05-09-2009, 11:40 PM
X-posted
<!--QuoteBegin-"A_Gupta"+-->QUOTE("A_Gupta")<!--QuoteEBegin-->
By contrast, to the planned communal terrorism of the Muslim League the British adopted a policy of: look the other way, take no effective action. NPA Smith, director of the Intelligence Bureau, wrote in a memorandum to the Viceroy Wavell who forwarded the same to London:
Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and lead us nowhere. <i>The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem</i>
This is why the original sources are important. Sorry, long post here, but I'm putting in the whole thing to put the N.P.A. Smith quote in its correct context.
This quote is from a letter from Mr Abell {George Edmund Brackenbury, Pvt Secy to the Viceroy} to Mr Harris {Randolph Montague Joseph, Pvt Secy to Secy of State for India} and is item 304, in the volume IX of the Transfer of Power papers.
<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->My dear Ronald,
H.E. thinks the Secretary of State may be interested in the enclosed note on the situation in India by Smith, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau.
Yours sincerely,
George Abell.
Enclosure:
British Angle
1. The game so far has been well played in that (a) both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government; (b) the Indian problem has been thereby thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism; © some kind of an opportunity for orderly evacuation now presents itself through the existence at the Centre of a government to which power can be transferred.
2. I fear, there is a tendency, now that we are temporarily in relatively untroubled waters -- from the purely British angle --, to forget that a storm will sooner or later again arise, and to move much too slowly in shedding our responsibilities. The fullest advantage should be taken of our present breathing space. In my view, the Secretary of State's control over civil officers should be abrogated at the earliest possible moment. This is only fair to the officers and has the political advantage that a decisive gesture of this kind will help to keep the problem on its correct communal plane.
3. The Quit India policy has now the general acceptance of almost all British officers. In the Congress Provinces, this acceptance is accompanied by a realisation of its complete inevitability and a general support of the line so far taken by H.M.G. In the non-Congress Provinces, and particularly in the Punjab, civil officers are apt to criticise bitterly H.M.G.'s policy and the moves made by H.E. This difference of outlook arises from difference of political circumstances. The Punjab is inclined to regard the rest of official India as defeatist and much of the rest of India regards the Punjab as living in a dead or dying past.
4. Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and leads us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem***
The Indian Angle
What is likely to eventuate? Very difficult to answer. My own views are --
(a) Whatever the position a few years ago, communal antagonism has now reached such a point of bitterness that it is difficult to see how Hindu and Muslim can jointly work the future. This antagonism may lessen, but the cleavage and difference of culture is so marked as to make healthy cooperation unlikely.
(b)It is clear that India, with its strongly fissiparous tendencies, can only continue to exist through a strong Centre.
© It is equally clear that this strong Centre will not be conceded by the Muslims, and is probably unattainable.
(d) The weak Centre of the present target carries within itself the seeds of disruption. It is difficult to foresee a joint policy in foreign affairs, and consequently in defence and finance.
(e)Indian leadership is so inept that there is little prospect of these inherent difficulties being overcome.
(f)I have little faith therefore in a successful outcome, in the long view, of the attempt to maintain a unified India. As I have said for some months, Pakistan is likely to flow from Congresstan (the acceptance of office by Congress).
(g)I do not think Pakistan will advantage the Indian Muslim, who is likely to be squeezed and embarrassed by stronger forces East and West of him; but if he is determined to have it, he will get it.
(h)If Congress were wise, they would either attempt to dissolve by a psychological approach the psychological mistrust which exists or they would establish a strong Centre for areas of Hindu preponderance and to the exclusion of the N-West. But I doubt if Congress is wise enough to do either of these things.
(i)Even if a strong Hindu Centre were established it is doubtful whether it could maintain itself for long in the face of a left-wing attack based on conditions rife for trouble, in labour, the peasantry, linguisitic and provincial jealousies, etc. Jai Prakash Narain and his ill-assorted horde threaten the future. Congress might conceivably handle them and the Communists with sufficient firmness, but they have not much time to spare, and with Nehru in the Cabinet, I doubt their capacity or even willingness.
(j)In brief, I am pessimistic and fear, first, Hindu-Muslim separation, and, secondly, some measure of Balkanisation. The threat of the extreme Left-Wing may serve to bring present Hindu-Muslim leadership closer together, but this remains to be seen.
(k)If pessimistic, I am also philosophical about all this. If we cannot control natural forces, we must accept them, keeping our eyes steadily on reasonable British interest.
(l) The psychological approach which I would commend to Congress would have to be one of great generosity -- an offer, if necessary, of one over parity. I suggested this to Sardar Patel and told him, moreover, that any attempt to force the Muslims would result, through the disintegration of the police and Army, in the loss of N.W. India. His reply was that, if I thought that generosity would placate the Muslim Oliver Twist, I did not understand either the Muslim mind or the situation. With which sentiment I am tempted to agree.
N.P.A Smith.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
***In a letter from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, September 24, 1946, N.P.A. Smith's assessment of "possible moves in the Muslim League field and the consequences that might flow from them" is included. {#360 in Volume VIII of the Transfer of Power}. I read this while looking for the quote that prompted this post. Strictly, to be fair, I should produce the whole letter, but it is now 2:00 AM.
NPA Smith wrote:<b>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->5. In brief, Mr Jinnah may be tempted by the knowledge of his possession of a very strong weapon which, though double-edged, can inflict deep wounds on his opponent. If he feels that the threat of its use is unavailing, he may well employ its reality. It is strange to think that, in the present century, the settlement of a dispute can be contemplated through the arbitrament, not merely of civil war, but of an insane butchery which spares neither women nor children. Nevertheless, the ghastly reality is there and it is beyond doubt that "jehad" is still an emotion of the Muslim mind and that relatively few Muslims will be found to resist its call, or to resist the pressure which sustains it. If, therefore, Mr. Jinnah does decide to plunge, the consequences will be of the gravest. The League has proclaimed its intention to keep "direct action" on the non-violent plane of non-cooperation and, until it announces its plan, it would perhaps be unwise to exclude absolutely its ability to do so; but, in the ordinary run of things, violence must result and must probably take on at least something of the character of a jehad.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
</b>
BTW, we are told later {#410, October 8} in a letter from Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell that "I hope, as you do, that this {NPA Smith's assessment of Direct Action, of which a para is above} will make an impression on Patel". So presumably Sardar Patel was shown this assessment.<!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-"A_Gupta"+-->QUOTE("A_Gupta")<!--QuoteEBegin-->
By contrast, to the planned communal terrorism of the Muslim League the British adopted a policy of: look the other way, take no effective action. NPA Smith, director of the Intelligence Bureau, wrote in a memorandum to the Viceroy Wavell who forwarded the same to London:
Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and lead us nowhere. <i>The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem</i>
This is why the original sources are important. Sorry, long post here, but I'm putting in the whole thing to put the N.P.A. Smith quote in its correct context.
This quote is from a letter from Mr Abell {George Edmund Brackenbury, Pvt Secy to the Viceroy} to Mr Harris {Randolph Montague Joseph, Pvt Secy to Secy of State for India} and is item 304, in the volume IX of the Transfer of Power papers.
<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->My dear Ronald,
H.E. thinks the Secretary of State may be interested in the enclosed note on the situation in India by Smith, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau.
Yours sincerely,
George Abell.
Enclosure:
British Angle
1. The game so far has been well played in that (a) both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government; (b) the Indian problem has been thereby thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism; © some kind of an opportunity for orderly evacuation now presents itself through the existence at the Centre of a government to which power can be transferred.
2. I fear, there is a tendency, now that we are temporarily in relatively untroubled waters -- from the purely British angle --, to forget that a storm will sooner or later again arise, and to move much too slowly in shedding our responsibilities. The fullest advantage should be taken of our present breathing space. In my view, the Secretary of State's control over civil officers should be abrogated at the earliest possible moment. This is only fair to the officers and has the political advantage that a decisive gesture of this kind will help to keep the problem on its correct communal plane.
3. The Quit India policy has now the general acceptance of almost all British officers. In the Congress Provinces, this acceptance is accompanied by a realisation of its complete inevitability and a general support of the line so far taken by H.M.G. In the non-Congress Provinces, and particularly in the Punjab, civil officers are apt to criticise bitterly H.M.G.'s policy and the moves made by H.E. This difference of outlook arises from difference of political circumstances. The Punjab is inclined to regard the rest of official India as defeatist and much of the rest of India regards the Punjab as living in a dead or dying past.
4. Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and leads us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem***
The Indian Angle
What is likely to eventuate? Very difficult to answer. My own views are --
(a) Whatever the position a few years ago, communal antagonism has now reached such a point of bitterness that it is difficult to see how Hindu and Muslim can jointly work the future. This antagonism may lessen, but the cleavage and difference of culture is so marked as to make healthy cooperation unlikely.
(b)It is clear that India, with its strongly fissiparous tendencies, can only continue to exist through a strong Centre.
© It is equally clear that this strong Centre will not be conceded by the Muslims, and is probably unattainable.
(d) The weak Centre of the present target carries within itself the seeds of disruption. It is difficult to foresee a joint policy in foreign affairs, and consequently in defence and finance.
(e)Indian leadership is so inept that there is little prospect of these inherent difficulties being overcome.
(f)I have little faith therefore in a successful outcome, in the long view, of the attempt to maintain a unified India. As I have said for some months, Pakistan is likely to flow from Congresstan (the acceptance of office by Congress).
(g)I do not think Pakistan will advantage the Indian Muslim, who is likely to be squeezed and embarrassed by stronger forces East and West of him; but if he is determined to have it, he will get it.
(h)If Congress were wise, they would either attempt to dissolve by a psychological approach the psychological mistrust which exists or they would establish a strong Centre for areas of Hindu preponderance and to the exclusion of the N-West. But I doubt if Congress is wise enough to do either of these things.
(i)Even if a strong Hindu Centre were established it is doubtful whether it could maintain itself for long in the face of a left-wing attack based on conditions rife for trouble, in labour, the peasantry, linguisitic and provincial jealousies, etc. Jai Prakash Narain and his ill-assorted horde threaten the future. Congress might conceivably handle them and the Communists with sufficient firmness, but they have not much time to spare, and with Nehru in the Cabinet, I doubt their capacity or even willingness.
(j)In brief, I am pessimistic and fear, first, Hindu-Muslim separation, and, secondly, some measure of Balkanisation. The threat of the extreme Left-Wing may serve to bring present Hindu-Muslim leadership closer together, but this remains to be seen.
(k)If pessimistic, I am also philosophical about all this. If we cannot control natural forces, we must accept them, keeping our eyes steadily on reasonable British interest.
(l) The psychological approach which I would commend to Congress would have to be one of great generosity -- an offer, if necessary, of one over parity. I suggested this to Sardar Patel and told him, moreover, that any attempt to force the Muslims would result, through the disintegration of the police and Army, in the loss of N.W. India. His reply was that, if I thought that generosity would placate the Muslim Oliver Twist, I did not understand either the Muslim mind or the situation. With which sentiment I am tempted to agree.
N.P.A Smith.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
***In a letter from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, September 24, 1946, N.P.A. Smith's assessment of "possible moves in the Muslim League field and the consequences that might flow from them" is included. {#360 in Volume VIII of the Transfer of Power}. I read this while looking for the quote that prompted this post. Strictly, to be fair, I should produce the whole letter, but it is now 2:00 AM.
NPA Smith wrote:<b>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->5. In brief, Mr Jinnah may be tempted by the knowledge of his possession of a very strong weapon which, though double-edged, can inflict deep wounds on his opponent. If he feels that the threat of its use is unavailing, he may well employ its reality. It is strange to think that, in the present century, the settlement of a dispute can be contemplated through the arbitrament, not merely of civil war, but of an insane butchery which spares neither women nor children. Nevertheless, the ghastly reality is there and it is beyond doubt that "jehad" is still an emotion of the Muslim mind and that relatively few Muslims will be found to resist its call, or to resist the pressure which sustains it. If, therefore, Mr. Jinnah does decide to plunge, the consequences will be of the gravest. The League has proclaimed its intention to keep "direct action" on the non-violent plane of non-cooperation and, until it announces its plan, it would perhaps be unwise to exclude absolutely its ability to do so; but, in the ordinary run of things, violence must result and must probably take on at least something of the character of a jehad.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
</b>
BTW, we are told later {#410, October 8} in a letter from Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell that "I hope, as you do, that this {NPA Smith's assessment of Direct Action, of which a para is above} will make an impression on Patel". So presumably Sardar Patel was shown this assessment.<!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->