[url="http://sify.com/news/othernews/fullstory.php?id=13263586"]Time to review our foreign policy[/url]
By Dr Subhash Kapila
Friday, 26 September , 2003, 14:36
India's foreign policies in recent years have made commendable progress in terms of relations with major world powers. Relations with the United States are moving towards more strategic cooperation to secure Indiaâs national security interests.
China, despite its traditional rhetoric, has seen the wisdom of greater economic cooperation with India and is departing from its hostility following the 1998 nuclear tests by India. European Union countries and Russia have modulated their policies towards India to exploit the vast defence purchase market and economic opportunities that India presents.
However, despite all of these Indiaâs foreign policies in South Asia need a drastic review. If there is a growing recognition worldwide that India is a power to reckon with in South Asia and an emerging key player in global affairs, then India, at the first instance needs to reinforce and press home this reality in the South Asian neighbourhood.
Indiaâs failure to create this impact in South Asia arises from a combination of the following factors:
* Indiaâs lack of political will to use her power to ensure that South Asian nations recognise Indiaâs predominance in the Indian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean.
* Indiaâs soft handling of Pakistanâs 'spoiler state' strategies both as a hand-maiden of intrusive external powers and its attempts to provoke other South Asian nations to adopt belittling policies towards India.
* Indiaâs inability to spell out firmly to the US and China that while they are free to follow their national interests in Pakistan, their future relationships with India would depend on their demonstrated sensitivity to Indiaâs national interests in South Asia and that these cannot be made subservient to theirs.
India, therefore, has to review and modulate its policies towards South Asian countries by giving predominance to Indiaâs strategic imperatives of creating a peaceful South Asian neighbourhood.
South Asia as a peaceful region can only emerge by strong and firm Indian policies that brook no playing around with Indiaâs national interests.
With the above in mind, some view points are expressed below in relation to our foreign policy formulations towards the countries of the region.
Pakistan: Pakistan has emerged as a 'rogue nuclear state' however much the United States may like to paint it white. It has proliferated uranium enrichment technology to North Korea and Iran too (estimative analysis) and thereby is jeopardizing vital United States strategic interests in East Asia and the Middle East. This is taking place with the assistance of and bidding of China. India should not, therefore, depend on or expect United States and China to restrain Pakistan's disruptive policies in South Asia.
In relation to bringing Pakistan to heel in South Asia, Indiaâs foreign policies concerning Pakistan must incorporate the following ingredients:
* Pakistanâs proxy war against India needs to be carried back into Pakistan. Self-determination movements in Sindh, Baluchistan, Pashtunistan and Northern Areas need to be exploited. Indiaâs oft-quoted âpro-active policiesâ must be put into effect here.
* Pakistan-based terrorist organisations must be struck the way the Israel strikes back at its opponents.
* Indiaâs foreign policies and military policies lack the essential ingredient of 'Psychological Warfare' and allied operations.
* Pakistan Armyâs stranglehold over the Pakistani nation-state and thwarting the emergence of democracy and pluralism in Pakistan needs to be vigorously exposed as part of the above operation.
* India must impose an arms-race on Pakistan the pace of which Pakistan can ill-afford economically and nor can its external patrons subsidise.
* In relation to Pakistan, India must make it clear to the other South Asian countries, that they have to choose between India and Pakistan in South Asia. âEither you are with us, or against usâ and if their choice is âagainst usâ they should be prepared to face the consequences of their choice.
Some may like to argue that the above are not realistic steps and that India does not have the capabilities to do so. This author would like to maintain that it is within Indiaâs means to do so seeing India's preponderant power attributes. All that India needs is to give a âshaped-chargeâ focus to these factors and re-order its priorities in its foreign policies.
As a starter, let India change its stand in relations to the conditions it stipulates for resumption of dialogue with Pakistan. Indiaâs strong-man, Deputy PM Advaniâs constant refrain is that unless Pakistan returns the persons in the 'list of 20' no dialogue can take place.
This is not an advisable stand as it reduces India to the level of trading far more important considerations in its approaches towards Pakistan than the extradition of 20 street-side hoodlums.
Indiaâs conditions for resumption of dialogue with Pakistan need to rest on far more important considerations, namely:
* India will enter into dialogue with Pakistan only when a democratically elected government comes into power, through elections supervised by international observers.
* India will not enter into dialogue with Pakistan based on Pakistani imposed pre-conditions of Kashmir and the rest.
* India should maintain that Kashmir is not an issue historically nor is it now. Kashmirâs accession to India is non-negotiable as per the unanimous resolution of the Special Session of the Indian Parliament.
* India will enter into a dialogue with Pakistan only when it begins to respect the sanctity of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Jammu and Kashmir- a point endorsed by the United States through President Clintonâs statement.
Nepal: Nepal has been wracked by a Maoist insurgency for the past five or six years. India has remained a passive bystander witnessing the growing erosion of Nepalâs state power. Other than giving some military materiel for counter insurgency operations, no weighty measures have been taken.
India has not recognised the gravity of a Maoist take-over of Nepal as American analysts have done in depth. As per American analysts, the strategic implications of a Maoist take-over of Nepal are:
* Nepal becomes a total client state of China. A Maoist Nepal under Chinese tutelage would be a serious disruptive factor for US global strategies in the region.
* Maoist insurgents ruled Nepal would inextricably get dragged into Islamic terrorist organisations linkages, besides Chinaâs policies towards the Islamic world.
India needs to realise the gravity of the strategic implications, specific to India, namely:
* A China-aligned Nepal, removes an important buffer state between India and China. India would have to militarily man the India-Nepal border in strength, which may eat up two to three infantry divisions.
* A China-aligned Nepal adds to the existing China-client states in South Asia i.e. Pakistan and Bangladesh. It would be a very unholy trinity with not only the Western and Eastern flanks of India under Chinaâs influence, but the Northern flank too added.
* For the majority peoples of India, the only Hindu kingdom in the world would slide down ignobly into a Chinese-Islamic coalition in South Asia.
India must, therefore, immediately, cast away its existing reluctance and inhibitions to act firmly, even militarily, to prevent a Maoist take-over of Nepal. Fortunately, in Nepalâs current Maoist-threatened environment, convergence of security interests exist between the United States and India. India must therefore jointly work with the United States to protect the sovereignty of the Nepalese state against a Maoist takeover.
It was so stated by US Assistant Secretary of State, Christiana Rocca, during her recent visit to New Delhi: âWorking in tandem, our governments can help Nepal defeat the Maoists threat and re-establish democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people".
India must, therefore, act forcefully and unapologetically in Nepal forthwith to secure her national interests. It would be a convincing demonstration of what this paper espouses: âIndia will intervene forcefully to secure her national interests in the region."
Bangladesh: For far too long India has been oblivious to the playing of the âIndian-Cardâ (for or against) in Bangladeshâs domestic politics. For far too long has India tolerated the use of Bangladesh as a springboard for Pakistanâs strategic de-estabilisation of Indiaâs North-Eastern states. India could borrow a leaf from Myanmar's dealing with the Rohinggya problem emanating from Saudi-based organisations in Bangladesh. Al Qaedaâs tentacles exist in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, too, is a fit case where Indian foreign policy objectives could gain a convergence with United States national interests. The China-Bangladesh Defence Cooperation Agreement adds an additional dimension to the other threats.
India needs to draw red-lines in terms of Indiaâs national interests which Bangladesh must not overstep with impunity. In tandem, India through its big business houses should integrate Bangladesh into more commercial linkages. Increased Indian economic investments in Bangladesh could generates thousands of job and remove the root cause of Bangladeshâs instability and move towards Islamic fundamentalism.
Sri Lanka: Indiaâs national interests demand maintaining the unity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Indiaâs domestic Tamil politics should not become the touchstone of Indiaâs policies towards Sri Lanka. India needs to react forcefully to ensure that Sri Lanka remains a unified state with a set up that would meet the just aspirations of a majority of Tamils.
The above proposition entails once again the forging of mutual national interests convergence of India and the United States. Sri Lanka is an important component of United States' India Ocean strategy and it is felt that United States-India convergences exist already. Joint USA-India strategies and foreign policies towards Sri Lanka would be helpful in counter-acting Chinese and Pakistani overtures to wean away Sri Lanka from Indiaâs influence.
Indiaâs emergence as a regional power and a key global player depends largely on her image and standing in the South Asian neighbourhood. If India cannot effectively generate and ensure her key status in South Asia, how can the world be convinced that it can carve influence farther afield.
Indiaâs nuclear weapons, space programmes, missiles development and her overwhelming superiority in military strength are of no use, if the South Asian neighbourhood takes India for granted and merrily tramples on Indiaâs national interests and her image. India needs to introduce an element of âunilateralismâ in her state-craft in South Asia.
Fortunately for India, with the exception of Pakistan, joint convergences of national interests exist between United States and India. This could greatly facilitate Indiaâs forceful assertion in South Asian affairs for greater regional good. Once this is achieved, a marginalised Pakistan in South Asia, may see the dawn of South Asiaâs strategic realities.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email )
By Dr Subhash Kapila
Friday, 26 September , 2003, 14:36
India's foreign policies in recent years have made commendable progress in terms of relations with major world powers. Relations with the United States are moving towards more strategic cooperation to secure Indiaâs national security interests.
China, despite its traditional rhetoric, has seen the wisdom of greater economic cooperation with India and is departing from its hostility following the 1998 nuclear tests by India. European Union countries and Russia have modulated their policies towards India to exploit the vast defence purchase market and economic opportunities that India presents.
However, despite all of these Indiaâs foreign policies in South Asia need a drastic review. If there is a growing recognition worldwide that India is a power to reckon with in South Asia and an emerging key player in global affairs, then India, at the first instance needs to reinforce and press home this reality in the South Asian neighbourhood.
Indiaâs failure to create this impact in South Asia arises from a combination of the following factors:
* Indiaâs lack of political will to use her power to ensure that South Asian nations recognise Indiaâs predominance in the Indian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean.
* Indiaâs soft handling of Pakistanâs 'spoiler state' strategies both as a hand-maiden of intrusive external powers and its attempts to provoke other South Asian nations to adopt belittling policies towards India.
* Indiaâs inability to spell out firmly to the US and China that while they are free to follow their national interests in Pakistan, their future relationships with India would depend on their demonstrated sensitivity to Indiaâs national interests in South Asia and that these cannot be made subservient to theirs.
India, therefore, has to review and modulate its policies towards South Asian countries by giving predominance to Indiaâs strategic imperatives of creating a peaceful South Asian neighbourhood.
South Asia as a peaceful region can only emerge by strong and firm Indian policies that brook no playing around with Indiaâs national interests.
With the above in mind, some view points are expressed below in relation to our foreign policy formulations towards the countries of the region.
Pakistan: Pakistan has emerged as a 'rogue nuclear state' however much the United States may like to paint it white. It has proliferated uranium enrichment technology to North Korea and Iran too (estimative analysis) and thereby is jeopardizing vital United States strategic interests in East Asia and the Middle East. This is taking place with the assistance of and bidding of China. India should not, therefore, depend on or expect United States and China to restrain Pakistan's disruptive policies in South Asia.
In relation to bringing Pakistan to heel in South Asia, Indiaâs foreign policies concerning Pakistan must incorporate the following ingredients:
* Pakistanâs proxy war against India needs to be carried back into Pakistan. Self-determination movements in Sindh, Baluchistan, Pashtunistan and Northern Areas need to be exploited. Indiaâs oft-quoted âpro-active policiesâ must be put into effect here.
* Pakistan-based terrorist organisations must be struck the way the Israel strikes back at its opponents.
* Indiaâs foreign policies and military policies lack the essential ingredient of 'Psychological Warfare' and allied operations.
* Pakistan Armyâs stranglehold over the Pakistani nation-state and thwarting the emergence of democracy and pluralism in Pakistan needs to be vigorously exposed as part of the above operation.
* India must impose an arms-race on Pakistan the pace of which Pakistan can ill-afford economically and nor can its external patrons subsidise.
* In relation to Pakistan, India must make it clear to the other South Asian countries, that they have to choose between India and Pakistan in South Asia. âEither you are with us, or against usâ and if their choice is âagainst usâ they should be prepared to face the consequences of their choice.
Some may like to argue that the above are not realistic steps and that India does not have the capabilities to do so. This author would like to maintain that it is within Indiaâs means to do so seeing India's preponderant power attributes. All that India needs is to give a âshaped-chargeâ focus to these factors and re-order its priorities in its foreign policies.
As a starter, let India change its stand in relations to the conditions it stipulates for resumption of dialogue with Pakistan. Indiaâs strong-man, Deputy PM Advaniâs constant refrain is that unless Pakistan returns the persons in the 'list of 20' no dialogue can take place.
This is not an advisable stand as it reduces India to the level of trading far more important considerations in its approaches towards Pakistan than the extradition of 20 street-side hoodlums.
Indiaâs conditions for resumption of dialogue with Pakistan need to rest on far more important considerations, namely:
* India will enter into dialogue with Pakistan only when a democratically elected government comes into power, through elections supervised by international observers.
* India will not enter into dialogue with Pakistan based on Pakistani imposed pre-conditions of Kashmir and the rest.
* India should maintain that Kashmir is not an issue historically nor is it now. Kashmirâs accession to India is non-negotiable as per the unanimous resolution of the Special Session of the Indian Parliament.
* India will enter into a dialogue with Pakistan only when it begins to respect the sanctity of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Jammu and Kashmir- a point endorsed by the United States through President Clintonâs statement.
Nepal: Nepal has been wracked by a Maoist insurgency for the past five or six years. India has remained a passive bystander witnessing the growing erosion of Nepalâs state power. Other than giving some military materiel for counter insurgency operations, no weighty measures have been taken.
India has not recognised the gravity of a Maoist take-over of Nepal as American analysts have done in depth. As per American analysts, the strategic implications of a Maoist take-over of Nepal are:
* Nepal becomes a total client state of China. A Maoist Nepal under Chinese tutelage would be a serious disruptive factor for US global strategies in the region.
* Maoist insurgents ruled Nepal would inextricably get dragged into Islamic terrorist organisations linkages, besides Chinaâs policies towards the Islamic world.
India needs to realise the gravity of the strategic implications, specific to India, namely:
* A China-aligned Nepal, removes an important buffer state between India and China. India would have to militarily man the India-Nepal border in strength, which may eat up two to three infantry divisions.
* A China-aligned Nepal adds to the existing China-client states in South Asia i.e. Pakistan and Bangladesh. It would be a very unholy trinity with not only the Western and Eastern flanks of India under Chinaâs influence, but the Northern flank too added.
* For the majority peoples of India, the only Hindu kingdom in the world would slide down ignobly into a Chinese-Islamic coalition in South Asia.
India must, therefore, immediately, cast away its existing reluctance and inhibitions to act firmly, even militarily, to prevent a Maoist take-over of Nepal. Fortunately, in Nepalâs current Maoist-threatened environment, convergence of security interests exist between the United States and India. India must therefore jointly work with the United States to protect the sovereignty of the Nepalese state against a Maoist takeover.
It was so stated by US Assistant Secretary of State, Christiana Rocca, during her recent visit to New Delhi: âWorking in tandem, our governments can help Nepal defeat the Maoists threat and re-establish democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people".
India must, therefore, act forcefully and unapologetically in Nepal forthwith to secure her national interests. It would be a convincing demonstration of what this paper espouses: âIndia will intervene forcefully to secure her national interests in the region."
Bangladesh: For far too long India has been oblivious to the playing of the âIndian-Cardâ (for or against) in Bangladeshâs domestic politics. For far too long has India tolerated the use of Bangladesh as a springboard for Pakistanâs strategic de-estabilisation of Indiaâs North-Eastern states. India could borrow a leaf from Myanmar's dealing with the Rohinggya problem emanating from Saudi-based organisations in Bangladesh. Al Qaedaâs tentacles exist in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, too, is a fit case where Indian foreign policy objectives could gain a convergence with United States national interests. The China-Bangladesh Defence Cooperation Agreement adds an additional dimension to the other threats.
India needs to draw red-lines in terms of Indiaâs national interests which Bangladesh must not overstep with impunity. In tandem, India through its big business houses should integrate Bangladesh into more commercial linkages. Increased Indian economic investments in Bangladesh could generates thousands of job and remove the root cause of Bangladeshâs instability and move towards Islamic fundamentalism.
Sri Lanka: Indiaâs national interests demand maintaining the unity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Indiaâs domestic Tamil politics should not become the touchstone of Indiaâs policies towards Sri Lanka. India needs to react forcefully to ensure that Sri Lanka remains a unified state with a set up that would meet the just aspirations of a majority of Tamils.
The above proposition entails once again the forging of mutual national interests convergence of India and the United States. Sri Lanka is an important component of United States' India Ocean strategy and it is felt that United States-India convergences exist already. Joint USA-India strategies and foreign policies towards Sri Lanka would be helpful in counter-acting Chinese and Pakistani overtures to wean away Sri Lanka from Indiaâs influence.
Indiaâs emergence as a regional power and a key global player depends largely on her image and standing in the South Asian neighbourhood. If India cannot effectively generate and ensure her key status in South Asia, how can the world be convinced that it can carve influence farther afield.
Indiaâs nuclear weapons, space programmes, missiles development and her overwhelming superiority in military strength are of no use, if the South Asian neighbourhood takes India for granted and merrily tramples on Indiaâs national interests and her image. India needs to introduce an element of âunilateralismâ in her state-craft in South Asia.
Fortunately for India, with the exception of Pakistan, joint convergences of national interests exist between United States and India. This could greatly facilitate Indiaâs forceful assertion in South Asian affairs for greater regional good. Once this is achieved, a marginalised Pakistan in South Asia, may see the dawn of South Asiaâs strategic realities.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email )