Nuclear Thread - 4

[Naresh]

<!--QuoteBegin-Viren+Jul 31 2008, 08:26 PM-->QUOTE(Viren @ Jul 31 2008, 08:26 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->Nareshji,

<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->One does believe that one did not post the Five Points you refer to. If so then please let me have the refercence to the post and then one will eat humble pie as well as eat crow.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
It's still archived on this very forum (Paki thread, strange that you missed it). The name of author's missing since software periodically removes name of members who go inactive - but subsequent posts by other IF members should not leave any doubt about authorship.
No need for eating any crows. If and when we meet, the choicest murg tandoori/mussalam is on me. Along with a Patiala peg of Lagavulin <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->
[right][snapback]85511[/snapback][/right]
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<b>Viren Ji :</b>

Many, many thanks for the link. Problem solved and all I can say is - the least you can do - is to appreciate that it is not my language!!

In addition I always sign off with <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->!!!

Under-the-stood?

I am sure that when you pass through London it will be Lagavulin - an Islay Malt - for you but it would be Maker's Mark or Bookers for me. I also like the Jack Daniels Single Barrel or Col. Blanton's Gold Label. At the moment I am going through a Bottle of Col. Blanton - Silver Label Warehouse H, Barrel No. 290, Rick No. 26, Bottle No. 231.

To a fellow partaker of the Wee Dram of the Drop from the Ol’ Crater : Never mind your case of Mistaken Identity. You are forgiven.

Next time you get a chance try a McDowell Single Malt or an Amrut Single Cask or even the Amrut Peated variety.

Man, you will like the taste of the "Sunny Indians".

This time I will sign off with Slandjay as well as the usual Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[acharya]

How many people have noticed that in the newspapers from Jul 20 the news reports about Power cuts and Power shortages has increased.

[Guest]

No problems Nareshji, your tone/tenor/language was never in doubt. And it was never in doubt to me as to who actually posted that. Only reason I bring it up is in reference to the original author who's part of the discussion here.

My apologies if my post incorrectly hinted at you.

<i>raat gayi, baat gayi</i>.
Will move <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo--> discussion to food/wine thread before some admin raps me on the knuckles.

[Naresh]

<!--QuoteBegin-Viren+Aug 1 2008, 04:07 AM-->QUOTE(Viren @ Aug 1 2008, 04:07 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->[right][snapback]85542[/snapback][/right]
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<b>Viren Ji :</b>

Chullo Ji - Back to Lota Bashing!

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[dhu]

<b>China mum on backing India at IAEA, NSG</b>
(Pioneer)
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Ahead of the crucial meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors, India has failed to receive any assurance from China in favour of the India-US civil nuclear agreement.  

Congress general secretary and Minister of State in Prime Minister's Office (PMO) Prithviraj Chavan has returned from China after holding discussions with the Government and political party there. Chavan, who had gone as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's special envoy, gave a letter to the Chinese Government seeking its support at the IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) fora. Sources indicated that though the meetings were cordial, t<b>here was no commitment from China, </b>which is eyeing India's nuclear agreement with US as a threat to its status in South Asia.

Back home after the meetings, Chavan refused to comment on the Chinese Government's position. He said: "I was there only as the PM's envoy and had three meetings there." According to sources, the Indian side had a luncheon meeting with a junior minister, then with a party minister and finally with a special representative and State Councillor.

India tried to impress upon China its need for energy security. The country touched the issues of population and poverty as the key to strike a chord with China. A source said: "We have put to the Chinese side that we have to face poverty just like them."

With the Beijing Olympics just round the corner, China has imposed restrictions on the number of cars on its roads to cut down pollution. The Indian side took that cue to show that India would also like to cut down carbon emissions by using innovative techniques like China (it allows cars with even number registration plates on one day and odd numbers the next). <b>The Chinese side asked specific questions on the nuclear agreement and expressed interest in understanding the political discord raging within India on the issue. </b>

The Prime Minister had met Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G-8 summit in Japan to drum up support. <b>Though China has hinted it would not want to become a stumbling block in India's way, it has still not spelt out its stance. India is now completely dependent on the US to use its clout to win over China to its side. </b>

<b>A source said that there was also a possibility of China not attending the NSG meeting at all.</b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

I am sure Burns and fellows have convinced the chinese much before they convinced their own rogue bigots in Congress about the true nature of the deal. Hence the "shadow boxing" (as said elsewhere) routine between Communists and Americans culminating with Communist-SP relay pass.

[Naresh]

Originally Posted on the Nuclear Thread :

<b>Mudy Ji, Viren Ji, Ravish Ji, acharya Ji - et al :</b>

At the risk of being admonished by the Powers That Be for digressing from the topic of this, it is heartening to note the response - with many a heckled feather - at the “unfairness and bindings” on India by the US for the success of the “Deal”.

However, a much more sinister game is being played in respect of India’s Energy need in the Form of Natural Gas of Iranian and Turkmenistani Origin traversing through 750 Kilometres - possibly more - Territory of the Terrorist Wahabi Republic of Pakistan.

Twirpistan has opposed India at every Forum in every cause and has fought tooth & nail in its efforts to frustrate India’s Progress to its destined goal.

Our Leaders are continuously calling this Natural Gas Pipe Line as a <b>“Peace Pipe Line“</b>. I would term it as a <b>Pipe Line of War</b> especially with Pakistani Domestic Pipe Lines - be they Gas, Oil or Water etc. - being regularly blown up 300 to 400 Times a Year.

<b><span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Why is no one protesting at this stupid self defeating act of the Kalidas Ilk?</span></b> <!--emo&:furious--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/furious.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='furious.gif' /><!--endemo-->

I am cross posting this on the Energy Thread and look forward to an Recrimination as well as Name Calling Free mutually beneficial dialogue.

Many thanks in advance.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[ravish]

Quote
India gets IAEA pass for global nuclear trade
The safeguards agreement breaks new ground by providing uninterrupted fuel supplies and acknowledges India's right to build a strategic reserve

Vienna: The India-US civil nuclear deal on Friday cleared its first global test as the 35-member board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unanimously approved the India-specific safeguards agreement, a key step towards readmitting New Delhi into the privileged world of nuclear commerce.

The 35-member IAEA board meeting lasted nearly four hours with an exhaustive discussion on different aspects of the safeguards agreement that aims at bringing 14 Indian nuclear power reactors under international safeguards over the next few years.

Batting vigorously for the India-specific safeguards agreement, IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei said it conformed to "all the legal requirements" of his agency.

"These are not comprehensive or full-scope safeguards (unlike with Nuclear Proliferation Treaty member states)... But it (the agreement) satisfies India's needs while maintaining all the agency's legal requirements," said ElBaradei.

The safeguards agreement is unique in as much as it breaks new ground by providing uninterrupted fuel supplies for the lifetime of safeguarded reactors and acknowledges India's right to build a strategic reserve of fuel and the right to take corrective action in case of disruption of foreign-sourced fuel and technologies.

There was an attempt by some countries like Pakistan to force a vote in the IAEA on the India safeguards pact, but in the end India's impeccable nuclear non-proliferation record prevailed as the board approved the historic pact unanimously.

With the IAEA board's approval of the safeguards pact, all eyes are now on the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - a cartel that controls the global flow of nuclear technology and fuel.
The US is keen that with not much time left for Congressional approval of the deal, the NSG meets sometime in the next fortnight so that the so-called 123 bilateral agreement can be approved by the US Congress before it adjourns ahead of the November US presidential elections.

The US has already sent a draft of exemption sought in the NSG to India. There are some differences over the draft, but Indian officials are hopeful that these issues will be resolved and the NSG will give India a "clean waiver," without any conditions outside the July 18, 2005 civil nuclear understanding that was signed in a joint statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George Bush.

Source: Indo-Asian News Service

Unquote

What should be the reaction in the mind of the ordinary citizens of India. They are in the dark of the various pitfals or benefits this is going to bring to India. The widely divergent interpretation of its aftereffect gives us a feeling of getting totally lost.

Let us now hope that the NSG member nations will come to the rescue of the BJP and Communist combination.With a little help ffrom this Group perhaps the third front may get absolute majority in the next general elections.

[Naresh]

<b>Ravish Ji :</b>

Many thanks for the above Article and the “Tongue in Cheek” comments!

<b>Consider :</b> IAEA has cleared the US-India and that the NSG also accepts-clears it (Possibly a BIG IF and a bit of wishful thinking on my part)

In these circumstances what is the USA Congress going to do?

If they do not approve then the US Nuclear Industry is left in the cold and France, Germany and Russia etc. will make hay.

Your comments - views please.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In these circumstances what is the USA Congress going to do?<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Today Pelosi had switched off lights in Congress, even when GOPs were debating on Oil drilling. Democrats on vacation for next few weeks. Nothing will happen in Congress till new President.

President McCain may not change direction on N-Issue and democrats will add more conditions.

As soon as Draft will come to email box, I will post here.

<i>Latest update :</i> Lights are back on, forced by GOP who were debating in dark <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->
This I called democracy.

[ravish]

The passage through the NSG may not be smooth .There are many countries like Ireland, Switzerland and Newziland who have very strong views on the subject. They will certainly try to impose certain conditions before giving approval to the resolution. At that point of time India will have to see whether these conditions are acceptable. The only plus point is that the opposition by these countries will not be so strong as to ensure the end of the deal. If that happens, the major nuclear equipment supplier countries will have to bear financial losses in the form of loosing the Indian market. So from the pure economic point of view there is a high possibility the NSG will ensure ultimate go ahead of the scheme after making some mild noise which will get contained.

Then is the passage of the agreement through the US Congress. Here again the size of the potential Indian market for nuclear reactors and control equipment will play a deciding factor. The manufacturers of items not directly related to nuclear power plants will also benefit from the proposed agreement. They are those who manufacture the grid control, power transmission and other such equipments. These are items that can be used in any power system irrespective of how the generation is taking place. Naturally these countries will also ensure that the agreement gets through and India undertakes its major nuclear power expansion project. Ireland and Switzerland along with a large number of EU countries will be benefited by this agreement.

[Naresh]

<b>Ravish Ji :</b>

In addition to the Nuclear Reactor and its Control Systems there will be a need of Huge Boilers, Steam Turbines, Condensers, AC Generators etc. (I am not an engineer and these are my guesses) and thus after the granting of NSG Approvals-Go Ahead there is precious little that the US Congress will-can do.

As such I think the US Congress-Administration will put all their demands “via” the NSG so that once India has NSG clearance the US Congress approval will be a formality.

In the meantime please give your view in respect of the Natural Gas Pipe Line on the "Energy" Thread.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[acharya]

<b>Indo-US nuclear deal bad for global nuclear restraint’</b>

* Stimson Centre co-founder predicts upgrading of New Delhi’s nuclear forces will require more nuclear testing
* Says India a responsible state, has shown great restraint by testing nuclear weapons less than 10 times

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: The Bush administration has obliged India by relaxing commercial constraints without asking for meaningful steps to strengthen global non-proliferation norms, especially India’s signature on the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), according to Stimson Centre co-founder Michael Krepon.
He writes in a commentary that President Bush’s decision to bring India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce while facilitating its ability to serve as a counterweight to China was a bold, game-changing move. The upgrading of New Delhi’s nuclear forces will almost certainly require more nuclear testing, he predicts. By endorsing the United States-India deal, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) can therefore become complicit in undermining non-proliferation norms they were designed to uphold. Congress, which was unable to oppose the political appeal of the nuclear deal, at least sought to erect firewalls to make it harder for a future government of India to resume testing. Congress, for its part, made clear that the benefits it was about to bestow would be cut off if India resumed testing. It also endorsed an amendment proposed by Barack Obama expressing US policy against India’s accumulation of a fuel bank to guard against disruption of supply, since the most likely reason for disruption would be a resumption of testing. Instead, fuel would be provided on an as-needed basis, consistent with safe nuclear power operations.
According to Krepon, the Bush administration and the government of India have colluded to weaken these constraints. The “123 agreement” implementing the US-India deal as well as the draft agreement now before the IAEA’s Board of Governors include language reflecting New Delhi’s demand for a nuclear fuel bank. By incorporating this language, the IAEA can become an enabler to the resumption of nuclear testing, first by India, and then by Pakistan. The consequences of the US-India deal for the NSG could be even more adverse. The NSG is the only global cartel ever established to prevent profit-taking - when proliferation would result. Prior US administrations have worked hard to establish this norm, which is reinforced by a consensus rule for the NSG’s decision making. This structure could be hollowed out by the US-India deal. Russian, French and the US firms stand to make significant profits providing India with the fuel bank that the Congress has identified as a key problem with the proposed deal. By placing profits ahead of proliferation, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the most essential guardians of the NPT - will become accomplices to its weakening.

Restraint:

Krepon writes, “India is a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons. It has shown great restraint by testing these devices less than ten times. Just one of these tests was claimed to be a thermonuclear device – a high-yield weapon that would be carried on long-range missiles, like those India is developing to deter China. No state has ever perfected a thermonuclear device on the basis of a single test, and the data from India’s lone test suggest that it may not have been a complete success. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been very forthright in stating that the nuclear deal would in no way constrain New Delhi’s right to resume testing. India is not a party to the NPT and it is one of the only 14 states that have not signed the CTBT. If India decides to test again, so be it. But the bulwarks of the global non-proliferation system should not become complicit in this decision. If so, the negative consequences of another game-changing decision by the Bush administration will be greatly compounded. The damage arising from this deal can be limited by making it harder for a future Indian government to resume nuclear testing.”

[acharya]

<b>Indo-US nuclear deal bad for global nuclear restraint’</b>

* Stimson Centre co-founder predicts upgrading of New Delhi’s nuclear forces will require more nuclear testing
* Says India a responsible state, has shown great restraint by testing nuclear weapons less than 10 times

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: The Bush administration has obliged India by relaxing commercial constraints without asking for meaningful steps to strengthen global non-proliferation norms, especially India’s signature on the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), according to Stimson Centre co-founder Michael Krepon.
He writes in a commentary that President Bush’s decision to bring India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce while facilitating its ability to serve as a counterweight to China was a bold, game-changing move. The upgrading of New Delhi’s nuclear forces will almost certainly require more nuclear testing, he predicts. By endorsing the United States-India deal, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) can therefore become complicit in undermining non-proliferation norms they were designed to uphold. Congress, which was unable to oppose the political appeal of the nuclear deal, at least sought to erect firewalls to make it harder for a future government of India to resume testing. Congress, for its part, made clear that the benefits it was about to bestow would be cut off if India resumed testing. It also endorsed an amendment proposed by Barack Obama expressing US policy against India’s accumulation of a fuel bank to guard against disruption of supply, since the most likely reason for disruption would be a resumption of testing. Instead, fuel would be provided on an as-needed basis, consistent with safe nuclear power operations.
According to Krepon, the Bush administration and the government of India have colluded to weaken these constraints. The “123 agreement” implementing the US-India deal as well as the draft agreement now before the IAEA’s Board of Governors include language reflecting New Delhi’s demand for a nuclear fuel bank. By incorporating this language, the IAEA can become an enabler to the resumption of nuclear testing, first by India, and then by Pakistan. The consequences of the US-India deal for the NSG could be even more adverse. The NSG is the only global cartel ever established to prevent profit-taking - when proliferation would result. Prior US administrations have worked hard to establish this norm, which is reinforced by a consensus rule for the NSG’s decision making. This structure could be hollowed out by the US-India deal. Russian, French and the US firms stand to make significant profits providing India with the fuel bank that the Congress has identified as a key problem with the proposed deal. By placing profits ahead of proliferation, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the most essential guardians of the NPT - will become accomplices to its weakening.

Restraint:

Krepon writes, “India is a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons. It has shown great restraint by testing these devices less than ten times. Just one of these tests was claimed to be a thermonuclear device – a high-yield weapon that would be carried on long-range missiles, like those India is developing to deter China. No state has ever perfected a thermonuclear device on the basis of a single test, and the data from India’s lone test suggest that it may not have been a complete success. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been very forthright in stating that the nuclear deal would in no way constrain New Delhi’s right to resume testing. India is not a party to the NPT and it is one of the only 14 states that have not signed the CTBT. If India decides to test again, so be it. But the bulwarks of the global non-proliferation system should not become complicit in this decision. If so, the negative consequences of another game-changing decision by the Bush administration will be greatly compounded. The damage arising from this deal can be limited by making it harder for a future Indian government to resume nuclear testing.”

[acharya]

<b> As Pakistan hails ‘precedent,’ other IAEA members express doubts, fears</b>

Siddharth Varadarajan

Agreement satisfies India’s needs while maintaining IAEA’s legal requirements: El Baradei

Even hardened veterans of IAEA politics taken aback by Austria’s vehemence

No other conditions for discontinuation of safeguards, says IAEA chief

New Delhi: After publicly opposing the India safeguards agreement, Pakistan on Friday did a turnaround, describing the IAEA’s approval of the draft as “a historic decision … A step has been taken towards accommodating the interests of a non-NPT nuclear weapon state by evolving an innovative and new model. A significant departure has been made from the standard norms pertaining to verification and global non-proliferation, which, inter alia take into account the imperatives of promoting civilian nuclear cooperation,” its Ambassador, Shahbaz, said. “This constitutes an acknowledgement of ‘new realities’,” he added.

Though Pakistan stressed the importance of the ‘new’ precedent that had been set, Mr. Shahbaz, who took the floor after the Indian agreement was adopted, said he wished to enter into the record the “considered position” Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) had taken on the India-U.S. nuclear deal. The NCA had criticised the agreement, called on the NSG to adopt a criteria-based exemption to its rules rather than an India-specific exemption and warned of the negative implications the deal would have on “strategic stability” in South Asia.

But if India got unexpected support from unwelcome quarters, it also had to contend with a raft of unsolicited advice from member countries who were expected to adopt a more uncritical stance towards the agreement as well as from well-known critics.

The debate over the India safeguards agreement in the International Atomic Energy Agency was never expected to be easy but even hardened veterans of the nuclear watchdog’s politics were taken aback by the vehemence with which Austria railed against the draft.

In his opening remarks, IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei emphasised that the Indian draft was “an Infcirc/66-type safeguards agreement based on the Agency’s standard safeguards practices and procedures” for states that are not party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Though many states, including India, stressed the importance of the IAEA’s “guidance documents,” Austria would have none of it. Its Ambassador said he disagreed with those who argued the Indian text was simply an “umbrella agreement” based on the standard template. Describing the draft as “an empty shell,” he declared that it was only out of respect for the DG and the Secretariat that Austria had decided to join the consensus in favour of the draft. The Irish Ambassador, too, expressed strong reservations about the agreement and said that if the matter had come to a vote, he would have been forced to abstain.

While Austria, Ireland and Switzerland were outliers in terms of the depth of their criticism of the nuclear deal, diplomats present in the board meeting told The Hindu that a range of countries gave free vent to their views on the wider context, stressing, variously, that India give up nuclear weapons, join the NPT, and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Brazil took the floor early to express its reservations about the implications of the safeguards agreement for the NPT system. Mexico and Japan also voiced their concerns. Iran, which took the floor as an observer, said it respected India’s sovereign decision not to join the NPT as well as its desire to develop civilian nuclear energy. But it blasted the U.S. for “double standards” and warned that the Indian agreement should not become a precedent for legitimising Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons.

China noted that many countries had raised questions and concerns about the safeguards agreement and said these should be addressed. The Chinese Ambassador added that international non-proliferation norms should be respected and, in a nod to Pakistan’s case, stressed that the IAEA should not have a discriminatory approach towards other states which might come forward to negotiate a similar agreement.

Indian diplomats characterised the South African intervention as one of the most supportive they had heard from a country that had been at the forefront of the non-proliferation lobby internationally.

Just before the lunch break, after all delegations had had their say, Dr. El Baradei took on the arguments raised by Austria and others. The agreement was not an empty shell, he said, urging member states not to lose sight of the fact that India was not obliged to safeguard its facilities and was coming forward voluntarily. As a lawyer, he said, he saw no problems with the text. Referring to questions raised by some about “corrective measures” compromising the perpetuity of safeguards, he said the termination and duration provisions in the agreement were standard and that the principle of rebus sic stantibus (things thus standing) in international treaty law itself provided for the end of obligations if the fundamental conditions of an agreement changed.

“Perpetuity is a misnomer. There is no such thing in international law,” he said.

In his opening remarks, he described the Indian draft as an “umbrella agreement” providing for any facility notified by India to become subject to Agency safeguards in the future. The IAEA DG said he expected to begin implementation of safeguards at new Indian facilities in 2009. The “umbrella” nature of the agreement provides for a “more efficient mechanism for ensuring that safeguards requirements can be met,” he argued, adding, “It satisfies India’s needs while maintaining all the Agency’s legal requirements.”

In a reference to Pakistan’s request to be treated the same as India, the IAEA chief said “such an ‘umbrella’ approach could also be used for the conclusion of other 66-type safeguards agreements.”

Attempting to allay the fears of several European states that India may invoke the agreement’s preambular references to “corrective measures” in order to withdraw facilities from safeguards at some point in the future, Dr. El Baradei insisted there were no conditions for the discontinuation of safeguards other than those provided by the safeguards agreement itself.

“The termination provisions contained in the agreement are the same for other 66-type agreements,” he said.

But in a nod to the Indian interpretation of the agreement, he added: “Naturally, as with all safeguards agreements, this agreement is subject to the general rules of international law. Therefore, the agreement should be read as an integral whole. The preamble provides for contextual background and safeguards are implemented in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”

In a brief statement, U.S. Ambassador Gregory Schulte said the agreement was “little different than those of other agreements based on Infcirc/66” and that under it, “safeguards would be applied to nuclear facilities in India using the same methods applied elsewhere in the world.”

Urging approval of the draft, he said that “without this agreement, the safeguards activities, and the assurance of peaceful use provided by them, will not be possible.”

Speaking on behalf of the European Union, France noted the EU’s understanding that the Indian agreement followed standard IAEA safeguards procedures and provisions, including on the duration of safeguards. France said it supported the agreement since it was fully consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

Diplomatic sources told The Hindu that Austria had opposed this formulation and delayed the framing of the EU statement for several hours before backing off. Austria also tried to garner support for a joint statement by several countries with reservations about the Indian agreement. However, this attempt fizzled out when it became clear that all other members preferred to make their own individual statements rather than creating the impression of a “gang up” on the question.

[dhu]

<!--QuoteBegin-Mudy+Jul 31 2008, 11:24 PM-->QUOTE(Mudy @ Jul 31 2008, 11:24 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>US can terminate N-deal if India conducts tests: Nicholas Burns</b><!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->On the eve of the vote by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors on the India-specific safeguards agreement, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal Nicholas Burns has said the 123 Agreement 'absolutely is consistent with every part of the Hyde Act'
....

<b>But he said it was highly unlikely that India would conduct a nuclear test</b>

<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd--> <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->

Here comes slaps on shameless Indian traitors (Moron Singh, Babus, English media).
[right][snapback]85520[/snapback][/right]
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posting in full:

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->On the eve of the vote by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors on the India-specific safeguards agreement, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal Nicholas Burns has said <b>the 123 Agreement 'absolutely is consistent with every part of the Hyde Act'.</b>

After a hiatus of four months and speaking for the first time since leaving the Bush administration, Burns, currently on a short stint with the<b> Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, </b>emphasised,  <b>"The 123 Agreement does not supersede the Hyde Act. It's a complement and necessary part."</b>

Burns said, <b>"When this agreement was negotiated, it was fully consistent with the provisions of the Hyde Act. So we have the right to terminate it if India tests." </b><b>But he said it was highly unlikely that India would conduct a nuclear test.</b>

He also added,<b> "No aspect of this deal recognises India as a nuclear weapons state."</b>

Burns also said he does not agree with some of the opponents of the deal, who fear that the deal would tear the nonproliferation regime apart and even prompt US allies like Japan [Images] and Turkey to reexamine their nuclear options.

Burns, who was the lead panelist on a discussion of the deal at a seminar organised by the Brookings Institution, said that he was <b>overjoyed that the Indian government had survived the trust vote. </b>"In my judgment, it is a triumph for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [Images]. It was his persistence and his very strong will -- his belief in this agreement and<b> his belief in the US-India partnership </b>that brings the situation to the very happy place where it currently resides."

The erstwhile diplomat, who said he spent "three years, eight trips to India and hundreds of hours negotiating" the deal, said it was "also a victory for President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice [Images] -- President Bush followed President Clinton and these are the two presidents who made a <b>strategic bet on India."</b>

Burns predicted that the deal would transform "the Indian public's attitude towards the United States, and in essence it takes away the elephant in the room."

Elaborating, he explained that despite the sixty-years-old diplomatic relations between the two countries, "for more than half of that, the elephant in the room has been the prospect that India felt it was not treated equitably by our country and others."

"My conviction has always been that this deal strengthens the international nonproliferation regime because it resolves this fundamental contradiction inherent in the regime, where countries like India, which were outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but were playing by the rules of the club were not allowed to join the club," he pointed out.

While stating that he "wouldn't dream of equating India with Iran," he added, "This agreement is an important message to Iran that if you play by the rules, if you don't proliferate your sensitive technologies, if you invest in the international system and commit yourself to transparency and work out your differences in a peaceful, civil, negotiated way, there will be benefits. And, if you don't do that, the opposite is true there will be sanctions and isolation."

He predicted that <b>"a conservative estimate would be that within a generation, 90 percent of India's nuclear establishment would be under IAEA safeguards�none of that would have been possible without this fundamental break with conventional wisdom that President Bush put forward three years ago."</b>

Burns, who is expected to land a top job soon in the private sector as soon as he completes his three-month sojourn at the Wilson Center, said, "US business ought to be at the head of the line when India begins to expand its construction of civil nuclear reactors."

But former Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration Strobe Talbott said, "This is emphatically a good deal for India and India is a good and deserving country and needs all the help it could get from the US and the world. <b>It is however, at least in its essence, not a good deal for the world." </b><i> [[bechara world]]
</i>
Talbott had negotiated the strategic dialogue with then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, after the US-India relations were in the doldrums following the May 1998 Pokhran nuclear explosions.

He argued that by creating a 'unique country-specific exception or exemption' for India, "it also creates a moral hazard and there have already been cases where countries have come to the United States and to others and said, <b>'Hey, wait a minute, we are a good country too, </b>we need an exemption too."

"And, that issue is going to loom fairly large in the months ahead," Talbott, currently the president of The Brookings Institution, warned.

He also predicted that this deal would ultimately "come back and bite India in some fashion."

Talbott said if the NPT "continues to unravel, it may be in some measure because of the Indian exception to the NPT and that unraveling could continue in a way that could leave us with the world, 10-15 years from now, where there are as many as 25 nuclear weapons states, quite a number of which would be in India's neighborhood, which is, as we all know a rather dangerous neighborhood."

However, he said he was relieved that the deal did not collapse and the Manmohan Singh government survived because "if it had gone the other way, the next president, the next administration of the United States, would find themselves in an even tougher position."

"They would have had to go back to square one at best and may be even earlier to square one like back in the 1990s and India would have been in a truly grouchy mood about this whole issue."

Talbott said that he "did not celebrate the apparent collapse of the deal. I did not dance on the grave out of which the deal has now emerged like Lazarus because I could see problems emanating from that."

Robert Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for Nonproliferation in the Clinton administration and part of the first Bush administration, before he was pushed out since he was the biggest impediment to a strategic partnership with India and was vehemently opposed to any transfer of nuclear technology to India, argued, "In the three years since the deal was negotiated, I've seen little evidence of India moving toward the nonproliferation mainstream."

He said that he was confident that "if the Nuclear Suppliers Group makes a decision by secret ballot, the proposal for a special exemption for India will fail."

But he said because the consensus that would be reached would not be by a secret ballot, he believed it would favour India <b>"because a vast majority of the NSG members will not want to disappoint India or the United States."</b><i> [[how generous]]
</i>
Einhorn said if some states threw a spanner into the works and wanted some modifications in the agreement, it is likely that China "will be smiling."

Stephen Cohen, head of the South Asia Programme at Brookings and moderator of the discussion, predicted that "implementation of the agreement will be difficult even if it does go through," in the US Congress.

He also said he did not believe it would 'produce the kind of strategic benefits', that Burns had spoken of but acknowledged <b>"it will get rid of that giant shadow of the relationship."</b>

<b>Cohen also said that it was highly unlikely that India would conduct nuclear tests </b>unless China and Pakistan began testing "<b>because I don't think they need the kind of complex, sophisticated system to make themselves to great power status."</b>

But Talbott strongly disagreed, saying, while he had 'no inside knowledge' his recollection "There remains a debate within the strategic community in India over whether the Pokhran tests were truly successful and fully sufficient for the scientific and military purposes involved."

"So, I think that is an open question at least in some very smart brains in India. So, I don't think we can be totally confident on that score," he argued. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[dhu]

Look at nuclear deal in context of the following:

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Islamic Bomb has a US proton
By Sandhya Jain
January 20, 2008
..
The long suspected truth about Pakistan’s supposedly clandestine nuclear programme is finally out – it was fathered by the United States! The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Turkish translator, Sibel Edmonds, has let the cat out of the bag. What is more, there may be more covert nuclear powers in the Gulf than beleaguered Teheran, because it seems to have been US policy to use a circuitous route to facilitate Islamabad’s nuclear armament, and as with all illicit deals, one can’t manage the leaks.
..<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Deal not a cake walk </b>
PIoneer.com
PTI/PNS | Colombo/ New Delhi
Govt finally wakes up
Having long fudged questions on the impact of the India-US nuclear deal on India's nuclear weapons programme, the Manmohan Singh Government has finally woken up to the fact that the deal is not such a cakewalk after all.

<b>On a day the IAEA indicated that India has moved closer towards the non-proliferation regime, the Prime Minister's Office gave out indications that the US is indeed engaged in some arm-twisting on the proliferation issue at the next hurdle India has to cross -- the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). </b>

<b>Sources accompanying Manmohan Singh to the SAARC Summit said India wants modifications in the US draft for grant of waivers by the NSG. India, they say, is not satisfied with the draft prepared by the US for consideration of the NSG and is pressing for modifications in it, seeking "clean" and "unconditional" waiver from the 45-nation grouping.</b> <i> [ I told you,  <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> ]</i>

<b>Suggesting that the draft prepared by the US contained some conditionalities, officials said India could not accept any conditions put by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India, they said, maintains that if any country has any non-proliferation concerns, these should not be reflected in the NSG waiver.</b>

The officials noted that several members of the NSG had no issues with India being given the exemption and if any country has some apprehensions, those could be addressed bilaterally with them instead of the NSG being involved.

"Individual countries can raise their doubts when we go for bilateral agreements with them after getting the NSG waiver and we will discuss those with them," the officials said.

The comments assume significance as India's case is expected to be taken up by the NSG later this month. The NSG waiver by consensus is essential for India to have cooperation with the international community.

"We want to sort out the issue (with the US) before the NSG takes up the matter," an official said. The officials conceded that not all members of the NSG were on board and said efforts are being made to bring them around. In this regard, some Ministers and senior officials are travelling to various countries to convince them and allay their apprehensions, if any.

India is sure of support from many countries, particularly Russia, France and UK but some countries like Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands, have reservations with regard to India being granted the waiver to do nuclear commerce with the international community as it is not a signatory to the NPT.

Some countries have not yet spelt out their position with regard to the issue, making India keep its fingers crossed. The NSG works by consensus and even if one of the 45 countries voices reservation, India would not get the waiver.

New Delhi contends that the Safeguards Agreement reached with IAEA covers 90 per cent of non-proliferation issues that any country could be concerned at. Efforts are being made to allay apprehensions on account of the remaining 10 per cent, the official said.

"We are telling them that they need not worry on account of India as it is committed to universal non-proliferation," the official said. The stand that China would take at the NSG is being watched closely as it has not yet spelt out its position.

The officials said China has not said it will support India's case but Chinese President Hu Jintao has conveyed to Singh that it will not create problems.

The officials also made it clear that India will not approach the international community for civil nuclear commerce till the US

Congress clears the 123 agreement. "Technically, we can approach countries for cooperation in the civil nuclear field after NSG grants waiver, but we will wait till the US Congress votes on the 123 agreement as it was the US which triggered such an initiative," they said.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Yayyayayayya .
Thats what we were screaming here. Indian leadership is moron.
Babus and leadership should be sent to US and asked them to buy used car and spent a day with used car salesman. Leadership and Babus will learn good lesson in American diplomacy. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Sellout at Vienna? </b>
Pioneer.com
Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi
India in all-duty-no-rights bind
With India only two steps short of a servile accession to the global non-proliferation regime, it is now clear that its sovereign right to enhance its nuclear weapons programme stands seriously challenged.   

It is also clear that India's dealings with the Nuclear Suppliers Group will be technically conducted in the capacity of a non-nuclear weapons State, inviting sanctions if it proliferates.

While it was evident from the start - 18 July, 2005, to be precise - that the Indo-US nuclear deal would de facto bring India under the NPT regime, it is only now that the documents the Manmohan Singh Government has signed along the way prove how alarmingly close India is to submitting its national security to a nuclear bazaar governed by the insulated P-5 club.

In a nutshell, even if the bilateral nuclear deal with the US comes apart in case India conducts further tests, it will be impossible for it to deal with other members of the NSG, bound as they are by the international nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.

This was precisely the submission fiercely resisted by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998, immediately after Pokhran. While Vajpayee had indicated India's commitment to complete global disarmament - India had declared a self-imposed moratorium on future tests - he had refused to sign the draconian CTBT that would have placed India under the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapons state and posed a threat to national security.

<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Terming the NPT a "discriminatory and flawed treaty," Vajpayee had said: "In any event we cannot join the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapon power when the fact is that we are a nuclear weapon power."</span>

This came amid noises from the US that India's security requirements are best served without nuclear capability. Then US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott even went to the extent of saying, "We do not, and will not, concede even by implication that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapons states under the NPT." Vajpayee's response: "We are a nuclear power State. It is not a gift from anyone."

<b>Now that India stands on the verge of signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA to access the nuclear bazaar on conditions that clearly show India's accession to the NPT regime as a non-nuclear power state, the Vajpayee Government's strategic victory in 2000 appears wasted.</b>

The UPA Government took the first step towards this in August 2007 when India and the US sealed the bilateral nuclear deal. While the Agreement underlines the US "commitment to reliable fuel supply to India," it is silent on the fact that the deal is governed by a domestic American legislation, the Hyde Act, specifically formalised for the Indo-US deal.

Although the UPA Government is at pains to explain that the Act is a domestic law not binding on India, the Act clearly says the US would deem India a fit partner only if it "has a foreign policy congruent to that of the US and is working with the US in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation."

While the former clause impinges on India's foreign policy sovereignty to deal with countries like Iran, the latter is a veiled threat in case India tests nuclear weapons. In effect, despite assurances of "uninterrupted fuel supply", the US reserves the right to withdraw from the deal unilaterally leaving India high and dry.

<b>The second step came on July 9, 2008 when India finalised the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, a step which placed India under a more binding international regime than the bilateral deal with the US</b>.

While Manmohan Singh repeatedly promised the country an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA the formalised text resembled all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states.

<b>Pinning India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default, the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity but holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.</b>

India is, indeed, allowed to take some undefined "corrective measures" in the event of disruption in fuel supplies. But the text does not provide for such license. The document dwells at length on the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports but does not elaborate on India's rights incase of fuel disruption.

<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>What it certainly does is to make it impossible for India to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments. </span>

That India has now opened itself to stringent IAEA safeguards, unsure fuel supplies and possible sanctions in the event of non-compliance with non-proliferation norms is evident in the Additional Protocol that India will have to sign with the IAEA.

<span style='color:red'><b>This signature would bind India to inspections in both "declared and undeclared" nuclear facilities at the IAEA's will if it determines that India is violating international non-proliferation norms in any way. </b></span>

These would be far more stringent than the token inspections conducted by the IAEA in nuclear weapons states, in effect, making a mockery of the much-touted "separation plan." Unlike the five declared nuclear weapons powers, India will not have the luxury of testing further nuclear weapons in case of a changed security environment.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Signing away nuclear rights  </b>
Pioneer.com
Shobori Ganguli
Never before in the history of independent India has a foreign policy issue or a national security matter ever divided the political leadership of this country in a manner in which the India-US nuclear deal irrevocably has. Be it the four wars with Pakistan, or the one with China, be it the issue of CTBT or nuclear sovereignty, India has always spoken in one voice. The reason: Never in the past has the impression gained ground that the Government of the day is submitting India's sovereign right to determine an independent foreign policy to certain global powers or is severely compromising its national security.

One only need recall Mrs Indira Gandhi's diplomatic and military coup in 1971 in getting Bangladesh liberated which had inspired Opposition leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee to describe her as Durga. Admittedly, despite intense international pressure -- even the very imminent threat of the United States attacking India -- Mrs Gandhi had done what she thought was best in India's national and security interests. And Mr Vajpayee's comment was an unambiguous indicator that the country was united in its effort to steer India along a course that furthered the interests of the country, not that of any individual or any political party. Protected solely by Soviet support in the international arena, Mrs Gandhi with that one act of defiance had proved to the world that India was determined to safeguard its strategic interests in a manner it deemed fit.

Since then, adversity or otherwise, the country has indeed spoken in unison on various matters of national security and foreign policy, in the belief that the Government of the day places the highest premium on national interest. However, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in disregarding Opposition concerns and clandestinely pushing the nuclear deal through to the IAEA has proved that matters of India's national security have been perilously mortgaged to the whims of one individual and his political party.

Today, the Congress is running a Government that is seen as being overly supine to the Americans, untouched by and deaf to the serious voices of concern that have brought the Left and the Right on the same side of the nuclear debate. Step after step of deception and obfuscation has been taken to commit India to a highly discriminatory international nuclear non-proliferation regime, all in the name of ensuring India's energy security. Indeed, the country is on a precarious edge as far as energy is concerned and it should be looking to tap every source it can find. However, there is a disturbing trend in the manner in which the Manmohan Singh Government is feverishly chasing the nuclear energy mirage with the United States and shying away from credible energy partners like oil-rich Iran.

After every step of deception -- that, the India-US nuclear deal would not impinge on India's right to conduct further nuclear tests, that recognition by the IAEA would result in "India-specific safeguards", that India's negotiations with the Nuclear Suppliers Group will be conducted in its capacity of a nuclear power -- what has become increasingly apparent is that the Prime Minister is binding India to a discriminatory international non-proliferation regime in perpetuity. From the bilateral 123 Agreement with the United States to the safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA, the Manmohan Singh Government has systematically signed away India's legitimate right to belong to the exclusive club of the five nuclear haves. It now faces the Nuclear Suppliers Group later this month armed with documents that boldly underline India's non-nuclear weapons status with provisions for severe penalties if it conducts further tests.

It may be recalled that when the United States was mounting intense pressure on India to sign the CTBT in 1998 after Pokhran, <b>then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had clearly stated that even though it was not binding on his Government to seek bipartisan consensus within the country on the issue, he would nevertheless do so because it concerned the country's security fabric. The main concern voiced by the Vajpayee Government was that signing the CTBT would bring India under the NPT regime and deny India its new-found status as a nuclear power. No amount of pressure from the Americans, and there was considerable pressure, could force Mr Vajpayee's hand to join the CTBT</b>. While India was in favour of total disarmament, the Vajpayee Government was worried that signing the CTBT would only further the non-proliferation goals of the nuclear five. India made its position well known and the Americans grudgingly reconciled to it.

Little has changed in the NPT regime since although the global security environment has altered greatly. There are genuine concerns, therefore, about placing India under a non-proliferation regime at this juncture which could prevent it from further nuclear tests if the security environment so demanded. While the UPA Government has repeatedly claimed that the nuclear deal does not impinge on India's right to further tests, the documents that are leading up to the ratification of the deal in the US throw India open to the risk of sanctions if it does indeed exercise that right. Does any Government of the day have the right to expose the country to such draconian international rules while ceding in perpetuity its rightful place in the nuclear world order?

<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Unlike Mr Vajpayee who sought to build a bipartisan consensus before mortgaging India's security interests to the nuclear sharks, Mr Manmohan Singh has served the Opposition and allies alike with a series of faits accomplis since July 2005, not allowing for any dissenting voice to disturb his inscrutable march towards nuclear cooperation with the United States. As the matter reaches the NSG later this month, one thing is writ large: India is on the verge of signing away its nuclear sovereignty. </span>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[acharya]

<b>
The said, and the unsaid
</b>
Manvendra Singh

The entire thrust of the 123 deal is to secure for India technology from global civilian nuclear vendors. All of it depends on import.

No foreign policy initiative has created as much bitterness in the polity as the Indo-U.S. 123 agreement

The logic of destabilising a government for the sake of an international pact defies all political wisdom

In the run-up to the most predictable political divorce of recent times a significant parliamentary development got submerged in all the din that invariably surrounds a split. Given that the parting of ways between the Left Front and the UPA government was over an agreement that is claimed to bring cleaner energy, the parliamentary initiative is momentous. And that it was a proposal from a couple of first-time members but keenly implemented by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha adds greater irony to all the drama that has unfolded since before and after the debate.

For the first time in its history the Parliament of India is to have an official forum on Global Warming and Climate Change. One of the highlights of the much-maligned 14th Lok Sabha has been the debate on climate change on May 8, 2007. What with members from across the political spectrum participating in gusto, free from the restrictions imposed by whips and guillotines. Since then there has been a clamour amongst members to set up a formal, official forum. After doing the rounds of parliamentary party offices, the announcement appeared on July 14 that there would now be a Parliamentary Forum on Global Warming and Climate Change.
Subtle, yet substantial

The much-under fire Speaker put it into place in the days before the country debated its political fortunes, and future, hinging on a foreign policy initiative that has caused divisions as sharp and bitter as those when India sent troops to Sri Lanka in 1987. No foreign policy initiative has created as much bitterness and difference of opinion in the polity as the Indo-U.S. 123 Agreement. The co-relation between the parliamentary forum and the 123 agreement are subtle, yet substantial. The ideas that propelled the forum into formation were largely around clean energy so as to save humankind. And the stated logic behind the 123 agreement has been India’s need for nuclear energy as a route to sustainable development using cleaner fuels.

In this case, what is stated, and what remains unstated is of such a vast gulf that the entire logic behind the Indo-U.S. 123 can be questioned. As it is the logic of destabilising ones own government for the sake of an international agreement defies all political wisdom, is bad foreign policy, and cannot generate energy security.

Encouraging domestic politics to split along such sharp lines, all for the sake of a largely esoteric international agreement does not reflect a good sense of leadership, or direction for the country. India’s society, and its political parties, must never be surgically divided for the purpose of fulfilling an international commitment, of whatever worth. That the country today stands divided over this deal is a matter of fact, and of great concern too. For foreign policy has not divided the country in two decades, but now it has, and this is the single biggest drawback for any leadership and a stigma that is unlikely to ever leave the Indo-U.S. 123 Agreement.

Political parties have their stated objections to the deal. Then there are the unstated aspects too. With its energetic staff, and contributors, The Hindu has been at the forefront of analysing the deal threadbare. With the largest technical readership, and specifically nuclear at that, there is little point in repeating critiques, and agendas. It is the unsaid aspects that need to be stated.

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal is driven by global politics with a view to co-opting New Delhi into an arrangement that seeks a greater worldly role for a country that is largely panchayat in its thinking and practice. It is not, yet, a role India seeks for itself, but which others seek for it. There is undoubtedly a greater confidence in the country, and to be fair to him, Rahul Gandhi did elaborate on that during his intervention in support of the confidence motion. But this sense of confidence is not an outcome of greater creativity or thinking in this country. It has come from an access to markets, from an acquired sense of belonging, and not from earning the seat or the role. For that the country needs greater intellectual resourcefulness.

Had that intellectual ingenuity already existed in ample amounts then the parameters around which this agreement came to be made would have been very different. For, in our rush to embrace we have tossed out some fairly simple and laudable foreign policy intransigents. From its stated position of a multi-polar world, India is now a practitioner of uni-polar politics. A visa to purchase a South African civilian nuclear reactor, even French, Russian, or Japanese, et al, will now have to be routed via Washington. By going ahead with this deal, and in this manner, we have underlined the U.S. as the sole repository of our global interests. That is patently unfair on India, and singularly unhealthy for our dynamic relationship with the world, as also the U.S. in particular.

Given that we seek the intervention of Washington in getting for us reactors that are currently restricted it becomes imperative to understand how they look at our efforts, policies. We may spin out any mantra to suit our domestic consumption but ultimately it also depends on how others interpret us. The first time it was mentioned this way in a parliamentary debate, the Speaker interjected to say, “You trust the Americans more than your own Prime Minister.” Prickliness not being unique to Indians, this retort completely missed the point. And which is “to advance India’s non-proliferation commitments… in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime.”

This is the Chair’s Summary from the recent G8 summit. And the Summit Leaders Declaration stated a “full commitment to… the NPT and pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty.” So now we have it as clearly enunciated as can be. These are words of those from whom we seek our nuclear solace. When all the while there is nobody in the entire domestic political spectrum that would claim India seeks to enhance and reinforce the global non-proliferation regime, or the NPT. That interpretation of India’s actions comes from the conviction of those who set the parameters of our entry into the regime. They set the goal posts into which we seek to strike. And for what, energy?

In the 40-odd years that it would take to fully implement the 123 Agreement, India may end up with an enhanced nuclear power generation capacity of 40,000 MW. Even at that point of time it would not total more than a single digit’s worth of the total energy basket. Coupled with the fact that almost 25 per cent of domestic power production gets lost due to theft or distribution faults, does it not make greater sense to aim for energy efficiency? By doing that only the corrupt and thieving would be isolated. Not then the divisiveness within the polity and society. And not, also, the subterfuge that the Indo-U.S. 123 Agreement is about our energy future, and security.

The entire thrust of the deal is to secure for India technology from global civilian nuclear vendors. All of it depends on import. And how imports could make the country more secure is an oxymoron of the most perplexing kind. The only route India has to greater energy security is by implementing efficiency standards and building up on its abundant renewable resources. The only democracy endowed with the resources, and a market, India’s renewable energy potential is currently estimated at more than its total production of today.
Plan India, implement village

What it needs is a re-working of the development vision for the country. Mega-projects and other big-ticket items are politics of the 20th century. India is a country that still refuses to urbanise at the global pace. All that it requires is to implement the panchayat level of thinking. Encourage, and allow, the development of renewable energy projects that are community-based, and sustained. Plan India, and implement village. This is the future, and there are ample examples of its success around the world. But it requires a change of mindset, shifting of gears, from Delhi to the districts. It is there that politics is played out, and there that energy security is available aplenty.

(The author represents Barmer in the Lok Sabha for the BJP. The views are his own.)