kartiksri
that quote was from s. n. balagagandhara. since it appears that certain powers are actively trying to erase any mention of his name (he's obviously been blacklisted from wikipedia), we could probably do with creating more awareness regarding his writings.
It's not in my ability to explain full nature of his theories, which i can just barely grasp, but i will atleast try to make feeble illustration here.
Balagangadhara considers the newly minted western environmental ethics to be a feeble attempt by "western" (in your case "modern") society to extend their particular human ethics to other domains, namely, to that of nature. This restriction of western ethics had even predated christianity to the times of homer and in all likelihood even before (see quote below). Indian society, however, certainly never had such a restriction.. in this sense it has always been profoundly "modern". really i cannot see anyone calling a buddha as a pre-modern or pre-enlightenment or whatever as recently done by one witzel and others of his ilk. this debate about "modern" is not about us but about the westerners struggle within themselves and with their own numerous demons. just think that the entire purpose of british presence in bengal was to grow opium for an engineered chinese market.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->... The actions one is âashamedâ of are done in such moments of âdeliriumâ. Good actions are reflec-tions of, come from, the âreal meâ. The point of reference is essentially the inner self (the good inner self, in Rousseauâs case), in terms of which one can say: âThis is really meâ or âThis is really not meâ. Such sentiments are foreign to us, or so I claim.
Three peripheral remarks are in order.
1. We do describe, even in our models, people as âgoodâ or âevilâ. But these descriptions abbreviate actions and relations: âdutiful sonâ abbreviates actions performed by one of the relata in its relation-ship with the other.
2. The âdoctrine of Karmaâ is a component of a theory of âself-identity. Because the âselfâ is the set of actions performed by the organism (if we leave out its representations) and because all organisms (including animals, insects etc.) do act, it is not possible to restrict âselvesâ to human beings alone. Such a doctrine must perforce be applicable to all organisms capable of performing actions, as is indeed the case.
3. Because of the essential relationship between the âselfâ and actions, the moral life of an organism includes all kinds of actions performed by it during its life-time. This has an additional conse-quence that a human organismâs relationship to the Natural world becomes an essential aspect in the construction of a âselfâ. By the same token, manâs relationship to Nature becomes a moral re-lationship as well.
The contrast with Western ethical thought is again instructive in this regard. <b>Ever since Homer, it has been a rather characteristic trait of Western thinking that moral phenomena pertained only to the domain of human intercourse. The relation of Man to Nature fell outside the scope of moral life: </b>where it does enter into discussion at all, it does so derivatively in terms of, say, the consequences of such actions on future generations. Inanimate Nature, non- and quasi-sentient animals, on their part, could not enter into any moral relationship with human beings because they lacked the faculty or the capacity to âreasonâ (or whatever) by exercising which moral choices and decisions could be made. Morality came into play only when both the relata in the relationship were moral agents and Nature disqualified herself from being one. In the best of cases, Nature was indifferent to manâs striving to realize a moral world. At worst, she was hostile to such an endeavour.
<b>This restricted scope of the domain of moral life has had the consequence that âtechnologyâ could not be considered as a moral action in itself. </b>Technological action has come to be governed by criteria other than those that regulate moral action. To be sure, in the last decade or so, there has emerged a burgeoning domain of environmental ethics, which has seen it fit to challenge the predominant view. ... <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
"Technological action has come to be governed by criteria other than those that regulate moral action. " This explains Ellul's inability to come to moral terms with technique and his consequent reversion to catholicism.
that quote was from s. n. balagagandhara. since it appears that certain powers are actively trying to erase any mention of his name (he's obviously been blacklisted from wikipedia), we could probably do with creating more awareness regarding his writings.
It's not in my ability to explain full nature of his theories, which i can just barely grasp, but i will atleast try to make feeble illustration here.
Balagangadhara considers the newly minted western environmental ethics to be a feeble attempt by "western" (in your case "modern") society to extend their particular human ethics to other domains, namely, to that of nature. This restriction of western ethics had even predated christianity to the times of homer and in all likelihood even before (see quote below). Indian society, however, certainly never had such a restriction.. in this sense it has always been profoundly "modern". really i cannot see anyone calling a buddha as a pre-modern or pre-enlightenment or whatever as recently done by one witzel and others of his ilk. this debate about "modern" is not about us but about the westerners struggle within themselves and with their own numerous demons. just think that the entire purpose of british presence in bengal was to grow opium for an engineered chinese market.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->... The actions one is âashamedâ of are done in such moments of âdeliriumâ. Good actions are reflec-tions of, come from, the âreal meâ. The point of reference is essentially the inner self (the good inner self, in Rousseauâs case), in terms of which one can say: âThis is really meâ or âThis is really not meâ. Such sentiments are foreign to us, or so I claim.
Three peripheral remarks are in order.
1. We do describe, even in our models, people as âgoodâ or âevilâ. But these descriptions abbreviate actions and relations: âdutiful sonâ abbreviates actions performed by one of the relata in its relation-ship with the other.
2. The âdoctrine of Karmaâ is a component of a theory of âself-identity. Because the âselfâ is the set of actions performed by the organism (if we leave out its representations) and because all organisms (including animals, insects etc.) do act, it is not possible to restrict âselvesâ to human beings alone. Such a doctrine must perforce be applicable to all organisms capable of performing actions, as is indeed the case.
3. Because of the essential relationship between the âselfâ and actions, the moral life of an organism includes all kinds of actions performed by it during its life-time. This has an additional conse-quence that a human organismâs relationship to the Natural world becomes an essential aspect in the construction of a âselfâ. By the same token, manâs relationship to Nature becomes a moral re-lationship as well.
The contrast with Western ethical thought is again instructive in this regard. <b>Ever since Homer, it has been a rather characteristic trait of Western thinking that moral phenomena pertained only to the domain of human intercourse. The relation of Man to Nature fell outside the scope of moral life: </b>where it does enter into discussion at all, it does so derivatively in terms of, say, the consequences of such actions on future generations. Inanimate Nature, non- and quasi-sentient animals, on their part, could not enter into any moral relationship with human beings because they lacked the faculty or the capacity to âreasonâ (or whatever) by exercising which moral choices and decisions could be made. Morality came into play only when both the relata in the relationship were moral agents and Nature disqualified herself from being one. In the best of cases, Nature was indifferent to manâs striving to realize a moral world. At worst, she was hostile to such an endeavour.
<b>This restricted scope of the domain of moral life has had the consequence that âtechnologyâ could not be considered as a moral action in itself. </b>Technological action has come to be governed by criteria other than those that regulate moral action. To be sure, in the last decade or so, there has emerged a burgeoning domain of environmental ethics, which has seen it fit to challenge the predominant view. ... <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
"Technological action has come to be governed by criteria other than those that regulate moral action. " This explains Ellul's inability to come to moral terms with technique and his consequent reversion to catholicism.