07-15-2007, 11:38 PM
Hit or hug Musharraf?
Swapan Dasgupta
There is understandable confusion in India over whether to endorse President Pervez Musharraf's assault on the Lal Masjid or to welcome the Islamic backlash that may end up unsettling the regime.
At one level, modernists will take heart at Musharraf's blunt assertion to "not allow any madarsa to be used for extremism" and argue that India should show a similar determination against seminaries which have become centres of subversion and treason. It is a different matter that Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi wasn't the only fanatic calling for jihad and an Islamic State.
The military authorities in Pakistan have either turned a blind eye to other citadels of terror or even financed them so long as they directed their jihadi energies against either India or the Hamid Karzai Government in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration which has been supportive of the military action in Lal Masjid has simultaneously been extremely critical of Pakistan's encouragement of Taliban insurgents across the Durand Line.
That Musharraf is a slippery customer, willing to be either a moderate Muslim or a soft Islamist when expedient, is well known. He has made innumerable "path-breaking" speeches against terrorism and extremism and then proceeded to do precisely the opposite. His credibility was always low in India and has also touched an all-time low in the West because he is seen to be wavering on his commitment to restore democracy in Pakistan.
Of course, it is not merely a problem of Musharraf doing a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde act too often. Regardless of what the Daryaganj boy actually thinks - and I have no doubt that he comes across as an eminently sensible chap in dinner table conversations - he is a creature of the military. The faults attributed to him are actually the shortcomings of a military establishment that will maintain a delicate balance between the Islamists and the Americans.
The suggestion that this brinkmanship is impossible in the long run is wishful thinking. Pakistan's geography accords it a strategic manoeuvrability. With China banking on it as the opening to the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to India, and the West looking to it as the springboard to Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistan can afford to play an inordinate number of games. Duplicity is a defining principle of Pakistan's foreign policy - a visceral hatred of India being the only non-negotiable element. Musharraf epitomises this perverse national consensus.
The Pakistani PLUs who are agitated by the inflammatory rhetoric of the "fundos", including Ayman al-Zawahiri's threat to unleash the Al Qaeda on Musharraf, are not insincere. They would like nothing better than to have a more equitable relationship with the West - one which allows unrestricted travel - and a mutually exploitative relationship with the Muslim ummah. Ideally, they would love a grand alliance of the Generals, Benazir Bhutto and, just for glamour, Imran Khan to fight the turbulent Pathans and the fanatical bazaar rabble. Maybe, this is what the Americans too would love -another sensible Muslim State like Jordan that can be showcased in opposition to Islamophobia.
For India it makes only a marginal difference which faction of the establishment is in power. There is a Pakistani elite which has a lot in common with its Indian counterpart - the younger generation in both countries studied in the US. However, while commonality extends to pop culture, opulence and bad ghazals, a common political ground has proved elusive. The Pakistan elite, for example, would love to extricate itself from the jihadi mess by exporting its troublemakers to war zones in the Kashmir Valley and Afghanistan. India, on its part, would love to emasculate Pakistan with its "soft power" and enlightenment.
This stalemate won't be broken in a hurry. There is a Cold War of attrition between the two countries which seems set to continue indefinitely, or as long as neither side blinks. The Lal Masjid fallout provides India with a good opportunity for some effective undercover fishing. Unfortunately, the UPA Government lacks the anatomical wherewithal to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture.
Swapan Dasgupta
There is understandable confusion in India over whether to endorse President Pervez Musharraf's assault on the Lal Masjid or to welcome the Islamic backlash that may end up unsettling the regime.
At one level, modernists will take heart at Musharraf's blunt assertion to "not allow any madarsa to be used for extremism" and argue that India should show a similar determination against seminaries which have become centres of subversion and treason. It is a different matter that Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi wasn't the only fanatic calling for jihad and an Islamic State.
The military authorities in Pakistan have either turned a blind eye to other citadels of terror or even financed them so long as they directed their jihadi energies against either India or the Hamid Karzai Government in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration which has been supportive of the military action in Lal Masjid has simultaneously been extremely critical of Pakistan's encouragement of Taliban insurgents across the Durand Line.
That Musharraf is a slippery customer, willing to be either a moderate Muslim or a soft Islamist when expedient, is well known. He has made innumerable "path-breaking" speeches against terrorism and extremism and then proceeded to do precisely the opposite. His credibility was always low in India and has also touched an all-time low in the West because he is seen to be wavering on his commitment to restore democracy in Pakistan.
Of course, it is not merely a problem of Musharraf doing a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde act too often. Regardless of what the Daryaganj boy actually thinks - and I have no doubt that he comes across as an eminently sensible chap in dinner table conversations - he is a creature of the military. The faults attributed to him are actually the shortcomings of a military establishment that will maintain a delicate balance between the Islamists and the Americans.
The suggestion that this brinkmanship is impossible in the long run is wishful thinking. Pakistan's geography accords it a strategic manoeuvrability. With China banking on it as the opening to the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to India, and the West looking to it as the springboard to Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistan can afford to play an inordinate number of games. Duplicity is a defining principle of Pakistan's foreign policy - a visceral hatred of India being the only non-negotiable element. Musharraf epitomises this perverse national consensus.
The Pakistani PLUs who are agitated by the inflammatory rhetoric of the "fundos", including Ayman al-Zawahiri's threat to unleash the Al Qaeda on Musharraf, are not insincere. They would like nothing better than to have a more equitable relationship with the West - one which allows unrestricted travel - and a mutually exploitative relationship with the Muslim ummah. Ideally, they would love a grand alliance of the Generals, Benazir Bhutto and, just for glamour, Imran Khan to fight the turbulent Pathans and the fanatical bazaar rabble. Maybe, this is what the Americans too would love -another sensible Muslim State like Jordan that can be showcased in opposition to Islamophobia.
For India it makes only a marginal difference which faction of the establishment is in power. There is a Pakistani elite which has a lot in common with its Indian counterpart - the younger generation in both countries studied in the US. However, while commonality extends to pop culture, opulence and bad ghazals, a common political ground has proved elusive. The Pakistan elite, for example, would love to extricate itself from the jihadi mess by exporting its troublemakers to war zones in the Kashmir Valley and Afghanistan. India, on its part, would love to emasculate Pakistan with its "soft power" and enlightenment.
This stalemate won't be broken in a hurry. There is a Cold War of attrition between the two countries which seems set to continue indefinitely, or as long as neither side blinks. The Lal Masjid fallout provides India with a good opportunity for some effective undercover fishing. Unfortunately, the UPA Government lacks the anatomical wherewithal to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture.