06-25-2009, 01:34 PM
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabri...ngle/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35172&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=4b06ac06a9
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What Guidance Do Chinese Thinkers Draw from Mahan?
Long stigmatized in China for advocating imperialism and colonialism, Mahan has inspired a flurry of interest in Chinese scholarly and policy circles. Studies parsing terms like âcommand of the seaâ (zhihaiquan) and âcommand of communicationsâ (zhijiaotongquan) have proliferated. Some neo-Mahanians appear spellbound by the American theoristâs oft-cited description of command of the sea as âthat overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemyâs flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive.â Indeed, this bellicose-sounding phrase is by far the most common Mahan quotation to appear in Chinese commentary.
Strikingly, Imperial Japan has emerged as a model for PLAN development. Ni Lexiong, a professor of political science at the Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law, faults the Qing Dynasty for being insufficiently Mahanian in its 1894-1895 naval tilt against Japan. China, says Ni, should bear in mind that Mahan âbelieved that whoever could control the sea would win the war and change history; that command of the sea is achieved through decisive naval battles on the seas; that the outcome of decisive naval battles is determined by the strength of fire power on each side of the engagementâ [2]. That distinguished analysts now pay tribute to Japanese sea power marks a stunning reversal in Chinese strategic thought.
Like Mahan, Chinese thinkers connect thriving commerce with naval primacy. In the respected Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Major (Ret.) General Jiang Shiliang, then chief of the PLA General Logistics Department, invokes him to justify Chinese control of âstrategic passagesâ traversed by vital goods. For Jiang, the contest for âabsolute commandâ is a fact of life in international politics [3]. In a similar vein, Beijingâs 2004 Defense White Paper instructs the armed forces to âstrengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the airâ [4]. This remains the clearest statement of Chinaâs Mahanian outlook.
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What Guidance Do Chinese Thinkers Draw from Mahan?
Long stigmatized in China for advocating imperialism and colonialism, Mahan has inspired a flurry of interest in Chinese scholarly and policy circles. Studies parsing terms like âcommand of the seaâ (zhihaiquan) and âcommand of communicationsâ (zhijiaotongquan) have proliferated. Some neo-Mahanians appear spellbound by the American theoristâs oft-cited description of command of the sea as âthat overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemyâs flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive.â Indeed, this bellicose-sounding phrase is by far the most common Mahan quotation to appear in Chinese commentary.
Strikingly, Imperial Japan has emerged as a model for PLAN development. Ni Lexiong, a professor of political science at the Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law, faults the Qing Dynasty for being insufficiently Mahanian in its 1894-1895 naval tilt against Japan. China, says Ni, should bear in mind that Mahan âbelieved that whoever could control the sea would win the war and change history; that command of the sea is achieved through decisive naval battles on the seas; that the outcome of decisive naval battles is determined by the strength of fire power on each side of the engagementâ [2]. That distinguished analysts now pay tribute to Japanese sea power marks a stunning reversal in Chinese strategic thought.
Like Mahan, Chinese thinkers connect thriving commerce with naval primacy. In the respected Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Major (Ret.) General Jiang Shiliang, then chief of the PLA General Logistics Department, invokes him to justify Chinese control of âstrategic passagesâ traversed by vital goods. For Jiang, the contest for âabsolute commandâ is a fact of life in international politics [3]. In a similar vein, Beijingâs 2004 Defense White Paper instructs the armed forces to âstrengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the airâ [4]. This remains the clearest statement of Chinaâs Mahanian outlook.
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