05-09-2006, 12:47 AM
(continued from previous post),
Gujarat has a long history of communal riots. The first such riot has been reported in 1714. After independence major riots broke out on several occasions since 1969. Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry of 1969 and Dave Commission of Inquiry of 1985 analysed the causes and consequences of communal tensions in great details. Serious rioting occurred in 1970 and also in 1992-93. According to
official data, Gujarat witnessed 443 major communal incidents between 1970 and 2002. Another characteristic of the communal frenzy in Gujarat is that it has always taken a long time to return to normalcy. For instance in Godhra itself in 1985 curfew remained imposed for about a year. Communal disturbance in 1985 continued for more than five months from February to July 1985.
The Study team has not gone into the facts and figures of the number of persons killed, injured and displaced, the loss of property destroyed and the number of cases related to molestation of women, if any. It is not because these facts are not important but because the team lacked the time and resources to go into these details. However the Study Team has analysed the situation for:
1.Administrative response
2.Deployment of Army
3.Relief and resettlement measures
4.Confidence building measures
5.Socio-economic profile of the rioting mobs
6.Involvement of vanvasis
7.Role of media
<b>ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE</b>
Based on the information collected from official and non-official sources at Godhra, Ahemdabad and Vadodara the Study Team is of the considered opinion that:
1.The local administration did not respond with speed to the Godhra carnage. The police remained a passive spectator and hesitated to use force against the miscreants. It made no attempt to apprehend the leaders of the mob that indulged in burning alive innocent pilgrims returning from Ayodhya. However, the administration took preventive measures after the VHP gave a call for Gujarat bandh in protest against the attack on the train.
2.In Godhra, Vadodara and Ahmedabad the police tried to control the rioting mobs but, more often than not, failed, as the police were outnumbered- the mobs were unexpectedly large and the police were inadequately armed. In certain cases, the mob carried more lethal weapons that the police had.
3.The administration was not prepared to handle massive migration of riot affected people of both the communities and did not have any idea of the quantum of the relief and rehabilitation work required.
4.Co-ordination between the administration and the NGOs was inadequate.
5.Training and drills for managing communal tensions was conspicuous by its absence in a state that periodically witnesses communal frenzy.
6.Socio-psychological understanding of the communal divide is lacking amongst the officials.
7.The adverse comments on the transfers of officials in the media and not so much the actual transfers demotivated the official machinery.
8.At many places policemen did commendable work of protecting life and property.
9.Policemen, by and large, responded to the situation without communal bias.
<b>DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY</b>
There has been lot of comments on the timing of the deployment of army in various urban and rural areas in Gujarat after the outbreak of violence. Although the team did not have enough time to go into the question in depth, the information made available to it shows that there was no delay on the part of the Gujarat Government in summoning and deployment of troops. A comparison with the past is presented for a proper perspective.
1.By the afternoon of 28.02.02 it was clear that the communal violence has spread widely and the situation had become so alarming that it was unlikely to be controlled by the police and paramilitary forces.
2.On 28.02.02 at 4.30 p.m. the Chief Minister announced at a press conference that the State Government has decided to call army to assist the civil administration.
3.By evening the Union Government had given instructions for the deployment of two brigades in Gujarat.
4.Defense Minister air dashed to Ahmedabad at midnight and had a meeting with the Chief Minister to discuss deployment of the army.
5.The army had to be withdrawn from the countryâs border with Pakistan despite the fact that the troops are deployed in full strength in eye-ball-to-eye-ball situation on Indo-Pak borders.
6.Withdrawal of army from the border may have weakened the countryâs defensive and offensive strategies.
7.Within less than 24 hours at least one brigade of Indian Army had air landed at Ahmedabad.
In a meeting at 0800hrs in which Chief Minister, Defence Minister, army generals and civil officers participated the formal plan for the deployment of the army was approved.
Magistrates who must accompany the army were appointed and by 11a.m. on 01.03.02 the actual deployment of army at sensitive points had begun.
8.The second brigade was deputed to Rajkot and Vadodara on 01.03.02 by that night.
9.Columns allotted to Godhra reached there in the morning of 02.03.02.
10.Army went back to barracks on 10.03.02.
11.In 1969 rioting started on 18.09.69 and army was called in on 21.09.69.
12.In 1985 the riots started on 15.04.85 and the army was called in on 16.04.85.
<b>RELIEF AND REHABILITATION MEASURES</b>
1.Many persons of both the communities whose houses were burnt or destroyed fled and came to the nearby towns for shelter.
2.Many persons who feared an attack on them also fled and gathered in nearby towns.
3.The State Government arranged for shelters called Relief Camps to provide safe temporary shelter to the displaced persons.
4.Many voluntary organizations of both the communities also opened Relief Camps for the displaced persons.
5.The Government managed some camps while other camps were run by the voluntary organizations.
6.Most of the inhabitants in the camps remained unoccupied, leading to idle talk and further reinforcement of views on communal basis.
7.The inhabitants did not feel confident and safe to go back to their respective habitations.
According to the State Government following is the information about the camps:
District
Number of Camps
Number of Inmates
Ahemdabad
44
68100
Anand
13
5200
Dahod
6
4526
Kheda
3
1441
Mahesana
6
2648
Panchmahals
7
8091
Sabarkantha
13
10938
Vadodara
11
12753
State Total
103
113697
<b>CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES</b>
1.In affected areas deployment of police or other forces was very scanty.
2.Residents of the sensitive areas were living in an environment of fear.
3.The mutual mistrust between Hindu and Muslim population is on the increase.
4.Longer the stay in the camps more is the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty.
5.In affected areas, sensitive areas and relief camps there was no publicity material appealing and advising for communal harmony and peaceful co-existence
6.The Information and Public Relations machinery of the state did not disseminate words of assurance and appeals by the Prime Minister, Chief Minister and others that are likely to have a soothing effect on the hurt psyche of the people.
7.Presence of the reports of arson in newspapers and repetition of such reports on television affected negatively the process of confidence building.
8.Most of the voluntary and social organizations were working on sectarian lines and hardly worked for creating an environment of communal harmony.
9.Efforts of some of the officials to bring both the communities together and arrive at a compromise failed, as the amount of antagonism against each other is very high.
10.Rumors spread like wild fire increasing the level of anxieties.
<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES OF THE RIOTING MOBS</b>
(Based on information collected from officials and public, no direct observation)
1.Muslim mobs predominantly included persons of lower socio-economic strata.
2.Muslim mobs included many known faces but number of persons not earlier seen in the locality was also very large.
3.Hindu mobs, especially during the first week of March, comprised a mix of people belonging to lower, lower middle and upper middle socio-economic strata of the society.
4.Involvement of upper middle class Hindus in arson and looting is a phenomenon seen for the first time in the country.
5.The Hindu mobs appeared to be more interested in destroying the property of selected establishments of Muslims. It was reported that a chain of restaurants with Hindu names and owned by a Muslim family was targeted because of the perception that lot of money from gulf countries had been invested thereby putting Hindu competitors at a disadvantage.
6.Another new phenomenon reported to the Study Team was the presence and active participation of women in the mobs.
<b>INVOLVEMENT OF TRIBALS</b>
Earlier in Gujarat, tribals never got involved in the Hindu-Muslim riots. However, their involvement in post Godhra riots added a new dimension to the communal violence. In rural areas the vanvasis attacked the Muslim moneylenders, shopkeepers and the forest contractors. They used their traditional bow and arrows as also their implements used to cut the trees and grass while attacking Muslims. They moved in groups and used coded signals for communication. Two factors seems to have contributed to this disturbing phenomenon:
1.A delegation of tribals told the Study team that the Muslim moneylenders, shopkeepers and forest contractors have been exploiting the tribals for decades. They charged exorbitant rate of interest to money loaned to tribals. In certain cases the rate of interest is as high as 50 per cent per year. Having got into this never-ending vicious circle of loans, the tribals have been reduced to the status of bounded labour. Tribals working as servants are ill-treated by these money lenders who happen to be Muslims. The accumulated anger of years of exploitation became explosive when moneylenders sexually exploited their womenfolk. The tribals are no longer allowed to use forest produce that has been their sustenance for centuries. This too fuelled the feelings of anger, hatred and revenge among them.
2.Tribals have, of late, become conscious of their Hindu identity because of the awareness campaign launched by VHP and other Hindu outfits. Burning alive of Hindu pilgrims by a Muslim mob at Godhra provided the spark for the fire of revenge and hatred.
It may be mentioned that these are only exploratory postulations, scientific anthropological, economic and sociological analysis is required to understand the changed behavior of tribals.
<b>ROLE OF MEDIA</b>
The Study Team received a large number of complaints against âbiased reportingâ, ânon-objective attitudeâ and âanti Gujarat cospiracyâof Delhi Media. The team felt it necessary to objectively observe and analyse the role of Media both regional and English language newspapers published from metropolitan cities. It also solicited comments about the role of media from about 500 persons with whom the members of the team interacted. The teamâs observations are:
1.Local and regional papers at times seemed to be emotionally surcharged and lost sight of objectivity. However, Gujrati newspapers, by and large, were factual in day to day reporting.
2.The editorial pages of local and regional newspapers maintained a balance in projecting all viewpoints.
3.Newspapers published in English from Delhi invariably editorialized the news. Direct and indirect comments in the news writing were so telling that the personal likes and dislikes of the news reporters were too obvious to be missed.
4.English language newspapers published from Delhi appeared to have assumed the role of crusaders against the State Government from day one. It coloured the entire operation of news gathering, feature writing and editorials.
5.The edit pages of English language press carried comments that clearly indicated biases:
a.against the State Government of Gujarat,
b.in favor of Congress, leftist parties and the secularist intellectuals,
c.indifferent to the carnage at Godhra,
d.against the Hindu organizations, and
e.against the NDA government at the Center.
6.Most of the national newspapers and news channels played down the intensity of Godhra carnage and projected it as a result of provocation by pilgrims. Not many reporters were deputed to dig out facts or to do follow-up stories. This resulted in large number of editorials and articles that projected Godhra as a reaction to provocation by âkarsevaksâ and riots in rest of the state as "state sponsored terrorism".
7.A distorted image of sectarian violence in the state was projected by the electornic and print media based in Delhi.
8.Repeated telecasts of arson and violence contributed in spreading the tension to unaffected areas. TV channels ignored warning from officials and kept telecasting communal riots like infotainment.
9.Coverage of Machhipiti in Vadodara is an example. One national news channel went overboard to telecast police firing at Machhipit as if it had taken place in Ahmedabad.
10.On 27.02.02 the Government of Gujarat announced a compensation of Rs. 2 lakh for the next of kin of victims of Godhra carnage. There were protests about discrimination between Hindu and Muslim victims and the Government announced on March 9 that all victims would get Rs one lakh. Yet, as late as the first week of April a Congressperson in USA cited a report in an Indian newspaper to accuse the Government of discriminating against minorities in the grant of compensation. The newspaper concerned did not care to inform its readers of the correct situation.
11.The code of ethics prescribed by the Press Council of India was violated by the media with impunity. It so enraged the citizens that several concerned citizens in the disturbed areas suggested that peace could return to the state only if some of the TV channels were closed for some weeks.
12.Media did not help to cool down the tempers. It failed to act as a platform for a dialogue between the Hindus and Muslims on the one hand and between the people and the establishment on the other.
The Study Team is of the considered opinion that the media in general failed to perform as conscious and socially responsible gatekeepers of information. It followed in the footsteps of an American journalist who said, " My job is to report the facts. I give a damn to the consequences". Telecasting images that spread hatred and instigated violence is unhealthy, but their repeated telecast is lethal. The media acted as an interested party in the confrontation, not a neutral reporter of facts. The team was alarmed at the intensity of hostile attitude among the people of the state for Delhi press and television news channels. This attitude was especially articulated by delegations of intellectuals like lawyers, doctors, and businessmen. Even the tribals complained that the media had no time to hear their tale of their agony and was spreading canards against the Hindus.
<b>CONCLUSIONS</b>
<b>TERRORISM NURTURED BY COMMUNAL DISHARMONY</b>
The Godhra carnage and related incidents make a typical case study of international designs and conspiracies to weaken India as an emerging world power. Analysts and professional strategists of all ideological inclinations converge on one forecast that India is going to be a major player on the international scene sooner rather than later. The global community also realizes the inevitability of India becoming an important economic and military power. In such a situation it is but natural that nations hostile to India or its adversaries make all out efforts to create impediments in this process. Their strategy is to keep India engaged in communal and caste strife so that the nationâs focus on development is defused and its endeavour to emerge as a super-power is thwarted. It would surprise no one if Pakistan with the tacit support of not-so-friendly neighbours and world powers hatches conspiracies to destablise and weaken the Indian State.
A careful and in-depth analysis, if carried out with an open mind, would throw open an action plans where terrorist activities appear to be merging with the already existing strong antagonism between Muslims and Hindus. Our hostile neighbour, sometimes in the guise of a friend, keeps on creating wounds on the body polity of our nation. Creation and perpetuation of Kashmir problem is one such example. The support to the authoritarian regimes in Pakistan by USA and European countries speaks volumes about the super powerâs commitment, or lack of it, to democratic values. Godhra and the wide spread communal violence in Gujarat in recent weeks is a part of this nefarious design. The Study Team concludes:
1.Burning of 58 Hindu pilgrims at Godhra on 27.02.02 was an act of international terrorism carried out with the evil objective of pushing the country into a communal cauldron.
2.The plan was to burn the entire train with more than two thousand passengers in the wee hours of February 27, 2002. It was a terrorist action plan that partly failed. The perpetrators of the terrorist acts received support from jehadi elements operating from Godhra. These included some Congress members of the Nagarpalika.
1.Preparations for enacting Godhra carnage were made in advance.
2.There were no quarrels or fights between Hindus and Muslim passengers on the train.
3.There were no quarrels or fights between the vendors and the Hindu pilgrims on the platform of Godhra Railway Station.
4.The intention of the mob was to put to death all the pilgrims travelling by the Sabharmati Express.
5.The fire fighting system available in Godhra was weakened and its arrival at the place of incident willfully delayed by the mob with the open participation of a Congress Councillor, Haji Balal.
6.The demographic changes in Godhra in recent years have made it a center for jehadi activities.
7.The Army was requisitioned and deployed in time.
8.The police was on many occasions overwhelmed by the rioting mobs that were massive and carried more lethal weapons than the police did.
9.Police did not have the training and know-how to mange situations of communal strife witnessed in the state in recent weeks.
10.Barring a few exceptions, the police was not found to be communally motivated.
11.Frequent deployment of army for internal management weakens the defence of our international borders and facilitates infiltration from across the border.
12.The local administration and police at Godhra did not take adequate and prompt action even after the receipt of information about the attack on the train by an armed mob. The local police was reluctant to use force against the rioting mob and made no attempt to arrest the leaders of the gang.
13.The local administration and the police should have been on the alert in view of the demographic and political changes taking place in the town.
15.The administration in Godhra, Ahmedabad and Vadodra was on the whole sensitized to the plight of Muslim minorities in their respective areas. However, the police failed to protect the citizens from frenzied mobs indulging in arson, looting and killing.
16.The relief work was carried out by establishing relief camps for victims of the riots. There are separate camps for Hindus and Muslims. Refugees are not satisfied with the facilities available in the camps.
17. Riot-affected citizens belonging to both the communities are reluctant to go back to their homes due to communal tension and apprehensions about violence.
18. Although Gujarat is a state notorious for communal riots, the bureaucracy and the police are not trained to handle communal riots and to take pre-emptive action to prevent sectarian violence.
19.Alternate strategies to mange communal divide have not been worked out.
20. Adverse media reports about role of officials affected their performance and de-motivated them. Several officers were reluctant to take firm action.
21.Gujarati language media was factual and objective. Yet its propensity to highlight the gory incidents in great details heightened communal tension.
22.English language media, particularly the Delhi Press, is perceived by the Gujaratis to be biased. The information disseminated by it was neither balanced nor impartial.
23.By converting half-baked news stories into major headlines, print as well as electronic media widened the psychological hiatus between Muslims and Hindus.
24.By disseminating half-truths and lies, the media played no mean role in distorting countryâs image in the World.
25. The credibility of the media â both electronic and print â is at dangerously low ebb in Gujarat.
The sectarian violence in Gujarat that began in Godhra on 27.02.02 can be divided into four phases:
1.The first phase was Godhra incident which was planned and executed by a combination of external and internal jehadi forces. It lasted for less than an hour.
2.The second phase was the reaction of Godhra where Hindu pilgrims were roasted alive in the train. The backlash was very intense for 3-4 days. However, sporadic incidents continued for several weeks.
3. The third phase began on 15.03.02 after a Muslim mob attacked a Hindu procession chanting Ram dhun. Extensive media coverage of this attack provoked yet another round of communal riots that lasted for 4/5 days.
4. Sectarian violence continues even more than a month after Godhra. This fourth phase of violence has no provocation or justification other than to sustain the "Remove Modi" campaign. It is the constitutional duty of the State Government to protect citizens and maintain law and order. It is also in the partisan interest of the ruling party in the state to put an end to the communal violence as its continuity in office depends on how soon and how effectively it combats violence. It is, therefore, hard to reject Chief Ministerâs contention that the Congress party that has a vested interest in getting him sacked is perpetuating the communal violence by provoking stray incidents.
<b>Thus the Study Team concludes:</b>
26.Communal violence in Gujarat has become politicized, and instead of treating it as human tragedy it is being used to get political mileage by political parties.
27.Loaded statements made by political leaders propounding their action plans increases the hiatus between Muslims and Hindus.
28.Continued communal violence in Gujarat has tarnished the image of the country in international field thereby reducing its status and bargaining power. Western countries jealous of Indiaâs growing clout in the international community have used the riots to interfere in our internal affairs. The Centre has taken some steps to stem the rot but the role of the opposition is negative. It is encouraging Muslim outfits to involve foreign powers in their "oust Mody" campaign.
29.On the world canvass today strong indicators are visible that point to a concerted effort by jehadi forces to slow down ever-increasing importance of India in the world affairs.
30.There are also concerted efforts to disintegrate India, politically as well as emotionally.
31.There are elements within the country that help and collaborate with the forces inimical to India.
32.The governing class in India is ignorant or willfully blind to the threat perceptions posed by the jehadi forces.
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS ALTERNATE PLAN OF THOUGHT AND ACTION</b>
India cannot escape taking the responsibility of failure to manage the relationship between Hindus and Muslims just by pleading that the problem was inherited from the colonial rulers and the Muslim invaders. Fifty-five years is a long enough period to resolve the issue. Unfortunately, no serious effort has been made to bring Hindus and Muslims closer. On the other hand, certain parties for partisan considerations have exploited the hiatus between the two communities. External agencies fuel the fire of hatred but they succeed only because there are weaknesses within the country. International designs find a ready response from within the civil society as there is a fertile ground for separatist tendencies to grow.
Traditional methods of conflict resolution having failed, new systems need to be employed to convert communal mistrust into national affection and brotherhood. New approaches are required to convert the weaknesses into strength. A minority as large as the second largest Muslim country should not feel alienated nor should the majority community be made to feel that the minorities were appeased at its cost. The amount of time, energy, effort and other resources that the country spends for managing the communal conflicts and failing again and again, if gets diverted to the process of growth and development, India can become a land of plenty and prosperity. But the old problems must be seen from new angles and unorthodox measures taken.
The intelligentsia will have to come up with new yet realistic principles and theories of social systems that are based on ground realities. They must stop romanticizing the miseries of the nation. The bureaucracy have to devise action plans that show results within their lifetimes and cease to give extensions to the problem solving systems. The politicians have to look for alternate means of winning elections and stop treating citizens as mere voters to be used only as pawns in the hands of politicians.
The nation must accept that Hindus and Muslims have no options but to live together. There are only two options. One, to live in amity and the other to live in mutual hostility. Saner elements in the two communities would prefer the first option. Every action and situation that carries the potential of disturbing the mutual amity have to be identified and weeded out. The problem is complex and multifaceted and solution is bound to be difficult and elusive. But the country has a large storehouse of brains that can find solutions to still harder problems. New faces have to be entrusted this job. So a different set of persons who look at the problems from new angles and propose a mix of curative and preventive measures is the need of the hour.
In view of the enormity of the cancerous problem of communal conflicts and the field experience of recent happenings in Gujarat the Study Team proposes to recommend
a.long term measures
b.short term measures and
c. immediate steps to be taken
<b>LONG TERM MEASURES</b>
1. Following groups be constituted to study the problems of communal conflicts in the country:
c.Diagnostic Team: to investigate the genesis of the process of communal conflict and identify key problem areas
d.Curative Team: to determine the solutions for the problems identified by the diagnostic team
e.Preemptive Action Team: to prepare action plans so that existing tensions do not flare up and also to ensure that no new conflict situations arise. The teams should comprise of social scientists, conflict managers, jurists and media persons.
2. Participation in the acts of communal violence should be treated as a crime of as serious nature as an act of terrorism. In no case, communal violence should be allowed to become a lucrative vocation.
3. Deployment of army for internal law and order should be confined to the situation of internal emergency. The enemies of the country should not be allowed to use communal violence as a strategy for withdrawal of army from the border.
4. In the states, police forces on the lines of rapid action force be created for deployment during riots and natural disasters.
5. Election laws need to be amended so that the politicians are not able to use caste or religion for nurturing votes banks. Once the politicians are aware that vote banks based on caste or religion would not serve their purpose, a major portion of the communal problem will disappear.
6. A citizens standing committee be constituted to keep a watch on the communal situation so that if and when communal tension in any part of the country tends to increase the administration is warned to take preventive measures. Such committees need to be constituted at State, District, Block and Village levels.
<b>SHORT TERM MEASURES</b>
7. Several laws and orders passed by the successive governments have remained on paper only. Two such laws are directly related with maintenance of communal peace:
a.The order to ban the use of loud speakers in religious places as well as in processions.
b.the law to regulate the sale of property by the members of one community to the other in communally sensitive areas.
It is recommended that the above orders should be implemented and indirect sale deeds such as on power of attorney should also be taken care of. All encroachments in important public places, busy markets, religious places, near railway stations and bus stations as well as on highways especially at the entry points to the cities should be cleared.
8. It is recommended that the orders for the ban of loud speakers be put to practice with the cooperation with the leaders of various communities.
9. An inquiry commission should be set up to inquire into:
c.Economic and social exploitation of tribals in the state.
d.Recommend ways and means to stop their exploitation
10. Rehabilitation is not merely a physical act of placement of families. Serious efforts need to be done to restore the emotional state of mind. The village and mohalla majorities should be intimately involved in the work of rehabilitation.
11. Gujarat must conduct a review of its police force, which appears to be ill equipped to handle communal violence at the level of recent riots. Special training needs to be given in âcrowd controlâ methods.
<b> IMMEDEATE STEPS TO BE TAKEN</b>
12. The case of issuance of disproportionate number of passports in Godhra be investigated.
13. Punitive fines be imposed on the residents of localities where communal violence erupts after a notified date.
14. Media should use itself as a platform for creating harmonious relationships between different communities. Its crusade, if at all, should be for or against the processes and not for or against individuals.
15.Persons living in relief camps should be provided safe habitations. Community leaders should be actively involved in managing the rehabilitation.
16. Persons booked for communal violence must be prosecuted quickly and given exemplary punishment so that it acts as a deterrent.
17. An independent commission should examine the role of media, both electronic and print, during the communal violence in Gujarat.
18. A code-of-conduct should be developed for the media both for general news gathering and news presentation and during the communal riots. Till the time new code is adopted the guidelines given by the Press Council of India for covering communal tensions should be followed.
19. Television news channels have very significant influence on the minds of the viewers. If the channels so desire they can provide a healing touch to the wounded population of Gujarat. Indian news channels also have the professional talent required for the job. It is suggested that the television news channels take the roles of crusaders for peace.
20. A situation of continuous dialogue needs to be created in every habitation in Gujarat by establishing citizensâ peace committees. It has been proved that regular communication links reduces antagonism between warring groups.
Gujarat has a long history of communal riots. The first such riot has been reported in 1714. After independence major riots broke out on several occasions since 1969. Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry of 1969 and Dave Commission of Inquiry of 1985 analysed the causes and consequences of communal tensions in great details. Serious rioting occurred in 1970 and also in 1992-93. According to
official data, Gujarat witnessed 443 major communal incidents between 1970 and 2002. Another characteristic of the communal frenzy in Gujarat is that it has always taken a long time to return to normalcy. For instance in Godhra itself in 1985 curfew remained imposed for about a year. Communal disturbance in 1985 continued for more than five months from February to July 1985.
The Study team has not gone into the facts and figures of the number of persons killed, injured and displaced, the loss of property destroyed and the number of cases related to molestation of women, if any. It is not because these facts are not important but because the team lacked the time and resources to go into these details. However the Study Team has analysed the situation for:
1.Administrative response
2.Deployment of Army
3.Relief and resettlement measures
4.Confidence building measures
5.Socio-economic profile of the rioting mobs
6.Involvement of vanvasis
7.Role of media
<b>ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE</b>
Based on the information collected from official and non-official sources at Godhra, Ahemdabad and Vadodara the Study Team is of the considered opinion that:
1.The local administration did not respond with speed to the Godhra carnage. The police remained a passive spectator and hesitated to use force against the miscreants. It made no attempt to apprehend the leaders of the mob that indulged in burning alive innocent pilgrims returning from Ayodhya. However, the administration took preventive measures after the VHP gave a call for Gujarat bandh in protest against the attack on the train.
2.In Godhra, Vadodara and Ahmedabad the police tried to control the rioting mobs but, more often than not, failed, as the police were outnumbered- the mobs were unexpectedly large and the police were inadequately armed. In certain cases, the mob carried more lethal weapons that the police had.
3.The administration was not prepared to handle massive migration of riot affected people of both the communities and did not have any idea of the quantum of the relief and rehabilitation work required.
4.Co-ordination between the administration and the NGOs was inadequate.
5.Training and drills for managing communal tensions was conspicuous by its absence in a state that periodically witnesses communal frenzy.
6.Socio-psychological understanding of the communal divide is lacking amongst the officials.
7.The adverse comments on the transfers of officials in the media and not so much the actual transfers demotivated the official machinery.
8.At many places policemen did commendable work of protecting life and property.
9.Policemen, by and large, responded to the situation without communal bias.
<b>DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY</b>
There has been lot of comments on the timing of the deployment of army in various urban and rural areas in Gujarat after the outbreak of violence. Although the team did not have enough time to go into the question in depth, the information made available to it shows that there was no delay on the part of the Gujarat Government in summoning and deployment of troops. A comparison with the past is presented for a proper perspective.
1.By the afternoon of 28.02.02 it was clear that the communal violence has spread widely and the situation had become so alarming that it was unlikely to be controlled by the police and paramilitary forces.
2.On 28.02.02 at 4.30 p.m. the Chief Minister announced at a press conference that the State Government has decided to call army to assist the civil administration.
3.By evening the Union Government had given instructions for the deployment of two brigades in Gujarat.
4.Defense Minister air dashed to Ahmedabad at midnight and had a meeting with the Chief Minister to discuss deployment of the army.
5.The army had to be withdrawn from the countryâs border with Pakistan despite the fact that the troops are deployed in full strength in eye-ball-to-eye-ball situation on Indo-Pak borders.
6.Withdrawal of army from the border may have weakened the countryâs defensive and offensive strategies.
7.Within less than 24 hours at least one brigade of Indian Army had air landed at Ahmedabad.
In a meeting at 0800hrs in which Chief Minister, Defence Minister, army generals and civil officers participated the formal plan for the deployment of the army was approved.
Magistrates who must accompany the army were appointed and by 11a.m. on 01.03.02 the actual deployment of army at sensitive points had begun.
8.The second brigade was deputed to Rajkot and Vadodara on 01.03.02 by that night.
9.Columns allotted to Godhra reached there in the morning of 02.03.02.
10.Army went back to barracks on 10.03.02.
11.In 1969 rioting started on 18.09.69 and army was called in on 21.09.69.
12.In 1985 the riots started on 15.04.85 and the army was called in on 16.04.85.
<b>RELIEF AND REHABILITATION MEASURES</b>
1.Many persons of both the communities whose houses were burnt or destroyed fled and came to the nearby towns for shelter.
2.Many persons who feared an attack on them also fled and gathered in nearby towns.
3.The State Government arranged for shelters called Relief Camps to provide safe temporary shelter to the displaced persons.
4.Many voluntary organizations of both the communities also opened Relief Camps for the displaced persons.
5.The Government managed some camps while other camps were run by the voluntary organizations.
6.Most of the inhabitants in the camps remained unoccupied, leading to idle talk and further reinforcement of views on communal basis.
7.The inhabitants did not feel confident and safe to go back to their respective habitations.
According to the State Government following is the information about the camps:
District
Number of Camps
Number of Inmates
Ahemdabad
44
68100
Anand
13
5200
Dahod
6
4526
Kheda
3
1441
Mahesana
6
2648
Panchmahals
7
8091
Sabarkantha
13
10938
Vadodara
11
12753
State Total
103
113697
<b>CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES</b>
1.In affected areas deployment of police or other forces was very scanty.
2.Residents of the sensitive areas were living in an environment of fear.
3.The mutual mistrust between Hindu and Muslim population is on the increase.
4.Longer the stay in the camps more is the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty.
5.In affected areas, sensitive areas and relief camps there was no publicity material appealing and advising for communal harmony and peaceful co-existence
6.The Information and Public Relations machinery of the state did not disseminate words of assurance and appeals by the Prime Minister, Chief Minister and others that are likely to have a soothing effect on the hurt psyche of the people.
7.Presence of the reports of arson in newspapers and repetition of such reports on television affected negatively the process of confidence building.
8.Most of the voluntary and social organizations were working on sectarian lines and hardly worked for creating an environment of communal harmony.
9.Efforts of some of the officials to bring both the communities together and arrive at a compromise failed, as the amount of antagonism against each other is very high.
10.Rumors spread like wild fire increasing the level of anxieties.
<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES OF THE RIOTING MOBS</b>
(Based on information collected from officials and public, no direct observation)
1.Muslim mobs predominantly included persons of lower socio-economic strata.
2.Muslim mobs included many known faces but number of persons not earlier seen in the locality was also very large.
3.Hindu mobs, especially during the first week of March, comprised a mix of people belonging to lower, lower middle and upper middle socio-economic strata of the society.
4.Involvement of upper middle class Hindus in arson and looting is a phenomenon seen for the first time in the country.
5.The Hindu mobs appeared to be more interested in destroying the property of selected establishments of Muslims. It was reported that a chain of restaurants with Hindu names and owned by a Muslim family was targeted because of the perception that lot of money from gulf countries had been invested thereby putting Hindu competitors at a disadvantage.
6.Another new phenomenon reported to the Study Team was the presence and active participation of women in the mobs.
<b>INVOLVEMENT OF TRIBALS</b>
Earlier in Gujarat, tribals never got involved in the Hindu-Muslim riots. However, their involvement in post Godhra riots added a new dimension to the communal violence. In rural areas the vanvasis attacked the Muslim moneylenders, shopkeepers and the forest contractors. They used their traditional bow and arrows as also their implements used to cut the trees and grass while attacking Muslims. They moved in groups and used coded signals for communication. Two factors seems to have contributed to this disturbing phenomenon:
1.A delegation of tribals told the Study team that the Muslim moneylenders, shopkeepers and forest contractors have been exploiting the tribals for decades. They charged exorbitant rate of interest to money loaned to tribals. In certain cases the rate of interest is as high as 50 per cent per year. Having got into this never-ending vicious circle of loans, the tribals have been reduced to the status of bounded labour. Tribals working as servants are ill-treated by these money lenders who happen to be Muslims. The accumulated anger of years of exploitation became explosive when moneylenders sexually exploited their womenfolk. The tribals are no longer allowed to use forest produce that has been their sustenance for centuries. This too fuelled the feelings of anger, hatred and revenge among them.
2.Tribals have, of late, become conscious of their Hindu identity because of the awareness campaign launched by VHP and other Hindu outfits. Burning alive of Hindu pilgrims by a Muslim mob at Godhra provided the spark for the fire of revenge and hatred.
It may be mentioned that these are only exploratory postulations, scientific anthropological, economic and sociological analysis is required to understand the changed behavior of tribals.
<b>ROLE OF MEDIA</b>
The Study Team received a large number of complaints against âbiased reportingâ, ânon-objective attitudeâ and âanti Gujarat cospiracyâof Delhi Media. The team felt it necessary to objectively observe and analyse the role of Media both regional and English language newspapers published from metropolitan cities. It also solicited comments about the role of media from about 500 persons with whom the members of the team interacted. The teamâs observations are:
1.Local and regional papers at times seemed to be emotionally surcharged and lost sight of objectivity. However, Gujrati newspapers, by and large, were factual in day to day reporting.
2.The editorial pages of local and regional newspapers maintained a balance in projecting all viewpoints.
3.Newspapers published in English from Delhi invariably editorialized the news. Direct and indirect comments in the news writing were so telling that the personal likes and dislikes of the news reporters were too obvious to be missed.
4.English language newspapers published from Delhi appeared to have assumed the role of crusaders against the State Government from day one. It coloured the entire operation of news gathering, feature writing and editorials.
5.The edit pages of English language press carried comments that clearly indicated biases:
a.against the State Government of Gujarat,
b.in favor of Congress, leftist parties and the secularist intellectuals,
c.indifferent to the carnage at Godhra,
d.against the Hindu organizations, and
e.against the NDA government at the Center.
6.Most of the national newspapers and news channels played down the intensity of Godhra carnage and projected it as a result of provocation by pilgrims. Not many reporters were deputed to dig out facts or to do follow-up stories. This resulted in large number of editorials and articles that projected Godhra as a reaction to provocation by âkarsevaksâ and riots in rest of the state as "state sponsored terrorism".
7.A distorted image of sectarian violence in the state was projected by the electornic and print media based in Delhi.
8.Repeated telecasts of arson and violence contributed in spreading the tension to unaffected areas. TV channels ignored warning from officials and kept telecasting communal riots like infotainment.
9.Coverage of Machhipiti in Vadodara is an example. One national news channel went overboard to telecast police firing at Machhipit as if it had taken place in Ahmedabad.
10.On 27.02.02 the Government of Gujarat announced a compensation of Rs. 2 lakh for the next of kin of victims of Godhra carnage. There were protests about discrimination between Hindu and Muslim victims and the Government announced on March 9 that all victims would get Rs one lakh. Yet, as late as the first week of April a Congressperson in USA cited a report in an Indian newspaper to accuse the Government of discriminating against minorities in the grant of compensation. The newspaper concerned did not care to inform its readers of the correct situation.
11.The code of ethics prescribed by the Press Council of India was violated by the media with impunity. It so enraged the citizens that several concerned citizens in the disturbed areas suggested that peace could return to the state only if some of the TV channels were closed for some weeks.
12.Media did not help to cool down the tempers. It failed to act as a platform for a dialogue between the Hindus and Muslims on the one hand and between the people and the establishment on the other.
The Study Team is of the considered opinion that the media in general failed to perform as conscious and socially responsible gatekeepers of information. It followed in the footsteps of an American journalist who said, " My job is to report the facts. I give a damn to the consequences". Telecasting images that spread hatred and instigated violence is unhealthy, but their repeated telecast is lethal. The media acted as an interested party in the confrontation, not a neutral reporter of facts. The team was alarmed at the intensity of hostile attitude among the people of the state for Delhi press and television news channels. This attitude was especially articulated by delegations of intellectuals like lawyers, doctors, and businessmen. Even the tribals complained that the media had no time to hear their tale of their agony and was spreading canards against the Hindus.
<b>CONCLUSIONS</b>
<b>TERRORISM NURTURED BY COMMUNAL DISHARMONY</b>
The Godhra carnage and related incidents make a typical case study of international designs and conspiracies to weaken India as an emerging world power. Analysts and professional strategists of all ideological inclinations converge on one forecast that India is going to be a major player on the international scene sooner rather than later. The global community also realizes the inevitability of India becoming an important economic and military power. In such a situation it is but natural that nations hostile to India or its adversaries make all out efforts to create impediments in this process. Their strategy is to keep India engaged in communal and caste strife so that the nationâs focus on development is defused and its endeavour to emerge as a super-power is thwarted. It would surprise no one if Pakistan with the tacit support of not-so-friendly neighbours and world powers hatches conspiracies to destablise and weaken the Indian State.
A careful and in-depth analysis, if carried out with an open mind, would throw open an action plans where terrorist activities appear to be merging with the already existing strong antagonism between Muslims and Hindus. Our hostile neighbour, sometimes in the guise of a friend, keeps on creating wounds on the body polity of our nation. Creation and perpetuation of Kashmir problem is one such example. The support to the authoritarian regimes in Pakistan by USA and European countries speaks volumes about the super powerâs commitment, or lack of it, to democratic values. Godhra and the wide spread communal violence in Gujarat in recent weeks is a part of this nefarious design. The Study Team concludes:
1.Burning of 58 Hindu pilgrims at Godhra on 27.02.02 was an act of international terrorism carried out with the evil objective of pushing the country into a communal cauldron.
2.The plan was to burn the entire train with more than two thousand passengers in the wee hours of February 27, 2002. It was a terrorist action plan that partly failed. The perpetrators of the terrorist acts received support from jehadi elements operating from Godhra. These included some Congress members of the Nagarpalika.
1.Preparations for enacting Godhra carnage were made in advance.
2.There were no quarrels or fights between Hindus and Muslim passengers on the train.
3.There were no quarrels or fights between the vendors and the Hindu pilgrims on the platform of Godhra Railway Station.
4.The intention of the mob was to put to death all the pilgrims travelling by the Sabharmati Express.
5.The fire fighting system available in Godhra was weakened and its arrival at the place of incident willfully delayed by the mob with the open participation of a Congress Councillor, Haji Balal.
6.The demographic changes in Godhra in recent years have made it a center for jehadi activities.
7.The Army was requisitioned and deployed in time.
8.The police was on many occasions overwhelmed by the rioting mobs that were massive and carried more lethal weapons than the police did.
9.Police did not have the training and know-how to mange situations of communal strife witnessed in the state in recent weeks.
10.Barring a few exceptions, the police was not found to be communally motivated.
11.Frequent deployment of army for internal management weakens the defence of our international borders and facilitates infiltration from across the border.
12.The local administration and police at Godhra did not take adequate and prompt action even after the receipt of information about the attack on the train by an armed mob. The local police was reluctant to use force against the rioting mob and made no attempt to arrest the leaders of the gang.
13.The local administration and the police should have been on the alert in view of the demographic and political changes taking place in the town.
15.The administration in Godhra, Ahmedabad and Vadodra was on the whole sensitized to the plight of Muslim minorities in their respective areas. However, the police failed to protect the citizens from frenzied mobs indulging in arson, looting and killing.
16.The relief work was carried out by establishing relief camps for victims of the riots. There are separate camps for Hindus and Muslims. Refugees are not satisfied with the facilities available in the camps.
17. Riot-affected citizens belonging to both the communities are reluctant to go back to their homes due to communal tension and apprehensions about violence.
18. Although Gujarat is a state notorious for communal riots, the bureaucracy and the police are not trained to handle communal riots and to take pre-emptive action to prevent sectarian violence.
19.Alternate strategies to mange communal divide have not been worked out.
20. Adverse media reports about role of officials affected their performance and de-motivated them. Several officers were reluctant to take firm action.
21.Gujarati language media was factual and objective. Yet its propensity to highlight the gory incidents in great details heightened communal tension.
22.English language media, particularly the Delhi Press, is perceived by the Gujaratis to be biased. The information disseminated by it was neither balanced nor impartial.
23.By converting half-baked news stories into major headlines, print as well as electronic media widened the psychological hiatus between Muslims and Hindus.
24.By disseminating half-truths and lies, the media played no mean role in distorting countryâs image in the World.
25. The credibility of the media â both electronic and print â is at dangerously low ebb in Gujarat.
The sectarian violence in Gujarat that began in Godhra on 27.02.02 can be divided into four phases:
1.The first phase was Godhra incident which was planned and executed by a combination of external and internal jehadi forces. It lasted for less than an hour.
2.The second phase was the reaction of Godhra where Hindu pilgrims were roasted alive in the train. The backlash was very intense for 3-4 days. However, sporadic incidents continued for several weeks.
3. The third phase began on 15.03.02 after a Muslim mob attacked a Hindu procession chanting Ram dhun. Extensive media coverage of this attack provoked yet another round of communal riots that lasted for 4/5 days.
4. Sectarian violence continues even more than a month after Godhra. This fourth phase of violence has no provocation or justification other than to sustain the "Remove Modi" campaign. It is the constitutional duty of the State Government to protect citizens and maintain law and order. It is also in the partisan interest of the ruling party in the state to put an end to the communal violence as its continuity in office depends on how soon and how effectively it combats violence. It is, therefore, hard to reject Chief Ministerâs contention that the Congress party that has a vested interest in getting him sacked is perpetuating the communal violence by provoking stray incidents.
<b>Thus the Study Team concludes:</b>
26.Communal violence in Gujarat has become politicized, and instead of treating it as human tragedy it is being used to get political mileage by political parties.
27.Loaded statements made by political leaders propounding their action plans increases the hiatus between Muslims and Hindus.
28.Continued communal violence in Gujarat has tarnished the image of the country in international field thereby reducing its status and bargaining power. Western countries jealous of Indiaâs growing clout in the international community have used the riots to interfere in our internal affairs. The Centre has taken some steps to stem the rot but the role of the opposition is negative. It is encouraging Muslim outfits to involve foreign powers in their "oust Mody" campaign.
29.On the world canvass today strong indicators are visible that point to a concerted effort by jehadi forces to slow down ever-increasing importance of India in the world affairs.
30.There are also concerted efforts to disintegrate India, politically as well as emotionally.
31.There are elements within the country that help and collaborate with the forces inimical to India.
32.The governing class in India is ignorant or willfully blind to the threat perceptions posed by the jehadi forces.
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS ALTERNATE PLAN OF THOUGHT AND ACTION</b>
India cannot escape taking the responsibility of failure to manage the relationship between Hindus and Muslims just by pleading that the problem was inherited from the colonial rulers and the Muslim invaders. Fifty-five years is a long enough period to resolve the issue. Unfortunately, no serious effort has been made to bring Hindus and Muslims closer. On the other hand, certain parties for partisan considerations have exploited the hiatus between the two communities. External agencies fuel the fire of hatred but they succeed only because there are weaknesses within the country. International designs find a ready response from within the civil society as there is a fertile ground for separatist tendencies to grow.
Traditional methods of conflict resolution having failed, new systems need to be employed to convert communal mistrust into national affection and brotherhood. New approaches are required to convert the weaknesses into strength. A minority as large as the second largest Muslim country should not feel alienated nor should the majority community be made to feel that the minorities were appeased at its cost. The amount of time, energy, effort and other resources that the country spends for managing the communal conflicts and failing again and again, if gets diverted to the process of growth and development, India can become a land of plenty and prosperity. But the old problems must be seen from new angles and unorthodox measures taken.
The intelligentsia will have to come up with new yet realistic principles and theories of social systems that are based on ground realities. They must stop romanticizing the miseries of the nation. The bureaucracy have to devise action plans that show results within their lifetimes and cease to give extensions to the problem solving systems. The politicians have to look for alternate means of winning elections and stop treating citizens as mere voters to be used only as pawns in the hands of politicians.
The nation must accept that Hindus and Muslims have no options but to live together. There are only two options. One, to live in amity and the other to live in mutual hostility. Saner elements in the two communities would prefer the first option. Every action and situation that carries the potential of disturbing the mutual amity have to be identified and weeded out. The problem is complex and multifaceted and solution is bound to be difficult and elusive. But the country has a large storehouse of brains that can find solutions to still harder problems. New faces have to be entrusted this job. So a different set of persons who look at the problems from new angles and propose a mix of curative and preventive measures is the need of the hour.
In view of the enormity of the cancerous problem of communal conflicts and the field experience of recent happenings in Gujarat the Study Team proposes to recommend
a.long term measures
b.short term measures and
c. immediate steps to be taken
<b>LONG TERM MEASURES</b>
1. Following groups be constituted to study the problems of communal conflicts in the country:
c.Diagnostic Team: to investigate the genesis of the process of communal conflict and identify key problem areas
d.Curative Team: to determine the solutions for the problems identified by the diagnostic team
e.Preemptive Action Team: to prepare action plans so that existing tensions do not flare up and also to ensure that no new conflict situations arise. The teams should comprise of social scientists, conflict managers, jurists and media persons.
2. Participation in the acts of communal violence should be treated as a crime of as serious nature as an act of terrorism. In no case, communal violence should be allowed to become a lucrative vocation.
3. Deployment of army for internal law and order should be confined to the situation of internal emergency. The enemies of the country should not be allowed to use communal violence as a strategy for withdrawal of army from the border.
4. In the states, police forces on the lines of rapid action force be created for deployment during riots and natural disasters.
5. Election laws need to be amended so that the politicians are not able to use caste or religion for nurturing votes banks. Once the politicians are aware that vote banks based on caste or religion would not serve their purpose, a major portion of the communal problem will disappear.
6. A citizens standing committee be constituted to keep a watch on the communal situation so that if and when communal tension in any part of the country tends to increase the administration is warned to take preventive measures. Such committees need to be constituted at State, District, Block and Village levels.
<b>SHORT TERM MEASURES</b>
7. Several laws and orders passed by the successive governments have remained on paper only. Two such laws are directly related with maintenance of communal peace:
a.The order to ban the use of loud speakers in religious places as well as in processions.
b.the law to regulate the sale of property by the members of one community to the other in communally sensitive areas.
It is recommended that the above orders should be implemented and indirect sale deeds such as on power of attorney should also be taken care of. All encroachments in important public places, busy markets, religious places, near railway stations and bus stations as well as on highways especially at the entry points to the cities should be cleared.
8. It is recommended that the orders for the ban of loud speakers be put to practice with the cooperation with the leaders of various communities.
9. An inquiry commission should be set up to inquire into:
c.Economic and social exploitation of tribals in the state.
d.Recommend ways and means to stop their exploitation
10. Rehabilitation is not merely a physical act of placement of families. Serious efforts need to be done to restore the emotional state of mind. The village and mohalla majorities should be intimately involved in the work of rehabilitation.
11. Gujarat must conduct a review of its police force, which appears to be ill equipped to handle communal violence at the level of recent riots. Special training needs to be given in âcrowd controlâ methods.
<b> IMMEDEATE STEPS TO BE TAKEN</b>
12. The case of issuance of disproportionate number of passports in Godhra be investigated.
13. Punitive fines be imposed on the residents of localities where communal violence erupts after a notified date.
14. Media should use itself as a platform for creating harmonious relationships between different communities. Its crusade, if at all, should be for or against the processes and not for or against individuals.
15.Persons living in relief camps should be provided safe habitations. Community leaders should be actively involved in managing the rehabilitation.
16. Persons booked for communal violence must be prosecuted quickly and given exemplary punishment so that it acts as a deterrent.
17. An independent commission should examine the role of media, both electronic and print, during the communal violence in Gujarat.
18. A code-of-conduct should be developed for the media both for general news gathering and news presentation and during the communal riots. Till the time new code is adopted the guidelines given by the Press Council of India for covering communal tensions should be followed.
19. Television news channels have very significant influence on the minds of the viewers. If the channels so desire they can provide a healing touch to the wounded population of Gujarat. Indian news channels also have the professional talent required for the job. It is suggested that the television news channels take the roles of crusaders for peace.
20. A situation of continuous dialogue needs to be created in every habitation in Gujarat by establishing citizensâ peace committees. It has been proved that regular communication links reduces antagonism between warring groups.