capt manmohan
your insight is impressive. Bugti's grandsons and Marri's son were not killed although the army claimed killing them amid musharaf's note of congratulations to the commando unit that undertook the excercise with air support. The war is far from over. But the suffering of baluch women and children will be huge.
September 7, 2006|04:21 IST
 In a strange irony of history. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the Tamundar of the Bugti tribe, who supported the creation of Pakistan, served as minister in the central cabinet and then as governor of Balochistan â at a time when his fellow Baloch sardars, the Mengals and the Marris, were in revolt against Islamabad â has been killed by a Pakistani bullet.
The Baloch 'leaders' will compromise and settle with sacking of Musharraf - allah and america willing, ofcourse. This is one conflict where India should stay completely away, let Balochs and Pakjabis have fun with each other, they are both islamic after all and both of them will stab us kaffirs when presented an oppurtunity.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Bugtiâs killing: botched signalling </b>
FT
Moeed Yusuf
It is highly unlikely that the opposition would agree to isolate its criticism on this event from the broader civil-military problemÂ
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The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti last week has created a political furore. Was it expected? If so, has the fallout been handled appropriately?
To the first question, the answer is yes; to the second, no.
Given Bugtiâs political history, his stature in Balochistan and the context in which the Baloch insurgency is being conducted, his killing would have doubtless resulted in the kind of reaction we are witnessing now. The political fallout from the event was a given which everyone, including those who authorised the action, should have known and expected. Yet, the official response to events after Bugtiâs death suggests the government might have been complacent about its repercussions. The operation seems to have been authorised in isolation from those responsible for instituting complementary mechanisms to ensure that the fallout remained minimal. In fact, by acting confusedly, often stupidly, authorities have strengthened the case of the opposing camp, be it the sardari elements or political parties.
Hereâs how.
The stateâs rationale behind the decision to kill Bugti would have been to send a clear signal to all sardars that no further nonsense (from stateâs perspective) would be tolerated. Given reports that the actual targets of the strike included Balach Marri and also Bugtiâs grandsons, the aim would have been to remove as much of the Baloch opposition as possible in one fell swoop and deter the rest from challenging the stateâs authority (Najam Sethiâs editorial in TFT last week brilliantly explains this point). Such a move would have been justified by citing that the establishment had attempted and failed to build a consensus around the issue. Targeting the sardars was thus the last resort (in the governmentâs view).
One prerequisite for taking this approach was for the state to behave in a manner that conveyed steadfastness, portrayed its act as justified and provided no hint of an apology for its action. After all, the entire premise, as explained above, would be to establish the writ of the state no matter what the cost. Indeed, the governmentâs public spokesmen kicked off with this very line. General Pervez Musharraf himself implied resolve, suggesting that anti-state elements would not be tolerated any further.
Within 72 hours of the killing, however, there was a dramatic turnaround and the state began to manifest signs of weakness. The director-general of Inter-Services Public relations, in complete contradiction to earlier official statements, suggested that a âmysterious blastâ had led to Bugtiâs killing and justified the development by citing the fact that 21 army personnel, including six officers, were also killed when the cave collapsed. This implied that the state had not intended to target or kill Bugti.Â
At this point the entire rationale of the plan falls apart. What signal does this contradiction send to the surviving sardars? What message should the opposition political parties and the international community take from this? One could only think of two logical answers: either the state is weak enough to give into pressure, a self-defeating situation for an establishment (particularly its leader) which thrives on its resolve to quash all anti-state extremists through use of force; or, that the entire episode was ill-planned and the state, having realised its mistake, is now retracting.
The result is that the opposition parties are having a field day, criticising the government, while the latter appears helpless in the face of mounting pressure. This is a consequence of the absence of any plan to tackle political opposition â which has only gathered further momentum due to signs of weakness from the government end â in the aftermath of Bugtiâs death. Opposition parties have conveniently meshed the entire discourse with the broader question of civil-military relations, and are portraying the event as the latest example of the âmilitaryâ establishmentâs disregard for citizen rights and its resolve to eliminate any opposition through targeted killings. In reality, the context in which the action was taken is much more complex and while the gains from Bugtiâs killing are highly debatable (to this we shall come next week), one cannot justify casting the move in a framework of âpersonal vendettaâ (Musharraf versus Bugti).
Notwithstanding the fact that the opposition is justified in questioning the lack of consensus on the governmentâs move (Ejaz Haider dealt with this issue superbly last week), their approach reflects lack of maturity among political cadres, and underscores the nascence of political processes in the country.
Consider that it was opposition parties like the PPP and PMLN who were as fed-up with the Baloch sardars as the current administration. Furthermore, the MMA was brought in specifically to counter the sardari vote in the province. That past governments had to persistently bribe the sardars, most notably Bugti, to buy peace is no hidden secret (Bhutto had even rewarded Bugti with the governorship of the province for breaking the unified Baloch opposition at the time). Most of the opposition does actually realize the complexities that surround the entire Baloch question, including the fact that a reconciliation approach is extremely difficult and that given Gwadarâs development, the government is on a tight timeline to unlock Balochistan.
But a lack of planning on the governmentâs side to deal with the fallout combined with a self-serving political response from the opposition has once again jeopardised Pakistanâs image among the international audience. Bugtiâs death and the reaction it has extracted has unleashed tremendous resentment among various civil society and media groups around the world, most of which cannot comprehend the internal dynamics of the situation. The West has bought into the oppositionâs stance that the state is willing to transcend all the boundaries, an argument which presents the government in the image of cruel Latin American juntas.
Some western press reports have even discussed the likelihood of Pakistanâs break-up if such political extermination continues for long. Civil society networks have been urging Pakistani intellectuals (I have received a number of alerts to this effect) to rise against state behaviour and condemn the targeting of political opponents. These perceptions are being reinforced by a number of vested interests within Pakistan that have chosen to present Bugti as a pivotal political leader persistently wronged by the state. The consequences of such a discourse for a state already suffering from a huge âimage deficitâ are obvious.
Finally, the international perception of increasing instability linked to this event will remain if the law and order situation in Balochistan and Sindh is not brought under control. Again, the violence following Bugtiâs death was predictable. That state apparatus was not put in place in advance to deal with such fallout beats logic. Interestingly, curfew was imposed in Quetta after the news of Bugtiâs death was made public but was lifted within three hours. That anyone within the decision-making circle would have imagined that the tide had subsided in such a short time is unimaginable. The only answer is extreme complacency on the part of the government.
What is needed is for the government and the opposition parties to treat Bugtiâs killing in an informed light, at least for the international audience to understand that this event cannot be compared to exploitative dictatorships (Burmese, Nepalese, South American, etc) around the world. Realistically, it is highly unlikely that the opposition would agree to isolate its criticism on this event from the broader civil-military problem. It suits their ongoing anti-Musharraf drive agenda immensely. That given, the onus to ensure this rests on the government. Unfortunately, the government seems entirely unprepared to counter such arguments. The end result is that the episode continues to bring much embarrassment to Pakistan.
â Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad.
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->â<b>Independent Balochistan is nonsense⦠we arenât going to fool the Balochâ¦â</b>
Malik Siraj Akbar
An outspoken Mir Hasil Khan Bizanjo is central secretary general of his father Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjoâs National Party (NP). The National Party was generally considered anti-sardari and has elements from the educated middle-class of Balochistan. It also believes, unlike others, in a federal system. However, recent developments in Balochistan have brought the NP closer to elements that are openly opposed to Islamabad. TFT spoke to Bizenjo about the current situation in Balochistan. Excerpts:
The Friday Times: How do you view BNPâs (Balochistan National Party) decision to resign from the assemblies?
Hasil Khan Bizenjo: We never imagined that this government would go to the extent of committing a blunder like killing an elderly, handicapped man who could not even walk without someoneâs help. Nawab Bugtiâs death has completely changed the face of politics in Balochistan. But this should not surprise anyone; this army didnât spare the Bengalis nor would it the Baloch. It has always killed its own people. General Musharrafâs militaristic approach towards political problems has disappointed all democratic forces in the country. We, the Baloch leaders, Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy and Pakistanâs Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) have made up our mind to sit and jointly decide whether or not to quit the assemblies. But the BNP made its own decision; it didnât consult any of the opposition parties.
<b>Do you think it was a right move?</b>
No. As democratic forces, we need to continue our democratic struggle. What does it mean to quit parliament? Where else can we raise our voice if not in the assemblies? I think we donât need to act in frustration. Politics requires strong nerves to face the hard times. I am convinced that we need to sit in the assemblies to continue our struggle.
<b>Are you saying that you wonât quit the assemblies at any cost?</b>
No, I didnât say that. As I told you earlier, NP does not make any decisions without keeping in view the ground realities. We admit that ours, like other Baloch parties, is a small party. The major role in pushing the army back to the barracks can only be played if the Pakistan Peopleâs Party and Pakistan Muslim League-N join hands with us and quit the assemblies. We need their cooperation. We are in contact with them. If they all decide to quit, that will have an impact. Otherwise, NPâs five seats in the provincial assemblies will not change the status quo.
<b>What if these parties refuse to join hands with you?</b>
Well, frankly speaking, we refuse to take a solo flight. We wonât make the kind of decision the BNP did. We are democratic people. We wonât climb mountains. We are not against Pakistan. The struggle the NP believes in is not that of an armed struggle; our struggle will revolve around the 1973 Constitution. We want greater autonomy, not self-determination.
<b>Do you oppose the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)?</b>
No. We support them because they are also fighting for the âBaloch causeâ. But we will not join them. They are fighting on their [armed] front and we are fighting on our democratic front. What is Rauf Mengal or Akbar Mengalâs positions after resigning? Yesterday, they could speak for Baloch rights when they were in the assemblies but today they canât even do that. It was foolish of them not to take other opposition parties in confidence before taking this step.
<b>What is NPâs take on the treatment being meted out to Punjabi settlers in Balochistan in the aftermath of Bugtiâs killing?</b>
Targeting Punjabisâ houses and property is only going to be counter-productive for Baloch leadership and people. I am not very pleased with how some people have been exploiting this situation and undertaking subversive activities. If this continues, we will be the greatest losers. The ordinary Punjabi has done nothing wrong to the people of Balochistan. I think our common enemy is the army. We should fight the army instead of battling poor settlers.
Some say the National Party has always been a pro-establishment party and a deal is currently being struck between it and the government. Even Balochistan Governor told TFT that NP was the real party. So it seems that the government has a soft corner for your party.
If we were pro-establishment, we would be enjoying ministries today. We have never compromised on Baloch rights and interests. The best thing about NP is that it is not an extremist party. We donât believe in going to extreme levels. We believe in realism; in doing all that we can. It is not possible for us to fool our people by promising them an Independent Balochistan. That is nonsense. Our ground realities and current position do not allow us to dream such things. As for the Governorâs remarks, I think he just wants to prove himself another Robert Sandeman. He is trying to defame our party and create misunderstandings between NP and other Baloch parties. He has been sent here to kill the people of Balochistan. He has been acting on a murderous agenda. We have no problems with him being an âimported governorâ because he is the representative of the federal government. The problem is the agenda he is working on. He has paved the way for a military operation in the province.
<b>What will be the impact of Bugtiâs death on the future of Balochistanâs politics?</b>
I believe Bugtiâs death has given blood to the Baloch national struggle. When we look at Baloch history, there have been four leading politicians: Mir Ghose Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and Nawab Bugti. Bugti can be ranked as the fourth among his three contemporaries. As a matter of fact, he was not a very popular leader in Balochistan because he kept changing his loyalties; he also never said he was a Baloch nationalist. But now his killing has made him a hero. Bugtiâs death has once again triggered anti-military feelings in the hearts of the Baloch. This hatred is going to have long-term negative repercussions.
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To my forum members. The clashes between the Pakistan army and Baloch people continues. Press is restricted from reporting. Follow the following internet sites:
