09-19-2006, 12:36 AM
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HAVANA LIKELY TO HAUNT US - B. Raman
"Battle fatigue has set in in New Dehi---particularly in the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Office."
<b>2. That is the way the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the Pakistan-based jihadi terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF) formed by Osama bin Laden in February, 1998, are likely to misinterpret the Indo-Pakistani Declaration of Havana and the remarks of the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and the Foreign Secretary designate Shri Shivshankar Menon and others before and after the Prime Minister's meeting with Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf at Havana on September 16, 2006.
3. This misinterpretation is also likely to be strengthened by some of the observations made by New Delhi based experts---particularly some retired officers of our Foreign Service---on the significance of the agreement reached by our Prime Minister and Gen. Musharraf to set up an Indo-Pakistan anti-terrorism co-operation mechanism.
4. I was highly disturbed to hear a retired Foreign Secretary say on a TV channel: "We do not seem to be making any headway in our fight against terrorism. This (the mechanism) may help." These remarks will be misinterpreted in Islamabad as an admission by a retired Foreign Secretary that the Indian security agencies have proved themselves incapable of controlling jihadi terrorism. Let us take the help of the Pakistani agencies and see whether that helps.
Ever since Pakistan was born in 1947, ill-wishers of India in Pakistan---governmental and non-governmental, jihadi and non-jihadi--- have shown a penchant for misinterpreting and misreading India's mind and launching adventures, which took us by surprise, but ultimately proved disastrous for them. Those adventures were of a conventional kind such as the wars of 1965 and 1971 and the Kargil conflict of 1999. In matters of conventional conflict, we always had the upper hand.
In 1997, we threw away our covert card in a moment of misplaced generosity towards Pakistan and we have already paid a heavy price for it. However, we continued to retain the Psywar card. At Havana, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary designate have thrown away even the Psywar card. This is likely to cost us dear.
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The worst of jihadi terrorism is not behind us. It is ahead of us. The Indian Police and security agencies are making valiant efforts to control the jihadis despite lack of satisfactory political backing from the leadership and operational backing from the Foreign Office. Their difficulties are likely to increase as a result of Havana.
15. Pakistan is a theocratic State founded on the belief that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together. We may call ourselves a secular state, but the Pakistanis look upon us as a Hindu State. If we think that a State with such beliefs will genuinely co-operate with us against jihadi terrorism, we will be living in a world of illusions.</b>Â
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HAVANA LIKELY TO HAUNT US - B. Raman
"Battle fatigue has set in in New Dehi---particularly in the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Office."
<b>2. That is the way the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, the Pakistan-based jihadi terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF) formed by Osama bin Laden in February, 1998, are likely to misinterpret the Indo-Pakistani Declaration of Havana and the remarks of the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and the Foreign Secretary designate Shri Shivshankar Menon and others before and after the Prime Minister's meeting with Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf at Havana on September 16, 2006.
3. This misinterpretation is also likely to be strengthened by some of the observations made by New Delhi based experts---particularly some retired officers of our Foreign Service---on the significance of the agreement reached by our Prime Minister and Gen. Musharraf to set up an Indo-Pakistan anti-terrorism co-operation mechanism.
4. I was highly disturbed to hear a retired Foreign Secretary say on a TV channel: "We do not seem to be making any headway in our fight against terrorism. This (the mechanism) may help." These remarks will be misinterpreted in Islamabad as an admission by a retired Foreign Secretary that the Indian security agencies have proved themselves incapable of controlling jihadi terrorism. Let us take the help of the Pakistani agencies and see whether that helps.
Ever since Pakistan was born in 1947, ill-wishers of India in Pakistan---governmental and non-governmental, jihadi and non-jihadi--- have shown a penchant for misinterpreting and misreading India's mind and launching adventures, which took us by surprise, but ultimately proved disastrous for them. Those adventures were of a conventional kind such as the wars of 1965 and 1971 and the Kargil conflict of 1999. In matters of conventional conflict, we always had the upper hand.
In 1997, we threw away our covert card in a moment of misplaced generosity towards Pakistan and we have already paid a heavy price for it. However, we continued to retain the Psywar card. At Havana, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary designate have thrown away even the Psywar card. This is likely to cost us dear.
Â
The worst of jihadi terrorism is not behind us. It is ahead of us. The Indian Police and security agencies are making valiant efforts to control the jihadis despite lack of satisfactory political backing from the leadership and operational backing from the Foreign Office. Their difficulties are likely to increase as a result of Havana.
15. Pakistan is a theocratic State founded on the belief that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together. We may call ourselves a secular state, but the Pakistanis look upon us as a Hindu State. If we think that a State with such beliefs will genuinely co-operate with us against jihadi terrorism, we will be living in a world of illusions.</b>Â
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