From: "Yvette C. Rosser" <y.r.rani@mail.utexas.edu>
Subject: Abuse of History in Pakistan: Bangladesh to Kargil
<fontfamily><param>Geneva</param>In mid-June I traveled from India to
Pakistan during the height of the Kargil crisis. I made the trip on the
Delhi-Lahore "diplomacy" bus. The rhetorical and ideological distance at the
Wagh boarder crossing between India and Pakistan was like traveling a
million miles and one hundred and eighty degrees in less than fifty meters.
It was certainly an interesting time to be crossing that boarder. While in
Pakistan, I felt as if I was experiencing history in the making, and the use of
twisted history for nationalist justification.
I delivered a paper in Islamabad, in July arranged by the Islamabad Forum
for Social Sciences. This paper discussed how Pakistani textbooks practice
history by erasure and embellishment and how these distorted historical
"facts" are used to corroborate contemporary political perspectives and
justify current military adventurism. I cited examples from <italic>Pakistani
Studies</italic> textbooks and compared these to the headlines which
appeared in Pakistani newspapers during the Kargil crisis. My lecture was
discussed in a newspaper article published in "The News," a daily in
Islamabad, (quote): "Yvette drew examples from state-sponsored textbooks
used in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan to illustrate the appropriation of
history to reinforce national philosophy or ideology wherein historical
interpretations are predetermined, unassailable, and concretized." History by
erasure can have its long-term negative repercussions. In Pakistani
textbooks, which narrate the 65 War with India, Operation Gibraltar is never
mentioned. Operation Gibraltar and the recent events in Kargil are products
of the same processes. The mistakes made in Kargil are a legacy of the lack
of information that citizens have about the real history of their country.
During the "war-like-situation" in Kargil, a headline in a Pakistani newspaper
read, "Kargil: Revenge for â71." This point of view can only be propagated by
someone who is unaware of the real facts that led the Bengalis to secceed
from the western part of the country, by someone who blames the breakup of
Pakistan on India Gandhi and "Hindu influences" in East Pakistan rather than
on 24 years of Panjabi-perpetuated internal colonization.
While I wasout of the USA last year, I also spent six months in Bangladesh
where I made several presentations. The first was in May 1999, entitled
"Hegemony and Historiography: The Politics of Pedagogy." I also delivered a
paper in Dhaka in late July when I returned to Bangladesh after a trip to
Pakistan. That paper was called, "The Pakistani Historian and the Bangladesh
War of Liberation." This talk received wide coverage in the Bangladesh
media. Here is a message sent from Dr. Ratan Lal Chakravorty, a history
professor at Dhaka University. This message describes some of the news
reports about that talk:
"1. The news coverage about you appears in a Daily Newspaper which is very
much popular at the present moment. Itâs name is the Janakanta (Voice of
the People) which I am a life subscriber. On 8 August, your photographs
appeared with news in four columns of half a page. The paper appreciated
you to such an extent that we had seldom received. The main topic covers
your findings about the historiography and historical studies of Bangladesh
and it suggests to follow your methodology to understand the things going
at present.
"2. The second also appeared in the Janakanta (Voice of the People) on 11
August, 1999, where an analytical and critical assessment of your work and
objectives were done in a very sophisticated way using metaphor. The writer
appreciated you very much for speaking the truth and the reality."
Here are some observations about current events in Pakistan as they relate
to the use of history in justifying current governmental and military actions
and also about the psychological health of the nation:
Pakistani nationalism is characterized by ironies and contractions. Its
ideology and national mythos have not been substantiated by its historical
realities. In the last fifty-two years the vision or ideal of Pakistan, as a
secure homeland where the Muslims in the subcontinent could find justice
and live in peace, has not been realized by the citizens. There is a shared
experience of disappointment and dissatisfaction among the populace that
has not abated since the restoration of democracy in 1988, and in fact the
feelings of betrayal and a collective mental depression have increased
dramatically in the last decade. This intellectual fatalism and depression
about the state of affairs is not something new, as can be seen in an excerpt
from the book,<italic> Breaking the Curfew, A Political Journey Through
Pakistan</italic><underline>,</underline> published ten years ago by a
British journalist, Emma Duncan, where she wrote, and I quote,"[. . . .] many
Pakistanis I talked to seemed disappointed. It was not just the
disappointment that they were not as rich as they should be or that their
children were finding it difficult to get jobs; it was a wider sense of betrayal,
of having been cheated on a grant scale. The Army blamed the politicians,
the politicians the Army; the businessmen blamed the civil servants, the civil
servants the politicians; everybody blamed the landlords and the foreigners,
and the left and the religious fundamentalists blamed everybody except the
masses.
"More than anywhere I have been - much more than India - its people worry
about the state of their country. They wonder what went wrong; they fear for
the future. They condemn it; they pray for it. They are involved in the
nationâs public life as passionately as in their small private dilemmas. . . "
(end quote).
In the ten years since this observation was written, the passion that the
people in Pakistan have for their country has not abated, but the shared
feelings of betrayal and disappointment have increased exponentially. A
friend of mine who is a professor, the principal at a womanâs college in
Lahore, confided that she and most of her colleagues felt not only
disillusioned, but abjectly hopeless about the condition and future prospects
of their beloved country. She said that she had lost all hope. She did not see
that the nation could survive given the current situation and there was no
alternative in sight. Here is a dynamic woman, a sincere practicing Muslim, a
patriotic Pakistani whose father was an officer in the Education Core. She
serves on the boards of directors of numerous institutions and works with the
government to develop and implement various educational projects. She
gives generously of her time and devotes herself professionally and
personally to her students, her colleagues and the educational organizations
of Pakistan. Yet, though she is totally committed to her country, and by
nature a jolly and friendly person not prone to any type of self pity or
despondency, she is overwhelmed by feelings of loss, failure, and depression
when she thinks of her beloved nation.
I was intrigued and disturbed by this expression of depression, which,
regardless of Emma Duncanâs observations did not seem as profoundly
obvious when I was in Pakistan two years ago. Since my dear sister working
in Lahore informed me that many of her friends and colleagues also felt the
same, I decided to ask the professors and scholars with whom I had
scheduled interviews if they shared this feeling of depression and sorrow
regarding their nation. I was astounded to find similar feeling of
disempowerment coupled with a dissatisfaction which offered no solutions.
Many of the social activists and progressives with whom I spoke expressed
this same helplessness while at the same time they counteract their feelings
of loss by publishing journals, holding seminars and discussion groupsâmany
work with NGOs to develop educational opportunities for girls in rural areas
or contribute their time to other altruistic and progressive endeavors. They
remain activeâtheir work belies the futility which they expressed to me.
They continue working, pouring their efforts and souls into positive activity
aimed at improving the social and intellectual climate of their country, and
they survive by <bold><italic>not</italic></bold> dwelling on the fact that
ultimately, they feel powerless to effect any positive change.
It distressed me that these very people who could help Pakistan the most
and whose voices should be heard and heeded are the very same people
who, because of their political perspectives and social critiques, are often
harassed by the authorities, denied jobs and otherwise discriminated against
by the establishment. The current democratically elected government
continues to make it difficult for intellectuals with alternative viewpoints to
do research and even to travel abroad, not to mention what has happened
lately to prominent journalists. Several professors at Quaid-e-Azam
University in Islamabad informed me that a recent decree by the government
mandated that professors must now obtain an NOC (No Objection Certificate)
when planning to travel abroad even for a family vacation. One well known
and respected Physics professor, Dr. Parvez Hoodbhoy is a vocal critic about
Pakistani affairs and writes magazines articles and essays about issues such
as corruption, the unequal availability of educational opportunities and lately
about the folly and danger of the nuclear option. Recently, Dr. Hoodbhoy was
denied an NOC when he was invited to lecture in the Physics Department at
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). He was able to leave the
country only through the intervention of the Vice-chancellor of his university,
Dr. Tariq Siddique, who also taught at the Civil Service Academy and served
as the education minister under Zulfikar Bhutto. Dr. Tariq Siddique is
well-known for supporting his staff and helping his former students.
However, his intervention on behalf of Dr. Hoodbhoy, I was informed, risked
provoking official ire. However, this type of potential threat is not something
new to Tariq Siddique, since he had been dismissed from Bhuttoâs cabinet for
too zealously advocating teacher empowerment and merit-based promotion.
Many scholars at the university level expressed resentment that research
was discouraged and intellectuals were often seen as a threat by the
establishment. They complained that mediocrity was encouraged and original
research impeded. Surrounded by a completely corrupt system, which they
felt powerless to change, yet endowed with self respect and moral
conscientiousness, many of these caring and intellectually brilliant
individuals lamented about their hopelessness and depression regarding the
condition of their nation.
As I was disturbed by this shared expression of depression, I interviewed a
psychiatrist and asked him his opinion about this phenomenon. He first
pointed out that the depression was a tangible reality and could be
quantified by the huge increase in the number of suicides in Pakistan in the
last few years. He said that there are 20 to 30 suicides per day in Pakistan
which occur primarily among the young between the ages of fifteen and
thirty, mostly upper-class urbanized females and newly educated rural or
newly urbanized lower middle class males. Dr. Inayat Magsi, from the Civil
Hospital in Karachi, explained that most of these suicides are the result of
the loss of hope for the future. But he also pointed out that the dramatic rise
in clinical depression which he has observed even among citizens with ample
economic opportunities can be partly attributed to the fact that even though
democracy has been practiced now for over ten years, there has been a
decline in the development of civil society, a death of collective vision, of
enthusiasm to change the system from within, a certain resignation.
During the time of Martial Law, the iron rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, the
intellectuals and socially conscious scholars, along with large segments of
the common people, had something to fight against, a mission and a
purpose to rid their country of authoritarian rule. Dr. Inayat Magsi pointed
out that this struggle against the military government and the hope for
democracy united the people with a vision which kept them enthusiastic
about the future potential of their country. Once democracy was restored, the
level of corruption certainly did not decrease, the practice of fomenting
regionalism which was practiced by General Zia increased, promises of a
better future rapidly died as the political parties fought a propaganda war for
their ascendancy instead working for the good of the country. The often
disenfranchised polity was once again dismayed and depressed by the
inability of their officials to focus on the needs and priorities of Pakistan. Dr.
Inayat Magsi added that now that there is no military government to rebel
against, they can only blame themselves for the lack of leadership and since
they are powerless to create other alternatives, they are disheartened. .
depressed.
Pakistan is a land that is torn by ethnic differences and is seemingly unable
to achieve unity within its diversity. It was founded on the principle that
Islam, as the great leveler of class and caste, was a sufficient force to tie
the Sindhis, the Pathans, and the Balouchi tribes, and also the Bengalis
together with the dominant Panjabis to form a cohesive and stable national
identity which would supersede regional loyalties and ethnicities. Through
the years, this mission to create a strong centrally controlled government
has been pursued by various methods including realignment of political
associations between its minority groups, usually based more on gains for
provincial party bosses than nation cohesion, and by the use of military
coercion, which as in the case of the Bengali majority, resulted in the split
up of the original country.
Even today the central government operates under the assumption that
Pakistan is a unitary entity, though the rhetorical idea of "One Unit" was only
abandoned immediately before the Bangladesh war of liberation. The
Pakistani military and bureaucracy are still grappling with the problems that
the contradictions inherent in the Ideology of Pakistan continue to create
within the varied cultural landscape of the nation.
The powers at the center, usually more intent at retaining the profitable
reins on the government, are inevitably unable to make equitable policies
which can reverse the decentralized loyalties nor reconcile these tendencies
with the imperatives of a highly centralized state apparatus. As Feroz Ahmed
in his book <italic>Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan</italic>, published by
Oxford University Press in 1999, wrote, "The state and its ideologues have
steadfastly refused to recognize the fact that these regions are not merely
chunks of territory with different names but areas which were historically
inhabited by peoples who had different languages and cultures, and even
states of their own. This official and intellectual denial has, no doubt,
contributed to the progressive deterioration of inter-group relations,
weakened societies cohesiveness, and undermined the stateâs capacity to
forge security and sustain development." (end quote)
Denial and erasure are the primary tools of historiography as it is officially
practiced in Pakistan. There is no room in the official historical narrative for
questions or alternative points of view which is Nazariya Pakistan, the
Ideology of Pakistanâdevoted to a mono-perspectival religious orientation.
There is no other correct way to view the historical record. It is, after all,
since the time of General Zia-ul Haq, a capital crime to talk against the
"Ideology of Pakistan."
According to A.H. Nayyar from Quaid-e-Azam University, "What is important
in the exercise is the faithful transmission, without any criticism or
re-evaluation, of the particular view of the past which is implicit in the
coming to fruition of the âPakistan Ideology.â" Rahat Saeed of the Irtiqa
Institute of Social Sciences in Karachi explains that school level history
teachers are often aware that what they are teaching in their Pakistani
Studies classes is at best contradictory and often quite incorrect. They
usually do not attempt to explain the "real" history regarding such events as
the civil war in 1971, because to do so might jeopardize their jobs, and, as
Rahat explains, the teachers are afraid "to corrupt their students with the
truth."
In contemporary Pakistani textbooks the historical narrative is based on the
Two Nation Theory. The story of the nation begins with the advent of Islam
when Mohammed-bin-Qazm arrived in Sindh followed by Mahmud of Ghazni
storming through the Khyber Pass, 16 times, bringing the Light of Islam to
the infidels who converted en mass to escape the evil domination of the
cruel Brahmins. Reviewing a selection of textbooks published since 1972 in
Pakistan will verify the assumption that there is little or no discussion of the
ancient cultures that have flowered in the land that is now Pakistan, such as
Taxila and Mohenjo-Daro, though this lack seems to have been partly
addressed in the very recent editions of several history textbooks published
for Oxford-Cambridge elite schools. In most textbooks, any mention of
Hinduism is inevitably accompanied by derogatory critiques, and none of the
greatness of Indic civilization is consideredânot even the success of
Chandragupta Maurya, who defeated, or at least frightened the invading
army of Alexander the Great at the banks of the Beas River where it flows
through the land that is now called Pakistan. These events are deemed
meaningless since they are not about Muslim heroes. There is an elision in
time between the moment Islam first arrived in Sindh and Muhammad Ali
Jinnah.
This shortsighted approach to historiography was not always the case.
Up until 1972, the history textbooks included much more elaborate sections
on the history of the subcontinent, while adopting the colonial frame of
periodizationâthe books described the Hindu Period, The Muslim Period and
the British Period. History textbooks, such as <italic>Indo Pak History, Part
1</italic> published in 1951, included chapters with titles such as the
Ramayana and Mahabharata Era, Aryansâ Religion and Educational Literature,
the Caste System, Jainism and Buddhism, Invasions of Iranians and Greeks,
Chandra Gupta Maurya, Maharaja Ashok, Maharaja Kaniska, The Gupta
Family, Maharaja Harish, New Era of Hinduism, The Era of Rajputs. This same
basic table of contents, which also included the history of Islam, was
prevalent in textbooks until post 1971. A textbook published in 1964, for use
at a military academy in Abbottabad included similar chapters, and even had
a chapter entitled, Mahatma Gandhi, Man of Peace. This same edition of this
textbooks was republished without any changes until 1971. It can therefore
be seen that Pakistani textbooks were not always estranged from their
associations with South Asian history and culture. but beginning with the
Bhutto years and accelerating under the Islamized tutelage of General Zia-ul
Haq, not only has the history of the subcontinent been discarded, but it has
been vilified and mocked and transformed into the evil other, a measure of
what Pakistan is not. Zulfikar Ali Bhuttoâs influence on the textbooks was
profoundâhe was furious at India, whom he blamed for the break-up of the
country. Though ironically, his mother was a Hindu, a natch-girl (dancer) who
had converted to Islam in order to marry his wealthy father, Bhutto
vehemently launched an anti-Indian campaign with vituperative anti-Hindu
rhetoric. This legacy of his orchestrated hatred is still the basis of Pakistani
historical narratives where Gandhi is now usually referred to as a "conniving
bania."
Much of the historical discourse and social analysis in Pakistan is based on
negative methodologies which seek to justify Pakistanâs failures and
shortcomings by pointing out similar problems that also exist in neighboring
India. Instead of focusing their academic lens on the Pakistani situation, and
be the view positive or negative, analyzing what is seen
<italic>within</italic> their nation, scholars repeatedly use the tact of
dismissing problems in Pakistan by discussions of parallel problems in India.
Within this paradigm, Pakistani scholarship is defined by placing the
countryâs problems in a less negative light in comparison to Indiaâs problems.
This could be called the theory of self justification, but more aptly results in
self negation. A vivid example of this methodology can be found in the book
by Akbar S. Ahmed, <italic>Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: the Search
for Saladin</italic>. It is one of a great number of books published in
Pakistan during 1997. Many of these books published in honor of Pakistanâs
fiftieth anniversary, such as Feroz Ahmedâs <italic>Ethnicity and Politics in
Pakistan, </italic>and others such as the work by the linguist, Dr. Tariq
Rehman, represent an effort to look objectively at topics such as Pakistani
nation-building, society, cultural myths, domestic and foreign policy. Prior to
this golden jubilee moment of self analysis, most books that graced the OUP
or Vanguard shelves were basically biased and very much situated in the
straight jacket of the two nation theory. This is not to criticize their
nationalist orientation, all nations write nationalist histories, but an
observation that historical discourse in Pakistan is dominated by negative
images of India and Hinduism. In general, the majority of books in the field
of the social sciences written in Pakistan have lacked theoretical basis and
are short on angst and verve, though perhaps books by ex-pats, such as
Mustfa Pasha are usually more circumspect. As Dr. Rahat in Karachi joked,
"In Pakistan, social scientists are more social than scientific!" However, since
1997, there have been several books written about the Bangladesh
experience, such as the recent book by Ahmad Saleem, <italic>Blood Beaten
Track</italic>, which does not lay the blame squarely in Indira Gandhiâs lap,
for conspiring to "Sink the Two Nation theory in the Bay of Bengal".
In Akbar S. Ahmedâs book, <italic>Search for Saladin,</italic> if judged by
its cover, the fairly post modern title gives the impression that perhaps the
book would be theoretically based and hopefully less biased than the
standard fare offered up as state sponsored Pakistani scholarship. In this
regard the book was a disappointment. Ahmed is a well know Pakistani
scholar, and though a civil servant and therefore perhaps prone to rubbery
research results stretching to accommodate the reigning regime, he is a
fellow at Selwyn College, Cambridge and would probably get a wider reading
audience in the West. Unfortunately, in this book he has fallen once again
into the prevailing discourse of Pakistani historians who define their nation in
the negative, in terms of what it is not. "We are not Hindus. We are not
Indians. We will not be ruled by the Hindus. We do not practice the evil
caste system. We do not mistreat our minorities. We do not attack our
neighbors." Through the decades Pakistani writers have used this discourse
of negation consistently describing their nation in contrast to Hindu Indiaâs
other. There have been far too few examples of reflexivity, inward looking
analysis.
In this book by Ahmed, much of the discussion centers on communalism in
India. He refers to books by Veena Das, Asghar Ali Engineer, Sarvepalli
Gopal, Kumari Jayawardena, T.N. Madan, Ashish Nandy, Khushwant Singh,
etc. He uses these Indian authorsâ work to prove his points about the
sufferings of minorities in India, couched in the usual
anti-Indian/Pakistani-centric rhetoric. He never pauses to question why there
are so many open and frank books about the plight of minorities in India and
there are very few such books about the problems faced by minorities in
Pakistan. He doesnât mention the bishop who blew his brains out on the city
hall steps to protest continuing officially sanctioned harassment of the
Christian community in Pakistan and the death sentence metted out to an
adolescent from the Christian community for his alleged blasphemy. Akbar S.
Ahmed fails to mention that Hindus and other minorities are delegated to
second class citizens through their prejudicial voting system and blasphemy
laws. Or that women are also second class citizens living under the burden of
Hudood laws. He can not see the problems in his own nation, for he is too
busy looking for problems in India. Once again, Pakistan is not looking at
Pakistan for its own meaning, it is looking to India to justify its own failings.
Akbar dwells extensively on rape during the Bombay riots of 1993, citing the
suffering in several pages, but he dismisses rape by Pakistani soldiers in
Bangladesh with less than one sentence. These types of examples are to be
found throughout the book. It must be said that some of the most exciting
and theoretically based and insightful scholarship in Pakistan is coming from
the small group of feminist intellectuals associated with such centers as
Simorgh, ASR, and Sahe in Lahore.
Discourses about Islam and its relationship to the Ideology of Pakistan make
up the majority of <italic>Pakistan Studies</italic> textbooks, which dwell
at length on how Islam will create a fair and just nation,"In the eyes of a
Muslim all human beings are equal and there is no distinction based on race
or colour. . . The rich or poor [are] all equal before law. A virtuous and pious
man has precedence over others before Allah."
The Pakistan Studies textbook goes on to say, "Namaz prevents a Muslim
from indulging in immoral and indecent acts." And regarding issues of justice,
the 1999 edition of this <italic>Pakistan Studies</italic> textbook written
by Rabbani and Sayyid which is in wide usage in Pakistan writes,
"On official level (sic) all the officers and officials must perform their duties
justly, i.e., they should be honest, impartial and devoted. They should keep
in view betterment of common people and should not act in a manner which
may infringe the rights of others or may cause inconvenience to others." How
does this discourse tally with the tales that the students have heard about
corruption and the hassles their parents have endured simply to pay a bill or
collect a refund? How do they rectify their cognitive dissonance when they
hear about elected officials and wealthy landholders and industrialists buying
off a court case lodged against them, or simply not charged for known
crimes, with statements from their textbooks such as, "Every one should be
equal before law and the law should be applied without any distinction or
discrimination. [. . . ] Islam does not approve that certain individuals may be
considered above law. The textbook goes on to state that "The Holy Prophet
(PBUH) says that a nation which deviates from justice <italic>invites its
doom and destruction"</italic> (emphasis mine).
With such a huge disparity between the ideal and the real, no wonder there
is a great deal of fatalism and depression among the educated citizens and
the school going youths concerning the state of the nation in Pakistan.
Further compounding the studentsâ distress and distancing them from either
their religion or their nation-state, or both, are the contradictions found in
this same <italic>Pakistani Studies</italic> book. On page 63 is the
statement that "the enforcement of Islamic principles . . . does not approve
dictatorship or the rule of man over man." Compared with the reality
unfolding a few paragraphs later when the student is told that,
"General Muhammad Ayub Khan captured power and abrogated the
constitution of 1956 [. . . .] dissolved the assemblies and ran the affairs of
the country under Martial Law without any
constitution.<smaller><smaller><smaller>
"</smaller></smaller></smaller>Since nearly half of this textbook is
dedicated to chapters with such titles as Islamization Under Zia, Hindrances
to Islamization, and Complete Islamization is Our Goal, the other themes
and events in the history and culture of Pakistan are judged vis-a-vis their
relationship and support of complete Islamization. Within this rhetoric are
found dire warnings that Islam should be applied severely so that it can
guard against degenerate Western influences, yet a few pages later the text
encourages the students to embrace Western technological innovations in
order to modernize the country. One part of the book complains that Muslims
in British India lost out on economic opportunities because conservative
religious forces rejected western education yet a few pages later the authors
are telling the students to use Islam to fend off Western influences and
lauding the efforts of conservative clerics who are the last hope of protecting
the country by the implementation of the Shari-a Law. This seems to be
schizophrenic reasoning.
Non-Muslim cultural influences are often blamed for regional allegiances,
such as in this discussion in Dr. Mohammed Sarwarâs <italic>Pakistani
Studies</italic> book, which states that, "At present a particular segment, in
the guise of modernization and progressive activity, has taken the unholy
task of damaging our cultural heritage. Certain elements aim at the
promotion of cultures with the intention to enhance regionalism and
provincialism and thereby damage national integration."
Once again progressive forces and regional cultural affinities are deemed
anti-Pakistani and thereby inherently anti-Islam. This is the same stance
that is used in describing the emergence of Bangladesh. This textbook goes
on to state that "It is in the interest of national solidarity that such aspects
of culture should be promoted as reflect affinity among the people of the
provinces." This type of discourse seems to deny the impetus and urges of
the cultural expressions of the Sindhis, the Pathans and the Balouchis,
instead of valuing them as part of the whole, these regional cultural
tendencies are seen as a threat to the nation, and Islam is employed to
ameliorate these dangerous cultural differences.
At the same time this textbook claims that Islam sees no differences and
promotes unity while it also discriminates between Muslims and
nonbelievers. For example, on page 120 the author states, "The Islamic
state, of course, discriminates between Muslim citizens and religious
minorities and preserves their separate entity. Islam does not conceal the
realities in the guise of artificialities or hypocrisy. By recognizing their
distinct entity, Islamic state affords better protection to its religious
minorities. Despite the fact that the role of certain religious minorities,
especially the Hindus in East Pakistan, had not been praiseworthy, Pakistan
ensured full protection to their rights under the Constitution. Rather the
Hindu Community enjoyed privileged position in East Pakistan by virtue of is
effective control over the economy and the media. It is to be noted that the
Hindu representatives in the 1st Constituent Assembly of Pakistan employed
delaying tactics in Constitution-making."
That this claim is spurious as can be seen in the recent book by Allen
McGrath, published by OUP, <italic>The Destruction of Democracy in
Pakistan</italic>, in which the author, a lawyer, analyzes the efforts at
constitution making in the first decade after independence before Iskandar
Mizra dissolved the National Assembly. In the McGrath book the productive
role D.N. Dutt played in constitution making is mentioned. Yet, in Pakistan
Studies textbooks, the anti-Hindu point of view and the vilification of the
Hindu community of East Pakistan are the standard orientation. In this
particular version of Pakistani history, which is the official version, General
Zia-ul-Haq is portrayed as someone who, "took concrete steps in the
direction of Islamization." He is often seen as pious and perhaps stitching
caps alongside Aurangzeb. Though Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is generally criticized in
the textbooks, General Zia usually escapes most criticism though he was the
most cruel and autocratic of the military rulers who usurped the political
process in Pakistan. Each time that martial law was declared in Pakistan, and
the constitution aborted, the textbook by Dr.
Sarwar describes it as an inevitable action stimulated by the rise of
unIslamic forces. For example,
"The political leadership did not come up to the expectations and lacked
commitment to Islamic objectives. Moreover, the civil service had not
undergone socialization process commensurate with Islamic teachings.
Bureaucratic elite had Western orientation with secular approach to all
national issues. [. . . ] the result was political instability and chaos paving
the way for the intervention of military and the imposition of Martial Law. "
In the next paragraph, however, Ayub Khan is accused of imposing unIslamic
laws, especially family laws, and the author claims that it was Ayubâs secular
outlook which ultimately brought about his decline.
General Zia, on the other hand, is described on page 138,
"During the period under Ziaâs regime, social life developed a leaning towards
simplicity. Due respect and reverence to religious people was accorded. The
government patronized the religious institutions and liberally donated funds.
"
This textbook, and many like it, claim that there is a "network ofconspiracies
and intrigues" which are threatening the "Muslim world in the guise of
elimination of militancy and fundamentalism." In this treatment Pakistan
takes credit for the fall of the Soviet Union and lays claim to have created a
situation in the modern world where Islamic revolutions can flourish and the
vacuum left by the fall of the USSR will "be filled by the world of Islam." This
textbook continues by saying that "The Western world has full perception of
this phenomena, [which] accounts for the development of reactionary trends
in that civilization." Concluding this section under the title Global Changes,
the author seems to be getting ready for Samuel Huntingtonâs Clash of
Civilizations when he writes,
"The Muslim world has full capabilities to face the Western challenges
provided Muslims are equipped with self-awareness and channelize their
collective efforts for the well being of the Muslim Ummah. All evidences
substantiate Muslim optimism indicating that the next century will glorify
Islamic revolution with Pakistan performing a pivotal role." (page 146)
<italic>Pakistan Studies</italic> textbooks are full of inherent
contradictions. One page the book brags about the modern banking system,
and another page complains that interest is unIslamic. There is also a
certain amount of self-loathing written into the <italic>Pakistan
Studies</italic> textbooks, and the politicians are depicted as inept and
corrupt and the industrialists are described as pursuing "personal benefit
even at the cost of national interest." Bouncing between the poles of
conspiracy theory and threat from within, the textbooks portray Pakistan as a
victim of Western ideological hegemony, and threatened by the perpetual
Machiavellian intentions of Indiaâs military and espionage machine, together
with the internal failure of its politicians to effectively govern the country
coupled with the fact that the economy is in the hands of a totally corrupt
class of elite business interests who have only enriched themselves at the
cost of the development of the nation. All of these failures and conspiracies
could, according to the rhetoric in the textbooks, be countered by the
application of more strictly Islamic practices. In fact, while I was in Pakistan
recently, I spoke to several well placed individuals who told me that they
would welcome a Taliban type government in Pakistan so that the country
could finally achieve its birth right as a truly Islamic nation. Though this is
certainly not a majority opinion, there is a large segment of society who
thinks along this line. Perhaps the choice of this alternative Taliban vision for
Pakistan is also a result of those feelings of helplessness discussed
previously, perhaps between the conspiracies and corruption, they see no
alternative.
When the textbooks and the clerics cry conspiracy and the majority of the
newspapers, particularly the Urdu press, misinform or disinform the people,
the tendency for the Pakistanis to feel betrayed and persecuted is not
surprising. During the 71 War, the newspapers in Pakistan told nothing of the
violence of the military crack down nor did they keep the people informed of
the deteriorating strategic situation. The role of the Mukti Bahini was
practically unknown in Pakistan, and when defeat finally came, it came as a
devastating and unexpected shock that could only be explained by Indira
Gandhiâs lies and treachery. It is no wonder that during and in the aftermath
of the Kargil crisis, newspapers often ran stories which called the occupation
of the heights above Kargil as Pakistanâs revenge for 1971. There has
historically been a lack of information available to the citizens of Pakistan
both in the 65 War and during the Bangladesh War of Independence. Yet
that split-up of the nation, and the creation of Bangladesh is a potent
symbol in Pakistan as evidenced by one headline that ran last summer in
"The News", which said, "Nawaz Shariffâs Policies are Turning Sindh into
Another Bangladesh."
During the recent war-like situation at the Line of Control in Kashmir, the
government claimed again and again that the muhajideen were not physically
supported by Pakistan, that they were indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters.
However, the presence of satellite television, the internet, and newspapers
which are now more connected to international media sources, prevented the
usual propaganda machine of the government from keeping all the facts from
the people. Perhaps there is at least one positive outcome of the tragic
Kargil crisis where hundreds of young men lost their lives, in the aftermath of
the crisis there was a dramatic outpouring of newspaper and magazine
articles which attempted to analyze the brinkmanship from various angles.
This new found critical reflexivity is a positive development and though some
of the essays in Pakistani newspapers called for the military to take over the
government in the wake of Nawaz Shariffâs sell out to the imperialist Clinton,
most of the discussions were more circumspect and many authors looked at
the Kargil debacle through a lens of history, trying to understand the cause
of Pakistanâs repeated failures arising from military intervention. Many of the
observations made during and after the Kargil situation, such as the
complete inadequacy of Pakistani international diplomacy, are interestingly
also cited in <italic>Pakistan Studies</italic> textbooks regarding Indiaâs
perceived manipulation of world opinion during the 71 war and Pakistanâs
inability to counter it.
Pakistani textbooks are particularly prone to a historical narrative
manipulated by omission. According to Avril Powell, professor of history at
the University of London, "The ârecastingâ of Pakistani history [has been]
used to âendow the nation with a historic destiny.â"
Textbooks in Pakistan are the domain of distorted politics which have
victimized the Social Studies curriculum. History by erasure can have its
long-term negative repercussions. An example of this is the manner in which
the Indo-Pak War of 1965 is discussed in Pakistani textbooks. In standard
narrations of the 65 War manufactured for students and the general public,
there is no mention of Operation Gibraltar, even thirty years after the event.
In fact, many university level history professors whom I interviewed had
never heard of Operation Gibraltar and the repercussions of that ill-planned
military adventurism, which resulted in Indiaâs attack on Lahore. In Pakistani
textbooks the story is told that the Indian army, unprovoked and inexplicably
attacked Lahore and that one Pakistani jawan equals ten Indian soldiers,
who, upon seeing the fierce Pakistanis, drop their banduks and run away.
Many people in Pakistan still think like this, and several mentioned this
assumed cowardice of the Indian army in recent discussions regarding the
war-like situation in Kargil. The nation is elated by the valiant victories on
the battlefield, as reported in the newspapers, then shocked and dismayed
when their country is humiliated at the negotiating table. Because they were
not fully informed about the adventurism and brinkmanship of their military,
they can only feel betrayed that somehow the Pakistani political leaders
"grabbed defeat from the jaws of military victory."
It is interesting to note in this context an episode from the book by Akbar S.
Ahmed in which he tells of a personal conversation with General Niazi, who
according to Ahmed, claimed that he was planning to "cross into India and
march up the Ganges and capture Delhi and thus link up with Pakistan." Niazi
told Ahmed that "This will be the corridor that will link East with West
Pakistan. It was a corridor that the Quaid-e-Azam demanded and I will
obtain it by force of arms." This absurd reasoning can still be seen among
those who were battling the Indian army in Kargil. In a recent newspaper
article published in The News, a commander of the Pakistani based
muhajideen told the reporter that their plan was first to take "Kargil, then
Srinagar, then march victorious into Delhi."
Operation Gibraltar, the recent debacle in Kargil, and especially the tragic
lessons that could have been learned from the emergence of Bangladesh are
products of the same myopic processes. As mentioned earlier, the mistakes
made in Kargil are a legacy of the lack of information that citizens have
about the real history of their country. How similar the public knowledge and
their naive response, how similar the disinformation pumped out by the
government, and how sad the loss of life, the continued hostilities, the
inability or unwillingness to negotiate diplomatically. Hegel and Toynbee
among others, have warned that nations do not learn from their history.
There is, however, significant merit to the argument that access to
information about past mistakes and successes and their consequences can
guide decision makers and citizens as they chart a course into the next
millennium between diplomacy and disaster.
</fontfamily> If you like, I can send more messages about my adventures in
South Asia. I was in Bangladesh supported by a fellowship from the American
Institute of Bangladesh Studies and I was in Pakistan funded by the
American Institute of Pakistan Studies. I will be returning to Pakistan in
November and December and plan to travel in interior Sindh to meet with
scholar and intellectuals there, and interview them concerning their
perspectives about the writing of history in Pakistan. Is anyone on this list
can be of some assistance to me while I am there, I would be most grateful.
<fontfamily><param>Palatino</param> The recent series of translations
submitted to this list-serve by Dr. Gul Agha concerning the history of the
invasion of Sindh by the Arabs is in direct contrast to how these events are
treated in the <italic>Pakistan Studies</italic> syllabus which devotes
considerable space to Muhammad-bin-Qasim who is hailed for bringing Islam
to the subcontinent. In <italic>Social Studies For Class VI</italic>,
published by the Sindh Textbooks Board, Jamshoro, April 1997 the story of
the Arabsâ arrival in Sindh is narrated as the first moment of Pakistan with
the glorious ascendancy of Islam. This textbook tells the young sixth class
school children of Sindh that, "The Muslims knew that the people of South
Asia were infidels and they kept thousands of idols in their temples." The
Sindhi king, Raja Dahir, is described as cruel and despotic. "The
non-Brahmans who were tired of the cruelties of Raja Dahir, joined hands
with Muhammad-bin-Qasim because of his good treatment." According to this
historical orientation, The conquest of Sindh opened a new chapter in the
history of South Asia. "Muslims had ever lasting effects on their existence in
the region. . .
For the first time the people of Sindh were introduced to Islam, itspolitical
system and way of the government. The people here had seenonly the
atrocities of the Hindus. . . . The people of Sindh were so much impressed by
the benevolence of Muslims that they regarded Muhammad-bin-Qasim as
their savior. . . . Muhammad-bin-Qasim stayed inSindh for over three years.
On his departure from Sindh, the localpeople were overwhelmed with
grief.<smaller><smaller><smaller>"
</smaller></smaller></smaller>When I visited Hyderabad, Sindh in 1997, I
discussed the contents of this textbook with local Sindhis, who assured me
that they told their children an alternative version of this story. They
informed me that any good Sindhi knows that "in several cities in ancient
Sindh, Muhammad-bin-Qasim beheaded every male over the age of eighteen
and that he sent tens of thousands of Sindhi women to the harems of the
Abbassid Dynasty." They also explained that impact of these textbooks was
minimal because, though the back of the book indicated that 20,000 copies
were supposedly printed annually, that, because of corruption, "fewer than
10,000 were ever printed and distributed."
I apologize for the length of this message and hope it is of interest.
Thank you for your kind attention and for any suggestions you may offer.
All the best,
</fontfamily>
Yvette C. Rosser
Ph.D. Candidate Department of Curriculum and Instruction (ABD)
M.A. Department of Asian Studies
B.A. (with honors) Department of Oriental and African Languages and
Literature
The University of Texas at Austin
