Balochistan's Freedom Fighter Martyred

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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Bugti’s killing: botched signalling </b>
FT
Moeed Yusuf
It is highly unlikely that the opposition would agree to isolate its criticism on this event from the broader civil-military problem 
   
The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti last week has created a political furore. Was it expected? If so, has the fallout been handled appropriately?

To the first question, the answer is yes; to the second, no.

Given Bugti’s political history, his stature in Balochistan and the context in which the Baloch insurgency is being conducted, his killing would have doubtless resulted in the kind of reaction we are witnessing now. The political fallout from the event was a given which everyone, including those who authorised the action, should have known and expected. Yet, the official response to events after Bugti’s death suggests the government might have been complacent about its repercussions. The operation seems to have been authorised in isolation from those responsible for instituting complementary mechanisms to ensure that the fallout remained minimal. In fact, by acting confusedly, often stupidly, authorities have strengthened the case of the opposing camp, be it the sardari elements or political parties.

Here’s how.

The state’s rationale behind the decision to kill Bugti would have been to send a clear signal to all sardars that no further nonsense (from state’s perspective) would be tolerated. Given reports that the actual targets of the strike included Balach Marri and also Bugti’s grandsons, the aim would have been to remove as much of the Baloch opposition as possible in one fell swoop and deter the rest from challenging the state’s authority (Najam Sethi’s editorial in TFT last week brilliantly explains this point). Such a move would have been justified by citing that the establishment had attempted and failed to build a consensus around the issue. Targeting the sardars was thus the last resort (in the government’s view).

One prerequisite for taking this approach was for the state to behave in a manner that conveyed steadfastness, portrayed its act as justified and provided no hint of an apology for its action. After all, the entire premise, as explained above, would be to establish the writ of the state no matter what the cost. Indeed, the government’s public spokesmen kicked off with this very line. General Pervez Musharraf himself implied resolve, suggesting that anti-state elements would not be tolerated any further.

Within 72 hours of the killing, however, there was a dramatic turnaround and the state began to manifest signs of weakness. The director-general of Inter-Services Public relations, in complete contradiction to earlier official statements, suggested that a ‘mysterious blast’ had led to Bugti’s killing and justified the development by citing the fact that 21 army personnel, including six officers, were also killed when the cave collapsed. This implied that the state had not intended to target or kill Bugti. 

At this point the entire rationale of the plan falls apart. What signal does this contradiction send to the surviving sardars? What message should the opposition political parties and the international community take from this? One could only think of two logical answers: either the state is weak enough to give into pressure, a self-defeating situation for an establishment (particularly its leader) which thrives on its resolve to quash all anti-state extremists through use of force; or, that the entire episode was ill-planned and the state, having realised its mistake, is now retracting.

The result is that the opposition parties are having a field day, criticising the government, while the latter appears helpless in the face of mounting pressure. This is a consequence of the absence of any plan to tackle political opposition – which has only gathered further momentum due to signs of weakness from the government end – in the aftermath of Bugti’s death. Opposition parties have conveniently meshed the entire discourse with the broader question of civil-military relations, and are portraying the event as the latest example of the ‘military’ establishment’s disregard for citizen rights and its resolve to eliminate any opposition through targeted killings. In reality, the context in which the action was taken is much more complex and while the gains from Bugti’s killing are highly debatable (to this we shall come next week), one cannot justify casting the move in a framework of ‘personal vendetta’ (Musharraf versus Bugti).

Notwithstanding the fact that the opposition is justified in questioning the lack of consensus on the government’s move (Ejaz Haider dealt with this issue superbly last week), their approach reflects lack of maturity among political cadres, and underscores the nascence of political processes in the country.

Consider that it was opposition parties like the PPP and PMLN who were as fed-up with the Baloch sardars as the current administration. Furthermore, the MMA was brought in specifically to counter the sardari vote in the province. That past governments had to persistently bribe the sardars, most notably Bugti, to buy peace is no hidden secret (Bhutto had even rewarded Bugti with the governorship of the province for breaking the unified Baloch opposition at the time). Most of the opposition does actually realize the complexities that surround the entire Baloch question, including the fact that a reconciliation approach is extremely difficult and that given Gwadar’s development, the government is on a tight timeline to unlock Balochistan.

But a lack of planning on the government’s side to deal with the fallout combined with a self-serving political response from the opposition has once again jeopardised Pakistan’s image among the international audience. Bugti’s death and the reaction it has extracted has unleashed tremendous resentment among various civil society and media groups around the world, most of which cannot comprehend the internal dynamics of the situation. The West has bought into the opposition’s stance that the state is willing to transcend all the boundaries, an argument which presents the government in the image of cruel Latin American juntas.

Some western press reports have even discussed the likelihood of Pakistan’s break-up if such political extermination continues for long. Civil society networks have been urging Pakistani intellectuals (I have received a number of alerts to this effect) to rise against state behaviour and condemn the targeting of political opponents. These perceptions are being reinforced by a number of vested interests within Pakistan that have chosen to present Bugti as a pivotal political leader persistently wronged by the state. The consequences of such a discourse for a state already suffering from a huge ‘image deficit’ are obvious.

Finally, the international perception of increasing instability linked to this event will remain if the law and order situation in Balochistan and Sindh is not brought under control. Again, the violence following Bugti’s death was predictable. That state apparatus was not put in place in advance to deal with such fallout beats logic. Interestingly, curfew was imposed in Quetta after the news of Bugti’s death was made public but was lifted within three hours. That anyone within the decision-making circle would have imagined that the tide had subsided in such a short time is unimaginable. The only answer is extreme complacency on the part of the government.

What is needed is for the government and the opposition parties to treat Bugti’s killing in an informed light, at least for the international audience to understand that this event cannot be compared to exploitative dictatorships (Burmese, Nepalese, South American, etc) around the world. Realistically, it is highly unlikely that the opposition would agree to isolate its criticism on this event from the broader civil-military problem. It suits their ongoing anti-Musharraf drive agenda immensely. That given, the onus to ensure this rests on the government. Unfortunately, the government seems entirely unprepared to counter such arguments. The end result is that the episode continues to bring much embarrassment to Pakistan.

─ Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad.
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