05-05-2006, 04:03 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE THIRD PHASE : (1766 TO 1795 A.D.)
Chapter 1
THE INEVITABLE
With the exit of the Jat power under Nawalsing, after its rout at Gowardhan (5th of April 1770 A.D.) at the hands of the Marahtas, from the politics of Delhi and with the entry of Mahadaji as Vakil-ul-Mutlak (November 1784 A.D.) subsequent to the treaty of Salbye with the English, the Maratha-Rajput relations entered into the last phase of severe contest in which both sides, disregarding that they belonged to the same religion, culture and land, fought with the determination to annihilate each other. This was the strange culmination of the relationship that started with the friendship that between Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing. But such an end though shocking was inevitable.
With his embarrassing financial needs, with the tremendous task of managing the fallen House of the Mughals with its scanty resources unequal to check the jealous enemies that surrounded him on all sides, it was natural for Machhedi in his camp, to instigate him. It was the scheme of the latter to replace Pratapsing, the ruling king of Jaypur, by Mansing, to use him as a puppet in his hands. The price for the help for such a change was 50 lakhs of rupees, that the needy Mahadaji could hardly afford to miss. The result was Mahadajiâs invasion of Jaypur in 1786 A.D. long with the Emperor in his camp.
With the possibility of bringing Jaypur under his complete sway like Gwalior, Gohad and Khichiwada, Mahadaji started with an extravagent demand of 3 crore (1) and 40 lakhs of rupees. It clearly explains his high tone of approach and also his wrong notion of the fabulous riches of the tiny Rajput State of Jaypur. When the Jaypurians saw that Mahadaji was committed to the side of Rao Raja, who was clearly bent on the destruction of Jaypur State, to meet his selfish ends, they gathered around their king and prepared to face the aggressor till last, With this view, they adopted delying tactics to tax Maahadajiâs poor resources and patience to his complete destruction, while strengthening their side at the same time.
The Kachhwahas and the Rathods rightly felt that Mahadajiâs efforts aimed at ending the means of their livelihood and this sense of survival aroused, as if by miracle, a strength into the same State which seemed completely spent up not only to Mahadaji but to all in 1785 A.D. the same Pratapsing who was despised (2) for indulging in insane practices of dancing into womenâs apartment in the garb of a woman, then marched with manly courage at the head of a host of about 50 thousand Rajputs and banished Patil Baba with his supreme dignities and De Boigneâs artillery, not only from Jaypur territory but from the politics of Delhi for a complete year, causing thereby unseen and unheard degradation of the House of Babar at the hands of Gulam Kadar. Lalsot proves onces more the eternal truth that no individual with whatsoever superior strength, is ever capable to stand the might of a united nation that has determined to face injustice at all costs.
Nothing can be said against Mahadaji as a politician and a diplomat, it he desired to bring the prostrate State of Jaypur under his control in 1786 A.D. Even Najib Khan (3) had previously desired the same thing. But without pursuing the atter to extremity, he had returned after accepting the settled dues from Jaypur. But having once brought the Emperor with him in 1786 A.D. to Jaypur to awe the Jaypurians, Mahadaji had lost the retreating ground, even though he strived hard for a rescue from the complicated affairs, wherein he saw few chances of an easy success that he had expected previously. But now the shrewd Rajputs realizing his difficulties, dragged him on and thoroughly crippled him at Lalsot in 1787 A.D. Lack of valour was not the cause of Mahadajiâs ruin which was mainly caused by the loss of resources. This dishonour of Mahadaji at Lalsot made the final subjugation of the Rajputs at Patan and Medta inevitable on his part.
But however Mahadaji as a politician was justified to invade Jaypur in 1786-87 A.D., he can not escape blame from one point of view. He was a prominent Sardar of the Peshwa and the Vakil-ul-Mutlak of the Emperor. But his Rajput policy, that was rash at the outset and lacked moderation completely, had neither the sanction of the Peshwa (4) nor any approval of the Emperor (5). By his shortsighted policy towards Jaypur he was neither serving the Peshwa nor the Emperor, but his own designs at the instigation of Rao Raja. There is not a single instance where any Peshwa has hinted to extinguish any Rajput State. What the Peshwa ever expected from his Sardars was âSardariâ i.e. tactful menagement of the affairs without deep involvement, always keeping an eye on the profit and nothing more. Even, Holkars never meant to extinguish any Rajput State and hence with their sober out look they were comparatively more popular with the Rajputs in comparison with the Shindes. Mahadajiâs policy, without any sanction or any possibility of immediate support from Deccan and with his unreliable Northern forces, had little chance of success in 1786-87 A.D. A severe chastisement at Lalsot at the hands of the same Rajputs whom he had despised in 1785-86 A.D. for their weakness, was the inevitable culmination of his hasty action.
Vijaysing was still on the throne of the Jodhpur in 1785 A.D. and utilized the same policy adopted by him in the pre-Panipat days. He called Taimur Sah on promise of 20 lakhs of rupees for his help against Mahadaji and tried to create a confederation wherein the Mughalias figured prominently under Ismail Beg. The battles of Patan and Medta were fought in 1790 A.D. for the same reason of opposing the Maratha supremacy at Delhi, for which Najib Khan forming a grand opposition had been the cause of the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761 A.D. It does not mean that the Rajputs were not religious minded, But it only stresses the point that when politics comes to forefront, religion plays but an insignificant part.
The Rajputs faced the Marathas at Patan and Medta in 1790 A.D. apparently to reject to territorial demands of the Marathas but in fact there was a deeper meaning to their opposition. It was a challenge to the Maratha supremacy at Delhi as like the Mughalias they felt their political existence threatened by the firm establishment of the Maratha rule at Delhi. The Rajputs who regarded themselves to the pillars of the North, looked with envy, at the predominance of the Marathas over them. It was not the real fact that they regarded Tukoji or Ali Bahadur as more favourable to them, but it was the fact that they dreaded the perfect dominance of Mahadaji as compared to the rest of the Maratha Sardars. Mahadaji on his part was following the same policy of Maratha expansion that Bajirao had pursued some 40 years before him. Bajiraoâs march on Delhi in 1737 A.D. was made a reality by making the Emperor his prisoner by Mahadaji. By way of forced association, the Rajputs, though reluctantly, had adjusted themselves in the role of the mansabdars of the Mughals, but when the Deccani Marathas began to play the role of the masters by substituting the Mughals, the Rajputs ego was hurt. In their heart of hearts, they had not forgotten for the past five centuries that they had been once the masters of the North before the coming of the Turks. This Rajput pride was fully exhibited in the attitude, deeds and utterances of Vijaysing and retention of Ajmer became the symbol of his pride. For Ajmer he did every thing that was possible for him. Jayappa was done away with his life for Ajmer and had Mahadaji been less cautious, he would have also followed the same path. In a way, the struggle that continued from Lalsot and seemed to end at Medta was all for Ajmer. Rajputs with Vijaysing at their back would have never acknowledged a willing subordination to the Marathas, unless Mahadaji had crushed their pride. And from this point of view also the battle of Patan and Medta were inevitable.
Patan and Medta were soon followed by Lakheri (1793 A.D.). This time it was the two Sardars of the Marathas that were bent on destroying each other. But in fact it was Mahadaji who wanted to remove the obstacle of the Holkars from his path to predominance. Dominance demands submission and after the submission of the Rajputs, Tukojiâs pride and interference could not be tolerated by Mahadaji for a long time. Lakheri was the result of the past injuries of some 50 years back that were nourished in the bosoms by both the parties. Holkars being equal in position to Mahadaji, insisted scrupulously to have their say in framing the Maratha policies and especially the Rajput ones in the North. And being inferior in strength as compared to Mahadaji, they felt most acutely the disegard they met with, on the part of Mahadaji and his Sardars. They had in their memory the past practices when Malharrao shared the far inferior after Panipat in strength to the formers. But Mahadaji had little patience to tolerate one whom he thought to be nothing but a hindrance to his policies. With the same force that crushed the Rajputs, he silenced Tukoji who fled to Indore burning with a wrath of a powerless person. The Holkars suffered the penalty of mismanagement for a long time resulting into lethargy and thereby causing them to lag far behind their superior colleague who utilized Holkarâs incompetence to further his own advancement in the North. The Holkars tried to avoid the impending blow for a long time by pleading their case at Poona but in vain ! In the long run they had to face the inevitable. Lakheri proves that politics is not always the game of justice but it is one of strength and power. With their complete collapse at Lakheri the Holkars, learnt this lesson by heart and after 9 years under Yashwantrao, preparing themselves thoroughly, charged the Shindes at Hadapsar near Poona in 1802 A.D., with a desperate courage and repeated the same performance which Mahadaji had enacted at Lakheri. But that had a disastrous effect not only on the Shindes, but on the whole Maratha power. What was sown at Lakheri in Jaypur territory in 1793 A.D. bore sufficiently ill fruits to destroy the Maratha Empire in the long run. In a way it was also inevitable.
Foot Notes (Description)
(1)
Dil, Raj. I-163.
(2)
M.D. I-19, 'Mar, Riyasat (U.V. Vol. II), p. 115, 'New Hist. Vol. III, p. 151.
(3)
'Jaypur Draft Kharitas 15-11, 25, 97, 104, 106, 107, 180, 16-21, 22, 71, 81, 135, 150, 151, see 'Appendix'.
(4)
'Hist. Papers' - 509.
(5)
25th July 1787. Mahadaji's generals received Emperor's letters urging them to "persuade Patil Bahadur" to make peace with the Rajputs, who were "old Khanazads" - 'Shinde Regent of Delhi', p. 8.
http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/1tp.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Chapter 1
THE INEVITABLE
With the exit of the Jat power under Nawalsing, after its rout at Gowardhan (5th of April 1770 A.D.) at the hands of the Marahtas, from the politics of Delhi and with the entry of Mahadaji as Vakil-ul-Mutlak (November 1784 A.D.) subsequent to the treaty of Salbye with the English, the Maratha-Rajput relations entered into the last phase of severe contest in which both sides, disregarding that they belonged to the same religion, culture and land, fought with the determination to annihilate each other. This was the strange culmination of the relationship that started with the friendship that between Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing. But such an end though shocking was inevitable.
With his embarrassing financial needs, with the tremendous task of managing the fallen House of the Mughals with its scanty resources unequal to check the jealous enemies that surrounded him on all sides, it was natural for Machhedi in his camp, to instigate him. It was the scheme of the latter to replace Pratapsing, the ruling king of Jaypur, by Mansing, to use him as a puppet in his hands. The price for the help for such a change was 50 lakhs of rupees, that the needy Mahadaji could hardly afford to miss. The result was Mahadajiâs invasion of Jaypur in 1786 A.D. long with the Emperor in his camp.
With the possibility of bringing Jaypur under his complete sway like Gwalior, Gohad and Khichiwada, Mahadaji started with an extravagent demand of 3 crore (1) and 40 lakhs of rupees. It clearly explains his high tone of approach and also his wrong notion of the fabulous riches of the tiny Rajput State of Jaypur. When the Jaypurians saw that Mahadaji was committed to the side of Rao Raja, who was clearly bent on the destruction of Jaypur State, to meet his selfish ends, they gathered around their king and prepared to face the aggressor till last, With this view, they adopted delying tactics to tax Maahadajiâs poor resources and patience to his complete destruction, while strengthening their side at the same time.
The Kachhwahas and the Rathods rightly felt that Mahadajiâs efforts aimed at ending the means of their livelihood and this sense of survival aroused, as if by miracle, a strength into the same State which seemed completely spent up not only to Mahadaji but to all in 1785 A.D. the same Pratapsing who was despised (2) for indulging in insane practices of dancing into womenâs apartment in the garb of a woman, then marched with manly courage at the head of a host of about 50 thousand Rajputs and banished Patil Baba with his supreme dignities and De Boigneâs artillery, not only from Jaypur territory but from the politics of Delhi for a complete year, causing thereby unseen and unheard degradation of the House of Babar at the hands of Gulam Kadar. Lalsot proves onces more the eternal truth that no individual with whatsoever superior strength, is ever capable to stand the might of a united nation that has determined to face injustice at all costs.
Nothing can be said against Mahadaji as a politician and a diplomat, it he desired to bring the prostrate State of Jaypur under his control in 1786 A.D. Even Najib Khan (3) had previously desired the same thing. But without pursuing the atter to extremity, he had returned after accepting the settled dues from Jaypur. But having once brought the Emperor with him in 1786 A.D. to Jaypur to awe the Jaypurians, Mahadaji had lost the retreating ground, even though he strived hard for a rescue from the complicated affairs, wherein he saw few chances of an easy success that he had expected previously. But now the shrewd Rajputs realizing his difficulties, dragged him on and thoroughly crippled him at Lalsot in 1787 A.D. Lack of valour was not the cause of Mahadajiâs ruin which was mainly caused by the loss of resources. This dishonour of Mahadaji at Lalsot made the final subjugation of the Rajputs at Patan and Medta inevitable on his part.
But however Mahadaji as a politician was justified to invade Jaypur in 1786-87 A.D., he can not escape blame from one point of view. He was a prominent Sardar of the Peshwa and the Vakil-ul-Mutlak of the Emperor. But his Rajput policy, that was rash at the outset and lacked moderation completely, had neither the sanction of the Peshwa (4) nor any approval of the Emperor (5). By his shortsighted policy towards Jaypur he was neither serving the Peshwa nor the Emperor, but his own designs at the instigation of Rao Raja. There is not a single instance where any Peshwa has hinted to extinguish any Rajput State. What the Peshwa ever expected from his Sardars was âSardariâ i.e. tactful menagement of the affairs without deep involvement, always keeping an eye on the profit and nothing more. Even, Holkars never meant to extinguish any Rajput State and hence with their sober out look they were comparatively more popular with the Rajputs in comparison with the Shindes. Mahadajiâs policy, without any sanction or any possibility of immediate support from Deccan and with his unreliable Northern forces, had little chance of success in 1786-87 A.D. A severe chastisement at Lalsot at the hands of the same Rajputs whom he had despised in 1785-86 A.D. for their weakness, was the inevitable culmination of his hasty action.
Vijaysing was still on the throne of the Jodhpur in 1785 A.D. and utilized the same policy adopted by him in the pre-Panipat days. He called Taimur Sah on promise of 20 lakhs of rupees for his help against Mahadaji and tried to create a confederation wherein the Mughalias figured prominently under Ismail Beg. The battles of Patan and Medta were fought in 1790 A.D. for the same reason of opposing the Maratha supremacy at Delhi, for which Najib Khan forming a grand opposition had been the cause of the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761 A.D. It does not mean that the Rajputs were not religious minded, But it only stresses the point that when politics comes to forefront, religion plays but an insignificant part.
The Rajputs faced the Marathas at Patan and Medta in 1790 A.D. apparently to reject to territorial demands of the Marathas but in fact there was a deeper meaning to their opposition. It was a challenge to the Maratha supremacy at Delhi as like the Mughalias they felt their political existence threatened by the firm establishment of the Maratha rule at Delhi. The Rajputs who regarded themselves to the pillars of the North, looked with envy, at the predominance of the Marathas over them. It was not the real fact that they regarded Tukoji or Ali Bahadur as more favourable to them, but it was the fact that they dreaded the perfect dominance of Mahadaji as compared to the rest of the Maratha Sardars. Mahadaji on his part was following the same policy of Maratha expansion that Bajirao had pursued some 40 years before him. Bajiraoâs march on Delhi in 1737 A.D. was made a reality by making the Emperor his prisoner by Mahadaji. By way of forced association, the Rajputs, though reluctantly, had adjusted themselves in the role of the mansabdars of the Mughals, but when the Deccani Marathas began to play the role of the masters by substituting the Mughals, the Rajputs ego was hurt. In their heart of hearts, they had not forgotten for the past five centuries that they had been once the masters of the North before the coming of the Turks. This Rajput pride was fully exhibited in the attitude, deeds and utterances of Vijaysing and retention of Ajmer became the symbol of his pride. For Ajmer he did every thing that was possible for him. Jayappa was done away with his life for Ajmer and had Mahadaji been less cautious, he would have also followed the same path. In a way, the struggle that continued from Lalsot and seemed to end at Medta was all for Ajmer. Rajputs with Vijaysing at their back would have never acknowledged a willing subordination to the Marathas, unless Mahadaji had crushed their pride. And from this point of view also the battle of Patan and Medta were inevitable.
Patan and Medta were soon followed by Lakheri (1793 A.D.). This time it was the two Sardars of the Marathas that were bent on destroying each other. But in fact it was Mahadaji who wanted to remove the obstacle of the Holkars from his path to predominance. Dominance demands submission and after the submission of the Rajputs, Tukojiâs pride and interference could not be tolerated by Mahadaji for a long time. Lakheri was the result of the past injuries of some 50 years back that were nourished in the bosoms by both the parties. Holkars being equal in position to Mahadaji, insisted scrupulously to have their say in framing the Maratha policies and especially the Rajput ones in the North. And being inferior in strength as compared to Mahadaji, they felt most acutely the disegard they met with, on the part of Mahadaji and his Sardars. They had in their memory the past practices when Malharrao shared the far inferior after Panipat in strength to the formers. But Mahadaji had little patience to tolerate one whom he thought to be nothing but a hindrance to his policies. With the same force that crushed the Rajputs, he silenced Tukoji who fled to Indore burning with a wrath of a powerless person. The Holkars suffered the penalty of mismanagement for a long time resulting into lethargy and thereby causing them to lag far behind their superior colleague who utilized Holkarâs incompetence to further his own advancement in the North. The Holkars tried to avoid the impending blow for a long time by pleading their case at Poona but in vain ! In the long run they had to face the inevitable. Lakheri proves that politics is not always the game of justice but it is one of strength and power. With their complete collapse at Lakheri the Holkars, learnt this lesson by heart and after 9 years under Yashwantrao, preparing themselves thoroughly, charged the Shindes at Hadapsar near Poona in 1802 A.D., with a desperate courage and repeated the same performance which Mahadaji had enacted at Lakheri. But that had a disastrous effect not only on the Shindes, but on the whole Maratha power. What was sown at Lakheri in Jaypur territory in 1793 A.D. bore sufficiently ill fruits to destroy the Maratha Empire in the long run. In a way it was also inevitable.
Foot Notes (Description)
(1)
Dil, Raj. I-163.
(2)
M.D. I-19, 'Mar, Riyasat (U.V. Vol. II), p. 115, 'New Hist. Vol. III, p. 151.
(3)
'Jaypur Draft Kharitas 15-11, 25, 97, 104, 106, 107, 180, 16-21, 22, 71, 81, 135, 150, 151, see 'Appendix'.
(4)
'Hist. Papers' - 509.
(5)
25th July 1787. Mahadaji's generals received Emperor's letters urging them to "persuade Patil Bahadur" to make peace with the Rajputs, who were "old Khanazads" - 'Shinde Regent of Delhi', p. 8.
http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/1tp.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->