04-08-2006, 06:58 AM
Mirwaiz meets President
ONE would agree with the President that the Indo-Pak composite dialogue needs to be accelerated and that side by side with CBMs there ought to be progress on the Kashmir dispute. But it would be difficult to accept the remark he made when he met Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who called on him at GHQ on Monday, that Pakistan continues to stand by the people of Kashmir. None of the raft of proposals that have emanated from Islamabad over the past two years or so seem to justify that statement. Some would tend to be mere palliatives, but not the remedy, while others are not easy to understand. Demilitarisation would indeed be helpful in reducing the atrocities the 700,000-strong Indian security forces are committing every day. The terrorised citizens of Held Kashmir would feel relieved of the oppressive presence of these forces, which demolish houses, arrest or shoot down inmates at will. But once the troops are out of the Valley, New Delhi would lose out on the argument that Islamabad was infiltrating 'terrorists' into Held Kashmir, which was fuelling what it would call 'insurgency' to make it necessary to keep armed forces there. Another setback of demilitarisation for India would be that Kashmiris, now suppressed, would open up to demand freedom from its hold, much to its shame in the eyes of the world. New Delhi would only agree to do so if it otherwise felt ready to go for a solution to people's liking. Islamabad must insist on demilitarisation as a stepping stone to a just solution.
Unfortunately, our various options do not point to a mechanism for seeking out Kashmiris' aspirations. In fact, we have set aside the only viable proposition of eliciting their views i.e., the UNSC role. That the LoC could not be the basis of final solution is a concrete point but what next? Self-governance, also on the cards as far as we are concerned, would be a poor substitute and something that does not suggest how it would make for settlement in future. Joint control is a nebulous idea. Flexibility also falls in the realm of ambiguity. Similarly for the rest of the proposals. If they have been thought out in conclusive details, the public has been kept in the dark. It would be too much to expect it to endorse them, without getting to know what they really stand for.
Somehow Dr Manmohan Singh's sincerity in resolving Kashmir, which our leadership so often points to, is hardly visible in action. With the peace process more than two years old and a host of CBMs in place, he has not wavered from the stand that there would be no change in the 'Indian' border. For him Kashmir is India's atoot ang. He can at best concede that the LoC be regarded as international border. In any case, should he be interested in resolving the dispute on the basis of justice and equity, he should conduct meaningful, result-oriented negotiations rather than drag his feet.
ONE would agree with the President that the Indo-Pak composite dialogue needs to be accelerated and that side by side with CBMs there ought to be progress on the Kashmir dispute. But it would be difficult to accept the remark he made when he met Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who called on him at GHQ on Monday, that Pakistan continues to stand by the people of Kashmir. None of the raft of proposals that have emanated from Islamabad over the past two years or so seem to justify that statement. Some would tend to be mere palliatives, but not the remedy, while others are not easy to understand. Demilitarisation would indeed be helpful in reducing the atrocities the 700,000-strong Indian security forces are committing every day. The terrorised citizens of Held Kashmir would feel relieved of the oppressive presence of these forces, which demolish houses, arrest or shoot down inmates at will. But once the troops are out of the Valley, New Delhi would lose out on the argument that Islamabad was infiltrating 'terrorists' into Held Kashmir, which was fuelling what it would call 'insurgency' to make it necessary to keep armed forces there. Another setback of demilitarisation for India would be that Kashmiris, now suppressed, would open up to demand freedom from its hold, much to its shame in the eyes of the world. New Delhi would only agree to do so if it otherwise felt ready to go for a solution to people's liking. Islamabad must insist on demilitarisation as a stepping stone to a just solution.
Unfortunately, our various options do not point to a mechanism for seeking out Kashmiris' aspirations. In fact, we have set aside the only viable proposition of eliciting their views i.e., the UNSC role. That the LoC could not be the basis of final solution is a concrete point but what next? Self-governance, also on the cards as far as we are concerned, would be a poor substitute and something that does not suggest how it would make for settlement in future. Joint control is a nebulous idea. Flexibility also falls in the realm of ambiguity. Similarly for the rest of the proposals. If they have been thought out in conclusive details, the public has been kept in the dark. It would be too much to expect it to endorse them, without getting to know what they really stand for.
Somehow Dr Manmohan Singh's sincerity in resolving Kashmir, which our leadership so often points to, is hardly visible in action. With the peace process more than two years old and a host of CBMs in place, he has not wavered from the stand that there would be no change in the 'Indian' border. For him Kashmir is India's atoot ang. He can at best concede that the LoC be regarded as international border. In any case, should he be interested in resolving the dispute on the basis of justice and equity, he should conduct meaningful, result-oriented negotiations rather than drag his feet.