<b>EVM: Dangers Of Trusting Them Too Much</b>
By Subramanian Swamy
There is much talk today about electoral rigging in the recent general elections. These doubts have arisen from the unexpected number of seats won by the Congress, and they are accentuated by the spate of articles recently published in reputed computer engineering journals and in the popular international press. All raise doubts about the EVMs.
For example, International Electrical & Electronics Engineering Journal (May 2009, p 23) has published an article by two professors of computer science, titled: Trustworthy Voting. They conclude that while electronic voting machines offer a myriad of benefits, nine suggested safeguards are absolutely essential to protect the integrity of outcomes. None of these safeguards are in place in Indian EVMs. In India they do not meet the standard of national integrity.
Newsweek magazine (June 1) has published an article by Evgeny Morozov, who points out that when Ireland embarked on an ambitious e-voting scheme in 2006, such as fancy touch-screen voting machines, it was widely welcomed: Three years and 51 million euros later, in April, the government scrapped the initiative. What doomed the effort was a lack of trust: the electorate just didnât like it that the machines would record their votes as mere electronic blips, with no tangible record.
A backlash against e-voting is brewing all over Europe. After almost two years of deliberations, Germanyâs Supreme Court ruled last March that e-voting was unconstitutional because the average citizen could not be expected to understand the exact steps involved in the recording and tallying of votes. Political scientist Ulrich Wiesner, a physicist who filed the initial lawsuit said in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel that the Dutch Nedap machines used in Germany were even less secure than mobile phones. The Dutch public-interest group âWij Vertrouwen Stemcomputers Nietâ (We Do Not Trust Voting Machines) produced a video showing how quickly the Nedap machines could be hacked without voters or election officials being aware (the answer: in five minutes). After the clip was broadcast on national television in October 2006, the Netherlands banned all electronic voting machines.
Why are EVMs so vulnerable? Each step in the life cycle of a voting machine â from the time it is developed and installed to when the votes are recorded and the data transferred to a central repository for tallying â involves different people gaining access to the machines, often installing new software. It wouldnât be hard for, say, an election official to paint a parallel programme under another password, on one or many voting machines that would ensure one outcome or another pre-determined even before voters arrived at the poll stations.
These dangers have been known to the Election Commission since 2000, when M S Gill, then CEC, had arranged at my initiative for professor Sanjay Sarma of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Gitanjali Swamy of Harvard to demonstrate how un-safeguarded the chips in EVMs were. Some changes in procedures were made by the EC, but not on the fundamental flaws. In 2004, the Supreme Court First Bench, of Chief Justice V N Khare, Justices Babu and Kapadia had directed the election commission to consider the technical flaws in EVMs put forward by Satinath Choudhary, a US-based software engineer in a Public Interest Litigation. But the EC has failed to consider his representation.
There are many ways to prevent EVM fraud. One way to reduce the risk is to have machines print a paper record of each vote, which voters could then deposit into a conventional ballot box. While this procedure would ensure that each vote can be verified, using paper ballots defeats the purpose of electronic voting in the first place. Using two machines produced by different manufacturers would decrease the risk of a security compromise, but wouldnât eliminate it.
A better way, it is argued in the cited International Electrical & Electronics Engineering Journal article, is to expose the software behind electronic voting machines to public scrutiny. The root problem of electronic machines is that the computer programs that run them are usually closely held trade secrets (it doesnât help that the software often runs on the Microsoft Windows operating system, which is not the worldâs most secure). Having the software closely examined and tested by experts not affiliated with the company would make it easier to close technical loopholes that hackers can exploit. Experience with Web servers has shown that opening software to public scrutiny can uncover potential security breaches.
Now the Madras High Court is soon to hear a PIL on the EVMs. This is good news. The time has arrived for a long hard look at these machines. Otherwise elections would soon lose their credibility. All political parties must collect evidence to determine how many constituencies could have been rigged. The number would not exceed 75 in my opinion.
We can identify them as follows: Any result in which the main losing candidate of a recognised party finds that more than 10 per cent of the polling booths showed less than five votes per booth, should be taken prima facie as a constituency in which rigging has taken place. This is because the main recognised parties usually have more than five workers per booth, and hence with their families would poll a minimum of 25 votes per booth for their party candidate. Hence if these 25 voters can given affidavits affirming who they had voted for, then the high court can treat it as evidence and order a full inquiry.
<b>Naidu blames EVMs</b>
Hyderabad: The Telugu Desam president, Mr N. Chandrababu Naidu, is now suspecting faulty Electronic Voting Machines for his partyâs defeat in the recent elections. He prefers the age-old ballot paper be continued.
Mr Naidu promised to infuse new blood into the party and reward hardworking party leaders and workers.
The TD chief scrapped the partyâs state and district committees and announced the constitution of ad hoc committees till new bodies were elected. He asked party leaders from the districts to review the poll debacle and give him reasons for the same.
Mr Naidu gave enough hints that the EVMs were not above suspicion in addition to the split in the anti-government votes by Praja Rajyam besides other reasons.
âWe received complaints from several places about malfunctioning of EVMs. Mr K.E. Krishnamurthy called up from Dhone and said that faulty EVM stopped polling for three hours. Many voters had to return dejected,â he alleged.
Mr Naidu cited an AIADMK complaint to the Election Commission alleging rigging in the recent elections due to EVMs and demanded reversion to the ballot paper. Ms Jayalalithaa has been arguing against the EVMs and referred to some developed countries reverting to ballot paper after they found out that EVMs were being manipulated.
âThe AIADMK chief had also lodged a complaint against EVMs. There is demand for reverting to ballot paper,â he said. Several party leaders also blamed the Mahakutami for the defeat of the Telugu Desam evoking sharp reaction from the CPI leader, Mr Narayana. The TD chief made it clear to party cadre not to indulge in superficial reviews but concentrate on the causes for the defeat of the candidate in each constituency.
Vote Count Tamper in 6 suspect States?
Was Vote Machines software tampered?
http://www.politicsparty.com/hatch_analysis.php
<b>Winning elections made easy</b>
Producing doctored EVMs is childâs play: Computer chips that control the EVMs can be easily programmed to do all kinds of improper manipulations. For example, after a certain number of people (perhaps hundreds) have voted, the rest of the votes may be channeled to a chosen candidate. This is just one among many mischievous tricks possible.
This kind of wrongdoing cannot be detected by the polling agents of candidates. It will take hundreds of votes, for which the presiding officers or polling officers are not likely to have the time or patience to monitor. Control-units keep track of votes by recognising them only by their serial number on the list of candidates on the poll-units on which people vote. So any tampering of the control-unit chip has to be done only after the serial number of various candidates in the list of candidates appearing on poll-units have been assigned.
Normally returning officers declare the serial number assignments after the last day of withdrawal of nominations, which happens about two weeks before polling. ROM chips with mischievous codes can be readied within hours after the candidatesâ serial numbers are known. During the two weeks before polling, the malicious ROM chips, or the motherboard, or possibly the whole control-unit, whatever appears easier, may be caused to replace the original ones. Would it be wise to assume that officials in charge of the EVMs, and/or those guarding the machines, are incorruptible? I would leave it as question for readers to ponder over. Luckily, this kind of possibility of a fraud before voting can be easily remedied. Instead of declaring the serial number of candidates two weeks in advance of polling, the serial numbers may be decided at each polling booth by random draws by the presiding officers in the presence of the polling agents of various parties just an hour or so before the poll opening. Thereafter their names may be affixed on the poll-units in appropriate order in the presence of the poll-agents. All that will need to be done by the POs is, paste them on the poll-units in proper order by the time the poll opens. This entails different serial orders for candidates in different booths.But that only improves fairness towards the candidates, distributing the chance to be at the top or bottom of the list more evenly.
Increasing the sense of responsibility of the presiding and polling officers at polling booths, could also be considered, by officially declaring all of them to have equal powers, with instructions to try to make decisions with unanimous consent, as far as possible.
The writer is president, Better Democracy Forum, The Bronx, New York. He is a retired professor of computer science
http://www.indianexpress.com/storyOld.php?storyId=45296
<b>Jayalalithaa asks EC to scrap EVMs</b>
Chennai: AIADMK chief Jayalalithaa today asked the Election Commission to give up electronic voting machines and revert to the paper ballot system as EVMs could be "tampered."
"Technologically advanced nations like the US and Japan have tried every possible electronic device for voting. They have tried it on many occasions and each time it has been proved conclusively that these machines can be tampered with," she said here.
"After several trials and failures, finally the US and Japan have reverted back to the paper ballot," she said.
Jayalalithaa said she had given a report to the Election Commission on how EVMs could be tampered, but the commission has "refused to accept this."
"Certainly, we are not more advanced than US or Japan. These technologically advanced nations have already certified that the electronic devices can be tampered with and have gone back to the paper ballot," she said.
"We have been demanding that we should go back to paper ballot," the AIADMK chief said.
Her comments come in the wake of defeat suffered by the AIADMK candidate in the by-election to the Tirumangalam assembly constituency. During the campaign, Jayalalithaa had alleged that the DMK, in collaboration with officials, was attempting to tamper the EVMs.
http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.as...umentid=1784728
<b>Remote Controlling EVM â Manufacturing Election Result</b>
A realistic Perspective of the Mass EVM Fraud:
In my earlier posts, i just gave a wild prediction of how EVMs could be hacked. And as the discussion goes on further, we get a realistic picture of how this fraud could have happened.
Let me put up my views on such possibilities again.
Insertion of Trojan:
Many people claim that this possibility is low, as the number of persons involved in this process would be high, and that there are possibilities that it might be leaked out. While their point is valid, we can also consider the sivaganga constituency, where the result is changed at the last minute, but the news has been completely blocked. So, even if there is more number of people involved, the news might be prevented from leaking out.
The important stage of this Software hacking process is to insert a trojan code in to the Control Unit software, right at the manufacturing stage. The EC claims that, since the same EVM is used in more than one election, and that the candidate serial number is not known at the time of manufacturing, this trojan software could not be effectively used.
However, this is not a FOOL PROOF method. What the trojan software needs to know is the exact button assigned to the beneficiary party. This button may vary from constituency to constituency. So there may be series of key combinations, to make the software know the button assigned for the particular beneficiary party. For example, if the congress is assigned the 3rd button in a particular constituency, that button is held for a particular time period (say some 30 seconds to 1 minute), in combination with other buttons. By this, the software will come to know of the button assigned to the beneficiary party, and use this for diverting the votes from other parties.
The EC also claims, that the each chip has a unique code assigned, and that replacing with any other chip will make the EVM crash. This is again a vague reasoning, because, it will not be difficult, to manufacture the same chip with same unique number when a determined fraud is happening.
One more claim by the EC is that most of the EVMâs are manufactured long time back. But that doesnt explain the possibility of replacing the chip with another identical one, just before this election.
Embedding of Minute Wireless Transmitter/ Receiver in EVM Chip:
Most of the technical persons might be aware of the rapid advancement of Nano Technology, where the size of the electronic componenet is highly miniaturised. Today is the era of embedding everything in to single chip. And i strongly raise the this question; Why dont the Controlling Unit of the EVMâs be embedded with a wireless transmitter/receiver, for remote access?
The embedding of wireless Transmitter/Receiver inside the control Unit of the EVM machine is highly possible, and can be done without being detected. I believe, this form of manipulating EVMs through remote control is indeed the most sophisticated, easier, and advanced way to manipulate the results accurately.
For those, who are rejecting this very idea, please refer the following article in BBC.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5186650.stm
The above news is about a HP chip, that stores 100âs of pages, and transmitts them via wireless, using bluetooth or other Radio Frequency.
And can you believe the size of that chip?
So, its entirely possible to embed such a wireless transmitter/receiver inside the control circuit of the EVMâs, and they can be controlled from any part of the world.
Before, i move on, please read the following articles too.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/...90310084844.htm
A full fledged bluetooth wireless featured embedded in a single chip. (antennas, transmitter, receiver, all within chip).
http://embedded-system.net/bluetooth-chip-...-bluecore7.html
Another HP article, that describes about the minute wireless chip that they had designed.
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/...0717a.html
An article in 2002, reporting about a wireless feature embedded within a chip.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2002/...20530073010.htm
A quote at the end of the above article, would give a brief idea on use of embedded wireless devices.
âIn other potential applications, the military has expressed interest in pairing wireless chips with tiny sensors such as microphones. The idea is to drop thousands or even hundreds of thousands of these devices in a region to eavesdrop over a wide area. The chips would form a listening network by themselves, and the military monitor the system as needed.â
when a tiny wireless chip is dropped in hundreds to eavesdrop, it means, the chip is capable of transmitting data back to the control station. This point is very important and has to be noted to understand the issue further.
Nano Technology in US Military:
http://mae.pennnet.com/articles/article_di...ticle_id=294946
How the EVMs Could have been manipulated through remote control:
To discuss this possible scenario, We need to assume that the wireless transmitter/emitter had been embedded in right at the manufacturing of the Chip itself. (Note: THe chip manufacturing happens at a different place, well before EVM production)
There is a unique ID assigned to each EVM, and each of the EVM could be contacted separately, using this unique ID.
Can such a wireless component be detected or traced?
The wireless componenet in a chip, cannot be detected, unless, it transmits or emits signals. The Chip might have been programmed to transmit data only upon receiving certain command through specific frequency. In this case, the receiver component might be in listen mode, waiting for a particular command, known only to a core expert group. So, in a normal circumstance, this wireless component will be in hidden mode.
Can the architecture of the CHIP be verified?
To my knowledge, a chipâs internal circuitry cannot be verified after it is manufactured. In our case, the expert committee had verified only the approved architecture for use in production. However, it doesnt gaurantee, that all the Chips manufactured there are as per the original design.
The current architecture might have been obtained by the hackers, and additional wireless component introduced, and this new modified architecture might be produced at some different place and then used during the assembly of EVMs.
The size, apperance, and even the Unique ID of the Chip would be emulated as it is, and thus it is extremely difficult to verify, if the current Chip components used is indeed the original one.
The EVMs are all despatched to the respective constituencies, and the high level âRigging / hacking teamâ, will ensure that the EVMâs with wireless component is delievered to the appropriate constituency.
Now, the election would be conducted regularly, and the EVMs are stored in a highly secured location in each constituency.
Now, the core hacking team comes in to picture. We know that there are two days b/w last phase of voting and counting. In that time interval, the following is possible.
Using specially designed device, the core hacking team, can connect to each of the EVMâs through satellite connection, and obtain the voting data in to its computer. This is possible, since each EVM has a unique ID, and using that ID, they can connect to each and every EVM accurately.
All the data would be downloaded to a computer, according to EVMâs.
Now, in the selected constituencies, the votes are adjusted in each EVMâs used there, to increase the tally of the ruling party. Suppose, if there are 1500 boths in a constituency, and each booth having 1000 voters, with an average voting of 750 votes. If we could adjust, atleast 50 votes in each booth, it comes around 45,000 votes in all the 1500 booths. And this 50 votes need not be taken from any single party. For example, in a particular constituency, 20 votes from ADMK, 10 votes from DMDK, 5 votes from 4 other small parties/candidates, will total 50 votes. And these small adjustments are extremely difficult to detect and prove.
After the adjustments, these data could be uploaded to the corresponding EVMs automatically through an appropriate devices.
To give a familiar view of this process, its possible, to download all the data in an excel sheet along with EVM ID, adjust the values, and then upload these data back to the EVM, from this excel sheet itself. This is very much possible. Through automation, any number of EVMs could be manipulated in a short time.
we have seen how the remote controlling of EVMâs can be done by a small group of 5 to 10 expert group. I cannot prove that this is what could have happened, but i am pointing out, that this is largely possible, with current technological advancement, no matter, what amount of safegaurds we have.
Imagine, if atleast 25% of the EVMs are embedded with such wireless component, the result can be manipulated in atleast 25% of the constituencies. That comes around 136 constituencies of india, where the results can be adjusted remotely from anywhere in the world. THis is not a small number to ignore.
What the political Parties (Mainly the opposition parties) can do now?
First of all, it would be difficult to prove that a rigging has been happened, because of the secrecy of the votes. The political parties can analyse the voting patter in the booth where they are strong, and then take a mock survey.
The next thing is that the opposition parties can fight to ban use of EVMs in the coming elections, and return to paper ballot mechanism. This is very important, and can be argued strongly, citing the numerous possibility of hacking electronic devices. Also, the possibility of Rigging elections on a mass scale, like use of automated software, wireless technology etc, undermines the very purpose of election. In Paper Ballot, although some amount of rigging take place, it cannot be done at a mass scale secretly.
And if the parties fail to do that, then Indian elections would always be a âMatch Fixingâ. The parties will continue to spend large amount of money and effort in fighting elections, and atlast lose the elections, without being aware that a core group would sit inside an A/C room (either in Delhi or in Newyork), and manipulate the results to make a particular party to win.
For those who dont accept, or reject this as non-sense, i can confidently bet, that in the current world of electronics, Nothing is impossible.
Imagine, if the US could detect the location of Osama Bin Laden, through his cell phone signals, its not Impossible to remote control the EVMâs through satellite.
PS: The US and Britain had a direct stake in the current indian election, mainly because of the nuclear deal they had done. They can get the full co-operation (or perhaps, the servitude, slavery and subjugation) only from the congress party, and that they had the larger interest in making congress win. So, we cannot neglect the role of the US, in architecting such a large hi-fi election rigging, using a small core group of hackers.
http://psenthilraja.wordpress.com/2009/05/...lection-result/
<b>Dutch government bans electronic voting</b>
The government of the Netherlands has banned electronic voting machines from future elections because of a risk of eavesdropping. The nation will return to paper voting.
The government of the Netherlands has banned electronic voting machines from future elections because of a risk of eavesdropping. The nation will return to paper voting.
"Research indicates that a secure voting machine that is immune to the risks of eavesdropping can't be guaranteed. Developing new equipment furthermore requires a large investment, both financially and in terms of organization. The administration judges that this offers insufficient added value over voting by paper and pencil," the Ministry of Internal Affairs said Friday evening.
In its decision, the government also banned so-called voting printers. Because they leave a paper trail, the printers had been suggested as a potential alternative to traditional voting computers that store the vote counts in their memory.
A group of experts headed by Bart Jacobs, a professor at Radboud University in Nijmegen, dismissed the printer option. The group concluded that "even with regular testing of each printer, it can't be guaranteed that all devices stay within the required emission limits" that safeguard against eavesdropping.
Instead of electronic voting machines, the nation will now shift focus to electronic vote counting. Election officials will initiate tests where a person will read out the elected name on the voting form. In one test, a second person will count the vote by scanning a barcode. A second test will use a special counting-device.
The reliability of voting machines marks a victory for a local activist group called "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" ("We don't trust voting computers") that is headed up by noted Dutch computer hacker Rop Gonggrijp.
The group published a note on its website on Friday declaring victory: "We, the proponents of election results that can be verified, are winning all over the world!"
The group cited earlier rulings against voting machines in other regions including California, Germany, the U.K., Ireland and Italy. "Protests are being held all over the world. Voting without a paper trail is on its way out," the group cheered.
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=003AE63C-...1DDDC0DCFA62609
<b>U.S. district judge refuses to lift state ban on electronic voting</b>
SACRAMENTO - A federal judge in Los Angeles upheld a partial state ban Thursday on electronic voting in the Nov. 2 election, denying a request by advocates for the disabled.
In a tentative ruling Thursday, U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper declined to overturn an April 30 order by Secretary of State Kevin Shelley to ban electronic voting in 14 counties. Four counties and advocates for the disabled sought a temporary restraining order to block Shelley's order.
Riverside County officials sued Shelley in May to regain rights to use their touch screen voting machines. Plumas, San Bernardino and Kern counties later joined the suit.
Cooper ruled that the counties and the disabled weren't likely to prevail in their arguments of irreparable harm and were "substantially outweighed by the advancement of the public interest."
Advocates for the blind said Shelley's order prevents them from being able to vote by themselves. But Cooper tentatively ruled that potential problems with electronic voting in a presidential election made Shelley's decision reasonable.
Of 14 counties originally banned from using their machines in November, Shelley has reached agreements with five to again allow their use. Santa Clara, Merced, Orange, Shasta and Tehama counties agreed to new security conditions, including making paper ballots available to those who want to use them.
On April 30, Shelley decertified touch screen voting machines in 10 counties until they meet new conditions to prevent problems that occurred in the March primary. Counties reported software glitches that prevented polls from opening on time, causing people to leave without voting.
Shelley also banned electronic voting - with no option for reconsideration - in San Diego, Solano, San Joaquin and Kern counties in November because their machines weren't federally approved for the March election.
Counties that must still meet Shelley's security conditions to use their machines Nov. 2 include Riverside, San Bernardino, Plumas, Napa and Alameda.
http://www.wvcag.org/news/fair_use/2004/07_01e.htm
<b>California bans the use of some e-voting machines</b>
Ca. Sec. of State bans the use of some electronic voting machines. It is not likely that paper receipts will be available for Ca. voters in time for the Nov 2 elections.
Following the recommendation of election officials, California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley decertified and banned the use of Diebold AcuVote-TSx voting machines in the November elections. The remaining machines used in 10 counties were also decertified, but instead of calling for an outright ban of all electronic voting machines, these machines can be recertified if they include a verifiable paper trail or a paper ballot option and certain security conditions are met. As of now, no voting machines that are certified in California provide a verifiable paper trail. Shelley has also asked the state's attorney general to pursue criminal and civil action against Diebold for installing uncertified software on machines that were used in primary elections.
"I came about this close to banning outright, decertifying outright, with no possibility of reprieve, the other 10 counties,'' said Shelley, holding his left thumb and index finger close to each other. "The reason I didn't is because I think the arguments the disabled community, non-English speaking voters and county election officials made in recent days were compelling.''
Many of the news stories circulating about the Secretary of State's decision are either misleading or wrong. Some news outlets are reporting that all electronic voting machines in California have been banned and others suggest that the machines will have paper receipts available in time for the November elections ? this is not true.
Although all touch-screen machines will have to produce voter-verified receipts by 2006 under rules already proposed by Shelley, no such machines are cleared for use in California, nor are any likely to be before Nov. 2.
The 10 counties with machines can comply with the ruling by providing the option of voting with paper ballots instead of using the electronic voting machines.? Many are praising the Secretary of State's decision as a step in the right direction, but it is likely that come Nov 2, no California voter who uses an electronic voting machine will receive a printed receipt that confirms their vote was accurately cast.?
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2004/05/3721.ars
<b>Analysis finds e-voting machines vulnerable</b>
WASHINGTON â Most of the electronic voting machines widely adopted since the disputed 2000 presidential election "pose a real danger to the integrity of national, state and local elections," a report out Tuesday concludes.
There are more than 120 security threats to the three most commonly purchased electronic voting systems, the study by the Brennan Center for Justice says. For what it calls the most comprehensive review of its kind, the New York City-based non-partisan think tank convened a task force of election officials, computer scientists and security experts to study e-voting vulnerabilities.
The study, which took more than a year to complete, examined optical scanners and touch-screen machines with and without paper trails. Together, the three systems account for 80% of the voting machines that will be used in this November's election.
While there have been no documented cases of these voting machines being hacked, Lawrence Norden, who chaired the task force and heads the Brennan Center's voting-technology assessment project, says there have been similar software attacks on computerized gambling slot machines.
"It is unrealistic to think this isn't something to worry about" in terms of future elections, he says.
The report comes during primary season amid growing concerns about potential errors and tampering. Lawsuits have been filed in at least six states to block the purchase or use of computerized machines.
Election officials in California and Pennsylvania recently issued urgent warnings to local polling supervisors about potential software problems in touch-screen voting machines after a test in Utah uncovered vulnerabilities in machines made by Diebold Election Systems.
North Canton, Ohio-based Diebold did not return calls for comment. The company, a major manufacturer of e-voting machines, said earlier this month that security flaws cited in its machines were theoretical and would be addressed this year.
The new threat analysis does not address specific machines or companies. Instead, it "confirms the suspicions about electronic voting machines that people may have had from individual reports" of problems, Norden says.
Among the findings:
⢠Using corrupt software to switch votes from one candidate to another is the easiest way to attack all three systems. A would-be hacker would have to overcome many hurdles to do this, the report says, but none "is insurmountable."
⢠The most vulnerable voting machines use wireless components open to attack by "virtually any member of the public with some knowledge and a personal digital assistant." Only New York, Minnesota and California ban wireless components.
⢠Even electronic systems that use voter-verified paper records are subject to attack unless they are regularly audited.
⢠Most states have not implemented election procedures or countermeasures to detect software attacks.
"There are plenty of vulnerabilities that can and should be fixed before the November election," says David Jefferson, a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory computer scientist who served on the task force. "Whether they will or not remains to be seen."
The report said state election officials could improve voting-machine security if they conduct routine audits comparing voter- verified paper trails to the electronic record and ban wireless components in voting machines.
"A voting system that is not auditable contains the seeds of destruction for a democracy," says Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J., a chief sponsor of a bill to improve electronic-voting security.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/20...-e-voting_x.htm
<b>Most electronic voting isn't secure, CIA expert says</b>
WASHINGTON â The CIA, which has been monitoring foreign countries' use of electronic voting systems, has reported apparent vote-rigging schemes in Venezuela, Macedonia and Ukraine and a raft of concerns about the machines' vulnerability to tampering.
Appearing last month before a U.S. Election Assistance Commission field hearing in Orlando, Fla., a CIA cybersecurity expert suggested that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies fixed a 2004 election recount, an assertion that could further roil U.S. relations with the Latin leader.
In a presentation that could provide disturbing lessons for the United States, where electronic voting is becoming universal, Steve Stigall summarized what he described as attempts to use computers to undermine democratic elections in developing nations. His remarks have received no news media attention until now.
Stigall told the Election Assistance Commission, a tiny agency that Congress created in 2002 to modernize U.S. voting, that computerized electoral systems can be manipulated at five stages, from altering voter registration lists to posting results.
"You heard the old adage 'follow the money,' " Stigall said, according to a transcript of his hour-long presentation that McClatchy obtained. "I follow the vote. And wherever the vote becomes an electron and touches a computer, that's an opportunity for a malicious actor potentially to . . . make bad things happen."
Stigall said that voting equipment connected to the Internet could be hacked, and machines that weren't connected could be compromised wirelessly. Eleven U.S. states have banned or limited wireless capability in voting equipment, but Stigall said that election officials didn't always know it when wireless cards were embedded in their machines.
While Stigall said that he wasn't speaking for the CIA and wouldn't address U.S. voting systems, his presentation appeared to undercut calls by some U.S. politicians to shift to Internet balloting, at least for military personnel and other American citizens living overseas. Stigall said that most Web-based ballot systems had proved to be insecure.
The commission has been criticized for giving states more than $1 billion to buy electronic equipment without first setting performance standards. Numerous computer-security experts have concluded that U.S. systems can be hacked, and allegations of tampering in Ohio, Florida and other swing states have triggered a campaign to require all voting machines to produce paper audit trails.
The CIA got interested in electronic systems a few years ago, Stigall said, after concluding that foreigners might try to hack U.S. election systems. He said he couldn't elaborate "in an open, unclassified forum," but that any concerns would be relayed to U.S. election officials.
Stigall, who's studied electronic systems in about three dozen countries, said that most countries' machines produced paper receipts that voters then dropped into boxes. However, even that doesn't prevent corruption, he said.
Turning to Venezuela, he said that Chavez controlled all of the country's voting equipment before he won a 2004 nationwide recall vote that had threatened to end his rule.
When Chavez won, Venezuelan mathematicians challenged results that showed him to be consistently strong in parts of the country where he had weak support. The mathematicians found "a very subtle algorithm" that appeared to adjust the vote in Chavez's favor, Stigall said.
Calls for a recount left Chavez facing a dilemma, because the voting machines produced paper ballots, Stigall said.
"How do you defeat the paper ballots the machines spit out?" Stigall asked. "Those numbers must agree, must they not, with the electronic voting-machine count? . . . In this case, he simply took a gamble."
Stigall said that Chavez agreed to allow 100 of 19,000 voting machines to be audited.
"It is my understanding that the computer software program that generated the random number list of voting machines that were being randomly audited, that program was provided by Chavez," Stigall said. "That's my understanding. It generated a list of computers that could be audited, and they audited those computers.
"You know. No pattern of fraud there."
A Venezuelan Embassy representative in Washington declined immediate comment.
The disclosure of Stigall's remarks comes amid recent hostile rhetoric between President Barack Obama and Chavez. On Sunday, Chavez was quoted as reacting hotly to Obama's assertion that he's been "exporting terrorism," referring to the new U.S. president as a "poor ignorant person."
Questions about Venezuela's voting equipment caused a stir in the United States long before Obama became president, because Smartmatic, a voting machine company that partnered with a firm hired by Chavez's government, owned U.S.-based Sequoia Voting Systems until 2007. Sequoia machines were in use in 16 states and the District of Columbia at the time.
Reacting to complaints that the arrangement was a national security concern, the Treasury Department's Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States launched an investigation. Smartmatic then announced in November 2007 that it had sold Sequoia to a group of investors led by Sequoia's U.S.-based management team, thus ending the inquiry.
In the former Soviet republic of Georgia, Stigall said, hackers took resurrecting the dead to "a new art form" by adding the names of people who'd died in the 18th century to computerized voter-registration lists. Macedonia was accused of "voter genocide" because the names of so many Albanians living in the country were eradicated from the computerized lists, Stigall said.
He said that elections also could be manipulated when votes were cast, when ballots were moved or transmitted to central collection points, when official results were tabulated and when the totals were posted on the Internet.
In Ukraine, Stigall said, opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko lost a 2004 presidential election runoff because supporters of Russian-backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych "introduced an unauthorized computer into the Ukraine election committee national headquarters. They snuck it in.
"The implication is that these people were . . . making subtle adjustments to the vote. In other words, intercepting the votes before it goes to the official computer for tabulation."
Taped cell-phone calls of the ensuing cover-up led to nationwide protests and a second runoff, which Yushchenko won.
Election Assistance Commission officials didn't trumpet Stigall's appearance Feb. 27, and he began by saying that he didn't wish to be identified. However, the election agency had posted his name and biography on its Web site before his appearance.
Electronic voting systems have been controversial in advanced countries, too. Germany's constitutional court banned computerized machines this month on the grounds that they don't allow voters to check their choices.
Stigall said that some countries had taken novel steps that improved security.
For example, he said, Internet systems that encrypt vote results so they're unrecognizable during transmission "greatly complicates malicious corruption." Switzerland, he noted, has had success in securing Internet voting by mailing every registered citizen scratch cards that contain unique identification numbers for signing on to the Internet. Then the voters must answer personal security questions, such as naming their mothers' birthplaces.
Stigall commended Russia for transmitting vote totals over classified communication lines and inviting hackers to test its electronic voting system for vulnerabilities. He said that Russia now hoped to enable its citizens to vote via cell phones by next year.
"As Russia moves to a one-party state," he said, "they're trying to make their elections available . . . so everyone can vote for the one party. That's the irony."
After reviewing Stigall's remarks, Susannah Goodman, the director of election reform for the citizens' lobby Common Cause, said they showed that "we can no longer ignore the fact that all of these risks are present right here at home . . . and must secure our election system by requiring every voter to have his or her vote recorded on a paper ballot
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/226/story/64711.html
<b>India's electronic voting faces lawsuit over accountability</b>
With a billion voters all depending on one proprietary system, the risks of tampering are high. With his recently filed lawsuit, a professor attempts to restore confidence in electronic voting.
Retired computer science professor Satinath Choudhary has filed public interest litigation over India's new electronic voting machines (EVMs) in India's Supreme Court. Dr. Choudhary is a 1964 graduate of the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology and has also taught in the United States. The suit is due to come up for hearing immediately.
In the petition, a copy of which was uncharacteristically released publicly over the tech lists in India, Dr. Choudhary cited news reports of problems with the EVMs in some parts of the country, and said: "In my public-interest litigation (PIL) I have asked the Supreme Court for directions. I hope it will give a direction to save democracy in India."
In an op-ed column for The Indian Express last week, Dr. Choudhary wrote, "Producing doctored EVMs is child's play."
Much of the debate cited problems faced by electronic voting even in countries like the US. India has voted for a new parliament. Results are due only around May 13, from the worlds most-populous democracy with a population of more than one billion. But whoever wins, the demand for openness in standards and source code is already a clear winner.
India held a staggered election to elect 540-plus parliamentarians. This is the first all-electronic Indian poll, with some 725,000 EVMs used in every polling booth in India.
The made-in-India EVMs consists of a control unit and a balloting unit joined by a cable. The vote is cast by pressing the blue button on the balloting unit next to the candidate and symbol of choice.
But official claims over the "achievements" of the EVMs were quickly contested both in the mainstream media, and also among tech-oriented mailing lists that link up some highly qualified techies in this part of the globe.
<b>"The reliability of the EVMs manufactured by the (Indian) public sector Bharat Electronics Limited and the Electronics Corporation of India Limited is doubtful. The software and circuits embedded in the EVMs could very well contain numerous flaws or deliberate backdoors for tampering," commented Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, writing in the prominent Delhi-based newspaper 'Hindustan Times'.
</b>
Prasad argued that a maxim of software and microelectronics engineering is that all software and electronic and electromechanical systems are to be regarded as error-prone unless rigorous testing proves them to be reliable. Significantly, he said, the Indian firms behind the products had not "disclosed details of the electronic hardware and software used in their EVMs for scrutiny by neutral experts".
"How does the EVM work? Frankly, we don't know. (A professor from the one of the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology who explained its working on TV) could only test the EVMs as a black box. A proper scrutiny of the EVM is possible only when the source code of the EVM is public," argued Ashhar Farhan on the tech-oriented India-GII mailing list, which focuses on Internet and technology issues. The list is hosted on the servers of the network of the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, the oldest non-profit, mass membership organization working on social impacts of computer technology.
There was wider agreement with Farhan's view that unless India knows the exact algorithm "and more particularly, the source code, then we, the citizens cannot be assured of fairness of the EVM".
Other questions were also raised over whether the EVMs were secure and had robust hardware.
Some debating the issue raised the possibilities of the EVM being programmed to change the vote count to a paritcular candidate after pressing a combination of other keys. This combination can easily be trigged by successive voters who are a part of the conspiracy.
This will remain only between the programmer and those few voters. They only have to stand in a particular order in the voting queue and press buttons in that particular order.
"Unless we are informed of the exact source code and hardware of the EVM, it is not possible to verify the security of the EVM," said Farhan.
"AFAIK there is no provision for any audit trail or manual/paper verification. Has anyone seen and verified the source code? As far as I know, it is in assembly language burnt into the IC and the source code is not available for inspection. Does anyone have the circuit schematic?" commented another poster to the list, signing his name as the 'Root Of All Evil'.
In another development, in end-April Rick Hohensee announced the release of a ballot editing script for Linux.
Said Hohensee: "Votescript was recently posted to Usenet alt.politics with and will appear in a few days at ftp://ftp.gwdg.de/linux/install/clienux/...votescript.
It is a Bash script that uses a PC and printer to edit a printed ballot and keep a tally file for political and other elections. This provides election accountability *to* the public, creates redundant records, and avoids such things as hanging chads.
In 2001, a team of developers: Bill Kastilahn, Zhiqian Wang, Galen Graham, David Schuller, and Jodi Kastilahn won an Embedded Linux Journal design contest with a Linux-based voting machine and estimated its cost at $300 per unit.
http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/7561
<b>Rajeev Srinivasan about EVM </b>
The Indian voter is not stupid, and is exquisitely sensitive to things that affect his wallet. Therefore it is a little surprising that the average voter drank the UPA's Kool-Aid.
There is, of course, the possibility that the average voter did not in fact fall for the UPA's charms, and that this election was subject to massive fraud. I am talking about Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs). Having spent many years in the high-tech world, I do not trust computers, especially embedded systems. Researchers in the US have shown how easy it is to break into EVMs, which is why they have not adopted them. They have realised how important it is to have a paper audit trail, hanging chads and all.
It would not be extraordinarily difficult to install a programme with a Trojan Horse in it. To outward appearances and to ordinary testing, the programme would appear normal. However, when it is fed a sequence of keystrokes by the agent of the party committing the fraud, the Trojan Horse wakes up, and then, regardless of what buttons the voter actually presses, it can assign a certain (non-suspicious-looking) percentage (not 90% but, say 45%) to the preferred party. The Trojan Horse can even be programmed to quietly delete itself when the voting is over. Nobody would know any better, as there is no paper trail.
Let me emphasise that I do not have any evidence that this happened in 2009, but it is worth investigating. There were too many surprising -- almost miraculous -- victories by certain candidates whom the casual observer would have written off. By Occam's Razor, the simplest explanation is fraud. I would like to note in passing that in 2004, expecting the NDA to commit fraud, an Indian Communist in the US had prepared a suit alleging EVM fraud. Therefore it is clear that the thought has occurred to various people that there could be EVM fraud.
http://election.rediff.com/column/2009/may...her-stories.htm
04.04.2009
PRESS RELEASE
The Congress Party President Ms.Sonia Gandhi seeing the imminent collapse of the UPA has set-up a seven member âcrisis managementâ team of foreigners based in a five star hotel in Delhi. This is a serious threat Indiaâs national security.
While the names of all seven members are available with me, I am gathering the detailed antecedents of these dirty seven. The first member identified for me is an obscure UK-based journalist called Mr.David Green who has written for London tabloids on âsnack foodsâ. He was easy to identify because he is often seen-by SPG at the residence of Ms.Sonia Gandhi reading secret files being made available to her by some Ministers and bureaucrats. Indian intelligence is being blocked by the Home Minister P.Chidambaram from investigating whether Ms.Green is an operative for British Intelligence, the MI-6.
<b>One of the tasks assigned to this nefarious team is how to doctor the electronic voting machines in about 50 constituencies by using dual passwords technique and by hacking via wireless cyber techniques.
</b>
(SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY)
http://www.janataparty.org/pressdetail.asp?rowid=58
<b>EVM- A BOTHER?</b>
ALMOST THE WHOLE OPPOSITION IN TAMILNADU HAS PASSED RESOLUTIONS INSISTING ON SWITCHING TO BALLOT SYSTEM FROM THE EXISTING EVM, WHICH THEY CLAIM IS PRONE TO TAMPERING. On the day of polling, some people not only in Tamilnadu but also far away in West Bengal complained of light glowing in front of some other candidate when they pressed their choice. While the parties which lost are complaining, the winners are saying it as a case of sour grapes. CM Karunanidhi has questioned, how come then the AIADMK alliance won in 12, is it that only in the 28 the votes got transferred?
Even were the UPA lost in Tamilnadu, it is not beyond suspicion for many Congress stalwarts were made to loose for ulterior motives, it may seem.
It is quite possible that either of them is correct. So why should we use a machine about which there is so much secrecy and which is only in the hands of government, made by them and stored by them. It is not enough that Justice is done but it should seem to be.
One of the allegation the Opposition says is since it is a machine it can be reprogrammed or programmed to give a particular result. In an age were cyber crimes are raising by the day, were there is global hacking from distant places, were an IT CEO could fudge accounts for years without notice, in spite of a best audit company at service, is it wrong to think on such a feasibility?
The EC claims that the The EVM is designed to be totally tamper proof. Each EVM comes with a sophisticated programme in assembly language: a software fully sealed against outside influence. And the programme is itself fused on to a customised micro processor chip at the manufacturer's end. This ensures that the program is rendered tamper proof and inaccessible. But IS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE A PARTICULAR LOT DIFFERENTLY TO SUIT A SPECIFIC PURPOSE. WHY CAN'T THE EC MAKE PROVISIONS FOR POLLING AGENTS TO BE ENSURED THAT EACH AND EVERY MACHINE IS TAMPER PROOF. A SAMPLE TEST MAY NOT BE ENOUGH. SO WHAT ELSE? WELL THE ANSWER SHOULD COME FROM THE EC.
THERE SHOULD BE NO DELAY IN COUNTING AFTER POLLS AND IF NEED BE POLLING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL OVER INDIA. IS IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE TWO MACHINES WITH THE SAME SERIAL NUMBER?
"A proper scrutiny of the EVM is possible only when the source code of the EVM is public. "- OPINES MANY TECHNOLOGISTS. THERE SHOULD BE A WAY TO ENSURE THAT MACHINES ARE SAFE, TAMPER PROOF AND ARE NOT REPLACEABLE. ALSO RIGGING OF POLLS IS IT FEASIBLE. ideally IDENTITY CARDS WITH PASSWORD SIMILAR TO ATM'S WILL SOLVE MOST DOUBTS.
IN SPITE OF SO MANY CHECKS AND BALANCES, IF YOU HAVE A PARTY WHICH IS DESPERATE TO HOLD ON TO POWER,THEN IT COULD ALWAYS FIND A WAY OUT AND EVEN IF YOU HAVE THE BEST SYSTEMS THERE WILL ALWAYS BE DOUBTING JACKS. BUT THAT DOES NOT ABSOLVE THE EC FROM MAKING ELECTIONS 'SEEM' FAIR. IT SHOULD THROW A CHALLENGE TO ANYONE WHO CAN TAMPER THE MACHINE OR SEND MACHINES TO ALL PARTY OFFICES AND GET THEIR CERTIFICATE. ALSO THERE SHOULD BE A WAY TO ENSURE THAT EVERY MACHINE IS AS SECURE AS THE OTHER.
BALLOT BOX CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTION FOR IT GIVES PLACE TO MASSIVE RIGGING. IT MAY WORK IN USA ETC WHERE BOOTH CAPTURING AND RIGGING IS RARE.
AND WHAT CAN A MACHINE DO IF A GULLIBLE VOTER IS GREASED AND A PROMISE TAKEN ON SOMETHING HE RESPECTS,WITH A FEAR PUT IN HIS MIND THAT HE WILL BE WATCHED IN THE BOOTH BY A CAMERA ABOVE HIS HEAD? IT HAPPENS IN INDIA.
THE ELECTIONS RESULTS LOOK TOO PERFECT TO BE TRUE. EVERY PROBLEM HAS A SOLUTION AND SURELY WE WILL FIND OUT.
http://www.chennaitvnews.com/2009/05/evm-bother.html
<b>PIL to ban EVMs in future elections admitted in Madras HC</b>
DMDK headquarters secretary P. Parthasarathy has filed a PIL in the High Court of Madras seeking a ban on the use of Electronic Voting Machines in bye-elections and to direct that elections be conducted using ballot papers.
The key points made in the PIL:
1. DMDK contested in all 40 constituencies of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry for the elections to Lok Sabha held on May 13.
2. Electronic Voting Machines were used during the election.
3. Frauds and malpractices occurred in the use of balloting units of EVMs. In Central Chennai constituency in particular, the EVMs were so manipulated that pressing of any button resulted in the vote accruing to the candidate of the ruling party.
4. In Virudhunagar constituency, it is reported that 25,000 additional votes were recorded on the machines than the number of voters.
5. In Dindigul constituency, when button was pressed on DMDK symbol, the light on the Congress symbol was lit up. Many EVMs were so manipulated that, one additional vote was recorded for the ruling party symbol for every 5 votes recorded.
Similar malpractices and frauds involving manipulation of EVMs occurred in many constituencies and booths during the election. When such malpractices and frauds were detected, no attempt was made to replace the EVMs in a wholesale manner. Despite representations and ccomplaints were made to the Election officials, no action was taken by the latter.
Hence, there should be a ban on the use of EVMs in the forthcoming bye-elections. Court was requested to direct the Election Commission to use only ballot paper system.
Vacation Bench judges Hon'ble V. Dhanapalan and MM Sundaresh admitted the PIL. The Solicitor General agreed to file the response of the Union of India.
The next hearing was postponed by three weeks, after issuing notices to the Central Election Commission and State Election Commissioner of Tamil Nadu.
<b>Chennai: Delay in receipt and changed serial numbers of EVMs</b>
The report received from the Collector on the counting of votes in Sivaganga constituency is seriously enquiring into the affair by reviewing the video recordings. During the counting of votes in the Sivaganga Lok Sabha constituency, from round 1 to round 15, AIADMK Candidate Raja Kannappan was in the lead.
In a sudden twist, during the next two rounds, Home Minister P. Chidambaram was declared to be in the lead and declared elected by a difference of 3354 votes. By 12: 30 PM in a situation when most party agents had left the counting premises, at about 6 PM, the declaration of election was made and has led to intense debate.
Raja Kannappanâs complaint: Stating that there were malpractices in the counting of votes, Raja Kannappan has lodged a complaint with Naresh Gupta, State Election Commmissioner and asked for recount. In his petition, Raja Kannappan has noted: âWhen counting of votes had ended by 1:30 PM, I was declared to have been in the lead and that I had won by a difference of 3552 votes. Claiming that there were differences in the counting, the District Election Officer declined to declare the result. Thereafter, a declaration was made that P. Chidambaram had wonâ
There is a difference of 15,000 votes between the recordings made during the counting, by Election Party Agents and details mentioned in the Announcement Board.
Why delay? Electronic Voting Machines used in Alangudi Assembly segment were received in Karaikkudi counting centre only on May 14 (that is, the day after the election at 6 AM). The distance between Karaikudi and Alangudi is only 60 kms. Despite this, there has been delay in bringing in the EVMs. Some Machine numbers are also different from the one recorded earlier. On some EVMs, there are no signatures of Election Party Agents. There is no tally between the number of voters and the votes recorded. So said, Raja Kannappan in his petition.
After reviewing the petition, Naresh Gupta has ordered for a detailed report from the Election Officer, who is Collector Pankaj Kumar. Naresh Gupta who gave a Press Statement on May 20 that there were no malpractices in the counting process, has, on the very next day asked for a detailed report from the Collector. This has fueled further debate. Election Commission is seriously engaged in matching the video recordings with the reports made by the Collector.
MAY 13, 2009: The following E-Mail has been sent to the Election Commission of India, New Delhi, today:-
Date: May 13, 2009
From: Satish Chandra
Telephone: 01-617-282-4996
FAX: 01-617-825-4973
E-Mail: satchandra24@hotmail.com
To: Members of the Election Commission, New Delhi
C/O feedback@eci.gov.in, ashishs@eci.gov.in, kakumar@eci.gov.in, rksrivastava@eci.gov.in, kfwilfred@eci.gov.in, ystandhope@eci.gov.in, skrudola@eci.gov.in, jaipriye@eci.gov.in, balakrish@eci.gov.in, dralokshukla@eci.gov.in
Dear Sirs:
With reference to the last paragraph of the addendum dated May 11, 2009 below and the rest of the Press Release dated November 14, 2008-May 11, 2009 below, this is to request that the counting of the votes in the just concluded elections be withheld or halted, on the grounds of national security, till the national security issues have been addressed.
Sincerely,
Satish Chandra
CC: Major Indian media organs
Date: May 13, 2009 (Second letter of this date)
From: Satish Chandra
Telephone: 01-617-282-4996
FAX: 01-617-825-4973
E-Mail: satchandra24@hotmail.com
To: Members of the Election Commission, New Delhi
C/O feedback@eci.gov.in, ashishs@eci.gov.in, kakumar@eci.gov.in, rksrivastava@eci.gov.in, kfwilfred@eci.gov.in, ystandhope@eci.gov.in, skrudola@eci.gov.in, jaipriye@eci.gov.in, balakrish@eci.gov.in, dralokshukla@eci.gov.in
Dear Sirs:
With reference to my earlier letter of todayâs date to you (included below), the national security issues I referred to in it include the following: in my addendum dated February 26, 2006 (below), titled âNational security crisis due to microwaves from satellitesâ, I say âThis shows that the C.I.A. can control any digital equipment, not just computers, by microwaves from satellites. This applies to all digital equipment, such as that used in a multitude of defence applications, electric power grids, nuclear power plants, etc., even if the equipment is not connected to the outside world by telephone lines.â This includes electronic voting machines; the United States has the ability to manipulate vote counts in electronic voting machines by microwaves from satellites. I repeat my request that the counting of votes in the just concluded elections be withheld or halted, on the grounds of national security, till the national security issues have been addressed.
Sincerely,
Satish Chandra
CC: Major Indian media organs
(For the addendum dated February 26, 2006 referred to above, see my blog titled âNuclear Supremacy For India Over U.S.â which can be found by doing a Google search with the title).
<b>C.I.A. Hijacks India With Microwaves From Satellites - Satish Chandra</b>
Microwaves from satellites can be used not just for audio and video surveillance (see addendum dated February 10, 2006 to letter dated May 11, 2005, above). Three days ago, I had put my computer to sleep when I went to sleep. As I approached my work table on getting up a few hours later, the computer switched on without my doing it ; the C.I.A. had switched it on remotely by microwaves hoping I will continue something I was doing on the computer before I went to sleep and this occurred several more times. In the past, when I was doing something, such as preparing one of these letters to the press, on my computer, the screen would suddenly be replaced with, say, a Google search box without my doing anything and it appeared the C.I.A. was remotely controlling my computer over the Internet, but its switching on without being connected to the Internet or the telephone line showed the control was by microwaves. Even signals over the telephone lines usually travel, at least part of the way, over microwaves. This shows that the C.I.A. can control any digital equipment, not just computers, by microwaves from satellites. This applies to all digital equipment, such as that used in a multitude of defence applications, electric power grids, nuclear power plants, etc., even if the equipment is not connected to the outside world by telephone lines. This means that all digital equipment should be shielded so it cannot be operated by microwaves from satellites. The turning on and off of a television set, changing its channels, etc., by a remote is done similarly though TV remotes use infra-red rays instead of microwaves. In a letter to the press several years ago, I also mentioned that the C.I.A. was able to remotely monitor what was being typed on an old-fashioned electric typewriter."
--------------------------------------------------
On May 16, 2009 I said : "It is no use developing bigger and better missiles if you don't use what you have to destroy India's enemies IN A TIMELY FASHION, now that the elections -- decided by the C.I.A. by microwaves from satellites -- are over. India is being hijacked by India's enemies; are India's missile men going to continue to "get paid, make babies, chase girls" or are they going to obey India's sovereign and destroy India's enemies with the weapons they already have? I am looking for some trace, some spark of life in India's missile men that will allow India to survive."
<b>SP alleges EVM tampering, demands old ballot system in election</b>
Alleging that the EVMs were tampered with in the last elections in Orissa, Samajawadi Party (SP) state unit president Kailash Mishra today demanded use of ballot papers in the elections.
Mr Mishra told newspersons here that rigging of the EVMs was done in selected places across the state in ''three different modes - pre-poll arrangement, change of EVMs and post-poll arrangement.'' He alleged that programming was done in around 15 per cent EVMs in such a way that whatever button a voter pressed the votes would go in favour of the Conch, the election symbol of the ruling BJD.
To justify his allegation, he cited the example of a booth in Nimasahi of Cuttack where the EVM was changed after the voters lodged a complaint. Similarly, during a mock poll at booth no 68 of Hindol all votes went in favour of the ruling BJD, he said.
Mr Mishra said the EVM was changed on the basis of complaints of the Preisiding Officer. The SP president further alleged that after the election was over the votes cast in favour of other parties were transferred to the account of the BJD by rigging the EVMs.
He said in Kamakhayanagar the number of EVMs sent to booth nos 93, 113 and 137 did not match the number of EVMs received from these booths for counting.
http://www.newkerala.com/nkfullnews-1-43374.html
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