<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Pakistan is burning</span>
Is Pakistan going to implode? Benazir Bhutto's assassination and the events thereafter lend to this question an alarming sense of immediacy. Optimists argue that the coming election will provide a cathartic release to the sorrow and anger of a traumatised country teetering on the brink of disaster and yield a Government that will re-establish the democratic process and the rule of law. Optimism, however, can be an unreliable guide as it tends to ignore reality's dark underbelly. The fact is that even if the election is held without much violence, is free and fair, and lead to the formation of a Government with a stable majority, the forces that have brought Pakistan to its present pass will remain.
The very fact of Bhutto's assassination points to several of the destabilising forces at work. Pakistan's Government has blamed it on Al Qaeda and produced a taped intercept of a telephone conversation in support. Many, however, have alleged that the Government itself was behind her assassination. Whatever the truth, the fact remains that Islamist fanatics and terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Sipah-e-Sahaba and so on, have proliferated and spread their tentacles far and deep into Pakistan's society and Government.
There has been heated argument over President Pervez Musharraf's role. It has been alleged that he has not gone full throttle against the terrorist outfits, particularly Al Qaeda and Taliban, because he wants to keep them alive to ensure a continuous flow of arms and aid from the US. On the other hand, one has heard that even his best efforts have not fully succeeded because of the odds he has to battle. The most important of these is the question mark against the country's armed forces, sections of which have been unable or disinclined to act.
Mr Musharraf could persist with military operations because of his position as its Chief of Army Staff. Gen Ashfaq Kayani, who has succeeded him, is supposed to be very close to him and a good professional soldier. If Mr Musharraf continues in office, much would depend on how his ties with Gen Kayani continue to be. Pertinently, Gen Zia-ul Haq was handpicked by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Gen Musharraf by Mr Nawaz Sharif, then Pakistan's Prime Minister. The former hanged his benefactor and the latter exiled his! In any case, a civilian Government that takes over after the election will not have Mr Musharraf's equation with Gen Kayani. If past experience is any guide, it will be a matter of time before the civilian Government, rendered unpopular by corruption and malgovernance, is overthrown by the military establishment.
The argument that the US and other global players will prevent the Army from doing this, will not wash. There is a limit to what the world's sole superpower can do. It has failed to goad the Musharraf regime to act more vigorously against Al Qaeda and Taliban and leaders entrenched in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Besides, there is no guarantee that a civilian Government will do the job better. Neither Benazir Bhutto nor Mr Sharif did much to counter Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadi groups during their tenure in office. Rather, it was during Bhutto's second innings that the ISI crafted the Taliban in 1994 with the CIA's blessings.
Even if the new Government wants to strike hard at Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadi groups, the ultimate outcome will depend on the Army's ability to crush them and, hence, the importance of the question mark mentioned earlier. Fanatical and Islamist outfits have deeply and extensively penetrated Pakistan's society, Government and the armed forces ever since Zia-ul Haq began his Islamisation drive in the early-1980s. An indicator is the proliferation of madarsas churning out jihadis. According to Air Commodore Prashant Dikshit (Retd) in 'Threats to Security' (Pakistan After 9/11, edited by Sreedhar, Manas), their number increased from 563 in Pakistan in 1979 to 2,500 -- with 200,000 students -- in Punjab Province alone in 1996. He further said in his 2003 paper that the number was "currently" estimated at 2,715, with 250,000 students.
Religious fanaticism has to a large extent coalesced with tribal identities and grievances and made for an explosive mix. <span style='color:green'>Pashtun tribals dominate FATA. According to Hassan Abbas in Terrorism Focus (Volume 3 (42) 2006), they constitute between 20 and 25 per cent of Pakistan's armed forces and 15 and 22 per cent of its officers' corps. The Frontier Corps, the para-military formation which is mainly involved in operations in FATA, is overwhelmingly Pashtun. Understandably, there have been many desertions, besides disaffection at the level of Colonels. A Major-General has reportedly chosen to retire prematurely rather than fight his own tribesmen.</span>
Worse, a section of the ISI continues to have close links with the leaders of Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadi groups. It is unlikely to stop supporting them and likely to do everything in its power to prevent their being crushed. Theoretically, such a situation can lead either to the eventual establishment of a Taliban-Al Qaeda Government in Pakistan or the terrorist outfits being crushed. The second, as we have seen, will not happen easily. Nor will the first, given the strong interest that several countries, including the US and India, have in preventing it. The result will be prolonged civil war, which might even lead to Pakistan's fragmentation. For, the country's ethnic faultlines are not confined to the armed forces alone. The conflict between Pathans and Mohajirs, that devastated Karachi for nearly a decade, is over but tensions simmer. Properties of Pathans, Punjabis and Mohajirs were attacked in Sindh during the rioting that followed Bhutto's assassination.
Much would, of course, depend on whether those who assume power after the election and those in the Opposition are able to work together, wisely and effectively, for a democratic, modern and moderately Islamic Pakistan. Here, Mr Bilawal Bhutto Zardari's anointment as the chairman of Pakistan People's Party is a cause for despair. The country remains tied to dynastic politics. Is it an indication that the other retrogressive features of its politics also survive?
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1.asp...writer=karlekar
Is Pakistan going to implode? Benazir Bhutto's assassination and the events thereafter lend to this question an alarming sense of immediacy. Optimists argue that the coming election will provide a cathartic release to the sorrow and anger of a traumatised country teetering on the brink of disaster and yield a Government that will re-establish the democratic process and the rule of law. Optimism, however, can be an unreliable guide as it tends to ignore reality's dark underbelly. The fact is that even if the election is held without much violence, is free and fair, and lead to the formation of a Government with a stable majority, the forces that have brought Pakistan to its present pass will remain.
The very fact of Bhutto's assassination points to several of the destabilising forces at work. Pakistan's Government has blamed it on Al Qaeda and produced a taped intercept of a telephone conversation in support. Many, however, have alleged that the Government itself was behind her assassination. Whatever the truth, the fact remains that Islamist fanatics and terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Sipah-e-Sahaba and so on, have proliferated and spread their tentacles far and deep into Pakistan's society and Government.
There has been heated argument over President Pervez Musharraf's role. It has been alleged that he has not gone full throttle against the terrorist outfits, particularly Al Qaeda and Taliban, because he wants to keep them alive to ensure a continuous flow of arms and aid from the US. On the other hand, one has heard that even his best efforts have not fully succeeded because of the odds he has to battle. The most important of these is the question mark against the country's armed forces, sections of which have been unable or disinclined to act.
Mr Musharraf could persist with military operations because of his position as its Chief of Army Staff. Gen Ashfaq Kayani, who has succeeded him, is supposed to be very close to him and a good professional soldier. If Mr Musharraf continues in office, much would depend on how his ties with Gen Kayani continue to be. Pertinently, Gen Zia-ul Haq was handpicked by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Gen Musharraf by Mr Nawaz Sharif, then Pakistan's Prime Minister. The former hanged his benefactor and the latter exiled his! In any case, a civilian Government that takes over after the election will not have Mr Musharraf's equation with Gen Kayani. If past experience is any guide, it will be a matter of time before the civilian Government, rendered unpopular by corruption and malgovernance, is overthrown by the military establishment.
The argument that the US and other global players will prevent the Army from doing this, will not wash. There is a limit to what the world's sole superpower can do. It has failed to goad the Musharraf regime to act more vigorously against Al Qaeda and Taliban and leaders entrenched in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Besides, there is no guarantee that a civilian Government will do the job better. Neither Benazir Bhutto nor Mr Sharif did much to counter Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadi groups during their tenure in office. Rather, it was during Bhutto's second innings that the ISI crafted the Taliban in 1994 with the CIA's blessings.
Even if the new Government wants to strike hard at Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadi groups, the ultimate outcome will depend on the Army's ability to crush them and, hence, the importance of the question mark mentioned earlier. Fanatical and Islamist outfits have deeply and extensively penetrated Pakistan's society, Government and the armed forces ever since Zia-ul Haq began his Islamisation drive in the early-1980s. An indicator is the proliferation of madarsas churning out jihadis. According to Air Commodore Prashant Dikshit (Retd) in 'Threats to Security' (Pakistan After 9/11, edited by Sreedhar, Manas), their number increased from 563 in Pakistan in 1979 to 2,500 -- with 200,000 students -- in Punjab Province alone in 1996. He further said in his 2003 paper that the number was "currently" estimated at 2,715, with 250,000 students.
Religious fanaticism has to a large extent coalesced with tribal identities and grievances and made for an explosive mix. <span style='color:green'>Pashtun tribals dominate FATA. According to Hassan Abbas in Terrorism Focus (Volume 3 (42) 2006), they constitute between 20 and 25 per cent of Pakistan's armed forces and 15 and 22 per cent of its officers' corps. The Frontier Corps, the para-military formation which is mainly involved in operations in FATA, is overwhelmingly Pashtun. Understandably, there have been many desertions, besides disaffection at the level of Colonels. A Major-General has reportedly chosen to retire prematurely rather than fight his own tribesmen.</span>
Worse, a section of the ISI continues to have close links with the leaders of Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadi groups. It is unlikely to stop supporting them and likely to do everything in its power to prevent their being crushed. Theoretically, such a situation can lead either to the eventual establishment of a Taliban-Al Qaeda Government in Pakistan or the terrorist outfits being crushed. The second, as we have seen, will not happen easily. Nor will the first, given the strong interest that several countries, including the US and India, have in preventing it. The result will be prolonged civil war, which might even lead to Pakistan's fragmentation. For, the country's ethnic faultlines are not confined to the armed forces alone. The conflict between Pathans and Mohajirs, that devastated Karachi for nearly a decade, is over but tensions simmer. Properties of Pathans, Punjabis and Mohajirs were attacked in Sindh during the rioting that followed Bhutto's assassination.
Much would, of course, depend on whether those who assume power after the election and those in the Opposition are able to work together, wisely and effectively, for a democratic, modern and moderately Islamic Pakistan. Here, Mr Bilawal Bhutto Zardari's anointment as the chairman of Pakistan People's Party is a cause for despair. The country remains tied to dynastic politics. Is it an indication that the other retrogressive features of its politics also survive?
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1.asp...writer=karlekar