<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Virsingh Dev's son Jujhar Singh succeeded as ruler of Orchha, but was killed by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan in 1636, and Orchha was briefly annexed to the Mughal Empire, although it was later restored to the Bundelas. Bhagwan Rao, another son of Virsingh Dev, became ruler of Datia.
Champat Ray, a descendant of Rudra Pratap, revolted against the Mughals. His fourth son Maharaja Chhatrasal (1649-1732) became the most prominent Bundela leader. In 1671 he started a rebellion against the Mughals, and soon captured Naugaon in present-day Chhatarpur District. In 1680 he conquered Mahoba, and went on to control much of Bundelkhand, ruling from Panna. He formed an alliance with the Maratha Peshwa Baji Rao I, who was challenging the Mughals for control of central India, and in 1729 Baji Rao sent a Maratha army to aid Chhatar Sal against the Mughals. Upon his death in 1732, Chhatar Sal left a third of his dominions, including Mahoba, Banda, and Jhansi, to his Maratha ally Baji Rao. Chhatar Sal's descendants ruled the states of Panna, Ajaigarh (founded 1765), Charkhari (founded 1765, Chhatarpur, and Jaso. Chhatarpur went to the Ponwar Rajputs in 1785.
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Rani Durgavatiâs son, Prem Narayan, was allowed to rule as a Mughal vassal over Chauragarh. But he was later killed by Jujhar Singh Bundela, who took away all his wealth. This episode provides an example of the appalling nature of Mughal statecraft (as seen earlier in the parallel case of Sri Ranga Rayal).
Both Jujhar and Prem Narayan were Mughal vassals, but instead of restoring the latterâs kingdom or compensating his son, the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan wrote to Jujhar, â<i>If you wish to be confirmed in (possession of) that land, you must give up some estates near your home, in exchange of it, and send to me 10 lakh rupees out of the cash taken from Prem Narayan</i>.â
In other words the tyrant would tolerate a criminal act as long as he was given a
share of the booty! <!--emo&:furious--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/furious.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='furious.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-Bharatvarsh+Sep 9 2006, 01:14 AM-->QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Sep 9 2006, 01:14 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->The following is an interesting extract which shows that Hindus were aware of the differences between the way battles were fought by Hindus and Muslims but they failed to adopt it:.........
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Bharatvarsh,
It is mostly monday morning quarterbacking when these authors try to portray the "strategy failures" and "lack of learning" on the part of Indians.
Let us look at an example: Ghori is considered a millitary genius. Historians talk about his "brilliant cavalry" and organization!.
Ghori was routed in the first war at Kayadara by rajputs of Gujarat.
In the first war of Taraori it was a contest between the two cavalries. Rajput cavalry charge was so ferocious that both flanks of Ghori's cavalry broke and ran away. This is completely overlooked by historians, who wrongly think that Indians only fought on elephants! This is really absurd logic.
From time immemorial horses have been the mainstay of Indian armies. Breeds like Marwari are completely indegenous and are extremely suited for warfare because they are very temperamental (i.e very agressive).
The biggest reasons for our major defeats were not bad strategy, caste system or lack of cavalry it was because we followed the ancient kshatriya code of not killing a prostrate enemy. Going back to Ghori's example, he could have been killed in Gujarat but was allowed to leave. Similarly he begged Prithviraj Chauhan, who also allowed him to go back.
Secondly a lack of central kingdom meant that individual king's resources were less compared to say the king of delhi. As a consequence gathering large armies became tough. E.g Maharana Pratap, Durgadas, Hammir Dev Chauhan, Kanhad Dev Songara, Surtan Deora, Rao Chandrasen Rathore etc. all fought with almost an order of magnitude men less then the opposing muslims.
For example if Shivaji, Chittor, Jai Singh (Amber) and Jaswant Singh(Marwar) had combined Aurang the rat could have been nailed. But lack of a central leader did not let this happen.
BTW this last point is still relevant today in India. We have different voices which sometimes tend to pull India in different directions w.r.t security matters. I just cannot understand the reasons behind this.
I have heard people like Singhvi (spokesman of congress), ofcourse muslims and some Hindus like Mahesh Bhatt etc that there is NOTHING that India can do on this war of terror being unleashed within the borders of India. If there is no will to fight then THERE IS NO WAY we will win. So does it mean we have wrong people at the helm?
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Secondly a lack of central kingdom meant that individual king's resources were less compared to say the king of delhi. As a consequence gathering large armies became tough. E.g Maharana Pratap, Durgadas, Hammir Dev Chauhan, Kanhad Dev Songara, Surtan Deora, Rao Chandrasen Rathore etc. all fought with almost an order of magnitude men less then the opposing muslims.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
IIRC Dharampal mentions about the economic aspects too. In terms of revenue collection the hindu state extracted much less compared to the invading kingdoms. Other guroos can comment on this but in his opinion Brits were the biggest - close to 50% taxation, followed by muslims (Aurangzeb was worst - 20-25% ?). I havent seen any detailed analysis of this factor. Can somebody please post if such an analysis has been done ?
---
Vaguely remember that Vijayanagara collected higher taxes (dont remember how much) and MDS only allows for 1/6th.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The biggest reasons for our major defeats were not bad strategy, caste system or lack of cavalry it was because we followed the ancient kshatriya code of not killing a prostrate enemy. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Well that's exactly what I mean when I say Hindus failed to learn, we failed to learn to be ruthless with these invaders, I also have to disagree with you on strategy and cavalry, those two were also major reasons for our defeats, for example in the 3rd battle of Panipat what kind of a strategy was it to bring women and thousands of civilians along to a battleground, also the empire of Vijayanagara realised that the Muslims had better horses, that is why they used the Portuguese to import good quality horses. We forgot to learn our lessons from what Sri Krishna did in Mahabharata and acted like war was some kind of a tournament.
Nextly take the case of Hindu routs, everytime the Hindus were winning all the Muslims had to do was to somehow kill the king and the entire army fled like rabble, this was repeated so many times. Here is a good analysis for Hindu defeats:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->REAL CAUSES OF HINDU DEFEATS
Finally, Dr. Misra lays his probing finger on the real factors which contributed to Hindu defeats during this period. The very first factor, according to him, was the lack of a forward policy vis-a-vis the Muslim invaders. In his own words, âWhat the Rajputs really lacked was a spirit of aggression so conspicuous among the Muslims, and a will to force the war in the enemyâs dominions and thus destroy the base of his power.â5
Secondly, a forward policy could not be pursued in the absence of a âstrong central government for even the whole of northern India which could think and act for the whole countryâ. As a result, âThe Rajput rulers found it difficult to look beyond the territorial limits of their own kingdoms and their regional interests pushed the national issues into the background.â6 Compared to a strong central authority, the various confederacies organised by the Rajputs proved to be patch-works which came apart either under the impact of military defeat, or as soon as the immediate purpose of stopping the enemy had been served.
Thirdly, the military organisation of the Rajputs was inferior as compared to that of the Muslims. The Rajputs depended mainly on feudal levies assembled on the spur of the moment. âThese feudal levies with no unity of training and organisation, coming together at the last moment, fighting under the leadership of and for their individual leaders, could not be expected to beat back an enemy united in purpose and organisation and acting as on coordinate unit.â A medieval Muslim historian quoted by Dr. Misra said so in so many words: âA commander with a heterogeneous army consisting of soldiers - a hundred from here and a hundred from there - cannot achieve anything. An army with so varied and so many component elements has never been able to achieve anything great.â7
Fourthly, âThe cavalry and mounted archers of the invading armies gave them a decisive superiority over the home forces. The Indian rulers too maintained cavalry units. But the Arabic and Turkoman horses were much better adapted to warfare⦠The second strong point of the Turkish military machine was its mounted archery. Their deadly arrows easily covered a range of eighty to hundred paces⦠Reference to archery among the Indian armies after the age of the epics is conspicuous by its absence.â8
Lastly, âthe strategy and tactics employed by the invaders on the battlefield proved decisive in their favour. Indians failed to keep pace with the developments of military strategy taking place in Central Asia before the advent of Islam. The Arabs and Turks perfected them⦠Besides, the traditional Rajput chivalry looked upon the battle as a ritual or a tournament for displaying their fighting skill and swordsmanship under well-recognised rules of sport. Did not Manu, the ancient law-giver proclaim â âA battle was ideally a gigantic tournament with many rules: a warrior fighting from a chariot might not strike one on foot; an enemy in flight, wounded or asking a quarter, might not be slain; the lives of enemy soldiers who had lost their weapons were to be respected; poisoned weapons were not to be used; homage and not annexation was the rightful fruit of victory.â The Arabs and the Turks, on the other hand, knew no rules and waged a grim and ruthless struggle to destroy their enemies. Feints and sudden attacks, manoeuvering under the cover of darkness and pretending defeat and flights, keeping a large reserve to be used only at critical moments - all these took the Indians by surprise and crippled their fighting capacity. The Indians never tried to take advantage of their enemyâs weakness and perhaps considered it unchivalrous to do so. Such magnanimity on the part of Indian kings⦠was a sure invitation to disaster against a ruthless foe who recognised no moral or ideological scruples in the pursuit of victory.â9
Â
SAPPERS AND MINERS OF ISLAMIC IMPERIALISM
Muslims had two more advantages in addition to their aggressiveness and superiority in the art of warfare. âDuring this long period of Indian resistanceâ, observes Dr. Misra, âthe infiltration of Arabs, and later on the Turks, continued almost unabated into India, both through armed invasions as well as through peaceful migration from Central Asia. The Hindus, true to their catholicity of religious outlook and rich tradition of tolerance, never obstructed the peaceful immigrants and even zealously granted them security and full religious freedom⦠The greatest Chishti saint of India, Shaikh Muinuddin Chishti, came to Ajmer just before the battles of Tarain and was able to attract a number of devoted followers⦠It is all the more remarkable that this Hindu tolerance towards the Muslim merchants and mystics should have continued even after the invasions of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni⦠As Professor Habib points out, âthe far-flung campaigns of Sultan Mahmud would have been impossible without an accurate knowledge of trade routes and local resources, which was probably obtained from Muslim merchants.â The same can be said to hold good about the invasions of Muhammad Ghori or Qutbuddin Aibak.â10 The sufis were working not only as the spies of Islamic imperialism but also as deceivers of gullible Hindu masses.
09-10-2006, 11:32 PM (This post was last modified: 09-10-2006, 11:37 PM by Bharatvarsh.)
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->For example if Shivaji, Chittor, Jai Singh (Amber) and Jaswant Singh(Marwar) had combined Aurang the rat could have been nailed. But lack of a central leader did not let this happen.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Actually we didn't even need that, Raj Singh of Mewar once had Aurangzeb surrounded and at his mercy and the Rajputs had also carried off his favourite Georgian wife but Raj Singh gave her back and let Aurangzeb go on the promise that he wouldn't kill cows anymore, this was in the 1670's, much before Aurangzeb unleashed his full scale fanaticism, that is what I mean when I say Hindus lacked the killer instinct and still do (for example we let off 93,000 Pakis who surrendered in 1971 for nothing instead of putting them in slave camps until their death for taking part in murdering millions of Hindus).
Quote:The biggest reasons for our major defeats were not bad strategy, caste system or lack of cavalry it was because we followed the ancient kshatriya code of not killing a prostrate enemy.
Well that's exactly what I mean when I say Hindus failed to learn, we failed to learn to be ruthless with these invaders, I also have to disagree with you on strategy and cavalry, those two were also major reasons for our defeats, for example in the 3rd battle of Panipat what kind of a strategy was it to bring women and thousands of civilians along to a battleground, also the empire of Vijayanagara realised that the Muslims had better horses, that is why they used the Portuguese to import good quality horses. We forgot to learn our lessons from what Sri Krishna did in Mahabharata and acted like war was some kind of a tournament.
Nextly take the case of Hindu routs, everytime the Hindus were winning all the Muslims had to do was to somehow kill the king and the entire army fled like rabble, this was repeated so many times. Here is a good analysis for Hindu defeats:
Bharatvarsh,
This is true for ANY war and not applicable to rajputs/Indians only. During battle of Samugarh when Dara had distinct advantage, largely because of roop singh rathore and other rajputs, Khalilullah Khan asked him to get down from the elephant and mount a horse. This was followed by Khalilullah's men spreading a rumour that Dara has been knocked out which his army started believing because they could not see him in the howdah. There courage broke down and Dara's army started running away.
Quote:REAL CAUSES OF HINDU DEFEATS
Finally, Dr. Misra lays his probing finger on the real factors which contributed to Hindu defeats during this period. The very first factor, according to him, was the lack of a forward policy vis-a-vis the Muslim invaders. In his own words, âWhat the Rajputs really lacked was a spirit of aggression so conspicuous among the Muslims, and a will to force the war in the enemyâs dominions and thus destroy the base of his power.â5
This is not entirely true. Bappa Rawal made his attacks deep into caliphate and the sind muslims actually were tributaries to rajputs. Note there is a big misconception that delhi sultanate ruled the roost from Ghori's wins till Babur. This is largely false. Major parts of India were under Hindu Kings. Professor Herman Kulke in his book "A History of India, ISBN: 0415154820, Publisher: Routledge; 3rd edition (March 1998)" records:
"Ala-ud-din was also quite realistic when he mentioned that his order would be obeyed only upto a distance of about 100 miles from Delhi; beyond that limit military intervention was required if he wanted to impose his will on the people."
So during this time one has to think of Delhi as just another kingdom like Amber or Mewar.
Quote:Secondly, a forward policy could not be pursued in the absence of a âstrong central government for even the whole of northern India which could think and act for the whole countryâ. As a result, âThe Rajput rulers found it difficult to look beyond the territorial limits of their own kingdoms and their regional interests pushed the national issues into the background.â6 Compared to a strong central authority, the various confederacies organised by the Rajputs proved to be patch-works which came apart either under the impact of military defeat, or as soon as the immediate purpose of stopping the enemy had been served.
Parts of this quote regarding central leadership are true and I did mention them in my first reply but one has to understand the dynamics of medieval India. Firstly for rajputs the most important in his mind was his patrynomic inheritance. To regain that he did not need any encouragement. Secondly if an oppurtinity did arise to form a confederacy as was done by Sanga and prithviraj rajputs did join these. Lack of central leadership was definetely an issue but why it did not happen is pure chance.
Quote:Thirdly, the military organisation of the Rajputs was inferior as compared to that of the Muslims. The Rajputs depended mainly on feudal levies assembled on the spur of the moment. âThese feudal levies with no unity of training and organisation, coming together at the last moment, fighting under the leadership of and for their individual leaders, could not be expected to beat back an enemy united in purpose and organisation and acting as on coordinate unit.â A medieval Muslim historian quoted by Dr. Misra said so in so many words: âA commander with a heterogeneous army consisting of soldiers - a hundred from here and a hundred from there - cannot achieve anything. An army with so varied and so many component elements has never been able to achieve anything great.â7
Fourthly, âThe cavalry and mounted archers of the invading armies gave them a decisive superiority over the home forces. The Indian rulers too maintained cavalry units. But the Arabic and Turkoman horses were much better adapted to warfare⦠The second strong point of the Turkish military machine was its mounted archery. Their deadly arrows easily covered a range of eighty to hundred paces⦠Reference to archery among the Indian armies after the age of the epics is conspicuous by its absence.â8
This is monday morning quarterbacking because most of the details about rajputs wars are not readliy available so the worst is thought. As I mentioned earlier rajput CAVALRY defeated the turk cavalry at Taraori under Prithviraj Chauhan. Secondly archers were used in every rajput war. Hammir's archers and the medieveal cannons were largely responsible for Allauddin's first defeat at Ranathambore. And Marwari is one of THE BEST horse for cavalry warfare. There is just no question about it. So Mishra is just misinformed. Historians just do not realise why they are still Hindu because they like everyone else falsely believe that India was occupied for 1000 years by muslims. This we know is utter falsehood.
<img src='http://www.marwarihorse.com/images/marwari_horse_6.JPG' border='0' alt='user posted image' />
Panchkalyan Marwari. Horse of Jeytung Bhati, one of the heroes of the famous Jaisalmer love story http://hindurajput.blogspot.com/#Rajput_Chivalry
Quote:Lastly, âthe strategy and tactics employed by the invaders on the battlefield proved decisive in their favour. Indians failed to keep pace with the developments of military strategy taking place in Central Asia before the advent of Islam. The Arabs and Turks perfected them⦠Besides, the traditional Rajput chivalry looked upon the battle as a ritual or a tournament for displaying their fighting skill and swordsmanship under well-recognised rules of sport. Did not Manu, the ancient law-giver proclaim â âA battle was ideally a gigantic tournament with many rules: a warrior fighting from a chariot might not strike one on foot; an enemy in flight, wounded or asking a quarter, might not be slain; the lives of enemy soldiers who had lost their weapons were to be respected; poisoned weapons were not to be used; homage and not annexation was the rightful fruit of victory.â The Arabs and the Turks, on the other hand, knew no rules and waged a grim and ruthless struggle to destroy their enemies. Feints and sudden attacks, manoeuvering under the cover of darkness and pretending defeat and flights, keeping a large reserve to be used only at critical moments - all these took the Indians by surprise and crippled their fighting capacity. The Indians never tried to take advantage of their enemyâs weakness and perhaps considered it unchivalrous to do so. Such magnanimity on the part of Indian kings⦠was a sure invitation to disaster against a ruthless foe who recognised no moral or ideological scruples in the pursuit of victory.â9
This is arguing in favor of treachery and using underhand means to win the war as muslims did pretty much in every war. If you read Tamur Lane's wars same theme runs through them. The Bayazid lost because of traitors. This change in beahvior is easier said then done. People who honor there word more then there life cannot easily fall to this line of thinking. But Mishra has a point here.
Quote:SAPPERS AND MINERS OF ISLAMIC IMPERIALISM
Muslims had two more advantages in addition to their aggressiveness and superiority in the art of warfare. âDuring this long period of Indian resistanceâ, observes Dr. Misra, âthe infiltration of Arabs, and later on the Turks, continued almost unabated into India, both through armed invasions as well as through peaceful migration from Central Asia. The Hindus, true to their catholicity of religious outlook and rich tradition of tolerance, never obstructed the peaceful immigrants and even zealously granted them security and full religious freedom⦠The greatest Chishti saint of India, Shaikh Muinuddin Chishti, came to Ajmer just before the battles of Tarain and was able to attract a number of devoted followers⦠It is all the more remarkable that this Hindu tolerance towards the Muslim merchants and mystics should have continued even after the invasions of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni⦠As Professor Habib points out, âthe far-flung campaigns of Sultan Mahmud would have been impossible without an accurate knowledge of trade routes and local resources, which was probably obtained from Muslim merchants.â The same can be said to hold good about the invasions of Muhammad Ghori or Qutbuddin Aibak.â10 The sufis were working not only as the spies of Islamic imperialism but also as deceivers of gullible Hindu masses.
Had Hindus not been magnanimous the world probably would have lost the ancient religion of zoroaster. I would say this is not a weakness. Because once the war starts there are other more important factors at play.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Gingee, Fort </b>
This is the most spectacular and strategic of all forts in Tamil Nadu. Founded by the Cholas, it rose to prominence in the 16th century under the Nayakas when most of the fortifications, temples and granaries were built. Thereafter it was successively occupied by the Adil Shahis, Marathas, Mughals, French and British until it was abandoned in the beginning of the 19th century. The site is composed of three hills, each separately fortified. Curtain walls connecting the hills form the vast outer fort. An enclosed area around the highest fort Rajagiri forms the inner fort and palace zone.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->By 1690 Aurangzeb was the unrivalled master of the Deccan---Rajaram had fled far in the south to Shivaji's possessions in the Carnatic. Before leaving, he appointed Ramchandra Bavdekar the supreme commander of the war in the Maratha homeland with lieutenants like Parashuram Trimbak and Shankarji Narayan. Safe in the southern fort of Jinjee Rajaram appointed Prahlad Niraji his supreme regent to be assisted by generals like Dhana Singh Jadav and Santa Ghorpade. Thus the Marathas calculated that Aurangzeb would be forced to divide his forces into two, separated by several hundred kilometers, and this would save the Maratha homeland from complete conquest....
Rajaram at Jinjee seeks the support of the southern chieftains for his war against Aurangzeb, however only his first cousin the Raja of Tanjore provides that aid. In January former Golconda officers, Muhammad Sadiq, Yachapa Nayak[39], and Ismail Maka, who had submitted to the Mughals, now join Rajaram. Zulfiqar Khan (Nusrat Jang) sent against them lays siege to Jinjee in September...
Nusrat Jang continues the siege of Jinjee joined by his father Asad Khan and Prince Kam Baksh in December 1691. Santa and Dhana bring fresh recruits from the homeland to the Carnatic---Santa captures Kanchipuram and imprisons the Mughal governor Ali Mardan Khan, whose foot-musketeers desert to the Marathas. Santa joins Dhana in attacking the besieging army at Jinjee, cutting-off its communications and food supply. Prince Kam Baksh intrigues with Rajaram, asking for his help in marching to North India and capturing the Mughal throne. Mughal force retires from the siege after many losses and Prince Kam Baksh is arrested by Nusrat Jang. Marathas dominate southern India and many local chiefs attack and plunder the Mughal supply lines. Santa and Rajaram subdue the Nayak of Trichinopoly but Santaji quarrels with his King and departs for the Ghats; Dhanaji is appointed senapati in his place. Nusrat Jang attacks the Raja of Tanjore in 1694 and forces him to submit, Yachapa Nayak joins that Mughal general but is treacherously arrested and beheaded. Nusrat Jang renews the siege of Jinjee....
Dhana attacks Nusrat Jang at Vellore and forces him away from the siege of that fort and to the refuge of Arcot. Santa reaches Jinjee and the long-running quarrels between the Maratha ministers (over policy and appointments to high office) and between the Maratha generals (over division of territory) come to a head. Rajaram supports Dhana and Amrit Rao Nimbalkar against Santa but after two battles Santa is victorious; Amrit Rao is killed and Dhana escapes to the Ghats. Santa turns towards Mysore; Nusrat Jang follows him from the south while Aurangzeb sends his grandson Bidar Bakht from the north but Santa's army eludes the slow-moving Mughals. Nusrat Jang besieges Jinjee again in November 1697 but forms a friendly understanding with Rajaram in the expectation of Aurangzeb's imminent death and Nusrat's desire to build a kingdom of his own. But Aurangzeb's suspicions are roused and in January 1698 Nusrat takes Jinjee but gives advance warning to his friend---Rajaram escapes to the Maratha homeland with his chief officers.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->After the conquest of Malwa, Alauddin sent his brilliant general Malik Naib Kafur to the south and he himself seized an opportunity to attack Scvana. Sevana was then in possession of Parmar Rajput chief, Satal Deva. Satal Deva had witnessed the mighty citadels of Ranthambhor and Chittor succumb to onslaughts of the Khalji warlord, but still he refused to submit to the Delhi Sultan. Satal Deva was a powerful and energetic ruler, he had defeated many Rais in battle and a number of Rajput Ravats acknowleged his suzerainty.
The Sultan marched on 2nd July, 1308 ( 13 Muharram, 708 H) to chastise the ruler of Sevana. On arrival there, he began the investment of the fort. The right wing of the royal army was stationed on two sides, east and west, of the battlement; the left wing was on the north; and the center was entrusted to the command of Malik Kamaluddin âthe wolf.â A constant shower off missiles was kept up from the manjniqs but success was not in sight for a long time. The royal forces resorted to many stratagems, but all in vain. The Rajputs defended the fort stubbornly, threw fire and stone from the battlement, and for months together âbreath was choked, by the sounds of the Turki flutes and Hindu bellâ. <b>When nothing seemed to avail, says Padmanabh, a trick was resorted to. A traitr named Bhaile was induced to indicate a passage to the royal commander through which a manjniq was carried and it discharged a cowâs head into the lake which supplied water and their fate sealed.</b>
The Imperial forces succeeded in escalating the battlements of the citadel, but after great difficulty. Satal Deva tried to Flee to Jalor, but ran into an ambush and was done to death on 10th November, 1308 (23 Rabiul Avval, 708H) the administration of Sevana was entrusted to Kamaluddin Gurg and Alauddin returned to Delhi.
Capture of Jalor
Now Alauddin Khalji attacked Kanhad Deva, the Chauhan Raja of Jalor. Kanhad Deva, also known by the names of Saligram, Gokalnath & Krishna III, was the son of Som Singh, a dependent of the Solanki Bhim Deva of Gujarat. After Sultan Alauddin had consolidated his authority in Marwar, Kanhad Devaâs semi-independent status was construed as contumacy and, his country was invaded.
Nainsi described two sieges of Jalor by Alauddin. The first occurred at the time of the royal armyâs return from Gujarat in 1298 and the second in 1311. As the Sultan himself did not lead the forces to Gujarat, the details given by Nainsi about the siege of 1298 may not be quite accepted, as he always refers to kingâs presence there. Farishta also mentions about the expeditions to Jalor While describing the events of the year 704 H (A.D. 1304) Farishta writes that as the imperial general Alap Khan and Nusrat Khan were returning from the conquest of Malwa, they arrived at Jalor and Nahar Deo (Kanhad Deva), taking lesson from the fate of Koka (of Malwa), offered his submission to the Sultan without a show of resistance. The other invasion according to Farishta came of in 1308 and was the outcome of a very curious incident. One day while Kanhad was present in the court, he heard Alauddin say that there was no one among the Hindu Rajas who could dare challenge the might of his arms. The remarks pricked Kanhadâs sense of pride and he picked up the gauntlet, retorting, âIf I wage a war and do not come out successful, I may be killedâ. This effrontery enraged the Sultan and he ordered an invasion of Jalor, to which Kanhad had already slipped to make preparation for war.
Hajiuddhabir, a cotemporary of Farishta, almost repeats the story, which appears to be incredible. It is really strange that at one time Kanhad Deva hurries to Delhi to pay homage to the king of his own accord, professes unflinching obedience for four years, and then suddenly adopts such an insolent attitude that he puts himself and his subjects in extreme jeopardy. An interesting reason has been given by Nainsi. <b>He say that a princess of Alauddinsâs harem fell in love with Viram, son of Kanhad Deva, who was on attendance at the court in place of his father. Padmanabh in his Kanhadde Prbandh says that she was a daughter of Sultan Alauddin and her name was Firoza. The Sultan and the ladies of the harem first threatened the girl to change her mind, but finding her adamant, Alauddin insisted on Viram to marry her. The young Rajput could never think of marrying a âTurkâ girl and left for jalor, promising to return with a wedding party (barat) after some time.</b> The Sultan suspected a ruse on the part of Viram and kept a Rajput prince of the house as hostage. As was expected, Viram never returned to marry the girl and the Sultan was so much incensed at his treachery that he invaded Jalor. Neither the reasons given by Nainsi nor by Farishta and Hajiuddabir are convincing. The real cause of the invasion was in all certainly the determination of the Sultan to put an end to the independence of Jalor as was done with the other states of Rajputana.
In short, a royal force was sent to Jalor in A.D. 1311. The name of the commander of the expedition is not known but he does not seem to have been a brave general. <b>The Rajputs defeated the royalists in a number of engagements and threw them back on many occasions. One thing is certain that the battle of Jalor was terrible, and perhaps a prolonged one. According to the Gujarati epic romance Kanhad de Prabhandh, the contest continued for some years, and the imperialists met with a number of reverses</b>.
The news of the humiliating retreats put the Sultan to his mettle and he sent a strong force under the veteran, Malik Kamaluddin Gurg. On reaching Jalor, Kamaluddin pressed the siege with unabated vigour. According to Padmanabh, one Sejwal was tempted by royal gold to guide the royalists to a secret entrance into the fort-Such meanness cost him his life at the hands of his wife, but it facilitated the task of Kamaluddin. At last Gokalnath, his son Viram Deva and their followers were killed in a close combat and the fortress was captured. <b>Maldeva, a brother of Kanhad Deva, survived the massacre that followed the fall of Jailor. Later on, he was able to secure the goodwill of the Sultan, who appointed him to take charge of Chittor from Khizra Khan. </b>
Nainsiâs date (1311 â 12 A.D.) of the fall of Jalor is in conflict with that of Farishta (1308 A.D.) In 1308 the conquest of Sevana was undertaken and a large army was sent to the Deccan also. It is, therefore, probable that Jalor was attacked at a later date. But Nainsiâs date find corroboration in the Tirtha Kalpa of Jina Prabha Suri who says that in Sam vat 1367 i.e. 1310, Alauddin destroyed the temple of Mahavira at Sanchor, a place near Jalor. The destruction of this temple must have been a part of large enterprise, namely the invasion of Jalor. Reu also concludes that Jalor capitulated in A.D. 1311. it appears that Jalor resisted the invasion for long, and fought for many years before it capitulated. The brave Chauhans of Jalor had kept up the tradition. To commemorate this victory, Alauddin had a mosque erected in the famous fort of Songir at Jalor which is still in existence.
With the capitulation of Jalor, almost all the leading states of Rajputana have been subdued one after the other. Ever since Sultan Alauddin had embarked upon the conquest of Ranthambhor in 1300, till the fall of Jalor in 1311, his armies had constantly fought in Rajasthan. There was tough resistance to his attacks by all Rajputs (Chauhans included) and the valour of Rajputs could not brook the insult of giving way to the enemy. The result was that bloody battles were fought before each and every fortress. <b>To enumerate the various wars in Rajputana, then, is to repeat the horrors of blood and slaughter, of gallant fight, of glorious martyrdom</b>. Sometimes before a single citadel the contest prolonged for years and ended in a general massacre of its population, accompanied by the gruesome destruction of the womenfolk in the fire of jauhar. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
PC,
The chronology of the above website seems to be off. Muhammad Shah became a rebel when the siege of Junagadh/Gujarat/Somanth occured. He was originally a member of Nusrat and Ulug's army that sacked the temple at Somnath. On the way back they, after breaking the shivalinga, stopped near Jalore and Kanhad Dev attacked Allauddin's army and recovered Shivalinga, pieces of which were established at various temples around Jalore.
Muhammad Shah helped Kanhad Dev, because he was disgruntled with Ulugh and Nusrat Khan. Ulugh and Nusrat discriminated against Muhammad Shah and other "new converts to Islam" and paid them less booty they won in the Gujarat campaign compared to the muslims who were muslims by birth.
Muhammad Shah started living in Jalore but he had a falling out at Jalore and then he moved to Ranasthambpur where Hammir gave him refuge.
Interestingly the fort was very well prepared. There was no problem with food inside the fort. Hammir used to have regular concerts with musicians and this used to aggravate Khilji because khilji could hear the sweet flow of music from the fort and was constantly reminded of his life in the insect infested marshes outside the fort. This is why he wanted to discuss the terms of peace to negotiate which Hammir had sent Ratipal and Ranmal. Rest is history.
09-30-2006, 08:09 PM (This post was last modified: 09-30-2006, 08:10 PM by Bharatvarsh.)
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Padmini, Rani, in legend, the wife of Rawal RATAN SINGH I of Mewar, although there appears to be no historical record of Ratan Singh having a wife by that name. Nor is she mentioned in Khaza'inul Futuh, Hazrat Amir Khusrau's official chronicle of Ala-ud-Din Khilji's campaigns. It would seem the ravishing Padmini may have been the figment of a contemporary bard's vivid imagination, quite possibly to supply a romantic reason for Ala-ud-Din's savage conquest of Chittor in 1303 (see CHITTOR, 1ST SACK). With the legend established, she was given a name, Padmavati, but that was the invention of the writer Malik Mohammed Jayasi, in a poem of that name written some two hundred and fifty years after Ala-ud-Din's conquest. This romantic tale relates the beginning of what was to become the Padmini legend (see GANDHARVASEN). Perhaps the name itself came from the Hindu word 'padmini', the archetype of all beautiful women. Nevertheless, the legendary Rani Padmini has become the most famous heroine in the annals of Mewar, and her extraordinary story is one of loyalty, faith, courage, and a shining example of the strength of Rajput womanhood. Padmini has an exotic background: a young princess from Sinhal Dripa (Lanka, Ceylon or modern Sri Lanka), the daughter of King Gandharvasen and Queen Champavati. (Another account gives the royal father's name as Hamir Sank who was, allegedly, a Chauhan, also of Ceylon.) Accompanied by her uncle Gora, his wife, and Gora's nephew, Badal, Padmini came to India to marry Ratan Singh. A dark-skinned maiden, her incredible beauty was soon acclaimed throughout India. When Sultan ALA-UD-DIN KHILJI of the Khilji dynasty of North India heard about Padmini, he decided to abduct her for his harem. At the time, the massive Islamic takeover of Hindu India was under way. Fiercely national Hindu clans were formidable in their struggle to retain their independence against the invading Muslims. They were so dedicated they would sacrifice everything, even their lives, to protect their homeland. The men prized honour above safety; the women held chastity dearer than life. And it was this combination of virtues that led to the Padmini tragedy (and, as is often the case with most myths or legends, they are frequently so improbable they can only work if the readers suspend their disbelief).
Ala-ud-Din Khilji had long been anxious to add Mewar, and its capital Chittorgarh, to his empire. Following his rewarding siege of Daulatabad, the Sultan considered Padmini a good enough reason to attack Chittor. Early in 1302, he began his attack. The Rajputs, however, held the fort and after eight months of deadlock Ala-ud-Din offered to lift the siege on the condition that he be allowed to have a glimpse of Padmini. Amazingly, as it makes Ratan Singh, his lieutenants and counsellors appear rather gullible, the Rawal agreed. Khilji was allowed to ride up the long winding roadway to the huge main gates with his men, but entered the fort alone, and was taken to Padmini's Palace. He, too, should have known better: Rajputs, as did Muslims, had a strict rule about purdah in that no outside males were permitted to gaze directly upon their womenfolk. So, Khilji had to be satisfied with seeing a reflection of Padmini in a mirror in the queen's summer palace: she appeared on the steps of a pavilion in the middle of a lotus pool just across from the palace. It is said that the mirror was fixed with such efficiency that a person standing on the pavilion's steps could be seen in the mirror, but if the viewer tried to see by turning towards the window he could not see the steps, let alone the desired object. That done, the Rawal, with customary Rajput chivalry, accompanied his enemy back to the main gates with Ala-ud-Din offering many complimentary excuses for the trouble he had caused. The huge wooden portals were dragged open, and the Rawal was about to bid his adversary a (hopefully) final farewell when suddenly Khilji's soldiers waiting in ambush just outside captured Ratan Singh. (Some accounts say this abduction occurred at the foot of the entrance road.) As ransom for the king, Khilji demanded that Padmini be turned over to him, this time unconditionally.
Padmini, who was also very intelligent sent word to the Sultan that she agreed to his ransom, adding that she would be accompanied by seven hundred personal friends and maids. The following morning a processions of palanquins (ostensibly carrying the queen and her handmaidens) duly arrived at the Muslim camp below the fort. Each palanquin was borne by six slaves, who were really armed warriors in disguise. And each palanquin also carried an armed warrior. Gora (the uncle) was in Padmini's palanquin. Nearing Ala-ud-Din's tent, Gora (pretending to be Padmini) expressed a desire to have a final, private meeting with Ratan Singh. With Ala-ud-Din's approval, Padmini's palanquin was carried to Rawal Ratan Singh and all soldiers were withdrawn. As soon as Gora had released Ratan Singh, not enchanting ladies but the fully armed Rajput soldiers, several hundred according to some chronicles, burst from the palanquins. In the ensuing confusion of battle, Ratan Singh escaped and was escorted back to the safety of the fort, but Gora and about five hundred braves were killed. Ala-ud-Din is said to have returned to Delhi disappointed (and to boost the heavily depleted ranks of his army). But he was restless; he constantly thought of capturing Chittor and Padmini.
In January, 1303, he again marched south and stormed the citadel with renewed vengeance, the siege lasting another six months. The fort's food supplies finally ran out. Finally realising further resistance would be futile, Padmini led all of the fort's women and children-a thousand or so-to Kumbha's Palace. There, as the legend goes, they entered an underground chamber, the door was sealed behind them, and a large bonfire was lit. Bravely, they committed the ultimate sacrifice of jauhar, the grisly ritual of suicide by fire, rather than suffer disgrace at the hands of the enemy. The site of the ceremony is unlikely. With or without Padmini, it probably took place at the fort's Mahasati, the traditional royal cremation ground near Chittor's Tower of Victory. In the still-to-be-seen cavern under Kumbha's Palace, there would have been neither space nor air for such an enormous pyre. Possibly that entrance led to an underground tunnel (also said to exist) which, in turn, led to the Gaumukh Reservoir. (Or they simply walked from the palace in procession.) The ladies ritually cleansed themselves in the reservoir's holy waters, attended a ceremony in the neighbouring Sammidheshwar Temple, then (heavily drugged and chanting hymns) moved to the Mahasati area. In his ANNALS AND ANTIQUITIES OF RAJASTHAN, James TOD describes that jauhar (wherever it may have occurred):
The funeral pyre was lit within the great subterranean retreat in chambers impervious to the light of day, and the defenders of Chittor beheld in procession the queens, their own wives and daughters, to the number of several thousands. The fair Padmini closed the throng. They were conveyed to the cavern, and the opening closed upon them leaving them to find security from dishonour in the devouring element.
Their families gone, the men of the fort donned traditional saffron robes of death, threw open the fort's gates, and charged to their mass destruction. Finally victorious, the Sultan rode in to take Padmini only to discover the beautiful, resourceful queen had cheated him one last time.
If all else is fable, at least there was substance to the wholesale jauhar of the women and the men's suicide charge. This happened two more times when Chittor was besieged, in 1534 and, finally, in 1568. On each occasion, thousands of brave men and women gave their lives for Mewar. Fact or fiction, the tragedy of Padmini remains a most inventive, passionate and exciting tale.
<!--QuoteBegin-Bharatvarsh+Sep 30 2006, 08:09 PM-->QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Sep 30 2006, 08:09 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->..........
Digvijay is the story of Rani Padmini for real or a legend?
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Bharatvarsh,
Reconstructing our history is not very straightforward as most of our records were burnt during the wars that took place. Nalanda and Takshila met the same fate and so did the detailed record keeping that was emplyed by our kings. And to add salt to the wounds western and Islamic historians have preached that we do not know how to record our own history! What nerve!
The annals of Jaislamer record that indeed there was a Padmini. She was born in the house of Pugal Bhattis. Ladies of Bhatti clan of Pugal were renowned for there exceptional beauty. Her mother, it is recorded (Bhavani Singh Chauhan former Devasthan commissioner, in his essay, 'Chittorharh ke teen Sake', has recorded on Page 58-59 "Rawal Ratan Singh was married to an extremely beautiful Chauhan rajkumari Padmini of Pugal". He is slightly wrong as in the mother of Rani Padmini was a chauhan.), was a Chauhan rajput which agrees with the fact that her maternal uncle, Gora, was a chauhan rajput. It is also recorded she was married in the house of Mewar.
As per Tawarikh Jaisalmer (History of Jaisalmer by Lakshmi Chand) and Jaisalmer Ri Khyat (Historiology of Jaisalmer by Dr Narain Singh Bhati), Rawal Punpal Singh Bhati had three Ranis:
i) Rani Paip Kanwar Parihaar of Belwaa
ii) Rani Jam Kanwar Devri of Sirohi
iii) Sodhi rani of Thar Pakar
Rani Padmini was the daughter of the second queen that is the chauhan queen.
Ala-ud-din conquered it after killing Kanhad Deva Chauhan....later it came under Rathors of Jodhpur.
But the Lohani Nawabs of Palanpur claim that their ancestor took Jalor from the Parihar Rajput ruler (!) in the 14th Century. That ancestor was a minister of the Parihar ruler.
Further Emperor Akbar expelled the Lohani Afghans to Gujarat (where they founded Palanpur) and gave Jalor to the Rathors.
The resistance of the small state of Idar in Gujarat.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Despite such setbacks, immigrations of fresh Rajput clans continued apace in both regions. In the early 16th century Kutch was conquered by the Jadeja Rajputs, and remained independent throughout the reign of the Sultans and even during the heydays of the Mughal Empire. Other clans like the Gohils and Jhalas founded fresh principalities in the Kathiawar peninsula while in the north the conflict with the Rathors of Idar and the Chauhans of Sirohi ensnared the Sultans in a strenuous contest with the Maharanas of Mewar. Idar in particular was attacked several times, its temples were broken and replaced by mosques, and a Muslim army was left to colonize the land and convert the population. But each time the ruling Rathors expelled the Muslims, tore down their mosques, and rebuilt the temples.
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Malwa and Gujarat had retained a primarily Hindu character under the Sultans due partly to the local resistance and partly to the bloody conflict with Mewar that exhausted the military resources of the Sultans and drained their energies. Under Akbar (the pragmatic) and Jehangir (the drunkard) matters remained the same in both regions. In Malwa Akbar had taken the fort of Gagraun from the Khichi Chauhans and compensated them by his recognition of their two states of Khilchipur and Raghogarh. In a later period the offshoots of the Jodhpur Rathors carved out their own states in Malwa (Ratlam, Sitamau, and Sailana). In Gujarat Jehangir was pleased to welcome the Rao of Kutch to a durbar in Gujaratâhowever due to its remote location, and its utility in the shipping of Mecca pilgrims, Kutch remained outside the Mughal orbit.
Despite this outward bonhomie (sulah-kul), there were also rebellions against the Mughals, and attempts by the latter to intervene in the domestic disputes of these Rajput states[18]. But with the accession of Shah Jahan (the bigot) and Aurangzeb (the fanatic) the bloody days of ceaseless warfare returned.
The Rajput state of Nawanagar (later known as Jamnagar) was attacked in 1635 by Shah Jahanâs subahdar Azam Khanâ¦again in 1662 the Mughals invaded and captured Nawanagar, this time renaming it Islam-nagar! However the Jadeja Rajputs, with aid from their kinsmen of Kutch, continued a guerrilla war and recovered Nawanagar in 1667. But the constant back-and-forth of the battles between Hinduism and Islam, was seen once again in the battle-scarred history of the Rajput state of Idar, which had defeated all attempts of the Gujarat Sultans to conquer it.
The Mughal prince Murad, as the next Subahdar of Gujarat, attacked Idar and appointed a Muslim governor thereâbut when he set out to fight the war of succession to the Mughal throne (1657) Rao Punja expelled the Muslims and recovered his ancestral kingdom.
Aurangzeb as Emperor again captured Idar but the Rathors fought a guerrilla war, killing 200 of the occupying Mughals in 1670, while in 1675 Rao Gopinath expelled Sayyid Kamal and recovered Idar. He was defeated and killed by the imperialists in 1680 and Idar again fell to the Mughalsâhowever during the Rajput War in neighboring Rajputana, the army of Mewar entered Gujarat and sacked Vadnagar and Visalnagar.
Taking advantage of the Mughal difficulties, Gopinathâs son hired a band of Rajput adventurers and finally recovered Idar.
Thus from the date of its founding (in the 13th century) this small Rajput state was attacked over a dozen times by the Islamists, with the familiar massacres and desecration of temples, but was recovered and the marks of Islam were expunged from the land each time.
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