Indian political leaders and bureaucrat

[acharya]

http://www.india-seminar.com/2004/539/539%...n%20chandra.htm
<b>Elections as auctions</b>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The more competitive an election, therefore, the more such voters from these groups are likely to benefit. But no matter how competitive it is, a democracy that does not guarantee access to a minimal set of entitlements for its most vulnerable citizens has malfunctioned in a serious way.

Paradoxically, however, this malfunction may well be the reason for the survival of democracy in India. When survival goods are allotted by the political market rather than as entitlements, voters who need these goods have no option but to participate.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


http://assets.cambridge.org/052181/4529/sa...521814529ws.pdf
Why ethnic parties succeed.
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald...04/br4.asp
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/0...42400070800.htm


http://yale.edu/ycias/ocvprogram/licep/1...handra.pdf
Strategic voting

http://yale.edu/ycias/ocvprogram/licep/5/c...ndra-laitin.pdf
Frame work for identity change




<b>
Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India. By Kanchan Chandra. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 368p. $80.00.

In the post-9/11 world where the “clash of civilizations” has moved beyond classroom debates to the public realm, it is refreshing, and challenging, to see a study that does not give ethnicity an easy ride. The title of this book is slightly misleading, though, because even while it concedes that appeals for political support on the basis of ethnic categories based on “race, caste, tribe or religion” (p. 2) are frequently made, sometimes with considerable success, it asserts that such tactics do not always succeed. When they do, it is not necessarily because of their putative appeal to sentiments but, instead, because both ethnic candidates and their supporters, rather than being swayed by appeals to their nonrational selves, are actually driven by sophisticated calculations of expected gain. Their utility calculus takes the size of the ultimate prize as well as the probability of winning it into account when they choose to align themselves with one set of politicians as opposed to another. Kanchan Chandra's parsimonious and general model explains why ethic parties in India, riding on Hindu or, for that matter, Tamil nationalism, succeed in some contexts but not in others.</b>

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Ethnic Bargains, Group Instability, and Social Choice Theory
KANCHAN CHANDRA

This article makes two arguments: first, it argues that theories connecting ethnic group mobilization with democratic bargaining are based, often unwittingly, on primordialist assumptions that bias them toward overestimating the intractability of ethnic group demands. Second, it proposes a synthesis of constructivist approaches to ethnic identity and social choice theory to show how we who study ethnic mobilization might build theories that rely on the more realistic and more powerful assumption of instability in ethnic group boundaries and preferences. It illustrates the promise of this approach through a study of the language bargain struck in India's constituent assembly between 1947 and 1949.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


http://www.aasianst.org/absts/1998abst/sasia/s-toc.htm

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/facu...ndra/as2000.pdf
Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic soceities