ultimately by Nehru and Sardar Patel. Gandhiji's path was not that of Abraham Lincoln who waged a war against the secessionist Southerners. Gandhiji, therefore accepted the right of self-determination. This he did in 1940 and Jinnah had nothing more to do than keep insisting on the same right. Nehru and Patel reluctantly accepted the reality. Jinnah was confused by Gandhiji's statements about the demand for Pakistan and showed a file of such statements to a senior Congress leader (probably Rajaji) asking him to clarify them.
Both Nehru and Patel are unnecessarily blamed for the rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which, critics say, might have maintained a united India. Some critics are indulging in idolatry of geography, while some Muslim commentators blamed Jinnah for leaving behind millions of Muslims in India without any safeguards in place. Jinnah would have replied that he did not claim to be a Muslim leader, but was an advocate of the Muslims. Besides, Muslims in the rest of India were free to migrate. He was not averse to the exchange of population. Of course, this was impractical.
The Cabinet Mission Plan was fraught with numerous handicaps. It would have made the Centre too weak and the states would have fallen apart. It is said that united Bengal and Punjab would have provided safeguards to the Muslims. But there was also a possibility of constant strife and communal riots. We have the example of the Bengali Muslims from East Bengal, who could not be accommodated by the Punjabi Muslims and therefore, broke away from Pakistan. Under the Cabinet Mission Plan there would have been many more divisions.
Several years ago, I had many discussions with H.V. Hodson, author of The Great Divide, and reforms commissioner under Lord Mountbatten. He agreed that the Cabinet Mission scheme was very complicated and thus was unworkable. It would have also created uncertainty, he felt.
As in the past, we are still blind to reality. Both the Kashmir problem and the border dispute with China need a bold and realistic approach. They should not be made the object of partisan politics. Even if Indian and Pakistani leaders talk of goodwill and improved relations, there is no let-up in the violence in Kashmir. There is no doubt that Pakistan is still a training ground for terrorists who cross over to Kashmir. Even American administrations friendly with Pakistan had to rein in the Pakistani authorities to curb such activities. Now Yasin Malik has also confirmed the existence of such terrorist training camps.
However, it has to be admitted that promises given to the Kashmiris have not been kept. They were promised a special status and autonomy in the Union. This was avoided on one pretext or the other. P.V. Narasimha Rao promised "more than azadi" to the Kashmiris. But no progress was achieved. The solution of the Kashmir problem lies with us, and all parties have displayed a lack of courage to face the reality.
With regard to China, much progress has been made since Indira Gandhi first initiated some moves, followed by successive governments. Under Atal Behari Vajpayee significant steps were taken and the present Manmohan Singh government has made further progress. By now it is clear that the Chinese are not keen about the border in the east and may accept the status quo. They, however, would not budge from the Aksai Chin area, as it is vital to them. It has not been under our command for half a century and we are not going to start a war for this area. There is much to be gained by such a move. Similarly, we expect Pakistan to accept the Line of Control as the international boundary.
It is high time that all political parties stopped the idolatry of geography and be bold enough to face reality. In the post Cold War era, there is no scope to play one power against the other; and with regard to both Kashmir and China, we are on our own.
http://www.asianage.com/?INA=2:175:175:164505
The Asian Age India | Govind Talwalkar
The propensity of our politicians, past and present, not to see and face the reality, is phenomenal although there were times when some of our leaders rose to the occasion to face the same. This refusal to come to terms with the reality is also true about several historians and commentators. The storm which BJP president L.K. Advani is facing because of some of his remarks is the latest instance of this tendency. Advani did not say that Jinnah was a secular leader. He said Jinnah wanted a secular Constitution. This is a matter of public record. So why the furore?
Nevertheless, by commending Jinnah's Constituent Assembly speech, Advani has indirectly admitted the desirability of such a Constitution in preference of the philosophy which he has been professing all his life. Though the Sangh Parivar might have felt betrayed because of this, Advani for a moment has admitted the reality. But this does not guarantee that he would stick to this position and would not revert to rousing the rabid communal elements, his mainstay in politics.
As Advani has declared, the partition of the country is a settled fact, and he might induce a renewed discussion of this phenomenon along with the Hindu-Muslim problem.
The Hindu-Muslim problem dogged our leaders from the inception of the Indian National Congress. They made it an inclusive organisation, and in spite of strong opposition from Sayyid Ahmed, scores of Muslim leaders joined this national endeavour. However, after two decades, as political reforms were in the offing, Muslims and other minorities staked their separate claims. The Muslim League was formed and when Gokhale was meeting John Morley, secretary of state for India, Amir Ali, a retired judge and a staunch Leaguer, was prevailing upon the bureaucrats in the secretary of state's office to concede special status to Muslims.
Gokhale had the courage to admit this reality, and so he accepted a separate electorate. His colleagues like Surendranath Banerjea initially endorsed the new scheme but at Congress sessions separate electorates were strongly denounced even by Banerjea.
As for Lokmanya Tilak, after his release from Mandalay prison, he did not oppose separate electorates but signed a pact in Lucknow with the Muslim leaders including Jinnah. This pact gave Muslims reserved seats in the provincial legislatures and also in the central legislative assembly. But within some months several leaders from both of the communities moved away from the Lucknow Pact. By this time Mahatma Gandhi had started playing a leading role in national politics.
Muslim leaders were agitated over the British treatment of the Sultan of Turkey who was also a Khalifa. Mahatma Gandhi joined them and started the Non-Cooperation Movement. Mahatma Gandhi's objective was noble. He thought that this movement would forge Hindu-Muslim unity. But Jinnah was not enthusiastic about Khilafat and was opposed to mass agitation and the total boycott of the government including courts and educational institutions. At Congress' Nagpur session, Jinnah was ridiculed which he could not forget for a long time.
It is noteworthy that though Hindu-Muslim unity and the removal of untouchability were the two main planks of the Mahatma, he failed to garner the support of the two most important Muslim and Dalit leaders â Jinnah and Dr B.R. Ambedkar.
While considering the political developments after the advent of Mahatma Gandhi, several factors are lost sight of, or not given proper importance, including the personal prejudices and predilections of the leaders and also their egos. Besides, though the Mahatma revolutionised politics, India did not follow the path of armed revolution. It was civil disobedience, and not revolution. Thus, the Satyagraha movements ended in a compromise and not the overthrow of the British government. The 1930 and 1932 movements resulted in the Round Table conferences and the Act of 1935, which brought in provincial autonomy.
While Gandhiji thought that his civil disobedience movements and emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity would bring the two major communities together, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was quite certain that it was not religion but economic conditions and urges that would unite Hindus and Muslims. Both Gandhi and Nehru were inspired by noble vision, but the problem was that of a share in the power, which the constitutional reform measures offered. Since the ensuing negotiations had to involve several parties, including the British government and a compromise had to be arrived at, an ideal solution could not be found.
Elections to the provincial Assemblies under the 1935 Act brought in Congress ministries in several provinces and the League in none. In the United Province, the Congress and the League leaders had prolonged negotiations with a view to form a coalition government. The Congress agreed to include Khaliq-uz-Zaman but declined to accept Nawab Ismail Khan, who represented the zamindars. As the Congress was wedded to land reforms, it could not accommodate Ismail Khan. Besides, the League refused to abide by the principle of collective responsibility. Jinnah demanded 33 per cent of seats in the ministry. Afterwards Khaliq-uz-Zaman wrote to Nehru objecting to the Congress putting up Muslim candidates in the reserved constituencies. This resulted in the failure of the negotiations, and a coalition ministry could not be formed.
Nehru was blamed for this failure, which was totally wrong. Even Maulana Azad held Nehru responsible, forgetting that it was he and Govind Ballav Pant who held negotiations with the League. It was not that Nehru alone opposed the inclusion of Nawab Ismail Khan in the ministry; UP Congress was not so inclined either. Moreover, Congress did not want to concede the demand of giving up the principle of collective responsibility. As the League did not form a ministry in any province, Jinnah adopted an extremist position and started playing the communal card contrary to his politics of previous decades.
The Second World War came in 1940; and the League, under the leadership of Jinnah, demanded a separate state for the Muslims. This Pakistan resolution was vague but it evoked strong feelings among the Muslim masses. Nehru, under the influence of Marxism, dismissed the demand as reactionary and thought that the interests of the Muslim masses were economic. Later he predicted that even if Pakistan came into being, it would dissolve with the first touch of reality. But Nehru's socialist beliefs made him oblivious of the reality. He could not gauge the strength of the appeal of religion. Jinnah's position became unassailable because of the appeal to the religious feelings of the Muslim masses, being bolstered by the policies of the British government.
Nehru and Sardar Patel were mainly held responsible for the partition of the country. Dr Lohia branded them as the "guilty men" and Lohiaites to this day are carrying on that pathological legacy, being vengeful not only against Nehru but also against his family. But in reality, Nehru and Patel represented Congress' policies and accepted partition, as there was no alternative. Lohia wanted us to believe that Gandhiji was opposed to partition. Gandhiji, of course, tried his best to avoid partition but Jinnah was not willing to oblige. It should also be remembered that after the Pakistan resolution was adopted by the League, Gandhi declared that if Muslims were bent upon exercising the right of self-determination, he, as a democrat, would not oppose it.
The demand for partition was based on the right of self-determination. This same right was accepted ultimately by Nehru and Sardar Patel. Gandhiji's path was not that of Abraham Lincoln who waged a war against the secessionist Southerners. Gandhiji, therefore accepted the right of self-determination. This he did in 1940 and Jinnah had nothing more to do than keep insisting on the same right. Nehru and Patel reluctantly accepted the reality. Jinnah was confused by Gandhiji's statements about the demand for Pakistan and showed a file of such statements to a senior Congress leader (probably Rajaji) asking him to clarify them.
Both Nehru and Patel are unnecessarily blamed for the rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which, critics say, might have maintained a united India. Some critics are indulging in idolatry of geography, while some Muslim commentators blamed Jinnah for leaving behind millions of Muslims in India without any safeguards in place. Jinnah would have replied that he did not claim to be a Muslim leader, but was an advocate of the Muslims. Besides, Muslims in the rest of India were free to migrate. He was not averse to the exchange of population. Of course, this was impractical.
The Cabinet Mission Plan was fraught with numerous handicaps. It would have made the Centre too weak and the states would have fallen apart. It is said that united Bengal and Punjab would have provided safeguards to the Muslims. But there was also a possibility of constant strife and communal riots. We have the example of the Bengali Muslims from East Bengal, who could not be accommodated by the Punjabi Muslims and therefore, broke away from Pakistan. Under the Cabinet Mission Plan there would have been many more divisions.
Several years ago, I had many discussions with H.V. Hodson, author of The Great Divide, and reforms commissioner under Lord Mountbatten. He agreed that the Cabinet Mission scheme was very complicated and thus was unworkable. It would have also created uncertainty, he felt.
As in the past, we are still blind to reality. Both the Kashmir problem and the border dispute with China need a bold and realistic approach. They should not be made the object of partisan politics. Even if Indian and Pakistani leaders talk of goodwill and improved relations, there is no let-up in the violence in Kashmir. There is no doubt that Pakistan is still a training ground for terrorists who cross over to Kashmir. Even American administrations friendly with Pakistan had to rein in the Pakistani authorities to curb such activities. Now Yasin Malik has also confirmed the existence of such terrorist training camps.
However, it has to be admitted that promises given to the Kashmiris have not been kept. They were promised a special status and autonomy in the Union. This was avoided on one pretext or the other. P.V. Narasimha Rao promised "more than azadi" to the Kashmiris. But no progress was achieved. The solution of the Kashmir problem lies with us, and all parties have displayed a lack of courage to face the reality.
With regard to China, much progress has been made since Indira Gandhi first initiated some moves, followed by successive governments. Under Atal Behari Vajpayee significant steps were taken and the present Manmohan Singh government has made further progress. By now it is clear that the Chinese are not keen about the border in the east and may accept the status quo. They, however, would not budge from the Aksai Chin area, as it is vital to them. It has not been under our command for half a century and we are not going to start a war for this area. There is much to be gained by such a move. Similarly, we expect Pakistan to accept the Line of Control as the international boundary.
It is high time that all political parties stopped the idolatry of geography and be bold enough to face reality. In the post Cold War era, there is no scope to play one power against the other; and with regard to both Kashmir and China, we are on our own.
http://www.asianage.com/?INA=2:175:175:164505