Twirp: Terrorist Wahabi Islamic Rep Pakistan 4

[dhu]

Sharm surrender not surprising
Balbir K Punj

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Why did Prime Minister Manmohan Singh blink at the meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in Sharm el-Sheikh? The truth is that he was under tremendous pressure from the US to give the beleaguered Pakistani regime a breather, notwithstanding all the nice things that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to say during her recent visit to New Delhi earlier this week.

With Mr Gilani hailing the so-called Indian ‘admission’ on Baluchistan as a huge victory, Mr Singh has been left with little room to manoeuvre. Although the Prime Minister has claimed that the reference to Baluchistan in the joint statement issued in Sharm el-Sheikh was not a climbdown, his counterpart has given it a different twist. Speaking to the media after his return to Islamabad, Mr Gilani said, “The joint statement ...underlines our concerns over India’s interference in Baluchistan and other areas.”

The Government’s apologists have been arguing that in exchange of India agreeing to include Baluchistan, Mr Gilani had agreed not to make any reference to Kashmir in the joint statement. This is hardly justifiable. By putting Baluchistan on the table, Mr Singh has given Pakistan an additional issue to deflect the blame for cross-border terrorism. Besides, it will be naïve to believe that Pakistan will actually give up on Kashmir.

On the other hand, our position on the composite dialogue process has also shifted, courtesy Mr Singh. Ever since 26/11, our stand had been that the dialogue process would only resume when there was credible evidence to show that the Pakistani authorities had taken appropriate action against those who planned the Mumbai terror strikes.

But in a baffling turnaround, Mr Singh actually agreed to de-link the two issues. Thus, in one move Mr Singh relinquished all the strategic-diplomatic advantage that New Delhi had over Islamabad.

The Government, in its enthusiasm to curry favour with the Obama Administration, has clearly overlooked the nuances of Islamabad’s relationship with terrorist organisations. Studies by US think-tanks and Congressional groups have revealed how these organisations are an intrinsic part of Pakistan’s strategic diplomacy vis-à-vis India. In dealing with Pakistan we have to constantly remind ourselves that it is the Pakistani Army that calls the shots in that country and that civilian Governments have limited clout.

Surely our Government’s strategists know what Pakistan’s chief military spokesman, Maj-Gen Athar Abbas, said in an interview with the CNN. In effect, Gen Abbas revealed that the Pakistani military was still very much in touch with the top leaders of the Afghan Taliban and could facilitate negotiations between them and the Obama Administration. The report of this interview adds: “The quid pro quo, he (Abbas) said, for any role as a broker between the US and the Taliban, Pakistan wants concessions from Washington with respect to long-term rival India. ‘What we see as a concern is the over-involvement of the Indians in Afghanistan. This becomes a concern particularly if one is watching the security calculus in the region,’ Abbas said. ‘The fear is what will happen tomorrow if the Americans move out and they are replaced by the Indians...’.”

In this background we have to be greatly concerned when our Prime Minister concedes so much to Pakistan. The US has to ensure some quid pro quo for Islamabad for its ‘action’ on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. For the Americans, India’s acceptance to resume the composite dialogue process with Pakistan without linking it to the latter’s progress on checking anti-India terrorism would be a significant diplomatic victory as they could then pressurise Islamabad to do even more on its western border.

Mr Singh might try to give the joint statement his own interpretation. But it is as plain as daylight that the present Government’s strategy against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism essentially depends on Washington, DC getting Islamabad to deliver. The Pakistani Army is presently moving against the Taliban and their allied terror outfits under American pressure. The basic objective of the US AfPak policy is to somehow stabilise the situation in Afghanistan and strengthen the administrations both in Kabul and Islamabad to facilitate a withdrawal of American forces from the region. India’s security concerns are secondary. In Egypt, Mr Singh, eager to score brownie points with the Obama Administration, bartered away India’s strategic interests.

For the Congress this may not be anything unusual — did not another Congress Prime Minister let the Russians score a diplomatic triumph at India’s expense in Tashkent? Similarly, the first Prime Minister of India had given up our historic clout in Tibet in return for a paper promise from the then Chinese Prime Minister respecting Tibet’s autonomy. Yet another Congress Prime Minister in 1971 gave up the advantage India had by way of 90,000 Pakistani POWs in return for some vague promises by a wily Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

Mr Singh, in keeping with tradition, has now given Pakistan an issue to counter the charge of terrorism that New Delhi levels against Islamabad. The history of Congress Governments jeopardising our national interests continues to be played out time after time.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->