India - China: Relations And Developments-2

[Guest]

US also pushed "Family planning" and "Happy abortion crowd" in India. Funds comes from number of foundations.

Last week, Hillary Clinton was promoting abortion in Canada for Africa and Asia.

[Guest]

[url="http://in.news.yahoo.com/210/20100406/1486/ttc-report-china-based-hackers-stole-ind.html"]Report: China-based hackers stole India secrets, AS[/url]

BEIJING (AP) China-based hackers stole Indian national security information, 1,500 e-mails from the Dalai Lama's office and other sensitive documents, a new report said Tuesday. Researchers at the University of Toronto said they were able to observe the hacking and trace it to core servers located in China and to people based in the southwestern city of Chengdu.



The researchers said they monitored the hacking for the past eight months. The report said it has no evidence of involvement by the Chinese government, but it again put Beijing on the defensive.



"We have from time to time heard this kind of news. I don't know the purpose of stirring up these issues," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told a regular press conference in response to questions about the report.



"We are firmly opposed to various kinds of hacking activities through the Internet," Jiang said. She said China will fight cybercrime according to law.



She added that the researchers have not formally contacted China. The report describes a hacking operation called the "Shadow network" that researchers were able to observe as it broke into computers and took information, including computers at Indian diplomatic offices in Kabul, Moscow and elsewhere.



The identity and motivation of the hackers remain unknown, the report said. "We have no evidence in this report of the involvement of the People's Republic of China," it added.



"But an important question to be entertained is whether the PRC will take action to shut the Shadow network down." There was no immediate comment Tuesday from the government in India, China's massive neighbor to the south with which it has a growing military rivalry and lingering territorial disputes.



Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna is visiting China this week to take part in celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries. The office of the Dalai Lama was aware of new hacking report.



"These things are not new," said Tenzin Takhlha, a spokesman for the office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader accused by China of supporting independence for Tibet. He said the office is working closely with the researchers to secure its computer systems.



A Canadian research group involved in Tuesday's report, the Information Warfare Monitor, released a similar report a year ago that said a cyberspy network, based mainly in China, hacked into classified documents from government and private organizations in 103 countries, including the computers of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles. Tibet's government-in-exile quickly denounced that network at the time.

[acharya]

China’s War Plan



Classified military documents on China’s strategy for a limited war against India confirm our worst fears: China can take Arunachal in 48 hours. And we are in no hurry to do anything about it.



BY Suman Sharma







Bumla: The border post in Arunachal Pradesh where Sino-Indian officials meet at least four times a year. The issues they discuss here range from military incursions to civilians who stray across the border.



The PLA has shifted away from the strategy that gave it victory in the 1962 war against India. But even today, the result is unlikely to be much different.



The PLA has shifted away from the strategy that gave it victory in the 1962 war against India. But even today, the result is unlikely to be much different.



Karu: One more mechanised infantry regiment of the Indian Army is to come up soon, comprising light infantry combat vehicles. As of now, only 52 such vehicles are manning the Sino-Indian border in Karu.



North Sikkim: The Indian Army plans to increase its armoured presence in this area. Most likely to be moved: the 66th Armoured Regiment.



McMahon Line: The line that serves as the effective border between India and China was actually the result of the 1914 Simla Accord between Great Britain and Tibet.



Repeated violations of the Indo-Chinese border lead to an escalation in the war of words, but India continues to believe that the Chinese are following their usual pattern of aggravation and conciliation. Rapid Reaction Forces, comprising 4 divisions stationed at Chengdu and Lanzhou after an overnight mobilisation cross rapidly into Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Indian defences are caught unawares, but the Fifth Mountain Division in Tenga engages the invading forces. They find themselves badly outmatched, not only outnumbered but also out-equipped because the Chinese RRF also include airborne assets. The Indian forces have no immediate airlift capacity to provide back up. Within the next 48 hours Arunachal is overrun. The other Indian divisions in the region need at least a week to reach the zone of conflict. By then, the Chinese have achieved their goal of winning a limited war.



The above scenario is no conjecture, it is a plausible outcome of the Chinese doctrine of war against India. The Delhi-based Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), a tri-services institution for planning joint doctrines for the Indian military, in its assessment of Chinese military might, has analysed the Chinese plan for winning limited wars under hi-tech conditions.



The document, a copy of which is available with Open, speaks of a Chinese strategy based on the use of RRFs or ‘fist units’ to fight local wars that ‘can achieve the political objective rendering major wars unnecessary’. These fist units are self contained units to be deployed as ground forces in direct combat, and were raised after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasis on numbers-in-action in a numerically huge army gave way to a capability-driven force.



In other words, the PLA has shifted away from the strategy that gave it victory in the 1962 war against India. But even today, the result is unlikely to be much different. Now, instead of overwhelming numbers, it is the rapidity of movement and mobilisation that is likely to overwhelm India, perhaps leading to a scenario no different from what transpired in 1962.



Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs):



»Total of 23 RRFs in China



»Elite Units trained to carry out ops in all types of terrain



»Meant to provide quick reaction capability to deal with contingencies of local/limited border conflicts



»Maintained at full strength



»Kept in high state of operation readiness



»Exempt from non-operational duties



»Provided modern equipment, high grade communications



»Capability of reaching anywhere within China in 7 days, likely to be reduced further



Speaking to Open, former Army Chief VP Malik confirms, “The Chinese have built infrastructure and have their Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) in place, and are prepared for short wars at the border, as far as movement of troops at short notice and arms are concerned, as they’ve been using an active defence strategy all along which has a certain amount of offensive in that. India earlier was thinking of converting one of its Army divisions into rapid reaction, but did not do it. We need to build our forces in terms of lift capability, landing, light arms and weapons, accordingly—something that was suggested by the IAF and Army earlier, but has not really taken off. Even electronically, the Chinese are far ahead of us.”



The IDS assessment of the Chinese WZC doctrine, done alongwith the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), talks about China’s three-fold War Zone Campaign (WZC) doctrine—elite force sharp arms (that is, suitable hi-tech equipment), fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution and gaining initiative by striking first. For this purpose, ranged against India are the following:



»In Chengdu adjoining north eastern Arunachal Pradesh: 3 Divisions and one artillery brigade



»In Lanzhou adjoining northwestern Arunachal: 3 divisions and one artillery brigade



These divisions provide a strength of 94,000 men against which India has ranged 9 Mountain Divisions comprising 90,000 men, but most of these would not even enter the conflict. Of the six Chinese divisions, four are airborne RRFs and can be moved within 48 hours on the back of airlift capability granted by Y8, IL-76 and H5 transport planes in the region. With rail and road infrastructure in place, mobilisation time could be further reduced. The Lhasa-Beijing railway line, the highest in the world, would further help in transporting troops and logistics. In contrast, India’s first C-130J transport plane would enter service only in February 2011. As a result, seven of India’s eight mountain divisions in the northeast would be of no use against an offensive as laid out in the Chinese War Doctrine.



The eight Indian mountain divisions in the northeast are as follows:



»2nd mountain Div in Dinjan



»5 mountain Div in Tenga



»17 mountain Div in Gangtok



»20 mountain Div in Rangiya,



»27 mountain Div in Kalimpong



»56 mountain Div in Zakhama



»57 mountain Div in Leimakhong



»71 mountain Div in Assam (still in the process of being raised)



No armoured or airborne units are part of mountain divisions in this region. Moreover, these units require at least a week to be mobilised, which would be time enough for China to bring its entire force of RRFs to bear against India. The numbers in Chengdu and Lanzhou can be backed up by any of the 19 other RRF divisions across China; given their airlift capabilities, many of them can reach the theatre of operations within a week, which is still faster than what it would take Indian troops located far closer to the action.



Former Army Chief JJ Singh sounds sanguine: “The enunciation of a doctrine and the creation of rapid reaction forces (RRFs) is a fundamental imperative for any military. RRF is a high sounding name for ‘reinforcements and reserves which are capable of quick induction’. There is nothing new in that. No professional army can be ‘sans’ doctrine, and no general can ignore having reserve forces in a ‘ready and relevant’ mode, to be employed when and where required.”







But the fact is the Indian response to the scenario laid out in documents compiled by its institutions has been slow in coming. India lacks infrastructure in the northeast. The Border Roads Organisation is still in the process of coming up with roads and other structures in the area nearly four decades after the defeat suffered at the hands of the Chinese. An amount of Rs 2,000 crore is now being pumped in for the re-activation of the advanced landing grounds (ALG) in the northeast and Ladakh.



In September 2009, in Nyoma, eastern Ladakh, an IAF An-32 transport aircraft landed at the ALG, at an altitude of 13,300 feet, and became the first fixed wing to land at the compact airstrip, which is 23 km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Helicopters have been landing at the place, though. Nyoma was re-activated as part of the seven defunct airfields which were to be re-activated, and came after Daulat Beg Oldie and Fukche in Ladakh, which were made operational in 2008. Daulat Beg Oldie is the highest airfield in the world at an altitude of 16,200 feet.



But in Arunachal Pradesh, Machuka, Tuting, Paasighat and Along still await re-activation. And it is here that the Indian vulnerability which was so badly exposed in 1962 persists. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict, and as a result, China registered major gains over India and seized Rezang La in Chushul in the western theatre and Tawang in the eastern theatre. The Chinese strategy was clear: the main assault was launched in the eastern sector, while a simultaneous but smaller assault took place in the western sector. All Indian troops in territories that China claimed belonged to it in the eastern sector were ousted before China declared a ceasefire in November 1962.



The Government’s own assessment of the failures of 1962, recorded in the official history of the war, reads: ‘Strategically, Walong, Tawang and the forward areas in Ladakh were indefensible in 1962 against a major attack. But, regarding eastern Ladakh in particular, it is difficult to think up any viable strategy to save it once the Chinese have stolen a march in logistics by quietly building the road through Akshai Chin.’ That is precisely what the Chinese are busy doing now: stealing the march in logistics.



India, on the other hand, continues to respond slowly. Two Sukhoi-30 squadrons are planned for Tezpur and one for Mohanbari, but only Six Sukhoi-30 aircraft are flying in Tezpur currently. Six C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, which India is buying from the US, are to be based in the northeast, in all likelihood in Jorhat as these aircraft need very little space and can take off and land on short runways.



There is no armoured regiment in the east or northeast. The 66 Armoured Regiment at the Indo-Bangladesh border is to be used for any eventuality in the east and northeast, till light tanks are bought for use at high altitudes.



The Indian Army plans to buy around 300 light tanks, mainly for the China-centric Karu-based 3rd Division, but plans to increase armoured presence in the North Sikkim plateau are also under active consideration.



But even as India gears up to meet the current Chinese threat, China is already planning for the future. As a result, the gap in capabilities is unlikely to shrink, if not grow wider.At the moment, while India has technological superiority in air power, this is also being neutralised by the Chinese. China is inducting 40 Sukhoi 27s and 300 J 10 fighters, 10 IL 78 mid-air refuellers, 4 Awacs and around 4 to 6 airborne early warning aircraft. This will take care of the current imbalance. The addition of 40 IL 76 heavy lift aircraft will bolster their airlift capabilities which will cater to another 48 additional airborne divisions that are being raised this year. In addition, the DIA estimates the Chinese have an additional 500 civilian aircraft for the airlifting of troops.



Former Air Chief FH Major tells Open that while some of the claims may be exaggerated, China does enjoy an advantage in numbers: “300 J-10 aircraft by the end of 2010 is too high an expectation as each aircraft requires clearance before becoming fully operational. But, inventory-wise China is ahead of us with their force multipliers and counter measures.”



In 1962 as well, the Indian establishment misjudged the intent of the Chinese. The Indian intelligence apparatus told the Government in Delhi that the Chinese ‘were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so’.



The 1962 incursion proved it wrong. The closing remarks of SN Prasad, chief editor of that war’s official history that was commissioned by the Union Ministry of Defence, sound a note of caution worth mentioning here: ‘In the long history of war, defeat has always proved a better teacher than victory. The 1962 war proved it once again. But no nation can afford to have many such teachers.’

[Capt M Kumar]

India losing focus

The entry of China as an observer country along with Japan, Iran, Mauritius, South Korea, Australia, the US and European Union into SAARC clearly has far-reaching implications on India’s South Asian policy. Instead of India emerging as facilitator of socio-economic development in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan, it is Chinese developmental assistance that’s having a larger impact, while New Delhi is busy repeating the old mantra of South Asia being its exclusive sphere of influence. http://www.indiatimes.com/photostory/5872101.cms

[Guest]

China's move west is as much motivated by desire to claim buddhism as desire to claim land.

[HareKrishna]

next step

Buddha was actually a chinese. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/rolleyes.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[agnivayu]

[quote name='HareKrishna' date='14 June 2010 - 02:52 AM' timestamp='1276463640' post='106887']

next step

Buddha was actually a chinese. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/rolleyes.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[/quote]



They are working on it already, building a big statue of him in India with Mongoloid features.

Chinese have already claimed Kung Fu which originated in India.

[HareKrishna]

[quote name='agnivayu' date='14 June 2010 - 07:16 AM' timestamp='1276479513' post='106890']

They are working on it already, building a big statue of him in India with Mongoloid features.

Chinese have already claimed Kung Fu which originated in India.

[/quote]

I ALSO READ ABOUT CHINESE ORIGIN OF TANTRA.

They claim that all mongoloids originated in China .And that mon-khmer,thai,indonesians,bhutanese,tibetans,birmanians are proto-chinese imigrants from southern-China,so is the China duty to "father" this nations.

[agnivayu]

[quote name='HareKrishna' date='14 June 2010 - 11:22 PM' timestamp='1276537443' post='106904']

I ALSO READ ABOUT CHINESE ORIGIN OF TANTRA.

They claim that all mongoloids originated in China .And that mon-khmer,thai,indonesians,bhutanese,tibetans,birmanians are proto-chinese imigrants from southern-China,so is the China duty to "father" this nations.

[/quote]



It sounds very similar to the European colonial mentality. Only problem for the elite Han race is all these countries already have experience with colonialism and can't be taken over easily. I hope all these races flood China like immigrants have poured into Europe. That should teach the ultra-nationalist Han a lesson.

[Guest]

[url="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/rent-a-white-guy/8119/"]Rent a White Guy[/url]

Confessions of a fake businessman from Beijing

NOT LONG AGO I was offered work as a quality-control expert with an American company in China I’d never heard of. No experience necessary—which was good, because I had none. I’d be paid $1,000 for a week, put up in a fancy hotel, and wined and dined in Dongying, an industrial city in Shandong province I’d also never heard of. The only requirements were a fair complexion and a suit.



“I call these things ‘White Guy in a Tie’ events,” a Canadian friend of a friend named Jake told me during the recruitment pitch he gave me in Beijing, where I live. “Basically, you put on a suit, shake some hands, and make some money. We’ll be in ‘quality control,’ but nobody’s gonna be doing any quality control. You in?”



I was.



And so I became a fake businessman in China, an often lucrative gig for underworked expatriates here. One friend, an American who works in film, was paid to represent a Canadian company and give a speech espousing a low-carbon future. Another was flown to Shanghai to act as a seasonal-gifts buyer. Recruiting fake businessmen is one way to create the image—particularly, the image of connection—that Chinese companies crave. My Chinese-language tutor, at first aghast about how much we were getting paid, put it this way: “Having foreigners in nice suits gives the company face.”



Six of us met at the Beijing airport, where Jake briefed us on the details. We were supposedly representing a California-based company that was building a facility in Dongying. Our responsibilities would include making daily trips to the construction site, attending a ribbon-cutting ceremony, and hobnobbing. During the ceremony, one of us would have to give a speech as the company’s director. That duty fell to my friend Ernie, who, in his late 30s, was the oldest of our group. His business cards had already been made.



Dongying was home to Sun Tzu, the author of The Art of War, and that’s just about all it has going for it. The landscape is dry and bleak, with factories in all directions. We were met at the airport by Ken, a young Canadian of Taiwanese extraction with a brush cut and leather jacket, whose company, we were told, had been subcontracted to manage the project.



The lobby at our hotel was dimly lit and smelled like bad seafood. “At least we have a nice view,” Ernie deadpanned as he opened the drapes in our room to reveal a scrap yard. A truck had been stripped for parts, and old tires were heaped into a pile. A dog yelped.



Ken drove us to the company’s temporary offices: small rooms with cement floors and metal walls arranged around a courtyard. We toured the facility, which built high-tech manufacturing equipment, then returned to the office and sat for hours. Across the courtyard, we could hear Ernie rehearsing his speech.



The next morning was the official ribbon-cutting ceremony. A stage and red carpet had been set up near the construction site. Pretty girls in red dragon-patterned dresses greeted visitors, and Chinese pop blared from loudspeakers. Down the street, police in yellow vests directed traffic. The mayor was there with other local dignitaries, and so were TV cameras and reporters. We stood in the front row wearing suits, safety vests, and hard hats. As we waited for the ceremony to begin, a foreman standing beside me barked at workers still visible on the construction site. They scurried behind the scaffolding.



“Are you the boss?” I asked him.



He looked at me quizzically. “You’re the boss.”



Actually, Ernie was the boss. After a brief introduction, “Director” Ernie delivered his speech before the hundred or so people in attendance. He boasted about the company’s long list of international clients and emphasized how happy we were to be working on such an important project. When the speech was over, confetti blasted over the stage, fireworks popped above the dusty field beside us, and Ernie posed for a photo with the mayor.



For the next few days, we sat in the office swatting flies and reading magazines, purportedly high-level employees of a U.S. company that, I later discovered, didn’t really exist. We were so important, in fact, that two of the guys were hired to stay for eight months (to be fair, they actually then received quality-control training).



“Lots happening,” Ken told me. “We need people for a week every month. It’ll be better next time, too. We’ll have new offices.” He paused before adding: “Bring a computer. You can watch movies all day.”

<img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[Guest]

[url="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7935350/Chinese-soldiers-invade-India-in-pursuit-of-valuable-love-flower.html"]Chinese soldiers invade India in pursuit of valuable 'love flower'[/url]

Chinese soldiers are crossing the Indian border to gather lucrative rare mushrooms, reputed to have aphrodisiac properties, that sell for £3,000 a kilogramme.

It grows at high altitude on remote Himalayan peaks along the border areas of Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and India and has been prized as a herbal medicine in Tibet and China since the 15th century.



Indian officials said troops from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) are sneaking across the disputed MacMahon Line border.



While the fungus, which has been dubbed the 'love flower,' is not particularly valued in India, its value has soared in China as an aphrodisiac.



"There have been instances of sporadic intrusion into the Indian side by the PLA in small groups .They come, stay there for a while and then go back," said Arunachal Pradesh's home minister Tako Dabi. "When they meet locals or are challenged by security officials the Chinese military personnel usually say they have entered Indian territory to collect wild fungus from the mountains. They call it the 'love flower".



Gen J.J Singh, Arunachal Pradesh's Governor, sought to play down the seriousness of 'incursions' yesterday, and said Chinese villagers were the main smugglers coming across into India.

[Capt M Kumar]

Towards the end of the 45 minutes, the debate shifted to comparing India's democracy to the Chinese system. The majority of the panelists did agree that India's biggest strength lies in its democracy but the system could not be a ploy to slow down decision-making. Can a messy democracy overcome a different political system? Do we have an answer as to who will win this amazing race?



The founder and the controlling shareholder of Network 18, Bahl has produced a gem of a book that reveals how India's Tortoise holds a 50/50 chance of catching up to China's Hare. http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/...88498.aspx

[Guest]

[url="http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-dismisses-report-of-confiscation-of-material-in-China/H1-Article1-593439.aspx"]India dismisses report of confiscation of material in China[/url]

India today dismissed reports of alleged confiscation of some printed material depicting its map from the 'India Pavilion' at the Shanghai Expo by Chinese authorities in July, amid a row between the two countries over China's refusal to issue visa to a top Indian Army officer. "I have seen a report...about alleged confiscation of some printed material depicting the Indian map, from the Indian pavilion at Shanghai Expo by the Chinese authorities," the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs said. He said, "There is no factual basis to this report. There has been no interference in the functioning of our pavilion at Shanghai Expo".



The report had said the Chinese police had seized the material showing maps depicting Arunachal Pradesh as part of India. The comments come close on the heels of a major diplomatic row between the two countries after China refused to permit an Indian army general to visit that country as he is in-charge of "sensitive" Jammu and Kashmir. In an angry retaliation, India put all defence exchanges with it on hold till the matter was sorted out.

[Arun_S]

[size="2"]

[url="http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/pakistan-handing-over-control-of-pok-to-china-48051"]Pakistan handing over control of PoK to China? [/url][url="http://www.ndtv.com/news/search/result.php?cx=partner-pub-7641565019577886%3Ax0cui3-m2pp&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=Selig%20S%20Harrison,%20New%20York%20Times&sa=Go&siteurl=www.ndtv.com%252Fnews%252Findex.php#1143"]Selig S Harrison, New York Times[/url], Updated: August 29, 2010 18:34 IST



[url="http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-deploys-11-000-troops-in-gilgit-area-in-occupied-kashmir/673770/0"]China deploys 11,000 troops in Gilgit area in Occupied Kashmir[/url]



[url="http://www.c3sindia.org/india/1590"] Time to Put China in Its Place ( B.S.Raghavan, C3S Paper No.575 dated August 29, 2010) [/url][/size]

[size="2"]

[url="http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indus-calling/entry/stone-pelters-from-beijing"]Stone pelters from Beijing[/url][/size][size="2"][url="http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indus-calling/page/authorProfile?page=authorProfile"] Tarun Vijay[/url], 28 August 2010, 11:32 PM IST

[/size]

[size="2"][url="http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/08/dealing-with-chinese-machinations-on-jk.html#more-4089"]China supports Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir ![/url][/size][size="2"] By [b] B Raman [/size]

[size="2"][url="http://dailypioneer.com/279273/Whimpering-India-assertive-China.html"]

Whimpering India, assertive China[/url][/size] [size="2"]Kanchan Gupta Sunday, August 29, 2010[/size][/b]

[Guest]

x-post



Friday, I was listening to radio discussion on China's recent ante towards India and South China Sea.

According to experts, first time Chinese Generals are independently speaking/releasing statements, they have started exerting power. Communist party is too busy making money and this wild rush towards money had left Chinese Army generals high and dry. Now they are looking for both money and power. India should watch them because Generals are very close to be call as rogue and may try some adventurous steps towards India and South China sea Nations. Suddenly, these Generals had started making claims on international waters.

[Guest]

[url="http://the-diplomat.com/2010/09/10/china%E2%80%99s-high-risk-india-gamble/"]China’s High Risk India Gamble[/url]

China is exerting pressure on India on a range of fronts. It’s time for India to push back—and to reach out to Taiwan.

How should India respond? It needs to pursue a more nuanced version of its current strategy. Given the importance of the relationship, both engagement and a certain amount of balancing remain crucial for bilateral and regional stability (for a start, India needs to indicate what its own core interests are).



The reported cancelling of military exchanges by India in response to the visa denial was only to be expected. But broader steps may also be needed to ensure that a comprehensive dialogue on a series of intertwined disputes takes place.



One thing India should do is to adhere to strict reciprocity on all diplomatic issues with China—unilateral concessions don’t seem to help matters. Another step India should take is to boost ties with Taiwan and invite a ministerial team for talks on trade and investments. And it would be useful if India’s leaders moved to open discussions with select Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore on China’s increasingly assertive behaviour across Asia—fears are growing about the growing gulf between Chinese rhetoric of peace and harmony and its actions.



Finally, India should stop reiterating that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of China until Beijing accepts Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir as integral parts of India.



It goes without saying that it’s important not just for India, but for Asia as a whole that relations with China move forward to ensure long-term stability in the region is maintained. But ultimately, no progress will be made unless China feels the same way.

India is behaving like a 1963 mindset. Current appointed PM of India is from that mindset, neither they have guts nor vision of India.

[Guest]

[sup]India must learn to deal with new threats[/sup]





By Subramanian Swamy



19 Sep 2010





The political relations between India and China have soured again. Will this lead to a war either by intent or miscalculation? Chinese non-governmental blogs have suggested a possibility in 2010-11. One Indian think tank's prognosis is war in 2012. No one in either nation's government however thinks so. But who can be sure? After all, who has forgotten - on both sides - 1962?



For us, 1962 was a military and political debacle although we Indians happily discovered how united our nation becomes when we are attacked - when other nations in a similar debacle unravel. Chanakya had in our hoary past described this Indian phenomenon of uniting in war when he propounded the concept of 'Chakravartin' and guided his king, Chandragupta, to war far west and 2,000 kilometres from Pataliputra, in Sind against the Greeks.



The border war in 1962 was Nehru's fiasco arising from his irrational and personalised conduct of foreign policy. Irrational because Nehru did not distinguish between defence and foreign policy. In fact, he made the fatal error of making defence depend on foreign policy, and blamed the Chinese 'perfidy' for it. Now that debacle haunts us. This is the 1962 Syndrome.



We now need, irrespective of our blow hot, blow cold foreign policy, to rationally look at possible and potential threats to India from China and then decide how to prepare credibly against these threats. Let us remember that the two nations by history, civilisation, population size, territorial area, economic growth rate, and global power potential, even though they have different political systems, are recognised the world over as peers.



Hence some competitive animosity, or peer jealousy, is to be expected between the two nations in peace times, even if it is held by some that there is no fundamental conflict of strategic interests. For more than two-and-a-half thousand years, India and China had good and peaceful relations based on mutual respect and exchange, and never had gone to war till 1962.



Today both India and China compete, for example, for US attention. Peer jealousy makes Chinese intellectuals and PLA personnel feign contempt for India, especially when talking to the US counterparts, which is also apparent in the carping and cutting comments in its publications, even though they realise that 1962 cannot be repeated.



Three decades later, thanks to prime minister P V Narasimha Rao, liberalisation and the Y2K problem launched India on a high growth rate path, and as a quality leader on the electronic software map globally. In an era of globalisation in which economics dominates, the India-China hyphenation has re-appeared again with gusto, especially in the US, re-kindling the peer competitiveness in China and unfortunately the return of smugness in India.



This hyphenation has taken root from Japan and Australia to Africa and Latin America where India and China are equally represented as suppliers and buyers of goods and services, with industrial corporates of global reach and advanced technology. But the smugness that this hyphenation is a settled question can be rudely exploded if our military capability continues for long to remain inadequate to sustain the hyphenation. Due to our smugness about our recent economic performance of nearly 9 per cent GDP growth, our defence expenditure has fallen to a dangerously low of 2.3 per cent of GDP whereas China has maintained a steady expenditure of 6 per cent of GDP for the last five decades.



To rephrase a Chinese saying: 'We must sweat in peace so that we do not bleed in war'. Today we fluctuate between being panicky when threatened, and complacent when there is bonhomie, remaining unprepared for war.Media coverage reflects this dysfunctional dissonance.



To sustain the peer status, India must graduate from oscillating between smugness to neurotically reacting to China on a daily basis, feeding the media with our 1962 psychosis, and instead get down to dealing with China rationally on the various dimensions of threats, and soberly examine how to structure our national security architecture and enhance our military capability. To do that we should clearly differentiate between the two facets of national security: First, in defence preparedness, we should never discount any potential threat from any country, and the threat could be multi-dimensional as it is in the case of China.



The second facet of national security is our foreign policy which has to be structured on the stated intentions of other nations, and which we through quiet unpublicised discussions and negotiations seek to modify, moderate, and even to make it favourable if possible. This is also called diplomacy.



China's intention today may not be to go to war with India but merely to needle us to commit foolish acts or behave stupidly by trivial provocative acts to either do something rash as Nehru did in 1962 to declare 'I have asked the troops to throw the Chinese out' without any preparations, or worse like a headless chicken run hither and thither seeking help from other countries, notably the USA.



We cannot rely on any country's stated intentions since it could be a deception to fool us. We should never be complacent about China's capacity to inflict damage to us nor should we, as a large mature and civilised population, exhibit a fevered imagination about China's assumed evil intentions to harm us, at least not to vocalise it as we are doing today. If we do so it will encourage and raise the morale of all our potential adversaries, and thus in a self-fulfilling prophesy could knee jerk our nation into bad decisions. Let us begin to sweat in peace by first enumerating the dimensions of China's threat.



Design a strategy based on massive defence build-up



The First threat dimension encompasses a possible Chinese attack in Arunachal over some provocation such as Dalai Lama's visit to Tawang. Some Indians tremble at the thought of that happening. This neurosis is the cause of our 1962 syndrome. The reality today is that even if we go to war, it will not be a repeat of 1962 because as China and the rest of the world have learnt by the events of 1962, and by subsequent unconnected events, that war unites the Indian people as nothing else does.



The Chinese will not be able to cross our borders and the contiguous areas. Moreover, the Indian air force is superior in the border arena, and the terrain on our side of the border provides a much shorter and friendlier supply chain for our troops.



Those in India who think today otherwise, that Chinese will walk into Assam and Kashmir not to mention Bahraich in UP, have been brought up on the British imperialist version of our history, which is that India is always a sitting duck for anyone who wants to invade it.



What should be of concern today is the implication of India's current military and psychological preparedness.



If China decides to wage war over Arunachal especially Tawang, then India should take it as an opportunity to wipe out Nehru's legacy of 1962. The Chinese claim over Tawang and Arunachal is based on the claim that it was a part of Tibet. This is utterly false since it was only for brief periods in history when an aggressive independent Tibet occupied the Monpa tribal town of Tawang and then reduced the Monpas to serfs and slaves. The Monpas have not forgotten that brutality even today.



I do not think that China will go to war over Tawang. It is needling us to win points with the Tibetans in Lhasa, who claim Arunachal and Tawang are part of Tibet. But that does not mean we should let our guard down. China should know it is the resolve of the Indian people that for Tawang, without which town the rest of Arunachal cannot be accessed by the Chinese, India will go for an all-out war, even abrogate the Nehru-Vajpayee treaty to regard Tibet as a part of China. It will be moral and just for us to go to war to defend Tawang and Arunachal.



Second, the threat from China to India arises from the UPA government's abdication of vital national interests for its domestic political survival in power, which sacrifice is in favour of China.



India rebuffed pro-Indian elements in Nepal and instead helped Maoists, who lean to China, to usurp power in that country because of what the then coalition partner, the CPM, of the UPA had wanted. Again China was the beneficiary in Sri Lanka and invited to build a naval base in Hamantota, just 35 miles east of the Tamil Nadu coast, because another coalition partner, the DMK, had wanted to help the LTTE.



Today not one of India's eight neighbours with common land and/or sea borders with us, supports us against China which has common borders with six. Recognising this factor is crucial for our preparedness against China.



We should begin by openly supporting Sri Lanka, and not fall for the pro-LTTE propaganda that Tamils are suffering from brutalities. Tamils however need constitutional protection and India should influence the Sri Lanka Buddhists to encourage the MPs of Sri Lanka to vote for it when the amendment Bill is introduced. We should help the Nepal Army and the Madeshis whom we seem to be losing, to resist the Maoists and liberate Nepal since the Nepal Maoists are openly helping the Naxalites in India.



Third, China has ringed us in today with naval bases from Gwadar in Baluchistan, to Hamantota in Sri Lanka, to Coco Islands in Burma. For the first time China is positioned to attack us from the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. We have to take steps to develop our navy and air force to face this new situation.



We should forge a strategic cooperation with Indonesia to monitor the Malacca Straits; Sumatra is very close to Indira Point in Nicobar islands, and through the Malacca straits pass 90 per cent of China's energy supply. The appropriate policy for India is to match Chinese military capacity. That is by spending not 2.3 but 7 per cent of GDP on defence, for which we have to tighten our belts. The problem is not what China is planning to do to attack us but what India is not planning to do to prepare to defend itself.



We should also not be defensive while arguing the border dispute with China. Chinese officials must explain to us why when they have accepted the McMohan Line for the border with Burma, they are rejecting it with India.



Also their argument for demanding Tawang is religion-based; Tawang was a part of Drepung Monastery which is in Tibet and which is a part of China. By that argument, Kailash-Manasarovar area should be a part of India since our Mahadev Lord Shiva resides there.



Under no circumstances we should initiate a war merely to recover the relatively small area of lost territory. When war is inevitable or imposed, then of course we have to meet the challenge.



Fourth, China has been consistently arming Pakistan even with nuclear weapons technology according to well-known and well-placed whistleblowers in Pakistan. This may be in Chinese national interest to keep a flank against India opened. Chinese officials told me in a discussion which I had in Beijing that they have assisted Pakistan with the knowledge of the IAEA and within international law.



Pakistan is the base and crucible for Islamic terrorists who periodically carry out horrendous terrorist acts on Indian soil. I think to counter this threat the time has arrived for us to draw up plans for doing something with Baluchistan and Sind, while re-populating Kashmir with at least 10 lakh ex-servicemen and families to compensate for the five lakh Kashmiri Hindus driven out.



Fifth, China is not at all happy with the growing Indian economic globalisation and intellectual influence in academia in East Asia and Australia. As for East Asia let us remember that the value-added switch trade of China with East Asia is the reason for China's huge accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. This switch trade can easily shift to India's favour. China is fundamentally geared to making things difficult for India .



We can counter this by more economic reforms and heavy infrastructure improvement if we could only control the shameless corruption in society by setting examples.



First we must talk with China especially in the context of the rising threat of a Taliban take-over of Pakistan which will adversely affect both India and China. The recent Islamic violence in Xinjiang is a case in point. But we must pursue every opening with China to reduce its support to Pakistan. According to me, a deal is possible.



These are the five threats that China poses to India.We have, at least for the present, to deal with these threats on our own capability. And we can. For India, the best course is to design a national security strategy based on a massive defence build-up with a conciliatory foreign policy whereby we do not react on a daily basis to every media report emanating from either side. But I feel the MEA needs to be more forthcoming in briefing the Indian media about the nuances of Sino-Indian relations on a regular basis.



If a Sino-Indian understanding can come about it will be a major factor for world peace. We should strive for that without letting down our guard. We should develop another option in case Pakistan crumbles to Taliban, that of US-Israel-India compact in case China decides to bond with Iran, North Korea and Venezuela against the US.



[url="http://janamejayan.wordpress.com/2010/09/21/india-must-learn-to-deal-with-new-threats-dr-swamy/"]http://janamejayan.wordpress.com/2010/09/21/india-must-learn-to-deal-with-new-threats-dr-swamy/[/url]

[HareKrishna]

china want aksai chin and arunchal on the basis that they belong to qing china.

why not make them zones of mutual collaboration instead of war?



here the map of qing empire



https://jspivey.wikispaces.com/file/view...y_1820.png

[shamu]

This is more like British claiming that most of the world, including USA, belong to them.

[Guest]

[url="http://sify.com/news/nervous-china-may-attack-india-by-2012-news-features-jhmqlGgeaia.html?sifyoutbrainnewsrecco=obinsite"]'Nervous China may attack India by 2012'[/url]



Ok , got it, more defense deal so that Congress can pocket more money.

Why opposition is not calling for scam here as they did with BJP, so called Coffin-gate etc.