A Lecture on India - Large and Small by Amartya Sen
Another Hindutva-bashing by this guy.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In contemporary politics, the enthusiasm for ancient India has often
come from the Hindutva movement - the promoters of a narrowly Hindu
view of Indian civilization - who have tried to separate out the
period preceding the Muslim conquest of India (from the third
millennium BCE to the beginning of the second millennium ADE) . In
contrast, those who take an integrationist approach to contemporary
India have tended to view the harking back to ancient India with
the greatest of suspicion. For example, the Hindutva activists
like invoking the holy Vedas, composed in the second millennium
BCE, to define India1 s "real heritage. " They are also keen on
summoning the Ramayana, the great epic, for many different
purposes, varying from delineating Hindu beliefs and convictions,
to finding alleged justification for forcibly demolishing a mosque
- the Babri masjid - that is situated at the very spot where the
"divine" Rama, it is claimed, was born. The integrationists, in
contrast, have tended to see the Vedas and the Ramayana as
unwelcome intrusions of Hindu beliefs into the contemporary life of
secular India.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The integrationists are not wrong to question the fractional
nature of the choice of so-called "Hindu classics" over other
products of India's long and diverse history. They are also right
to point to the counterproductive role that such partisan selection
can play in the secular, multi-religious life of todayâs India.
Even though more than 80 per cent of Indians may be Hindu, the
country has a very large Muslim population (the third largest among
all the countries in the world - larger than the entire British and
French populations put together) , and a great many followers of
other faiths: Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Parsees, and others. The
fact that India currently has a Muslim President, a Sikh Prime
Minister and a Christian head of the dominant party in the ruling
coalition may make India very unlike any other country in the
world, but it need not be seen as particularly strange in India
itself.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Similarly, the adherents of Hindu politics - especially those
who are given to vandalizing places of worship of other religions -
may take Rama to be divine, but in much of the Ramayana, Rama is
treated primarily as a hero - a great "epic hero" - with many good
qualities and some weaknesses, including a tendency to harbour
suspicions about his wife Sita's faithfulness. A pundit who gets
considerable space in the Ramayana, called Javali, not only does
not treat Rama as God, Javali calls Rama's actions "foolish"
("especially for," as Javali puts it, "an intelligent and wise
m a n " ) . Before he is persuaded to withdraw his allegations, Javali
gets time enough in the Ramayana to explain in detail that "there
is no after-world, nor any religious practice for attaining th a t , "
and that "the injunctions about the worship of gods, sacrifice,
gifts and penance have been laid down in the Shastras [scriptures]
by clever people, just to rule over [other] people."<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
he means "babri maqsjid" right?
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->I turn finally to the political issue of minority rights and
secularism, a subject in which there have been many ups and downs
in recent years. The 2002 riots in the state of Gujarat, following
the Godhra incident, in which possibly 2000 Muslims died, were not
prevented by the state government, nor was the BJP-dominated state
government, which had failed to protect minority community, booted
out of office in the December elections that followed. On the
other hand, the BJP-led central government did fall in the general
elections held in May 2004. Any set of election results,
especially in a country as large as India, would tend to carry the
impact of many different types of influences, and there cannot be
any single-factor explanation of the electoral outcomes. But
looking through the nature of the electoral reverses of the BJP and
its allies in the recent elections, including the total - or neartotal
- demise of the "secular" parties in alliance with the BJP,
it is difficult to miss a general sense of grievance about the
neglect of secular concerns by parties which were not formally
signed up for the Hindutva agenda. Not only were the voters keen
on bringing down the BJP itself a notch or two (its percentage of
voting support fell from 25% to 22%), but there are reasons to
entertain the hypothesis that the "secular" support that the BJP
allies delivered to the BJP-led alliance was particularly imperiled
by the Hindutva movement's aggressive - and sometimes violent -
undermining of a secular India and the complete failure of the
BJP's allies to resist the extremism of Hindutva.
In particular, the violence in Gujarat did seem to tarnish the
image of BJP and its allies, in addition to the issue of economic
inequality and the back-firing of the boast about "India shining."
The apparent concession by the former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, that the Gujarat killings had been a major influence in
the B JP' s defeat ( " I t is very difficult to say what all the reasons
are for the defeat [of BJP] in the elections but one impact of the
violence was we lost the elections") was, I understand, withdrawn
or significantly emended by him later, but no matter who concedes
what that plausible connection would be hard to overlook. It is
important to understand the hold of the sceptical tradition in
India, despite the manifest presence of religions all across the
country.
In responding to the exploitation of religious demography
in the politics of Hindutva, the defenders of secular politics
often take for granted that the Indian population would want
religious politics in one form or another. This has led to the
political temptation to use "soft Hindutva" as a compromised
response by secularists to the politics of "hard Hindutva." But
that tactical approach, which certainly has not given the anti-BJP
parties any dividend so far, is, I would argue, foundationally
mistaken. It profoundly ignores the strength of scepticism in
India, which links with the argumentative tradition and which
extends to religions as well, particularly in the form of doubting
the relevance of religious beliefs in political and social affairs.
Indeed, despite the bloody history of riots in India, the
tolerance of heterodoxy and acceptance of variations of religious
beliefs and customs are, ultimately, deep rooted in India.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Another Hindutva-bashing by this guy.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In contemporary politics, the enthusiasm for ancient India has often
come from the Hindutva movement - the promoters of a narrowly Hindu
view of Indian civilization - who have tried to separate out the
period preceding the Muslim conquest of India (from the third
millennium BCE to the beginning of the second millennium ADE) . In
contrast, those who take an integrationist approach to contemporary
India have tended to view the harking back to ancient India with
the greatest of suspicion. For example, the Hindutva activists
like invoking the holy Vedas, composed in the second millennium
BCE, to define India1 s "real heritage. " They are also keen on
summoning the Ramayana, the great epic, for many different
purposes, varying from delineating Hindu beliefs and convictions,
to finding alleged justification for forcibly demolishing a mosque
- the Babri masjid - that is situated at the very spot where the
"divine" Rama, it is claimed, was born. The integrationists, in
contrast, have tended to see the Vedas and the Ramayana as
unwelcome intrusions of Hindu beliefs into the contemporary life of
secular India.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The integrationists are not wrong to question the fractional
nature of the choice of so-called "Hindu classics" over other
products of India's long and diverse history. They are also right
to point to the counterproductive role that such partisan selection
can play in the secular, multi-religious life of todayâs India.
Even though more than 80 per cent of Indians may be Hindu, the
country has a very large Muslim population (the third largest among
all the countries in the world - larger than the entire British and
French populations put together) , and a great many followers of
other faiths: Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Parsees, and others. The
fact that India currently has a Muslim President, a Sikh Prime
Minister and a Christian head of the dominant party in the ruling
coalition may make India very unlike any other country in the
world, but it need not be seen as particularly strange in India
itself.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Similarly, the adherents of Hindu politics - especially those
who are given to vandalizing places of worship of other religions -
may take Rama to be divine, but in much of the Ramayana, Rama is
treated primarily as a hero - a great "epic hero" - with many good
qualities and some weaknesses, including a tendency to harbour
suspicions about his wife Sita's faithfulness. A pundit who gets
considerable space in the Ramayana, called Javali, not only does
not treat Rama as God, Javali calls Rama's actions "foolish"
("especially for," as Javali puts it, "an intelligent and wise
m a n " ) . Before he is persuaded to withdraw his allegations, Javali
gets time enough in the Ramayana to explain in detail that "there
is no after-world, nor any religious practice for attaining th a t , "
and that "the injunctions about the worship of gods, sacrifice,
gifts and penance have been laid down in the Shastras [scriptures]
by clever people, just to rule over [other] people."<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
he means "babri maqsjid" right?
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->I turn finally to the political issue of minority rights and
secularism, a subject in which there have been many ups and downs
in recent years. The 2002 riots in the state of Gujarat, following
the Godhra incident, in which possibly 2000 Muslims died, were not
prevented by the state government, nor was the BJP-dominated state
government, which had failed to protect minority community, booted
out of office in the December elections that followed. On the
other hand, the BJP-led central government did fall in the general
elections held in May 2004. Any set of election results,
especially in a country as large as India, would tend to carry the
impact of many different types of influences, and there cannot be
any single-factor explanation of the electoral outcomes. But
looking through the nature of the electoral reverses of the BJP and
its allies in the recent elections, including the total - or neartotal
- demise of the "secular" parties in alliance with the BJP,
it is difficult to miss a general sense of grievance about the
neglect of secular concerns by parties which were not formally
signed up for the Hindutva agenda. Not only were the voters keen
on bringing down the BJP itself a notch or two (its percentage of
voting support fell from 25% to 22%), but there are reasons to
entertain the hypothesis that the "secular" support that the BJP
allies delivered to the BJP-led alliance was particularly imperiled
by the Hindutva movement's aggressive - and sometimes violent -
undermining of a secular India and the complete failure of the
BJP's allies to resist the extremism of Hindutva.
In particular, the violence in Gujarat did seem to tarnish the
image of BJP and its allies, in addition to the issue of economic
inequality and the back-firing of the boast about "India shining."
The apparent concession by the former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, that the Gujarat killings had been a major influence in
the B JP' s defeat ( " I t is very difficult to say what all the reasons
are for the defeat [of BJP] in the elections but one impact of the
violence was we lost the elections") was, I understand, withdrawn
or significantly emended by him later, but no matter who concedes
what that plausible connection would be hard to overlook. It is
important to understand the hold of the sceptical tradition in
India, despite the manifest presence of religions all across the
country.
In responding to the exploitation of religious demography
in the politics of Hindutva, the defenders of secular politics
often take for granted that the Indian population would want
religious politics in one form or another. This has led to the
political temptation to use "soft Hindutva" as a compromised
response by secularists to the politics of "hard Hindutva." But
that tactical approach, which certainly has not given the anti-BJP
parties any dividend so far, is, I would argue, foundationally
mistaken. It profoundly ignores the strength of scepticism in
India, which links with the argumentative tradition and which
extends to religions as well, particularly in the form of doubting
the relevance of religious beliefs in political and social affairs.
Indeed, despite the bloody history of riots in India, the
tolerance of heterodoxy and acceptance of variations of religious
beliefs and customs are, ultimately, deep rooted in India.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->