06-14-2008, 05:51 PM
<b>Behind the surge in Naga violence</b>
Namrata Goswami
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
The last few months have seen much violence in the Naga-inhabited
areas of India. The National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu, or the NSCN(I-M), spilt on
November 23, 2007, and a new armed outfit emerged from within its
fold: the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Unification), or
the NSCN(U). The violence between these factions has led to more
than 40 deaths in April-May alone.
This surge in violence compelled Naga civil society groups led by
the Joint Forum of Gaonburahs (village headmen) and Doaibashis
(elders), or the JFGBDB, supported by the Naga Hoho (Council), to
convene several peoples' consultative meetings to garner support for
an overarching ceasefire between the underground outfits.
Subsequently, on May 20, an eventful day for Nagaland, tens of
thousands of Naga people took out a "peace march" across the State
demanding that the insurgents withdraw from civilian areas and
respect the ceasefire between different outfits as declared by the
JFGBDB on July 24, 2007.
Surprisingly, the wishes of the common people have been brushed
aside by the NSCN(I-M), the NSCN(U) and the NSCN(Khaplang), and
their incessant factional fighting has vitiated the atmosphere. On
April 25, the residents of Diphupar `B,' a village about 10 km from
Dimapur, Nagaland's commercial hub, were hit by clashes between the
NSCN (I-M) and the NSCN(U). This evoked a strong response from the
residents, and village council chairman Kakiho Sumi and headman L.P.
Therie appealed to all the underground factions to respect the
sentiments of the civilian population and refrain from resorting to
gunfights in populated areas.
Though civil society bodies such as the JFGBDB, the Naga Hoho, the
Naga Peace Centre and the United Naga Council, to name a few, have
openly rallied around efforts for peace, their calls appear to be
largely ineffective in the face of the growing factional violence.
Worse still is a situation that shows the absence of the "rule of
law" due to a weak state structure in these areas. The state
security forces have remained either aloof or inconsequential when
it comes to enforcing law and order. And the local administrators
appear to have little or no influence on either the insurgent
outfits or the social base from where they draw their recruits.
Rather, in the context of the March 5 Nagaland State Assembly
elections, politicians such as Niphiu Rio, who went on to become the
Chief Minister, sought the support of the NSCN(I-M) in order to
ensure the electoral success of his party, the Nagaland People's
Front (NPF).
The increasing violence and social divisiveness in Naga society is
advocated by insurgent groups aligned along tribal lines: the NSCN(I-
M) is mostly made up of Thangkhuls, the NSCN(U) of Semas, and the
NSCN(K) of Konyaks, while the Naga National Council (NNC) comprises
Angamis. The other major tribe, Ao, oscillates between the three
factions, but mostly leans towards the NSCN(I-M).
In this context, what explains the inter-group violence plaguing the
Naga-inhabited territories that has claimed a growing toll of lives
in recent months? Currently there is no violence between the
security forces and the NSCN(I-M) or the NSCN(K), thanks to
ceasefire agreements signed by the Union government with both of
them, in 1997 and 2001 respectively.
Theories of violence
Interesting insights can be drawn from three contending theories of
ethnic violence. According to the rational choice theory advocated
by David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "information and commitment to
peace problems" between ethnic or tribal groups leads to a situation
of "security dilemma" or "uncertainty" over the other's intentions
and can lead to violence. Thus, ethnic or tribal groups view
violence as rational, propelled mostly by an incentive to maximise
security.
Violence is also caused by the fact that in such an uncertain
situation, ethnic or tribal groups overestimate an adversary's
hostile intentions and escalate pre-emptive or preventive violence â
call it what you may. Negotiations between insurgent groups or their
social base becomes unthinkable at this stage as there is a credible
commitment problem.
An alternative theory advocated by Rui de Figueiredo and Barry R.
Weingast, also based on rational choice, argue that predatory ethnic
or tribal elites, and not uncertainty, is the prime cause of ethnic
violence because these elites deliberately provoke violence as a
means to maintain their hold on society and dubiously mislead their
supporters and sympathisers into believing that the other side is to
be blamed for the violence. Hence, elite predation coupled with mass
uncertainty creates violence.
An equally powerful and contending theory to explain violence of
this nature is the socio-psychologically propelled theory of
symbolic politics put forward by Stuart J. Kaufman. According to
this theory, the critical causes of ethnic or inter-tribal or clan
violence are "group myths that justify hostility, fears of group
extinction, and a symbolic politics of chauvinistic mobilisation."
Hostile socio-cultural myths about the "other" and exclusivist
historical narratives can produce emotion-laden symbols, resulting
in group hostility and "other" driven violence.
Significantly, as identified by Anthony Smith, each group has
a "myth-symbol complex," which creates subjective narratives binding
a group vis-Ã-vis others.
Incidentally, elite manipulation of the social base for violent
assertion is rather limited if such subjective discourses do not
exist in a given society prior to violence. This theory posits that
emotions, and not rational calculations, motivate people's actions.
Indeed, the most important finding of the symbolic politics theory
is worth mulling over if one wants to derive a specific explanation
for ethnic conflicts in general and the Naga inter-group violence in
particular. And that is: the sources of ethnic conflict are
ultimately a struggle for relative group worth.
Security dilemma
If one studies the present Naga inter-factional violence from the
notion of a "security dilemma," there is a situation of uncertainty
existing in the Naga areas relating to both the intentions of the
rival insurgent groups and their social base. In interviews with the
author in July 2007 and January 2008, leaders of the NSCN(I-M),
including self-styled Brigadier Phunthing Shimrang, said that though
the outfit respected the ceasefire declaration by the JWGBDB, it was
impossible to abide by it as they were uncertain about the
intentions of their rival faction, the NSCN(K). NSCN(K) leader Khole
Konyak offered the same argument about the NSCN(I-M)'s intentions.
A situation of uncertainly also prevails amongst the social base of
the NSCN(I-M) around Diphupar in Nagaland, Ukhrul and Tamenglong in
Manipur, and the NSCN(K) strongholds in Phek and Mon. Both staged
violent ambushes in each other's territory in order to pre-empt or
prevent violent surprises by either.
However, when one views the Naga conflict from the elite predatory
model, there is reason to believe that the NSCN(I-M) leaders have
upped the ante in recent months following its split in November
2007, in order to demonstrate to its target population who is in
charge. Also, the newly formed NSCN(U) is trying to establish itself
in NSCN(I-M) territory, mainly in and around Dimapur. Therefore, it
makes sense for the latter to step up attacks against both NSCN(U)
cadres and civilians, to instil fear in the population and its
support base. This will automatically rally the population towards
the NSCN(I-M) as the only force capable of controlling violence. It
also develops a pathetic path dependency: if the population does not
support the outfit, they might face coercion of the worse kind â
sometimes even death.
This happened on May 2 and 3 when three NSCN(U) cadres and a
civilian were killed in Dimapur by NSCN(I-M) cadres in a show of
power. Interestingly, Mr. Muivah and Mr. Swu argue that the NSCN(I-
M) has been forced to use force due to the irrational and violent
behaviour of its rival factions, effectively creating mass
uncertainty about the causes of the violence.
The third explanation based on the symbolic politics theory is
revealing. Naga social mores and history indicate that individual
tribes have been rather exclusivist in their behaviour in the pre-
colonial and colonial times, and this continues after Independence.
Each tribe, Ao, Angami, Konyak, Maram, Sema, Tangkhul, and so on,
lives in areas marked by single-tribe domination and little inter-
mixing. This exclusivist social behaviour was, or is, informed by
fears of group extinction and hostile myths, leading to more or less
unfavourable attitudes to tribes that are not one's own. In this
context, it was, or is, rather easy for predatory insurgent elites
to utilise emotional and symbolic hostile narratives to mobilise
social support for violence. "Others" in individual Naga tribal
historical narratives include not only other tribes but the larger
Indian society, frequently viewed as posing a threat to their
individual existence, resources, and identity. Therefore, though
there is an existing cohesive Naga narrative across tribes against
Indian subjugation, this unity no longer holds when tribes start
fighting against one another.
Three propositions
Depending on the three explanations of growing ethnic tensions and
violence, a resolution to the conflict has to be informed by three
propositions. First, if the Naga conflict is based on the notion of
a "security dilemma," the state forces must negotiate between
outfits, not only to remove the information and commitment problems
but to broker a peace deal. This will resolve the "uncertainty"
issue. If the cause of violence is elite predation, then the
leadership structure of that particular society as well as of the
insurgent outfits must be brought to heel. Since both outfits have a
ceasefire arrangement with the Union government, state negotiators
must firmly assert to the outfits' leadership their aversion to
social violence. This is the least the state forces can do for a
ravaged Naga society in these circumstances.
If the violence is based on symbolic politics, then the problem is
rather rooted and requires an alternative discourse aimed at
deconstructing social Naga myths and hostile attitudes. Indeed, all
three theories offer genuinely important explanations for the
ongoing Naga inter-group conflict. A resolution mechanism must
factor in a simultaneous process based on all the three factors â
the security dilemma, elite predation and symbolic politics â if the
violence is to be realistically ended.
<i>(Dr. Namrata Goswami is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)</i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Namrata Goswami
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
The last few months have seen much violence in the Naga-inhabited
areas of India. The National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu, or the NSCN(I-M), spilt on
November 23, 2007, and a new armed outfit emerged from within its
fold: the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Unification), or
the NSCN(U). The violence between these factions has led to more
than 40 deaths in April-May alone.
This surge in violence compelled Naga civil society groups led by
the Joint Forum of Gaonburahs (village headmen) and Doaibashis
(elders), or the JFGBDB, supported by the Naga Hoho (Council), to
convene several peoples' consultative meetings to garner support for
an overarching ceasefire between the underground outfits.
Subsequently, on May 20, an eventful day for Nagaland, tens of
thousands of Naga people took out a "peace march" across the State
demanding that the insurgents withdraw from civilian areas and
respect the ceasefire between different outfits as declared by the
JFGBDB on July 24, 2007.
Surprisingly, the wishes of the common people have been brushed
aside by the NSCN(I-M), the NSCN(U) and the NSCN(Khaplang), and
their incessant factional fighting has vitiated the atmosphere. On
April 25, the residents of Diphupar `B,' a village about 10 km from
Dimapur, Nagaland's commercial hub, were hit by clashes between the
NSCN (I-M) and the NSCN(U). This evoked a strong response from the
residents, and village council chairman Kakiho Sumi and headman L.P.
Therie appealed to all the underground factions to respect the
sentiments of the civilian population and refrain from resorting to
gunfights in populated areas.
Though civil society bodies such as the JFGBDB, the Naga Hoho, the
Naga Peace Centre and the United Naga Council, to name a few, have
openly rallied around efforts for peace, their calls appear to be
largely ineffective in the face of the growing factional violence.
Worse still is a situation that shows the absence of the "rule of
law" due to a weak state structure in these areas. The state
security forces have remained either aloof or inconsequential when
it comes to enforcing law and order. And the local administrators
appear to have little or no influence on either the insurgent
outfits or the social base from where they draw their recruits.
Rather, in the context of the March 5 Nagaland State Assembly
elections, politicians such as Niphiu Rio, who went on to become the
Chief Minister, sought the support of the NSCN(I-M) in order to
ensure the electoral success of his party, the Nagaland People's
Front (NPF).
The increasing violence and social divisiveness in Naga society is
advocated by insurgent groups aligned along tribal lines: the NSCN(I-
M) is mostly made up of Thangkhuls, the NSCN(U) of Semas, and the
NSCN(K) of Konyaks, while the Naga National Council (NNC) comprises
Angamis. The other major tribe, Ao, oscillates between the three
factions, but mostly leans towards the NSCN(I-M).
In this context, what explains the inter-group violence plaguing the
Naga-inhabited territories that has claimed a growing toll of lives
in recent months? Currently there is no violence between the
security forces and the NSCN(I-M) or the NSCN(K), thanks to
ceasefire agreements signed by the Union government with both of
them, in 1997 and 2001 respectively.
Theories of violence
Interesting insights can be drawn from three contending theories of
ethnic violence. According to the rational choice theory advocated
by David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "information and commitment to
peace problems" between ethnic or tribal groups leads to a situation
of "security dilemma" or "uncertainty" over the other's intentions
and can lead to violence. Thus, ethnic or tribal groups view
violence as rational, propelled mostly by an incentive to maximise
security.
Violence is also caused by the fact that in such an uncertain
situation, ethnic or tribal groups overestimate an adversary's
hostile intentions and escalate pre-emptive or preventive violence â
call it what you may. Negotiations between insurgent groups or their
social base becomes unthinkable at this stage as there is a credible
commitment problem.
An alternative theory advocated by Rui de Figueiredo and Barry R.
Weingast, also based on rational choice, argue that predatory ethnic
or tribal elites, and not uncertainty, is the prime cause of ethnic
violence because these elites deliberately provoke violence as a
means to maintain their hold on society and dubiously mislead their
supporters and sympathisers into believing that the other side is to
be blamed for the violence. Hence, elite predation coupled with mass
uncertainty creates violence.
An equally powerful and contending theory to explain violence of
this nature is the socio-psychologically propelled theory of
symbolic politics put forward by Stuart J. Kaufman. According to
this theory, the critical causes of ethnic or inter-tribal or clan
violence are "group myths that justify hostility, fears of group
extinction, and a symbolic politics of chauvinistic mobilisation."
Hostile socio-cultural myths about the "other" and exclusivist
historical narratives can produce emotion-laden symbols, resulting
in group hostility and "other" driven violence.
Significantly, as identified by Anthony Smith, each group has
a "myth-symbol complex," which creates subjective narratives binding
a group vis-Ã-vis others.
Incidentally, elite manipulation of the social base for violent
assertion is rather limited if such subjective discourses do not
exist in a given society prior to violence. This theory posits that
emotions, and not rational calculations, motivate people's actions.
Indeed, the most important finding of the symbolic politics theory
is worth mulling over if one wants to derive a specific explanation
for ethnic conflicts in general and the Naga inter-group violence in
particular. And that is: the sources of ethnic conflict are
ultimately a struggle for relative group worth.
Security dilemma
If one studies the present Naga inter-factional violence from the
notion of a "security dilemma," there is a situation of uncertainty
existing in the Naga areas relating to both the intentions of the
rival insurgent groups and their social base. In interviews with the
author in July 2007 and January 2008, leaders of the NSCN(I-M),
including self-styled Brigadier Phunthing Shimrang, said that though
the outfit respected the ceasefire declaration by the JWGBDB, it was
impossible to abide by it as they were uncertain about the
intentions of their rival faction, the NSCN(K). NSCN(K) leader Khole
Konyak offered the same argument about the NSCN(I-M)'s intentions.
A situation of uncertainly also prevails amongst the social base of
the NSCN(I-M) around Diphupar in Nagaland, Ukhrul and Tamenglong in
Manipur, and the NSCN(K) strongholds in Phek and Mon. Both staged
violent ambushes in each other's territory in order to pre-empt or
prevent violent surprises by either.
However, when one views the Naga conflict from the elite predatory
model, there is reason to believe that the NSCN(I-M) leaders have
upped the ante in recent months following its split in November
2007, in order to demonstrate to its target population who is in
charge. Also, the newly formed NSCN(U) is trying to establish itself
in NSCN(I-M) territory, mainly in and around Dimapur. Therefore, it
makes sense for the latter to step up attacks against both NSCN(U)
cadres and civilians, to instil fear in the population and its
support base. This will automatically rally the population towards
the NSCN(I-M) as the only force capable of controlling violence. It
also develops a pathetic path dependency: if the population does not
support the outfit, they might face coercion of the worse kind â
sometimes even death.
This happened on May 2 and 3 when three NSCN(U) cadres and a
civilian were killed in Dimapur by NSCN(I-M) cadres in a show of
power. Interestingly, Mr. Muivah and Mr. Swu argue that the NSCN(I-
M) has been forced to use force due to the irrational and violent
behaviour of its rival factions, effectively creating mass
uncertainty about the causes of the violence.
The third explanation based on the symbolic politics theory is
revealing. Naga social mores and history indicate that individual
tribes have been rather exclusivist in their behaviour in the pre-
colonial and colonial times, and this continues after Independence.
Each tribe, Ao, Angami, Konyak, Maram, Sema, Tangkhul, and so on,
lives in areas marked by single-tribe domination and little inter-
mixing. This exclusivist social behaviour was, or is, informed by
fears of group extinction and hostile myths, leading to more or less
unfavourable attitudes to tribes that are not one's own. In this
context, it was, or is, rather easy for predatory insurgent elites
to utilise emotional and symbolic hostile narratives to mobilise
social support for violence. "Others" in individual Naga tribal
historical narratives include not only other tribes but the larger
Indian society, frequently viewed as posing a threat to their
individual existence, resources, and identity. Therefore, though
there is an existing cohesive Naga narrative across tribes against
Indian subjugation, this unity no longer holds when tribes start
fighting against one another.
Three propositions
Depending on the three explanations of growing ethnic tensions and
violence, a resolution to the conflict has to be informed by three
propositions. First, if the Naga conflict is based on the notion of
a "security dilemma," the state forces must negotiate between
outfits, not only to remove the information and commitment problems
but to broker a peace deal. This will resolve the "uncertainty"
issue. If the cause of violence is elite predation, then the
leadership structure of that particular society as well as of the
insurgent outfits must be brought to heel. Since both outfits have a
ceasefire arrangement with the Union government, state negotiators
must firmly assert to the outfits' leadership their aversion to
social violence. This is the least the state forces can do for a
ravaged Naga society in these circumstances.
If the violence is based on symbolic politics, then the problem is
rather rooted and requires an alternative discourse aimed at
deconstructing social Naga myths and hostile attitudes. Indeed, all
three theories offer genuinely important explanations for the
ongoing Naga inter-group conflict. A resolution mechanism must
factor in a simultaneous process based on all the three factors â
the security dilemma, elite predation and symbolic politics â if the
violence is to be realistically ended.
<i>(Dr. Namrata Goswami is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)</i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->