10-09-2006, 10:42 PM
[EDITORIAL]<b>What N.K. can expect </b>
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Seoul and its allies should immediately start fresh consultations on what action they should take against Pyongyang now that it crossed the line from making threats to actually playing with the dangerous weapon. The U.N. Security Council's presidential statement issued on Friday said broadly that the council "will act consistent with its responsibility" under the U.N. Charter. Council President Kenzo Oshima of Japan explained that North Korea could face sanctions or possible military action under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter which outlines the actions the council can take to deal with threats to international peace.
But any tough Security Council action, including military options such as a blockade, would most likely face a veto from Russia or China, whose geopolitical positions make them hesitant to join any operation that would be considered hostile by their former military ally. So it will be squarely on the shoulders of South Korea, the United States and Japan to explore individual and collective measures against North Korea.
Of the three nations, South Korea comes under pressure to take the first direct action against the North. Over nearly a decade of implementing an engagement policy toward the North, Seoul has been the biggest donor. Once the recipient shook the peninsula with a nuclear blast and broke a military equilibrium in the region, there is no sense of continuing humanitarian and economic aid to it.
First, the Mt. Geumgang tourism project which gives $150 to the North for every South Korean visiting the resort north of the border should be brought to a halt, eight years after it opened as the symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. Investment in the Gaeseong Industrial Park should be discontinued, and all South Korean businesses be withdrawn. Losses to individual firms may be compensated from the government's South-North Cooperation Fund.
An estimated 2 trillion won (about $2 billion) worth of aid has been delivered to the North under the engagement policy which had two major justifications - to prevent a new war on the peninsula and prevent the collapse of the North, an event that would cause an unbearable economic and social impact on the South. A nuclear-armed North Korea dismisses these reasons. It says it needs nuclear arms for self-defense, but their concept of self-defense is nothing less than holding Seoul hostage in the event of an external invasion.
<b>Seoul now has two options. One is continued aid to the North, which will lead to perceptions that the South has caved in to nuclear blackmail; the other is resolutely ending the engagement policy and readying itself for any eventuality. For its part, North Korea as a nuclear power will find it even more difficult to survive under deepening international isolation leading to severer poverty, and the constant threat of a possible preemptive attack</b>.
Kim Jong-il still has the chance to prevent a worsening of the crisis by returning to the Six-Party Talks and restarting denuclearization negotiations with the four neighbors and the United States. But he will soon find that joining the nuclear club with a few rudimentary atomic bombs does not improve the regime's lot at all.
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Seoul and its allies should immediately start fresh consultations on what action they should take against Pyongyang now that it crossed the line from making threats to actually playing with the dangerous weapon. The U.N. Security Council's presidential statement issued on Friday said broadly that the council "will act consistent with its responsibility" under the U.N. Charter. Council President Kenzo Oshima of Japan explained that North Korea could face sanctions or possible military action under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter which outlines the actions the council can take to deal with threats to international peace.
But any tough Security Council action, including military options such as a blockade, would most likely face a veto from Russia or China, whose geopolitical positions make them hesitant to join any operation that would be considered hostile by their former military ally. So it will be squarely on the shoulders of South Korea, the United States and Japan to explore individual and collective measures against North Korea.
Of the three nations, South Korea comes under pressure to take the first direct action against the North. Over nearly a decade of implementing an engagement policy toward the North, Seoul has been the biggest donor. Once the recipient shook the peninsula with a nuclear blast and broke a military equilibrium in the region, there is no sense of continuing humanitarian and economic aid to it.
First, the Mt. Geumgang tourism project which gives $150 to the North for every South Korean visiting the resort north of the border should be brought to a halt, eight years after it opened as the symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. Investment in the Gaeseong Industrial Park should be discontinued, and all South Korean businesses be withdrawn. Losses to individual firms may be compensated from the government's South-North Cooperation Fund.
An estimated 2 trillion won (about $2 billion) worth of aid has been delivered to the North under the engagement policy which had two major justifications - to prevent a new war on the peninsula and prevent the collapse of the North, an event that would cause an unbearable economic and social impact on the South. A nuclear-armed North Korea dismisses these reasons. It says it needs nuclear arms for self-defense, but their concept of self-defense is nothing less than holding Seoul hostage in the event of an external invasion.
<b>Seoul now has two options. One is continued aid to the North, which will lead to perceptions that the South has caved in to nuclear blackmail; the other is resolutely ending the engagement policy and readying itself for any eventuality. For its part, North Korea as a nuclear power will find it even more difficult to survive under deepening international isolation leading to severer poverty, and the constant threat of a possible preemptive attack</b>.
Kim Jong-il still has the chance to prevent a worsening of the crisis by returning to the Six-Party Talks and restarting denuclearization negotiations with the four neighbors and the United States. But he will soon find that joining the nuclear club with a few rudimentary atomic bombs does not improve the regime's lot at all.
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