06-21-2006, 06:01 AM
Wednesday, June 21, 2006
COMMENT: Yashwant Sinhaâs hidden message âIjaz Hussain
The question arises why did Mr Sinha take a hawkish line on Kashmir while on a goodwill visit to Pakistan? Whatever his calculations the message for Pakistan is: India has not changed an iota on Kashmir. All the talk of demilitarisation and joint management is poppycock. Pakistan is being offered only a settlement more or less on Indiaâs terms
Yashwant Sinha, the Indian foreign minister during the last BJP government and currently an important figure in the party, is no wishy-washy politician. He is an inveterate hawk who likes to speak his mind without mincing words. His hard-hitting statements against Pakistan, particularly the one suggesting that it was more deserving of a pre-emptive military strike than Iraq bear testimony to this. On a visit to Pakistan recently he gave free expression to his uncompromising views on Kashmir, particularly in an interview on Aaj television.
One question on which Mr Sinha took issue with the interviewer was whether or not Kashmir constituted the core issue. He refused to accept the description arguing that there were no documents to show that India ever agreed to it. A spokesperson for the Foreign Office subsequently refuted his contention by pointing out that no issue other than Kashmir was specifically mentioned in the Simla Agreement for final settlement and that it was also mentioned in the Tashkent Declaration. She also said no student of Pakistan-India relations could escape the conclusion that Kashmir lies at the heart of the tension between the two countries.
Irrespective of the existence or lack of documentary proof, a formal agreement on the centrality of Kashmir would have been of no avail since India has repeatedly reneged on its word. Take the agreement on a plebiscite under UN auspices as a solution of the Kashmir imbroglio to which India, Pakistan and the international community were formally agreed by virtue of various UN resolutions. Nehru reneged on the commitment on the pretext that the circumstances had changed, though the real reason was the realisation that India could in no way win in a fair and free plebiscite. Ever since India has been in denial of these resolutions, even though the Indian position is absolutely untenable strictu sensu under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Some Indians have argued that the âcore issueâ formulation is no more than a semantic quarrel and that since the two countries are committed to resolving Kashmir Pakistan should stop insisting on it. They draw a parallel with the situation whereby Pakistan is deemed to have accepted the Indian formulation of calling Kashmir an âissueâ rather than a âdisputeâ in the interest of advancing negotiations on Kashmir.
This contention assumes that language is of secondary and the intention(s) of the parties of primary importance. This is a very dangerous proposition because it questions the sanctity of the written word that the Vienna Convention wisely insists on in Article 31. Otherwise too one should be circumspect for India has not only consistently tried to undermine the text of agreements with Pakistan but also approached negotiations in bad faith.
For example, the UN resolution S/3793 of 1957 describes Kashmir as a dispute but India insists on calling it an issue. India also comprehensively sabotaged negotiations under the UN auspices, forcing Owen Dixon â entrusted with preparing the ground for holding the plebiscite â to hold it responsible for the failure. Also, if the âcore issueâ formulation is just a matter of semantics why should India be so reluctant to accept it?
Mr Sinhaâs refusal to accept Kashmir as a âdisputeâ inexorably led him to observe that the latter territory was an integral part of India. This created a difficult situation for him because it implied the utter futility of the ongoing peace process of which he was one of the architects. (He was reportedly involved in the drafting of the January 6, 2004 Joint Statement). To extricate himself from it he tried to hide behind the Indian parliamentâs resolution on Kashmir calling the territory an integral part of India and seeking the restitution of Azad Kashmir from Pakistan. This meant that the current talks on Kashmir were nothing but a farce.
Mr Sinha threw a challenge to the interviewer on Pakistanâs locus standi on Kashmir â a challenge the latter did not take up. India had earlier raised this objection during the 1962 Security Council debate. Pakistanâs representative Sir Zafrulla Khanâs reply deserves to be reproduced here: âIt is argued too, on the other side, that Pakistan is no party. Pakistan is no party? Look at the agenda which the Security Council approved only today: âThe India-Pakistan Questionâ. Look at the resolutions of the Security Council: âThe dispute between India and Pakistanâ, âThe situation between India and Pakistanâ. Look at the resolutions of the Council: even with regard to the plebiscite they have said: âby the Government of India and the Government of Pakistanâ. And now it is beginning to be said... that Pakistan is not really a party to this. It is only I suppose, out of charity that we are even permitted to speak on this question.â The situation has not changed a bit since because even today Kashmir is on the Security Council agenda as âIndia-Pakistan questionâ.
On the question of the participation of Kashmiris in the peace process, Mr Sinha categorically stated that there was no place for a third chair on the table. In this connection, he recalled the Joint Statement of January 6, 2004 that envisaged a settlement of the Kashmir dispute to the satisfaction of Pakistan and India. His reluctance to see the peace process become tripartite is understandable. He knows that the moment India does so it will lose half the battle on Kashmir. Pakistanâs position possibly does not differ much from that of India. The question the two countries need to ponder is whether an imposed settlement on Kashmiris will endure.
On one occasion, the Aaj interviewer suggested that India should be more circumspect before levelling allegations against Pakistan. He cited the example of Chittisinghpora incident of 2000 when 35 Sikhs were massacred and Pakistan was blamed for it. The interviewer referred to the subsequent investigation that showed that the episode was stage-managed by the Indian intelligence agencies to tarnish Pakistanâs image at a time President Bill Clinton was visiting the subcontinent.
With a straight face, Mr Sinha denied the existence of such an investigation. This despite the fact that according to Ritu Sarin of the Indian Express the CBI investigation spread over three years showed the involvement of five army offices in killing five Kashmiri civilians in a fake encounter to protect those involved in the massacre.
Finally, the question arises why did Mr Sinha take a hawkish line on Kashmir while on a goodwill visit to Pakistan? Was he scared into it by the Advani episode (challenge to his leadership following his pro-Jinnah observations)? Perhaps it was linked to the power struggle within the BJP rather than a hawkish temperament. He might have calculated that a soft line on Pakistan could hurt his chances at home. Whatever his calculations the message for Pakistan is: India has not changed an iota on Kashmir. All the talk of demilitarisation and joint management is poppycock. Pakistan is being offered only a settlement more or less on Indiaâs terms. Take it or leave it.
North Korea left the NPT in 2003 and not in 1993 as stated in my last piece. The error is regretted. The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com.
COMMENT: Yashwant Sinhaâs hidden message âIjaz Hussain
The question arises why did Mr Sinha take a hawkish line on Kashmir while on a goodwill visit to Pakistan? Whatever his calculations the message for Pakistan is: India has not changed an iota on Kashmir. All the talk of demilitarisation and joint management is poppycock. Pakistan is being offered only a settlement more or less on Indiaâs terms
Yashwant Sinha, the Indian foreign minister during the last BJP government and currently an important figure in the party, is no wishy-washy politician. He is an inveterate hawk who likes to speak his mind without mincing words. His hard-hitting statements against Pakistan, particularly the one suggesting that it was more deserving of a pre-emptive military strike than Iraq bear testimony to this. On a visit to Pakistan recently he gave free expression to his uncompromising views on Kashmir, particularly in an interview on Aaj television.
One question on which Mr Sinha took issue with the interviewer was whether or not Kashmir constituted the core issue. He refused to accept the description arguing that there were no documents to show that India ever agreed to it. A spokesperson for the Foreign Office subsequently refuted his contention by pointing out that no issue other than Kashmir was specifically mentioned in the Simla Agreement for final settlement and that it was also mentioned in the Tashkent Declaration. She also said no student of Pakistan-India relations could escape the conclusion that Kashmir lies at the heart of the tension between the two countries.
Irrespective of the existence or lack of documentary proof, a formal agreement on the centrality of Kashmir would have been of no avail since India has repeatedly reneged on its word. Take the agreement on a plebiscite under UN auspices as a solution of the Kashmir imbroglio to which India, Pakistan and the international community were formally agreed by virtue of various UN resolutions. Nehru reneged on the commitment on the pretext that the circumstances had changed, though the real reason was the realisation that India could in no way win in a fair and free plebiscite. Ever since India has been in denial of these resolutions, even though the Indian position is absolutely untenable strictu sensu under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Some Indians have argued that the âcore issueâ formulation is no more than a semantic quarrel and that since the two countries are committed to resolving Kashmir Pakistan should stop insisting on it. They draw a parallel with the situation whereby Pakistan is deemed to have accepted the Indian formulation of calling Kashmir an âissueâ rather than a âdisputeâ in the interest of advancing negotiations on Kashmir.
This contention assumes that language is of secondary and the intention(s) of the parties of primary importance. This is a very dangerous proposition because it questions the sanctity of the written word that the Vienna Convention wisely insists on in Article 31. Otherwise too one should be circumspect for India has not only consistently tried to undermine the text of agreements with Pakistan but also approached negotiations in bad faith.
For example, the UN resolution S/3793 of 1957 describes Kashmir as a dispute but India insists on calling it an issue. India also comprehensively sabotaged negotiations under the UN auspices, forcing Owen Dixon â entrusted with preparing the ground for holding the plebiscite â to hold it responsible for the failure. Also, if the âcore issueâ formulation is just a matter of semantics why should India be so reluctant to accept it?
Mr Sinhaâs refusal to accept Kashmir as a âdisputeâ inexorably led him to observe that the latter territory was an integral part of India. This created a difficult situation for him because it implied the utter futility of the ongoing peace process of which he was one of the architects. (He was reportedly involved in the drafting of the January 6, 2004 Joint Statement). To extricate himself from it he tried to hide behind the Indian parliamentâs resolution on Kashmir calling the territory an integral part of India and seeking the restitution of Azad Kashmir from Pakistan. This meant that the current talks on Kashmir were nothing but a farce.
Mr Sinha threw a challenge to the interviewer on Pakistanâs locus standi on Kashmir â a challenge the latter did not take up. India had earlier raised this objection during the 1962 Security Council debate. Pakistanâs representative Sir Zafrulla Khanâs reply deserves to be reproduced here: âIt is argued too, on the other side, that Pakistan is no party. Pakistan is no party? Look at the agenda which the Security Council approved only today: âThe India-Pakistan Questionâ. Look at the resolutions of the Security Council: âThe dispute between India and Pakistanâ, âThe situation between India and Pakistanâ. Look at the resolutions of the Council: even with regard to the plebiscite they have said: âby the Government of India and the Government of Pakistanâ. And now it is beginning to be said... that Pakistan is not really a party to this. It is only I suppose, out of charity that we are even permitted to speak on this question.â The situation has not changed a bit since because even today Kashmir is on the Security Council agenda as âIndia-Pakistan questionâ.
On the question of the participation of Kashmiris in the peace process, Mr Sinha categorically stated that there was no place for a third chair on the table. In this connection, he recalled the Joint Statement of January 6, 2004 that envisaged a settlement of the Kashmir dispute to the satisfaction of Pakistan and India. His reluctance to see the peace process become tripartite is understandable. He knows that the moment India does so it will lose half the battle on Kashmir. Pakistanâs position possibly does not differ much from that of India. The question the two countries need to ponder is whether an imposed settlement on Kashmiris will endure.
On one occasion, the Aaj interviewer suggested that India should be more circumspect before levelling allegations against Pakistan. He cited the example of Chittisinghpora incident of 2000 when 35 Sikhs were massacred and Pakistan was blamed for it. The interviewer referred to the subsequent investigation that showed that the episode was stage-managed by the Indian intelligence agencies to tarnish Pakistanâs image at a time President Bill Clinton was visiting the subcontinent.
With a straight face, Mr Sinha denied the existence of such an investigation. This despite the fact that according to Ritu Sarin of the Indian Express the CBI investigation spread over three years showed the involvement of five army offices in killing five Kashmiri civilians in a fake encounter to protect those involved in the massacre.
Finally, the question arises why did Mr Sinha take a hawkish line on Kashmir while on a goodwill visit to Pakistan? Was he scared into it by the Advani episode (challenge to his leadership following his pro-Jinnah observations)? Perhaps it was linked to the power struggle within the BJP rather than a hawkish temperament. He might have calculated that a soft line on Pakistan could hurt his chances at home. Whatever his calculations the message for Pakistan is: India has not changed an iota on Kashmir. All the talk of demilitarisation and joint management is poppycock. Pakistan is being offered only a settlement more or less on Indiaâs terms. Take it or leave it.
North Korea left the NPT in 2003 and not in 1993 as stated in my last piece. The error is regretted. The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com.