Pakistan - News and Discussion 6

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Minimum credible deterrence: minimum or credible? </b>
FT
Moeed Yusuf
Does Pakistan now view its deterrence as a 'static' concept, moving away from its traditional approach of maintaining ratios of force structures within an asymmetrical relationship? 
   
‘Minimum credible deterrence’ is the guiding principle of Pakistan’s nuclear capability. But within the concept, the emphasis since shortly after May 1998 has been on ‘credible’. Why?

Credibility is crucial for a state that is (<b>a) inherently paranoid about a real threat from India (a perception that Indian moves, over the years, have only helped reinforce) and (b) is not entirely confident of its conventional capabilities vis-à-vis India. This is why most analysts have pointed towards the need for Pakistan to upgrade its arsenal to ensure that India is not allowed to run away with a major advantage in the nuclear arena</b>.

Lately, however, there seems to be a significant shift in Islamabad’s signalling. There is a certain level of comfort in recent statements by the president and other informed authorities. Signals emanating from Islamabad seem to suggest that Pakistan has achieved ‘minimum credible deterrence’ and will thus not require any major up-gradation of its force structure in the foreseeable future.

In essence, this implies <b>that Pakistan now views its deterrent as a ‘static’ concept, moving away from its traditional approach of maintaining ratios of force structures within an asymmetrical relationship vis-à-vis India. Islamabad believes that New Delhi can never contemplate aggression since it (Pakistan) has developed a large-enough quantum of reliable quality (in absolute terms), and has concealed it well enough</b>. In other words, Pakistani deterrence is only loosely connected to Indian up-gradation, barring any revolutionary (in the military sense) improvement in the Indian nuclear capability.

Unlike conventional capabilities where deterrence is entirely a relative (dynamic) concept, nuclear deterrence can be ‘static’. ‘Static nuclear deterrence’ is achieved when a state believes that its capability is robust enough to deter the adversary at any point in the foreseeable future and thus routine up-gradation from the adversary would not alter the bilateral equation. Of course, such a stance is only viable at the higher end of the nuclear-capability spectrum. <b>In other words, a country would ideally have to develop a large number of warheads, have an assured second-strike capability and have enough dispersal and concealment to ensure that irrespective of its adversary’s capability, deterrence would hold in all scenarios.</b> The cold war rivals were in a position to exercise static deterrence (not to react to the adversary’s up-gradation) once they had assured MAD. That various factors led them to remain entrenched in a tit-for-tat arms race, and thus continue viewing deterrence in dynamic terms is another matter.

To determine if Pakistan’s move to signal comfort in viewing deterrence in static terms is viable in the South Asian context, there is need to analyse the country’s current nuclear force structure.

Although the Pakistani strategic enclave seems to be confident that the quantum Pakistan has achieved is sufficient to prevent India from flirting with Pakistani ‘red lines’, Islamabad still does not have an assured second-strike capability. No matter how quantitatively strong land- and air-based nuclear assets (delivery systems) are, they are always vulnerable to enemy strikes and can never provide complete assurance. The only channel to achieve ‘assured’ second strike is through a sea-based strike capability.<b> India has declared its intent to establish a ‘triad’ as part of its nuclear doctrine. Although Pakistan has not released its doctrine, given India’s quest and Pakistan’s strategic vulnerability, Islamabad is sure to match an Indian triad.</b>

Moreover, consider that Pakistan and <b>India are nascent nuclear-weapon states and are currently on the initial leg of the nuclear progression curve</b>.  <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> It is not clear if the two have moved warheads out of production sites, let alone ensured their dispersal and built facilities to conceal and protect them. All these are steps that Pakistan may or may not have to take, depending on how aggressively India postures its nuclear forces in the years ahead. <b>In a futuristic scenario where India undertakes deployment of nuclear forces, in all likelihood, given South Asia’s negligible warning times and less than optimal intelligence capabilities, Islamabad would be forced to oblige.</b> [Pakis are sleeping]

The point is that while MCD might have been achieved at this point in time and may also remain effective in the short to medium term, the Indian military modernisation plan is likely to produce significant challenges to the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent in the future. One may also consider that Pakistan’s nuclear programme will inevitably generate a broader sphere of interest than the current India-specific outlook. This will automatically make the Pakistani deterrence relative (dynamic) to the actors falling within the new sphere of interest (one example could be an ICBM programme to reach Israel or further).

Clearly Pakistan’s nuclear establishment must be fully aware of these facts. Why then would Pakistan opt to gradually signal towards a ‘static’ deterrence stance knowing that it is not viable? There could be two reasons for that.

With respect to domestic audience, the need to underscore the ‘minimum’ deterrence aspect is linked to pressure on the military to cut back its expenditure to promote development. The majority view in Pakistan is that every penny spent on defence is one penny taken away from development. <b>A move to de-link nuclear force up-gradation from India is an attempt to portray the nuclear establishment’s determination to maintain a lid on the nuclear expenditure (although the entire nuclear programme to date has entailed an insignificant cost as compared to the conventional capability).</b> Highlighting the comfort level with ‘static’ deterrence allows the nuclear establishment to suggest a move away from asymmetrical ratios, which were bound to continue climbing in the face of Indian modernisation.

To the international community, a ‘static’ stance conveys Pakistan’s responsible nature as a nuclear state and its determination to keep the lid on nuclear progression, and thus, nuclear risk in South Asia. This is essential for a country currently in the midst of the worst nuclear proliferation scandal and whose nuclear programme is considered to be in danger of falling in the hands of ‘extremist’ non-state actors. The static nature of deterrence confirms that Pakistan is no longer interested in matching India move for move and instead wants to ensure nuclear stability and maintain a manageable weapons capability.

<b>Necessary as this policy might seem presently, it could backfire. Moving towards a static stance while approaching deterrence in a ‘dynamic’ context could cause the domestic audience to view this as habitual fudging of facts by the military</b>. Also, continued up-gradation of the nuclear programme and expansion beyond an India-specific stance could provide Western critics with a fresh opportunity to present this as proof of Pakistan’s lack of self-restraint and the danger Pakistan’s nuclear capability poses to the world (while Pakistani moves may be considered normal for any other state, our perception in the West will lead it to be construed as an extreme negative).

In essence, the very factors that have led the establishment to move towards a ‘static’ stance would cause major headaches once it is clear that Pakistan is unable to maintain such a position.

<i>-Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad</i>
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