12-01-2005, 11:07 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->3) what was the real reason that the poms backed gandhi, nehru and ambedkar. what exactly did they want to achieve through the first 2 puppets??<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I wouldnt go so far as to call them puppets (personally there is no need to demonze them just as there is no need to deify them). But there are several reasons. Remember they had both spent considerable time in britain and fundamentally did not have any animus against Britain (neither do i for that matter but that is neither here nor there).
Secondly they did not back Gandhi nor Nehru till the very end when they had little choice.
They obviously did not like the demands for freedom put forward by either of them. But the reason they preferred Nehru and Gandhi was that they were non violent. As long as opposition to British rule remained nonviolent they could rule India indefinitely. Particularly so, since by that time they had unleashed the Muslim League to thwart the Congress at every turn. If you read the interview with Lord Ismay(aide to Mountbatten) he makes it quite clear that Gandhhiji had very little do with granting of independence to India.
In fact they achieved quite a bit by agreeing to hand over power to Nehru. Nehru appointed Lord Mountbatten as the first GG of India. Remember at that time there was no constitution and in reality Mountbatten presided over the cabinet meetings regularly and was privy to a lot of confidential material. Mountbatten convinced Nehru to take the Kashmir case to the UN where the Brits and the Americans promptly scuttled it and made it look like India was the agressor.
Nehrus mistrust of the Indian military leaders was legendary,so much so that he preferred to have British military officers as Chiefs of staff till 1950
read the following inter view of LG Vas
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/may/27spec1.htm
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In fact, Nehru neither understood nor was interested in politico-military matters. At the time of Independence he believed, or was cleverly made to believe by Mountbatten, that there was no Indian capable of taking over as head of the army. The fact that he asked a British officer to stay on as commander-in-chief shows his frame of mind.
But in the initial decades of his rise to power, few perceived his distaste of the military as an obsession or considered it a serious liability. This was because India was busy celebrating its freedom, setting up democratic institutions, sorting out its internal problems, and integrating the princely states. Moreover, it was seen that India's military power was being used effectively to assert Indian authority on disputed borders in Jammu and Kashmir and in northeastern India. But military officers and others who were in close contact with Nehru had first hand experience of his obsessions. A few anecdotes will illustrate what this implied.
Nehru, who was honest enough to admit that he knew little about military matters, <span style='color:red'>left the setting up of the newly established defence ministry to Admiral Mountbatten and Lord Ismay. <i>(Amazing is all i can say!)</i>Nehru was advised by Mountbatten to organise the defence structure on the council system [each of the services having a council, composed of military staff] presided over by a politician and run very much on the lines of the Railway board, with military heads as chiefs of their respective service staff or boards. Under this system, there would be no need for a bureaucratic defence secretary [whoever hears of a railway secretary?] This would require the establishment of a Chief of Defence Staff to coordinate the three services at the defence minister level. But Nehru was unwilling to do that.
Lord Mountbatten has stated in a letter that 'although Prime Minister Nehru agreed with me in principle, he said it would be difficult at this moment to get through the appointment of a CDS as it would give to the Indian politician the impression of perpetuating the idea of the great Commander-in-Chief in India. Lord Ismay and I worked hand in hand on these proposals but I thought it would come better from him than the constitutional Governor General as I then had become. He [Ismay] also tried to negotiate a CDS but met with the same opposition from Nehru and for the same reason.'
Shortly after assuming the office of prime minister, Nehru was being taken around to the newly set up military wing of the Cabinet secretariat. When he entered the room he was startled to see several military officers wearing air force, naval and army uniforms. Nehru turned angrily on the secretary and began shouting and demanding to know what military officers were doing in the Cabinet secretariat.
Later Nehru calmed down when Lord Ismay explained the role of the military wing and why military officers were needed. Obviously the prime minister had no concept of the newly established higher defence system This episode was witnessed by military officers who were later told that they would always wear civilian clothes whilst at work; a practice which is followed till today.
Nehru would lay down the law to his Cabinet ministers knowing that none would dare oppose him. He felt he could do the same while dealing with elementary military issues about which he was quite ignorant.
During the early days of the Jammu and Kashmir operations Nehru visited the Srinagar airfield and was being briefed by IAF pilots. He was told they were using 500 lb bombs. He at once said this was an excessive use of force and the less powerful 250 lb bomb should be used. He was told the target area was criss-crossed with nullahs and deep valleys and less powerful bombs would be ineffective. Nehru protested that this was a violation of the principle of 'minimum force.'
He was tactfully told this was not an aid to a civil power operation but a full-fledged war against aggressors. The principle of minimum force was not relevant in this instance. It was essential for the air force and army to use adequate force while dealing with this enemy. It is significant that the senior military officers who accompanied Nehru seemed to be overawed by the prime minister and kept quiet.
On another occasion, Nehru and his entourage were waiting at Palam air force station for a VIP to arrive. The prime minister turned to the air chief and pointing to an air force plane parked nearby, asked, 'Why are your planes marked Indian Air Force? Surely no foreign planes could be parked here.' The air chief mumbled that he would look into the matter. A young air force officer standing nearby intervened and said, 'All air forces follow the practice of using national names. Thus we have the Royal Canadian Air Force, the French Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and so on.' Nehru seemed taken aback at this response, turned to the air chief and said, 'Do look into this.' Later, after the VIPs had departed, the air chief scolded the young officer, telling him he should guard against talking about policy matters that were above his head.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
From a British point of view, having Nehru at the helm of India was the best thing that could have happened. Till 1965 Britaiin was the sole supplier of military goods to India as a result.</span>
I wouldnt go so far as to call them puppets (personally there is no need to demonze them just as there is no need to deify them). But there are several reasons. Remember they had both spent considerable time in britain and fundamentally did not have any animus against Britain (neither do i for that matter but that is neither here nor there).
Secondly they did not back Gandhi nor Nehru till the very end when they had little choice.
They obviously did not like the demands for freedom put forward by either of them. But the reason they preferred Nehru and Gandhi was that they were non violent. As long as opposition to British rule remained nonviolent they could rule India indefinitely. Particularly so, since by that time they had unleashed the Muslim League to thwart the Congress at every turn. If you read the interview with Lord Ismay(aide to Mountbatten) he makes it quite clear that Gandhhiji had very little do with granting of independence to India.
In fact they achieved quite a bit by agreeing to hand over power to Nehru. Nehru appointed Lord Mountbatten as the first GG of India. Remember at that time there was no constitution and in reality Mountbatten presided over the cabinet meetings regularly and was privy to a lot of confidential material. Mountbatten convinced Nehru to take the Kashmir case to the UN where the Brits and the Americans promptly scuttled it and made it look like India was the agressor.
Nehrus mistrust of the Indian military leaders was legendary,so much so that he preferred to have British military officers as Chiefs of staff till 1950
read the following inter view of LG Vas
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/may/27spec1.htm
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In fact, Nehru neither understood nor was interested in politico-military matters. At the time of Independence he believed, or was cleverly made to believe by Mountbatten, that there was no Indian capable of taking over as head of the army. The fact that he asked a British officer to stay on as commander-in-chief shows his frame of mind.
But in the initial decades of his rise to power, few perceived his distaste of the military as an obsession or considered it a serious liability. This was because India was busy celebrating its freedom, setting up democratic institutions, sorting out its internal problems, and integrating the princely states. Moreover, it was seen that India's military power was being used effectively to assert Indian authority on disputed borders in Jammu and Kashmir and in northeastern India. But military officers and others who were in close contact with Nehru had first hand experience of his obsessions. A few anecdotes will illustrate what this implied.
Nehru, who was honest enough to admit that he knew little about military matters, <span style='color:red'>left the setting up of the newly established defence ministry to Admiral Mountbatten and Lord Ismay. <i>(Amazing is all i can say!)</i>Nehru was advised by Mountbatten to organise the defence structure on the council system [each of the services having a council, composed of military staff] presided over by a politician and run very much on the lines of the Railway board, with military heads as chiefs of their respective service staff or boards. Under this system, there would be no need for a bureaucratic defence secretary [whoever hears of a railway secretary?] This would require the establishment of a Chief of Defence Staff to coordinate the three services at the defence minister level. But Nehru was unwilling to do that.
Lord Mountbatten has stated in a letter that 'although Prime Minister Nehru agreed with me in principle, he said it would be difficult at this moment to get through the appointment of a CDS as it would give to the Indian politician the impression of perpetuating the idea of the great Commander-in-Chief in India. Lord Ismay and I worked hand in hand on these proposals but I thought it would come better from him than the constitutional Governor General as I then had become. He [Ismay] also tried to negotiate a CDS but met with the same opposition from Nehru and for the same reason.'
Shortly after assuming the office of prime minister, Nehru was being taken around to the newly set up military wing of the Cabinet secretariat. When he entered the room he was startled to see several military officers wearing air force, naval and army uniforms. Nehru turned angrily on the secretary and began shouting and demanding to know what military officers were doing in the Cabinet secretariat.
Later Nehru calmed down when Lord Ismay explained the role of the military wing and why military officers were needed. Obviously the prime minister had no concept of the newly established higher defence system This episode was witnessed by military officers who were later told that they would always wear civilian clothes whilst at work; a practice which is followed till today.
Nehru would lay down the law to his Cabinet ministers knowing that none would dare oppose him. He felt he could do the same while dealing with elementary military issues about which he was quite ignorant.
During the early days of the Jammu and Kashmir operations Nehru visited the Srinagar airfield and was being briefed by IAF pilots. He was told they were using 500 lb bombs. He at once said this was an excessive use of force and the less powerful 250 lb bomb should be used. He was told the target area was criss-crossed with nullahs and deep valleys and less powerful bombs would be ineffective. Nehru protested that this was a violation of the principle of 'minimum force.'
He was tactfully told this was not an aid to a civil power operation but a full-fledged war against aggressors. The principle of minimum force was not relevant in this instance. It was essential for the air force and army to use adequate force while dealing with this enemy. It is significant that the senior military officers who accompanied Nehru seemed to be overawed by the prime minister and kept quiet.
On another occasion, Nehru and his entourage were waiting at Palam air force station for a VIP to arrive. The prime minister turned to the air chief and pointing to an air force plane parked nearby, asked, 'Why are your planes marked Indian Air Force? Surely no foreign planes could be parked here.' The air chief mumbled that he would look into the matter. A young air force officer standing nearby intervened and said, 'All air forces follow the practice of using national names. Thus we have the Royal Canadian Air Force, the French Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and so on.' Nehru seemed taken aback at this response, turned to the air chief and said, 'Do look into this.' Later, after the VIPs had departed, the air chief scolded the young officer, telling him he should guard against talking about policy matters that were above his head.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
From a British point of view, having Nehru at the helm of India was the best thing that could have happened. Till 1965 Britaiin was the sole supplier of military goods to India as a result.</span>