09-22-2006, 11:44 PM
Heresies of Ensoulment: Upanishadic and Yogic Teachings and the Wudeng
As Buddhism arose within the cultural context of Hinduism in India, it directly addressed the ideal of the self known as atman, a notion that was interpreted, represented, reacted to, and soundly dismissed by the Buddha himself. As his doctrine of anatman, or ânot-self,â marks a clear departure from such notions, the Mahayana ideals that developed among Chinese schools recorded in the Wudeng Huiyan (Compendium of Five Lamps) suggest new developments and variations on this theme. These variations, and the original contrast that they developed from, provide important insights on how the Buddhist notion of selfhood or ensoulment underwent gradual changes throughout its development in China.
The original dichotomy involves an assertion in the Upanishads that âthe sage eventually discovers that within everyone is an eternal, unchanging essence, an immortal soul referred to as the âselfâ (atman) (Fieser and Powers 5). This self âalone survives death,â and âhas been reborn countless times in an infinite variety of different bodies, while itself remaining unchanged by the multiple entities [developed] in successive lifetimesâ (ibid.) In the Samyutta-Nikaya of the Pali Canon, the Buddha directly interprets and rejects this claim: âAll formations are transient; all formations are subject to suffering; all things are without an Ego-entity. Form is transient, feeling is transient, perception is transient, mental formations are transient, consciousness is transient. And that which is transient is subject to suffering; and of that which is transient and subject to suffering and change, one cannot rightly say:-This belongs to me; this am I; this is my Ego.â (Goddard 27).
This dichotomy, however, is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. Paradigms such as reincarnation and karma as pervasive natural laws still influenced the claims that the Buddha made, or perhaps more importantly, refused to make, as can be seen in another passage of the Samyutta-Nikaya: âAnd it is impossible that any one can explain the passing out of one existence and the entering into a new existence, or the growth, increase and development of consciousness, independent of bodily form, feeling, perception and mental formsâ (Goddard 26). This passage, while addressing and dismissing certain yogic claims about a separation between consciousness and matter, also clearly refuses to deny outright the possibility of reincarnation, or some other manifestation of karma. The traditional yogic separation was presented concisely by Patanjali, who contended âthat both matter (prakriti) and spirit (purusha) are real entities, and the goal of his system is separation (kaivalya) of spirit from matterâ (Fieser and Powers 5). The Buddha seems here, through the denial of the possibility of making a claim about it, since he refuses to say that reincarnation is an impossibility, involving a transcendental form of consciousness that may not involve typical notions of what a soul consists of, or what it may represent.
The Wudeng Huiyan, a compilation of dialogues and commentaries by a Chinese Buddhist monk named Puji (1179-1253), hints at a tense interplay within this uncertainty, reflected in the recorded discussions of masters of various Chan Buddhist schools and lineages. One of the traditional Chinese Chan schools of the time was known as Wei-Shih (Mind-Only or Consciousness-Only), a school that claimed that there was an eternal essence of mind not unlike the Hindu atman, that existed beyond the transient state of typical mental formations (Puji 13). Wei-Shih was known as a southern school, but was criticized by some as not being true to the teachings of the Buddha. The claim of an atman, an immortal soul, is addressed in the following passage by Nanyang Huizhong (675-775 AD), a master trained in the Vinaya tradition who was known as âNational Teacherâ because he taught three Tang Dynasty emperors:
âThe National Teacher asked a monk, âWhere are you from?â The monk said, âFrom the South.â The National Teacher said, âAre there any teachers there?â
The monk said, âA great many.â The National Teacher said, âWhat is it that they teach people?â The monk said, âIn that place, worthies directly impart the teaching âmind is Buddhaâ to their students:
âRight now, you completely possess the nature of conscious perception. This benevolent nature can cause the raising of an eyebrow and the twinkling in an eye. It is employed when coming or going, and it pervades the body. If you tap your head, the head knows it. If you stamp the feet, the feet know it. The ancients called it âpervasive consciousness.â Aside from this, there is no other Buddha. This body is subject to birth and annihilation, but the nature of mind is beginningless, and does not undergo birth and death. The body subject to birth and death is like a dragon that loses and regrows its bones, or a snake that sheds its skin, or a human that leave his old home. The body is impermanent, but its nature is eternal.â
National Teacher Huizhong criticized this, saying, âIf thatâs so, then their teaching is no different from the heretical Senika doctrine. Teachers of that doctrine said, âWithin the body is a spirit. Although this spirit can know the bodyâs affliction, when the body expires the spirit departs from it. If I am burned up, this spiritual host moves on. Although I am not eternal, this host is eternal.â With such an understanding, true and false canât be distinguished.ââ (Puji 53-54)
Yet there remains in the Wudeng extensive examples of karma as it travels from one incarnation to the next, as in Baizhang Huaihaiâs (720-814 AD) story of a monk who was destined to be reborn as a fox 500 times for claiming that he was independent of cause and effect (Puji 80). Other references include an assertion that in 100 years a certain monk will be reborn as an ox in a nearby field (Puji 114).
It is interesting to note, however, that the monks and teachers of monks who refused to make claims about the role of reincarnation or karmic retribution in a schema that left no option for a self or an immortal soul all had training in Vinaya lineages before they came to practice Chan. Vinaya study involves not only strict observance of the formal rules for monks described in the Pali Canon, but intense study of the scriptures and sutras as well. A classic example of this tendency is âOld Teacher Wang,â Nanquan Puyuan (748-835 AD): âWhy is it that phenomenal existence is empty? If there is nothing within mind, then how does one explain how the myriad things arise? Isnât it as if shadowy forms differentiate emptiness? This question is like someone grasping sound and placing it in a box, or blowing into a net to fill it with air. Therefore some old worthy said, âItâs not mind. Itâs not Buddha. Itâs not a thing.â Thus we just teach you brethren to go on a journeyâ (Puji 105). When Old Teacher Wang passed away, his final words asserted this mystery while continuing to refuse to lay claim to an absolute solution: âThe starsâ light is dim but eternal. Donât say that Iâm coming or goingâ (Puji 107). This reflects the uncertainty of the Buddhaâs comments on reincarnation mentioned earlier.
Therefore, the Hindu concept of ensoulment seemed to undergo a rebirth with the Wei-Shih school in ancient Chinese Chan Buddhism, but for the most part was denied by an assertion of uncertainty dating from the time of the Buddha himself. While he made other knowledge claims, he did not pretend to know what exactly survived the death of the body.
As Buddhism arose within the cultural context of Hinduism in India, it directly addressed the ideal of the self known as atman, a notion that was interpreted, represented, reacted to, and soundly dismissed by the Buddha himself. As his doctrine of anatman, or ânot-self,â marks a clear departure from such notions, the Mahayana ideals that developed among Chinese schools recorded in the Wudeng Huiyan (Compendium of Five Lamps) suggest new developments and variations on this theme. These variations, and the original contrast that they developed from, provide important insights on how the Buddhist notion of selfhood or ensoulment underwent gradual changes throughout its development in China.
The original dichotomy involves an assertion in the Upanishads that âthe sage eventually discovers that within everyone is an eternal, unchanging essence, an immortal soul referred to as the âselfâ (atman) (Fieser and Powers 5). This self âalone survives death,â and âhas been reborn countless times in an infinite variety of different bodies, while itself remaining unchanged by the multiple entities [developed] in successive lifetimesâ (ibid.) In the Samyutta-Nikaya of the Pali Canon, the Buddha directly interprets and rejects this claim: âAll formations are transient; all formations are subject to suffering; all things are without an Ego-entity. Form is transient, feeling is transient, perception is transient, mental formations are transient, consciousness is transient. And that which is transient is subject to suffering; and of that which is transient and subject to suffering and change, one cannot rightly say:-This belongs to me; this am I; this is my Ego.â (Goddard 27).
This dichotomy, however, is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. Paradigms such as reincarnation and karma as pervasive natural laws still influenced the claims that the Buddha made, or perhaps more importantly, refused to make, as can be seen in another passage of the Samyutta-Nikaya: âAnd it is impossible that any one can explain the passing out of one existence and the entering into a new existence, or the growth, increase and development of consciousness, independent of bodily form, feeling, perception and mental formsâ (Goddard 26). This passage, while addressing and dismissing certain yogic claims about a separation between consciousness and matter, also clearly refuses to deny outright the possibility of reincarnation, or some other manifestation of karma. The traditional yogic separation was presented concisely by Patanjali, who contended âthat both matter (prakriti) and spirit (purusha) are real entities, and the goal of his system is separation (kaivalya) of spirit from matterâ (Fieser and Powers 5). The Buddha seems here, through the denial of the possibility of making a claim about it, since he refuses to say that reincarnation is an impossibility, involving a transcendental form of consciousness that may not involve typical notions of what a soul consists of, or what it may represent.
The Wudeng Huiyan, a compilation of dialogues and commentaries by a Chinese Buddhist monk named Puji (1179-1253), hints at a tense interplay within this uncertainty, reflected in the recorded discussions of masters of various Chan Buddhist schools and lineages. One of the traditional Chinese Chan schools of the time was known as Wei-Shih (Mind-Only or Consciousness-Only), a school that claimed that there was an eternal essence of mind not unlike the Hindu atman, that existed beyond the transient state of typical mental formations (Puji 13). Wei-Shih was known as a southern school, but was criticized by some as not being true to the teachings of the Buddha. The claim of an atman, an immortal soul, is addressed in the following passage by Nanyang Huizhong (675-775 AD), a master trained in the Vinaya tradition who was known as âNational Teacherâ because he taught three Tang Dynasty emperors:
âThe National Teacher asked a monk, âWhere are you from?â The monk said, âFrom the South.â The National Teacher said, âAre there any teachers there?â
The monk said, âA great many.â The National Teacher said, âWhat is it that they teach people?â The monk said, âIn that place, worthies directly impart the teaching âmind is Buddhaâ to their students:
âRight now, you completely possess the nature of conscious perception. This benevolent nature can cause the raising of an eyebrow and the twinkling in an eye. It is employed when coming or going, and it pervades the body. If you tap your head, the head knows it. If you stamp the feet, the feet know it. The ancients called it âpervasive consciousness.â Aside from this, there is no other Buddha. This body is subject to birth and annihilation, but the nature of mind is beginningless, and does not undergo birth and death. The body subject to birth and death is like a dragon that loses and regrows its bones, or a snake that sheds its skin, or a human that leave his old home. The body is impermanent, but its nature is eternal.â
National Teacher Huizhong criticized this, saying, âIf thatâs so, then their teaching is no different from the heretical Senika doctrine. Teachers of that doctrine said, âWithin the body is a spirit. Although this spirit can know the bodyâs affliction, when the body expires the spirit departs from it. If I am burned up, this spiritual host moves on. Although I am not eternal, this host is eternal.â With such an understanding, true and false canât be distinguished.ââ (Puji 53-54)
Yet there remains in the Wudeng extensive examples of karma as it travels from one incarnation to the next, as in Baizhang Huaihaiâs (720-814 AD) story of a monk who was destined to be reborn as a fox 500 times for claiming that he was independent of cause and effect (Puji 80). Other references include an assertion that in 100 years a certain monk will be reborn as an ox in a nearby field (Puji 114).
It is interesting to note, however, that the monks and teachers of monks who refused to make claims about the role of reincarnation or karmic retribution in a schema that left no option for a self or an immortal soul all had training in Vinaya lineages before they came to practice Chan. Vinaya study involves not only strict observance of the formal rules for monks described in the Pali Canon, but intense study of the scriptures and sutras as well. A classic example of this tendency is âOld Teacher Wang,â Nanquan Puyuan (748-835 AD): âWhy is it that phenomenal existence is empty? If there is nothing within mind, then how does one explain how the myriad things arise? Isnât it as if shadowy forms differentiate emptiness? This question is like someone grasping sound and placing it in a box, or blowing into a net to fill it with air. Therefore some old worthy said, âItâs not mind. Itâs not Buddha. Itâs not a thing.â Thus we just teach you brethren to go on a journeyâ (Puji 105). When Old Teacher Wang passed away, his final words asserted this mystery while continuing to refuse to lay claim to an absolute solution: âThe starsâ light is dim but eternal. Donât say that Iâm coming or goingâ (Puji 107). This reflects the uncertainty of the Buddhaâs comments on reincarnation mentioned earlier.
Therefore, the Hindu concept of ensoulment seemed to undergo a rebirth with the Wei-Shih school in ancient Chinese Chan Buddhism, but for the most part was denied by an assertion of uncertainty dating from the time of the Buddha himself. While he made other knowledge claims, he did not pretend to know what exactly survived the death of the body.

