Maratha-Rajput Relations (1720-1795 A.d.)

[Bharatvarsh]

[quote]  Chapter 4
THE LALSOT AND THE MIRACULOUS RECOVERY

(i) Mahadaji Begins His Forward March :

Three miles south of Lalsot, lay the Maratha base camp. North of Lalsot is the ‘pass of Lalsot’. Three miles beyond the pass, was the village Didwana. Four miles further north – west from the village, lay the village and fortalice of Ramgadh. Four miles further, from the north – west the path crossed the Morel river, opposite the village and fort of Bidakha. Beyond the river, path was hard to traverse for cavalry and even for infantry, as there was a nala on one side and a hill on the other for a mile. After that a clear plain stretched north-westward for six miles till the village Tunga was reached. Here the Jaypur camp lay on an elevation with hillocks and nalas on three sides and hence a hard place for  any night attack. The Jaypur King was encamped still further two miles towards north-west at Madhaogadh. The battle of 28th July was fought on the plain between Tunga and Bidakha, the Marathas having the nalas and the river Morel at their back.

Mahadaji began his forward movement on 23rd June (1) when Khanderao Hari’s force was expected to join him the next morning. On 24th, Ranakhan, who was the head of the Maratha Army, occupied Lalsot pass, the Rajput having vacated it to fall back on Ramgadh. On 26th Khanderao Hari, rode into the camp with 3,000 Deccani horse, De Boigne’s two battalions (1,300 strong), 2,000 hired Naga monks and some 300 Gujar infantry (from simthar). This reinforcement ended the perilous situation, Mahadaji was facing till then, but he was still waiting for Ambaji Ingle, who had started at the urgent call of Mahadaji from Patiala on 7th June.

On 30th June Ranakhan advanced three miles further beyond the pass and encamped below the Jowana hill at Didwana. On 10th July, he made a further advance towards Ramgadh. Dharrao Shinde and Jiwaji Bakshi, the vanguard of the Maratha army reached Morel river by 12th July. Now Skirmishes began between the advanced posts of the rival sides. Pushing back (2) the Rajput Posts, the Maratha vanguard crossed Morel on 13th July. But even though his generals were advancing thus, Mahadaji held them in check (3) from engaging with the Rajputs, till the troops, traversing 25 kos that day, leaving his men, provisions and camp at Piplai. On 23rd July Ranakhan captured the fort of Bidakha on a strong hillock from the Rajputs and dismantled it to have no hindrance to Maratha movements. The two armies now stood face to face the front skirmishing began.

(ii) The Rajput Confederacy :

The forward movement of Mahadaji began on 23rd June but the final action was fought on 28th July, more than a month later on. Mahadaji was during this time waiting for the coming of Ambaji (4) , moreover, it was his expectation that the illknit confederacy of the Rajputs would dissolve either from inaction or from non-payment of regular salary to the mercenary Mughalia and North Indian soldiers, as it was reasonably expected that it would be impossible for the exhausted and tiny State of Jaypur to bear such a huge burden of war expenses for long.

Mahadaji’s expectations even quite reasonable (5) , were not fulfilled, far from it, the Rajputs grew more formidable by receiving reinforcements on one hand and effectively reducing his strength on the other.

Vijaysing, the vigilant King of Jodhpur, stood watchfully behind the Rajput Confederation and quickly made good the possible cracks therein and did not allow it to dissove as per Mahadaji’s expectations. He was active throughout and on all fronts. On 16th July when Mahadaji was reinforced  by Ambaji Ingle, he sent promise of more assistance to Muhammad Beg Hamdani (6), with orders to Bhojraj Bakshi to do as the Jaypur Raja bid him. He informed that more troops were being sent and urged the Jaypur King to deliver the battle immediately and to do ‘Pakka’ whatever he intended to do. He sent 7 to 8 thousand Rathods, horse and foot, towards Sambhar and wrote letters to Bundi, Kota and Bikaner Rajas urging them to send aid to Jaypur. All these forces with those from Raghogadh Khichi joined the Jaypur (7) army on 26th and 27th July. The Jaypur King, who ws held worthless and foresaken to his fate by most of his Sardars and thus having no army to defend his State the previous year, was successfully challenging Mahadaji the Regent of the Emperor with about 50 thousand army, this was in itself a miracle. The Rajput (8) appeal to save their land at the threat of aggression was the reason behind it, which was the reaction of Mahadaji initial folly of treating Jaypur so negliable as to think of placing any one on its throne, who would pay him more in cash and territory.

While keeping the road of negotiations (9) still open to their advantage, and forcing thereby on Mahadaji a role of aggressor, the Rajputs, being in their territory, effectively applied all the means of force, diplomacy, seduction and starvation by cutting all his supplies of grain to force him to give a battle (10).

The blockade was so thorough and the means so effective (11) that on the day of the fight grain in Mahadaji’s camp was sold four seers a rupee. It was another Panipat for the Marathas with a superior force in number to face, and an atmosphere of starvation and suspicion in their camp. It is no wonder that with every day adding to his difficulties, Mahadaji grew bitterer vowed never to accept money but to devastate Jaypur (12) and Jodhpur both.

On 19th July Mahadaji received a written challenge from Jaypur King (13), calling him to fight a pitched battle into open, out of the shelter of guns. Mahadaji told Rana Khan, Ambaji, Khanderao and the rest that if he made terms with the Jaypur Raja, he would not be able to show his face in all Hindusthan “A man will not live for ever; come what may!”. The Sardars said that unless he paid money, the soldiers would not fight well, up till then they had paid their soldiers by selling their property and equipment. Mahadaji padi rupees 20 thousand to them but non-would accept.

On 22nd Ambaji sent Daulatram’s letter (14) to Mahadaji but he returned it saying “If after bearing the heavy expenses for six months in such humiliation, I accept tribute from Jaypur Raja, the other Rajas too would behave in the same way. Without fighting a battle tribute can not be accepted.”

On 27th July Rana Khan (15) sent the Jaypur Raja’s letter addressed to him to Mahadaji. Its purport was “I have always behaved like a Zamindar, and never acted contrarily. I am ready to pay contribution. But if you want to seize my Raj and will not accept money, why are you delaying to fight? Come on tomorrow, and I too shall be ready.”

The Challenge was accepted. Mahadaji ordered all his troops to get ready and assemble one ‘ghadi’ before dawn.

(iii) The Battle of Lalsot (16) (28th July 1787) :

In the morning of 28th July, Mahadaji woke up four ghadis before dawn, performed his bath and puja and rode to Rana Khan’s former camp.

Skirmishing between the rival posts began. Rana Khan with all his troops and guns advanced two miles towards Tunga, after crossing the river, and drew up his line of battle in the plain, west to east, for the length of a mile, raising batteries and placing guns on them. Behind the guns in centre stood Rana Khan and Vitthalrao with the untrustworthy Hidusthani sipoys. On the left wing stood Appa Khanderao and Rajaji Patil and on the right stood Ambaji Ingle with Rao Raja and his troops.

The Rajputs also advancing two miles from their base, similarly marshalled their troops with the artillery infront, behind earthwork. The Rathods, who had taken a vow not toreturn alive without victory, were to their right side under Bhimsing. At the centre, infront of Rana Khan, was the king in person with his Kachhwa army and to his left was Muhammad Beg Hamdani with the deserted Mughalia and Hindusthani soldiers of Mahadaji.

The battle of cannonade began. But the Rajput guns were larger; their shots reached the Maratha ranks and killed many men with cannon balls weighing five to fourteen seers, whereas the Maratha guns being comparatively lighter ones, their shots hardly reached the enemy ranks. (Later on, it was revealed that this was the result of treachers) Mahadaji hence sent four big guns to Rana Khan. Isamil Beg rallying his uncle’s troops, led such a furious charge on the Maratha right that the troops under Rao Raja and Ambaji Ingle were driven back in disorder. Mahadaji sent Bapuji Vitthalrao and other Sardars to reinforce them. Thus encouraged with the success of their left wing, the famous Rathod cavalry charged the Maratha left under Appa Khanderao and Rayaji Patil with all furiousness.

At about 11 O’clock, the battle passed from cannonade to fighting at close quarters. Mahadaji then rode at near Bidarkah; and keeping information of the whole field, instantly sent reinforcement, where they were needed mostly. A camel courier brought the news that four thousand Rathods had fllen on the artillery of Appa Khanderao and pushed back the Nagas and Mughalia Sardars killing hundreds of the troops however, reformed his lines and began to fire his guns, but the Rathods heeded it not.

Ramji, Patil, Ambaji Ingle and Bapuji (Shivaji) Vitthal, and Dharrao Shinde hastened to reinforce them. The risala of the sons of the late Murtza Khan Barach dismounted and began to fight a hand to  hand encounter. Rana Khan sent some guns and kept a deadly fire on the Rajput center so as not to allow the Kachhwas to come to the help of the Rathods on whom the entire Maratha army charged by now. Having got no support from behind, the Rathods fell back on their front, the Marathas, who were pushed back recovered their trenches.

In the close fighting Malharrao Pawar, Chimnaji the Diwan of Vitthalrao Rao Raja’s brother’s son, Gazi Khan the brother of the late Murtza Khan received mortal wounds and were killed. Sambhaji Shinde a high Sardar Cavalry were slain. Nearly there were a thousand casualties on the Maratha side and their two hundred and fifty horses were carried off. The losses from the Rathod side were about two hundred men killed with Shobaram Bhandari, Bhimsing Bakshi’s brother-in-law and two or three other prominent Sardars, about four to five hundred men wounded and one hundred horses captured by the Marathas. It is quite evident from the Maratha losses that the Ratohd onslaught was a terrible one. On Maratha side great exertion and bravery was shown by the Telangas, the Turk Sawars, Murtza Khan’s son, De Boigne’s paltan, Bapuji Vitthalrao and Pawars, otherwise there would have been a defeat.

The Rathods made three or four more attempts to fall on the Maratha guns but got no opportunity like the first one. At three quarters of the day, when Muhammad Beg Hamdani was coming to the support of the Rathods, he was killed by a cannon ball that hit his breast. This broke the spirit of the Rajput army. The Marathas were mainly on defensive for fear of treachery of the suspected Hindusthani force. There was little fighting due to the death of Hamdani on Rajput side and the coming of rain’s in afternoon made the movements of artillery difficult. Keeping their patrols, both sides retreated to their respective camps at the nightfall, even though the cannonade was kept on till two ghadis after that. About two to three thousand men fell on both the sides. At one watch after nightfall (17), Mahadaji returned to his own tent. The Deccani soldiers agent stated that nearly five hundred costly horses had been slain and many more were wounded. All Officers demanded money for their troops and rewards for those who had fought well (especially Murtza Khan’s sons). He paid rupees 25 thousand to his Sardars as price of ointment (18) and granted gold bracelets, money and robes to the Shiledars. Mahadaji gave sixty horses to those whose horses had been slain and two thousand rupees to the troops of the late Murtza Khan Barach for their heroic fighting. His Sardars urged him to deal a final blow two days later to finish off the business.

The King of Jaypur paid a visit to the tents of Aga Najaf Ali, the son of the deceased Hamdani and Mirza Ismail Beg, his nephew and condoled them. He gave rupees 4000 for the wounded besides jewels and robes.

Then he visited the Rathod camp. They complained that, while fighting desperately, they were not supported by the Kachhwas. The King of Jodhpur, on hearing this news, sent another contingent of 5000 Rathods to aid Jaypur and also sent twenty pairs of gold bracelets, twenty pearl necklaces, and twenty swords for his Sardars. Nearly one thousand mercenaries from Multan, contingetns from Bikaner and Daudputri (Bahawalpur) came to the assistance of the Raja of Jaypur who sent a letter on 29th to Mahadaji through Sulaiman Beg Khan, praying from the postponement of the battle for two days for the fatiha of the 3rd day of Muhammad Beg’s death. On Tuesday (31st July) he assured to come out for a pitched battle.

Neither Marathas nor the Rajputs held the battle fought on 28th July as the decisive one, which was a victory for none. Inspire of the Rathod valour and the treachery in Mahadaji’s camp, the Rajputs were not successful in destroying Mahadaji’s camp, whose artillery still stood a formidable strength from their point of view. On 28th July, Mahadaji could not be but on his defensive for fear of treachery but from the fact that the next day his forces had again appeared in the field and waited there for three quarters of the day, it was evident that he was in high spirits and decided to end the business as he expressed confidently in his letter to Nana Fadnis, giving him the account of the battle. He wrote (19) (29th July), “The Rajputs came out from their camp for a fight, after havng joined by Hamdani, with a total number of 50 thousand and 60 pieces of gun. We (also) marched on them after the junction of Khanderao Hari and Ambaji Ingle, whom letters had been sent, on Shrawan Shuddha Chaturdashi (Saturday, the 28th July) with all our force and artillery. At first the battle began with gun fire on both the sides that continued till noon. Then the Rajputs divided themselves into three groups (right, center and left). Their left fell on Ambaji Ingle thinking his a weaker side. Ingle facing them boldly cut their ‘gol’ into two. On our left, Shivaji Vitthal Bapu, Dharrao Shinde, Rayaji Patil and Khanderao Hari, rode into the thick mass of the Rathod horse and pushing them back, followed them for one and a half miles. Rana Khan, opening a deadly fire on the King in person and Hamdani before him, made it impossible for them to come to the help of the Rathods. Hamdani was about to march, when he was killed by one of the cannon balls from our fire. We would have pushed on further to their camp but we had to think of the nala in their front and the ravines besides. The battle raged for three quarters of the day. (At the time of fighting) water was not available near at hand, that needed to be carried from the rive, one and a half miles behind the front, and hence our horses and men suffered greatly for want of drinking water and hence the Rangadas were saved. But by the valour of Shirmant, the Rangadas are greatly punished. The Rathods and the Kachhwas left a thousand corpses behind the field. Men of prominence were killed and moreover two thousand went away wounded. Shivaji Vitthal Bapu’s men exerted well. Forces of Jodhpour and Jaypur had marched in unity with full preparation, but (inspite of that) due to the valour of Shrimant, they were punished. Next day also (29th July) our army marched on them, but they did not come out of their camp. As the place is difficult (for assault) with a nala infront, a hillock behind and ravines on both sides (they are saved). But by the valour of Shrimant, the enemy will be destroyed completely.”

But no sooner Mahadaji dispatched this letter on Monday the 30th July, than the matter began to take such an ugly form that he lost complete control over the situation and had to make a hasty retreat before the formidable enemy to save the whole Maratha camp from destruction. thIs was the culmination (20) of the chain of effects, that originated in his utter lack of money for the task he had undertaken as Vakil-ul-Mutlak, the ill luck of having famine affected and devastated territories under him that could hardly make good his vast need, the large armies he had to employ irrespective of his scanty resources, forcing on him an indebtedness that swallowed up the capital of all the available bankers leaving none to pay him, ultimately compelling on him a short sighted policy to look to the immediate present, which was the main reason of his folly. Lalsot proved that he was still formidable for the Rajput confederacy but like a devouring disease, Rajput treachery had eaten up his power inwardly and had brought him to a stage of complete ruin. This could be possible only cause he was unable to pay long standing arrears of pay of his Mughalia and North Indian sipoys, still with him. Besides other things, lack of money was the only powerful reason that turned the Lalsot campaign into a defeat for Mahadaji.

(iv) Mahadaji Decided to Retreat Before the Rajputs :

On 30th July (21) news came that a Maratha forage party of 6000 pack of oxen and 700 camels from Karauli side via Khushalgadh was attacked by the Rajputs and 14 to 15 hundred oxen and camels were carried off due to the utter cowardice of the escort – a thousand Deccani horse and foot. Afzal Khan’s and Shujaet Khan’s men fought well and hance the rest of the grain convoy and the money coming from Gwalior were safely brought to the camp. Mahadaji praised the two Khans and gave them some money. The Jaypur Raja’s Dhayabhai blocked the eastern road from Khushalgadh, while Rodaram Khawas, closed the southern road from Ranathambhore. Next day supplies were entirely stopped “A rupee could ot by even four lbs of flour or six lbs of Dal. All the troops, especially the sipoy battalions, clamoured for their pay. Mons. Lasteneau came to Mahdaji and reported that the Mughalia troops that had previously gone over to Jaypur side were seducing his sipoys by promising to pay up their dues from the Jaypur treasury”.

All the trained sipoy battalions (22) and especially a group of 7000 Telangas took up arms, and imprisoning their Commandants, stood up in a line saying that “If we get our past dues for seven or eight months in full and four annas daily for the future, we shall serve or else shall go over to Jaypur Raja with our artillery.” Rana Khan urged Mahadaji a quick settlement of their claims but Mahadaji replied “If I pay the salary of the Telangas today, then the Hindusthani tomorrow and the Deccani horse the next day, will ask for the dues. Six lakhs is what their monthly salary amounts to”. At last Mahadaji agreed to pay them for one month and rest later on. They demanded five months’ salary. Mahadaji offered them three months pay and promised to pay the rest after the final battle with the Rajputs was over. The rest of the paltan accepted the offer and Mahadaji at night paid rupees two thousand nine hundred to the gunners of the Camp and rupees one thousand to Lasteneau and rupees ten thousand to the sons of Murtaza Khan.

But the 7 thousand Telangas would listen to non. News came from Jaypur camp that seven more guns had come from Jaypur and the King had planned to plant these bigger guns infront of Mahadaji’s artillery and assault the Maratha army from three sides. Mahadaji grew deeply anxious. He offered jewels to the Campoo. But they refused saying, “Of what use would this be ? Give us cash. The Jaypur Raja has sent rupees fifty thousand to us”. Throughout the 30th and the forenoon of 31st this tumult raged in the Maratha camp. All the efforts of Mahadaji failed to pacify the soldiers. They had with them one hundred twenty five guns, turning the muzzles of them, they threatened to carry the guns if the payment was not made.

At three quarters of the day, they marched off with all the guns, their entire munition carts and forage and planted their standard on the river. They sent back the envoys sent by Mahadaji to soothe them. Mahadaji called Shivajipant Bapu, Rao Raja and the rest for consultation. News came that all the Rajput camp was preparing for a fight. They said, “All the paltans had demanded money. The seven thousand have winded off, but the rest of the Mughalia and Hindusthani are with us. Who can believe in them now? Hence a battle is not advisable at present. There will be confusion in the camp (at the time of battle) and there will be another Panipat. Campoo is carrying guns, let them carry”. Thus saying they sat there.

Meanwhile the Campoo had marched three miles. Ismail Beg and Malik Mahmud Khan, advancing from the Jaypur army, welcomed them. Daulatram Haldia gave them twenty-five maunds of sweets and seven thousand Ashraps and promised one lakh five thousand next day.

Their departure had created all alarm in Mahadaji’s camp. News came to them that the Rajputs and all Rathod forces were coming to fight. Another news followed that Daulatram and Pahadsing had advanced forward, but the King had not come. Grain was sold four seers a rupee in the Maratha camp. Many Shiledars had no meals and even then, all Sardars with their forces hastened to the field and stood in readiness to face the Rajputs. Mahadaji also became ready. After four five ghadis at night, a salvo was heard and all thought that the Rajputs and news also confirmed the same thing. But as the Rajput army with the pared to meet them saying “whatever God has settled will happen”. But another news came that the Rajputs had gone to their camp keeping five hundred to one thousand men on the post. Marathas also keeping men on their post, returned back to their camp. Shivajipant Bapu, confidentially spoke to Patil Baba and Rana Khan said, “conditions appear like that of Panipat. Nothing but death was before us, had they come. All the Kachhwas and Rathods are to march tomorrow. They have been emboldened as our paltans and guns have gone to them. Our men are (consequently) disheartened. There are (yet) Rangadas, Mughalias and Hindusthanis in the enemy. They can’t be believed. Definitely they will join the enemy. There is no need of any proof now. We know the number of Deccani fauj. The grain is sold four seers a rupee. No supplies are coming. Shiledars have died of hunger. Horses have died. On what strength will you take fight? It is better that we retreat was decided. In the last quarter of the night keeping the light forces on the Rajputs, camp followers were sent back to the main camp.

(v) The Retreat to Dig :

Mahadaji ordered his Captains (23) to send quickly off the camp and baggage towards Pimplai. Sixty troopers of the sons of Murtza Khan and five paltans of Najib had gone over to Jaypur King. Mahadaji ordered Murtza Khan’s sons to put their baggage in the centre and march heedfully to the rear. He kept ten to twelve thousand horse with the paltans of De Boigne and Lesteneau and seventeen guns with Rana Khan in the pass and himself marched to the rear, three hours before dawn.

In the morning of 2nd August, he was standing on the Dongri hill when the spies reported that the Jaypur army had come out for a battle and Rana Khan in battle formation was retreating step by step. A courier brought the news that on hearing of Mahadaji’s march ot the rear, the Jaypur Raja made great rejoicings.

The camp followers from Rambagh advance camp had joined the main camp at dawn. Every one was in a hurry, packing his baggage. In what confusion a powder chest exploded mostly through accident or through mischief as was held lateron, with a terrific blaze and roar. The time itself was of running away and such incident had taken place. The men thinking away and such incident had taken place. The men thinking that the treacherous Hindusthanis turning their guns had fired on their Deccani comrades, Terror seizzed their hearts and they ran away with whatever they had collected, leaving the rest in the camp. With no fight, the men ran away leaving the grain of the merchants, cloth, tents and carpet loads and the cooking utensils of Mahadaji himself. Amidst the tumult and confusion the thieves and Pendharis of the camp got a chance to loot the bazar of Afrasiyab Khan. When Mahadaji came to the camp, he saw that all had run away. Sending the loads of camels, he asked the men around, to carry on as much they could and burnt away the rest. Leaving Rana Khan on Dongri, and asking him to retreat in battle formation slowly, Mahadaji left the camp.

Coming three kos away, Mahadaji halted and swore, “If I live I shall reduce Jaynagar and Jodhpur to dust. I shall halt at Dig and see what I can do.” The camp reached Pimplai at three quarters of the day, traversing sixteen or seventeen kos from the advance camp and twelve kos from his base camp near Lalsot. Mahadaji entered his tent one kos near Pimplai and waited for Rao Raja’s arrival. After about six ghadis at night, Rana Khan joined the camp with is troops and artillery.

On 3rd August, the spies reported that the Rajput army was occupying Dongri and Daulatram Haldia and others were encamped in Lalsot pass. Another news came that a 15000 Jaypur army under Ismail Beg, Pahadsing and Daulatram Haldia was coming after them. Mahadaji mounted on his horse and made his army hurry on cautiously, the Sardars guarding the two flanks with the baggage and camp in the centre. After marching four kos, he halted by the side of a nala and took his breakfast. Leaving Rana Khan and others there, he pushed on and halted opposite Udai. On hearing that Rana Khan had arrived one kos behind, he resumed his march, went six kos further and entered his tents. The Rajputs had followed him up to Pimplai but returned from that place. The people were bewildered with constant rumors of the coming of the Jaypur army behind them.

On 4th August, the camp halted at Sikhuda, one kos from Hindaun. It was humiliating for Mahadaji to have run away before the pursuing enemy. He told his Courtiers that he had not lost any gun in the battle nor suffered a disaster, but had retreated because his troops had lost heart. After reaching Dig, as soon as froces came from Deccan, he would punish the Jaypur Raja. The Kamavisdar of Khshalgadh came running road to Karauli was thus blocked, road to Dig was taken up.

With many of his horses, camels and oxen perishing from leanness in every day’s march, under constant threat of the Rajput attack, amidst appalling difficulties, Mahadaji led his terror-stricken army with tireless exertions and eternal vigilance to Dig in eleven days.

Reaching Dig, all felt relieved for having escaped from a situation like Panipat. Mahadaji had kept too much confidence in Naubatray, the Chief of artillery. It was suspected that the treachery was not the result of one day and he must have been in the know of it. He was kept under arrest and the search began. Mahadaji sent all families, baggage and camp followers to Gwalior, and became light. As days passed on, he repented for what had taken place and especially having kept so much faith in the Hindusthanis. He hence dismissed (24) them all and told them to go away from his camp. Badal Beg Khan and Khadin Husain Khan (the sons of Afrasiyab Khan) went to Delhi. Murad Beg Khan, a Mughalia Sardar had already left him during the march and joined to Jaypur Raja. Only Ala Yar Beg Khan, Kasim Khan and another two or three Mughalia Sardars with great entreaty got permission to stay with him.

(vi) The Collapse of Mahadaji’s Power :

Hearing the news of Mahadaji retreat from Lalsot (25), Gulam Kadar issued from Gausagadh and established his rule from Gadhamukteshwar to Yamuna. He then marched on Delhi. Lodoji Deshmukh and Shah Nizamuddin tried to face him but due to the defection of Maniyarsing they lost the fight and fled from Delhi (24th August). The helpless Emperor then invested him with the robes of Mir Bakshi (5th September 1787 A.D.). Thus the immediate effect of Lalsot, was the loss of Delhi.

“Rana Khan (26) and the rest requested Patil Baba that for the time being, the Jaypur Chief has grown powerful and we have not enough of armed strength and more over there is little money. To face the situation, let us be in Gwalior region by crossing the Chambal. The force will be fresh and after writing to Shrimant, assistance would come from that side. Ahillya Bai also has written that she is sending a force with the Pendharis. Thus gathering all forces, we should start after Dasara to punish the Kings of Jaypur and Marwad". Patil Baba spoke, “I conquered the whole of Antarwed, Jatwada, Mewat and the territory up to Panipat. I took over the forts of Dig, Agra, Ramgadh and Kishangadh etcc., worked as Wazir of the Patshah and sat in ‘Nalki’. All these things have gone from me, and I have come to the present situation. Now it is proper for me to vanquish the Jaypur King with (whatever) army is at my command. Even if the army leaves me, I shall try to reduce Jaypur with the remaining four five hundred Rauts with me but I shall never leave Jaypur (territory) now”.

Bapuji Vitthal (27) wanted to go home, but Mahadaji went to his tent and entreated him (to say). He (Bapuji Vitthal) Wrote secretly to Jaypur king to make peace with Shinde or else his dominion would be devastated. But the King offered to make peace provided Rao Raja Pratapsing was surrendered and Shinde remained in his own territory. He was, moreover, ready to pay only the tribute settled in the time of Mirza Najaf Khan. A letter of the same purport also came from the Bakshi of Jodhpur. Mahadaji refused to surrender Rao Raja who had always sided him and who had taken a refuge with him. Setting aside the peace proposal, he said, “The Raja of Jaypur will know my capacity. When I have gained such a victory over him, I shall make peace”.

It was clear that Patil Baba had felt the retreat from Lalsot as a great humiliation, which he had taken to his heart. His return to Delhi, was an essential stp to shoe Jaypur his capacity. The Rajput Maratha relations, henceforth entered round one figure Patil Baba, for whose present plight, it was Jaypur, as he felt, that was responsible.

Rao Raja of Machhedi (28) invited Mahadaji to Alwar fort, where he would have plenty of provisions of fodder etc. it was a fort that could not be taken by less than a year or two of fighting. Here he proposed, Mahadaji should stay at ease, pending the arrival of reinformcement from Deccan, and in the mean time plunder Jaypur territory so as to force the Jaypur Raja to make peace. The Machhedi Raja’s Wakil Ramchandra told Mahadaji in private that his master would pay him some money for his troops.

Rana Khan and Bapuji Vitthal, who were from the first opposed to Rao Raja’s designs regarding Jaypur, opposed the idea of marching to Alwar fort. At that time Jaypur army was marching towards the Rao Raja’s forts of Rajgadh and Lachhmangadh. Thus it was quite clear that by giving invitation ot Mahadaji at Alwar, it was Rao Raja who was really going to be profitted by his presence. They proposed that they should stay in Dig for some times or else they would not march with him to Alwar. Mahadaji replied that he would march to Alwar alone; others might do, as they liked. They all accompanied him to Alwar. The Rao Raja welcomes them. Mahadaji visited and inspected the interior of the fort and encamped under its walls.

On 18th of August he wrote to Nana thus (29): “For the present only light forces are kept with the intention to harass the enemy with the predatory war. The financial difficulties have created a problem for me. The Emperor’s dues are in arrears for the last nine months. If he comes to me at this (critical) time, every thing will remain in hands. Otherwise (Delhi) will be a place for all sorts of politics. The Emperor is fickle-minded and greedy. No banker is available. Hence I request you to manage this time to send me money through the Government. If help is sent in money and army, that will have a desirable effect on all (the enemies). The English, Wazir and all have gone against us. We have come near Alwar in the territory of Rao Raja. From here the force has been sent in Jaypur territory and hence the Rathods and the Kachhwas are upset. Hamdani’s nephew Ismail Beg married the daughter of Hamdani. He has been sent with forces and guns by the Rangadas to Agra. Rayaji Patil has been despatched behind him. He pushed him thrice. But Mon. lesteneau’s paltan from the fort treacherously joined Ismail Beg and hence he could not be defeated. At present defections have spoiled the politics. There is no money. There is no scope any-where…”

Sadashio Dinkar was more explicit in his report to Nana He wrote (30) “Patil Baba would never utter a word of fear, as that is like a death for him. He only says that the succor should be sent as early as possible, but the situation is highly depressing. Unless a formidable army is sent, nothing can be done. For the present, the days are passed only because, Rao Raja gave shelter, otherwise every thing would have been over by now. Chambal was flooded and the enemies were on all sides. Where to go was the problem. Rao Raja gave refuge with full support and hence he was saved. Now, he is eagerly watching for the reinforcement from the Government. Once he spoke “In our house of Shinde all men have died while performing Government duty. All advise me to leave the present politics for a few days and move on to Gwalior. But is not death preferable to running for life avoiding the enemy in the field? What have I to gain by surviving? I have no hopes (31) for future. I am this time in danger, in that case I am sure, and the Government will assist me and will not neglect me”. Thus he spoke. If help in army and the rest is sent, Sardar and Sardari will be saved, otherwise if delay is made in this respect, there is no possibility of any survival…. this time Sardar is in great danger. A lakh of (enemy) army has assembled from all sides and in the midst the thousand Deccani men are entrapped. Here the days are like those of Gajendra (32). All are watching for the coming of the succor from the Swami (Nana), from all sides the enemies are pressing.”

Nana (33) promptly assured Mahadaji that rupees five lakhs were being sent and a force under Tukoji Holkar and Ali Bahadur would be despatched quickly for his succour. Mahadaji (34) felt grateful for the brotherly attitude of Nana Fadnis. When the news reached the camp that a big army was coming from Deccan, guns were fired in joy.

As the Deccan (35) reinforcement were not expected to reach in the rainy season and as it was impossible for Mahadaji to abandon Hindusthan from where all the Maratha rule had ended, even Ajmer was lost to the Rathods, and Agra fort was under siege, he proposed to stay at Alwar for some months. He sent his Deccani horse to ravage Jaypur territory to relieve himself from the daily wrangle of his troops, for their pay and not to allow Jaypur King to enjoy peace, Ambaji, Jiwaba Bakshi and Bapu Malhar were sent towards Thana, Gazi etc. to raid the neighborhood of Jaypur.

(vii) The Rajput Advances

On the retreat of Mahadaji (36), the Jaypur King gained a new life as it were, and fired a salutation. Daulatram gave, as promised, fifty thousand rupees to the paltans that had come from Mahadaji on 1st of June and removed their one hundred twenty guns to his own park. He placed these paltans under Najaf Ali Kha, Hamdani’s son.

Daulatram advised the king not to think first of expelling Mahadaji from Hindusthan but to attend to the administration of the mahals he had conquered from Mahadaji and wrest the forts, around, belonging to Machhedi Raja. He took two or three fortalices of Rao Raja and reached the fort of Lachmangadh, fourteen kos from Mahadaji’s camp and also besieged the stone fort of Jamrauli.

Mirza Ismail told the Jaypur Raja, “Send me with a sufficient force towards Agra and Dholpur so that I may occupy that country and expel the Marathas.” The Raja, hence, keeping Najaf Khan Hamdani with himself, sent Ismail Beg with ten thousand horse and foot and sixty guns to Agra.

The king at the same time wrote (37) about the overtures of friendship from Najafkuli to Vijaysing and waited for his reply. Rayaji Patil (38) with four or five thousand Deccani horse, and the paltan of Mons. Leateneau and the contingent from the bharatput Raja, arrived to oppose Mirza Ismail. Lakhwa Dada with two thousand men joined the army from the fort. On 14th, 15th and 16th September, a servere battle was fought between Mirza Ismail and Rayaji Patil. On 17th September in the thick of the fight, Mons. Lesteneau, abandoning the side of Rayaji Patil went over to Ismail Beg. Hence, defeat fell on Rayaji who fled to Bharatpur while Lakhwa entered the fort. Mirza Ismail entered the city of Agra and then setting up his entrenchment at the Jami Masjid, began to attack on Agra fort. At the same time he established his administration in the Mahals of Dholpur and Agra. Mahadaji was greatly grieved on hearing the news and said “The kingdom of Hindusthan has gone out of my hand, in the same way, that it had come. But by the grace of Peshwa it will be reconquered and I shall make my enemies realize (my power).”

Mahadaji (39) knew that his entire fate depended on the retention of Agra fort. But lack of money and inferiority of his force were his greatest drawbacks. In dire need he sent Bhau Bakshi to the English offering to let them set up a factory in Agra if they sent a large force to join him in governing the Empire in mutual co-operation. The income of the Subha would be spent in supporting the armies of the two allies. But the English declined to interfere in any way.

The Jaypur King sent Murad Beg Khan, a Mughalia Sardar to Mewat and Kishangadh Jilhas, where he began to set up his administration. Mahadaji sent Jiyaram Jat, his old adherent to strengthen Kishangadh. A Jodhpur army reached Ajmer District. All the Maratha Mokasdars of that region were bewildered and were in dispair. The Rajputs captured the town without any resistance on Shrawan Shuddha Chaturdashi (27th August 1787 A.D.). The Maratha Subhadar was in the fort, which was sure to fall.

Vijaysing’s Wakils (40) were with Taimur Shah in Kabul Kandahar. On hearing Mahadaji’s much upon Jaypur, the Shah, at the request of the King, had despatched Bakshi Maddu Khan with 15000 horsemen and 2000 Uzbegs, who reached the Peshawar pass. But as the Sikhs prevented them from crossing Sindhu, they had to return back.

Viajaysing (41) vigilantly maintained the anti-Maratha atmosphere throughout. He had contacts with all the Chiefs of Hindusthan. A new envoy from Mewad reached his Darbar. Also Wakils from the son the Shuja Uddaula, from the English, and also from Gulam Kadar were with him. At the same time, he justifies his case with the Peshwa throwing all blame on Mahadaji. Calling the envoy of the Peshwa he told, “We are paying the regular dues to Patil Baba and also paid two to four lakhs in addition on demand. But Patil Baba came with the intention to destroy Jaypur and Jodhpour making use of the old Ministers of Jaypur, Khushaliram and Machhediwala, as he had destroyed Khichiwada and Gohad. Thirteen lakhs out of sixty-three lakhs were to be paid, and when the negotiations were under progress, he marched into Jaypur at the instigation of Rao Raja. He was about to capture Jaypur and hence being helpless, a fight was given. When (Marathas) established their rule over the whole of India, we thought that Hindu-Raj and especially that of Peshwa’s Brahman Raj was preferable. We are the Jamindars of Hindusthan from ancient times. We had saved our land, ever when Pat Shahi was powerful.”

Krishnaji Jagannath (42) wrote to Nana “Had Patil Baba decided to capture Jaypour, when he had come there for Khandani, it was possible then. But since then, the Rajput Chiefs have grown powerful. If the Peshwa desires, that the relations with the Rajput Chiefs, should be in his hand, then these Chiefs are willing. Whoever Sardar is sent by the Peshwa, he would be able to transact the business. But if Swami wishes that the business should be transacted  by the Sardar alone (i.e. Patil Baba) then the question is a different one. (In that case) Unless a force of fifty thousand is sent to the help of Patil Baba, these Chiefs would not listen, for they have as if measured the strength of Patil Baba. At present, the strength of the Rathods has increased. All the Rajput Chiefs are with him.”

<- one paragraph missing here 43-->

(viii) Mahadaji’s Heroic Efforts Fail to Maintain :

Mahadaji (44) could wait no more. In early November, leaving Alwar, he came marching towards Rewadi, thirty kos from Delhi, with a view to attending on the Emperor. He sent Ambaji Ingle to Delhi. On 15th November Ambaji came with two hundred men to the Emperor who blamed Shinde for having wrought his own ruin by disobeying the Emperor’s order not to attack the old faithful house of Jaypur. He further remarked that when Shinde was unable to maintain his own troops, how could he conduct the administration of the State? It was clear that unless Mahadaji was strong enough to withstand his enemies, the Emperor, even though he favoured him, could not call him. Ambaji’s mission was hence unsuccessful.

Mahadaji then took counsel. Rana Khan and Bapu Vitthal advised him to march and save Ajmer and other old possessions, which were slipping out of his hands, abandoning Hindusthan for the time being.

Taking ten to twenty thousand rupees as loan from the paragana of Rewadi, Mahadaji turned back. On the way, he plundered the paraganas of Kanti, Narnaul etc. belonging to Najafkuli Khan and arrived beyond Narnaul when he got the news that the King of Jaypur with his own army and the contingent of Jodhpur Bakshi had turned back from Alwar territory to Jaypur frontier, while another Rathod army had reached th Sambhar and Ajmer Districts, with an intention of fighting. Hence Mahadaji decided to return to Dig and Agra in order to attack Mirza Ismail who was besieging Agra fort with a small force, with the expectation that the Rajputs would not be able to come to his aid in a short time. His turning back from Narnaul distric decided the fate of Ajmer which capitulated to Vijaysing on 24th December, without making the least defense. The Killedar and his wife were dead.

Mahadaji turned back again via Kishangadh to near Alwar, the Mewatis robbing his army as before. Then by way of Alinagar and Bhusawat, he arrived near Dig. Next day, he marched to Bharatpur. The Jat Raja’s son and Rani Kishori joined him on the way from Bharatpur to Agra. Mahadaji with his and Jat Raja’s forces encamped seven kos from Agra city. Ismail came with 5000 horses, 10000 infantry, besides paltans and 70 guns and halted three kos from the Maratha camp. From 8th to 14th December every day the troops from both the sides rode out and exchanged fire, but the Deccanis could not attack the Mirza due to his large number of guns. In fact, the Deccani forces were equal in number to that of the Mirza but they had lost heart since the retreat of Lalsot, and hence were incapable to face Ismail. Meanwhile Ismail was collecting troops from all sides Gulam Kadar, postponing the siege of Aligadh was coming to his help. Before his juncture with Mirza’s forces, on 14th December, Mahadaji fought a severe battle. But all his charges failed enface of the shower of balls from Mirza’s guns. The battle raged for full three quarters of the day but the victory lay to the side of the Mirza.

At night getting exact reports that Gulam Kadar was about to reach the bank of Yamuna, Mahadaji decided to retreat to wards Gwalior. On 17th December, he crossed Chambal and encamped near Gwalior.

On 21st December 1787 A.D., he explained (45) the reasons of his retreat in a letter to Raghunath Hari, in Bundelkhand thus “We were marching on Agra to punish Ismail Beg. One or two fights took place with him. He has (a powerful park of) artillery and hence it was our plan to draw him away from that protection. But even the Emperor siding him, despatched the Prince and Gulam Kadar with their forces to his succor. The kings of Jaypur and Marwad are also in league with him. Hence seeing that all Hindushthan having gone against us, I decided to avoid them for a few days and came to the south bank of Chambal. Here, with our territory at the back, it is my intention to devastate and burn the territory of the enemy to harass him, till reinforcements from Deccan reach here, while remaining here I can subdue the rangadas of the Gwalior region.”

Thus the heroic exertions for five months, after his retreat from Lalsot to maintain against the combined might of the Rajputs, Mughalias and the Rohillas failed at last. This was mainly because he had no funds and because, the small number of half hearted Deccani force, eager to return their homes, was worthless to face the powerful and emboldened enemies that dominated him. By the end of 1787 A.D., with his retreat beyond Chambal, the eclipse of his power that thad begun with the Rajput threat that compelled him to give a fight and then retreat from Lalsot, was complete. Even though, he never lost hopes of regaining power and teaching a lesson to the Rajputs, the possibility of the fulfillment of his determination was remote unless a strong army came to his assistance from Deccan. Now he had nothing beyond Chambal excepting the fort of Agra, held precariously and his two friends namely the Rao Raja of Machhedi and the Jat Raja of Bharatpur who were both threatened by the Jaypur King and the Mughalias respectively for their friendship with him.

(ix) The Rajputs Fall to Dominate Delhi :

After Mahadaji had (46) finally crossed Chambal, the Jaypur King with the Jodhpur Bakshi, was busy in reducing the Rao Raja’s forts of Harwa, Basi and Satur and setting up posts in his mahals. He was encamped at Sursi, thirty kos from Delhi, in the District of Narnaul.

Having detached from Mahadaji, Rao Raja and clung to his former friend Najafkuli, who was equally the enemy of Jaypur, having created for himself a principality in Narnaul region, at the expenses of the Shekhawati districts of Jaypur kingdom. Both had taken possession of Mewat and established their posts there. The five battalions, that had joined Jaypur King, deserting Mahadaji at the time of Lalsot, now joined Najafkuli by deserting the Jaypur king for non-payment of their salary. Thus Najafkuli had come face to face with the Jaypur King in Narnaul. Strongly enough, Jodhpur King and his Bakshi were the warm supporters this time of Najafkuli.

The reason for this breach between Jaypur and Jodhpur was the envy felt by Jodhpur Bakshi for Himmat Bahadur Gosawi, who was with Jaypur King and who had been given a  preference to the said Bakshi, by the Jaypur King. This Himmat Bahadur was an ambitious man, desirous of dominating Delhi politics by making use of some agency. It was he, who was the man who facilitated the compact of Mahadaji with Afrasiyab Khan in 1784 A.D. His friendship and subsequent enmity with Mahadaji was due to the powerful personality of the latter, who allowed no place for the meddling of the former. Now after the eclipse of Mahdaji’s power, he had come again to the Rajputs, who had been directly the cause of Mahadaji’s failure. It was the aim of himmat Bahadur in collusion with Daulatram Haldia and Ram Ratan Modi, to raise the Rajput power to enter Delhi Politics, due to the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Mahadaji.

At Delhi (47), Prince Akbar was to march to the Subha of Ajmer to regulate it, now having been vacated by Mahadaji. He appointed Badal Beg as his deputy. But all the mahals  in Doab having been seized by Gulam Kadar. There was no means for the Emperor to subsist upon. Just then a timely letter came from the Jaypur King, requesting to wait on him. A secreat letter from Himmat Bahadur assured the Emperor that if he case the Emperor came over to Rewadi, he would induce the Jaypur King to pay him a substantial Nazrana. The Emperor could hardly afford to reject such an offer in his sore need and on 4th January 1788 A.D., he left Delhi with Akbar Shah and other Princes with twelve thousand horse and foot for Rewadi.

Agra city (48) was held by Ismail Beg on behalf of the Jaypur King and the fort held by Lakhwa Dada was under his siege. But hearing that the Emperor had bestowed the Subha of Agra on Prince Jahandar Shah, Ismail Beg set up the imperial red banner removing the five coloured flag of the Jaypur King. He complained to Udaram, the paternal uncle of Daulatram Haldia, that the Jaypur King had not only failed to appreciate the devoted service of Daulatram but had sent him no aid, while he was busy in the fight with Mahadaji Shinde. Finally, he remarked that nothing could be expected from such a king.

On receipt of the Emperor’s letter, the Jaypur King started from Basai Mansur, for Rewadi and on 28th January encamped one kos from the Imperial camp. On receiving a conciliatory letter from the Emperor, Najafkuli also marched with his compoo and encamped two kos from the imperial camp, at Bhandawas. On reaching there, he sent a message to the Emperor, “You ought to grant me audience first and thereafter to Jaypur Raja. I have arranged for a lakh of rupees for your Majesty I shall bring the Machhedi Rao to you and make him pay two lakhs. Do not agree unless the Jaypur Raja promises to pay a satisfactory amounts as tribute and all the things he took away from Shinde (at Lalsot) because myself, with the Machhedi Raja and Bakshi Bhimsing are present at your Majesty’s service.”

Himmat Bahadur Gosawi (49) came from the Jaypur King and had an audience of the Emperor on 27th January. The Jodhpur Bakshi asked the Jaypur king to make terms with Najafkuli and take him to the Emperor along with him. Najafkuli, on his part vowed that he would teach a lesson to those who were turning the Emperor’s mind against him. The Emperor on his part wanted money from the Jaypur King and the possession of Rewadi and Gokulgadh from Najafkuli. Under the circumstances, it was impossible that, all would unite and march on Mahadaji and drive him further and finish the problem of the Marathas, once for all.

The Jaypur King was presented to the Emperor,  by the Nazar on 3rd of February 1788 A.D. As for the demand of money, his Wakil told the Emperor that his Raja had been utterly impoverished due to the cost ov maintaining a large army for two years against Mahadaji to save his honour and kingdom and the Marathas were still devastating his territories. Finally, when pressed, the Jaypur King paid him in all fifty thousand rupees, partly in cash and partly in cloth, and on the invitation of Jodhpur King, he left the Emperor for Pushkar, where the grand daughter of Vijaysing was to be Married to him. Without being able to do any thing against Najafkuli, the Emperor also marched back to Delhi on 23rd March. Thus two months were wasted for nothing.

In North India, (50) there were two forces that were opposed to the Marathas; the first being the Rajputs and the other one was that of the Mughalia and the Rohillas. It was clear from the above effort of the diplomats at Jaypur, Jodhpur and Delhi, that the Rajputs were unable to take the position of Mahadaji with the Emperor. The Rajputs, having lost his chance it was very natural that the Mughalias and the Rohillas should profit at the opportunity created and lost by the Rajputs. In 1788 A.D. hence, we see both the Kings located in their own territories, with their full sympathies with Ismail Beg (51) and Gulam Kadar, but taking no active part either for the capture of Agra fort or in the heroic struggle of Ismail Beg and Gulam Kadar against advancing Mahadaji. One feels that even at this stage (March 1788 A.D.) a solution in Rajput affairs could have been attained. There is no reason to doubt the truth in what Bhimsing Bakshi told Peshwa’s Wakil Hingne before leaving Rewadi for Pushkar that, “We do not want the Muslim Emperor’s rule. Our king does not like their anti-religious treatment. For this, we are ready to pay if Shrimant asks for a few rupees more as Khandani, (in fact) that is agreeable to us than serving the Yawanas. But if some one (i.e.Mahadaji) is bent on dethroning us and snatching our land, then we are compelled to die.”

(x) Mahadaji in Distress :

When the new reached Mahadaji’s camp that a big army from Deccan was coming to their help in North, guns were fired in Joy. But months passed and inspite of his constant urging and the receipt of hopeful letters from Nana (52), that the armies were coming, there was no army. The Rajputs began to jest and were sure that no armies were going to come to Mahadaji’s succour. On 21st January 1788 A.D. Mahadaji finally wrote that thinking that the army was not coming to his help, had he crossed Chambal earlier, he could have at least saved his honour and the name of his Government.

In reply Nana wrote the real reason of delay thus “Thinking that unless a Sardar joined his tents, the men would not follow, Ali Bahadur was sent out side the city in tents in Shrawan (on 8th September 1787 A.D.) and messages wre sent to Saranjami force to assemble quickly for the northern march. Haripant Fadke had recently arrived from Karnatak and had given leave to the forces. Men had suffered in that campaign due to constant pressure of the enemy and scarcity and hence it was impossible for them to be ready immediately. If another force was to be engaged, great amount of money was needed, whereas even previous amount was yet to be paid…Due to all this it took time than what was expected by Patil Baba.” Finally Nana informed that Ali Bahadur had started for North on Margashirsha Shuddha Panchmi (14th December 1787 A.D.) and that he would reach Patil Baba soon. Further Nana hinted (53) Mahadaji “Now a days, it is learnt that you speak of completely annihilating the (Rajput) principalities and hence all feel threatened. They know what you talk and hence wai tfor the day of your defeat. It is the way of a diplomat not to speak any thing, what ever is in one’s mind, till the day comes.”

But still the army did not come. The personal force brought from Jamgaon, that had reached ujjain, was directly sent to Mewat (February 1788 A.D.) Equally (54) his efforts by writing in detail the story of his difficuties and dangers in letter to Ahilyabai failed to produce any tangible effect. The pious lady hardly took any notice of his precarious conditions and answered in such a way as seemed a mockery. Finally he left writing to her.

News came that Ismail Beg (55) and Umraogir Gosari were intending to cross Chambal to drive Mahadaji stil further (March 1788 A.D.) Appajiram in distress wrote to Nana, “Now even debt is not available here, hence it is up to God to save us!.” The conditions in Mahadaji’s camp (56) were so depressing that at times even Mahadaji had to go without food and it was impossible to face the oncoming enemy and remain there. In bitterness Mahadaji wrote, “If the Swami had no intention to send help, he ought to have written plainly. Letters from Shrimant and Nana were received stating that Ali Bahadur was being sent with force and keeping faith in it, we waited here till now. Now we have no money and the men also are not under control; and the enemy is powerful. Hence what are we to do next? I had faith in the brotherly feeling of Nana and hence I could gather strength. Now Chaitra (April) has come and no force is seen. And now (even if it comes) what is the use of its coming? Now Hindusthanis will clearly understand that force from Deccan is not coming to the succour of Shinde.”

Finally with nothing except Agra for beyond Chambal, with no prospects of any help from any quarters all felt that leaving all hopes of regaining North India, they had to retreat further towards Ujjain.

(xi) The Miraculous Recovery of Mahadaji :

Nearly for an year Mahadaji (57) was hearing about the coming of Ali Bahadur to North. Meanwhile he had suffered from all hardships and anxieties from starvation to the possibility of total political extinction, but even in dispair he had never lost heart to regain Delhi again.

The force from Jamgaon (58), that was  sent in February 1788 A.D. in to Mewat, captured the posts of Mathura, Vrundawan, Mot and Mahaban and fell into Antarwed crossing yamuna (June 1788 A.D.). Threatening Agra city (59), he forced the Mughalia and Rohilla forces to fall back for its defence. Then by a master strategen he forced the Rohilla Chief (60) to leave Ismail Beg at Agra and to hasten to save his territories from devastations. Then timely (61) provisioning the Agra fort, collecting all his forces, he destroyed Ismail Beg so thoroughly that he had to flee for his life with only twenty five men (18th June 1788 A.D.). The eclipse ended and the tide definitely turned in his favour from this moment. On 4th July, (62) he was back again in his camp at Mathura. The reckless and revengeful Gulam Kadar (63) with Ismail Beg then captured Delhi, before sufficient forces from Mahadaji could reach there, and blinded Shah Alam (64) after collecting all his riches and dishonouring the Royal family (July 1788 A.D.). But Mahadaji’s forces soon expelled him from Delhi for and restored Shah Alam (16th October 1788 A.D.) Gulam Kadar was punished and captured and was executed to the entire satisfaction of Shah Alam (4th March 1789 A.D.)

The wholehearted help of the Jat Chief of Bharatpur was invaluable to Mahadaji. But it must be noted that it was his strength of mind and tenacity that stood the trial in the long run. Mahadaji’s miraculous recovery was not due to any political mistake or accident on the part of his enemies, but was the effect of his excellent planning and rare qualities of leadership (65). The long-awaited grand army from Deccan did not reach Mahadaji till he captured Delhi. It was with about thirteen thousand men that Ali Bahadur (66) joined him in November 1787 A.D., and was of use in capturing Gulam Kadar.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1)
P.R.C. I-124, Dil RAj I -202, Sindhia as REgent- p.2

(2)
Sindhia as Regent - p. 4, P.R.C. I-p. 204.

(3)
E.G. - Mahadaji's message to Rana Khan "let non go hear the river (Morel), but fight any one who comes over to this side of it" 6th July, Ibid - p. I.

(4)
Ibid - p. 5.

(5)
14th July, Jaypur news : the Raja was ready with all his troops, but the skirmishing was done by the Rathods and isamil Beg only. At this Muhammad Beg Khan told the Raja "if such is the valour of the Raja's men, that leaving every affair on our shoulders, they would remain aloof, then all affairs should be entrusted to me. If today, the Rajputs had bravery exerted, the battle would have been decided". Sindhia as Regent-p. 4.

(6)
Ibid - p. 5.

(7)
Ibid - p. 9.

(8)
Jodhpur letters - 3.

(9)
The King of Jodhpur wrote Mahadaji through Rana Khan "Jayur and Jodhpour are both the kingdoms and Hindus. Till now, even the Musalmans have not disturbed us. Your are a Hindu. We also wish that there should be a Hindu rule (at Delhi) and our kingdoms be protected. But your are seizing our kingdoms. This is no good. You should take (your) Khandani and take back your force from our kingdoms" - Mar. Riya. Vol. II (U.V.) - p. 12

(10)
M.D. II-147.

(11)
This will be more clear by a few of the news-reports (Sindhia as Regent pp. 2 to 5) :

8th July :Mahdaji's Camp - Ranakhan reports "through starvation 150 men are leaving me daily and you are not attending to it." Camels were stolen by the Minas from every Sardar's misl."

10th July :Mahadaji's Camp - At night two risaldars with 5000 horsemen, went off to Jaypur Raja. The Minas plundered three carts of grain in the nala behind the camp.

11th July: Jaypur News - The Raja has ordered 5 to 6 thousand men cut off Mahadaji's grain supply from Kerauli.

12th July :Mahadaji's Camp - 150 bullocks of grain carried off by the Minas from the rear.

14th July: Jaypur news - The Raja wrote to the Kerauli Raja, threatening him if he did not stop sending provisions, to Mahadaji.

15th July: News - Jaypur detatchments sent to loot (coming) provisions, towards - Kama and towards Raghogadh (in Rao Raja's land).



(12)
Sindhia as Regent - p. 8, P.R.C. I -p. 207

(13)
Ibid - p. 6.

(14)
bid - p. 7.

(15)
Ibid - p. 9.

(16)
Sindhia as Regent - pp. 9, 10, P.R.C. I-135 to 137. Ait. Patre - 261, Dil. Raj. I-224, M.D. II-147-150, Chandrachud-71, Hist. Papers - 500, 503, Per, Records - p. 157, Jarypur Draft Kharitas 19-6, 32, 42, 53. 68.

(17)
Sindhia as Regent - p. 11.

(18)
Per. Records I-157.

(19)
Hist. Papers - 500.

(20)
M.D. II-152.

(21)
Sindhia as Regent - pp. 11, 14, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-6, 31, 42.

(22)
Per. Records I-158, Sindhia as Regent, pp. 11, 12, Hist. Papers - 503, M.D. II-147, 150.

(23)
Sindhia as Regent - pp. 12 to 15, Hist. Papers - 503, P.R.C. I-137, 142 to 144, 151 to 156, M.D. II-149.

(24)
Per. Records I - p. 163.

(25)
Per. Records I-pp. 158, 159, 163.

(26)
Satara Hist. Papers I-121.

(27)
Per. Records I-p. 163.

(28)
Ibid - p. 163, Satara Hist. Papers I-121.

(29)
Hist. Papers - 54, Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II - pp. 126, 127.

(30)
Mar. Riya. U.N. Vol. II-p. 127.

(31)
Mahadaji had no issue.

(32)
Refreence is here to the Mythological story of the Gajendrea (elephant) who was saved by God vishnu from the cluthches of the crocodile who had caught the leg of the said Gajendra.

(33)
Satara Hist. papers I-122, 124, 125.

(34)
Hist. Papers - 505, Satara Hist. Papers - 126.

(35)
Satara Hist. Papers I - 123., Per. Records I - 164. Hist. papers - 506.

(36)
Per. Records I-p. 164, 165., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-53, 68.

(37)

Sindhia as Regent - pp. 13, 15., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-25.

(38)
Per. Reocords I-p. 165., Dil. Raj. I-296., M.D. II-155, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-24.

(39)
Per. Records - pp. 166, 167. M.D. II-160.

(40)
Ibid - p. 167.

(41)
Jodhpur letters - 3.

(42)
Satara Hist. Papers I-120, Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II-p. 134.

(43)
Per. Records I-p. 167, M.D. II-154, P.R.C. I-192.

(44)
Per. Records -P. 168, Dil. Raj. - 280., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-8.

(45)
Hist. Papers - 512. Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II-p. 138.

(46)
Per. Records I-pp. 175, 179, Dil. Raj. I-278, 331, 279.

(47)
Per. Records I-pp. 172, 173, 177 to 179.

(48)
Per. Records I-p. 175., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-24.

(49)
Per. Records I-pp. 179, 181, 182, Dil. Raj. I-262, 274, 279, 281, 307.

(50)
Hist. Papers - 518.

(51)
When Vijaysing heard about the death of Gulam Kadar, he was so upset that he did not take his food. - Jodhpur letters.

(52)
Hist. Papers - 514 to 516, Satara Hist. Paper I-126.

(53)
Hist. Papers - 511, Dil. Raj. I-277, 287, 289, 293.

(54)
H.D. II- 148 to 154, Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II-p. 143.

(55)
Hist. Papers - 516.

(56)
Hist. Papers - 518.

(57)
Hist. Papes - 521, 516, 518.

(58)
Ibid - 516, 521, to 525, 527., Dil. Raj. I-278.
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