03-04-2008, 09:14 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Four steps to curb Naxalism</b>
While the Naxalite movement is gaining momentum, the government machinery to tackle it remains weak. For example, the Maoists were able to hold in January-February the ninth congress of their central committee for four days at a hideout on the Jharkhand-Orissa border without any official coming to know about it. About 1,000 hard-core Maoists, including a few from Nepal, attended this congress. The government heard about the event only after the delegates had dispersed and distributed to the public copies of the resolutions passed by the congress. Even in the worst affected states, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, a large number of police posts remain unfilled. In the former, 42 per cent posts of deputy superintendents of police, 50 per cent of sub-inspectors and 20 per cent of constables are lying vacant; in the latter, the corresponding percentage are 34, 22 and 17.
In this phase, another basic change has come about. The new strategy is to target the policemen and persons in authority, on the one hand, and on the other, to create the public impression that the Naxalites are fighting for the poor masses. For example, during the attack on police posts in Orissaâs Nayagarh district on February 16, they repeatedly announced over loudspeaker that no harm would be done to the people.
A key question for the immediate future is: How should India tackle the serious challenge to its internal security by a reorganised, reinvigorated and re-equipped Naxal movement which is proceeding in accordance to a well thought-out strategy of first establishing a "compact revolutionary zone," extending from the jungles of North Bihar to Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka and then using that zone for seizing the cities and the power structure of the state? Four major measures are badly needed.
First and foremost, a strong and sustained campaign needs to be launched to relieve rural distress, which, of late, has assumed serious proportions. A recent national survey has revealed that about 33 per cent of Indiaâs population, that is, about 200 million rural people, live on only Rs 12 a day. About 36 million young people, between 15 and 29 years, are "usually unemployed"; on some days, as many as 58 million remain without work. In these circumstances, anger and frustration of the people and their attraction for movements like the Naxal movement are understandable.
Take, for example, the case of Jharkhand, which is the second worst Naxalite-affected state. Here, about 50 per cent of the total population of 27 million live below the poverty line; 21 million, that is, about 78 per cent, live in the rural areas; 80 per cent of its farm-holdings fall in small and marginal category. Tube well irrigation is next to nothing. There is an acute shortage of power. Though harvesting water during the rainy season can grow a second crop, no one in the administration and village community takes the initiative to start a campaign for conserving and storing water. Nor does anyone tap the financial and technical resources that are available under the Bharat Nirman and National Food Security and horticulture missions. Thus, because of cultivation only in one season, low productivity, poor infrastructure, somnambulant governance and increasing pressure of population, rural distress and discontent get intensified. Educated and semi-educated youngsters are becoming particularly bitter. All this provides ample opportunities to the Naxalites to play upon the frustration of the people and offer them a "romantic solution" of changing the current social, economic and political order through a violent revolution. Able-bodied persons are weaned away to join the active Naxal cadres and other villagers are enlisted as supporters.
It speaks volumes about the failure of Indian polity, Indian leadership and Indian social and cultural milieu that a very large number of people in the country should still go hungry and jobless every day, while millions of others get more and more affluent. The Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, if implemented effectively, may provide some relief to the jobless unskilled villagers. But it would do nothing for the hordes of other unemployed persons and their hungry families. What is required is a far more basic change in economic priorities, a change in the work culture, and a change in the earnestness of leadership.
Secondly, the state governments which are covered by the "compact revolutionary zone" and through which the red corridor passes, must make an effective institutional arrangement to coordinate police action against the Naxalites. Intelligence should be shared and joint operations launched. Special squads of personnel trained to operate in forests and hilly areas and suitably equipped to counter guerrilla tactics should be raised by each of the affected states. The dictum should be, "Fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla."
Thirdly, the fearsome environment which the Naxal movement has engendered needs to be highlighted through a strong publicity campaign. The public must be repeatedly reminded that terror is central to the thinking of the Naxalites who openly advocate "creation of terror for a while in every rural area." Likewise, the dangerous implications of some of the ideas propagated by Naxal-ideologues, such as the right of "sub-nationalities" for self-determination and even secession, should be explained to the public. It should be indicated how unworkable and unpatriotic these ideas are, how they would Balkanise India, how bloody strife would ensue, inviting interference of those very "imperialist powers" whom the Naxalites so vehemently denounce.
Fourthly, narrow political calculations have to be kept at bay. In 1982, N.T. Rama Rao played electoral politics. He called the Naxalites true patriots who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes. By 1985, however, he was forced to take action against them. M. Chenna Reddy, Congress CM, acted no differently. In 1989, he too declared that the Naxalites were patriots. When subsequent chief minister N. Chandrababu Naidu adopted a firm approach against the Naxalites, it was Rajashekhar Reddyâs turn to appease them. In other states too political parties and individual leaders have not hesitated to arrive at an understanding of mutual help with the Naxalites. This has enabled the latter to carve out an unhindered space for their activities, while the former have been getting electoral support of the Naxal cadre at the time of elections. This mutual understanding was widely noticed in Bihar and Jharkhand during the last state elections.
If Indiaâs future has to be made safe from the destructive potential of Naxalism, the infections in her social, economic and political structure which caused the malady in the late Sixties, have to be eliminated. The four measures suggested earlier would substantially help in doing so. But true and lasting cure of Naxalism and other perplexing problems of internal security would emerge only from a set of fundamental reforms in both the structure and soul of governance in India.
Jagmohan is a former governor of Jammu and Kashmir and a former Union minister.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
While the Naxalite movement is gaining momentum, the government machinery to tackle it remains weak. For example, the Maoists were able to hold in January-February the ninth congress of their central committee for four days at a hideout on the Jharkhand-Orissa border without any official coming to know about it. About 1,000 hard-core Maoists, including a few from Nepal, attended this congress. The government heard about the event only after the delegates had dispersed and distributed to the public copies of the resolutions passed by the congress. Even in the worst affected states, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, a large number of police posts remain unfilled. In the former, 42 per cent posts of deputy superintendents of police, 50 per cent of sub-inspectors and 20 per cent of constables are lying vacant; in the latter, the corresponding percentage are 34, 22 and 17.
In this phase, another basic change has come about. The new strategy is to target the policemen and persons in authority, on the one hand, and on the other, to create the public impression that the Naxalites are fighting for the poor masses. For example, during the attack on police posts in Orissaâs Nayagarh district on February 16, they repeatedly announced over loudspeaker that no harm would be done to the people.
A key question for the immediate future is: How should India tackle the serious challenge to its internal security by a reorganised, reinvigorated and re-equipped Naxal movement which is proceeding in accordance to a well thought-out strategy of first establishing a "compact revolutionary zone," extending from the jungles of North Bihar to Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka and then using that zone for seizing the cities and the power structure of the state? Four major measures are badly needed.
First and foremost, a strong and sustained campaign needs to be launched to relieve rural distress, which, of late, has assumed serious proportions. A recent national survey has revealed that about 33 per cent of Indiaâs population, that is, about 200 million rural people, live on only Rs 12 a day. About 36 million young people, between 15 and 29 years, are "usually unemployed"; on some days, as many as 58 million remain without work. In these circumstances, anger and frustration of the people and their attraction for movements like the Naxal movement are understandable.
Take, for example, the case of Jharkhand, which is the second worst Naxalite-affected state. Here, about 50 per cent of the total population of 27 million live below the poverty line; 21 million, that is, about 78 per cent, live in the rural areas; 80 per cent of its farm-holdings fall in small and marginal category. Tube well irrigation is next to nothing. There is an acute shortage of power. Though harvesting water during the rainy season can grow a second crop, no one in the administration and village community takes the initiative to start a campaign for conserving and storing water. Nor does anyone tap the financial and technical resources that are available under the Bharat Nirman and National Food Security and horticulture missions. Thus, because of cultivation only in one season, low productivity, poor infrastructure, somnambulant governance and increasing pressure of population, rural distress and discontent get intensified. Educated and semi-educated youngsters are becoming particularly bitter. All this provides ample opportunities to the Naxalites to play upon the frustration of the people and offer them a "romantic solution" of changing the current social, economic and political order through a violent revolution. Able-bodied persons are weaned away to join the active Naxal cadres and other villagers are enlisted as supporters.
It speaks volumes about the failure of Indian polity, Indian leadership and Indian social and cultural milieu that a very large number of people in the country should still go hungry and jobless every day, while millions of others get more and more affluent. The Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, if implemented effectively, may provide some relief to the jobless unskilled villagers. But it would do nothing for the hordes of other unemployed persons and their hungry families. What is required is a far more basic change in economic priorities, a change in the work culture, and a change in the earnestness of leadership.
Secondly, the state governments which are covered by the "compact revolutionary zone" and through which the red corridor passes, must make an effective institutional arrangement to coordinate police action against the Naxalites. Intelligence should be shared and joint operations launched. Special squads of personnel trained to operate in forests and hilly areas and suitably equipped to counter guerrilla tactics should be raised by each of the affected states. The dictum should be, "Fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla."
Thirdly, the fearsome environment which the Naxal movement has engendered needs to be highlighted through a strong publicity campaign. The public must be repeatedly reminded that terror is central to the thinking of the Naxalites who openly advocate "creation of terror for a while in every rural area." Likewise, the dangerous implications of some of the ideas propagated by Naxal-ideologues, such as the right of "sub-nationalities" for self-determination and even secession, should be explained to the public. It should be indicated how unworkable and unpatriotic these ideas are, how they would Balkanise India, how bloody strife would ensue, inviting interference of those very "imperialist powers" whom the Naxalites so vehemently denounce.
Fourthly, narrow political calculations have to be kept at bay. In 1982, N.T. Rama Rao played electoral politics. He called the Naxalites true patriots who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes. By 1985, however, he was forced to take action against them. M. Chenna Reddy, Congress CM, acted no differently. In 1989, he too declared that the Naxalites were patriots. When subsequent chief minister N. Chandrababu Naidu adopted a firm approach against the Naxalites, it was Rajashekhar Reddyâs turn to appease them. In other states too political parties and individual leaders have not hesitated to arrive at an understanding of mutual help with the Naxalites. This has enabled the latter to carve out an unhindered space for their activities, while the former have been getting electoral support of the Naxal cadre at the time of elections. This mutual understanding was widely noticed in Bihar and Jharkhand during the last state elections.
If Indiaâs future has to be made safe from the destructive potential of Naxalism, the infections in her social, economic and political structure which caused the malady in the late Sixties, have to be eliminated. The four measures suggested earlier would substantially help in doing so. But true and lasting cure of Naxalism and other perplexing problems of internal security would emerge only from a set of fundamental reforms in both the structure and soul of governance in India.
Jagmohan is a former governor of Jammu and Kashmir and a former Union minister.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->