Pakistan News and Discussion-8

Naresh · 11-06-2006, 04:29 AM

[center]Bonapartist Vs non-Bonapartist generals â Dr Ayesha Siddiqa[/center]

The ability of some generals to take over power where others do not may be governed by three factors: the peculiar environment in the country; the conditions within the organisation (whether senior generals support a take over or not); and, the peculiar personalities of the army chiefs

In his November 4 column (The Kakar Legacy; Daily Times), Brig (retd) Shaukat Qadir has eulogised former army chief General Waheed Kakar for his sense of professionalism. Qadir says Kakar proved himself a professional soldier in dealing with military affairs and the tricky political situation he confronted during the first government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The general wisely chose not to get embroiled in the battle between now-late President Ishaq Khan and then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Using this benchmark, the army has had other professional chiefs as well: Generals Gul Hassan Khan, Asif Nawaz Janjua, Mirza Aslam Beg and Jahangir Karamat chose not to take over and allowed civilian governments to run the state. However, Qadirâs article points to an important issue: what makes a general Bonapartist; or, to put it slightly differently, why do some generals choose to take over while others do not?

Surely, generals such as Beg, as is obvious from his later involvement in politics, had both political instinct and ambitions. So the decision to take over the reins of government may not simply be a matter of adverse political conditions. After all, Generals Hassan, Beg, Janjua and Karamat faced equally critical situations. The country had faced a major crisis in 1971, having lost one wing, and that could have tempted Gul Hassan Khan to declare martial law. While the army, having lost a war, did not have a moral basis to take control of the state, he still could have decided to takeover on the argument of the gravity of the situation.

Similarly, with most of the military top brass having been killed in the air crash, Beg had the option to declare another martial law. In 1969, declaring the situation critical, Yahya Khan had opted to take over instead of allowing a civilian dispensation to form a government. Again, conditions were far from perfect during the two civilian regimes of Nawaz Sharif. In fact, one of the reasons Karamat proposed the formulation of a National Security Council was due to his assessment of the poor socio-political and economic conditions of the country. Still, he chose to resign when Sharif pulled him up for his controversial statement.

These generals aught to be compared with those like Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf who chose to strike. The ability of some generals to take over power where others do not may also be governed by three other factors: the peculiar environment in the country; the conditions within the organisation (whether senior generals support a take over or not); and, the peculiar personalities of the army chiefs.

From the standpoint of political environment, Ayub Khan got an opportunity to take over because civilian institutions were extremely weak, there was chaos in the country and the civilian bureaucracy was interested in capturing control of the state through the military. The civil bureaucracy, in particular, represented by Iskandar Mirza, wanted to use this political chaos to justify the transformation of the state into a bureaucratic-authoritarian rule. Similarly, there was a lot of political confusion when Generals Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf took over.

The state bureaucracy, argues Mohammad Waseem, views the political class as playing a subservient role. In the post-colonial state of Pakistan, the executive or the bureaucracy can be understood as : â...a group of bearers of office of authority [that]...reduces the political parties to the role of mere brokers, who manipulate public relations in their favour and thus function as a legitimacy factorâ.

However, what is equally important to assess is an army chiefâs sense of timing : when to strike and take direct control. Here, the peculiar personality of a general plays an important role. A Bonapartist general, if one were to look closely at personalities, has an extra flair, flamboyance and âfire in his bellyâ; he feels dissatisfied with the conditions and thinks, in highly ambitious terms, that he can reform the country and turn the conditions around. Indeed, his âzealâ to do so should exceed his sense of organisational discipline. In his personal life, such an officer is a norm-breaker. Perhaps, this trait also allows such an officer to have greater âownershipâ of his service or the armed forces than others.

Ownership is about the capacity to make the majority of military personnel believe that what the general is doing is in the best interests of the organisation and the state. Although there is a lot of talk about the high standards of discipline in the military and the significance of the army chief, it is important that the chief be fully confident that he can carry the entire organisation with him on the most controversial decision of taking direct control of the government.

In this respect, Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Musharraf have a lot in common. They had smartly manoeuvred their way to the top slot. Indeed, they were lucky officers as well. Ayub and Yahya Khan had adverse entries in their confidential reports. The same applies to Musharraf, who, in his own words, had broken the norms of discipline of the army and nearly avoided a court martial due to the 1965 war. Later, as is apparent from the statement of Lt-General (retd) Ali Quli Khan, Musharraf manoeuvred his way to the top slot by convincing Nawaz Sharif to trust him more than the then army chief, Karamat.

General Zia-ul-Haq also tricked Bhutto into believing that he could be trusted more than others and thus managed a promotion to the top slot. Although sufficient details about Ziaâs personality are not available, he is one of the cases where a decision to take control of the government was taken by the army chief due to pressure from his peers in the service.

A case similar to Zia-ul-Haq is General Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh who took power not because he consciously manoeuvred so that he would have greater power but was thrown into a position by some Bonapartist elements within the Bangladesh military. In fact, Rahman was put into confinement by General Khaled Musharraf but was bailed out by the leftist forces in the army and installed to power. It was later that Rahman began to consolidate power.

General Ershad and Maj General Hilal Morshid, on the other hand, are the two generals in Bangladesh who fit the bill of Generals Ayub, Yahya and Musharraf. Throughout their military careers, Ershad and Morshid were known for flouting the norms of military discipline including standards set for the personal life of a military officer. The personal flamboyance was possibly attractive for other officers and soldiers in a highly disciplined environment of the military. Such personal exuberance allowed these officers to break all rules and convinced others to support their decision to take over the state, or at least attempt to do so. Morshidâs coup attempt in 1996 failed because he could not manage to win the support of the head of the 46th brigade based in Dhaka. Also, the Bangladesh military was too factionalised to support a coup.

Bangladesh and Pakistan, the latter more so, are two countries that continue to grapple with the issue of keeping their militaries in check. While a lot has been written about the nature of politics and the praetorian character of the militaries, it is also vital to research the personality types of generals to see which senior officers have a greater proclivity to break norms. All Bonapartist generals share some common personal traits. Perhaps, psychoanalysis of senior officers is in order before the civilian governments can make the most critical decision of appointing an army chief. What is equally important is for the civilian governments and the military leadership to ensure that officers do not err in following the norms of discipline that differentiate the military from other state institutions.

The author is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst. She is also the author of a book on Pakistanâs arms procurement decision-making, and on the militaryâs economic interests

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