04-22-2004, 01:05 AM
Social Base of Hindutva Movement
One will like to add a comment about the relations of Hindutva with Congress and Shiv Sena. Congress came up mainly as a 'national', anticolonial movement but Hindutva was constantly associated with it, at times dominant, at times hidden and at times a marginal accompaniment. Under the leadership of Tilak Congress was the vehicle of Hindutva in a major way. With Gandhi assuming the leadership of Congress, Hindutva was subjugated to the main 'anti-British' project and was side tracked. But it existed within Congress all the came. Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sardar Patel and later Purshottamdas Tandon were the main 'Hindutva' votaries. Also there was a uniform scatter of these 'strong saffron' to mild saffron leaders at all the rungs of leadership. With Nehru assuming strong 'socialist, secular' principles as the state policy, the Hindutva elements kept themselves maintaining their roots. After Nehru's demise and with change in social dynamics, Indira Gandhi veered to upper castes as the main support base, the upper caste vote bank, in 84 electrions.
Rajiv's Congress lost out the battle for the 'upper caste' vote bank, to the blatant puritan and unadulterated upper caste agenda of BJP, which since then has not looked back and has by now become 'The' vehicle of Hindutva politics, marginalising the Congress from the upper caste arena. All in all though Hindutva has played a 'hide and seek' expression in some periods, through Congress. But it is the BJP which has been the major and preferred vehicle for Hindutva agenda. Shiv Sena, which thrived on the 'sons of the soil' garbage, watered from the backyard by some elements of Congress, came up strongly in Bombay. Supported by the big capital, it unleashed a'physical annhilation' of communist labor leaders in Bombay.
After exhausting this agenda, it temporarily campaigned against the 'lungiwallahs' (South Indians), and Gujarathis before latching on to the upswinging Hindutva movement. In the process it boosted and supplemented the SP, playing the combine role of a mini Maharashtraian BJP and the storm tropper Bajrang Dal (the lumpen 'son' of R.S.S., specialising in anti-muslim onslaught/pogroms). In early simmerings of its emergence this movement to begin with was spearheaded mostly by Brahmins. Its support came from the landed aristocracy and some layers of middle classes. Most amorphous sections identified with the Gandhian Nationalism, while the subulterns identified more with the movement of Ambedkar or the communist parties.
Despite the training of cadres, dedicated, committed, ascetic on so on, the reach of religious nationalism was confined to Brahmin/Bania/Rich peasant and petty bourgeoisie in the Hindi belt in Northern India. And the failure of its campaigns on cow slaughter ban, Indianise the Muslims, was well indicative of that. Even the communal riots which began from 60s began with a slow pace and picked up more and more dangerous proportions with passage of time. The ideological propagation of Hindutva and the rise of its support base went hand in hand, and by late seventies and early eighties the anti-Muslim riots began to assume horrendous proportions.
Though BJP and its predecessor the Jan Sangh began with small electoral support, this support was well designed. It was the urban middle classes, sections of twice-born castes, and the Banias. Let us have a brief look at the changes in social composition which have occurred during last 50 years of the republic. The proportion of urban population has gone up by 20-25 per cent. They also constitute the ones' having derived maximum benefit of modern education and the facilities thrown up by the industrialization process. They do have a sort of dominant presence in the society. The cultural, social and political aspirations of this sector is the ground on which has risen the edifice of SP.
To understand the social base of the SP we will like to go into the regrouping of social groups in Gujarat. Nandy et al (11) have described this process in detail. Along with urbanisation there has been a parallel process in which the rich peasants of Gujarat have achieved an enhanced social status. These Patidars', (cash crop farmers) caste has been upgraded by a process of religious manoeuvering. The polarisation of middle class (Brahmin, Bania) and Patidar occurred around 1980, around the issue of reservations for the lower castes. In 1981, Gujarat witnessed an extreme form of caste violence directed against the lower castes. These antireservation agitations played a key role in consolidating the base of upper castes and upwardly mobile middle classes. SP directly or indirectly stood by to support this upper caste onslaught.
By using clever strategies SP was also able to give an upwardly mobile channel to a section of Dalits, aspiring a better place within Hindu society. In Gujarat, one can clearly see the social functionality of creating the `other'. Here earlier the ultimate object of hate was the dalit, by a clever manoeuver, the Muslim is substituted for that, the dalit is unleashed upon the "other", a atmosphere of terror is created, which helps to maintain a `status quo' of social hierarchy. The core of this social base was given a cohesion by various Yatras and campaigns by VHP.
Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen in their enlightening work `Khakhi Shorts Saffron Flags' (1), have tried to trace the roots of SP movement. They correlate it with the rise of new religiosity around worship `Jai Mata Di', `Jai Santoshi Ma', around functions like `Jagrata' and pilgrimages like `Vaishno Devi'. All these which emerged in northern states in late 60's and early 70 got co-opted and colored by the VHP campaigns. Basu et.al. identify a significant social base of SP in new urban middle class, spreading in small towns as well, which has come up due to the rapid growth of relatively small enterprises and the accompanying trade boom. "These small scale units flourish without the concomitant growth of organized working class, since individual work-places are far too small to consolidate the labor force and enable effective unionization." This type of industrial development, based on screw driver technology has mushroomed all through in 70's and 80's. This newer middle class tends to be fragmented into smaller more individual units. "They are marked by intense internal competition and steady pressure of new opportunity structures, ever expanding horizons for upward mobility and a compulsive consumerism that keeps transcending its own limits. The very pressure of growth is disturbingly destabilizing; the brave new world of global opportunities creates anomie and existential uncertainties." (1) The Green Revolution in parts of UP has increased rural purchasing power feeding into the boom in urban enterprises, consumerism and trade.
Characterisation of the Movement
Most of the social scientist have characterised this movement as a communal one. The broad perception amongst the segment of liberal, progressive intellectuals is that this is a communal movement, spearheaded by the SP, to strengthen the social and political power of Hindu elites. It's most commonly perceived activity is to train the cadres in its core doctrine to float the different organisations (BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Swadeshi Jagran Manch, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, etc.) which overtly spread the communal venom against minorities in general and Muslims in particular. By now the success of SP (Sangh Parivar) in communalising the social space, infiltrating police, army and bureaucracy is well recognised. And it is, and is broadly perceived as a communal movement.
`Religious nationalism' is a characterisation by many a sociologists who pick up the assertions of these movements and give them a decent looking veneer (13). In Juergansmeyers' understanding the religious nationalists see the failure of democracy and socialism, both western models, leading them to conclude that secular nationalism has failed. And so they view religion as a hopeful alternative, which can provide a basis for criticism and change. As per him the differences amongst various religious leaders are immense, but they all share one thing in common - seeing Western secular nationalism as their enemy and their hope to revive religion in public sphere. Juergansmeyer hesitates to call these movements fundamentalist as this word tends to suggest "an intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism." The term is less descriptive and more accusatory. Also it is an imprecise term for makingcomparisons across cultures. The better term for this phenomenon is offered by Bruce Lawrence (14) which suggests a global revoltagainst secular ideology that often accompanies modern society.
The 'modern' according to this are those who are `modern' while opposing the values of modernism. Also fundamentalism does not carry any political meaning and conveys the idea of solely being motivated by religious beliefs rather than broad concerns about the nature of society and the world. The term religious nationalist conveys the main meaning of religious and political interests and also holds that there is no clear distinction between religion and politics, as this distinction is a mask of western thinking.
But this characterisation is not able to totally understand different broad and deepfacets of its offensives. Also it isnot able to explain the intensity and sustained nature of this movement. To fill this gap some social scientists and activists like Ram Bapat, characterise this as being a fundamentalist movement, akin to the one in countries like Iran (12). As per this formulation Indian fundamentalism, like the global one which exists everywhere in post industrial societies, has been generated by the system of advanced capitalism or late capitalism.
In third world countries it is in a manifest form in contrast to the latent form in advanced countries. Bapat feels that due to lack of power of public opinion of the progressive world at the turn of century, the first world is making every attempt to put fundamentalism on top of the agenda for the world politics and even for military purposes. After the decades of 60s and 70s, which constituted the years of triumph of socialism and also of emancipatory nationalism, the next two decades marked the beginning of revivalism and fundamentalism. Originally fundamentalism developed in America where capitalism faced a lot of turmoil from 1870 to 1930. Similarly other countries when faced with severe economic crisis, came up with the fundamentalist response from some sectors of society. In America this fundamentalist response came in the form of a movement which asserted the revivalist trend to identify essential absolute to enable American citizens to take on the force of darkness. Bapat makes a pertinent point that since 1818, Maharashtra, amongst all Indian states has served as a kind of hot house plant for sustaining all kinds of orthodoxy, revivalism, fundamentalism and communalism, particularly of Hindutva variety. To begin with Fundamentalist Hindutva is not the Hinduism practised by millions of people. It (the Hindutva) is an imaginary Hinduism which is essentially extra-historical, extra-religious and is a political credo for those who want to make much of the ideology for their political ends. The fundamentalism is neither based on traditional modes of thought nor traditions as they existed. They win over people by propogating of `manufactured traditions.'
They adopt the gains of modernity, science, technology, weaponary and industrial production. It wants a modern apparatus of life without the necessary relations between human beings which would give them space to struggle for their rights. In nutshell, it wants to achieve a certain modern culture i.e. the modern production process sans the accompanying space for improvement of human relationships. It is a post feudal phenomenon aimed at inventing a new identity for the ruling classes.
It uses the language of religious discourse. Fundamentalism is possible only in semitic religions. The semitisation process of Hinduism is going on from last many decades. This semitic Hinduism which in fact is the Brahminical Hinduism has discovered the Book in `Gita', the holy deity in `Ram' from amongst hundreds of contenders for this status. The attempt of this fundamentalist movement is to read their interests and programmes of the present into the past. Bapat feels that Sangh Parivar is not fascist as, fascism does not lean upon religion to give it the cohesive aggressive slant. In contrast Aijaz Ahmed, K.N. Panikar, Sumeet Sarkar and many other sociologist characterise the SP as being Fascist. As per Sarkar (15) the SP movement may not look exactly parallel to the German Fascism, but a closer look at the pattern of affinities and differences helps to highlight the crucial features, notably as the implications of the offensive of SP go far beyond the events of 92-93. The drive for Hindu Rashtra has put into jeopardy the entire secular and democratic foundations of our republic. It is onlyHindu communalism, and not the Muslim communalism which has the potential of imposing fascism in India. Sarkar points out that Fascism was introduced in Italy and Germany through a combination of carefully orchestrated street violence (with a mass support) and deep infiltration into the police bureaucracy and the army, with the connivance of 'centrist' political leaders. Hitler, for example, had repeatedly asserted his party's respect for legality even after coming to power, but meanwhile his colleague Goering, Nazified the German police, organised street encounters in which more than 50 anti-Nazis were murdered and set the scence for Reichstag fire; after which first the communists and then all opposition political parties and trade unions were quickly destroyed. The methodology adopted in destruction of mosque is so much reminiscent of the same method. The mosque is demolished in 51/2 hours in total violation of supreme court order and repeated assurances given by leading opposition party, and the central government does not even lift a finger till the mosque is totally razed to the ground. Countrywide riots follow, police partiality is painfully obvious, the land grabbing vandals build a temporary 'temple', illegally, and this structure is protected, while the political force behind this, the BJP alternates between occasional apology and more frequent aggressive justification, while their brother organisation, the VHP adds Delhi's Jumma Masjid in the list of Hindu monuments and denounces the Indian constitution as being anti Hindu. The beating up of journalists on Dec. 6, is no surprise as the fascists forces, who carefully cultivate the press usually, like to combine persuasion with an occasional big stick.
Unlike the Fascism in Italy and Germany which came into power within a decade or less of its emergence as a political movement, Hindutva had a long gestation period, which has given added strength and stability to the movement and it has been a long enough time for their ideas to become part of the social common sense. Sarkar correctly points out that the real base of Sangh Parivar remains the predominantly upper caste trader professional petit bourgeoisie of cities and small town mainly in Hindi heartland; with developing connections perhaps with upwardly mobile landholding groups in countryside. He quotes Daniel Gurien's definition of fascism as "not only an instrument at the service of big buisness, but at the same time a mystical upheaval of the petite bourgeoisie. Specific linkages of big business with fascism remain controversial. By a sustained propaganda work SP has succeeded in creating a communalised common sense in which Muslim has become a near equivalent of the Jew - or the Black in contemporary white racism. As per SP the Muslim in India is unduly privileged a charge much more absurd than it was in Germany where Jews had been fairly prominent and well to do. In India Muslims are grossly underrepresented in business, bureaucracy, army, police, private enterprise etc. Here the alleged privileges are the appeasement of Muslims by pseudosecularists.
Like Hitler in Germany, the SP arrogates to itself to be representative of Hindus, who are in majority, and thereby its democratic credentials are above board. Similarly since SP is 'The' representative of Hindus, any body deviating from its line is anti Hindu at worst and pseudosecular at best. Unlike Jews who had to face the gas chambers, Hindutva line is 'kind and generous' and offers a second class citizenship to the Muslims.
The constant anti Muslim violence, euphemistically called 'communal' riots has succeeded in ghettoising large chunks of the Muslim population. Also unlike Nazis, SP grounds the identity on religion.
Aijaz Ahmed (16) calls it Hindutva Fascism and points out that it differs from the Italian and German ones' on the ground that it speaks relatively rarely of economic instance and fashions its ideological discourse along categories of 'nation' and community seeking to obtain the identity between these two categories nation and community - through methodical use of violence as a political instrumentality. Hindutva has nationalised the violence as a means for capturing state power. As per Ahmed the whole series of mass spectacles, mobilizationsand blood baths that began with rath yatra and culminated in the demolition of masjid on one hand, and terrorization of Bombay on the other has introduced into Indian politics a qualitatively different dynamics, pushing the urban culture of diverse regions across the country in a distinctly fascist direction,and giving to the new phase of Indian communalism a form at once hysterical and methodical which is similar to that of European anti-semitism.
The true object of SP's desire is not submission of the muslims alone but of state power as a whole, and remaking of India in its own image. This, it is achieving by imposing a homogenisation on the lines of Brahminical ethos on the society. Concieved and executed as at present, the SP fascist project has some limitation since it does not 'pose' to be radical enough to win over the masses and India is too diverse a country to buy SP's homogenisation at a quick pace.
The Hindu Right (SP) has been equated with Nazi Germany by Jan Breman (17), who points out that popular support for Hindutva primarily stems from social sections which enjoy better life than earlier generations were used to. " - both (German Fascism and Hindutva) originate within and also appeal to the petty bourgeoisie, a composite class which is growing in size and political weight". Despite minor differences Breman posits that there are deeper similarities. Nazi ideology worked into a pseudo religious dogma, while Hindutva has packed its gospel in purely religious terms. This religiosity of Hindutva is a mere facade for a more comprehensive societal reconstruction which is very materialistic in nature. Breman, who was born and bred during Hitlers reign and has also seen the Hindutva onslaught from close quarters, gets a distinct feeling of de ja vu. This is partly because of the fact that similar to the Hitler regime here also one community is singled out as arch enemy of the people (the nation), the Hindu majority. The persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany was planned and controlled by the party machinary. Though in the maze of propaganda which gives advanced legitimization to the pogroms which are to follow, the Hindutva offensive tries to cleverly masquerade its role in the pogroms on Muslims. This is possible because of a clever division of labor between 'father' (RSS) and different 'sons' and 'daughter' of this 'parivar'. RSS trains the cadre in ideology, BJP plays this game on political chessboard, VHP gives an emotive touch to the communal project by roping in the Sants, Mahants and the NRI's, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti backs up the RSS ideology by taking it in the sphere of home, and the Bajrang Dal translates it in to the street violence, which can take off only because of the ground work done by other members of the 'parivar'. This was painfully obvious on Bombay and Surat in 1993. In addition the Hindutva forces encouraged hunt against the deviant forces, with those upholding the secular ethos, being next on the firing line.
But unlike the Jews in Germany, Muslims are no capitalist sharks, so their 'privileged' 'appeasement' is projected and they are shown to be a pampered lot. Also part of this aggression is justified by their political domination and harassment of Hindus in the medieval times. Bremen sharply perceives the project of Hindu right-"marginalised as Mohammadi Hindus they may be allowed to hide in their own ghettos, cordoned off like the judenvierter"were in the Nazified Europe. In their defiled habitat they will live beyond the pale, as new untouchables in a modern India which is thoroughly Hinduised".
Trying to take a broad and critical look at the Fascist analogy of Sangh Parivar Achin Vanaik (8) theorises the phenomenon of fascism and uses it for analysing Hindu Nationalism. Vanaik feels that fascist paradigm is inappropriate and of very limited value for situating not just Hindu nationalism but a whole host of political phenomena, particularly in the third world. There are important similarities and dissimilarities between Hindutva and Fascism. To take up dissimilarities first: lack of charismatic leader in SP, absence of an explicitly anti-liberal/anti-democratic and anti working class themes, absence of any verbal anticapitalist demagogy, absence of any orientation to the theme of a 'generalisational revolt' etc. Vanaik states that though Fascist formations can draw their support from all classes, they are not multiclass political formations or movements. They are not a form of authoritarian populism. "Fascist formations win ideological and political hegemony because their decisive victories are achieved on non-ideological terrain. Their momentum is convulsive. They grow rapidly but they also fade out fast if they do not achieve power. In postcolonial societies the political vehicles of religious fundamentalism or religion based nationalism are not so much the fascist formations as, at most, potential fascist formations, where that potential may or may not be realised. While fascist state in India would necessarily be Hindu nationalist, the Hindu nationalist state would not ecessarily be fascist."
Vanaik in his presentation is totally silent on the class base of fascism. This forces him to turn to ideological realms to characterise the nature of Hindu nationalism. In a subtle shift from class analysis, to analysing 'nation' Vanaik dumps the materialist understanding in the bin and walks on the crutches of idealism "In last 15 years ..... there has been the dramatic rise of politics of cultural exclusivisms and xenophobia.... we are witness to four forms of which the politics of exclusivity have taken .... rise of religious fundamentalism.... HIndu nationalism .... spreading and swelling of carbuncles of racist and anti immigrant xenophobia in the first world. Vanaik does relate all these phenomenon to global changes in correlation and feels that politics of identity has by and large overshadowed the politics of class. He sees this movement, the political vehicle of religious fundamentalism not as fascist but only potentially so, it is an Indian variant of a generic phenomenon but does not belong to the genus of fascism.
One will like to add a comment about the relations of Hindutva with Congress and Shiv Sena. Congress came up mainly as a 'national', anticolonial movement but Hindutva was constantly associated with it, at times dominant, at times hidden and at times a marginal accompaniment. Under the leadership of Tilak Congress was the vehicle of Hindutva in a major way. With Gandhi assuming the leadership of Congress, Hindutva was subjugated to the main 'anti-British' project and was side tracked. But it existed within Congress all the came. Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sardar Patel and later Purshottamdas Tandon were the main 'Hindutva' votaries. Also there was a uniform scatter of these 'strong saffron' to mild saffron leaders at all the rungs of leadership. With Nehru assuming strong 'socialist, secular' principles as the state policy, the Hindutva elements kept themselves maintaining their roots. After Nehru's demise and with change in social dynamics, Indira Gandhi veered to upper castes as the main support base, the upper caste vote bank, in 84 electrions.
Rajiv's Congress lost out the battle for the 'upper caste' vote bank, to the blatant puritan and unadulterated upper caste agenda of BJP, which since then has not looked back and has by now become 'The' vehicle of Hindutva politics, marginalising the Congress from the upper caste arena. All in all though Hindutva has played a 'hide and seek' expression in some periods, through Congress. But it is the BJP which has been the major and preferred vehicle for Hindutva agenda. Shiv Sena, which thrived on the 'sons of the soil' garbage, watered from the backyard by some elements of Congress, came up strongly in Bombay. Supported by the big capital, it unleashed a'physical annhilation' of communist labor leaders in Bombay.
After exhausting this agenda, it temporarily campaigned against the 'lungiwallahs' (South Indians), and Gujarathis before latching on to the upswinging Hindutva movement. In the process it boosted and supplemented the SP, playing the combine role of a mini Maharashtraian BJP and the storm tropper Bajrang Dal (the lumpen 'son' of R.S.S., specialising in anti-muslim onslaught/pogroms). In early simmerings of its emergence this movement to begin with was spearheaded mostly by Brahmins. Its support came from the landed aristocracy and some layers of middle classes. Most amorphous sections identified with the Gandhian Nationalism, while the subulterns identified more with the movement of Ambedkar or the communist parties.
Despite the training of cadres, dedicated, committed, ascetic on so on, the reach of religious nationalism was confined to Brahmin/Bania/Rich peasant and petty bourgeoisie in the Hindi belt in Northern India. And the failure of its campaigns on cow slaughter ban, Indianise the Muslims, was well indicative of that. Even the communal riots which began from 60s began with a slow pace and picked up more and more dangerous proportions with passage of time. The ideological propagation of Hindutva and the rise of its support base went hand in hand, and by late seventies and early eighties the anti-Muslim riots began to assume horrendous proportions.
Though BJP and its predecessor the Jan Sangh began with small electoral support, this support was well designed. It was the urban middle classes, sections of twice-born castes, and the Banias. Let us have a brief look at the changes in social composition which have occurred during last 50 years of the republic. The proportion of urban population has gone up by 20-25 per cent. They also constitute the ones' having derived maximum benefit of modern education and the facilities thrown up by the industrialization process. They do have a sort of dominant presence in the society. The cultural, social and political aspirations of this sector is the ground on which has risen the edifice of SP.
To understand the social base of the SP we will like to go into the regrouping of social groups in Gujarat. Nandy et al (11) have described this process in detail. Along with urbanisation there has been a parallel process in which the rich peasants of Gujarat have achieved an enhanced social status. These Patidars', (cash crop farmers) caste has been upgraded by a process of religious manoeuvering. The polarisation of middle class (Brahmin, Bania) and Patidar occurred around 1980, around the issue of reservations for the lower castes. In 1981, Gujarat witnessed an extreme form of caste violence directed against the lower castes. These antireservation agitations played a key role in consolidating the base of upper castes and upwardly mobile middle classes. SP directly or indirectly stood by to support this upper caste onslaught.
By using clever strategies SP was also able to give an upwardly mobile channel to a section of Dalits, aspiring a better place within Hindu society. In Gujarat, one can clearly see the social functionality of creating the `other'. Here earlier the ultimate object of hate was the dalit, by a clever manoeuver, the Muslim is substituted for that, the dalit is unleashed upon the "other", a atmosphere of terror is created, which helps to maintain a `status quo' of social hierarchy. The core of this social base was given a cohesion by various Yatras and campaigns by VHP.
Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen in their enlightening work `Khakhi Shorts Saffron Flags' (1), have tried to trace the roots of SP movement. They correlate it with the rise of new religiosity around worship `Jai Mata Di', `Jai Santoshi Ma', around functions like `Jagrata' and pilgrimages like `Vaishno Devi'. All these which emerged in northern states in late 60's and early 70 got co-opted and colored by the VHP campaigns. Basu et.al. identify a significant social base of SP in new urban middle class, spreading in small towns as well, which has come up due to the rapid growth of relatively small enterprises and the accompanying trade boom. "These small scale units flourish without the concomitant growth of organized working class, since individual work-places are far too small to consolidate the labor force and enable effective unionization." This type of industrial development, based on screw driver technology has mushroomed all through in 70's and 80's. This newer middle class tends to be fragmented into smaller more individual units. "They are marked by intense internal competition and steady pressure of new opportunity structures, ever expanding horizons for upward mobility and a compulsive consumerism that keeps transcending its own limits. The very pressure of growth is disturbingly destabilizing; the brave new world of global opportunities creates anomie and existential uncertainties." (1) The Green Revolution in parts of UP has increased rural purchasing power feeding into the boom in urban enterprises, consumerism and trade.
Characterisation of the Movement
Most of the social scientist have characterised this movement as a communal one. The broad perception amongst the segment of liberal, progressive intellectuals is that this is a communal movement, spearheaded by the SP, to strengthen the social and political power of Hindu elites. It's most commonly perceived activity is to train the cadres in its core doctrine to float the different organisations (BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Swadeshi Jagran Manch, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, etc.) which overtly spread the communal venom against minorities in general and Muslims in particular. By now the success of SP (Sangh Parivar) in communalising the social space, infiltrating police, army and bureaucracy is well recognised. And it is, and is broadly perceived as a communal movement.
`Religious nationalism' is a characterisation by many a sociologists who pick up the assertions of these movements and give them a decent looking veneer (13). In Juergansmeyers' understanding the religious nationalists see the failure of democracy and socialism, both western models, leading them to conclude that secular nationalism has failed. And so they view religion as a hopeful alternative, which can provide a basis for criticism and change. As per him the differences amongst various religious leaders are immense, but they all share one thing in common - seeing Western secular nationalism as their enemy and their hope to revive religion in public sphere. Juergansmeyer hesitates to call these movements fundamentalist as this word tends to suggest "an intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism." The term is less descriptive and more accusatory. Also it is an imprecise term for makingcomparisons across cultures. The better term for this phenomenon is offered by Bruce Lawrence (14) which suggests a global revoltagainst secular ideology that often accompanies modern society.
The 'modern' according to this are those who are `modern' while opposing the values of modernism. Also fundamentalism does not carry any political meaning and conveys the idea of solely being motivated by religious beliefs rather than broad concerns about the nature of society and the world. The term religious nationalist conveys the main meaning of religious and political interests and also holds that there is no clear distinction between religion and politics, as this distinction is a mask of western thinking.
But this characterisation is not able to totally understand different broad and deepfacets of its offensives. Also it isnot able to explain the intensity and sustained nature of this movement. To fill this gap some social scientists and activists like Ram Bapat, characterise this as being a fundamentalist movement, akin to the one in countries like Iran (12). As per this formulation Indian fundamentalism, like the global one which exists everywhere in post industrial societies, has been generated by the system of advanced capitalism or late capitalism.
In third world countries it is in a manifest form in contrast to the latent form in advanced countries. Bapat feels that due to lack of power of public opinion of the progressive world at the turn of century, the first world is making every attempt to put fundamentalism on top of the agenda for the world politics and even for military purposes. After the decades of 60s and 70s, which constituted the years of triumph of socialism and also of emancipatory nationalism, the next two decades marked the beginning of revivalism and fundamentalism. Originally fundamentalism developed in America where capitalism faced a lot of turmoil from 1870 to 1930. Similarly other countries when faced with severe economic crisis, came up with the fundamentalist response from some sectors of society. In America this fundamentalist response came in the form of a movement which asserted the revivalist trend to identify essential absolute to enable American citizens to take on the force of darkness. Bapat makes a pertinent point that since 1818, Maharashtra, amongst all Indian states has served as a kind of hot house plant for sustaining all kinds of orthodoxy, revivalism, fundamentalism and communalism, particularly of Hindutva variety. To begin with Fundamentalist Hindutva is not the Hinduism practised by millions of people. It (the Hindutva) is an imaginary Hinduism which is essentially extra-historical, extra-religious and is a political credo for those who want to make much of the ideology for their political ends. The fundamentalism is neither based on traditional modes of thought nor traditions as they existed. They win over people by propogating of `manufactured traditions.'
They adopt the gains of modernity, science, technology, weaponary and industrial production. It wants a modern apparatus of life without the necessary relations between human beings which would give them space to struggle for their rights. In nutshell, it wants to achieve a certain modern culture i.e. the modern production process sans the accompanying space for improvement of human relationships. It is a post feudal phenomenon aimed at inventing a new identity for the ruling classes.
It uses the language of religious discourse. Fundamentalism is possible only in semitic religions. The semitisation process of Hinduism is going on from last many decades. This semitic Hinduism which in fact is the Brahminical Hinduism has discovered the Book in `Gita', the holy deity in `Ram' from amongst hundreds of contenders for this status. The attempt of this fundamentalist movement is to read their interests and programmes of the present into the past. Bapat feels that Sangh Parivar is not fascist as, fascism does not lean upon religion to give it the cohesive aggressive slant. In contrast Aijaz Ahmed, K.N. Panikar, Sumeet Sarkar and many other sociologist characterise the SP as being Fascist. As per Sarkar (15) the SP movement may not look exactly parallel to the German Fascism, but a closer look at the pattern of affinities and differences helps to highlight the crucial features, notably as the implications of the offensive of SP go far beyond the events of 92-93. The drive for Hindu Rashtra has put into jeopardy the entire secular and democratic foundations of our republic. It is onlyHindu communalism, and not the Muslim communalism which has the potential of imposing fascism in India. Sarkar points out that Fascism was introduced in Italy and Germany through a combination of carefully orchestrated street violence (with a mass support) and deep infiltration into the police bureaucracy and the army, with the connivance of 'centrist' political leaders. Hitler, for example, had repeatedly asserted his party's respect for legality even after coming to power, but meanwhile his colleague Goering, Nazified the German police, organised street encounters in which more than 50 anti-Nazis were murdered and set the scence for Reichstag fire; after which first the communists and then all opposition political parties and trade unions were quickly destroyed. The methodology adopted in destruction of mosque is so much reminiscent of the same method. The mosque is demolished in 51/2 hours in total violation of supreme court order and repeated assurances given by leading opposition party, and the central government does not even lift a finger till the mosque is totally razed to the ground. Countrywide riots follow, police partiality is painfully obvious, the land grabbing vandals build a temporary 'temple', illegally, and this structure is protected, while the political force behind this, the BJP alternates between occasional apology and more frequent aggressive justification, while their brother organisation, the VHP adds Delhi's Jumma Masjid in the list of Hindu monuments and denounces the Indian constitution as being anti Hindu. The beating up of journalists on Dec. 6, is no surprise as the fascists forces, who carefully cultivate the press usually, like to combine persuasion with an occasional big stick.
Unlike the Fascism in Italy and Germany which came into power within a decade or less of its emergence as a political movement, Hindutva had a long gestation period, which has given added strength and stability to the movement and it has been a long enough time for their ideas to become part of the social common sense. Sarkar correctly points out that the real base of Sangh Parivar remains the predominantly upper caste trader professional petit bourgeoisie of cities and small town mainly in Hindi heartland; with developing connections perhaps with upwardly mobile landholding groups in countryside. He quotes Daniel Gurien's definition of fascism as "not only an instrument at the service of big buisness, but at the same time a mystical upheaval of the petite bourgeoisie. Specific linkages of big business with fascism remain controversial. By a sustained propaganda work SP has succeeded in creating a communalised common sense in which Muslim has become a near equivalent of the Jew - or the Black in contemporary white racism. As per SP the Muslim in India is unduly privileged a charge much more absurd than it was in Germany where Jews had been fairly prominent and well to do. In India Muslims are grossly underrepresented in business, bureaucracy, army, police, private enterprise etc. Here the alleged privileges are the appeasement of Muslims by pseudosecularists.
Like Hitler in Germany, the SP arrogates to itself to be representative of Hindus, who are in majority, and thereby its democratic credentials are above board. Similarly since SP is 'The' representative of Hindus, any body deviating from its line is anti Hindu at worst and pseudosecular at best. Unlike Jews who had to face the gas chambers, Hindutva line is 'kind and generous' and offers a second class citizenship to the Muslims.
The constant anti Muslim violence, euphemistically called 'communal' riots has succeeded in ghettoising large chunks of the Muslim population. Also unlike Nazis, SP grounds the identity on religion.
Aijaz Ahmed (16) calls it Hindutva Fascism and points out that it differs from the Italian and German ones' on the ground that it speaks relatively rarely of economic instance and fashions its ideological discourse along categories of 'nation' and community seeking to obtain the identity between these two categories nation and community - through methodical use of violence as a political instrumentality. Hindutva has nationalised the violence as a means for capturing state power. As per Ahmed the whole series of mass spectacles, mobilizationsand blood baths that began with rath yatra and culminated in the demolition of masjid on one hand, and terrorization of Bombay on the other has introduced into Indian politics a qualitatively different dynamics, pushing the urban culture of diverse regions across the country in a distinctly fascist direction,and giving to the new phase of Indian communalism a form at once hysterical and methodical which is similar to that of European anti-semitism.
The true object of SP's desire is not submission of the muslims alone but of state power as a whole, and remaking of India in its own image. This, it is achieving by imposing a homogenisation on the lines of Brahminical ethos on the society. Concieved and executed as at present, the SP fascist project has some limitation since it does not 'pose' to be radical enough to win over the masses and India is too diverse a country to buy SP's homogenisation at a quick pace.
The Hindu Right (SP) has been equated with Nazi Germany by Jan Breman (17), who points out that popular support for Hindutva primarily stems from social sections which enjoy better life than earlier generations were used to. " - both (German Fascism and Hindutva) originate within and also appeal to the petty bourgeoisie, a composite class which is growing in size and political weight". Despite minor differences Breman posits that there are deeper similarities. Nazi ideology worked into a pseudo religious dogma, while Hindutva has packed its gospel in purely religious terms. This religiosity of Hindutva is a mere facade for a more comprehensive societal reconstruction which is very materialistic in nature. Breman, who was born and bred during Hitlers reign and has also seen the Hindutva onslaught from close quarters, gets a distinct feeling of de ja vu. This is partly because of the fact that similar to the Hitler regime here also one community is singled out as arch enemy of the people (the nation), the Hindu majority. The persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany was planned and controlled by the party machinary. Though in the maze of propaganda which gives advanced legitimization to the pogroms which are to follow, the Hindutva offensive tries to cleverly masquerade its role in the pogroms on Muslims. This is possible because of a clever division of labor between 'father' (RSS) and different 'sons' and 'daughter' of this 'parivar'. RSS trains the cadre in ideology, BJP plays this game on political chessboard, VHP gives an emotive touch to the communal project by roping in the Sants, Mahants and the NRI's, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti backs up the RSS ideology by taking it in the sphere of home, and the Bajrang Dal translates it in to the street violence, which can take off only because of the ground work done by other members of the 'parivar'. This was painfully obvious on Bombay and Surat in 1993. In addition the Hindutva forces encouraged hunt against the deviant forces, with those upholding the secular ethos, being next on the firing line.
But unlike the Jews in Germany, Muslims are no capitalist sharks, so their 'privileged' 'appeasement' is projected and they are shown to be a pampered lot. Also part of this aggression is justified by their political domination and harassment of Hindus in the medieval times. Bremen sharply perceives the project of Hindu right-"marginalised as Mohammadi Hindus they may be allowed to hide in their own ghettos, cordoned off like the judenvierter"were in the Nazified Europe. In their defiled habitat they will live beyond the pale, as new untouchables in a modern India which is thoroughly Hinduised".
Trying to take a broad and critical look at the Fascist analogy of Sangh Parivar Achin Vanaik (8) theorises the phenomenon of fascism and uses it for analysing Hindu Nationalism. Vanaik feels that fascist paradigm is inappropriate and of very limited value for situating not just Hindu nationalism but a whole host of political phenomena, particularly in the third world. There are important similarities and dissimilarities between Hindutva and Fascism. To take up dissimilarities first: lack of charismatic leader in SP, absence of an explicitly anti-liberal/anti-democratic and anti working class themes, absence of any verbal anticapitalist demagogy, absence of any orientation to the theme of a 'generalisational revolt' etc. Vanaik states that though Fascist formations can draw their support from all classes, they are not multiclass political formations or movements. They are not a form of authoritarian populism. "Fascist formations win ideological and political hegemony because their decisive victories are achieved on non-ideological terrain. Their momentum is convulsive. They grow rapidly but they also fade out fast if they do not achieve power. In postcolonial societies the political vehicles of religious fundamentalism or religion based nationalism are not so much the fascist formations as, at most, potential fascist formations, where that potential may or may not be realised. While fascist state in India would necessarily be Hindu nationalist, the Hindu nationalist state would not ecessarily be fascist."
Vanaik in his presentation is totally silent on the class base of fascism. This forces him to turn to ideological realms to characterise the nature of Hindu nationalism. In a subtle shift from class analysis, to analysing 'nation' Vanaik dumps the materialist understanding in the bin and walks on the crutches of idealism "In last 15 years ..... there has been the dramatic rise of politics of cultural exclusivisms and xenophobia.... we are witness to four forms of which the politics of exclusivity have taken .... rise of religious fundamentalism.... HIndu nationalism .... spreading and swelling of carbuncles of racist and anti immigrant xenophobia in the first world. Vanaik does relate all these phenomenon to global changes in correlation and feels that politics of identity has by and large overshadowed the politics of class. He sees this movement, the political vehicle of religious fundamentalism not as fascist but only potentially so, it is an Indian variant of a generic phenomenon but does not belong to the genus of fascism.