08-30-2006, 11:44 PM
<b>Plan. Plan.Plan.</b>
<i>On Bugtiâs killing, we have been bullish and mindless.</i><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->29 August 2006: So we have condemned Nawab Bugtiâs assassination. What next? We donât know. The government does not know. Nobody is thinking on those lines.
Since the troubles began in Baluchistan last year, we saw an opportunity to embarrass Pakistan for its interference in Jammu and Kashmir. Our role in the troubled Pakistani province, rich in gas and strategically bordering Iran with a port in the Arabian Sea, was nothing more than that. When Pakistan scaled up anti-Baluch military operations in the region, India cautioned against it. Now the Bugti condemnation naturally flows from it. But what next?
The governmentâs idea is to raise the Baluch issue in world forums, and the coming UN General Assembly session presents an opportunity. Routinely, Pakistan would have brought up Kashmir, because the peace process is dead after the Bombay blasts. In answer, we would serve up Baluchistan. At the moment, nothing more succeeds the Bugti condemnation.
Is the answer to Pakistani terrorism in J and K to embarrass it on Baluchistan? Is it at all proportional? Are we prepared for what is bound to be Pakistanâs redoubled efforts at terrorism in J and K and the rest of India? Bombay blasts II, III, IV? Donât ask. We donât know.
It is a fact that prime minister Manmohan Singh has turned against Pakistan after the Bombay blasts. Who wouldnât? It is also certain that he is totally dismissive of the peace process, and he has spoken roughly during his Orissa tour. The Pakistan government tried to soft soap him by advertising the house arrest of the Lashkar founder. But officials said the PM was unmoved. The PM now believes no business can be done with Pakistanâs military president, Parvez Musharraf.
But if you tinker with responses, you must accept it is policy change, bear the consequences of it, but also plan the next steps in the change, step two, three, four, and so on. Beyond condemning the Bugti killing, and embarrassing Pakistan with it internationally, we donât know what else to do. Sure, we know whatâs to be done, but we donât want to do it. We donât, letâs face it, have the courage for it, to repeat East Pakistan with Baluchistan thirty-five years later.
Let us also face it. It is not an easy thing to do. Yes, there are options. Which country doesnât? Yes, there is opportunity. Pakistan is very suicidal. Yes, there is money. But nations, political leaders, decide what is done and not done. Their decision has to be respected. The leadership is wiser about such issues, or hopefully is. You and I sitting out may not grasp the detail or the big picture. So let us not slam the government for not going the whole way on Baluchistan. But the Bugti condemnation is neither here nor there. If anything, it would give the wrong ideas to Pakistan.
Oughtnât the government to do something, anything? Let such an opportunity pass? No. But the response should be evaluated for proportion, symmetry. What do we gain by embarrassing Pakistan? Will it wind down its terrorism against us? Nope. It would surely redouble it. And likely as not, it would show our statement to the West as interference in its internal affairs. We better have a very good explanation.
The point is this. Nations must roadmap their bilateral relations every mile of the way. This may not always be possible, because it takes two to make a relationship, but there is a good chance that if you are sure of what you want, you could inevitably get the other side to agree. The driver of a relationship, between individuals as with nations, is usually one side or party, and it is usually the winning side. The US occupies that side most times, so does China, and so does Pakistan with us. Pakistan uses any and all means to drive our relations, from cricket to terrorism, and we are just happy to fall along. That way it ensures we fall on our face.
<b>The Bugti killing is the single biggest threat to Pakistanâs unity and territorial integrity since Bangladesh separated</b>. But we havenât handled it right. We have said all the right things, but should we have said it without a full plan? A plan restricted to embarrassing Pakistan is a hopeless plan. It is less effective than whatever we have done to contain Pakistani terrorism. If anything, it exposes our limitations of courage and options even more. Often, not doing something is better than blundering in.
Who drives our Pakistan relations or rather ditches it? In this government, it is mostly the national security advisor, M.K.Narayanan. His instincts are right about Pakistan, that it is a terrorist state, that it is up to no good, that it must be countered every part of the course. Where he is less clear or effective is in countering the terrorist state. Pakistani terrorism is with us for more than twenty years, and Narayanan is not the first NSA. He should know that rhetoric is a spent weapon against Pakistan. It was expended within the first few years of Pakistani terrorism in J and K. So what can he give beyond rhetoric? What can this government give beyond rhetoric?
Again, this is not to blame this or that government. But it is to understand that our less painful options against Pakistan have passed their sell by dates. We have to think new, we have to think deep, we have to think far. As far as two decades. Pakistani terrorism needs to be countered. The Americans wonât counter it for us. We have to take courage in our hands and do what has to be done. The empty rhetoric of the Bugti kind takes us nowhere.
On the contrary, such rhetoric damages our friends, those we seek to protect. <b>If we cannot be of assistance beyond verbal consolations, then they and us would be better off with our silence. With our terrorist neighbour Pakistan, our speech and actions must be calibrated and well conceived, and we must work to a plan. The attitude in the PMO, post the Bugti episode, is, we will take it as it comes. It is, unfortunately, the worse attitude to take, and one programmed to fail</b>. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<i>On Bugtiâs killing, we have been bullish and mindless.</i><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->29 August 2006: So we have condemned Nawab Bugtiâs assassination. What next? We donât know. The government does not know. Nobody is thinking on those lines.
Since the troubles began in Baluchistan last year, we saw an opportunity to embarrass Pakistan for its interference in Jammu and Kashmir. Our role in the troubled Pakistani province, rich in gas and strategically bordering Iran with a port in the Arabian Sea, was nothing more than that. When Pakistan scaled up anti-Baluch military operations in the region, India cautioned against it. Now the Bugti condemnation naturally flows from it. But what next?
The governmentâs idea is to raise the Baluch issue in world forums, and the coming UN General Assembly session presents an opportunity. Routinely, Pakistan would have brought up Kashmir, because the peace process is dead after the Bombay blasts. In answer, we would serve up Baluchistan. At the moment, nothing more succeeds the Bugti condemnation.
Is the answer to Pakistani terrorism in J and K to embarrass it on Baluchistan? Is it at all proportional? Are we prepared for what is bound to be Pakistanâs redoubled efforts at terrorism in J and K and the rest of India? Bombay blasts II, III, IV? Donât ask. We donât know.
It is a fact that prime minister Manmohan Singh has turned against Pakistan after the Bombay blasts. Who wouldnât? It is also certain that he is totally dismissive of the peace process, and he has spoken roughly during his Orissa tour. The Pakistan government tried to soft soap him by advertising the house arrest of the Lashkar founder. But officials said the PM was unmoved. The PM now believes no business can be done with Pakistanâs military president, Parvez Musharraf.
But if you tinker with responses, you must accept it is policy change, bear the consequences of it, but also plan the next steps in the change, step two, three, four, and so on. Beyond condemning the Bugti killing, and embarrassing Pakistan with it internationally, we donât know what else to do. Sure, we know whatâs to be done, but we donât want to do it. We donât, letâs face it, have the courage for it, to repeat East Pakistan with Baluchistan thirty-five years later.
Let us also face it. It is not an easy thing to do. Yes, there are options. Which country doesnât? Yes, there is opportunity. Pakistan is very suicidal. Yes, there is money. But nations, political leaders, decide what is done and not done. Their decision has to be respected. The leadership is wiser about such issues, or hopefully is. You and I sitting out may not grasp the detail or the big picture. So let us not slam the government for not going the whole way on Baluchistan. But the Bugti condemnation is neither here nor there. If anything, it would give the wrong ideas to Pakistan.
Oughtnât the government to do something, anything? Let such an opportunity pass? No. But the response should be evaluated for proportion, symmetry. What do we gain by embarrassing Pakistan? Will it wind down its terrorism against us? Nope. It would surely redouble it. And likely as not, it would show our statement to the West as interference in its internal affairs. We better have a very good explanation.
The point is this. Nations must roadmap their bilateral relations every mile of the way. This may not always be possible, because it takes two to make a relationship, but there is a good chance that if you are sure of what you want, you could inevitably get the other side to agree. The driver of a relationship, between individuals as with nations, is usually one side or party, and it is usually the winning side. The US occupies that side most times, so does China, and so does Pakistan with us. Pakistan uses any and all means to drive our relations, from cricket to terrorism, and we are just happy to fall along. That way it ensures we fall on our face.
<b>The Bugti killing is the single biggest threat to Pakistanâs unity and territorial integrity since Bangladesh separated</b>. But we havenât handled it right. We have said all the right things, but should we have said it without a full plan? A plan restricted to embarrassing Pakistan is a hopeless plan. It is less effective than whatever we have done to contain Pakistani terrorism. If anything, it exposes our limitations of courage and options even more. Often, not doing something is better than blundering in.
Who drives our Pakistan relations or rather ditches it? In this government, it is mostly the national security advisor, M.K.Narayanan. His instincts are right about Pakistan, that it is a terrorist state, that it is up to no good, that it must be countered every part of the course. Where he is less clear or effective is in countering the terrorist state. Pakistani terrorism is with us for more than twenty years, and Narayanan is not the first NSA. He should know that rhetoric is a spent weapon against Pakistan. It was expended within the first few years of Pakistani terrorism in J and K. So what can he give beyond rhetoric? What can this government give beyond rhetoric?
Again, this is not to blame this or that government. But it is to understand that our less painful options against Pakistan have passed their sell by dates. We have to think new, we have to think deep, we have to think far. As far as two decades. Pakistani terrorism needs to be countered. The Americans wonât counter it for us. We have to take courage in our hands and do what has to be done. The empty rhetoric of the Bugti kind takes us nowhere.
On the contrary, such rhetoric damages our friends, those we seek to protect. <b>If we cannot be of assistance beyond verbal consolations, then they and us would be better off with our silence. With our terrorist neighbour Pakistan, our speech and actions must be calibrated and well conceived, and we must work to a plan. The attitude in the PMO, post the Bugti episode, is, we will take it as it comes. It is, unfortunately, the worse attitude to take, and one programmed to fail</b>. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->