04-26-2005, 05:10 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Diplomacy of India: Then and Now.
by Rene Wadlow
Harish Kapur New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2002 399 pages
<i>Harish Kapur, emeritus professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, has written a first-rate study of the making of Indian foreign policy, following up on his earlier India's Foreign Policy 1947-1992: Shadows and Substance. </i>
Kapur looks in particular at the environments that India inherited at birth--domestic, regional and global--for as he notes, all states "have to adapt their foreign policy to the changing realities of the planet--realities which often escape them, and over which they hardly have any control." What control they do have, however, is the result of the decisions made by individuals in positions of power, individuals influenced by their education and experience, by their evaluation of the possibilities for action and by the domestic pressures which often limit their choices. Thus Kapur looks in particular at the role of the Prime Ministers in the making and execution of foreign policy.
India began its independent life with Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister. Nehru was a man educated for leadership with wide experience in Europe in the 1930s, where he met others active in the anticolonial struggle and who were to play important roles in their countries. With his close friend, Krishna Menon, who shared a similar background, Nehru was able to play a high profile role in world politics, especially at the start of the Cold War and as a mediator in the 1950-1953 Korean War, which some feared was the forerunner of a broader armed conflict. Indian diplomats were also able to work on compromise formulas during the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China.
In many ways, Nehru had a free hand in setting foreign policy goals and in creating a diplomatic style. The first real foreign policy issue at Independence was the creation of Pakistan with the resulting population flows and the division of Kashmir. However, Pakistan and Kashmir were considered by most Indians as a "domestic" problem. Although the Kashmir issue was taken to the United Nations and was one of the first major issues which the UN had to face, relations with Pakistan, the integration of refugees and relations with the domestic Muslim population have always been the focus of domestic political activity.
Thus the 1950s were a period when the Cold War structures were being put into place, and the function of neutral-non-aligned mediators was needed for no one could know how stable the bipolar system was to become.
This period of international mediation combined with proposing international norms came to an end in 1962--the result of the frontier conflict with China. The conflict was widely considered a defeat for India and India was seen as an unsuccessful state in the international system. As Kaput writes,
<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> Since nothing blights more the image of a nation than failure, the defeat at the hand of the Chinese conjured up an international perception of India whose attributes were that of a country which had become weak, incoherent, unable to defend its own interests, and which had to turn to the outside for help and protection. Nothing is forgiven in international relations, least of all the defeat of a country that has the normative pretensions of building a self-reliant and self-sustaining nation. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Krishna Menon left political life, and Nehru was personally targeted for not having been vigilant enough of the Chinese menace. Nehru died in 1964 before he was able to change this image of India. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, Prime Minister from 1965-1977 and again in 1980 until her assassination in 1984, had been educated in Europe and had known many foreign leaders as her father's official hostess. While she tried to control both foreign and domestic policy decisions, the international environment had changed. Although there were still crises, the Cold War had become stable, and neither Russians nor Americans felt the need for intermediaries.
Thus, only the regional area was open for action, which Indira Gandhi took in the lead up to Bangladesh independence in 1971. Regional politics became the main focus of Indian diplomacy seeking to influence events in Sri Lanka and Nepal whose tensions could spill over into domestic Indian politics. As Kapur points out,
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> But after Nehru things began to change. The balance slowly tilted in favour of regionalism. While the global policy began to gradually lose its lustre, its coherence, its framework, and, what is more, its importance, the broad contours of a regional policy began to emerge--a policy that was more coherent, more pragmatic, more national-oriented and more forceful. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Such a pragmatic and regional focus also fit better the talents and possibilities of many of the subsequent Prime Ministers and the contours of domestic politics. The Indian domestic political structure moved from a domination by the Congress Party to one of coalition governments often made up of "strange bedfellows." This was first seen in the government of Morarji Desai (1977-1979). Kapur analyses this change: "By its very nature, a government composed of different political parties, is disparate, making it exceedingly difficult for the one who is heading it to exercise the same degree of authority as a one party government." In his summing up, Kaput poses fundamental questions:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> One can validly ask what is in store for India in the post-cold war and post-Soviet international system? What can India do to safeguard national security? Where is the threat emanating from? Who are its present and potential adversaries? Can they really be identified?" India needs to seriously examine all that goes under national security in order to establish an overall picture of present and future threats, of direct and indirect menaces, of possible external attacks, of externally inspired internal upheavals, and of the possible linkage between ecological degradation and national security. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
There is a need for a strong domestic base in order to carry out a successful foreign policy. There are two structural requirements for such a strong domestic foundation. <b>The first need is a national consensus on the nature of a viable political-economic regime and using this broad consensus to counter disintegrating forces operating within the country such as secessionist movements and caste and religion -based politics.</b> The second requirement for a strong domestic base is modernisation within a global world economy. Kapur asks, "But, will this globalization of the economy help India to tackle the economic problems it is currently faced with? Will all this new ongoing globalization of the economy finally open possibilities for it to grow rapidly, to obtain the necessary transfer of resources, and to become more export-oriented?"
<b>In this book, Harish Kaput provides the methodological tools for analysis of Indian diplomacy and the interplay of domestic and external influences. This is an important guide for understanding South Asian diplomatic politics. </b>
Rene Wadlow
Transnational Perspectives
F-07140 Gravieres
France <!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->
by Rene Wadlow
Harish Kapur New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2002 399 pages
<i>Harish Kapur, emeritus professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, has written a first-rate study of the making of Indian foreign policy, following up on his earlier India's Foreign Policy 1947-1992: Shadows and Substance. </i>
Kapur looks in particular at the environments that India inherited at birth--domestic, regional and global--for as he notes, all states "have to adapt their foreign policy to the changing realities of the planet--realities which often escape them, and over which they hardly have any control." What control they do have, however, is the result of the decisions made by individuals in positions of power, individuals influenced by their education and experience, by their evaluation of the possibilities for action and by the domestic pressures which often limit their choices. Thus Kapur looks in particular at the role of the Prime Ministers in the making and execution of foreign policy.
India began its independent life with Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister. Nehru was a man educated for leadership with wide experience in Europe in the 1930s, where he met others active in the anticolonial struggle and who were to play important roles in their countries. With his close friend, Krishna Menon, who shared a similar background, Nehru was able to play a high profile role in world politics, especially at the start of the Cold War and as a mediator in the 1950-1953 Korean War, which some feared was the forerunner of a broader armed conflict. Indian diplomats were also able to work on compromise formulas during the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China.
In many ways, Nehru had a free hand in setting foreign policy goals and in creating a diplomatic style. The first real foreign policy issue at Independence was the creation of Pakistan with the resulting population flows and the division of Kashmir. However, Pakistan and Kashmir were considered by most Indians as a "domestic" problem. Although the Kashmir issue was taken to the United Nations and was one of the first major issues which the UN had to face, relations with Pakistan, the integration of refugees and relations with the domestic Muslim population have always been the focus of domestic political activity.
Thus the 1950s were a period when the Cold War structures were being put into place, and the function of neutral-non-aligned mediators was needed for no one could know how stable the bipolar system was to become.
This period of international mediation combined with proposing international norms came to an end in 1962--the result of the frontier conflict with China. The conflict was widely considered a defeat for India and India was seen as an unsuccessful state in the international system. As Kaput writes,
<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> Since nothing blights more the image of a nation than failure, the defeat at the hand of the Chinese conjured up an international perception of India whose attributes were that of a country which had become weak, incoherent, unable to defend its own interests, and which had to turn to the outside for help and protection. Nothing is forgiven in international relations, least of all the defeat of a country that has the normative pretensions of building a self-reliant and self-sustaining nation. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Krishna Menon left political life, and Nehru was personally targeted for not having been vigilant enough of the Chinese menace. Nehru died in 1964 before he was able to change this image of India. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, Prime Minister from 1965-1977 and again in 1980 until her assassination in 1984, had been educated in Europe and had known many foreign leaders as her father's official hostess. While she tried to control both foreign and domestic policy decisions, the international environment had changed. Although there were still crises, the Cold War had become stable, and neither Russians nor Americans felt the need for intermediaries.
Thus, only the regional area was open for action, which Indira Gandhi took in the lead up to Bangladesh independence in 1971. Regional politics became the main focus of Indian diplomacy seeking to influence events in Sri Lanka and Nepal whose tensions could spill over into domestic Indian politics. As Kapur points out,
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> But after Nehru things began to change. The balance slowly tilted in favour of regionalism. While the global policy began to gradually lose its lustre, its coherence, its framework, and, what is more, its importance, the broad contours of a regional policy began to emerge--a policy that was more coherent, more pragmatic, more national-oriented and more forceful. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Such a pragmatic and regional focus also fit better the talents and possibilities of many of the subsequent Prime Ministers and the contours of domestic politics. The Indian domestic political structure moved from a domination by the Congress Party to one of coalition governments often made up of "strange bedfellows." This was first seen in the government of Morarji Desai (1977-1979). Kapur analyses this change: "By its very nature, a government composed of different political parties, is disparate, making it exceedingly difficult for the one who is heading it to exercise the same degree of authority as a one party government." In his summing up, Kaput poses fundamental questions:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> One can validly ask what is in store for India in the post-cold war and post-Soviet international system? What can India do to safeguard national security? Where is the threat emanating from? Who are its present and potential adversaries? Can they really be identified?" India needs to seriously examine all that goes under national security in order to establish an overall picture of present and future threats, of direct and indirect menaces, of possible external attacks, of externally inspired internal upheavals, and of the possible linkage between ecological degradation and national security. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
There is a need for a strong domestic base in order to carry out a successful foreign policy. There are two structural requirements for such a strong domestic foundation. <b>The first need is a national consensus on the nature of a viable political-economic regime and using this broad consensus to counter disintegrating forces operating within the country such as secessionist movements and caste and religion -based politics.</b> The second requirement for a strong domestic base is modernisation within a global world economy. Kapur asks, "But, will this globalization of the economy help India to tackle the economic problems it is currently faced with? Will all this new ongoing globalization of the economy finally open possibilities for it to grow rapidly, to obtain the necessary transfer of resources, and to become more export-oriented?"
<b>In this book, Harish Kaput provides the methodological tools for analysis of Indian diplomacy and the interplay of domestic and external influences. This is an important guide for understanding South Asian diplomatic politics. </b>
Rene Wadlow
Transnational Perspectives
F-07140 Gravieres
France <!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->