04-13-2004, 05:57 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->More important, if anyone can summarize it as 'that' document on Shakti was summarized (does anyone have a copy of it).<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I dont want to digress but for the benefit of newcomers here is the critical look document on the Shakti tests in Pokhran
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>A Critical Look at India's Nuclear Critics</span>
Last-Modified: June 9, 1998
Awards Won Disclaimers - A Must Read
Introduction
I received this article by email. Not sure who is the author of this article. It is a long but well written article. Take time to read it, it is time well spent. Please do pass it on to others.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After India exploded 5 nuclear devices, a lively debate has been started in India (and elsewhere) on issues like nuclear testing, CTBT, economic consequences etc. However, after weeks of incessant talk shows and columns on these topics, it is becoming apparent that the debate is being led by technically uninformed loud mouths whose sole qualification may be `peace activist' or `environmental crusader'. Even the tag `scientist' is meaningless if he/she doesn't know the technical details of CTBT, NPT, subcritical tests or fourth generation nukes. Worse, the political personalities are not technically well informed enough to counter this set and sometimes even second their opinions if it suits them politically. After the Pakistan tests, decibel levels shot up further.
While this reflects very well on the freedom of expression enjoyed in our society, it does place a certain responsibility on those better informed to raise the level of public awareness.
A regular feature of most debates seem to be a set of rhetorical questions whose answers are taken to be evident. Sadly, they are evident one way for the unwary and another way for the well informed, and therein lies the danger. Just as a lie if repeated often may become the truth, a falsehood not contradicted long enough may also become the truth. This article is an attempt to answer some of these questions. The first part is structured as Question-Answer. Inevitably, some answers need to address fairly technical issues or require elaboration. In order to maintain continuity, these technical issues/elaborations have been clubbed together under `Part-II Technical Issues'. The Question-Answer section contains many references to this section (as [See This Topic]) but the reader may skip them on the first pass. The issues discussed here are more technical rather than political / social. The author believes that only after the technical nuances have been mastered can the latter issues be meaningfully dealt with.
Part-I Frequently Asked Rhetorical Questions
Questions: Why now? What has changed so dramatically? Why not wait longer? Implied Ans: We could have waited forever. We tested because we are crazy.
Real Answer: First of all it must be appreciated that there does not always have to be a single reason for everything. In this case, there were at least two.
Security issue: (a)Pakistan - Its ability to hit deep into India is certainly a new dramatic development. (b)China - Here the change has been more gradual. Given their continued testing since 1964, they have been improving their nukes. The gap between India and China has been widening steadily. At some point a correction had to be applied. The fact that we have survived so far is no reason not to test, but a reason not to push our luck any further. After all, if we live to be 35 years old we do not say, "Hey! I've survived so far, so why get life insurance now?". [See China and its Neighbors]
CTBT issue:
What will CTBT do?
CTBT aims to ban certain types of nuclear tests, while allowing certain other types [See CTBT: technical specs]. Significantly, but NOT coincidentally, it means that if you have conducted enough tests already, you can keep making more and better n-bombs but if you have not done any tests so far then you can never make a USEFUL bomb. [See US and CTBT]
But did we not refuse to sign it in 1996 Geneva? So why not continue with our policy of `option is open'?
At the time of the Geneva conference it was stated that the conference will have to UNANIMOUSLY agree to the CTBT draft and that CTBT would come into force if all 44 countries with nuclear (weapons or reactor) technology ratify it. Subsequent developments [See CTBT and UN] indicate that CTBT may have been enforced without unanimous approval, possibly by a General Assembly vote in 1999. Instead of just *US aid* sanctions, we could then face *UN trade* sanctions like Iraq, if we ever had to test post UN CTBT enactment.
Why is it not mentioned?
This is a major reason for testing now, but is understated in public for two reasons: (1) It means taking on the Big-5 rather than little Pakistan and (2) It requires making very technical rather than emotional arguments and consequently requires significantly more (long term) effort. But if we scientists want India to be a nuclear power, we MUST put in that effort towards educating our public and politicians.
Note that after an initial phase of Pak bashing, India has finally stated unambiguously that Pak alone was not the reason for invoking the N option. The basic asymmetry and long term dangers inherent in NPT and CTBT would have made these tests necessary, with or without a nuclear Pakistan.
Questions: What have we achieved by these tests? Hadn't we already proved ourselves in 1974? Are we any safer now?
Implied Answer: Nothing but trouble. Yes. No.
Real Answer: What we achieved now (that we hadn't in '74)
We have demonstrated that we have Usable n-devices. A device too heavy for us to transport out of our country would not deter anyone!
Over the years, the role of tests have changed dramatically. It used to be that a test verified a bomb design. Subsequently, tests were conducted to verify design tools for making n-bombs, i.e., tests have gone from being consumer goods to capital goods!! This calls for a drastic re-evaluation of our old concepts. The cost we are paying for the tests is not for 5 bombs but our *ability* to make them in future. Consequently, if we had not tested before Sept 1999 [See CTBT and UN], then we would have committed all our future generations to enforced nuclear disarmament in a world full of nuclear weapons/threats (See question on disarmament). Surely a nation that has watched Mahabharat should realize the danger of making such tall promises/commitments on behalf of future generations & situations!
The safety factor
Arms race: See the question on peace and arms race below.
Deterrence: It is well said that the generals (and the public) are always preparing for the last war. (Not last as in Armageddon, but last as in the most recent one!) This is evident even now during our debates which are fixated on the utility/futility of the H-bomb. Yes, the H bomb is seldom an option. From this the unsuspecting pacifists concluded that n-bombs are useless. The NATO/US generals, unfortunately, concluded otherwise. They simply demanded smaller, and hence more usable, n-bombs. The nuclear threat in future will not be that Calcutta may get wiped out but that our armored corps may get wiped out by a few nuclear artillery shells. Not only is this scenario more likely, it is utterly lacking in the `world will stand by us' safety factor. No civilian casualties, limited battlefield radiation. Certainly not a `crime against humanity' which would bother the international community beyond expressing grave concern.
In the recent tests we have shown that we are also in the reckoning for these `designer nukes'. This deterrence was UTTERLY lacking in the '74 test. In layman terms, making these small bombs is more difficult than making big bombs just as making a wristwatch TV is than a 14in TV. [See Types of Nukes]
India-Pak: The international loud mouths would have you believe that deterrence requires rationality and does not apply to Indo-Pak. The reality is starkly, and awkwardly, different. Within days of both India and Pakistan going nuclear, the following doctrines emerged:
India will not use a first strike and
Pakistan reserves the right to first strike and will exercise it if any of their cities is about to fall. Both doctrines are reasonable and SAFE. There is no talk of launching an all out attack if satellites/radars detect a launch from the other side, the kind of error prone hair-trigger deterrence practised by the `rational' powers. Given Pak deterrence, Indians can stop dreaming about crossing over with massed tanks and besieging Lahore. Given Indian depth and range, Pak can forget about getting away with a first strike. So now we can return to our low intensity conflicts without the threat of escalation. The real incentive to solve the Kashmir issue comes not from the threat of nuclear war but precisely because such open warfare is now ruled out as a solution.
Question: Hasn't India destroyed NPT/CTBT and drive towards N disarmament? Can disarmament take place now?
Implied answer: It has, and for that we should be ashamed. Little hope for disarmament now, thanks to India
Real Answer: Yes, we did deal a body blow to NPT and CTBT. And that is all. We have not dealt a body blow to disarmament because it was never there to begin with. What were NPT and CTBT trying to achieve? They were eliminating hypothetical nuclear weapons only - the few crude devices that `rogue' states may have produced. In return for this, NPT gave legitimacy to the 5 nuclear weapons states (NWS) to stay nuclear forever. That means [See Number of Nukes] NPT legitimized over 35,000 *actual* nuclear warheads while eliminating a hundred *hypothetical* warheads. CTBT was even worse. It was aimed at letting these same NWS develop `fourth generation' warheads, which are far more USABLE [See Types of Nukes] and in return it would have eliminated the same phantom warheads as NPT. NPT and CTBT were instruments of surrender rather than treaties.
Does disarmament stand a chance now? I believe the answer is YES. More so now than before! Consider this: there were three types of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological. The world quickly agreed to ban the last two and concrete steps have been taken in that direction. So why not nuclear? All the talk of `verification reliability' applies to all three types, so that can't be the real reason. I believe the real reason was the perception that ANYBODY could make chemical / biological bombs. They were low technology (poor man's nuke, they called it) options that gave no advantage to the big guys. So they were banned. Nukes were different. Did their development not require a galaxy of brilliant people like Oppenhiemer, Feynman, Teller? That hi-tech image has stuck, along with the associated perceived strategic advantage. The US has openly stated that the utility of CTBT to US lies in CTBT's ability to freeze that advantage [See US and CTBT]. Given the license to N arms ALREADY granted by NPT to the Big-5, if CTBT was allowed to also assure a monopoly then there would have been absolutely no incentive to disarm. SALT treaties would reduce the bloated stocks for US and Russia, but no NWS has ever committed to total elimination. Now, with India forcing the NWS to face a world sans CTBT-assured nuclear monopoly, their assessment might change. An advantage based on sophisticated (and costly) convention weapons may be deemed more sustainable than nukes if nukes are perceived as giving too many `small' countries a viable deterrence. This won't assure peace, but for what its worth, the world may be rid of nukes.
Questions: Won't these tests start an arms race and hamper peace in the region?
Implied answer: Of course they will. There goes the neighborhood!
Real Answer: Just because it is said on BBC/CNN, it doesn't have to be true.
Arms race: This term has come to be used indiscriminately. An actual `arms race' can only be sustained between equals. This has happened only once in the nuclear sense, between US & USSR. They both wanted PARITY, never trusted the other and kept racing. It was the desire for PARITY that made the balance unstable till such time as one collapsed out of fatigue. Consider, however, the other nuclear linkages. USSR-UK:France, USSR-China and our own China-India. All these relationships were so asymmetric that the issue was DETERRENCE, not parity; and deterrence does admit stable solutions [See Number of Nukes]. The trouble with this stable order began with Pakistan having a (pre-tested) n-device. Now there was a possible parity with India, ergo there was scope for nuclear/conventional race.
By testing 5 devices of increasing complexity, India has in one stroke restored the asymmetry. Pakistan matched us numerically for show, but not technically or in terms of infrastructure. So we will have a stable asymmetric chain once again, albeit with one more link to it: Russia-China-India-Pakistan. Moreover, the stability of this configuration will be guaranteed by the size and technical sophistication of the underlying economies, a far more dependable anchor than international goodwill.
Peace: This will neither help nor hurt the peace prospects. Peace requires a change of mind set, not technology level. Most people easily confuse the means of warfare with the need for warfare and think that peace can be achieved by technological deprivation. Try telling that to Rwandans. Using guns, pistols and usually just machetes, they managed to kill more than 200,000 (Washing- ton Post, 19/5/94) while Hiroshima casualties were estimated at 130,000 (N.Y.Times, 6/8/94: After 40yrs, A Bell Tolls). On the other hand UK and France have been nuclear neighbors and yet enjoyed mutual peace.
Questions: Can we afford nuclear arms? Shouldn't we be spending on food & housing?
Implied Answer: No, nukes are a rich man's toy.
Real Answer: Not so fast, my politically correct friend!
The cost of nukes: This is where one needs to distinguish between the needs of a genuine n-arms race and a stable asymmetric deterrent. The cost of a n-arms race is, of course, open ended and prohibitive. The loser goes bankrupt and the winner goes into debt. However, it is not clear what the `nuclear' part has to do with it. The same sorry results can be guaranteed with jets/tanks/carriers. Like paying $600,000,000 for 28 F16's sitting in Arizona. It would appear that so long as there is a `race', its bad news.
So we come now to the cost of maintaining asymmetric nuclear deterrence. It turns out that if one does have a big enemy, then it is cheaper to use a nuclear deterrence than a conventional one. This conclusion was arrived at by Trueman (President) and Dean Acheson (Sec of State) in '51. [See Bang for the Buck]. The US is rich, but rest assured they count their pennies. (Where their projections went haywire is in failing to stop at deterrence and sliding into a race.) So now we have the worlds richest nation
using nukes because it cannot afford the alternatives and
urging poorer countries not to use nukes.
The lesson to be learned from US-USSR is that we SHOULD seek a nuclear deterrence w.r.t. China but NOT seek parity. And if Pakistan tries for parity rather than deterrence, its their economic funeral - not ours. No economy 1/7th our size can sustain parity with us in the long run.
Economic sanctions: As mentioned before, these are all *aid* sanctions, not trade sanctions. Even for these cosmetic acts, there was no consensus among G-8 countries. Since the impact (or lack thereof) of these sanctions will play itself out on the world stage, history itself will make clear the `price' India has paid for the N tests. Not signing CTBT may have attracted similar sanctions [See CTBT and UN].
Nukes vs social spending: In order to make this case, one would have to substantiate a number of other claims first. Detailed budget figures are hard to get but one must have certain standards in deductive reasoning.
It would need to be shown that the dominant reason for our underdevelopment is lack of funds rather than mismanagement.
The sums involved must make sense, i.e., it should not be that money saved by cutting our entire nuclear weapons program increases our social sector spending by a fraction. Right now we spend 3% of our GDP on defense. The bulk of even that 3% goes into salaries. If delaying our nuclear prog. by 5 yrs would ensure that by 2003 we would be rich (or at least without poverty), it would have been worth it. Consider, however, that we have already delayed it by 25 yrs and we are still not rich - just poor and non-nuclear.
One must be consistent in applying this argument. ALL `non-essential' expenditure must be likewise cut. For e.g., tenured positions for talking heads, all of arts and culture, astronomy, pure science, exotic accelerators, all leisure activity, foreign trips, boutiques, fashions...
All things being equal, one should pay more attention to economic development rather than defence. This, however, assumes two things.
minimum current defence requirements have been taken care of and
changes to defence needs can be met as and when necessary. Our present troubles arise because of (ii).
With NPT, CTBT and FMCT regimes, we are faced with an immediate deadline for developing our defences. So far, thankfully, there have been no attempts to place a cut off date for economic development. We can get nuclear today and rich tomorrow but not rich today and nuclear tomorrow. If we want a future for India where she is well off and strong, then the present exercise of N option was inevitable.
PART II: Technical Details, Elaborations and References
Types of Nukes:
Fission device - Popularly called Atom bomb. Two or more subcritical masses of a radioactive material are suddenly brought together. A run away chain reaction ensues releasing lots of energy. Yield is determined by how much fission takes place before the blast dissipates the rest of the material into subcritical aggregates. Since chain reaction is involved, CTBT bans testing of such devices
Fusion device - Popularly called H-bomb. A fission device is used to start a fusion reaction in tritium (isotope of hydrogen). Again, the challenge is to make it all happen before the bomb destroys itself. Yields from H-bombs are much higher than from A-bombs. Since a fission device is used as a trigger, testing of such devices will be banned by CTBT.
Subcritical devices - The latest fad. A subcritical mass of radioactive material is made to fission due to fast neutrons produced by some other radioactive material. A self sustaining chain reaction is neither required nor produced though yields can reach hundreds of tons. CTBT will NOT ban such tests. NWS have asserted their determination to continue developing such nuclear devices.
Pure fusion devices - The fission trigger is to be replaced by chemical explosives. Since the fusion of tritium is not a chain reaction, even these very high yield devices can be tested under CTBT. Of course, for these tests to go anywhere, scientists must have some prior data about tritium fusion. Since this can only be done through testing conventional fusion devices, only countries that have already conducted sufficient tests can benefit from this CTBT loophole!
Usable nuclear device - It is relatively easy to build a very large (in terms of the weight of the device) nuclear device that successfully explodes. To be called a weapon, it must be small enough to be transported (accurately) to the target. It is this miniaturization that makes testing necessary [See US and CTBT] even for fission devices.
Since large bombs are an overkill in most cases, the drive has been towards smaller bombs of less yield. Boosted fission devices and other "fourth generation" bombs are the result. A source of fast neutrons, other than the nuclear fuel itself, is used to cause fission in the nuclear fuel [See CTBT: technical specs]. The high yield bombs served two purposes.
It enabled one to threaten mass destruction of the enemy
It enabled one to use missiles with large terminal errors. Even if the missile missed by 5 miles it was OK, since anything within 10 miles would be wiped out any way. Those who now look down on some states for following the first doctrine conveniently forget that they would have achieved just the same effect even while fighting a `propah, military targets only' war by the second doctrine.
Now that missiles have become MUCH more accurate, low yield devices can be used with them. This will reduce the political fallout and mass destruction of civilians. This now gives NWS the option of using nuclear weapons in Third World conflicts.
CTBT - Technical specs:
Reference - Los Alamos Study Group
The treaty bars all signatories from conducting all nuclear tests that involve any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Exactly what "nuclear explosions" are prohibited will be determined by parties to the CTBT, and possibly the International Court of Justice, on the basis of the treaty text, the (sparse) negotiating record, and the future practice of all states parties, including their statements at review conferences. As with NPT, the nuclear weapon states (NWS) have inserted escape clauses for themselves. The NWS have stated that the treaty bars explosions involving a self-sustaining chain reaction. Accordingly, they claim, subcritical tests are permitted though they involve the production of neutrons by fissile materials. However, such tests involve a nuclear "explosion" though a chain reaction does not occur. It remains to be determined whether the CTBT bars tests of possible "fourth-generation" weapons in which fissile material is "burned", without a chain reaction, at a rapid rate resulting in yields of tens or 100s of tons.
CTBT and UN:
After India's categorical refusal to sign the CTBT draft in Geneva, there have been several indications that efforts would be made to by-pass or coerce India.
Extract from the Los Alamos Study Group:
The NWS could ratify the CTBT and then seek to persuade/coerce India to endorse the treaty. This appears to be the present US strategy.
More direct indications come from the Special briefing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Washington, DC, April 7, 1998. John Holum, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms, while answering a query on the future of CTBT had this to say:
QUESTION: Back on the CTBT, you spoke earlier about a review conference in September 1999, if you can't get all 44 countries to ratify the treaty. Assuming that conference becomes necessary, what specific options are available at that time to bring the treaty into force? My understanding is that the conference would not be able to waive the original requirements stating that all 44 countries would have to ratify it. What is the current thinking about what measures could be taken to accelerate the ratification conference if that becomes necessary?
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY HOLUM: "You're getting a little ahead of the game, I think, because we need to ratify first before we can even go. So if we're not going, it won't be fruitful to develop a strategy.
"One thing that such a conference would do is presumably talk about a political strategy. The test ban, as most of you probably know, takes 44 specifically named countries before it can enter into force; 41 of those 44 have signed the treaty, and we expect they'll ratify. Three - India, Pakistan and North Korea - have not signed, and I'm sure an intense focus of the conference, assuming the other 41 have ratified by then, will be, what is the right political strategy to engage the other three, to bring them on board?
"Some people have suggested that the countries who are present there could make a decision to adopt a different test ban treaty. They couldn't amend this one, but they could adopt on their own a test ban treaty that would have all the same provisions but a different entry into force provision. That's a theoretical possibility, I suppose. Or they could decide on provisional application. I think any of those kinds of options would be very difficult to pursue because the entry into force provisions of the treaty were the product of very intense negotiations and they wouldn't be likely adjusted by countries that presumably will have ratified by then. Certainly, the two who ratified last week, who have just ratified - the UK and France - have strong views on that question."
End quote.
It is telling that just about every possibility was discussed save that of accommodating India's concern!
US and CTBT:
The CTBT, when originally proposed, would have led to (forced) nuclear disarmament. At that time not enough was known to either design new weapons or verify safety of old weapons without explosive testing. That is when the NWS opposed CTBT. Subsequently a technological threshold was breached whereby, if one had sufficient data, there would be no more need for testing. Tests were now purely the requirement of nuclear aspirants. Suddenly the NWS were gung-ho on CTBT. Even then, France and China had to scramble up the technological ladder at the last minute with their 1996 tests. Once again, we turn to Holum (see above) for a clear exposition of the US perspective. (Note: The quotes from Holum only do not imply that the other NWS were any less cynical. It is just that the US is more open.)
"...I want to underscore here the importance of ratifying this treaty for one of our most important international security challenges, and that's to intercept and prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles to more countries."
"...You can make a nuclear weapon without testing, but it's a much bigger challenge, much more difficult to make weapons of small enough size to be of great danger to us. We had to dig a trench under a B-29 bomber to put our first nuclear weapons on board. Without testing, it's an insurmountable challenge, virtually, to get them down to the sizes and weights that would be of particular danger to us."
"...So then the argument becomes, well, if we're not going to test anyway, why not hold the rest of the world to the same standards?"
Now for a final quote, which I think takes the cake. Having just testified that the US would not be inconvenienced by CTBT anymore since it no longer needed explosive tests, Holum gives the following `ethical' reason for the US signing CTBT:
"... Remember that the non-nuclear weapons states have considered, since the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated in the 1960s, that part of the bargain was an agreement on the part of the nuclear weapons states to engage in good-faith efforts towards disarmament; and the Test-Ban Treaty was specifically mentioned at the time in the late 1960s as part of the bargain. So, in order for us to make our case effectively for non-proliferation, we need to hold up our end of the bargain; and the test ban is part of it."
Number of Nukes: (Time magazine May 25, 1998)
Known
US 12,070
Russia 22,500
UK 380
France 500
China 450
Presumed [These are just guesses and have no official sanctity]
India about 65
Isreal 64-112
Pakistan 15-25
As the numbers show, only US-Russia were in a `race'. The rest were content with just deterrence. It also shows that US-Russia SALT talks are about removing redundancy, not renouncing N weapons.
Bang for the Buck:
Reference: http://h-net2.msu.edu/~diplo/reGardner.htm
The following is an extract from the above source.
In his State of the Union message, January 7, 1954, Eisenhower's two leading defense planning considerations dealt with the new nuclear weapons technology.
"First, while determined to use atomic power to serve the usages of peace, we take into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons and the most effective means of using them against an aggressor ... [including] the tactical use of our nuclear weapons .... Second, the usefulness of these new weapons creates new relationships between men and materials. These new relationships permit economies in the use of men as we build forces suited to our situation in the world today ...." (p. 5, _DAFR_, 1954)
In sum,
significant planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe by the U.S., and thus, NATO was underway by 1951,
Eisenhower supported this approach from the moment he was first informed of its possibilities and,
the features most appealing to Eisenhower were the ability to `get more bang for the buck' -- ,i.e., more than he could get from comparable conventional weapons, and the possibility to save the lives of his troops -- men he had spent his entire career protecting.
China and its Neighbors:
Much is said about the recent reduction of tension with China. Much less is said about its past track record of hostilities following such `friendship' as discovered by India('62), USSR('69) and Vietnam('79). Further, while USSR and even tiny Vietnam held their own, India was routed. These lessons of history seem lost on our die-hard China apologists. Recent events in Taiwan and Spratleys also indicate that while friendship with China is desirable, keeping one's guard up is also essential. Contrast the flippancy with which many Indians dismiss the Chinese threat (`It happened 35 yrs ago') with the pragmatism with which US has dealt with Japan & Germany. Even though they were *defeated*, more than 50 yrs ago, they are still denied their own military/armament build-up. If defeated, and *politically reformed* Japan and Germany are still suspect, shouldn't we be wary of an undefeated and unreformed China that is getting stronger by the day?
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I dont want to digress but for the benefit of newcomers here is the critical look document on the Shakti tests in Pokhran
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>A Critical Look at India's Nuclear Critics</span>
Last-Modified: June 9, 1998
Awards Won Disclaimers - A Must Read
Introduction
I received this article by email. Not sure who is the author of this article. It is a long but well written article. Take time to read it, it is time well spent. Please do pass it on to others.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After India exploded 5 nuclear devices, a lively debate has been started in India (and elsewhere) on issues like nuclear testing, CTBT, economic consequences etc. However, after weeks of incessant talk shows and columns on these topics, it is becoming apparent that the debate is being led by technically uninformed loud mouths whose sole qualification may be `peace activist' or `environmental crusader'. Even the tag `scientist' is meaningless if he/she doesn't know the technical details of CTBT, NPT, subcritical tests or fourth generation nukes. Worse, the political personalities are not technically well informed enough to counter this set and sometimes even second their opinions if it suits them politically. After the Pakistan tests, decibel levels shot up further.
While this reflects very well on the freedom of expression enjoyed in our society, it does place a certain responsibility on those better informed to raise the level of public awareness.
A regular feature of most debates seem to be a set of rhetorical questions whose answers are taken to be evident. Sadly, they are evident one way for the unwary and another way for the well informed, and therein lies the danger. Just as a lie if repeated often may become the truth, a falsehood not contradicted long enough may also become the truth. This article is an attempt to answer some of these questions. The first part is structured as Question-Answer. Inevitably, some answers need to address fairly technical issues or require elaboration. In order to maintain continuity, these technical issues/elaborations have been clubbed together under `Part-II Technical Issues'. The Question-Answer section contains many references to this section (as [See This Topic]) but the reader may skip them on the first pass. The issues discussed here are more technical rather than political / social. The author believes that only after the technical nuances have been mastered can the latter issues be meaningfully dealt with.
Part-I Frequently Asked Rhetorical Questions
Questions: Why now? What has changed so dramatically? Why not wait longer? Implied Ans: We could have waited forever. We tested because we are crazy.
Real Answer: First of all it must be appreciated that there does not always have to be a single reason for everything. In this case, there were at least two.
Security issue: (a)Pakistan - Its ability to hit deep into India is certainly a new dramatic development. (b)China - Here the change has been more gradual. Given their continued testing since 1964, they have been improving their nukes. The gap between India and China has been widening steadily. At some point a correction had to be applied. The fact that we have survived so far is no reason not to test, but a reason not to push our luck any further. After all, if we live to be 35 years old we do not say, "Hey! I've survived so far, so why get life insurance now?". [See China and its Neighbors]
CTBT issue:
What will CTBT do?
CTBT aims to ban certain types of nuclear tests, while allowing certain other types [See CTBT: technical specs]. Significantly, but NOT coincidentally, it means that if you have conducted enough tests already, you can keep making more and better n-bombs but if you have not done any tests so far then you can never make a USEFUL bomb. [See US and CTBT]
But did we not refuse to sign it in 1996 Geneva? So why not continue with our policy of `option is open'?
At the time of the Geneva conference it was stated that the conference will have to UNANIMOUSLY agree to the CTBT draft and that CTBT would come into force if all 44 countries with nuclear (weapons or reactor) technology ratify it. Subsequent developments [See CTBT and UN] indicate that CTBT may have been enforced without unanimous approval, possibly by a General Assembly vote in 1999. Instead of just *US aid* sanctions, we could then face *UN trade* sanctions like Iraq, if we ever had to test post UN CTBT enactment.
Why is it not mentioned?
This is a major reason for testing now, but is understated in public for two reasons: (1) It means taking on the Big-5 rather than little Pakistan and (2) It requires making very technical rather than emotional arguments and consequently requires significantly more (long term) effort. But if we scientists want India to be a nuclear power, we MUST put in that effort towards educating our public and politicians.
Note that after an initial phase of Pak bashing, India has finally stated unambiguously that Pak alone was not the reason for invoking the N option. The basic asymmetry and long term dangers inherent in NPT and CTBT would have made these tests necessary, with or without a nuclear Pakistan.
Questions: What have we achieved by these tests? Hadn't we already proved ourselves in 1974? Are we any safer now?
Implied Answer: Nothing but trouble. Yes. No.
Real Answer: What we achieved now (that we hadn't in '74)
We have demonstrated that we have Usable n-devices. A device too heavy for us to transport out of our country would not deter anyone!
Over the years, the role of tests have changed dramatically. It used to be that a test verified a bomb design. Subsequently, tests were conducted to verify design tools for making n-bombs, i.e., tests have gone from being consumer goods to capital goods!! This calls for a drastic re-evaluation of our old concepts. The cost we are paying for the tests is not for 5 bombs but our *ability* to make them in future. Consequently, if we had not tested before Sept 1999 [See CTBT and UN], then we would have committed all our future generations to enforced nuclear disarmament in a world full of nuclear weapons/threats (See question on disarmament). Surely a nation that has watched Mahabharat should realize the danger of making such tall promises/commitments on behalf of future generations & situations!
The safety factor
Arms race: See the question on peace and arms race below.
Deterrence: It is well said that the generals (and the public) are always preparing for the last war. (Not last as in Armageddon, but last as in the most recent one!) This is evident even now during our debates which are fixated on the utility/futility of the H-bomb. Yes, the H bomb is seldom an option. From this the unsuspecting pacifists concluded that n-bombs are useless. The NATO/US generals, unfortunately, concluded otherwise. They simply demanded smaller, and hence more usable, n-bombs. The nuclear threat in future will not be that Calcutta may get wiped out but that our armored corps may get wiped out by a few nuclear artillery shells. Not only is this scenario more likely, it is utterly lacking in the `world will stand by us' safety factor. No civilian casualties, limited battlefield radiation. Certainly not a `crime against humanity' which would bother the international community beyond expressing grave concern.
In the recent tests we have shown that we are also in the reckoning for these `designer nukes'. This deterrence was UTTERLY lacking in the '74 test. In layman terms, making these small bombs is more difficult than making big bombs just as making a wristwatch TV is than a 14in TV. [See Types of Nukes]
India-Pak: The international loud mouths would have you believe that deterrence requires rationality and does not apply to Indo-Pak. The reality is starkly, and awkwardly, different. Within days of both India and Pakistan going nuclear, the following doctrines emerged:
India will not use a first strike and
Pakistan reserves the right to first strike and will exercise it if any of their cities is about to fall. Both doctrines are reasonable and SAFE. There is no talk of launching an all out attack if satellites/radars detect a launch from the other side, the kind of error prone hair-trigger deterrence practised by the `rational' powers. Given Pak deterrence, Indians can stop dreaming about crossing over with massed tanks and besieging Lahore. Given Indian depth and range, Pak can forget about getting away with a first strike. So now we can return to our low intensity conflicts without the threat of escalation. The real incentive to solve the Kashmir issue comes not from the threat of nuclear war but precisely because such open warfare is now ruled out as a solution.
Question: Hasn't India destroyed NPT/CTBT and drive towards N disarmament? Can disarmament take place now?
Implied answer: It has, and for that we should be ashamed. Little hope for disarmament now, thanks to India
Real Answer: Yes, we did deal a body blow to NPT and CTBT. And that is all. We have not dealt a body blow to disarmament because it was never there to begin with. What were NPT and CTBT trying to achieve? They were eliminating hypothetical nuclear weapons only - the few crude devices that `rogue' states may have produced. In return for this, NPT gave legitimacy to the 5 nuclear weapons states (NWS) to stay nuclear forever. That means [See Number of Nukes] NPT legitimized over 35,000 *actual* nuclear warheads while eliminating a hundred *hypothetical* warheads. CTBT was even worse. It was aimed at letting these same NWS develop `fourth generation' warheads, which are far more USABLE [See Types of Nukes] and in return it would have eliminated the same phantom warheads as NPT. NPT and CTBT were instruments of surrender rather than treaties.
Does disarmament stand a chance now? I believe the answer is YES. More so now than before! Consider this: there were three types of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological. The world quickly agreed to ban the last two and concrete steps have been taken in that direction. So why not nuclear? All the talk of `verification reliability' applies to all three types, so that can't be the real reason. I believe the real reason was the perception that ANYBODY could make chemical / biological bombs. They were low technology (poor man's nuke, they called it) options that gave no advantage to the big guys. So they were banned. Nukes were different. Did their development not require a galaxy of brilliant people like Oppenhiemer, Feynman, Teller? That hi-tech image has stuck, along with the associated perceived strategic advantage. The US has openly stated that the utility of CTBT to US lies in CTBT's ability to freeze that advantage [See US and CTBT]. Given the license to N arms ALREADY granted by NPT to the Big-5, if CTBT was allowed to also assure a monopoly then there would have been absolutely no incentive to disarm. SALT treaties would reduce the bloated stocks for US and Russia, but no NWS has ever committed to total elimination. Now, with India forcing the NWS to face a world sans CTBT-assured nuclear monopoly, their assessment might change. An advantage based on sophisticated (and costly) convention weapons may be deemed more sustainable than nukes if nukes are perceived as giving too many `small' countries a viable deterrence. This won't assure peace, but for what its worth, the world may be rid of nukes.
Questions: Won't these tests start an arms race and hamper peace in the region?
Implied answer: Of course they will. There goes the neighborhood!
Real Answer: Just because it is said on BBC/CNN, it doesn't have to be true.
Arms race: This term has come to be used indiscriminately. An actual `arms race' can only be sustained between equals. This has happened only once in the nuclear sense, between US & USSR. They both wanted PARITY, never trusted the other and kept racing. It was the desire for PARITY that made the balance unstable till such time as one collapsed out of fatigue. Consider, however, the other nuclear linkages. USSR-UK:France, USSR-China and our own China-India. All these relationships were so asymmetric that the issue was DETERRENCE, not parity; and deterrence does admit stable solutions [See Number of Nukes]. The trouble with this stable order began with Pakistan having a (pre-tested) n-device. Now there was a possible parity with India, ergo there was scope for nuclear/conventional race.
By testing 5 devices of increasing complexity, India has in one stroke restored the asymmetry. Pakistan matched us numerically for show, but not technically or in terms of infrastructure. So we will have a stable asymmetric chain once again, albeit with one more link to it: Russia-China-India-Pakistan. Moreover, the stability of this configuration will be guaranteed by the size and technical sophistication of the underlying economies, a far more dependable anchor than international goodwill.
Peace: This will neither help nor hurt the peace prospects. Peace requires a change of mind set, not technology level. Most people easily confuse the means of warfare with the need for warfare and think that peace can be achieved by technological deprivation. Try telling that to Rwandans. Using guns, pistols and usually just machetes, they managed to kill more than 200,000 (Washing- ton Post, 19/5/94) while Hiroshima casualties were estimated at 130,000 (N.Y.Times, 6/8/94: After 40yrs, A Bell Tolls). On the other hand UK and France have been nuclear neighbors and yet enjoyed mutual peace.
Questions: Can we afford nuclear arms? Shouldn't we be spending on food & housing?
Implied Answer: No, nukes are a rich man's toy.
Real Answer: Not so fast, my politically correct friend!
The cost of nukes: This is where one needs to distinguish between the needs of a genuine n-arms race and a stable asymmetric deterrent. The cost of a n-arms race is, of course, open ended and prohibitive. The loser goes bankrupt and the winner goes into debt. However, it is not clear what the `nuclear' part has to do with it. The same sorry results can be guaranteed with jets/tanks/carriers. Like paying $600,000,000 for 28 F16's sitting in Arizona. It would appear that so long as there is a `race', its bad news.
So we come now to the cost of maintaining asymmetric nuclear deterrence. It turns out that if one does have a big enemy, then it is cheaper to use a nuclear deterrence than a conventional one. This conclusion was arrived at by Trueman (President) and Dean Acheson (Sec of State) in '51. [See Bang for the Buck]. The US is rich, but rest assured they count their pennies. (Where their projections went haywire is in failing to stop at deterrence and sliding into a race.) So now we have the worlds richest nation
using nukes because it cannot afford the alternatives and
urging poorer countries not to use nukes.
The lesson to be learned from US-USSR is that we SHOULD seek a nuclear deterrence w.r.t. China but NOT seek parity. And if Pakistan tries for parity rather than deterrence, its their economic funeral - not ours. No economy 1/7th our size can sustain parity with us in the long run.
Economic sanctions: As mentioned before, these are all *aid* sanctions, not trade sanctions. Even for these cosmetic acts, there was no consensus among G-8 countries. Since the impact (or lack thereof) of these sanctions will play itself out on the world stage, history itself will make clear the `price' India has paid for the N tests. Not signing CTBT may have attracted similar sanctions [See CTBT and UN].
Nukes vs social spending: In order to make this case, one would have to substantiate a number of other claims first. Detailed budget figures are hard to get but one must have certain standards in deductive reasoning.
It would need to be shown that the dominant reason for our underdevelopment is lack of funds rather than mismanagement.
The sums involved must make sense, i.e., it should not be that money saved by cutting our entire nuclear weapons program increases our social sector spending by a fraction. Right now we spend 3% of our GDP on defense. The bulk of even that 3% goes into salaries. If delaying our nuclear prog. by 5 yrs would ensure that by 2003 we would be rich (or at least without poverty), it would have been worth it. Consider, however, that we have already delayed it by 25 yrs and we are still not rich - just poor and non-nuclear.
One must be consistent in applying this argument. ALL `non-essential' expenditure must be likewise cut. For e.g., tenured positions for talking heads, all of arts and culture, astronomy, pure science, exotic accelerators, all leisure activity, foreign trips, boutiques, fashions...
All things being equal, one should pay more attention to economic development rather than defence. This, however, assumes two things.
minimum current defence requirements have been taken care of and
changes to defence needs can be met as and when necessary. Our present troubles arise because of (ii).
With NPT, CTBT and FMCT regimes, we are faced with an immediate deadline for developing our defences. So far, thankfully, there have been no attempts to place a cut off date for economic development. We can get nuclear today and rich tomorrow but not rich today and nuclear tomorrow. If we want a future for India where she is well off and strong, then the present exercise of N option was inevitable.
PART II: Technical Details, Elaborations and References
Types of Nukes:
Fission device - Popularly called Atom bomb. Two or more subcritical masses of a radioactive material are suddenly brought together. A run away chain reaction ensues releasing lots of energy. Yield is determined by how much fission takes place before the blast dissipates the rest of the material into subcritical aggregates. Since chain reaction is involved, CTBT bans testing of such devices
Fusion device - Popularly called H-bomb. A fission device is used to start a fusion reaction in tritium (isotope of hydrogen). Again, the challenge is to make it all happen before the bomb destroys itself. Yields from H-bombs are much higher than from A-bombs. Since a fission device is used as a trigger, testing of such devices will be banned by CTBT.
Subcritical devices - The latest fad. A subcritical mass of radioactive material is made to fission due to fast neutrons produced by some other radioactive material. A self sustaining chain reaction is neither required nor produced though yields can reach hundreds of tons. CTBT will NOT ban such tests. NWS have asserted their determination to continue developing such nuclear devices.
Pure fusion devices - The fission trigger is to be replaced by chemical explosives. Since the fusion of tritium is not a chain reaction, even these very high yield devices can be tested under CTBT. Of course, for these tests to go anywhere, scientists must have some prior data about tritium fusion. Since this can only be done through testing conventional fusion devices, only countries that have already conducted sufficient tests can benefit from this CTBT loophole!
Usable nuclear device - It is relatively easy to build a very large (in terms of the weight of the device) nuclear device that successfully explodes. To be called a weapon, it must be small enough to be transported (accurately) to the target. It is this miniaturization that makes testing necessary [See US and CTBT] even for fission devices.
Since large bombs are an overkill in most cases, the drive has been towards smaller bombs of less yield. Boosted fission devices and other "fourth generation" bombs are the result. A source of fast neutrons, other than the nuclear fuel itself, is used to cause fission in the nuclear fuel [See CTBT: technical specs]. The high yield bombs served two purposes.
It enabled one to threaten mass destruction of the enemy
It enabled one to use missiles with large terminal errors. Even if the missile missed by 5 miles it was OK, since anything within 10 miles would be wiped out any way. Those who now look down on some states for following the first doctrine conveniently forget that they would have achieved just the same effect even while fighting a `propah, military targets only' war by the second doctrine.
Now that missiles have become MUCH more accurate, low yield devices can be used with them. This will reduce the political fallout and mass destruction of civilians. This now gives NWS the option of using nuclear weapons in Third World conflicts.
CTBT - Technical specs:
Reference - Los Alamos Study Group
The treaty bars all signatories from conducting all nuclear tests that involve any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Exactly what "nuclear explosions" are prohibited will be determined by parties to the CTBT, and possibly the International Court of Justice, on the basis of the treaty text, the (sparse) negotiating record, and the future practice of all states parties, including their statements at review conferences. As with NPT, the nuclear weapon states (NWS) have inserted escape clauses for themselves. The NWS have stated that the treaty bars explosions involving a self-sustaining chain reaction. Accordingly, they claim, subcritical tests are permitted though they involve the production of neutrons by fissile materials. However, such tests involve a nuclear "explosion" though a chain reaction does not occur. It remains to be determined whether the CTBT bars tests of possible "fourth-generation" weapons in which fissile material is "burned", without a chain reaction, at a rapid rate resulting in yields of tens or 100s of tons.
CTBT and UN:
After India's categorical refusal to sign the CTBT draft in Geneva, there have been several indications that efforts would be made to by-pass or coerce India.
Extract from the Los Alamos Study Group:
The NWS could ratify the CTBT and then seek to persuade/coerce India to endorse the treaty. This appears to be the present US strategy.
More direct indications come from the Special briefing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Washington, DC, April 7, 1998. John Holum, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms, while answering a query on the future of CTBT had this to say:
QUESTION: Back on the CTBT, you spoke earlier about a review conference in September 1999, if you can't get all 44 countries to ratify the treaty. Assuming that conference becomes necessary, what specific options are available at that time to bring the treaty into force? My understanding is that the conference would not be able to waive the original requirements stating that all 44 countries would have to ratify it. What is the current thinking about what measures could be taken to accelerate the ratification conference if that becomes necessary?
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY HOLUM: "You're getting a little ahead of the game, I think, because we need to ratify first before we can even go. So if we're not going, it won't be fruitful to develop a strategy.
"One thing that such a conference would do is presumably talk about a political strategy. The test ban, as most of you probably know, takes 44 specifically named countries before it can enter into force; 41 of those 44 have signed the treaty, and we expect they'll ratify. Three - India, Pakistan and North Korea - have not signed, and I'm sure an intense focus of the conference, assuming the other 41 have ratified by then, will be, what is the right political strategy to engage the other three, to bring them on board?
"Some people have suggested that the countries who are present there could make a decision to adopt a different test ban treaty. They couldn't amend this one, but they could adopt on their own a test ban treaty that would have all the same provisions but a different entry into force provision. That's a theoretical possibility, I suppose. Or they could decide on provisional application. I think any of those kinds of options would be very difficult to pursue because the entry into force provisions of the treaty were the product of very intense negotiations and they wouldn't be likely adjusted by countries that presumably will have ratified by then. Certainly, the two who ratified last week, who have just ratified - the UK and France - have strong views on that question."
End quote.
It is telling that just about every possibility was discussed save that of accommodating India's concern!
US and CTBT:
The CTBT, when originally proposed, would have led to (forced) nuclear disarmament. At that time not enough was known to either design new weapons or verify safety of old weapons without explosive testing. That is when the NWS opposed CTBT. Subsequently a technological threshold was breached whereby, if one had sufficient data, there would be no more need for testing. Tests were now purely the requirement of nuclear aspirants. Suddenly the NWS were gung-ho on CTBT. Even then, France and China had to scramble up the technological ladder at the last minute with their 1996 tests. Once again, we turn to Holum (see above) for a clear exposition of the US perspective. (Note: The quotes from Holum only do not imply that the other NWS were any less cynical. It is just that the US is more open.)
"...I want to underscore here the importance of ratifying this treaty for one of our most important international security challenges, and that's to intercept and prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles to more countries."
"...You can make a nuclear weapon without testing, but it's a much bigger challenge, much more difficult to make weapons of small enough size to be of great danger to us. We had to dig a trench under a B-29 bomber to put our first nuclear weapons on board. Without testing, it's an insurmountable challenge, virtually, to get them down to the sizes and weights that would be of particular danger to us."
"...So then the argument becomes, well, if we're not going to test anyway, why not hold the rest of the world to the same standards?"
Now for a final quote, which I think takes the cake. Having just testified that the US would not be inconvenienced by CTBT anymore since it no longer needed explosive tests, Holum gives the following `ethical' reason for the US signing CTBT:
"... Remember that the non-nuclear weapons states have considered, since the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated in the 1960s, that part of the bargain was an agreement on the part of the nuclear weapons states to engage in good-faith efforts towards disarmament; and the Test-Ban Treaty was specifically mentioned at the time in the late 1960s as part of the bargain. So, in order for us to make our case effectively for non-proliferation, we need to hold up our end of the bargain; and the test ban is part of it."
Number of Nukes: (Time magazine May 25, 1998)
Known
US 12,070
Russia 22,500
UK 380
France 500
China 450
Presumed [These are just guesses and have no official sanctity]
India about 65
Isreal 64-112
Pakistan 15-25
As the numbers show, only US-Russia were in a `race'. The rest were content with just deterrence. It also shows that US-Russia SALT talks are about removing redundancy, not renouncing N weapons.
Bang for the Buck:
Reference: http://h-net2.msu.edu/~diplo/reGardner.htm
The following is an extract from the above source.
In his State of the Union message, January 7, 1954, Eisenhower's two leading defense planning considerations dealt with the new nuclear weapons technology.
"First, while determined to use atomic power to serve the usages of peace, we take into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons and the most effective means of using them against an aggressor ... [including] the tactical use of our nuclear weapons .... Second, the usefulness of these new weapons creates new relationships between men and materials. These new relationships permit economies in the use of men as we build forces suited to our situation in the world today ...." (p. 5, _DAFR_, 1954)
In sum,
significant planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe by the U.S., and thus, NATO was underway by 1951,
Eisenhower supported this approach from the moment he was first informed of its possibilities and,
the features most appealing to Eisenhower were the ability to `get more bang for the buck' -- ,i.e., more than he could get from comparable conventional weapons, and the possibility to save the lives of his troops -- men he had spent his entire career protecting.
China and its Neighbors:
Much is said about the recent reduction of tension with China. Much less is said about its past track record of hostilities following such `friendship' as discovered by India('62), USSR('69) and Vietnam('79). Further, while USSR and even tiny Vietnam held their own, India was routed. These lessons of history seem lost on our die-hard China apologists. Recent events in Taiwan and Spratleys also indicate that while friendship with China is desirable, keeping one's guard up is also essential. Contrast the flippancy with which many Indians dismiss the Chinese threat (`It happened 35 yrs ago') with the pragmatism with which US has dealt with Japan & Germany. Even though they were *defeated*, more than 50 yrs ago, they are still denied their own military/armament build-up. If defeated, and *politically reformed* Japan and Germany are still suspect, shouldn't we be wary of an undefeated and unreformed China that is getting stronger by the day?
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