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I am posting the online book I came across about Maratha-Rajput relations from 1720 to 1795. The book is written by a Maratha named D. Acharya so there is bound to be some bias but it has a lot of valuable information, particularly the letters exchanged between the Hindu rulers of the time which show us how important a role religion played in their alliances and opposition to the Mughals. I will highlight what I think are important points. The book has convinced me that if history is taught as it is today in India, it will not be long before Hindu identity will be diluted in the name of secularism and assorted nonsense, it is no wonder that I never read these original letters between Hindu rulers which stress how important religion was to them and stress the idea of the restablishment of a Hindu Raj, these letters show us that the idea of Pan-Hindu identity cutting across regional barriers was present even 3 centuries ago.

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->PREFACE

The present thesis " Maratha-Rajput relations from 1720 to 1795 A.D." begins with the career of Peshwa Bajirao I and ends with the death of Peshwa Madhaorao in 1795 A.D. The work 'Rajput' refers to the Rajput States of Rajasthan in the 18th century and particularly to the former States of Jaypur, Jodhpur and Udaypur as of the 15 States the leading Houses were three-the Sisodias of Mewad, the Rathods of Marwad and the Kachawahas of Ambar, History of other smaller States like Bundi, Kotal Alwar, Kishangadh or Bikaner, comes into picture wherever it touches the main theme. (1)

Again, there is no intention to give internal history of any individual State, that has no bearing on the main topic. Even then, it will be seen that the continuity is maintained, so far as it was possible.

Taking the 'Sanads' of 'Chauth' and 'Sardeshmukhi' as a base for expansion, the Maratha-Imperialism spread towards all directions from their base in Maharashtra. Their main object was 'territorial conquest for the regeneration of religion and the Gods' (2), in the words of Chimaji Appa. Their movements in Rajasthan were not isolated raids for mere plunderbut were a part of their general policy of expansion towards the North (3) . Maratha hold on Malwa was complete even in 1732 A.D. and Hastinapur (Delhi) was their target as early as 1736 A.D. Rajasthan came naturally under the sphere of the Maratha expansion. The treatment of of some of the eminent scholars to Maratha Invasions, creates an impression that the Marathas had no other business than to wake one fine morning and move on to raid the peace-loving territories of Rajasthan (4).

There is no use in saying "Whatever might have been the objects of the Maratha expansion there is no doubt that their penetration into Rajasthan and their domination of Mewad was a great calamity. As their power grew and states after states lay prostrate before them, plunder, rapine and ravages became the order of the days. (5) "

Activities of any political power, in the past (or even in the present) have been hardly without objects. Hence treating the political activities excluding the objects of the party involved will scarcely be a complete picture in itself. A scholar who has deliberately selected a particular topic for study is obliged to take all the aspects of the topic into consideration. Hence while dealing with the Maratha-Rajput relations of 18th century, one has to take the Maratha aims and objects into account along-with their faults, otherwise the whole campaign carried on by the Marathas incessantly, year after year, ceases to have any meaning other than the raids of the plunderers.

The present work, I hope, presents a through picture of the changing relationship of the Marathas and the Rajputs, in the 18th century, from mutual friendship to bitter enmity.

The long period of seventy five years is divided into three phases as they appear to me. The first phase (1720 to 1743 A.D.) ends with the death of Sawai Jaysing, the second phase (1743 to 1766 A.D.) ends with the death of Malharrao Holkar and the third, and the last one, ends with the accidental death of the young and promising Peshwa Sawai madhaorao. These three phases constitute the main body of the thesis. At the end I have given my reflections over the Maratha-Rajput relations during 1720 to 1795 A.D.

The first chapter in every phase explains the significance of the particular phase, summarizes the activities during the phase and in short serves as an introduction to the phase.

Before actually starting with the topic, a survey of the past history of the Marathas and the Rajputs has been taken into the introductory first chapter. As I started with origin of the Marathas, I had to give the same treatment in the case of the Rajputs too and hence, I could not avoid the questions of the origin of the Rajput. This introductory chapter, in two parts, serves as a background of the meeting of the Marathas and the Rajputs in first quarter of the 18 century.

The third factor of the Nizam' in the Malwa affair (first phase) so distinctly put up, is a new thing in the Indian History, Dadorao Bhimsen's letter (S.P.D. 13-10) wrongly interpreted by eminent scholar like Dr. Raghuvir, has been given here due treatment for the first time. It has been adequately supplemented by other sources. It was the Nizam, who was aimed at, in calling the Maratha-help in Malwa in 1728 A.D. This work will also clear the objects of Sawai Jaysing in forming friendship with the Marathas. The treatment of Bajirao's Northern expansions gets here a new light in comparison to the works of others who have handled the same topic before me.

The second phase (1743 to 1766 A.D.) opens with the reasons behind the changed attitude of the Rajputs towards the Marathas. It is altogether a new attempt to state the underlying meaning of the political activities concerning Rajasthan after the death of Sawai Jaysing. The second phase covers everything relating to the topic. Particularly I have to draw the attention to the explanation of Malharro's individuality in handling the Northern politics in general and Rajput politics in particular.

During the third phase (1766 to 1795 A.D.) the Maratha Rajput relations reached the highest pitch of rivalry. This phase relates the initial errors of Mahadaji (with reasons) towards the Rajputs in general and Jaypur in particular, the entrapment of Mahadaji, the Lalsot campaign, the miraculous recovery of Mahadji, the comparatively late coming of Tukoji to the scene and the final triumph of Mahadaji over all his rivals. The whole episode resembles the third battle of Panipat (1761 A.D.). I have not given long descriptions of the battles (that are available in Poona residential Correspondence Vol. I) but given as much as was necessary. Sir Jadunath's descriptions of the battle of Patan" (6) and Medta would give one an impression that these battles wre won by De Bolgne alone and that the famous Maratha cavalry, as if, was doing nothing but standing aloof. He nearly omits the part played by the forces (though smaller in number) of Holkar and Ali Bahadur. I have taken all the available accounts of these battles into consideration and described the battles in brief. In fact the descriptions are hardly mine. They are base mainly on the news-reporters, the sources of which have been stated in footnotes.

A historian ought not to be too loose in his language? (7) While criticizing the personalities of the past, because it has come fortunately to his lot to pass judgments on their actions. No body can boast of knowing all the aspects of a particular case. By the end of the third phase we see Tukoji-Patra were exchanged) (8) acting against Mahadaji. Tukoji's actions but I do hope that my exertions will be of use in forming a balanced view in viewing the actions of these two Maratha Sardar. Namely Tukoji and Mahadaji with reference to the Maratha Rajput relations. I do claim that I have been impartial, as far as possible, in dealing with all these intricate polities. One should never forget that Ahillyabai and Tukoji had their own case like Mahadaji. It is for the impartial historian to pass the final remarks.

As for Ali Bahadur, he was simply unfortunate. He had no hand in the Gosawi episode. Once he took the charge of the latter, he defended him against the might of Mahadaji. History does not prove any treachery committed by either Tukoji or Ali Bahadur against Mahadaji at the time of the battles of Patan and Medta in 1790 A.D., even though, the latter is emphatic in placing such a charge against the two. In fact Mahadaji was too shrewd to build his case against Tukoji and Ali Bahadur from the first. Lakheri depicts the tragic end of the House of Holkars brought at the hands of Mahadaji.

The present work goes a long way to prove that the Maratha-Rajput relations is not the story of "plunder, rapine and ravages" but the story of continuous political relationship between the two political powers namely the Rajputs of the North, collectively, and the Marathas of the South. It is neither the history of any 'dark age' nor the history of the factual accounts of the raids and the doubtful accounts of the money exacted. It is in short the political history of the period. I do submit most humbly that the present work tries to approach the problem with a balanced view. It rejects the tradition of the followers of Tod of looking to the Marathas as some-thing free-booters coming from the foreign lands.

Of the dates of letters that I have corrected, I would draw attention to the latter No. 27 of S.P.D. 10. Sardesai gives it to be of 1724 A.D. whereas Dr. Raghuvir states it to be of 1737 A.D. In fact it belongs to 1730 A.D. I have givent the reasons in detail (Appendix to first phase). But the only fact besides others that goes against the date being 1737 A.D. is the mention of Kanhoji Bhosle in the particular letter. Kanhoji was taken a prisoner to Satara by Raghuji Bhosle in 1730 A.D. and he remained in prison after that at Satara till his death (9) How could, under the circumstances, he come in 1737 A.D. to the Nizam as has been Stated in the letter ? I have corrected the dates of other letters too, and stated the reasons for the same in the foot-notes.

In his preface to 'Madhava Rao Sindhia' p.s.H.G.Keena writes, "the omission to cite Tod's Rajasthan may be thought to demand explanation. It is a noble book, full of priceless information and inspired by a fine enthusiasm. But this every inspiration renders the author an unsafe guide in regard to the relations and dealings of the Rajputs with other tribes". I agree fully to this statement and hence have omitted Tod, excepting where he has cited the origined sources. I value the opinion of Rajwade, the famous historian of Maharashtra, that "one cannot believe in a mass of native or foreign Bakhars (10) (cronicles) as he can rely on a single scrap of original material". Hence I have not relied on any of the Marathi or Rajasthani Bakhars. The text of the thesis is based only on original Marathi and Rajasthani sources, and on standard books based on original material.

Regarding the spelling of the proper nouns, I have to state that, as far as possible they are nearer to the original pronunciations. Hence I have written Medta (and not Merta), Shinde (and not Sidhia), Vijaysing and Jaysing (and not Bijesing and Jaising), Mewad (and not Mewar), Marwad (and not Marwar) and so on. I have done this mainly because I see no justfication in writing 'Marwar' when we call it 'Marwad'. But while quoting the extracts from other writers, I have retained the original spellings given by them of these proper nouns.

I have utilized all the Marathi as well as Rajput sources for this work. I have visited for the purpose of study, different libraries and stayed at places like Poona, Jaypur and Bikaner. I have made full use of the University Library of the Nagpur University, Nagpur. The library of my college, - The Sitabi Arts College, Akola, was always at my disposal. I am obliged to all those who have been useful to me in my studies. I also express my sincere gratitude to the Education Officer, University Grants Commission, New Delhi - 1, for the sanction of grant, which made the publication of this book possible.

In the introduction to Marathi Riyasat (Vol. V, Punyashlok Shahu) G.S. Sardesai says, "I have been doing this work of the interpretation (of history) for the last so may years". In the same way I put up this work, most humbly, as a sincere attempt to interprete the dealings of the two brave peoples of India namely the Marathas and the Rajputs with each other, spread over the span of seventy five years.

'Vijayadashmi'
 

Akola
K.A.Acharya

11th October 1978.


Descrption of Foot Notes

(1) 'Later Mughals' Vol. I, p. 42, Mar, Riya. Vol. V (Punya Sholke Shahu) p, 128.

(2) 'Hingne Daftar' I-15.

(3) "The aim behind the activities of these people is simple this. To decrease the income of the Mujahids (Moslems), to inflict injuries on the strength of the Moslems through these off and on harassments, and to deprive the Moslems of the strength to wage jihad." - From the letter of Nizam-ul-Muk (1737 A.D.), Eighteenth Century Deccan, pp, 146 and 147.

(4)"These Marathas, who did not like any other way but looting, were the greatest source of destruction for Mewad" - Veer Vinod, p. 1704. "In Samvat 1792, the Emperor granted the Subhadari of Malwa in the name of Bajirao Peshwa thus the robbers became the masters of the territory." - ibid, p. 1151.

(5) "Mewar and the Maratha relations" K.S.Gupta, in preface, p. viii.

(6) Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. IV. pp. 23 to 25 and 31 to 36, respectively.

(7) See the way how Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes about Tukoji - "Like a vulture which which sees a dying cow from a far, Tukoji Holkar, who had been hovering close the Mathura border without coming to Mahadaji's side, inspite of orders from Poona, now hastened to that city in order to stiffen Ali Bahadur's deflunce of Shinde's authority" . Fall IV p. 11.

(8) Jaypur Draft Kharitas 21 - 54.

(9) 'Nagpur Prantacha Itihasa' by Y. M. Kale, p. 64., Ahwal -I- Khawaquin in "Studies in mAratha History, Vol II , P. 101.

(10) 'Aitnhasik Prastavanas' by V. K. Rajwade p. 4.

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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter I
MAHARASHTRA AND THE MARATHAS


(1) Maharashtra Physiography :

Besides being simple and honest in their habits, Maharashtrians from ancient times (1) have always been brave warrior sufficiently hardy to meet any challenge and tenacious to hold on inspite of unspeakable hardships. That has been their nature for which to a greater extent, the physical conditions of the country are responsible.

"The characteristic features (2) of the Maharashtra country are the great mountain ranges which enclose it on two sides, the Sahyadri range running from north to south, and the Satpura and Vindhya ranges running from east to west, The minor ranges, which break out in rugged outline from these mountain Chains and from the watersheds of many rivers which fall ultimately into the Godavari and into the Krishna, give the whole country an appearance ruggedness and unevenness not to be met with in other parts of India on such a scale. The country thus defined forms a sort of a triangle of which the Sahyadri range and the sea, from Daman to Karwar, form the base, the Satpura range forms the perpendicular side, reaching to the east beyond Nagpur as far as the watershed of the Godavari and its tributaries extend, and the hypotenuse which joins these two ranges has been determined not so much by natural features as by the test of language.

The three (3) distinct physical regions of Maharashtra are: the Kokan, the strip between the Sahyadri and the sea, the Ghatmatha, the country on the top of the ranges, and the Desh, which includes the valleys lower down the river.

With the average rainfall of 100 inches a year in Kokan, which at places is as high as 200 inches, the numerous streams, that carry the water from the Sahyadri to the sea, take the form of mighty swollen rivers in rainy season and make the communication most difficult. The marvel of Ghatmatha is the impregnable forts with which it is studded. They are as many as three hundred, built at different times out of the abrupt flat topped peaks in the Sahyadri ranges. They protect (4) the naturally defensible position of the country and have played an important part in the political history of Maharashtra. The Dash is a vast tract that extends from the Sahyadris in the west to the river Wainganga in the east. The major portion of the Desh is spread over the areas, covered by the river valleys namely: the Purna Tapti valley, the Godawari valley and the Bhima and Krishan valleys. All most all the ancient Capitals of Maharashtra, from Pratishthan of the Andhras to Devgiri of the Yadavas. Are situated here, The Desh can rightly be said to be the cradle of Maharashtra Civilization.

(ii ) The Origin of the Maharashtra and the Marathas :

Maharashtra was called Dandakaranya (5) in ancient times by the Aryan (6) colonists who conquered it and settled down there. The Aryan settlers (7) who were called Ratthas, Maharatthas, or Rashtrakuta, must have been a hardy race in whose character, the best traits of the Aryan settlers from the North, were blended with the best - characteristics of the indigenous stock of western India (8) .In course of time, after they had earned great distinction for wealth, velour, and political power, the land which they had occupied, now began to be called after them as the nation of Maharashtra and their language was known as Maharashtri. An image of Maharatta warrior can be seen in Nane Ghat caves near Junner, which were carved out by the Andhra rulers about the first century before Christ. The present Marathi language is the direct descendent of the Prakrit Maharashtri, the language of Maharashtra (9).

The fifth rock edict (10) of Ashok Maurya (273 to 236 B.C.) mentions the countries of the Rashtrikas and the Aparantas who were his feudatories and to whose dominions; he had sent his -"Dharma Matra". The Ceylonese chronicle (11) Mahavamasa mentions the missions sent after the third Buddist Council at Pataliputa - from which we know that one Rakkhita (Rashtrika) was sent to Vanawasi (afterwards the Capital of Kadamb Kingdom) and a Yona Damma Rakkhita was deputed to Apranta (North Kokan) and Maharakkhita to Maharashtra Country. In the cave temples(12) of Maharashtra, which began to be excavated about the middle of first century before Christ, we find among the list of donors, Princes and Chiefs, who call themselves Mahabhojas and Maharathis. In the great case temple of Kara, the lion pillar in the Court near the entrance was scooped out by a Maharathi name d Agimitra. "Varaha - Mihir (13), a famous astronomer of the sixth century, used the word Maharashtra, which later came to be corrupted into Mahratta or Maratha”. Hiuen-Tsang (14) speaks Pulakeshi as the great kshatriya king of Maharashtra. (Mo-ho-la-cha), Rajeshkar (15) a Sanskrit author of the nineth century, used Marahatti (Marathi) in the feminine gender. The poet Jayamangal (16)who lived in twelfth century, clearly defines the geographical limits of Maharashtra as follows : "Dî£b ¥TDbDàaîÇàC î"bÙbý> <ëáà " Maharashtra is the name of country between the river Narmada and the province of Karnatak

(iii) Ancient Glory and the Subsequent Fall :

In the confused state of affairs, that followed the death of Ashok Maurya(17) , Simukh the first king of the Satavahanas, overthrowing the Northern hegemony, laid down the foundation at Pratishtan at about two hundred thirty B.C. of the first great Empire of Maharashtra. The Puranas, list the names of Thirty kings, that ruled altogther for four centuries and a half. The most famous among them were Gautami Putra Shatakarni (80 to 104 A.D) and yadnyashri Shatakarni. The former, by overthrowing Nahapan, earned the fame as the destroyer of the Shakas, Pahlavas, and Yawanas, whereas, the figure of a ship on the coins of the latter clearly indicates that his rule was not restricted to land alone. At its greatest extent (18) the Satavahan Empire covered the whole of Decean and spread far in to the North as far as Magadha. Under the long rule of the Satvahanas the country entered a period of great industrial and commercial activities. The west (19) and the east coasts were studded with ports like Bhadoch, Sopara and Kalyan, from where trade was carried on to the Malay penisula and eastern archipelago. The properity gave impetus to art and literature, athe glimpses of which can even today be visualised in the wonderful caves at Nasik, Karla, Bhaja and Kanheri.

With the exist of the Satavahanas(20) by the beginning of the third century, the Vakatakas, the Abhiras and the Traikutakas rose to power in the middle of third century, the Wakatakas being the most powerful among them. Pravarsena I was the first great king of the Vakatakas. He performed four ashwamedhas and all the seven Soma sacrifices. Thereafter the assumed the unique Imperial Title 'Samrat'. The Vakatakas were contemporary to the Imperial Guptas. Chandragputa II vikramaditya gave one of his daughers, Prabhawati Gupta to the Vakataka king Rudrasena II. The last great king of the Vakatakas was Harisena. He made extensive conquests from Lata (Southern Gujrat) and the Malwa in the North to Karnataka in the South. In the middle of the sixth century, the Chalukyas of Watapi (Badami in Vijapur District) rose to power. The most powerful of them was Satyashraya Pulakeshi Ii (610 to 642 A.D), during whose reign, the chinese traveller Hiuen-Tsang (21) visited Maharashtra. About the king he observed 'The king in consequences of possessing these men (The Marathas) and elephants, treats his neighbours with contempt. His plans and Undertaking are widespread, and his beneficient actions are felt over a great distance. His subjects obey him with perfect submission." Under Pulakeshi Ii Maharashtra was so powerful that the great Shiladitya (Harsha Vardhana) was unable to sub due him inspite of the fat that his troops came from the five indis, and he had conquered the most of Northern India, "from east to west, and carried his army to remote districts". Not only this but according to Aihole>(22) inscription, in this battle which crushing defeat on the great Harsha, destroying his army of innumerable elephants. The Chalukyas in their turn were succeeded by another powerful dynasty, the Rashkutas, who ruled Maharashtra during about 750 to 975 A.D. Their rule is the most brilliant epoch in the whole history of ancient Maharashtra. Dhruva (23) (779 to 793 A.D.) and Govind III (793 to 814 A.D.) were the greatest kings of the Rashtrakutas, who not only subdued the Deccan but wrested Kanauj, the capital made famous by Harsha Vardhana in the first half of seventh century, by defeating in the trianguler contest the Gurjara Pratiharas and the Palas. Indra III (915 to 917 A.D.) and Krishan III (939 to 963 A.D.) were also equally great kings who revived the glory of Dhruva and Govind III. Sulaiman (24), the Arab merchant who traveled in the Western India in the middle of ninth century, mentions the Rashtrakuta ruler Amoghavarsha I as one of the four greatest rulers of the world, the other three being the Caliph of Bagadad, the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Constantinople. During the reign of Krushna I (756 to 768 A.D.) the magnificent specimen of Hindu art and the veritable wonder of the world, the Kailas temple was excavated at Verula, out of the solid rock. The Rashtrakutas were followed by the Later Chajukyas who in turn ruled for some two hundred years (during 975 to 1189 A.D.) from their Capital Manyakhet and Kalyani. Then came the Yadavas of Deogiri (the hill abode of Gods) who reigned for over one hundred years (from 1187 to 1294 A.D.)

During these years Marathi language had gradually evolved almost imperceptible from Prakrit Maharashtri and had reached The stage of perfection (25), During these years the save temples of Ajantha, Verula and the rest had been excavated. They were the symbol of the past peace and prosperity, artistic excellence, worldly grandeur, religious amity and the peak of creative activities of the people who had lived in the age of abundance that was based on the sound foundation of thriving trade and commerce. With the background of such remarkable heritage, Raja Ramdeo (26) of the dynasty of the Yadavas, the name made famous by Shri Krishan, was ruling at Deogiri with justice as per the Hindu way of religion and custom. The whole structure seemed as perfect and as sound as the 'Hamadpanti' stone temples, a new style of architecture, named after the famous Yadava Minister Hemadri..

Astonishingly enough, the whole structure collapsed like a house of cards with the contact of the first Turk adventurer from the North, who came with only seven thousand horse in 1294 A.D (27). His strength and tacties proved more than enough to destroy the power and prestige of Ramdeo who saved himself for the time being by paying ahuge indemnity and accepting the humiliating subordinate position. But this was only the beginning of the end, which soon followed in 1318 A.D. when Mubarak Khalji flayed alive Harpaldeo, the last of the independent line of the ancient kings of Maharashtra. The ancient world simbolised by Pratishtahn, Shurparak, Kalyani, Manyakhet, Watapipur, Vinawasi and Deogiri, all of a sudden came to an end and a new rule alien in race, religion, culture, and way of life totally unsympathetic to the way of the people of Maharashtra was established in the country. This Muslim rule(28) was so firmly and so soon established and the Yadava lineage was so thoroughly cut off that no Yadava price or any Yadava Chief like KapayaNayaka, Somdeo Chaulkya or any Harihar or Bukka, could take the advantage of the disruption of the Delhi Sultanate in Decean after 1730 A.D. that was much due to the freedom movement which was partly religious(29) and partly political. As a result of this movement by 1736 A.D., excepting Maharashtra, the rest of the Deccan including Telangana, Andhara, Karnataka and Pandya Desh (Mabar - at first under the Muslim rule(30) which was submerged in to Vijaya Nagar Empire by 1770 A.D.) slipped out of the Muslim rule and became independent. But no such sign of political life was visible in Maharashtra, which looked passively to a few foreign Musalmans establishing a Bahamani kingdom(31) at Daulatabad in 1347 in defiance of the might of the Delhi Sultan Muhammad Tughlak.

Under the foreign Bahamanis, the people were completely cowed down. Positions of the power and trust were monopolised by the Muhammedans. The sultans(32) hardly cared for their subjects Famines like the one known as "Durga Devi Famine" (33) (1392 to 1404 A.D.) carried away lakhs of people. The Russian merchant Athanasium (34) Nikitin who lived in Bidar during 1470 to 1474 A.D. records: "The land is overstocked with people, but those in the country are very miserable, whilst the nobles are extremely opulent and delight in luxury. They are wont to be carried on their silver beds, preceded by some twenty men on horse back and by five hundred on foot and by horsemen, ten torchbearers and musicians ".

May of the Bahamani Sultans were fanatics and they tried to spread Islam by razing temples and building masques in their places, Even the liberal Mahamud Gawan the famous Minister of Bahamani can not escape from the charge of religious Bigotry. In his Ministership(36) the Bahamani troops levelled the city and the temples of Kanchipuram.

(iv) The Spiritual Upheaval of Bhakti Pantha :

The loss of independence was followed by the loss of social status for the Hindus. But the situation was still aggravated when the Muslim power tried to spread its religion by raising the temples to ground and building masques in their places and forcing the people by converting them to Islam. Clearly the religion was in danger(37) and the society was helpless to defend it. At such critical times it was the Bhakti movement that kept up the morale of the society. This movement was carried by the saints, the followers of 'Bhagawat - Dharma(38), from Saint.

Dyanadeo to Tukaram. Especially(39) during fiteenth and sixteenth centuries it was in fact a religious, social and literary revival, based on the spirit of Hindu brotherhood, through love and faith in God Vithoba of Pandharpur. "These saints and writers(40) were mostly men of learning and experience, - having widely travelled on pilgrimage through India on foot and gained first hand information of local occurrences which they often actually witnessed. They delivered orations and held Hari Kirtans and supported the spiritual background to political aims of workers like Shivaji. They made ardent and piteous appeal to God Almighty on behalf of the oppressed peoples and bring them relief from Muslim persecution. " As the followers of common Bhagwat Dharma, all loved one another and a spiritual Hindu brotherhood thus came into existence, having the Vithoba at their head, spreading love and eternal happiness to his Bhaktas. The poor and oppressed, thus forgetting the wordly miseries faced their lot with a happy and contended frame of mind. Such was the spiritual defiance(41) put up by the saints to the foreign Muslim rulers of Deccan, who ultimately failed to realize their goal(42) .

(v) The effect of the disruption of the Bahamany Kingdom :

Unlike the Northern Muslim power at Delhi, the Bahamany kingdom was separated by a great distance from their base Camp beyond the North-Western frontier. Hence the Turks, Arabs, the Persians and the Mongals were not regularly recruited(43) from time to time. But the foreign Musalmans, though less in number as compared to the Deccan Musalmans in the Sultan's service, monopolised(44) the higher posts in civil and military offices. This gave rise to a rivalry between them and the local Deccani Musalmans. Besides, the situation was aggravated by the haughty attitude of these foreigners who looked down upon the Deccans as totally inferior(45) to them. The result of such a rivalry(46) was the bloody feud in which the Decanis party slew some 1200 Sayyads and about 1000 other foreigners in 1453 A.D. This was the signal of the dissolution of the Bahamany kingdom itself, which took place after the execution of Mahamud Gawan, the last great victim of this rivalry in 1581 A.D. Nothing could then stop the disruption of the kingdom hereafter and the five branches of the Bahamany came into existence in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

The fall of Bahamanis in Deccan synchronized with the establishment of a powerful Muslim dynasty under Babar in 1526 A.D. at Delhi. His grandson Akbar became the master of the whole of the Northern india by 1595 A.D. Next year he invaded Ahmadnagar and with the Session of Berar(47) by Chandbibi the conquest of the Deccan by the Mughals began.

The Bahamanis never cared to win over the affection of their Hindu subjects and their policy in general was to keep them aloof from the positions of power and trust. But with the creation of five Sultanates in the first quarter of sixteenth century, with their mutual jealousies and with the impending danger from the north by the end of sixteenth century, the entire aspect of the question was changed. Now the Sultanates were obliged to enlist the Hindus in civil and later on in military services. At the same time, with the defeat of the Hindu Empire of Vijaynagar at Rakshasi Tangdi in 1565, at the hands of the Muslim confederates, the capital of Vijayanagar began to shift south - wards from Vijayanagar to Penukonda and later on to chandragiri. The Maratha Chiefs, enlisted in the service of Vijayanagar, unwilling(48) to move southwards, returned to Maharashtra and offered their services to the Sutans of Ahmedanagar, Vijapur and Gowalkonda.

(VI) The revival:

"The Marathas(49) as a people doubles possessed in their van high blood and noble tradition derived through ages from their royal ancestors such as the Mauryas, the Rashtrakutas, the Chalukyas and the Yadavas, not to mention the more recent additions to the original stock by the arrivals from time to time of north Indian Rajput tribes such as the Paramars (Ghorpades, the Mohites, the Mahadiks, the Gujars, the Shirkes, the Sawants, the Ghates, the Manes, the Dafles, the various Deshmukh of he Mawals, several of whom adopted new surnames, in some cases from the place they occupied in the Daccan and from other sources.

" The Marathas(50), in general the descendents of the Aryan Kshatriya stock, had become formidable soldiers and worriers with the experience of war-fare between the Vijaynagar and the Mohemedan powers, for some two hundred years (1347 to 1565) before their entry into services of the Sultanates in the latter half, and the beginning of 17th Century. Their valuable exertions were soon appreciated and they rose to prominence. The employment as the soldiers gave them dignity and status and their bands both cavalry and infantry formed a respectable army under the Sultanates while opposing the Mughals. As they became indispensable to the Sultans, they became assertive and called themselves 'Rajes' and with the formidable forts in the Ghats or elsewhere they became virtually masters of their Jahagirs.

The penetration of Deccan, begun by Akbar at the end of 16th century, was carried on with great vigor by his successors from Jahagir to Aurangazeb. The importance of the Marathas was still raised, when they rallied forth for the defense of the sultans. It was in the defence of Niazmshahi that the genius of Shahaji Bhosale shone brilliently at Bhatwadi(51) in Novemeber 1624 in support of Malik Ambar. He continued the defence of Nizamshahi, even after the death of Malik Amber, against the odds and had been nearly successful(52) in creating a dominion for him in the Sahyadris in 1733 under a thin veil of Nizamshahi. Through unsuccessful he was fortunate enough to see his mission carried on to completion under his eyes by his able so Shivaji.

The scattered elements of the Maratha chiefs, needed self realization only and the time at last was ripe. Keeping before them, such lofty ideal(53) as the restoration of Hindu empire in Hindustan and pursuing it with singleness(54) of purpose against the mighty Mughal empire and the two Muslim Kingdoms and the host of others Hindu chiefs like Chandrarao More, who could not even dream of an independent Hindu Kingdom, he achieved the object which was felt as something imaginary at the beginning (55).

No nation is built abruptly. It was invitable culmination of the proud heritage of the glorious past, with the political as well as military experiences that the Marathas had acquired during the previous three centuries in the services of Vijaynagar and the three off-shoots of Bahamani namely Ahmadnagar, Vijapur and Gowalkonda, backed by the spiritual upheaval of the Bhakti movement and the natural defenses of the Western Ghats. As a result, a Hindu Kingdom, with Chhatrapati Shivaji at the helm, was established at Raygarh in 1674 A.D.

(vi) The nation successfully faces the Catastrophe :

After Shivaji's death, Sambhaji succeeded in securing the Maratha throne in 1680 A.D. He received the fugitive prince Muhammad Akbar, who was in rebellion against his father Aurangzeb. The Emperor, realizing the gravity of the danger, concluded peace with the Rajput Rana of Udaypur with whom he was at war, and marched southwards, for the subjugation of Deccan to fulfil the task begun by his great grand father Akbar. He reached Aruangabad on 1st of April 1682 A.D.

Within five years, he was successful in destroying the two remaining off shoots of Bahamani Kingdom namely Vijapur and Gowalkonda in September 1686 A.D. respectively. Next came the turn of the Maratha Chhatrapati who was captured(56) and tortured to death in March 1689 A.D. Soon Rajgadh, the Capital of Marathas was captured with Sambhaji's family in 1690 A.D.(57)

Thus it appeared that Aurangzeb had been successful (58) in his mission. The whole country(59) from Narmada to Tungabhadra lay at his feet. It seemed as if Shivaji and the men whom he had led to victory, had lived and died in vain. The great deluge against which Shivaji and Shahaji had strugged to protect the country for over sixty years, now swept over the land carrying every thing before it and there seemed no sign of any possible resistance. "But the efforts(60) of the great Shivaji had not been lost in vain. The marathas had in fact not been cowed down, as the Emperior had supposed. It was in fact the beginning of his end. With spirit undaunted(61) and courage that never failed, the Marathas fought against the whole of the resources of the Mughal Empire brought to bear against them with renewed vigour. It soon became people's war (62) and the determined and the prolonged efforts of Aurangzeb proved futile against the united will of the people. This long - drawn and terrible war of 25 years ate up his whole resources and his grand army(63) was beaten down completely in the long run. Finally he succumbed to the inevitable and died a broken hearted man in his camp at Ahmnadnagar on 20th February 1707 A.D, "No curtain ever dropped on a more woeful tragedy.

(VII) The down of the new era :

After, the death of Aurangzeb, prince Azam (64) marched northwards, with the remaining grand army, for the impending Civil war had broken out. To create diversion amongst the Marathas he released Shahu (65) in Malwagranting him Chauth and Sardeshmukhi over the six Deccan Subhas, namely Khandesh, Berar, Aurangabad, Bedar, Hydrabad and Vijapur, Shahu was also appointed Governor of Gondwana, Gujarat and Tanjor. As expected by the Mughals, Tarabai refused to surrender the claims of her son and prepared to resist Shahu till last. Shahu, however, was successful in capturing Satara, the seat of the Maratha Kingdom, where he was crowned as the Chhatrapati on 12th January 1708 A.D. For this as well as for the subsequent events of national importance, Shahu was fortunate in getting the services of Balaji Vishwanath, whom he made his Peshwa in 1713 A.D.

The nation had stood the trials of unspeakable harships and won the life and death struggle against the Mughals but at a very high cost. Law and Order had disappeared from the county. A rival Chhatrapati (66) at Kolhapur was a constant source of divided loyalties with the encouragement of the Muslim Subhadar at Aurangabad for his own profit. Shahu's rule was practically confined to his Capital and a few hill forts and the remaining country was in a state of anarchy. The Peshwa was successful in suppressing the free boaters who were unwilling to submit to the discipline of the State, but the rest of the powerful Maratha Chiefs were virtually independent. Thus the great victory over the Mughals would have been nothing but calamity with the separatist tendencies at full play, if no national aim with full opportunities for diversing the energies, would have been supplied. And fortunately the opportunity for the necessary diversion did some.

Farrukh Siyar (67) came to throne on 17th January 1713 A.D. defeating Jahandar Shah (the successor of Bhadur Shah) mainly with the help of Sayyad brothers - Sayyed Abdulla and Sayyad Husain Ali. The six years of his regime are the momentous years that afforded the Marathas the needed outlets to expand in all directions beyond their national limits. The reason was the changing politics at the Delhi Court where the fickle - minded, suspicious and cowardly Emperor kept on plotting incessantly for the ruin of his powerful ministers who had been mainly the cause of his success.

From the very commencement of his regime a party hostile to Sayyad brothers, was formed at the Court by the Emperor's personal favorites and attendant who tried at every step to hinder the administration of the Sayyad brothers. At last tired of the recurring plotting followed by submission on the part of the Emperor who was devoid of any consistency to his own promises, the ministers removed Mir-Jumla, the chief instigator, to the viceroyalty of Bihar and in return Husain Ali, agreed to leave the Court as a viceroy of Deccan.

Daudkhan Pani (68) had governed the Mughal Deccan since 1708 A.D. as the deputy of Zulfikar Khan, who was assassinated at the hands of Farrukh Siyar in 1713 A.D. Nizam-ul-Mulk bahadur Fath Jang was then appointed to the government of Deccan, Daud Khan being transferred to Gujarat, in July 1713 A.D.

Now, to make room for Hussain Ali (69), the Nizam-ul-Mulk, was transferred to the insignificant Faujdari of Moradabad in 1715 A.D., much against his will. The Nizam belonged to Turani group that was opposed to Sayyad brothers and hence it is no wonder that when Hussain Ali and the Nizam passed through Malwa, no customary formality of exchanging visits as brother officers was observed. The antagonism between the Emperor and his ministers i.e. the Sayyad brothers, had reached such a ptich, that the former called upon Daud Khan Pani from Gujarat to march against the Sayyad and finish him off. As a result, the Sayyad met him in a deadly combat near Burhanpur on 26th August 1715 A.D., in which Daud Khan was killed and the Sayyad came out victorious. But due to this open act of hostility on the part of the Emperor, Husain Ali in Deccan and his brother Abdulla at Delhi felt their very existence threatened. They were compelled, henceforth, to act according to the instinct of self-preservation. This very fact is most important from the Maratha standpoint, since it is concerned with the moulding of their policy towards Delhi in the near future.

Husain Ali (70) strenuously tried for two years, to check Maratha inroads in Baglan and Khandesh but since he found that he stood in great danger in between the treacherous master at Delhi and the turbulent Maratha in South, he had to reverse his policy towards the Marathas and instead of opposing them he had to stretch his hand for their friendship.

The terms agreed upon by both the parties at Satara were (71):

(1) That all the territories known as Shivaji's Swarajya together with the forts therein, should be delivered to Shahu in full possession.

(2) That such territories as had been recently conquered by the Marathas in Khandesh, Berar, Gondwana, Haidrabad and Karnatak should also be ceded to them as part of the Maratha Kingdom.

(3) That the Marathas should be allowed to collect Chauth and Sardeshmukhi from all the six Mughal Subhas in the South. In return for the Chauth the Marathas were to serve the Emperor with a Contingent of 15 thousand troops for his protection. In return for the Sardeshmukhi the Maratha were to be responsible for maintaining order by preventing robbery and rebellion.

(4) That Shahu should do no harm to Sambhaji of Kolhapur.

(5) That the Marathas should make a cash payment annually of ten lakhs of Rupees to the Emperor by way of tribute, and lastly.

(6) That the Emperor should release and send back from Delhi Shahu's mother Yeshubai, his wife and his brother Maddening with all followers that were detained there.

The Emperor(72) did not approve of the whole transaction. He realized the danger he was running into by antagonizing the powerful Sayyads and hastily called back to his presence Nizam-ul-Mulk from Moradabad. Sarbuland Khan from Patna and Ajitsing from Gujarat. Thereupon Sayyad Abdulla sent urgent calls to his brothers to repair to the Capital from the South without a moment's delay.

Husain Ali left Aurangabad with the Maratha contingent of 15 thousand troops in November 1718 A.D. and reached Delhi on 16th February Farrukh Siyar was deposed and another Shahjada was put up on the throne.

The most important fact to be noted in this revolution is that, Ajitsing of Marwad sided with the Sayyad brothers along with the Marathas(73). The Nizam kept silence for the time being and got the government of Malwa as the price for his neutrality. As soon as the palace revolution was over the Sayyads prepared formal grants(74) for the three items of Swarajya, Chauthai, and Sardeshmukhi and delivered them at Balaji, duly ratified under the imperial seal (March 1719 A.D.) Shahu's mother and the rest of the party in confinment at Delhi, for the last 12 years, were released and delivered over.

These  Sanads(75) were utilized most diplomatically as the base for expansion all over India by the Marathas. It provided exactly the due facilities that they required. An orderly government for Shahu's Swarajya came to be immediately organized, the divided loyalties came to an with an immensely vast field that was made available to them and all this was accomplished within a short period of twelve years from the death of Aurangzeb who could have never dreamt that the insignificant Marathas from the Deccan hillocks would play such a significant part in a revolution at Delhi, so soon after his death.

A new era providing the best opportunities had dawned for the enterprising Marathas. Delhi, supposed to be far off hitherto, came within their sight and 'towards North' soon became the watchward under the next inspiring young Peshwa Bajirao I, who was invested with the robes of the first minister by Chhatrapati Shahu on 17th April 1720 A.D., after the death of his father Balaji Vishwanath.


Foot Notes (Description)

(1) "This country is about 5000 li in circuit. The capital boarders on the west on a great river. It is about 30 li round. The soil is rich and fertile, it is regualrly cultivated and very productive. The climate is hot, the disposition of the people is honest and simple, they are fall of stature, and of a stern, vindictive character. To their benefactor they are grateful, to their enemies relentless. If thy are insulted, they will risk their life to savage themselves. If they are asked to help one in distress, are going to seek revenge, they first give their enemy warning, then each being armed they attack each other with lances, When one turns to flee, the other pursues him, but they do not kill a man down (a person who submits). The country provides for a band of champions to the number of several hundred. Each time they are about to engage in conflict, they intoxicate themselves with wine, and then one man with lance in hand will meet ten thousand and challenges them in fight. " Destruction of Maharashtra and the Marathas in the first half of seventh century "Travels of Hiuen Tsang, " Vol. IV, Samual Beal, P, 449.

(2)Rise of the Maratha Power - P. s.

(3)

(4)

(5)  The Maharashtra region was known as Dandakraya - the Dandak forest - with lot of aboriginal people living in it,.. This region extended southwards up to and beyond Krishna and northwards into the forest belt of Central India "Maharashtra State Gazetteer ". I-P. 5.

The Maharashtrian Brahmins even today chant the Mantra " ³bC£bëàb ¦cÙC ÈaÙC £·Ô>¥TbÙ·à £C~C " at the time of their worship. Those who live, to the South of Godawari change " £<[L " for " ¦cÙC " in the said Mantra. It is very clear that the country to the North and South of Godawari was Dandakaranya.

(6) Dr. bhandarkar places the Aryan penetration into Deccan, after the beginning of the seventh Century B.C. Early History of Dekkhan, third edition, P. 16, whereas K.A. Nilkanth Sastri places the starting points of this Aryanlraota, some where about 1000 B.C. in his history South India, p, 70.
(7) (7) Early History of Dekkan, p. 20. New Hist, I.P. 19.

(8)(8) "All over Inida, the foundations of Indian culture were laid - down by the fusion of Indo-Aryans and pre-Aryan elements. The Marathas of the western Dekkan are the southern most of the Indo-Aryan speaking people" - The Hist. Of the South India, K.A.N. Sastri, p. 2.

(9)(9) Early Hist. Of Dekkan, pp. 6,21. New Hist, I-PP, 17,18 and 19.

(10)(10) A pepp into the early hist of India, Sir R.G.Bhandarkar, p. 14.

(11) (10) Early Hist. Of Dekkhan, p, 20 - A Hist. of South Inida, K.A.N. Sastri, P. 84, 'Pracheen Mahrashtra', Dr. S.V.Ketkar, P. 23.

(12) (11) A peep in to the early History - P. 45.

(13)New Hist. I-P. 17, Pracheen Maharashtra, Dr.S.V.Ketkar, P. 23.

(14)(14) Travels of Hiuen-Tsang, Vol. P. 450.

(15)(15) New Hist. I-P. 17, Pracheen Maharashtra, Dr. S.V.Ketkat, P. 33.

(16)(16) The Background of the maratha renaissance, N.K.Behere - P. 19

(17)(17) "A critical discussion of the available evidence thus shows that the Satavhanas rose to power, in the last quarter of the third century B.C., soon after the death of Ashok". - Maharashtra. State Gazetter I-P. 63. Also India in the time of Patanjali, P. 64.

(18) A History of South India, K.A.N. Sastri ,p. 92

(19)(19) Ibid -PP. 97,98.

(20)(20) A history of South India-P. 99, Gazetteer of Maharashtra - I, PP. 102, 123.

(21)(21) Travels of Hiuen-Tsang, V.VI. Sammel Beal, P.450.

(22)(22) Maharashtra State Gazetteer - I, PP. 212,213.

(23)(23) A History of South India, - PP. 158,159.

(24)(24) The age of Imperial Kanauj, R.C. Majumdar, P. 17

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(26)

(27) New Hist. I, P. 31.

(28) "In this way all the work of the great builders of Chandragupta Maurya to Ramdeo of Deogiri covering a period of some sixteen and a half centuries, was undone within less than a quarter of century, an extra ordinary phenomenon for which no parallel can be found in the history of the world " . New Hist. I - P. 32.

(29) A Hist. of South India - P. 236.

(30)A Hist. of South India - P. 266.

(31) But it should be remembered that even though the Desh passed under the foreign rule, the Ghatmatha and the Kokan were not conquerered thoroughly till September, 1470 by Mahamud Gawan - Rise of Muhammadan Power, Farishta, V. II - PP. 120, 121.

(32) The Cambridge Hist. of India, V. III - P. 432.

(33) Shivaji the founder of Maratha Swaraj, C.A. Vaidya, PP. 7, 8. The Barkground of Maratha Renaissance - P. 432.

(34) A Hist. of South India, K.A.N. Sastri - P. 261. The Cambridge Hist. of India V. III - P. 432.

(35)  "Between 1347 and 1518 the throne was occupied by fourteen Sultans. All the sovereigns who attained maturity were blood-thirty fanaties - It would be difficult to specify and definite benefit conferred upon India by the Dynasty - The Oxford History of India - P. 288.

(36) Rise of the Muhammadan power in India V. II, Farshta - PP. 130,131. Hist. of South India - P. 257. "The Minister was devout Sunni Muslim, as ruthless as any one else in slaying and despoiling idolater". - The Oxford History of India - p. 287.

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" The people are completely crushed (by the Muslim rule). There is dire poverty in the land and no ray of hope is visible, Hindu women are molested, raped and sold as slaves in far off countries. Crops failed and villages have been devastated. People fled from their homes in abject misery and several died of starvation. Every thing is taken away and only the country remained. It is a calamity for all and there is no escape from it. When the low born became masters, the religion comes to an end who cares then for the learned brahimin". - Saint Ramdas.

(38)

(39) The Rise of the Maratha Power - p. 5.

(40) New Hist. I - P. 38.

(41) The Story of Saint Eknath of Paithan (15th Century) may explain the state of affairs prevailing in Maharashtra under the foreign rule. While on his way back from Godawari, one day after his bath, as usual, a certain Muslim officer spat on him from the gallery. The saint went back to the river and again took a dip. But this he had to perform innumberable times. At last, it is said the officer got tired and begged pardon of Eknath. A visitor to Paithan can still witness the house of the Muslim Officer at Paithan, reminding one the incident.

(42)"The Bahamani Sultans failed in the attrocious attempt made more than once by the members of the dynasty to exterminate the population of the Hindu State of Deccan or in default of extermination to drivee it by force into the fold of Islam. They succeeded in killing a hundreds of thousand of men, women an children and in making considerable members converts but inspit of all their efforts, the population continued to be Hindus in the main." Oxford History of India- PP. 289,290.

(43) Rise of the Maratha Power - P. 12.

(44)A Hist. of the South India - P. 251.

(45) "Malik - Tujar Khalaf Hasan Basri, the Governer of Daulatabad and the leader of the foreigners, declared his readliness to take to field (against Nasir Khan of Khandesh) if he was given foreign troops and no Deccans" - A Hist. of the South India - P. 252.

(46) Rise of Muhammadan Power in India, V. II - PP. 93 to 95 the Oxford Hist. of India - P. 284.

(47)Akbar the great Mughal by V.A. Smith, p. 266.

(48)The back ground of Maratha renaissance P. 146.

(49) New Hist. V. I - P. 42.

(50) The back ground of Maratha Renaissance, PP. 145 to 148.

(51)New Hist. I - PP. 60,61,66.

(52)Badashah Nama in E.D. Vol. 7, PP. 51,58 to 60.

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Shivaji's seal as early as 1645 New. Hist I - P. 111.

(54) "My armies were employed against him for nineteen years but nevertheless, his state has been always increasing". The Cambridge Hist. Vol. IV. P. 279.

(55) 'Adnya Patra, Chapter - I, PP-3, 4.

(56)Vakil Reports I, 172. Vakil Reports H, 266. Muni. Lubab in E.P. vol VII P. 342

(57) Vakil Reports, II, 153,154,345.

(58) Ibid, 240 - "Informing the maharana that the Deccan affair was over and therefore imperial camp was returning to Hindusthan."

(59) Rise of the Maratha Power - pp. 78,79.

(60) "The territories and treasures, however which Shivaji acquired were not so formidable to the Mohammedans as the example he had set, the system and habits he introduced and the spirit he had infused into a large proportion of the Maratha people" - Grant Duff. I - P. 254.

(61) Munt Lubab in E.D. pp. 346, 347.

(62) "The Emperor Khuldmakan (Aurangzeb) poured the treasures of these (Bengal and the other provinces of northern India) provinces in this compaign. He captured the forts of the Marathas and established thanas (Out-posts) in that area.

(63) Ibid, PP. 355 to 358.

(64) Ibid, P. 394.

(65)Ibid, P. 295.

(66) S.P.D. - 96 to 110. New Hist. I, P. 30 Hist of India, Elephantine, p. 604.

(67) Munt. Lubab in ED. Vol, VII, PP. 440,443,447,448,571. New Hist. Vol. II, P. 37.

(68) Munt, Lubab in E.D. Vol, VII, P. 442, New Hist, Vol II, P. 38.

(69) Munt. Lubab in E.D. Vol. VII P. 451 to 454, Hist. of India, Elephantine, P. 603.

(70) Munt. Lubab in E.D. Vol, VII, P. 463,464., New Hist. Vol. II - P. 44, Hist of India, Elephantine, P. 605.

(71)Munt. Lubab in E.D. Vol. VII, PP. 467., New Hist. Vol. II - P. 47. Rise of the Maratha Power, p. 85. Hist of India, Elphinstone, p. 605.

(72) Munt. Lubab in E.D. Vol. VII, PP. 469 to 472.

(73)Ibid, pp. 472 to 478.

(74) Later Mughals Vol, I, PP. 406, 407, Mar. Riya. Vol. V.P. 146.

(75) Mar. Riya. Vol, V, P. 174.

http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/intro1.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[quote]Chapter II

RAJASTHAN AND THE RAJPUTS


(1) Rajasthan - Physiography (1) :

Rajasthan comprises the area between 23rd degree to 30th degree North latitude and 68th degree to 78th East longitude. The earliest reference to Rajasthan is in connection with its agidity. The word Maru is found in Rugwed the Mahabharat (Vanaparva, 201.41) and Brahatsamhita.

Aravalli range runs through Rajasthan, northeast to southwest, for about 430 miles, starting from Delhi (known as Delhi ridge) and extending to Ahmadabad. The word Aravalli, is derived from Ada-vala, meaning "a beam lying across". In the past, the entire length of this range was a complete barrier to all kinds of movements from east to west. But today the effectiveness of the barrier is felt only in the Central and Southern parts.

Aravalli forms the backbone of Rajasthan, dividing it into two regions, with clearly distinguishable features. On its west and north lies the arid plain and on its east and southeast lie plains and forests. Besides being a source to rivers like the Khari, the Gambhari the Banas and the Luni, Aravalli hills have afforded sites to the various forts like Jalor, Sanchor, Bhinmal, Siwana, Mandowar, Jodhput etc. in Western Rajasthan and Chitod, Mandowar, Mandalgadh, Rampura, Ranathambhor, Bundi, Kota, Amer, Alwar etc. in the Eastern Rajasthan. The part played by these forts in the past History of Rajasthan is very well known. No history of Rajasthan can be written without the proper mention of them.

(a) Eastern Rajasthan :

MEWAT :- From Delhi to Narnaul and Khetri, a few scattered mounds, hardly above two hundred feet, rise here and there. But from Khetri to |Ringus they take the regular from of a mountain range. This part of the north east of Rajasthan is called 'Mewat' where the hills rise to a uniform height of two thousand feet. The river Bangana  which rises from Arravalli hills north of Ringus, and falls into Banas, divides Mewat from Dhundbad.

DHUNDHAD :- From Ringus to Ajmer the range is again disconnected. Here lies the Sambhar salt lake, about thirty seven miles west of Jaipur, From Amer hills near Jaypur rises the Dhundu river that falls into Banas. This is 'Dhundhad' region. To the south of Dhundhad lies 'Hidauti' comprising of Bundi, Kota and Jhalawar. To the east flows the river Chambal dividing it from the Madhya-Bharat-Pathar and to the Soth-West lies Ajmer-Merwada.

AJMER-MERWADA :- To the south of Sambhar the Aravalli Hills rise again at Pushkar and Ajmer to a height of two thousand to three thousand feet and continue thus for a long distance, dividing effectively the western 'Marushtali' from east Rajasthan.

Ajmer held strategically key position being situated at the central place of Marwad, Mewad and Dhundhad. All the roads from Sindha and Marwad, from Malwa and Mewad and from Hadauti and Dhundhad, passed through the 'Ghat' of Ajmer. Thus, being the key post of Rajasthan it was made the central place of the Subha by the Mughals after whose fall it was a coveted post by both the Marathas and the Rathods in the latter half of 18th century.

MEWAD, HADAUTI AND BAGAD :- The portion of Rajasthan than lying east of Aravalli and to the south of the river Khari forms an upland ranging from 750 to 1500 feet. This is a hilly tract studded with tanks and watered by Banas and many of its tributaries. The Banas rised from the Eastern flank of Aravalli near Kumbhalgad and after flowing for a major part through Mewad enters Dhundhad (Jaypur) territory and thus after flowing for about two hundred fifty miles from its Source it joins the Chambal at Rameshwar. The rivers Berach and Kothari join the Banas near Madalgadh and the Khari near Deoli.

East of Udaypur, the Aravalli range traverses in a semicircle line towards Pratapagadh and Jawara and further runs southward to join hands with the range coming from Malwa. Another range starting from Nimach runs parallel to the main Aravalli range towards northeast direction dividing the valley of Banas from that of Chambal.

This is Mewad  which comprises the eastern upland territory between the main range of Aravalli and the parallel range covering the valley of Banas. The word Mewad is derived from the Sanskritised name Medapata and reminds one of the period when the territory was ruled by the Meds, prior to Guhnlots.

Beyond the valley of the Banas lies Hadauti. Many subranges of Aravalli run across this territory. Its main river is Chambal.

Rising near Mhow and covering a distance of about two hundred miles from its sources, the Chambal enters the southeast of Rajasthan, near the northern end of Gandhi Sagar, breaking through Aravalli plateau. It flows for about a hundred miles in Hadauti, through a deep gorge south of Kota and an open valley near its confluence with Kali Sindhu, Parvati, and Banas. It then serves as the eastern boundary of Rajasthan for about one hundred twenty five miles.

The southern part of Mewad comprising of Dungarpur, Banswara with its semi-circle sub-range of Aravalli, is full of forests and is watered by the river Mahi and its tributary Soma. This part is called Bagad.

(b) Western Rajasthan :

The west of Aravalli is the sandy desert of 'Maruthali' that extends for about three hundred ninety seven miles from north-east to south-west. With an average width of about 186 miles from west to east and with an extent of about 64,000 square miles covering the former states of Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Major portion of Jodhpur and a part of Jaypur called Shekhavati. Its productivity in the past depended upon the rivers, the Saraswati, Drashdwati and Sutlaj. Saraswati with its tributary Drashdwati, then poured its waters in the Arabian sea. They dried up completely by 1,000 A.D., when arid conditions had become established. The dry beds of these rivers are still visible in the Gaggar area. There is also evidence to suggest that Sutlaj was much bigger in the past and flowed in the prehistoric and historic times through Punjab and Rajasthan, receiving waters from Yamuna and entered into the Runn of Kutch. Its former banks can still be traced.

This is not a desert. In fact, a good harvest of wheat, jawar and bajri can be had, wherever water is obtained from either wells or canals. In the Mansoon  months large patches of grass afford pasture to herbs of cattle and flocks of sheep.

Generally speaking west of 'Maruthali' is sandy, whereas eastern 'Maruthali' is rockey. A belt of steppe country stretches westwards from the foot of Aravalli range and merges into western 'Marusthali'. It contains less of sand hills and is drained by innumerable short water-courses that fall into Luni, which is the only notable river of this part. It rises from the Anna Sagar, about 3 miles south-west of Ajmer of flows west-wards for about two hundred seventy-nine miles before entering the Run of Ghuiya, the Bandi, the Sukri, the Jawari, and the Jojri, "According to a staying of Marwar, about half the agricultural produce of the area is the gift of the river Luni."

The highest groups of hills in the western Rajasthan stand in this region. These hillocks of red-stone, coming abruptly from the sandy desert have offerded sites for the forts mentioned above.

To the south west and to the south east of Rajasthan lie Gujarat and Malwa plateau respectively. The Malwa plateau is to the North of Narmada and is covered by Vindhya mountain ranges that starts from Gujarat and run towards Raisen and Bhopal. Many of the sub-ranges of Vindhya mountain appear to have risen northwards to embrace the eastern and southern sub ranges of Aravalli; proving the physiographical oneness of Rajasthan and Malwa.

(ii) The Aryanaisation of Rajasthan :

In their first stage of penetration into India(2) , as depicted in Rigweda, we see the Aryans occupying Afghanisthan. The valley of Kashmir, Punjab, North Rajasthan and part of Sindha and reaching as far as Sharayu in the east.

The Aryans(3) were intimately familiar with the Saraswati Drashdvati region of Rajasthan. It is here on the banks of these rivers that they performed their sacrifices, developed their system of yadnyas, and composed their hymns to Indra and soma. In short it is here that they established the norms of their civilization. Hence Saraswati became 'Naditama' the river par-excellence, and the tract between the two rivers was held as Brahmavarta, the land of Gods.

But a fairly developed culture with powerful kingdom of daityas, Asuras or Danavas, flourished then in the territory to the south and west of Chambal and to the snorth of Tapti river. Besides, there were uncivilized barbarians, the ancesters of the present Bhills, Shabaras. Menas, Mers and Nishads. The Aryans had to face all of them, before they could penetrate further into Rajasthan.

It seems that the 'Alias'(4) (Lunar dynasty) under Pururava were the first to spread towards east Rajasthan from their original home in the Himalayas. Vayati in this line, the son of Nahusha and the great grand-son of Pururava was a 'Samrat'. East Rajasthan was under his vast empire which comprised of the whole of Madhyadesh west of Ayodha and as far as Saraswati. He married the Asur Princess Sharmistha, the daughter of the Asur king Vrishyaparva, and also Devayani, the daughter of Ushinas Shukra, the Great Bharagava, by a pratilom marriage.

After Yayati the main tline was continued under Sharmishtha;s son Puru but the country watered by the rivers Charmanvati (Chambal), Vetravati (Betwa), and Shuktimati (Ken), i.e. eastern Rajputana and Bundelkhand, came under Yadu, the son of Devayani, North of Charmanvati i.e., jaypur and Alwar region passed to Drahyu, another son from Sharmistha.

The dynasty under Yadu soon rose into prominence and expanded towards south and south-west i.e. Malwa, Gujarat and Kathiawad. It is with the sons of Yadu - the yadawas, that the traditional history of Rajasthan is associated. It was due to their activities that Rajasthan alongwith Gujarat, Malwa and Deccan, came under the Arya occupation. They mixed freely with the non-Aryas with whom theyhad marital relations and some of whose customs they incorporated, which facilitated the Aryanization of those, outside the Aryan fold.

After Yadu the dynasty branched off into Yadavas and Haihayas. The Southern part of the empire passed over to Haihayas of Mahishmati.

The solar dynasty of Ayodhya was founded by Ikshwaku the eldest of Manu's sons. One of the decendants of Ikshwaku, Kuvalashva, marched against the Daitya Dhundumar, the son of Madhu Daity-near a shallow sand-filled set in the desert, in order to rescue a sage named Uttank. It is said that this Daitya's(5) had a very peculiar way of practising penance. He used to bury himself in the sand and would come out in a year to breathe. Kuvalashva killed him. The Dhundumar - Dhundhad (Jaypur) region to the north of Mewad, still cherishes the memory of the first success of Ikshwakus in this region.

Madhatri of the solar dynasty of Ayodhya was a 'Chakravarti' and 'Samrat'. Shashabindu the Yadava emperor, 13th generation after Yadu, was his contemporary. Bindumati, Shashabindu's daughter, was married to him. Crossing the Doab, he subjugated the whole of the Lunar dynasties, including the Haihyas. The northern border of his empire reached Punjab whereas the southern one reached narmada. Thus began the polical rivalry of the two Houses, the Ikshwakus and the haihyayas.

Kartavirya and his son Arjun were themost famous of the Haidayas. The latter is known as kartavirya-Sahastrarajun. He Carried the Haihaya empire to great prominence and supremacy which reached the outskirts of Himalayas. He was an ideal monarch who performed a number of sacrifices. 'Sahasra' in his name denotes his unprecidental strength. However, his brilliant career was cut short when he was killed by Parashuram Bhargava in a combat. The Haihayas received a set-back after this and they were pushed back from the east.

In the 4th generation after Sahasrarjun, the Bhojas (Haihaya Branch) ruled the region of Aravalli hills and Avanti in western Malwa. They were connected with the river Parnasha (Banas) with their capital at Mattikavati. The Vitihotras (another Haihaya branch) ruled in eastern Malwa.

Not long after this, the Pauravas of the Doab, of whom very little was heard till then, came into forefront under Dushyant and his son Bharat. The latter was a 'Samrat' and north Rajasthan passed under him. Now the Ikshwakus of Ayodhya, the Yadavas of Mathura, Bhojas of Marttikavati and Mahishmati were forced into secondary postion.

Not long after this, the Pauravas of the Doab, of whom very little was heard till then, came into forefront under Dushyant and his son Bharat. The latter was a 'Samrat' and north Rajasthan passed under him. Now the Ikshwakus of Ayodhya, the Yadavas of Mathura, Bhojas of Marttikavati and Mahishmati were forced into secondary postion. In the great Bharat War, most of the Yadavas sympathised with the Kauravas. But the Matsyaa were the strongest supporters of the Pandavas. In the Shatapatha Brahmana, we see the Matsyas on the bank of Saraswati, where their great king Dhvasan Dvaitavan performed fourteen horse-sacrifices. But in the Mahabharat times, they were in the Jaypur-Alwar region of Rajasthan. It is in the Virat country that the Pandavas lived in disguise in the 13th year of their banishment. After they declared themselves to be the Pandvas, the greatful Matsya king, for the help rendered by them against the Kaurava onslaught, gave his daugher Uttara in marriage to Abhimanyu, the celebrated son of Arjun. Pandawa-army encamped near Upapalvya (another capital of the Matsya besides Vairata(6) ) before the commencement of the great battle. Most of the Yadavas fought on the side of the Kauravas and perished with them.

The Bharat war has a disastrous effect on the political condidtions of northern India. The tremendous carnage of the Kshatriyas in it weakened them completely, beyond recovery We see no 'Chakravarti' or 'Samrat' here-after until Mahapadma(7) ? Nanda whose end is traditionally regarded as the last of the Kshatriya Kulas in India.

The tribal element seems to have gained ground. We hear that Arjun, the renowned archer and the hero of Mahabharat, was defeated by the Abhiras, in the south-western Rajasthan, while he was returning back from Saurastra, to Mathura, with the women folk and the children of the Yadavas.

The curtain drops down here, as if after a tragic drama, separating us from the remote antiquity concerned with the Aryan phase in India.

(iii) Historic Rajasthan : (From 600 B.C. to 200 A.D.)

When the curtain rises again after the great Bharat war, we see the Matsyas, south of the Kurus and west of Yamuna in the former Jaypur-Alwar region. But they (8) had lost their former political importance.

The indirect (9) effect of Alexander's invasion of Afghanisthan and Punjab during 327 to 325 B.C. was the migration of Mlawas, the Shibis, and the Arjunayanas from Punjab to Rajasthan.

Soon the Maurya Empire was established at Pataliputra under Chandragupta Maurya in 321 B.C.(10) and Rajasthan passed under the Mauryas. During the reign of Ashok Maurya, Rajasthan(11) seems to have figured prominently in the Empire. One of the six recensions of his first 'Minor Rock Edict' is at Bairat (12). Close to it on the top of the hill is the Buddhist moestic order in general, recommending devout meditation upon and proper studies of the particular texts.

The Maurya Empire disintegrated rapidly after Samprati, the grandson of Ashok and the dynasty came to an end in 184 B.C., when the last of the Mauryas, Brihadrath(13) was murdered by his Brahman commender-in-chief Pushya Mitra, who founded the Shung dynasty.

But the Shungas were unable to check the disruption of the Empire, which was aggravated by the Greeck invasion under Demetrius(14) in about 175 B.C. Assisted by his Commender Minandar, pushing aside the resistence, he arrived at the very gates of Pataliputra. In Rajasthan, the Greeks laid siege to Madhyamika(15) an important town in those days, belonging to a branch of Shibi people, who had migrated to Rajasthan from the Punjab.

Due to internal dissensions, the Greeks however retreated hurriedly this time, but came back again under their greatest king Minandar. Even though they were checked(16) by the grandson of Pushamitra, Rajasthan passed under the Greek rule. Minandar's (17) Empire (160 to 140 B.C.) extended from Mathura to Bhadoch. He is supposed to have been a convert to Buddhism.

The Greeks were soon followed by the Shakas who, dislodging the greek, established an extensive Empire in the north-west of India by the closing years(18) of the first century B.C.

The Shakas(19) in their turn were followed by the hordes of nomads called the 'Great Yuch-Chis'. Between 78 A.D. and 102 A.D., an extensive Kushan Empire from Gandhara to Waranashi in the east, and Narmada to the south, including Sindhu valley, besides Bactria, came in to existence under Kanishka who was the greatest ruler of the Kushanas. He conquered Kashmir and extended his Empire beyond Pamirs.

The Kushan Empire was intact till 185 A.D. It began to crack by the end of second century A.D.

(iv) The Tribal states of Rajasthan (20) : (During 200 B.C. to 500 A.D.) :

The fall of the Maurya Empire had given rise to many tribal republics in Rajasthan, who had to submit first to the Greeks, then to the Shakas and then to their successors, the Kushanas. But after the fall of the Kushan Empire, by the end of the second century A.D., some of the tribal States gained in importance and strength, till they were forced to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Guptas in about the second half of the fourth century A.D. The Guptas let the Rajasthan States continue in their political career. But theyhad to carry to Emperor's behests and pay tribute and homage.

The tribal States of Rajasthan during this period (200 B.C. to 500 A.D.) were as follow :

(1) The Shibis :
At the time of the invasion of Alexander the Shibis lived with their neighbours 'Agalassoi' in the region adjoining the confluence of Zelam and Chinab. They are described as rude folk, clad with skins of wild beasts and having clubs for their weapons. They migrated during troubled time of the invasion of the Greeks, to the region round Madhyamika near Chitod. Their coins with the legend 'Majhamikaya-Shibi-Janapadasa' are assigned the period of about first century B.C.

2. The Udeehikas :
According to Alberuni, the territory of the Uddehikas lay near the city of Bazana (Bayana in former Bharatpur State of Rajasthan). Their coins of about the second half of First century B.C. bear the legend 'Udehaki' and 'Udehaki Suyamitasa'.

3. The Rajanyas :
The coins of Rajanya Janapada with legends either in Brahmi or Kharosthi are assigned to the letter half of the first century B.C. They lived in the north-west of Rajasthan where both these scripts were in use, Brihat-Samhita places them in the north along with Yaudheyas and Trigartas.

4. The Uttambhadrs :
The Uttambhadras lived in the neighbourhood of their rivals, the Malvas against whom they obtained help from the Shakas. Probably they lived in the Pushkar and Ajmer region.

5. The Abhiras :
There were several Abhira settlements in different parts of western, central and southern India. In Rajasthan they probably lived in the south-west part i.e. in Abu region.

6. The Arjunayanas :
Probably the discendants of the Pandava-prince Arjun, the Arjunayanas lived in the region lying west of Agra and Mathuar i.e. in previous Bharatpur and Alwar States of Rajasthan. Their coins bear the legad 'arjunayanm Jayah' in Brahmi script and are assigned the period of the closing decades of the first century B.C. They grew powerful after the decline of the Kushanas, but submitted to the Guptas, in the middle of the fourth century A.D. As per Varahamihira, they were still the important people of the north or northwest part of India in the Sixth century A.D.

7. The Yaudheyas :
Essentially a tribe of eastern Punjab, but dominating over the adjoining tracts of Uttar-pradesh and Rajasthan, the yaudhyeyas were known even to Panini along with the Trigartas as 'ayudha-jivi-Sangh' a tribal republic organisation depending mainly on arms.

The forms 'Yodheya' or 'Yaudheya' are are derived from 'Yoddha' meaning a warrior. The Yaudheyas grew powerful with the decline of the Indo-Greeks, but they had to submit to the Shakas and later on to the Kushanas. Never-the-less, they retained strength and audacity to challenge the mighty Shaka-Kshatrap Rudradaman in the middle of the second century A.D.

With the decline of the Kushanas, the Yaudheyas still grew powerful, till they were subdued by the Guptas. They are mentioned as a subordinate ally of the Gupta Emperor, in the Allahabad inscription of the fourth century A.D.

Skanda-kartikeya was the titulary deity of the Yaudheyas and peacock was the scared animal; being the carrier of the God Kartikaya. (It is still regarded as a holy animal in Rajasthan and is forbidden to be killed) Coins were issued in the name of this God. The coins of the third and the fourth century A.D. bear the legend "Yaudhe gansya jayah" - victory to the republic of Yaudheyas. On a large clay seal attributed to the period of the fourth century A.D. occurs the legend "Yaudheyanam Jayamantradharanam".

8. The Malavas :
While retreating back to his country by voyage down the rivers of Punjab, Alexander got the staffest resistance, after the Paurav King of Zelam, at the hands of the Malvas who dwelt on the banks of the lower course of Ravi. He had subdued the Shibis and "Agalassoi" who dwelt in the region adjoining the confluence of Zelam and Chinab, so that they should not join the powerful Malvas who were known to be preparing for strenuous apposition. Their neighbors, the Kshudrakas of the upper course of Ravi had also resolved to make a common cause against the invader, forgetting their rivalry with them. The Macedonians were alarmed at the magnitude of the apposing force. Alexander strategy in facing the Malvas lay in swiftness of action before their allies could come to their help and in massacring the innocent people at large(21) . Perhaps the Malvas must never have drempt of such a thing before. The fighting was severe and ruthless. But it is to the credit of the Malvas that they boldly faced the full weight of the determined world-conqueror, in spite of the defeat of the Paurava King of the Zelam. It was they who had nearly killed him by a barbed arrow as a result of which the inhabitants of the Malva town were slain one and all.

This much is enough to stress that the Malvas like the Pauravas of Zelam, represented the true Kshatriya spirit, undaunted bravery, dignified manners and self respect that made them resolute while resisting a foe. They were truly "ayudha jivis" as Patanjali classed them.

During the Indo-Greek and later on during the Seythian occupation of their home province, a large section of their tribe migrated to Rajasthan.

To the Malvas goes the credit of having started an area that has been identified with the Vikram Samvat of 57 B.C. It is believed that the Malvas must have started this era to commemorate some important event, probably the foundation of their republic in Rajasthan. But very soon this era came to be known as "Krita", probably after an illustrious Malva leader of that name, who must have maintained the independence of his tribe from the foreign yoke.

The capital of the Malva Republic was Malva-nagar, modern Nagar or Karkot-nagar in the former Jaypur State of Rajasthan. In the beginning of the second century A.D. the Malvas of south Jaypur are known to have fought with their neighbours Uttambhadras and their allies the Kshaharates of western India, With the decline of the Kushanas by the end of second century A.D., the Malvas got a chance and they spread practically to almost all the parts of the Eastern Rajasthan i.e. Mewat, Hadauti and Mewad regions.(22)

The fight of the Malvas of the Eastern Rajasthan with the Kardamakas of Ujjaini continued in the third and fourth century A.D. But while the Guptas extirpated the Kardamkas, the Malva dynasty flourished at Dashpur (Mandasor) as a vassal under the Guptas. But the Malva Kings, even being the subordinates to the Guptas, used their own "Krit" era, called as the era of the Malvas, in perference to the era of the Guptas. Coins of the Malvas bear the legends "Malva Janapadasa", "jayomalavanam" or "malavanam jayah".

(v) The Huna Invasion and the end of Gupta Empire (455 to 500 A.D.) :

From the valley of Oxus(23) , the white Huns, as they are referred to in the Greek accounts, advanced towards both Persia and India. The stream towards India, assailed the Kushan Kingdom of Kabul and then poured into the north Indian plains. But their attack was repelled by Skandagupta in 455 A.D., and India was saved for a while.

But about 465 A.D.(24) fresh Swarms of the Huns poured across the frontier, overwhelmed the kingdom of Gandhara or Peshawarand starting from that base attacked Skanda Gupta into the heart of his dominions. The gupta forces succumbed to the repeated attacks of the Huns and probably after the death of Skand Gupta that occurred by 667 A.D., the Gupta Empire was overthrown, though it survived for a few generations after this, in diminished form.

The collapse(25) of the Parsian opposition in 484 A.D. when the Persian King Firoz was killed by the Huns must have greatly facilitated the crossing of the immense multitudes of Huns to the Indian frontier. Thus the invasion of the Huns in India is aprocess that covered at least about 50 years from 455 to 500 A.D., with a short break of about ten years due to their first defeat at the hands of Skanda Gupta.

By 500 A.D. we see the extensive Huna-Empire established, that stretched from Gandhara to Malva and covering part of Ganga valley too. The coins of the Huns Chief Toraman indicate his rule over parts of Uttar-Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Kashmir. He assumed the title of "Maharajadhiraj". He was a Shaiva and allowed the administration of the Guptas to continue under his sway as before(26) .

The Hunas, like their predecessors, the Greeks, the Shakas and the Kushanas, had adopted Hindu religion and customs but they seem to have been averse to Buddhism. The duration of Huna-Empire in India seems to be too short, at the most it lasted for thirty years.

Tormana(27) was succeeded by his son Mihirkula, who probably ascended the throne in about 515 A.D. He was defeated at the hands of aconfederacy formed by Baladity, king of Magadha and Yashodharman, the king of Malava, about the year 528 A.D. Mihirkul still ruled for a few years more over Gandhara and Kashmir. Even(28) after him the Huna principalities seem to linger on in the north-west of Punjab against whom Prabhakar Vardhan, the father of Harish Vardhan, waged incessant war at the close of the sixth century and at the beginning of the seventh century.

The political fabric of the Gupta-Empire was brokent up completely out of which emerged new independent States like the Maukharis of Kanuj, the Pushapbhutis of Sthaneshwar and the Gurjaras of Rajasthan and Nandipuri.

(vi) The Gurjaras and the Rajpurts : ( 550 to 950 A.D.) :

About sixty years after the destruction of the Huna supremacy in nortthern India, there arose another Empire at Kanuj under Harshavardan (606 to 647 A.D.), but Rajasthan(29) lay out of his suzerainty. Hiuen Tsang mentions the existence of independent Gurjara (Ku-che-lo) kingdom with Pi-lo-mo-lo, which has been indefined with Bhillamala, modern Bhinamal, as its Capital.

The origin(30) of the Gurjaras has been a subject of controversy, which is related to the origin of the Rajputs. A school of thought holds them to be of a foreign origion, having come along with the Hunas. But this assumption has no evidence to prove it as a hitorical truth.

The Gurjara Kingdom(31) was founded in the former Jodhpur State of Rajasthan after the destruction of the Gupta-Empire in the second half of sixth century by Harichandra, a Brahman. The sons of his Kshtriya queen Bhanda became the founders of the Royal lines of the Praiharas. Harichandra and his three successors ruled between 550 to 640 A.D. Besides, there were other States founded by the sons of Harichandra. One of these was in the Lata country (South Gujarath) and the other was in Malva, with its Capital at Ujjain, where a Pratihar Chief Nagabhata was rulling early in the eighth century.

By the time Harichandra founded the Gurjara Kingdom in Marwad, another dynasty of the Guhila arose in the western part of Mewad under Guhadatta(32). The most famous among the Guhilots was Bappa Rawal, who seems to be ninth ruler of the dynasty and was probably a contemporary of Nagabhata. Pratihar king of Ujjain. He captured Chitod from the Mori King, probably after the latter fell a victim to the Arab aggression.

Another branch of the Guhilots (33) was rulling in the latter half of the sixth century or about the beginning of the seventh century in the jaipur region. From the inscription found at Chatse, 26 miles to the south of Jaypur city, we know that it was founded by one Bhartipatta who "was like Parshuram endowed with both priestly and martial qualitities". It clearly supports the view that the Ghilots were originally Brahmans.

Besides these(34) , there were Mauryas in the eastern Mewad and part of hadauti, Chapas in South Rajasthan and the Chahamanas at Shakambhari.

But an un-expected foreign(35) aggression between 724 and 738 A.D., revolutionised the whole political structure of Rajasthan. This was the invasion of the Arabs, who, after the conquest of Sindh (712 A.D.) swept over the whole of Rajasthan, Gujarat and advanced as far as Ujjain. The Gurjar kingdom of Jodhpur was overrun but the Pratihar Nagbhata hurled back the invaders in collaboration with Avanijanashraya Pulakeshi, the Chalukya ruler of Lata (south Gujarat).

This victory of Nagbhata(36) over the Arabs not only enabled him to dethrone Jodhpur as the supreme power in the Pratihar confederacy, but laid the foundation of a new power of the Gurjara - Pratiharas, who became the masters of Kanauj by about (37) 815 A.D. The Pratiharas reached the Zenith of their power during 815 A.D. to 940 A.D. and were called "Gurjareshvaras" and "Raghukulbhu - Chakravarti".

Sulaiman(38) , an Arab traveller, who visited India in 851 A.D. refers to Bhoj Prathihar in Vivid terms and states that the king maintained numerous forces and that not other Indian prince had so fine a cavalry. He further observes that there was no greater foe of the Muhammadan faith than him. He had great riches and his camels and horses were numerous. No country in India was more safe than his country.

Al Masudi (39), another traveller, a native of Bagdad, who visited India in the year 915-16 A.D. refers to the great power and resources of the Pratihar king of Kanauj, and the wide extent of his kingdom, which touched Rashtrakuta kingdom in the South and the Muslim Principality of Multan in the west with both of whom the king was at war. He was rich in horses and camels and maintained four armies in four directions each numbering 7,00,000 or 9,00,000 men.

And with all this strength(40) , even though the Pratiharas could have easily exterminated the Muslim rule in the Sindh province, they allowed it to remain there. It appears that the danger of the Muslim meance was not fully realized by them. Had they possessed even a general knowledge of the political condition of the lands immediate outside the borders of India on the north-west, they would not have committed such a grave mistake. The indifference of the Hindu Chiefs in general cost them terribly very soon.

The Pratihar Empire collapsed in the latter half of 10th century giving rise to new powers, known later on under the collective name Rajputs. It was the lot of these Rajpurt powers to face the new invaders that fell like hurricane on the furtile fields and rich localities of Hindusthan.

(vi) The End of the Ancient Glory :
In the year 997 A.D.(41) Abu-I-Qasim Mahmud, the son of Subuktigin captured Ghazni and turned his attention to India and the most crucial age in the Indian Hostory began. "Yamin abdaula Mahmud marched in to India during a period of 30 years and more. God be merciful to both father and son. Mahmud utterly ruined the prosperity of the country and performed there wonderful exploits, by which the Hindus became like atoms like dust scattered in all directions and a tale of old in the mouth of people."

Crossing rivers(42) "deep beyond description". Where "even elephants bodies are concealed in them, so it may be easily conceived what is the case with horses", accompanied by his valiant warriors, receiving submission from the ambassadors sent to him, bidding "farwell to sleep and ease", the Sultan "led the way crossing forest after forest at midnight, the drums sounded the march and the friends of God mounted the horses" and thus they marched on.

In vain the Hindus tried to give a stand but "the friends(43) of God commenced the action, setting upon the enemy with sword, arrow and spear, plundering, seizing and destroying at all which the Hindus, being greatly alarmed, began to kindle the flame of fight…… The elephants moved on from their posts, and line advanced against line, shooting their arrows at one another like boys escaped from school… Swords flashed like lightning amid the blackness of clouds, and fountains of blood flowed like the fall of setting stars. The friends of God defeated their obstinate opponents, and quickly put them to a complete rout".

This happened again and again for 30 years and nobody was able to check Mahamud from plundering and destroying places like Multan(44), Sthaneshwar, Mathura, Kanauj or Sorti Somnath. Noblest monuments of ancient India perished, immence riches were plundered, lakhs of people were killed and enslaved and one of the fairest provinces of India, the Punjab, was detatched, as Sindh was done 300 years ago from the sphere of Aryavarta. The stories of this wanton destruction still make a painful reading, than what must have been the magnitude of the sufferings of the vanquished.

"But (45) a still worse sublime tragedy was the complete indifference of the Indian Chiefs to this growing meance and the fancied security in which they chose to repose during the period intervening between the death of Mahamud and the next invasion by the Ghurs…. The kingdom of Ghazni passed through critical days and was over taken by many dangers, both internal and external, till the nemesis over look it, and its beautiful city, built on the ruins and plunder of India, perished in flames. But the powerful Indian Chiefs, far from taking advantage of any such opportunity during the long period of a century and a half, were more intent upon aggradising themselves at the cost of their neighbouts than turning their whole-hearted attention to the great national task of freeing the Punjab from the yoke of the foreigners of an alien faith".

Consequently when the Turkish Muizzudddin Muhammad began his attack on India in 1175 A.D. the individual victories over him of Mulraja II Chalukya of Gujarat in 1178 A.D.(46) and Prithviraja Chahamana of Ajmer in 1191 A.D. were of no avail as no two Chiefs could combine against him. Prithviraja fell fighting in 1192 A.D. at Tarai, and the powerful Jayachandra who had remained silent while beholding the destruction of his heighbour, also perished on Yamuna in the neighbourhood of Chandwara in 1193 A.D. Every thing that was sacred and dear to a Hindu mind was destroyed and laong with it the ancient India came to an end. Thus most of North India passes under the foreign yoke by the end of 12th century. It was a tremendous change in the capital and social life of India with far reaching consequences.

(vii) The Rajput Opposition :

The efforts of Islam to spread further and the resistence to such a move on the part of the Rajput Chiefs or the main substance of the history of Northern India for the next four centuries, in which the Chahamanas, the Guhilots and the Rathods figure prominently.

After the death of Iltatmish(47) in 1236 A.D. the Ghahamanas recaptured Ranathambhor and becoming powerful made the Muslim military hold of Ajmer insignificant. Balban's two invasion against Ranathambhor in 1248 A.D. and 1257 A.D., had little consequences. Even Jalauddin Khalji's invasion against Ranathambhor failed. The Guhilots of Mewad were also coming fastly to prominence. Besides, there were Chahamanas of Nado, Jalor and Deoda and the Parmars of Mount Abu and the Rathods of Hastikundi (Marwad). After Iltatmish, excepting Ajmer and Jaypur --Mewat tract, the rest of Rajputana was not only independent but powerful enough to resist the Muslim forces.

Allauddin Khalji(48) was the first Turkish Sultan to crush Rajputana. With the end of the resistence of Ranathambhor in 1301 A.D. and the fall of Chitod in 1303 A.D. the whole of Rajasthan cam under his sway with the fall of Jalor in 1308 A.D.

But Rana Hammir Deo of Chitod(49) , seizing back the fort in 1326 A.D. proved the hollowness of Khalji imperialism. Excepting a few places like Mandor and Nagor nearly the whole of Rajasthan freed itself the foreign elutches under the leadership of Mewad. Muhammad Tughlak and the later Sultans left Rajasthan alone.

By the end of 14th century(50) the Delhi Sultanate disintegrated giving rise to provincial principalities. Mewad saw herself flanked by the Muslim States of Gujarat and Malwa. But she was not alone. Chunda, the Rathod king (1390 to 1422 A.D.), had opened a new chapter in the history of Marwad by driving away the Muslims from Mandor. He formed an alliance with Mewad by giving his daughter in marriage to Lakha Rana, who was advanced in age. This friendship enabled the Rajputs to drive away the Muslims from Nagor, probably the last vestige of Muslim rule in Rajasthan. But unfortunately this friendship came to an end in the time of Rana Kumbha in 1333 A.D. when Ranamalla, the next ruler of Marwad after Chundas, was murdered at Chitod resulting into a fued between the two States, that continued for centuries after this.

Jodha(51) the son of Ranamalla (1438 to 1448 A.D.) founded the city of Jodhpur in 1459 A.D. His sons, like the sons of Harichand Gurjar of seventh century, captured new lands and founded the States of Satalmer, Bikaner and Medta.

Rana Kumbha (1433 to 1468 A.D.)(52) of Mewad, as per the Kumbhilgadh incription, "Churned the ocean-like armies of the Sultans of Malwa and Gujarat". He built 32 out of the total 84 forts of Mewad. Two thirds of his reign were spent in warfare. He was one of the greatest rulers of Mewad.

Another great ruler like Kumbha was Rana Sanga (53) (1509 to 1528 A.D.) He pushed the borders of Mewad on all sides and made Mewad prominent among all the Rajput States. The defeat of Ibraham Lodi of Delhi was his greatest achievement. But for Bahar, there were chances that he would have captured Delhi and ended the Muslim rule there. His defeat at the hands of Bahar in 1727 A.D. at Khanua ended his ambition. His life too came to an end the next year.

The death of Rana Sanga(54), was followed by the invasion of the ambitious Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Chitod fell after the 'Jauhar' and Mewad got a set back (1534 A.D.).

(viii) The Acceptance of Foreign Yoke :
With crippled Mewad, it was easy for Sher Shah Sur, to break the back-done of Ranathambhor, Raisen and by defeating Maldeo of Marwad(55) in 1544 A.D. Rajasthan had shed ample blood while resisting the Sultans of Delhi for the last three centuries and a half, and the Chiefs were in a mood to submit honourably to Delhi, if they were allowed to rule peacefully in their territories. Hence, most of the Rajput Chiefs fell easy victims to the apparent friendly overtures of Akbar and thus the Rajputs lost by 1670 A.D. what they had preserved till then, namely the independence. But they went a step further and marrying their princesses with the Mughal princes(56), became the members of the Royal Mughal family.

But Mewad continued her heroic resistence even after the fall of Chitod in 1568 A.D. to the foreign Mughals, single-handedly, under Rana Pratap. Had the rest of Rajput Chiefs continued their resistence and helped Rana Pratap whole heatedly, then perhaps the story of Haldighat (1776 A.D.) would have been quite different and with the Afgan opposition to the Mughals in other quarters, the Rajputs would not have been obliged to be the "brave watch dogs of alien regime" in the words of Dr. Qanungo(57).

After Rana Pratap's death in 1597 A.D. Rana Amarsing continued the struggle with the same vigour but was overwhelmed by the superior forces of Jahagir(58), and he had to accept the inevitable in 1615 A.D. Thus the Guhilots accepted most reluctantly in 1615 A.D., the effect of Ray Pithora's defeat of 1192 A.D.

(ix) The Foreign Rule
The Rajput kings of Ambar, Marwad, Bundi, Bikaner and the rest, shared the administrative offices offered to them by the Mughals, accepted their military commands, and forgetting the past became one with the Muslim rule and "filled the Indian History", as Jadunath Sarkar states(59), "by the most brilliant and valued services to the empire in far apart fields" for the next century and a half till the Emperor Aurangzeb(60) opened their eyes to the fact that all-the-while they had served but a foreign master, alien to their race, religion and culture.

The powerful Rajput Chiefs(61) , even though holding subordinate posts in the Mughal Empire were in fact to the pursuance of Aurangzeb's religious policy. One of these Chiefs the Mirza Raja of Ambar (jaypur) died on July 12, 1667 A.D. On 19th of April 1669 A.D.(62) the Emperor issued a general order to the Subhedars of all the provinces to demolish the schools and the temples of the infidels and to put down strongly their teaching and religios practices.

The order was executed faithfully throughout the Empire(63) . For e.g. - In 1669 A.D. "Khan Jahan Bahadur arrived from Jodhpur, bringing with him several cart-loads of idols, taken from Hindu temples that had been razed. His Majesty gave him praise. Most of these idols were adorned with precious stones, or made of gold, silver, brass, copper or stone. It was ordered that some of them should be cast away in the out offices, and the reminder placed beneath the step of the grand mosque, there to be trampled under foot. There they lay for a long time, until, at last, not a vestige of them was left."

After the death of Mirza Raja Jaysing of Ambar, Raja Jaswantsing of Marwad, was the only obstacle in the way of Aurangzeb. He had never forgotten the audacity of Jaswantsingh(64) in confronting him at Dharmat (15th April, 1658 A.D.) and his treachery at Khajuha (5th January 1969 A.D.). He had suspician about Jaswant's secret understanding with Shivaji (65) , the founder of the Maratha kingdom and hence separating him from Deccan, he had sent him as a Coomandant of the small post of Jamrud to the west of Sindhu, at the mouth of Khybar. There he died far away from his land on 20th December, 1778 A.D.

"The success of emperor's plan for the forcible destruction of Hindusthan(66) . Required that Jaswant's State should sink into a tame dependency or a regular province of the empire, and Hindu resistance to the policy of religious persecution should be deprived of a possible head and rallying point". Marwad was hence, at once annexed and the Emperor moved to Ajmer to over-awe the possible Rathod opposition. The headless State could offer no resistance to the vast and well-directed imperial armies that poured upon the Rathod land, which was soon occupied by them. Anarchy (67) and slaughter were let loose upon the doomed State. All the the greate towns in the plain were pillaged and the temples were destroyed.

Thus having achieved his object in respect of Marwad(68) , Aurangzeb returned to Delhi and on the very day (12th April 1779 A.D.) reimposed the hated 'Jazia' on the Hindus, after more than a century of abeyance. In June, 1679(69), he was fortunate enough to secure the infant Ajitsing, the posthumous son of Jaswantsing. But the loyal Rathods, under their leader Durgadas, the son of Jaswant's minister Askaran, rescued their late Raja's heir from the clutches of Aurangzeb, by sacrificing their lives.

Aurangzeb's annexation(70) of Marwad was a preliminary step to the conquest of Mewad. The Maharaja Rajsingh was wise enough to comprehended it, moreover, Ajit's mother was his niece. Hence he stood with the Rathods, in their critical time, against the Mughals.

Thus forgetting all their past services rendered to the Empire and all their blood-shed in external as well internal sturggles, Aurangzeb thrust upon the Rajputs a cruel war only to convert "dar-ul-harb"(71) (the Hindu States in his Empire) into 'dar-ul-islam' i.e. realm of Islam. "The Rajputs suffered(72) all the horrors of war in their most extreme form. Many temples were demolished… at or near Udaypur 123, and at Chitod 63 temples were over-thrown. The friendly State of Ambar (Jaypur) suffered the loss of 66 temples". Through destruction of temples, imposition of 'Jazia' and mass conversion to Islam, Aurangzeb meant to struck(73) at the very existence of the Hindus. The Mughal rule, even after its stay for the past 150 years, was a foreign rule after all !

(x) The Rajput War

In the ensuing fight Rana Rajsinh(74) had to flee to the hills, leaving the low country, which was occupied by the imperialists. His capital Udaypur and the famous fort of Chitod fell to the victors, and Mewad suffered the fate of Marwad.

The Sisodias(75) and the Rathods used diplomacy to supplement their limited resources against their formidable foe. Detatching prince Akabar, from the Emperor;s side, they had nearly succeeded in snatching the crown of Aurangzeb, but for the fraud employed successfully by Aurangzeb, in which he was an unrivalled master.

The disappointed prince Akbar (76) was then escorted to Chhatrapati Sambhaji in Deccan, by Durgadas Rathod(77) to unite the destinies of the Rajputs and the Marathas against their common foe (June 1780 A.D.) Akbar's flight(78) to the only power that could defy him, caused anxiety to the Emperor who naturally lost interest in the Rajput war. At the same time, the ravaged State of Mewad chose to fall back. Hence, the Emperor was successful in effecting treaty with the Mewad, in order to procceed to Deccan (June 1781 A.D.).

Mewad regained peace, but Marwad(79) continued to be scene of war and devastation for twenty-five years more. The continuous war brought famine to the land, and the two destroyed it completely. Under such circumstances, the Rathod national opposition would have died out gradually, but for the fact that during all these years the Emperor was plunged deep into the deadly fight against the Marathas, that ate up all his resources and thus ensured the success of the Rathod patriots.

The Rathod Durgadas(80) lived in in Maharashtra during 1681 to 1687 A.D. formulating plans along with Akbar and Sambhaji to oppose(81) the Emperor with the combined strength of the Marathas and the Rajputs. Unfortunately(82) , the plans did not materialise for various reasons and in sheer desperation Akbar left Sambhaji in February 1687 A.D. for Iran by sea.

In 1687 A.D.(83) Durgadas returned from Deccan and Ajitsing came out of concealment. The spirit of opposition, now spread by contagion from the Rathods and Sisodias to the Hadas and Gaud clans and moving further overflowed into Malwa. Joined by the Hadas of Bundi under Durjan Sal, the Rathods cleared the plains of Marwad and carried their ravages into Mewat and to the west of Delhi. But there were checked by Shuja-at Khan, the Subhedar of Jodhpur. After the latter's death in July 1701 A.D., Ajitsing began the war afresh and recovered Marwad completely by 1707 A.D.

(xii) The Rajput Challenge (1707 to 1720 A.D.)

"Raja Ajitsingh(84) had cast of his allegiance to the late Emperor, and done many improper things. After the death of Aurangzeb, he again showed his disobedience and rebellion by oppressing Musalmans, forbidding the killing of cows, preventing the summons to prayer, razing the mosques which had been built after the destruction of the idol temples in the late reign, and repairing and building new idol-temples. He was warmly supported and assisted by the army of the Rana of Udaypur, and was closely allied with Raja Jaisingh, whose son-in-low he was."

But when Bahadur Shah, himself marched to Ambar, in January 1708, his strength fell too short to face him and he submitted. He was pardoned and was given a command of 3500 and the title of Maharaja. The dispute for succession to Ambar was decided by giving it to Vijaysing. Officers of Justice, kazies etc. were reappointed in Jodhpur and other towns. Ajitsing, Jaysing and Durgadas came to the Court and each was honoured with two gift of robe, elephant, etc. (February, 1708 A.D.)

But while the Emperor(85) was on his way to Deccan to punish Kam Baksha, Ajitsing, Jaysing and Durgadas fled from his camp (30th April 1708 A.D.) and joining Amarsing of Mewad, expelled of Commandant of Jodhpur, defeated the Commandant of Hinaun-Bayana, recovered Ambar by night attack, and killed the Commandant of Mewat and many other officers (August, September 1708 A.D.).

Fully preoccupied in Deccan(86) Bahadur Shah could ill afford to meet these Rajput challenges. He sent Abdulla Khan(87) to the Subha of Ajmer accompanied by the killedars of Ambar, Jodhpur and Medta. At the same time, in order to concillate the Rajput Chiefs, he made an increase in the Mansabs of Jaysing and Ajitsing. But these acts of Bahadur Shah could hardly pacify the Rajputs.

The news of the reciprocal treaties(88) among the various States reached the Mughal camp in Deccan. The three States of Jaypur, Jodhpur and Udaypur effected an alliance against the Mughals. They had previously come nearer in 1680 A.D. with the same understanding in the war of Rathod independence. But this time the unity was more perfect, since Jaypur also had joined the aliance. The Rajput Cehiets cemented this unity with the ties of blood. Rana Amarsing gave his daughter Chandrakuwari in marriage to Sawai Jaysing on 25th May, 1708 A.D. He had also married the daugher of Ajitsing in the previous year. They now held a prolonged conference (1708 to 1710 A.D.)(89) on the border of Pushkar lake and after full deliberation proclaimed a solemn concerted policy that they would not henceforth give their daughters in marriage to the Muslimd and that if any prince acted contrary to this resolution, the others should join and put down the deserter by force, if necessary. The Ranas of Udaypur were further acknowledged to be fo purer blood having all-long refused to give their daughters in marriage to the Msulims. Hence, Pushkar conference laid down that if any Rajput prince had an issue from a daughter of Udaypur family that issue was to be given a preference over those born from other wives.

No Hindu ever liked to give his daughter in marriage to a Muslim. It was all the force of circumstances to which the Rajputs had bowed. The acknowledgement of the high social status and the purity of blood of the Rana's family revealed the wounds of the hearts of the Rajput Chiefs. It wad clearly the Hindu spirit that the Rajputs exhibited this time. The Emperor in Deccan did not fail to recognise it.

The following two letters of Sawai Jaysing clearly reveal the prevailing Hindu spirit. To Chhatrapati Shahu he wrote.(90)

"Your Highness must be aware of the cordial ties that existed among our elders. I hope, by the kindness of Shri Ramji, the ties between us shall grow still closer. Shah Alam, after becoming the Emperor, resumed my watan, and called Maharaja Ajit Singh to the Court assuring him that Jodhpur would be restored to him, but did not do so. This news must have reached Your Highness. I, on my part, spared no effort, to serve the Patshah, but he harbors malice towards the Hindus, and on one pretext or another wants to ruin them. For this reason, and as it was considered necessary, we broke off from the Emperor and came to Rana Amar Singh at Udaipur, an after (full) deliberations decided that if the Patshah even now becomes favourable towards the Hindus and restores mansabs and watans, as had been enjoyed by their ancestors, then it is all right, otherwise the Hindus will also do what they can. So far we have expelled the faujdars and qiledars from Amber and Jodhpur, and have established our control there, and shall now be leaving for Amber. Ranaji will also join (us) on Dashera (there). Your Highness is the Sardar of the Deccan. The honour of all the Hindus is one and the same. Hence, you take such measures that just as by entangling Patshah Alamgir in the Deccan, the honour of Hindustan was upheld, in the same manner this Patshah too should not be able to extricate himself from there. Earlier, Your Highness servants had accompalished this much, but now you yourself are there. Kam Baksh is also in Bijapur, Haidarabad. In alliance and in consultation with him, you will no doubt do what you think is proper, so that the Hindus have an upper hand in this conflict. What more I write".

(In the margin) "It has often been said that Alamgir was displeased with Raja Ram Singh on account of Shivaji's case, and did not forget the hostility of Mahraja Jaswant Singh towards him. He retained in his heart ill-feeling on that account. Now we have to see to it."

In his letter dated October 16, 1708 to Chhatrasal(91) , Jai Singh wrote that the trouble started when the Emperor, while granting them mansabs, incorporate the parganas of their watans into khalisa. "Your Highness knows well as to how one can live without a watan and what is (the importance) of a mansab without the watan. Informing Chhatrsal about the Rajput victory at Sambhar in which three thousand of the enemies were killed, and expressing his confidence that similar victories would be gained by them in future also, he wrote, "If Sardars like Your Highness gird up their loins, then the honour of Hindustan would no doubt be maintained. Other zamindars, mansabdars and the Rajas of the intervening region have already united and have removed the thanas of the Turks from their territories. Shri Ranaji too must have written to Your Highness (to do so). You will please join us early for the sake of the honour of th entire Hindu race. As we all Hindus hae common ties, you will not delay in coming towards this side." He asked Chhatrasal to send the names of the prominent zamindars of the east whom they might contract and requested him to write letters to all such chiefs with whom he had intimate contracts. "This is no longer as issue which concerns any one person; now it concerns all the Hindu (rulers) ", he concluded.

The Emperor(92) was extremely displeased with the Hindus of the North. After completing his work in in Deccan, he began to march towards North, with the determination to lay waste the lands of the Rajputs. The Rajput Vakil with the Emperor wrote to Sawai Jaysing to be fully prepared with forces and to intimate Ajitsing accordingly. The Udaypur Rana (93) urged Jaysing and Ajitsing to come with forces.

The Rajput showed perfect unity this time. They were determined to free Rajasthan from the Mughals. They laid claim on Ajmer(94) , bikaner, Kishangadh, Palanpur, Jaisalmer, Kasaba Jodhpur, Medta, Sojat, Jataran, Jalor, Siwana, Falodhi, Sanchor, Bhinmal and asked Asafddaula Zulfikar Khan, Khan Khanan and Khan Zaman, the influencial persons of the Court, to vacate these places. Ajitsing wrote the he was determined to get these places vacated and if needed to fight for them. If the Emperor declined, he was determined to leave the Mansaab. ("±bÈ~b" D îbDC ÈbC îNDPk n>bCÔ>Db ¥TkNJ "¼") Of the Mughal diplomats Asafuddaula(95) in particular, it seems, was not inclined to allow the matter to got to extremes. But the Rajputs had no belief in any of them. ("ëC ÈN¥T n>C, "®bÙ kb"Db ¥TÙ DC Àb±ÙbC îÈJk £CÚPa" ) They perfectly realized that they would not be able to achieve their object of freedom unless they combined. The Emperor was marching towards North with his guns and forces. Though he had written to Ajitsing to keep patience, the latter suspected treachery behind his coming to Rajasthan ("|"bÙC ÈC ®aë î¼ îÙ³^> £³bC Da®ÙÀbëC n>¼ ") He was determined to oppose the Mughals and asked all the Rajput's to collect forces, irresective of the result. ("µÙÈa PNDa ¥Tò ®¼ D¼ ®îaàÈ BC²a ¥Tò ®C ±n>¼ ®a ¥TbÊëbÈ kLPa PN kLbëPb D¼" ) Ajitsing in particular was so disguested with the Mughal yoke that he declared that instead of serving the Mughal Emperor, he would have liked to serve a mere Rawat ("±bÈ~b"a ªb¥TÙa n>bCÔ>C D¼ ÙbëJ¼ÙC ¥Tk®CîC ªb¥TÙa ¥TÙPb}" ).

The Rajputs(96) were thus fully determined to face the might of the Mughals. According to the orders of Sawal Jaysing(97) when the Rajput force was about to besiege Tonk, the Muslim officer Muhammad Khan fled and thus the city and pargana of Tonk was captured. Ajitsing drove the Muslims from Raypur and took hold of Sambhar.

The Emperor(98) reached Lunera from Narmada. The Rajputs began to assemble their forces to meet any evantuality. Ajitsing came with force from Nagor to Didwana. Despite the Royal army(99) at Ajmer (May 1710 A.D.) the Rajputs showed no signs of submission and were fully prepared to lay down their lives in an armed encounter with the Imperials. Asafddaula, requested the Emperor several times to condone the faults of the Rajputs. Even though, the Emperor was determined not to show leniency, he had to yield due to the Sikh danger(100) that called his immediate attention in Punjab. "It was settled that Raja Jaysing, Raja Ajitsing(101) and the Vakils of the Rana and other Rajputs should make their homage, put on the robes presented to them, and accompany the Royal train. All the Rajputs of name and station, forming a body of thirty or forty thousand horse, passed in review". Sawai Jaysing(102) received Farman, Kaulnama and Nishan. Ajitsing got Sambhar (21 June 1710 A.D.)

The Wars of succession, that followed the death of Bajadur Shah (24th February 1712 A.D.) practically left the Rajputs free in their territory. Ajitsing expelled the imperial officers(103) from Jodhpur, captured Ajmer and forbade cow-killing and Muslim prayers in his territory.

But this was too much for the Muslim rule(104) to endure and Husain Ali marched from Delhi with a powerful army to punish him. Ajitsing was powerless against his strength. Not only had he to submit, but also to give his daughter in marriage to the Emperor (May 1714 A.D.)(105) But since then Ajitsing became the supporter of the Sayyad brothers(106) . He took active part in deposting Farrukh Siyar on 27th February 1719 A.D. But Sawai Jaysing(107) , unlike Ajitsing, was on the side of Farrukh Siyar and as such was opposed to Sayyad brothers. He resented the fall of Farrukh Siyar and became the rallying point of the discontented nobles, several of whom fled to him. Thus he attained imence influence and prestiage in the group that was opposed to Sayyad brothers. He was one of the prominent figures behind the rising of Niku Siyar at Agra. But when he saw that none of his expected supporters arrived, he sent his Vakil to beg forgiveness for the offence he had committed. "It was eventually arranged that the faujdari of Surat, in the Subha of Ahmedabad, should be held by Jaising, and the Subhadaris of Ahmedabad and Ajmer, including Jodhpur, should continue under Raja Ajitsingh. Under this arrangement, the two Rajas held all the country from thirty kos from Delhi where the native land of Jai Singh begins, to the shores of the sea of Surat".

But the Turani party(108) with the instigation of the Emperor and his mother, soon succeeded in overthrowing the Sayyads (October - November 1720 A.D.). Being the partisan of the Sayyads(109) , Ajitsing refused to recognise the Government of Muhammad Shah. He assumed the state of an independent Hindu sovereign and exhibited the strongest reaction to the Muslim rule by destroying the mosques at Ajmer, forbidding the butchers to kill the cows and prohibiting the Muslims to call prayer. He was deprived of the province of Gujarat, but no body from the Court was ready to march against him to expel him from Ajmer ( 1721 A.D.). It was in 1722 A.D.(110) that Haidar Kuli took possession of Ajmer by expelling the Raja's officers. It is clear that the life of Ajitsing was itself a challenge to the Mughal Government, till his death, by mishap(111) , in 1724 A.D.

Sawai Jaysing (1699-1743 A.D.) had served the Emperor Aurangzeb(112) in Deccan in his early youth, at the capture of the fort of Vishalgadh during November 1701 to April 1702 A.D. Along with Ajitsing and the Rana of Udaypur he opposed Bahadur Shah during 1708 to 1710 A.D. He was a shrewd politician and knew perfectly how far to stretch a point. He skillfully utilised the opportunities provided by the ever-changing politics at Delhi especially after the death of Bahadur Shah, to meet his own ends. He raised his personal prestige and influence in the Court of Delhi through each occasion but avoided to be entangled him in any of the decisive actions. He was the acknowledged opponent to the ascendancy of the Sayyad brothers, but had no hand in their fall which was effected by the deliberate opposition of the 'Turani faction headed by Nizam-ul-Mulk. However, he was not slow to congratualte Muhammad Shah for his success on 23rd November 1720 (113) A.D. In fact, he was neither interested in Farrukh Siyar, nor in Muhammad Shah but in his own ambition, which was to expand his dominion at the cost of the shattering Mughal Empire(114) . His life was also a challenge to the Mughal Empire, we may call it a diplomatic challenge.


Foot Notes (Description)

(1) "The Gazetteer of India" Vol, I, chap, I, pp. 4 and 22 32 to 35, 'Rajasthan through the Ages', Vol, I,  PP. 1-5 and 11.

(2) 'The Cambride History of India' Vol, I, P. 72, 'The Vedic Age' (1971), P. 248.

(3)  'Rajasthan Through the Ages', pp. 41 to 43, 'The Oxford History of India',

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->(4) I have taken the help of chapters XIV & XV in 'Vedic Age', by A. D. Pusalkar, to construct the traditional history of Rajasthan.

(5)  'Mahabharat, Vana Paerva' - Ch. 202.

(6) 'The Combridg History of India', Vol, I, P. 282.

(7)  'The Age of Imperial Unity', p. 221.

(8) 'The Cambridge History of Inida', Vol, I, p. 152, 'The Age of Imperial Unity', p. II

(9)'Rajasthan Through the Ages', p. 49.

(10) 'The Cambridge History of India', Vol. I, Pp. 279, 424. Dr. R.K. Mukharji gives 324 B.C., as the year of the foundation of the Maurya Empire, 'The Age of Imperial Unity', pp. 38,49.

(11)  'Rajasthan Through the Ages, pp. 48, 49.

(12)  'The Early History of India', p. 158.

(13)'The Cambridge History of India', Vol, I. P. 466.

(14) 'India in the time of Patanjali, pp. 27 to 31.

(15) The ancient town of Nagari, about eleven miles, to the North of Chitod, 'Early History of India', p. 204.

(16) As per the letter of Pushyamitra to his son Agnimitra, in 'Malvik agnimitra' by Kalidas, 5th Act.

(17) 'India in the time of Patanjali', p. 58.

(18)  'The Age of Imperial Unity', p. 118.

(19) Ibid, p. 144.

(20) 'Rajasthan Through the Ages', pp. 49 to 55, 'The Age of Imperial Unity', pp. 159 to 168, 'India in the time of Patanjali', pp. 60 to 62, 'The Early History of India' by V.A. Smith, p, 91.

(21) "Alexander completely surprised the Mlloi, most of whom were working unarmed in the fields. Many of the helpless wretches were ruthlessly cut down without their turning to offer resistence." 'The Early History of India', V.A. Smith p.93.

(22) Maharashtra State Gazetteer - I, PP. 212,213.

(23)'The Classical Age', p. 35.

(24)'The Early History of India, V.A. Smith p, 297. 'The Vakatak Gupta Age', pp. 182 to 185.

(25)'The Classical Age', p. 35.

(26) From 'political theory and administrative organization" 'The Classical Age', p. 347.

(27) Ibid, pp. 35,38,43.

(28) 'The Classical Age', pp. 97,98..

(29) Ibid, pp. 104 to 106, 112,153,154.

(30) See the Appendix at the end of this Chapter.

(31) 'The Classical Age', pp. 153 to 155.

(32) 'The Guhils at a later stage regarded themselves as Kshatriyas of the solar race and claimed their descent from Shri. Ram; but Guhudatta, the founder of the dynasty as well as Bappa are called Vipra in two records dated 977 A.D. and 1274 A.D. Another record dated 1245 A.D. tells us that Bappa exchanged Brahma (prisestly) for Kshatra (millitary) Splendour, - 'The Classical Age', p.159.

(33) Ibid, p. 160.

(34) 'The Classical Age, pp. 161 to 163, 'Rajasthan Through the Ages' p. 101.

(35) 'The Classical Age', pp. 155,171 to 173'. 'Futuhu-1 Buldan' in E.D. Vol, I, p. 126 Appendix, pp. 390,391,441.

(36) 'The Classical Age', p. 155.

(37) 'The Imperial Kanauj', p. 27, 'Rajasthan Through the Ages', pp. 141,142. The Oxford History of India, p. 199.

(38) 'Salsilatut Tawarikh' in E.D. Vol, I, p. 4.

(39) 'Murujul Zahab' in E.D. I, pp. 22,23.

(40) 'The Age of Imperial Kanauj', pp. 127,128.

(41) 'Albiruni's India', pp. 22,23.

(42) 'Tarikh Yamini' in E.D. Vol, II, pp. 41,42.

(43) Ibid, pp. 25,26.

(44) 'Tarikh Yamini' in E.D. Vol, II, pp. 14 to 52. 'The Oxford Hist. of India', pp. 208,209.

(45) Dr. R. C. Majumdar in 'Preface' to "The Struggle for Empire", p. xLv.

(46) 'Tabkat-I-Nasiri' in E.D. Vol, II, pp. 294,296,297.

(47) 'The Struggle for Empire", pp. 72,85 to 87, 90,134,147,148, 'The Delhi Sultanate', p. 348.

(48) 'The Delhi Sultanate', pp. 22,26,33.

(49) Ibid, p. 70.

(50) Ibid, pp, 329,331,333,334,352,353.

(51) 'The Delhi Sultanate', pp. 354,355.

(52) Ibid, pp. 335 to 337.

(53) Ibid, p. 344, 'The Hist. of India' by M. Elphinstone. Pp. 372 to 374.

(54) Ibid, p. 382.

(55) Ibid, pp. 395,396.

(56) 'The Hist. of India', M. Elphinstone, p. 441, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol,II, p. 52 to 55.

(57) 'Studies in Rajput Hist', by Qanungo, p. 64.

(58) 'The Oxford Hist. of India', p. 368, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 161.

(59) Fall Vol. I, p. 234.

(60) 'The Hist. of India', by M. Elphinstone, p. 563, 'Aurangzeb' by S. Lane - Poole, pp. 141,142.

(61) Ibid, p. 134.

(62) 'Maasir-I-Alamgiri' in E.D. Vol, II, pp. 183,184.

(63) Ibid, PP. 355 to 358.

(64) 'Munt, Lubab' in E.D. vol, VII, pp. 233,234,297, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 247.

(65) 'The Hist. of India', M. Elphinstone, pp. 549,553,555.

(66) 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, P. 247.

(67) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol VII, p. 300, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 248.

(68) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 296. 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 242.

(69) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 297,298.

(70) 'Aurangzeb' by S.Lane-Poole, p 139, 'The Hist. of India' by M. Elphinstone, p. 562.

(71) 'Aurangzeb' by S. Lane-Poole, pp. 65, 138., T.F.M.E., pp. 28,29.

(72) 'The Oxford Hist of India', p. 419, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, p. 241.

(73) "If the poorer among them discovered that it took away the bulk of their income and thus rendered it impossible for them to maintain themselves, that was none of his business. If they wanted to evade its payment, the way was open to them. They could accept the true faith and escape this burden found it too irksome to bear…

If manucci is to be believed, it was Aurangzeb's intention to use it for spreading the Muslim religion among his subjects". - 'The religious policy of the Mughal Emperor's by Sri Ram Sharma, pp. 158,159.

(74) 'Maasiri Alamgiri' in E.D. Vol, VII, p. 189.

(75) 'Farmand, Manshuras and Nishan', p. 39-254. 'Maasiri Alamgiri' in E.D. Vol. II, pp. 301,302,304, 'The Hist. of India' by M. Elphinstone, p. 564, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV p. 251.

(76) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol VII, p. 300, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 248.

(77) "Since his coming to the throne, my father the Emperor Aurangzeb has formed the deliberate resolution of putting down the Hindus. This is the sole cause of his war against the Rajputs, while in the eyes of God all men are His equal children and deserve impartial protection from their ruler. I.. decided to oppose him in this disastrous move. I am, therefore, coming to you as a friend, as your kingdom is out of the Emperor's reach. The valiant Durgadas Rathod accompanies me. Please do not entertain any false suspicion about my intensions. We shall fully co-operate in putting down the Emperor more when we meet in person." May 1681. - Extract from Prince Akbar's letter to Sambhaji, New Hist. Vol. I, p. 305.

(78) 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, pp. 252,281. 'Aurangzeb' by S. Lane-Poole, p. 141.

(79) 'Hist. of Aurangzeb', Vol, V, p. 270.

(80) 'The Hist. of Aurangzeb', Vol, V, pp. 268,271.

(81) "We cannot endure any longer the persecution that this wicked Emperor is inflicting upon the Hindu race and religion, and are prepared to sacrifice everything, our land, our forts and even our lives, in an attempt to put him down. With this resolve, we have for these two years entertained at our court our honored guests Akbar and Durgadas, and have put to death many a brave captains of his, captured several, released some, either after exacting heavy ransoms or out of compassion. The moment has arrived when the Emperor himself can be captured and made prisoner, so that we can carry out our religious functions without molestation. If you muster courage and co-operate with us, what is there to prevent success crowing our endeavors? You will remember how your own son the yough Krishna Singh was treacherously put to death father, the revered Mirza Raja Jai Singh, who helped Aurangzeb in acquiring for him the throne of Delhi as against his brother Dara Shukoh" - Sambhaji's letter to Raja Ramsingh of Ambar, May 1682, New Hist. Vol. I, p. 312.

(82) Ibid, p. 321.

(83) 'The Cambridge Hist. of India'. Vol, IV, pp. 262,303, 'Aurangzeb by S. Lane-Poole, p. 139, 'Hist. of Aurangzeb' by Jadunath Sarkar, pp. 281 to 385, 390,394.

(84) 'Farmans, Manshurs and Nishan', p. 46-2, 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 404,405, 'Hist, of Aurangzeb' by Jadunath Sarkar, Vol. V, p. 292, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, p. 321.

(85)'Vakil Reports' II, 456,457,461,462,469, 'Mar. riya'. 5, p. 128, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, pp. 321,322.

(86) 'Vakil Reports' I, 955,960.

(87) 'Jaypur Records - Maratha Papers' - 170,171.

(88) 'Vakil Reports' II, 425,458,460, 'Jaypur Kharitas' 4-1.

(89) '£bC kÙP BC²b Ù"b' - 'Jaypur Kharitas', 7-18 also 16 and 17., Mar. Riya. 5, p. 128.

(90) Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh by Dr. V.S. Bhatnagar, pp. 59 and 60.

(91) Life and times of Sawai Jai Singh by Dr. V. S. Bhatnagar, p. 64.

(92) "<"}£éëbhàbC k"bCÈ PÚÈa ¥Tò D®Ù n>¼" Jaypur Records, Mar.-Papers - 159. 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. II - p. 420, 'Wakil Reports' I - 959.

(93) 'Jaypur Kharitas', 6-1 7-5.

(94) Ibid, 7-17 and 18.

(95) 'Vakil Reports' I-963, 'Vakil Reports' II-456.

(96) 'Jaypur Records, Maratha Papers' - 173.

(97) Ibid, 156, 157,165,173,184.

(98) Ibid, 163, 173,176,183,184, 185

(99) 'Vakil Reports' II, 426.

(100) Ibid, 467,473,475,476, 'Munt Lubab in E.D. Vol. VIII - pp. 413 to 420

(101) Ibid, p. 420.

(102) 'Farmans, Manshurs - 157,158,162, 'Vakil Reports' II, 470,474, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, p. 322.

(103) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 446.

(104) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 446,447.

(105) But after the fall of Farrukh Siyar, he took back his daughter "made throw off her Musalman race, dismissed her Muhammadan attendants". Kafi Khan laments, "In the reign of no former as to take his daugher after she had been married to a king and admitte to the honour of Islam". 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 483.

(106) 'Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans'. P. 50-27, 51-31.'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol, VII, pp. 470,471,475,477,478.

(107) Ibid, 474,475,482 to 485.

(108)'Mun Lubab' in E.D. Vol, VII, pp. 488 to 515.

(109) Ibid, p. 517.

(110)'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 339.

(111) 'Later Mughals', Vol, II, p. 115.

(112) 'Hist. of Aurangzeb', by Jadunath Sarkar, Vol, V, p. 386.

(113) 'Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans', p. 58-22, 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol, IV, p. 346.

(114) 'Tarikh - Hind' in E.D. Vol, VIII, p. 50.

http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/intro2.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
From Shambhuji's letters it can be inferred that he was even more assertive about Hindu rights and more hostile to Muslim rule but unlike Shivaji he had many vices and even raped a woman before, that was what brought his downfall, if he like his father was a capable general and free of vices, things would have been different. Peshwa Baji Rao was also a great leader and ambitious but his hands were tied by Shivaji's grandson Shahu, who was more modest in his aims and also the sudden death of Baji Rao in 1740 was a heavy blow to Hindus, we have been unlucky in many ways.

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE FIRST PHASE : (1720 TO 1743 A.D.)

THE PHASE OF FRIENDSHIP (1720 TO 1743 A.D.)

(i) The Marathas, The Rajputs and The Nizam :

The factions at the Court of Delhi after the death of Aurangzeb, especially from the beginning of the reign of Farrukh Siyar till 1720 A.D., made the Emperor a puppet in the hands of either the Sayyad brothers or the Nizam who was the head of the Turani party. And every time the Emperor reacted, by trying to set himself   free from the grip of the former or the latter, it only added to the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. Actuated by selfishness(1), every Courtier of eminence and every thief tried to secure a share for him out of the spoil. The Marathas had secured the Sanads (2) of the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of the six subhas of Deccan (March 1719 A.D.) and had begun to cast their covetous eyes on the Subhas of Gujarat and Malwa(3). The Rajput chiefs were also not lagging behind. The House of Jodhpur had fixed its gaze on Ajmer and Gujarat whereas Agra and Malwa were the expected possessions for the House of Jaypur. The Rajput Chiefs in fact had lost all interest in the survival of the Mughal Empire(4), and their contact with the Court was merely to secure the coveted provinces with the Imperial sanction.

There was still one more claimant for these provinces of Gujarat and Malwa, namely Nizam-ul-Mulk(5). He had equally grasped the situation of the collapsing edifice of the Mughal Empire and had aimed at creating an independent Empire for himself, if it could be possible, to the south of Chambal. He was successful in effecting the downfall of the Sayyad brothers and as an effect of the same, became the Wazir of the Emperor(6). He then obtained for himself the provinces of Gujarat and Malwa alarmed the Emperor. The out-come(7) was the rebellion and the consequent independence of the Nizam in the six Subhas of Deccan, after his victory at Sakharkherda, on 11th October 1724 A.D. But the Nizam never took his eyes off from these two Subhas. In Gujarat(8), he took recourse to armed opposition, and it was only after his uncle Hamidkhan was overpowered by Sarbuland Khan, that he gave up its possession. For Malwa, he was constantly(9) writing to the Emperor and once again in 1737 A.D. got its possession on the plea of driving away the Marathas(10).

Thus for the acquistion of Gujarat and Malwa the Rajputs(11) were laying their claims through the Mughal Court, the Nizam was endeavouring to acquire it by dint of the pressure of his renowned personality, aided by diplomacy and the leadership of the Turani party at the Court, and the Marathas were trying to penetrate, with the force of their arms. The interplay of these three powers in relation to Gujarat and Malwa is the history of Maratha-Rajput relations during 1720 to 1743 A.D.

(ii) Role of Religion in the friendship of the Marathas and the Rajputs

Aurangzeb's death definitely marks a change in the political atmosphere of India, that was not congenial to the survival of the Mughal rule in general.

During the last years of the reign of Aurangzeb and after it, the anti-Hindu policy of Aurangzeb, enkindled the flame independence in the hearts of Rajput Chiefs and the phase of Mughal predominance(12) over Rajasthan as under Akbar, Shah Jahan or even Aurangzeb, became a thing of the past, Especially from the reign of Farrukh Siyar, the Mughal Empire lost its integrity as it lost the loyal supporters(13), who would care for the existance of the Empire.

A history of 18th Century, excluding the religious feelings behind the political and religious activities, at least up to 1739 A.D., until when the Mughal rule as Muslim rule had not lost all its vigour, is complete in itself. The first act (14) of Ajitsing, when he declared independence after the fall of Sayyad, was to ban cow slaughter in both the Subhas of Ajmer and Ahmadabad. The appointment of Abhayasing as a Subhadar  of Gujarat even in 1730 A.D. was acclaimed by the Hindus of Ahmadabad with joy as he belonged to their religion. "They compared Abhayasing and his brother with Ram and Laxman and recited songs in their honour." The Muslim Historian laments that, "Under Maharaja's rule, the prestige of Islam declined(15). Cows were forbidden to be slaughtered and temples came again into honour".

From the first entry of the Marathas in Malwa (16) , they were regarded not as invaders but as the saviors from the detested Mughal rule. And hence there is no wonder that "to their first invasion of Malwa (17) , we are told by every Persian or Hindu writer, that notices the subject, hardly any opposition was given and we possess many testimonials to show that they chiefly attributed their success on this occasion to the action of religious feeling." The first act (18) of the Hindus rule in Malwa was to reinstate the worship of Hindu God in the temple previously converted into a mosque.

When Rafi-ul-darjat(19), the Emperor, installed after the dethronement of Farrukh Siyar, abolished, Jazia and the taxes levied in places of Hindu pilgrimage, on the advice of Ajitsing, it was moment of joy for the Hindu world. One this occasion, the following letter was addressed to Ajitsing by Sangramsing II, the Maharana of Udaypur. It goes a long way to reveal the prevailing religious sentiments of the Rajput Chiefs and their selfconfidence that reflected the changed political conditions of Delhi.

"Maharana Ajitsingji (20) at Delhi should accept the complements from Maharana Sangramsing of Udaypur. We all are doing well and you should inform us about your own welfare. You are great, You would continue showing more and more intimacy. Consider this Stte your own and do not see any difference in any matter. Your letter received. You wrote that by putting Rafi-ul-darjat on the throne (of Delhi) got the Hindusthan freed from Jazia and the restrictions imposed in sacred places. I am very glad to learn all this. No one like you had taken birth among the Hindus up till now, nor is expected in future. May God give you more success? This is a great gain for us all. Until this day the Muhammedans were more powerful, but now they seek our support.

The shortsighted Mughal (Emperor) would do nothing in future without careful consideration as he has lost his prestige. You should consider this place as your own house. Please let me know if I may be of any service to you. On account of you all Hindusthan is safe and especially ourselves. What more should I write?"

The Rajput chiefs began to pride themselves as Hindu Rajas  & had little interest in calling themselves as mansabdars of the Mughal Court. The titles & deeds of Ajitsing (21)  & the rest of Rajput Chiefs, amply explain their religious outlook. The murder of Ajitsing in 1724 A.D. was lamented, because besides other things, in him a supporter of the Hindu religion   & a competent opposer to the Turks was lost(22) .

The Nizam had taken a lesson from the long-drawn struggle of Aurangzeb with the Marathas (1862 to 1707 A.D.) (23) and had fully realized their strength in Deccan. Being a shrewd politician, he deemed it wise not to differentiate between a Maratha and a Muslim as his subject, for the survival of his newly created kingdom(24). But apart from diplomacy, at heart he was the true follower of Aurangzeb and opposed the Marathas and the Rajputs on religious grounds and detested their predominance either in Deccan, or in the North. His religious attitude behind his politics is obvious from the following letter.

ASAF JAH TO ABDUL NABI KHAN, APRIL 1731(25)

"The accursed Bajirao finding the province of Gujarat unoccupied by defenders laid siege to Baroda a city that is in the hands of dispersed (i.e. mutually antagonistic people). I reflected that if, God avert it, this rebel got Baroda, it would be a great disgrace and loss and our work would be ruined, while his disturbance would become perpetual in that Subha and utter ruin would seize the prevalence of the religion of Muhammad. Therefore, in the spirit and pride of Islam and fidelity to the (Emperor's) salt, I decided upon this religious duty, that after crossing the Narmada I should engage at the full gallop in rooting this black wretch out, and thus perform the tasks of a holy war and cutting off the roots of disturbance."

It was the ambition of the Rajput Chiefs of Marwad and Jaypur to have the Subhas of Gujarat and Malwa respectively for themselves. But when they realized that they could not maintain these provinces in opposition to the Maratha strength and the designs of the Nizam and the Turani party, they drew back and helped the Marathas (26) in the acquisition of these provinces, lest they should fall into the hands of the Turani party and the Nizam.

Beyond doubts, Jaysing was the patron of Hindu religion and culture. It was his ambition his kingdom from Yamuna to Narmada(27). There was nothing unnatural in it as after the fall of Farrukh Siyar, every Mughal Chief tried to create and independent position for himself, even Giridhar Bahadur(28) in Malwa was not an exception to this rule. It is correct to say that in calling the Marathas into Malwa in 1728 A.D.(29) , his action was motivated by self interest. But when he saw that he could not retain Malwa for himself, he was not sorry to leave it into the hands of the Marathas, because in the view of the Rajpurts of the generation of Sawai Jaysing there was definitely a difference between the Malwa under the Maratha Government and the Malwa under the Mughal Government. Had it not been the fact then Sawai Jaysing would have been the enemy of the Marathas especially after 1736 A.D. when their hold on Malwa was established beyond doubt.

After the defeat the death of Giridhar Bahadur at the hands of Chimaji Appa, Sawai Jaysing congratulated Nandlal Mandloi (30) thus, "You have defended our religion in Malwa and crushed the Muhammedans(31) , establishing Dharma. You have fulfilled my desire." He was ambitious no doubt but he was religious minded as well. And hence his ambition could not carry him to extreme limit in opposing the Marathas for the possession of Malwa, so as to join hands with the Turani party. He would have certainly liked to retain Malwa for himself to fulfill his cherished dream of the expansion of his kingdom. And he did all efforts to achieve it. But he was sufficiently religious minded to see that in the acquisition of Malwa by the Marathas he was leaving that province to another Hindu power that was nothing but friendly to him. It is a well-known fact that he was the well wisher and supporter of Bajirao till the death of the latter.

There should be no doubt about the fact that Sawai Jaysing saw the “Establishment of Dharma”, in the victories of the Maraths over the muslims (32) had he called the Marathas for his personal gain alone, the story would not have continued from 1728 A.D. till the cession of the Subha of Malwa to the Maraths . It is through him that the demands of the Bajirao (33) relating to Malwa reached the Emperor and it is through his efforts that Balajirao-Bajirao's son-got the Sanad of Malwa in 1741 A.D. It was due to this partiality of Jaysing towards the Marathas that Sadat Khan gained the confidence of the Emperor in 1735 A.D(34) . This common factor of Hindu religion between the  Rajputs and the Marathas was known even to the Emperor. He feared that if Jaysing were displeased, he, being a Hindu, would join Bajirao(35) .

The object of the Maratha expansion (36) in the North was to safe-guard the Hindu religion. One of the demands of Bajirao not accepted by the Emperor in 1736, was the grant of Jagir of Prayag, Kashi, Gaya, and Mathura(37). His whole career stood for the protection of Hinduism(38). In the conquest of Malwa, he had secured the alliance of Hindus, in his war against Siddis, he was avenging the desecration of Hindu temples, in his war against the Portuguese he was undoubtedly fighting for Hinduism, in as much as the inquisition of Portuguese India made it impossible for Hindus to profess their faith in peace. And when the Bundela Chief found his principality threatened by the Pathan Nawab of Farrukhbad he hurried for protection to Bajirao as the acknowledge leader of the Hindus in India."

Even outside Maharashtra, Bajirao was regarded as the supporter of the Brahmins and the incarnation of Parshuram(39). He had no equal as a successful General in his time. He victories over the renowned Turani leader Nizam-ul-Mulk, and his dash upon Delhi in 1737 A.D. were the greatest triumphs for the Hindus(40) who had received nothing but defeats at the hands of the Muslim Generals with a few exceptions, in the previous centuries. It is no wonder that the Hindu(41) North centered its attention on him for his able leadership in the calamity of Nadirshah in 1739 A.D.

There are ample proofs to show that Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing had come closer(42) . Hence it is correct to say that "Unity of faith and religion strengthened the bounds of amity between Bajirao and Raja Jaising and his circumstance was a source of additional power and influence to the former (i.e. Bajirao)".

(iii) The Phase of Friendship

The relations between Sawai Jaysing and Abhayasing were not always cordial and at a time, the latter leaned towards the Turani party(43). But even then, Abhaysing's activities never seriously hampered the harmony that existed between the Marathas and the Rajputs during this phase of friendship.

The Rajput opposition to the Turani party and their consequent support to the Maratha-cause are the two sides of the same coin. Allowing full consideration for the play of self-interest on the part of Rajput Chiefs, there are ample proofs to prove that common religion and culture played a dominant   part between the relations of the Marathas and the Rajputs during 1720 to 1743 A.D.

Though the Rajputs were affected by the ravages of the Maratha horse(44) or were asked to pay 'Khandani' or were pressed for a grant of patta by the Marathas (45), they showed no ill felling towards the Marathas during this phase in spite of the conference at Hurda in July 1734 A.D.

With the common element of religion in their minds, with a sincere appreciation for the heroic deeds of the Marathas (46), with the practical need of soliciting help against the Turani party led by Nizam-ul-Mulk and Kamrudding Khan at the Court, the Rajputs during the period of 1720 to 1743 A.D., regarded the Marathas as their ally and an indispensable element in Delhi politics, in to which, they advocated their entry, pleaded (47) their case before the Emperor, called (48) them in the North with all the urgency and felt relieved when their support was assured(49)

Even though the Marathas hardly needed any invitation for the invasion of Malwa, where their raids were not unknown previously, let it be noted that in the initial stage of their friendship, it were the Rajputs who called them across Narmada(50), promised them expenses (51) to the amount of a lakh and fifty thousand per month, believed them to be honest(52) and trust worthy and honoured(53) them by offering elephants of palankins and expressed gratification (54) at the brotherly feeling exhibited by the Maratha Chief towards them.

It was the grand beginning of the combination that was unfortunately destined to end in deadly enmity in the last quarter of the 18th century!


Foot Notes (Description)

(1) ' Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 244.

(2)'Later Mughals', Vol. I, pp. 406,407, 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. III, p. 468.

(3) S.P.D. 10-1.

(4)'Central India', Vol. I, pp. 53,54.

(5) "Nizam-ul-Mulk's ambition was to break away from the Empire and secure for himself an independent position in the Deccan with, if possible, Malwa and Gujarat added to it. For Malwa was the doorway to the South. He began with this object to consolidate his position but in this daring plan, he encountered opposition not only from the Marathas but also from the two Rajput rulers, of Jaypur and Marwar, who coveted for themselves Malwa and Gujarat respectively". - New Hist., Vol. II, p. 84.

(6)'Munt. Lubab', in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 518.

(7) Ibid, pp. 523 to 527. 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, pp. 349, 350.

(8)Ibid, pp. 350,351.

(9)"I have been writing during all these years on the pressing necessity of the destruction of the Marathas (in the provinces of Gujarat and Malwa). But it had no effect. In writing as I did, I had no other view than that of discharging my duties, and serving the Emperor faithfully. But the contents of letters had no effect. On the other hand, the replies were vague, and had no relation to the questions, which I had raised………."Extract from Nizam's letter, Eighteenth Century Deccan, p. 145.

(10)'Tarikh-I-Hindi' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 57.

(11) 'Jaypur Records-Maratha Papers', 206,209,210.

(12)  Mark the confident tone in the following writing of Ajitsing - "We thought that after mounting an elephant, the other conveyances are below our dignity and as we could dethrone and imprison Farrukh Siyar and after releasing the other one of our choice from prison, put him on the throne, this Jaysing, does not deserve our attention."

(13) 'Central India', Vol. I, pp. 53,54.

(14) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 517. 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 103.

(15) 'Mirat-o-Ahmadi, quoted in Hist. of Guj. Vol. II, p. 435.

(16) "The Rajputs, especially Sawai Jaising, were allies of the Marathas, and actually called them in order to weaken the detested Mughal rule" - 'Later Mughals', Vol. II p. 244.

(17) 'Central India', Vol. II, pp. 53,54.

(18) 'Holkar Shahi' I-51.

(19) 'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 479.

(20) Letter of Maharana Sangramsing II to Maharana Ajitsing of Marwad, dated 11th day of the dark half of Vaishakh, Samvat 1775 (1719 A.D), 'Glories of Raj.' Pp. 110 to 112.

(21) The title of Ajitsing was, "blessed, adorned with many auspicious qualities, protector of Hindus, Emperor, Sovereign ruler, king of Kings, Maharaja Shri Ajitsinghji". - From Glories of Rajasthan.

(22) "Oh Bakhta, in evil hour Why slew you Ajmal, The puller of Hindus The lance of the Turks" - The Annals, Vol I, pp. 383. 384. "The Gods above exclimed, "Dhanya Dhanya Ajit" who maintained the faith and overwhelmed the Asuras - From Raj. Roopak in Annals. Vol. II (1957) p. 73.

(23) "The Emperor Aurangzeb forced armies and treasuries against them. But the resources were found to be insufficient", - Extract from the letter of Nizam, Eighteenth Century Deccan, pp. 142, 143.

(24) Ibid, p. 95 - "I had to go and tell him that diplomacy was entirely a different matter. I have won over these people (marathas) Otherwise, they were the Zamindars of this country".

(25) Extract from the letter Nizam, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 142.

(26)"The Rajput princes and Chiefs of Jaypoor, Marwar and Mewar, so far from continuing to be the defence of the empire were either secretly or openly the supporters of the Maratha invaders". - 'Central India', Vol. I, p. 53.

(27)'Malwa in transition', p. 194.

(28) 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 244.

(29) S.P.D. 13-10.

(30) 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 243.

(31) Even though Giridhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur were Brahmans, they were treated to be the men of the Muhammedans, See - "A fight took place Daya Bahadur, - from Muhammedan side." - S.P.D. 13-27.

(32) Dr. Raghubirsingh writes in his 'Malwa in tran', (p.194) : 'The policy of Jaysing to favour the Maratha cause was not dictated by any religion motive but self - interest and personal gain."

(33) Even in September 1738, the 'Farman' from the Emperor in respect of a Jagir, Mansab and Mahal from Malwa, received by Bajirao was under the seal of Sawai Jaysing - S.P.D. 15-p. 86.

(34) S.P.D. 14-27.

(35) S.P.D. 15-29390,391,441.

(36) Hingne 1-15.

(37) S.P.D. 15-p. 96.

(38)'Mil. System-pp. 58, 59.

(39) S.P.D. 14-1

(40) S.P.D. 9-22

(41) 'Ait. Charitra', 4. 'New Hist.' II, pp. 178, 179.

(42) "Tarikhi Ibrahim Khan" in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 261.

(43) S.P.D. 14-39.

(44) S.P.D. 30-108.

(45) Ibid, 128, S.P.D. 9-12.

(46) S.P.D. 10-66.

(47) S.P.D. 14-39, 47.

(48) S.P.D. 30-134, 143.

(49) 'Satara Ait, Lekh', 2-263.

(50) S.P.D. 13-10.

(51) S.P.D. 14-47.

(52) S.P.D. 10-66.

(53) S.P.D. 30-pp. 322 TO 326.

(54) S.P.D. 15-23.

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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 2

MALWA, 1720 TO 1733 A.D.


(i) Malwa during 1699 to 1713 A.D. :

The strenuous Deccan war in which Aurangzeb was entangled during 1682 to 1707 A.D. was a part of his religious policy that affected adversely the provinces of the North, including Malwa. "Any disturbance in Berar or Gondwana (1). Bundelkhand or the Eastern Rajput States would immediately spread by contagion to Malwa." The people lost all attachment to Mughal rule (2) and gave expression to their opposition in revolts. "The local disturbances (3) of peace in Malwa in the closing years of the reign (of Aurangzeb) were too many to be counted."

It is no wonder that when the Marathas invaded Malwa, under such circumstances, they were not regarded by the people of Malwa as invaders but were looked upon as their supporters to oppose the detested Mughal rule(4) . The Marathas during their successive raids did nothing to alienate the sympathetic attitude of the people of Malwa. "The Marathas(5) carried the war against of Government. They had taken a large share of the revenue but did not destroy like the barbarous invaders the source from which it was drawn. They were in this, acting with the concurrence and aid of the Hindu chiefs of Malwa."

When Rajaram (6) was the Chhatrapati of the Marathas, the first Maratha invasion of Malwa, took place in 1699 A.D. under Krishnaji Sawant. After crossing Narmada, he ravaged some places near Dhamoni. Tarabai, the regent, also carried the policy to plunder Mughal-territories as a war strategy, after the death of Rajaram in 1800 A.D., the Maratha bands penetrated in Malwa as far as Mandsor and Sironj(7), which places they invested. From Sironj they passed to Bundelkhand, where Chhatrasal was fighting for his independence. They were in close touch with him.  Mohansing, the Zamindar of Awasgadh, guided a Maratha detachment near Mandu. The Kolis and Bhils also rebelled. The effects of the Maratha invasion of 1703 A.D. were so disastrous; that Bidar Bakht the Governor (august 3, 1704 to September 1706 A.D.) reported (8) that half of Malwa adjacent to Khandesh was devastated.

With the coming of Shahu from the Mughal camp in 1708 A.D., a civil war broke out among the Marathas in which ultimately Shahu was victorious. After that the Marathas again resumed their contacts with Malwa (9) .

(ii) The three factors in the politics of Malwa :

With the coming of Farrukh Siyar to the throne of Delhi, Jaysing rose in his estimation day by day. He was appointed Subhadar (10) of Malwa in February 1713 A.D. and continued in that capacity till November 1717 A.D. i.e. nearly for 5 years with a population predominated (11) by the Rajputs, and with most of the Chiefs being Rajputs, having connection with the ruling Houses of Udaypur, Jodhpur and Jaypur, Malwa had closer contacts with Rajasthan on the basis of race, religion, culture and geography. With the losing grip of the Mughal administration all-round. It was natural for Swai Jaysing to think to creatinga kindom strectching form Yamuna to Narmada, and he never lost touch with Malwa, which remained always an integral part of his ambition. When Nizam was removed from Malwa and Gujarat from 1725 A.D. due to this rebellion he tried to secure both these provinces(12) for him but was unsuccessful, as the Emperor was not prepared for that.

On February 18, 1718 A.D. Farrukh Siyar was disposed and the supremacy of Sayyads was ensured. The Nizam (13) was sent to Malwa as the Subhadar, by the Sayyads to remove him from Delhi. With two successive deadly strokes the Nizam affected the downfall of the Sayyads consequently, on the death of Muhammad Aminkhan, he was appointed as Wazir by the Emperor Muhammad Shah, on February 4, 1721 A.D. With a break of about nine and half months (14), the Nizam was the Subhdar of Malwa from 20th February 1719 to 2nd June 1725 A.D., and even though the province was taken away from him by the Emperor in 1725 A.D. due to his rebellion, like Sawai Jaysing the Nizam too, never lost sight of Malwa (15) , and it should be noted that it was in the capacity as the Subhadar of Malwa, that he measured, for the last time his strength with Bajirao at Bhopal. This was the last severe fight in the career of Peshwa Bajirao over the issue of Malwa. His success in it removed the last hurdle in the possession of Malwa.

With the Sanads of six Subhas of Deccan, when the Marathas started their invasions of Malwa afresh under the able Peshwa Bajirao I, they added a third factor in the history of Malwa where they had already numerous friends and supporters and a few out-posts(16).

Bajirao was invested with the robes of Peshwaship on 17th April 1720 A.D. Not very long before, in 1719 A.D., he had been with his father to Delhi (17) and had seen the degenerated political conditions prevailing there. Being filled with an ambition of the expansion (18) of the Maratha rule from the very beginning of his career, he clearly judged that the time was ripe to strike at the roots of the Empire boldly, and hence, directed all his energies towards the North. The first object of his ambitious schemes was naturally Malwa.

Early in 1723 A.D. the Peshwa crossed Tapi river and entered Nemad, the Southern division of Malwa. On 13th February 1723 A.D. he met the Wazier Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was on his way to Gujarat, at Badaksha (19) in Zabua paragana near the borders of Malwa and Gujarat. After a week, he took leave of the Nizam and procceded to Deccan.

(iii) The Niam's Rebellion :

Disgusted with the Emperor, the Nizam left Delhi by the end of December 1723 A.D. "Having been accurately informed by his agents at Delhi of the Nizam's activities (20) , Bajirao left Satara in January 1724 A.D. and passing some time in north Khandesh, organising his forces, crossed the Narmada on 8th May and arrived in close proximity to the Nizam's camp at Sihore". The Nizam then met Bajirao for the third time at nalcha, near Dhar on 16th May 1724 A.D.

On 30th September 1724 A.D. the Nizam won the battle of Sakhar Kherda against Mubariz Khan, and founded an independent Kingdom of Deccan at Haidarabad. The immediate reaction of the Emperor Muhammad Shah was to remove all the officers appointed by him from their posts and to deprive him of the two Subhas of Malwa and Gujarat.

The rebellion of the Nizam greatly facilitated the Marathas to tighten their hold during 1724-25 A.D. on Gujarat as well as on Malwa. In 1724 A.D., Indore was assigned as Mokasa to Chimnji Ballal, for the maintenance (21) of his cavalry force and the Mandloi and the Kanungo were asked to pay the 'Chauth' to him, During 1725-26 Ambaji Trimbak (22) realized nearly 2 lakhs of rupees as Chauth from Malwa and Gujarat. On 10th October 1726 A.D. Ram Chandra Malhar (23) was granted the mamju of Sardeshmukhi for Malwa.

Giridhar Bahadur (24) as the Subhadar of Malwa on his part tried to check the collection of chauth and Sardeshmukhi by the Marathas in Malwa.

During these years (November 1725 to April 1727 A.D.) the Peshwa had accompanied Fattening Bhosale to Karnataka(25) . As soon as he returned, he was involved in a severe struggle with the Nizam whom he humbled at Palkhed (February 1728 A.D.)(26). This victory of Bajirao made his name famous in Hidusthan and established a fact that the Marathas were a strength capable to check even the Nizam. The party opposed to Nizam in the Court of the Emperor did not fail to take a note of it.

(iv) Najm-Ud-Din Ali Khan :

The Emperor's attention (27) was dominated by the idea of reducing the power of the Turani faction at the Court especially after the rebellion of the Nizam in 1724 A.D. It was after sufficient deliberation that the he appointed the Subhadars Sadat Khan (28) as the Subhadar of Malwa and Abhaysing (29) as the Subhadar of Gujarat. Then he thought of appointing Sayyad Nijam-Ud-din Ali Khan (30) as the Subhadar of Malwa. Finally he appointed Giridhar Bahadur and Sar Buland Khan as the Subhadars of Malwa and Gujarat respectively. He could never forgive the Nizam (31) for detatching a great part from the Empire and for his designs over Malwa and Gujarat. Much of the policy, of the Emperor in respect of these provinces, for more than a decade, hereafter, was directed by his desire to chastise the Nizam.(32)

Ambition was the dominant factor in the character of Sawai Jaysing and hence, the Nizam's (33) as well as Giridhar Bahadur's (34) interests in Malwa clashed with those of him. Even after the appointements of Giridhar Bahadur (35) and Sar Buland Khan to the Subhas of Malwa and Gujarat respectively, he was contemplating to take possession of both the Subhas that gave an income of 50 lakhs, by paying off 20 lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, And hence the maintained direct contact with them.

Under such circumstances, if the Marathas, with whom Sawai Jaysing was in close contact, were induced to invade Malwa with a big army, they would serve the purpose of both, Swai Jaysing and the Emperor. Their disturbance would have paved the way for the removal of Giridhar Bahadur to make room for Swai Jaysing and the despatch of the armies to suppress the so called Maratha disturbance would afford a chance to take revenge on the Nizam to the entire satisfaction of the Emperor, And the choice fell upon Sayyad Najm-ul-din Ali Khan who was capable to accomplish the task.

Najm-Ud-din Ali Khan (36) had taken active part in deposing and blinding Farrukh Siyar and was in prison since the battle of Hasanpur (37) in which he had fought against the Emperor Muhammad Shah most heroically along with his brother Sayyad Abdulla. As one of the Sayyad brothers he was naturally the deadliest enemy of Nizam-ul-Mulk.

After the province of Gujarat was taken away from him (38) , the Nizam asked his uncle Hamid Khan, who represented him in that province, to oppose any new Subhadar, whom the Emperor might appoint. Sarbuland Khan was the new Subhedar chosen and he begged for the aid of Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was then in the prison. In the summer of 1725 A.D. he and Giridhar Bahadur, who was going to take charge of the Government of Malwa, left the Capital together, followed closely by Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, who had been appointed second-in-Command of a large force. Their appointments to the Subha of Gujarat forced Hamid Khan to take refuge with his nephew Nizam-ul-Mulk in Deccan.

The gallant Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was then appointed as a reward for his services in Gujarat, to the Government (39) of the province of Ajmer and as the Faujdar of Gwalior (40) , Nod-shahbad and Dhamoni.

As Sawai jaysing had been the partisan of Farrukh Siyar, he was opposed to the Sayyads and as such as did not like the elevation of one of his former foes to power. Naturally the appointment of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan at Ajmer and other places gave rise to troubles. There was even occurrences of armed clashes (41) . Meanwhile Dadorao Bhimsen, the Peshwa's agent, came to the scene and intervened. The effect was the friendship between Sawai Jaysing and Najm-ud-din Ali Khan to whom Swai Jaysing recommended for the task of marching upon the Nizm. The following letter of Dadorao Bhismsen, makes the whole plan clear.

(v) The letter from Dadorao Bhimsen to Bajirao Pant Pradhan and Chimaji Appa (42) :

"Hearing the news of the treaty (43) , I had dispatched both the couriers to you. But it has been four months since then that no reply from you is received. I came here as per the letters of Khoja. Koki and Roshan Daula are the influential persons here. The opposite group is powerless before them. The Emperor does nothing without their counsel. The opposite party had tried to raise the question of Sarbuland Khan, but they were frustrated in it and hence they felt the humiliation. Sekhaji and Kesharao Ray have been sent. I am informed that, "I shall surely do the work. I am only watching for the opportunity. Rest assured". Sawaiji has taken full interest in cause. You will know from his letter to you. As for Sayyad all the Chiefs were opposed to the Emperors policy to favor him. When he was in Kota, the Emperor paid him three lakhs of rupees per month. Then the provision for the Subhadari of Gujarat was made but Kamruddin Khan opposed the proposal. The Emperor then assigned him the territory of Gwalior, Kalanbag, Dhamoni and Jortalab. Keeping an army of 20 to 25 thousand, the Sayyad destroyed the robbers and established his posts in the territory. Sawai then sent some force to assist the Chief of Gwalior. Nijm-ud-din Ali Khan attacked the force re-established his post. Hearing of it, force came again. Meanwhile I reached there, and spoke about the Sayyad and removed the differences in the minds of both of them. Robes, and a horse were sent with a trusted man and they were made friends by taking oaths. After that, Sawai Jaysing wrote once or twice about the Sayyad to the Emperor. "If the Nizam's work (44) is to be done it should be entrusted to Sayyad. He will do it." The Emperor called Sawai's Vakil Rao Jagram who is an influential person being six hazari, and asked him about the provision made by Sawaiji for this enterprise. Sawaji had written in detail t Rao Jagram who explained it all to the Emperor. On that, Sawaji received an order to come to the Court immediately without loss of time. The Rajput Mansabdars have about 25 to 30 thousand force. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan is asked to raise 25 thousand troops and a park of artillery. The Emperor is going to provide him for the expenses of twenty thousand forces and the artillery. All this is being done in the name of Gujarat but really it aims at Deccan (45). Sawaji has whole-heartedly taken the side of Sayyad. This he has done on the support of Swami. The name of Swami is famous in Hindustan. Previously also their had been great Sardars, nobody did like this (46). The Sayyad also depends on the Swami. The credit goes to Swami. I am also willing for the same." A letter should also be written to Chhatrasal Bundela. He is fighting with Bangash. He should be assured that "our force will come to that province after Dasera. You will get succour". He will pay for the expenses. For this work Durgadas, a man of trust is sent. He will explain all; Sawaiji has ordered, "send your force forthwith into Malwa. If this is done the Emperor will grant all your demands. The force should create disturbance in Malwa". I am forwarding Swai immediately. A courier from Sawai Jaysing and Moropant from me, have been dispatched to the Sayyad. He will come soon for this work. Send a letter assuring your help to Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan. An answer from Khoja also had been received today. He writes, "Write to Maharaja immediately to send Maratha armies forthwith into Gujarat and Malwa, go that under the same pretext we shall dispatch Sayyad. Any how the arrangement is made for the army to reach Malwa".

(vi) The Plan:

The important thing to note about the plan is that it was originated by Sawai Jaysing and was matured in full consultation with the Emperor. Sawai Jaysing personally wrote to Bajirao to send Maratha forces immediately into Malwa to create disorder, assuring him that, "The Emperor would be pleased to grant all the Maratha demands if the forces would be dispatched without loss of time". The Marathas were to be used as a means to prove incapacity of Giridhar Bahadur to check them. This was further to serve as an excuse (47) for sending the expedition of Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan into Malwa. Thus, the main object of the plan was to check Nizam's pretentions over Gujarat and Malwa and to crush him if possible. Accordingly (48) the Sayyad marched with Khanderay, the Sardar of Sawai Jaysig for Malwa. (14th January 1729 A.D.)

The most curious thing to note in the phase of the Maratha expansion towards the North, is the fact that they were invited by the consent of the Emperor himself to create disorder in his own province namely Malwa. The main figure behind this plan was Sawai Jaysing who depneded on the sympathy and support of Bajiroa for the success of the plan. In doing so, Sawai Jaysing, the Emperor and the Courtiers, opposed to the Turani Party, had no reason to dream that this invitation to the Marathas in Malwa would be the cause of terrific consequences later on.

But it seems that the Nizam suspected the designs of the Emperor and Sawai Jaysing behind the move of the appointment of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan to Malwa he wrote "I have received (49) the Farman of the following effect. The Marathas were spread in the province of Malwa. Najm-ud-din Ahmad Khan has been deputed to assist Raja Giridhar Bahadur in putting down the Marathas. Orders have been issued to the Governers of Gujarat and Malwa to take their posts on the banks of Narmada with their contingents and be ready to join me when required and cooperate with me in imperial matters. My work in fighting against the Marathas has been appreciated. The isue of these orders is due to the kindness of His Majesty. I am extremely thankful for the same.

Rajadhiraj (Sawai Jaysing) had informed that the Marathas had spread in the province of Malwa. Request had been made that an army of 40,000 would be required to be posted in Malwa to put down the Marathas…At present the Governors of Gujarat and Malwa have received considerable sums of money to put down the Marathas. Now that the Rajadhiraj has been appointed he must have received not less than one crore rupees. This is in addition to the troops posted in the Province…Under these circumstances. I have undertaken this campaign solely out of my sense of duty. My income is limited….The expenditure in heavy. Where I could realize ten previously I can realize only one. I would request your Majesty to grant 50 lakhs of rupees. Until such time as the amount  is not received by me the Mahals of the province of Gujarat and Malwa may be granted to me. I am making this request only for support in this holy war. I hope my request will be granted."

The Nizam got a firman from the Emperor (50) and the Amir-ul-Umara (Khan Dauran) also wrote a letter. The Nizam thereupon wrote most courteously, "I am in receipt of the Firman…Mir Ahmed Khan Bahadur (later Nasir Jung) has been honoured with a title, a plalanquin, robes of honour and two items of jewellery. I am thankful for these kindnesses." But in spite of all these, he refused to be entrapped in the plan on the plea. "The income from the provinces is limited while the expenditure is heavy. I had asked that the income from the provinces of Ahmedabad and Malwa be spent towards meeting the cost of the Jihad (Holy war against the Marathas). The Khan had written to me to put in exertion in this war. My request for the income of the above provinces was due to my anxiety to cope with the war. There was no other alternative the income is small and the cost of meeting the salary of the army is very great. The expenditure has gone up now ten times."

Finally he declined to cooperate stating his inability in the following way. "I have received (51) your Majesty's Firman. The Marathas have spread into Malwa. Raja Giridhar Bahadur had applied to you for reinforcements. You had appointed Najm-ud-din Muhammad Khan to put down the Marathas. You have issued instructions to the Governor's of Malwa and Gujarat that their deputies should with their contingent, take their posts on the banks of the Narmada, be vigilant, be at my (Nizam-ul-Mulk) back and call and put in their best exertions to put down the Marathas. I have received your Majesty's Firman to the above effect. Roshanuddowlah Bahadur too has written to me In detail…. In the previous years numerous armies, renowned generals and mansabdras, countless artillery and other equipment and the treasure of India were spent on the warfare in the Deccan. My resources are limited… I have written the details to Roshanuddowlah. Your Majesty will receive that letter. May the sun of the empire shine in all splendor."

(vii) Maratha Victories in Malwa and Bundlekhand :

Exactly as per the instructions in the above letter of Dadorao Bhimsen, two armies started from Poona - one towards Malwa and the other towards Bundelkhand without losing a moment after the ned of mansoon. The former marched through Khandesh and Nemad under Chimaji while the latter by the eastern route led by peshwa Bajirao, through Nagpur and the former central provinces (52). Both maintained contact with each other throughout the campaign.

Chimaji, having left Poona, towards the end of October 1723 A.D. (53) with swift marches fell upon Giridhar Bahadur, the Subhadar of Malwa, near Amzera, and killing him in a bloody encounter (54), looted his whole camp and captured 18 elephants (29th November 1728 A.D.). Bajirao, on his way to Chhatrasal from Washim (55) in Berar, congratulated Chimaji on his grand victory, on receiving his letter from Amzera (20 miles south west of Dhar) dated 30th November 1828 A.D. He asked him at the same time to march to Ujjain and attach all the Jagirs of Giridhar Bahadur for the payments of debt.

These dramatic achievements raised immediately the reputation of the Marathas and for the first time Delhi was convinced that it was power to be reckoned with. The success, of Chimaji Appa was soon followed by the victory of the peshwa over Muhammadkhan Bangash in Bundelkhand in April 1729 A.D. Completely disorganized; he gave a pledge never to molest Chhatrasal again.

Thus within six months from their march from Poona in 1728 A.D., the horizon of Maratha ambition was pushed on practically to the banks of Chambal and Yamuna (56).

(viii) Sawai Jaysing appointed as Subhadar of Malwa for the second time:

From December 1728 to April 1729 A.D. Chimaji was active in Malwa (57). Large sums were exacted from the paragnas of Jawad, Nawalai, Dhar, Ratlam, Badnawar and the city of Ujjain (December 1729 A.D.) . Then he moved on the Bundi-Kota. In March 1729 A.D., he was in the paraganas of Bhanpur, Mandsor, Jawad, Sutoda and Dahod. In the middle of April, he was on Narmada and on 4th of  May 1729 A.D., he was back to Poona.

Bahwaniram, the son of Giridhar Bahadur was the new Subhadar of Malwa during 1728 end to 1729 November, but the supremacy of the Marathas, was established beyong doubt. Along with some Mahals in Gujarat, Udaji Pawar and Anandrao Pawar got a saranjam of 54 Mokasa Mahals in Malwa in 1729 A.D. (58) , and the same was contiuned in 1729 A.D. On 3rd October 1730 A.D., Malharrao Holkar was assigned a saranjam of 74 paraganas (59) in Malwa. He was informed that Malwa had been handed over to him. He was to realize the Khandani of Malwa through Krishnaji Hari, an agent of the peshwa, who was to be paid Rs. 1500, annually by Malharrao. By 1730 A.D. the arrangement for the possession of Malwa was thus complete (60).

As it was evident (61) that Bhawaniram was incapable to face the Marathas, Rajadhiraj Sawai jaysing was appointed the Subhadar of Malwa at the end of November 1729 A.D. Khan Dauran Amir-ul-Umra had an active hand in this appointment. Sawai Jaysing was asked by the Emperor to open negotiations with Raja Shahu for the peaceful settlement in respect of Gujarat and Malwa, so that no Maratha invader should cross Narmada.(62)

Jaysing left the capital on 23rd October 1729 A.D. (63) for Malwa. While he was on the way to Ujjain, Malharrao Holkar and Udaji Pawar entering Malwa, captured the fort of Mandu (64), in November 1729 A.D. Sawai jaysing hastened to Malwa and a skirmish took place between him and the Maratha forces. But hearing of his coming into Malwa, Shahu Chhatrapti (65) informed Chimaji Appa, Udaji Pawar and Malharrao Holkar on 18th March 1730 A.D. that, "Sawai Jaysing has come to ujjain province. Treat him with respect, in view of the old hereditary friendship between the two Royal families. Give him Mandu fort, if he asks for it."

(ix) A mission to Satara :

By 1730 A.D. the Marathas had firmly established themselves in Malwa and to a greater extent, Sawai Jaysing himself was responsible for their success. Besides other things his self interest in the Subha of Malwa was apparent. When he got it in 1729 A.D., he wanted to retain it for himself. As a subhadar of Malwa,it was his duty to see that province was free from the Maratha invaders, while as a hereditary friend of Shahu's family, he wanted to retain their friendship. A way out would have been possible after a full discussion with the Maratha Chiefs. And hence, at the instigation of the Emperor, but much with his own initiative (66), Sawai Jaysing decided to send a deputation to Satara, to know the nature of Maratha demands and to effect a peaceful settlement with them. After consulting Rana Sangramsing of Udaypur, Deepsing, Manasaram Purohit and were fixed as the personnel of the mission, which reached Satara in August 1730 A.D. During September, they consulted the Chief persons including the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa and after finishing the work, proceeded to Aurangabad, where they were received with hospitality.

But from the point of view of its results, the mission was failure, for the Emperor did not wait even for its coming back to Delhi, but removing Sawai Jaysing from the post appointed Muhammad Khan Bangash in September 1730 as the Subhadar of Malwa (67). But besides the questions of the settlement of the Chauth, the real object of sending this mission to Satara by Jaysing was to know the position of Bajirao Pandit Pradhan. His name had been famous in the North for his velour. But Jaysing wanted to know whether he was really a worthily person having diplomatic talents and organizing capacity and whether he was respected in the Maratha State and was honored by the Maharaja of Satara. From this point of view, the object of the mission was highly successful, for Deepsing who was the nominee of Jaysing himself, was convinced that Bajirao was fully trust worthy from every point of view and not only he was respected by Raja Shahu, but was the only person who pre-eminently ruled the Maratha Court.

The Nizam expressed his grave doubt about the faith of Deepsing in Bajirao. But the latter emphatically answered him that Bajirao would never deceive them as there had been good relations between them since the days of his father. It was a bitter experience for the Nizam to hear so much praise of Bajirao, for Deepsing scarcely left any attribute in the praise of Bajirao who was in his opinion brave, upright, honest, truthful and trusted by his men as superman. As for Shahu, Deepsing considered him to be a capable ruler, who was considerate, wise and knew his craft well.

This recorded opinion of one, who was deputed to judge Bajirao (68) and the Marathas in general in their homes, and expressed behind them, before one who was averse to their praise, deserves a special attention. In the name of Chauth, the Marathas were busy in their process of Empire building in Gujarat and Malwa. At times, they were harsh in exacting money. But there is no glimpse of any bitterness in the attitude of Deepsing who seems to have been highly impressed by the ambitious 'Pant Pradhan' and the 'Chhatrapati' of the Marathas. This can be treated as the prevailing opinion about the Maratha of Jaypur Court and of all the open minded Rajputs who could read the meaning of the Changing times.

(x) The Nizam's plans frustrated

While the Mission visited the Nizam, the latter was busy in formulating a grand plan to oust Bajirao and the Maratha completely from Deccan. He plainly told Deepsing that he meant to chastise Bajirao. Deepsing remarked that it was improper for the Nizam who was considered to be a rebel by the Emperor, to create enmity with Bajirao, who could assemble a lakh of force under him if he meant. But this piece of advice was in vain for the Nizam who had advanced too much in his scheme. The reason was that the victories of Chimaji Appa and Bajirao in 1728-1729 A.D. had raised the prestige of the Peshwa to preeminence which consequently had raised a challenge for the ambitious Nizam. As an effect, the Nizam had grown extremely jealous of Bajirao (69) . By October 1730 A.D., taking the advantage of the breach between Bajirao and Trimbakrao Dabhade, he had been successful in seducing most of the prominent Maratha Sardars of Shahu's Court (70) . At the same time he arranged a meeting on Narmada (71) with the new Subhadar of Malwa, Muhammad Khan, whom he met in March 1731 A.D. But mean while Bajirao had taken the offensive and defeated and killed Trimbakrao Dabhade at Dabhoi on 1st April 1731 and frustrated the hole plan of the Nizam. Had he been successful, then perhaps he would have been not only the master of Deccan but of Gujarat and Malwa as well, and thus he would have been a genuine threat to the Emperor himself.

It is very clear, hence, that in checking the Nizam in Deccan, the Marathas were helping the cause of the Emperor (72) in another way. It will not be incorrect to say that had there been no strong Maratha State in Deccan to check the Nizam, he would have either displaced Muhammad Shah or thoroughly crippled him by acquiring most of his fertile territories. This relative importance of the Marathas was the main factor that affected the imperial policy toward the Marathas during 1730 to 1740 A.D. especially.

(xi) The policy of Delhi towards the Marathas:

The appointments of Abhaysing and Muhammad Khan Bangash to government of Gujarat and Malwa in 1730 A.D., removing Sarbuland Khan and Sawai Jaysing respectively, clearly meant that the Emperor and Khan Dauran did not approve (73) a policy of appeasement towards the Marathas by paying them the Chauth of the two Subhas of Gujarat and Malwa. In the same way the appointments of Sarbuland Khan in 1725 A.D. in Gujarat and Muhammad Khan Bangash in 1730 A.D. in Malwa, were mainly with an object to chastise (74) the Nizam. Thus in 1730 A.D. the policy of the Court of Delhi centered round the two factors of the Marathas and the Nizam, and the Court felt sufficiently strong enough to check them both. The success of this policy of opposing them both depended to some extent upon the sincerity of the Subhadars of these two provinces in their attachment to the cause of the Emperor, and mainly on the fact that the Marathas and the Nizam remained at varience with each other.

In 1730 A.D. to 1731 A.D. the Nizam tried to profit by the dessensions in the Maratha Sardars by building up a common front against Bajirao. But the latter proved to more than a match to him. The Nizam being thorough diplomat now won him over by explaining to him the policy of Delhi towards the Marathas by showing him the secret orders of the Emperor to the Subhadar of Gujarat, Malwa and himself. He then arranged aa meeting with Bajirao on 27th December 1732 A.D., which was highly successful. Writes Bajirao (75), "I had made before now three visits to the Nawab, but those were only formal with no opening of hearts. This time, however, we discussed many questions openly, cementing our mutual goodwill and friendship. Whatever suspicions and fears had existed formerly, have have now been completely removed. The Nawab repeatedly expressed a desire that our cordiality and pleasant relations would go an ever increasing."

Had the Nizam been allowed to keep Bajirao on his side, a threat to Delhi (76) would have been severe. A conciliatory policy towards the Marathas was hence a necessity. Khan Dauran (77) had nothing to do with the success of the Marathas cause in 1730 A.D. or in 1736 A.D. His change of policy in being willing to pay them the Chauth of Gujarat and Malwa after 1732 A.D.(78) was a reaction to the diplomacy of the Nizam and hence even though opposing the Marathas as per the orders of the Emperor, we find Khan Dauran and Jaysing advocating the policy of paying off the Chauth to the Maratha to subside their trouble.

But thus, the coming closer together of Khan Dauran and Bajirao in this way was looked with suspicion by the Nizam who kept a constant watch on Delhi politics and urged the leaders of the Turani party at Delhi, not to allow the pretensions of Bajirao to be successful (79). This conciliatory attitude of Khan Dauran continued til the Marathas became too strong to threaten Delhi itself in 1737 A.D. Khan Dauran, then gave way and consented to invite the Nizam to meet the Maratha challenge on behalf of the Emperor.

Thus, the factor of the Nizam must be taken into account while dwelling on the Maratha expansion towards the North as well as their relations with the Rajputs.

(xii) The object of the Maratha invasion of Malwa :

Depending on the ample references to be collection of money in the letters sent by Bajirao and others (80), Dr. Raghubirsing in his 'Malwa intransition, first phase', infers n respect of "the real cause of the Maratha invasion of Malwa" as follows :

"A primary cause of the invasion on Malwa" was that "The Peshwa was deep in debt and he wanted money to pay it". (p. 186)
"Gujarat and Malwa were nearer to Deccan, but the former had been dominated by Maratha general Dabhade, which left Malwa alone to the Peshwa." (p. 186)
"Even after the successful invasion of Chimaji, the Peshwa did not appear very keen on having full control over the province if he could be assured of smooth payment of the Maratha dues." (p. 192) 4. "The Maratha statesmen hoped to get the subsidy regularly from Raja Jaysing, and therefore, Raja Shahu ordered the surrender of the 'Mandu fort to Raja Jaysing." (p. 192)
"The Maratha statesmen hoped to get the subsidy regularly from Raja Jaysing, and therefore, Raja Shahu ordered the surrender of the 'Mandu fort to Raja Jaysing." (p. 192)
"In 1730 A.D., when by the order of the Emperor, Jaysing opened peace negotiations, Raja Shahu promised not to allow his generals and army to cross the Narmada, if 10 lakhs were regularly paid to him." (p. 192-93)
Thus above inference, if taken for granted, go a long way to deny the very objectives for which the Marathas stood. They state that the Marathas had no other objective than the recovery of money to pay off the debt.

I have to state, with due deference to Dr. Raghubirsing, that I would refute, the above statements one by one.

(1) Maratha expeditions from Bajirao till Sawai Madhaorao, and the recovery of money for the payment of debts, are two inseparable things. All the Marathas Sardars including the Peshwa, from Bajirao to Mahdaji Shinde, were worried till last over the repayment of debts. As for Bajira

o it was his huge army that was responsible for his debts. It is too established a fact that the Maratha demand for 'Chauth' was the for-runner of Maratha possession of the territories. Gujarat, Malwa, Central India, passed under their rule through the same process. Even in Rajasthan, the demand of ''Chauth' was soon followed by the demand of territory, which was infact the primary cause of Maratha Rajput rivalry later on.

(2)To state that Bajirao invaded Malwa, because Gujarat was closed to him due to the predominance of Dabhade, is totally incorrect. Bajirao able Sardar Baji Bhivrao (81) (and probably Bajirao himself) invaded Gujarat in early 1725 A.D. Hereafter, the encroachments of the Peshwa through Chimaji Appa, and his Sardars continued vigorously. In 1727 Chimaji Appa (82), penetrated as far as Dholke within 25 miles of Ahmadabad. At the end of 1729 A.D.(83), Chimaji again entered Gujarat with a considerable force and captured the hill fort Pavadh in January 1730 A.D. This Gujarat expedition of Chimaji lasted had established a considerable hold on Gujarat. It is enough to prove that in 1729 A.D. Gujarat was also open to the Peshwa like Malwa (84).

(3) As for the Charge of Peshwa not being very keen on having full control over the Province of Malwa even after, "Chimaji's successful invasion" the letter of Bajirao himself and of others will speak for themselves.

(a) An extract (85) from the letter of Bajirao to Chimaji Appa, after the latter had been successful in killing both Giridhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur, from Deogadh on his march to Bundelkhand. "Keep collectors (Amaldars) if they are ready, in the territory under our control. If any new Subhadar is dispatched from Delhi, keep an eye on him and if it is within your reach, destory him by advancing on him. Leave no scope for the (Mughal) forces in Malwa. If a strong force is sent from Delhi, and is beyond your strength to face it, and if your think it proper that we should combine to face it, write to us. We shall join you forthwith and shall consider the plan (of attack)."

The above extract from the Peshwa's letter, clearly indicates his determination not to tolerate any new Mughal Subhadar in Malwa. Was this all for the assurance of the smooth payment of Maratha dues? It was clearly for the possession of Malwa.

(b) The letter of Pillaji Jadhao (86) to Narayan Dixit, dated 4th April 1729 A.D., "Muhammadkhan Bangash, Subha of Prayag, Marched (upon us) with an army for 20,000 men. He is surrounded completely after his discomfiture. Grain is sold three rupees a seer in his camp. All provisions have been stopped. We shall destroy him within a week, or if he comes to terms, after affecting a treaty, we are soon returning to our country. After meeting the Swami, details will be supplied. With the blessing of the Swami, our rule has been established upto Yamuna.

© The innumerable congratulatory letters (87) that poured on Bajirao and Chimaji over their victories, reveal the writer's immense joy over the 'Digvijaya' (conquest). They reveal the real spirit behind the invasion of the Marathas, which aimed at the conquest of territories Does the following letter for e.g. express joy merely at the prospects of getting only huge sums of money in Malwa ?

An extract from, the letter from Govind Krishna (88), Peshwa's mutalik at Srivardhan to Chimaji Appa, "Enveloping the sky, conquering the North, subduing the South, humbling the pride of all, the Swami has achieved such a success, that is too much for the earth to contain."

(4) Raja Shahu ordered the Surrender of Mandu fort to Raja Jaysing not with the expectation of getting regular payment of Subsidy from him, but out of regard for him, and in view of the hereditary friendship that existed between the two Royal families (89).

(5) And as for the promise of Shahu to Jaysing, that he would not allow his generals army to cross the Narmada, it should be remembered that when Jaysing was ready to pay, 11 lakhs for Malwa and 15 lakhs for Gujarat (S.P.D. 10-56), Shahu had no reason to disagree to the settlement. As for the promise, that he would not allow anybody to cross the Narmada, it should not be taken literally. In 1730 A.D., the Marathas had tightened (90) their hold both on Gujarat and Malwa and had no desire to slacken it on both the Provinces. As for Malwa, even while the mission of Deep-Chand had just finished its discussion, Malharrao Holkar was assigned a Saranjam of the Mokasa Mahals in Malwa with the under standing that Malwa (91) had been handed over to him from that very movement. On 25th October 1730 A.D. Kusaji Ganesh was appointed as a Vakil at Ujjain. All this arrangement was in the light of establishing Maratha administration in Malwa, "for the benefit of Rayat and the officers of Peshwa, both."

(xiii) Sawai Jaysing appointed Subhadar of Malwa for the third time :

For a time the new Subhadar Muhammad Khan Bangash seemed to succeed, as Bajirao hastened to Satara after the battle of Dabhoi for the internal settlement before Shahu. But when Ranoji Shinde joined Holkar after Dabhoji, Bangash(92)realized how difficult it was to face the Marathas. He sent urgent appeals to the Emperor for reinforcement and funds. But since Khan Dauran and Kamrudding Khan wre opposed to him from the beginning, sand moreover he had roused the suspicion (93) of the Emperor by his meeting with the Nizam, no reinforcements came, on the contrary, he was removed from his office and once more Jaysing was appointed Subhadar of Malwa by the end of September 1732 (94) , which office he held till August 3-1737 A.D. Jaysing reached Ujjain in December 1732 A.D..

After routing Trimbakrao Dabhade at Dabhoi, and attending the consequent home settlements at Satara, Bajirao was involved in the complicated affair of the Siddis of Janjira from 1732 A.D. From this long drawn struggle (95), he could free him self in December 1733 A.D., by patching up a temporary understanding with the Siddi, to be free once more to took to the North.

But this does not mean that meanwhile the Malwa affairs were neglected. In latter part of 1732 A.D. Malharrao Holkar and Rawaji Shinde, along with other Sardars, reached the Narmada, starting from Kansul (96). On the Narmada the Maratha army was divided into two. One section under Anandrao Pawar and Vithuji Bule was sent towards Malwa. Another led by Malharrao and Ranoji, entering Gujarat, captured Champaner, strengthened Pawagad and sacked one or two places. Meanwhile Jaysing had arrived in Malwa (early 1733 A.D.) and a fight between him and Chimaji was expected. Chimaji hence wrote to Udaji Pawar and Malharrao to repair to Malwa.

Accordingly Udaji Pawar joined him marching through the territory of Mohansing. Malharrao and Ranoji also went to Malwa after finishing their work in Gujarat. Jaysing was at Mandosr (97). The Maratha light forces encircled him and stopped all his supplies. Jaysing tried to seduce Krishnaji Pawar and Udaji Pawar from the Maratha side. But Shinde and Holkar, brought pressure on the Pawars, to leave his side, by disgracing them for such defection. Sawai Jaysing then tried to give a bold stand to the Marathas. But he was hardly a match for them. His half hearted attempts proved futile and in the long run, he admitted to pay them six lakhs of rupees in cash and the 'Khandani' already recovered by them in the 28 paraganas. All this business was handled by Malharrao Holkar as Chimaji was at Orchha in bundelkhand (98). Chimaji reached Poona in June 1733 A.D. (99) from this expedition of Malwa and Bundelkhand.


Foot Notes (Description)

(1) 'Aurangzeb', Vol V, p. 281.

(2)"A preponderantly Hindu province with a study population, was not likely to take Aurangzeb's policy of temple destruction and poll tax on the Hindus with tame submission" Ibid - p. 381.

(3)Ibid - 390.

(4) 'Central India', pp. 50-51. 'Malwa in tra.' P. 32.

(5) 'Central India' pp. 60-61.

(6) 'Aurangzeb' Vol. V, p. 382.

(7) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 315, Aurangzeb Vol, V, p. 384.

(8) 'Malwa in Tra', p. 65.

(9)

"Early in 1715 A.D., Dawlji Somwanshi, invading Malwa, recovered a sum of Rs. 25,000 from Nandlal Mndloi". 'Malwa in Tra', p. 709.
On Jan. 24-1717 A.D. Shahu granted Mokasa rights of 28 Paraganas of Ujjan and 15 Paraganas of Nemad, 14 Paraganas of Handia, 17 paraganas of Ujjain and 15 Paraganas of Bhilsa with Deshmukh Vatan of 5 Mahals of Nemad and Sarkar Handia to Kanhohi Bhosale. S.P.D. - 30-17 A and 17 B.

(10) 'Malwa in Tra.', p. 99.

(11) 'Jaypur Recods Maratha Papers,' 206.

(12) 'Later Mughals', Vol. I, pp. 336 to 339, 405

(13) From August 30, 1722 to May 15, 1723 A.D. Giridhar Bahadur was the Subhadar of Malwa, 'Malwa in Tra', p. 144.

(14) S.P.D. 27-10

(15) S.P.D. 27-10

(16) "The short sighted local magnates and their tenants sided with the Marathas" - 'Later Mughals' ? Vol. II, p. 244. 'Holkar Sahi', I, 1 to 5, 15.

(17) M.I.S. Vol. II, 14, 'New Hist,' II, p. 50.

(18) 'Life of Shahu'' by Chitnis, p. 45, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p 82.

(19) S.P.D. 30 - entries on pp. 266 to 268.

(20) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 85.

(21)'Holkar Shahi' I, p 9.

(22)S.P.D. 30-280, 281.

(23)Ibid, 278.

(24)Letter of Keso Mahadeo (4-3-1726 A.D.) . "Giridhar Bahadur is obstructing the collection of chauth and Sardeshmukhi in Malwa" S.P.D. 13-5.

(25) 'New Hist.' Vol, II, p. 98.

(26)Ibid, pp. 108. 109.

(27) "The Emperor, however, was day and night plotting to lay his hands on Nizam-ul-Mulk. He often asked his nobles to embark on a campaign against him" 'Ahwal-I-Khawaquin' in 'Studies in Maratha Hist.', Vol. II, p. 95. Also 'The Cambridge Hist of India', Vol, IV, p. 105.

(28) 'Jaypur Records-Marathas Papers', 205.

(29)Ibid, 210.

(30) Ibid, 209.

(31) S.P.D. 10-66, "Every year it was rumored that the Emperor hac' ordered a campaign against the Nizam, But none had the courage to undertake the campaign" Ahwal-I-Khawaquin' in 'Studies in Maratha Hist.', Vol, II, p. 96.

(32)

"Sarbuland Khan was recalled from Gujarat as Muhammad Shaha's hopes that through him, vengeance would be wreaked upon Nizam-ul-Mulk had vanished". 'Later Mughal', Vol, II, p. 204.
"According to prevalent rumor Muhammad Khan Bangash when accepting the Government of Malwa had secretly bound himself to lead a campaign against Nizam-ul-Mulk as soon as the Marthas had been sufficiently dealt with". Ibid, p. 251.
"After a few years Muhammad Bangash was appointed the Governor of Malwa. He secretly promised to carry out appointed the paign against the Nizam. He said , "I will first establish myself in Malwa. Once I raise and have artillery according to my heart's desire. I will embark on the campaign". Accordingly Muhammad Bangash reached the province of Malwa. After he had equipped his army, he proceeded against the Nizam. Nizam-ul-Mulk became aware of the aim of Muhammad Bangash". 'Ahwal-I-Khawaqin' in 'Studies in Maratha Hist.', Vol. II, pl. 95.
"It is in the minds of the Empero." And Sawai to Chastise the Nizam, It will be done accordingly" from the letter of Chimaji, dated 2nd of June 1740. Ingne Dafter, I-15.

(33)  'Jaypur Kahritas Udaypur', 22 to 24.

(34) 'In 1725 A.D. Raja Giridhar Bahadur was appointed as the Governor of Malwa. He cherished the idea of establishing his dynasty like Nizam-ul-Mulk had done in deccan' 'The First Nizam' by Yusuf Husain' p. 153, 'Later Mughal,' Vol. II, p. 244.

(35) 'Jaypur Records-Maratha Paper' - 231, see Appendix - A.

(36)'Munt. Lubab' in E.D. Vol. II, p. 478.

(37) 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, p. - 345.

(38)Ibid, 350.

(39) 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, p. 345.

(40)'Jaypur Records, Maratha Paper', 215.

(41)Ibid 215,216,219, S.P.D. 13-10

(42)S.P.D. 13-10

(43) Ibid, pp. 25,26.

(44)

(45)

(46) The reference is obviously to victory of Bajirao at Palkhed over Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was the renowned General of his age.

(47) Writes, Dr. Raghubirsing (Malwa in Tra, p. 162) , "The continuous Maratha inroads in Malwa had caused great consternation at the Mughal Court. Jaysing was summoned to the capital, while arrangements were made to send armies to Malwa, and Gujarat Jaysing however, preferred to stay at home and asked Dado Bhimsen, Peshwa's agent in North (in Aug. 1728) to request his master to send the Maratha armies to Malwa at an early date for wtihout a display of force the Emperor would not yield". As per the source (S.P.D. XIII-10) on which Dr. Raghubirsing has based his above statement, it is quite evident that Jaysing was called by the Emperor not for sending him to Malwa, but to have a consultation with him on his (i.e.Jaysing;s) project of sending armies to Malwa and Gujarat on the plea of suppressing the Maratha disturbance. The letter clearly says, "The Emperor called Sawai's Vakil Rao jagram who is an influential person being 'six hazari' , ans asked him about the provision made by Sawaiji for the plan ". This will be quite clear from the letter itself given above.

(48) 'Jaypur Records-maratha Papers' - 211.

(49) 'Gulshane Ajaib', Nizam-ul-Mulk's Letter in 'Studies in Marathas Hist.' Vol. II, p. 74.

(50) 'Gulshane Ajaib', Nizam-ul-Mulk's letter in 'Studies in Maratha History', Vol. II, pp. 75, 76.

(51) Ibid, p. 82.

(52) S.P.D. 22-as per entries on page 13.

(53) S.P.D. 23-7.

(54) S.P.D. 13-15, 27, 29.

(55) Ibid, 23.

(56) "As blessed by Swami, our rule has been established till the bank of Yamuna." Pilaji Jadhao to Narayan Dixit 4th April 1729, S.P.D. 13-45.

(57) 'Studies in Rajput Hist', by Qanungo, p. 64.

(58) S.P.D. 20-pp. 293 to 295.

(59) S.P.D. 30-pp. 300, 301.

(60) As per entries on p. 304 of S.P.D. 30, it is clear that Chanderi, Narwar, Orchha, Datiya, Bundelkhand upto Kalpi had come under the Maratha sway by 1730 A.D.

(61) 'Malwa in Tran,', p. 176.

(62) S.P.D. 10-66.

(63)  'Malwa in Tran.' P. 178.

(64)  S.P.D. 29-46 , S.P.D. 30-p. 297.

(65) Vad. I- p. 95. Fall I-p. 246.

(66)  'New Hist.' II, p. 124.

(67)S.P.D. - 10-66. Said the Nizam to Deepsing. "You have lost Malwa, for Bangash has been appointed as the Subhadar there."

(68)S.P.D. 10-66.

(69) S.P.D. 66-72.

(70)  S.P.D. 10-61, 65, 67-70, 73-76

(71) 'Later Mughal' Vol. II, p. 251.

(72) S.P.D. 10-1. (Item No. 9)

(73) Even in 1735 A.D. when Khan Dauran had purchased peace of paying off the Marathas, the Emperor ensured him for that. S.P.D. 14-39.

(74) 'Later Mughal' Vol. II, pp. 204 and 254, 'Traikh-I-Hindi' in E.D. Vol, VIII,p. 49.

(75) 'New Hist. II, p. 156, 'Later Mughals Vol,' II, p. 252.

(76) Even in 1740 A.D. the Nizam being being at Delhi, the Emperor was alarmed, hearing the news of the understanding of Bajirao with nasri Jang in Deccan. - Hingne Daftar I-15.

(77) Samsam-ud-daulsh said "Your majesty had remarked at the time when Nizam-ul-Mulk was coming to the court that the enquiry that Bajirao was making was not without a meaning. If he had not enrolled Bajirao among the servants of the Emperor. It would not have been possible for Nizam-ul-Mulk to come to Delhi. Nizam-ul-Mulk had to be reconciled to this. What I have to say is that both Bajirao and Nizam-ul-Mulk are hostile to the empire. We must plan in such a way that one of them dies. This should strengthen the foundations of the empire. Otherwise, affairs would become very difficult. 'Ahwal-I-khawaqin' in 'Studies in Maratha History' Vol. II, p. 111.

(78) Up till 1732 A.D. the Niza had met Bajirao for six times and his last meeting in 1732 A.D. was much successful. - 'New Hist.' Vol. II, pp. 155 and 156.

(79)S. P. D. 14-43.

(80) S.P.D. 10-13 TO 15, 17 to 23,25,29,30 and 33.

(81) S.P.D. 30-312.

(82)  'A Hist. of Gujarat Vol. II, p. 426.

(83)  S.P.D. 30-pp. 295 and 296, S.P.D. 12-12.

(84)  Ibid - I,

(85)  S.P.D. 13-30.

(86) 'Vakil Reports' I, 955,960.

(87) S.P.D. 13-17, ,25,31,37,38,43 and 46

(88) S.P.D. 13-47.

(89) "Sawai Jaysing has come to Ujjain Province. Treat him with respect, in view of the old hereditary friendship between the two Royal families, Give him Mandu fort, if he asks for it." Vad I, p 95, Fall I p. 246.

(90) S.P.D. 30-pp. 293-95.

(91) Ibid : pp 300-301.

(92)  'Later Mughals,' Vol. II p. 253.

(93) "Accordingly Muhammad Bangash reached the provinces of Malwa. After he had equipped his army he proceeded against the Nizam. Nizam-ul-Mulk became aware of the aims of Muhammad Bangash He hurriedly arrived on the banks of the Narmade river, What miracle ! Every one expected war to break out, but what happened was that peace was established. The conferences lasted for nearly 12 days. Every one was surprised at this change from talks of war to talks of peace." - 'Ahwai-I-khawaqin in 'Studies in Maratha Hist.' vol. II, P. 95. 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 254.

(94)  'Framans, Manshurs and Nishans.' P. 61-42, Gul-I-Ajaib,' in 'Proceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress," 1933 A.D. A.D., p. 617, also Fall I, p. 246.

(95)  S.P.D. 22-16 to 19.

(96) S.P.D. 14-1.

(97) Ibid-2.

(98) S.P.D. 15-6, 'New Hist.' II, p. 157.

(99) S.P.D. 14-11, 12.

http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/2fp.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 3
THE IMPERIAL RESISTANCE


(i) The Maratha Involved in Delhi Politics :

From the letter of Mudhaji Hari (1), written from Banda, to Bajirao (dated 28th July 1733 A.D.) we learn about the developments in Bundelkhand (2) after Chimaji's invasion of 1733 A.D. in that province. Of the two brothers (sons of Chhatrasal) Hirdeshah was more favorable to the Marathas. It was he who had encouraged Chimaji Appa to march to Orchha in his expedition to Bundelkhand. He had designs on Orchha and Datiya. When Chimaji had marched on Orchha, the king of Orchha had called Kamrudding Khan to assist him and accordingly the latter had come with an intention to fight with Chimaji, but he had already gone to Deccan. Kamruddinn Khan, being a friend of the king of Orchha, was hence opposed to Hirdeshah. The Amirs of Delhi had been by now convinced of the Maratha strength. Just as due to his vested interests in Bundelkhand, Kamrudding Khan was opposed to the Marathas, some new friends at Delhi were desirous of seeking their support, and Sadat Khan, strangely enough, was one of them.

He was a deadly enemy of the Nizam. He had heard of the meeting of Bajirao with the Nizam (27th December 1732 A.D.)(3) And as such was doubtful, whether Bajirao would be friendly towards him. He hence sent his overtures through Hirdeshah, knowing his friendship with Bajirao. He informed that the (Sadat Khan was ready to form friendship with Bajirao. He was prepared to appoint the persons of Bajirao's choice as the Subhardars of Deccan and of Malwa to meet the constant demand of the Marathas from early 1734 A.D. i.e.(4) from the rebellion of the Nizam against the Emperor. He was prepared to fulfil other demands of Bajirao and was ready to meet him in Malwa or at Orchha but it was detemination (5) to finish Nizam-ul-Mulk.

This letter clearly explains why the Nizam was so much watchful over the activites of Bajirao in the North, and why he took pains to be in constant touch with the Amirs of Delhi. Bajirao's success in getting his names accepted as the Subhadars of Malwa and Deccan meant practically his political extermination.

(ii) The Under Currents of the Delhi Politics :
The Court of the Emperor Muhammad Shah was divided house in itself. Its policies were shaped due to the impact of ambitious rivalries of the four personalities in the main. They were thus:

(1) The Wazir Kamrudding Khan :
He was the leader of the Turani party and was a determined apponent of the Marathas. In all the actions fought between him and the Marathas during 1734 A.D. to 1736 A.D., we see him operating in Budelkhand, which seems to be his special sphere of interest. With the adherance of the Orchha King and one Ramchandra, it was his effort to prevent the Maratha from creating a base in Bundelkhand (6) . He was the nearest relation of the Nizam-ul-Mulk and as such accepted his lead in opposing the Hindusthani party led by Khan Dauran.

(2) Sadat Khan :
He was the Subhadar of Oudh. The Subha of Agra also belonged to him, before it was transferred to Sawai Jaysing by Khan Dauran (7) in 1723 A.D. He was ambitious and desired the first place in the Court of Muhammad Shah. He was naturally opposed to Khan Dauran and Jaysing. But being a Shia, his natural place was not the Turani party, Inwardly he was a deadly opponent of Nizam-ul-Mulk and to oppose him, he desired friendship with Bajirao. Among the Courtiers of Muhammad Shah, he alone seems to have the capacity to oppose the Marathas. Being a rival of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing. There was no question of him coming in closer contacts with Bajirao in spite of his overtures through Hirdeshah. He finally lost ground with the Emperor and left the Court in disgust (8) when it was decided that the Nizam should be called to save Delhi from the threat of the Marathas in 1737 A.D. His rivalry with the Nizam carried him to such extremity (9) that he brought the calamity of Nadirshah on the people of Delhi. Finally he had to relieve himself by swallowing poison (10)

3. The Nizam-ul-Mulk :
From 1724 A.D. onwards he was continuously held as a rebel by the Emperor, till he was called to save Delhi against the Marathas in 1737 A.D. He was never content with the independent Kingdom he had created in Deccan, but ever cherished the ambition of being the dictator (11) of the Mughal Empire as its Chief minister. With the conciliating policy of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing towards the Marathas since 1732 A.D. onwards, he was particular in watching the movements of Bajirao in the North, lest his activities might endanger his position. With his association with Kamrudding Khan and the Truani party, he was really a powerful factor in Delhi politics.

4. Khan Dauran, Amir-ul-umra :
He was the leader of the Hindustani party and a sincere friend of Sawai Jaysing (12) . Along with Sawai Jaysing, he was mainly responsible for the Maratha advance in the North. His opposition to Nizam-ul-Mulk and Turani party was the key point behind his attitude of conciliation towards the Marathas.

The success of the maratha expansion towards Delhi, within a shor to period of 12 years after the fall of Giridhar Bahadur, under Bajirao Peshwa, was due to Bajirao's skilful handling of the situation, a result of his thorough knowledge of the currents and undercurrents of the Delhi politics.

(iii) The Maratha Offencive of 1734 A.D. :
By the end of 1733 A.D., Bajirao had freed himself from the engagement with Siddi. Early in 1734 A.D. a powerful Maratha army crossed the Narmada (13). This year the vigorious activities (14) of the Marathas extended from Gwalior to Ajmer and to the Subha of Agra beyond Chambal(15). A favorable Bundelkhand (16) served as the base for these Maratha activities, which continued without any fear (17) of the Mughal forces. The object of this invasion was to realize 'Khandani'. Pilaji Jadhao, Malharrao Holakar and Ranoji Shinde were active in collecting dues from Bundi-Kota, Narwar, Ahirwada, Gwalior, Datiya and Orchha(18). After consulting Govind Ballal for the management of Bundelkhand, Pilaji proceeded to Deccan before rains. Malharrao and Ranoji, from Ahirwada, went to Bundi and captured (19) it for budhasing on 12th April 1734 A.D. But after their return to Deccan before rains, Sawai Jaysing took it back from Budhsing.

(iv) Bundi Affairs, and the attempts of Sawai Jaysing to check the Marathas :
Sawai Jaysing wanted (20) to expand the limits of his kingdom, in keeping with the tradition of the great ancient kings of India. He knew that the time was favourable especially after the fall of Farrukh Siyar. He seized Bundi from Budhasing Hada and transferred it to Dalelsing, the second son of Salimsing Hada of Karwar. (September 1729 A.D.) Budhsing's attempt to recover Bundi failed in April 1730 A.D. Jaysing crowned Dalelsing as the king of Bundi and gave his daughter in marriage to him. Thus Bundi (21) came under his over lord ship. (May, 1730 A.D.)

The defeated Budhsing, who took refuge in Udaypur and then at Begham, go an unexpected ally in Pratapsing, the elder brother of Dalelsing Hada, the new ruler of Bundi. Budhsing's queen sent him to Satara to bring Maratha and against Dallying. Accepting six lakhs of rupees for the help, Malharrao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde attacked and captured Bundi from Salem sing, the regent of Bundi on 12 April 1734 A.D. Budhsingh's queen tied(22) the secred thread, 'Rakhi' round the wrist of Malharrao Holkar, and become his sister. Thus the first Maratha invasion of Rajasthan was welcomed by one of the Rajput Chiefs. But the success was short-lived, recaptured. Bundi Marathas had gone, a strong Jaypur force, recaptured Budi back for Dalelsing (23).

But Jaysing knew that in the Bundi affair, it was not Budhising or his able son Immersing, that he had to deal with. He had faced Malharrao and Ranoji in early 1733 A.D. and now once more they had threatened his designs of expansion. In the oposition of the Marathas, Dalelsing's throne was insecure.

We can very well imagine the feelings of Sawai Jaysing, towards the Marathas. He urged the Emperor (24) to send him additional troops with funds and supplies under Muzaffer Khan, the Mir Atish and the brother of Khan Duaran. But the Khan returned to the capital without fighting the Marathas, who had gone to Deccan before the Monsoon. Jaysing then tried to enlist the co-operation of the Rajput Chiefs in October 1734 A.D. at Hurda, in driving out the Marathas beyond Chambal. But nothing came out of it (25).

Due to the opposition of the Marathas, Plans of expansion of Sawai Jaysing with respect to Malwa and Bundi, were upset. At the same time, he was powerless to check them. Hence he was dejected and complained about the activities of Malharrao and Ranoji to the Peshwa. He expresses his desire to meet him and showed his willingness for the comporomise (26) . However partial Sawai Jaysing might be for the Marathas as opposed to the Turani faction at the Court, it is impossible to believe that he was ready to compromise his personal interests to win over their friendship.

Hence, when the year 1735 A.D. opened with a trial of the strength between the Emperor and the Maratha, there is no reason to believe that Sawai Jaysing was Luke-warn in his support to the Emperor's cause against the Marathas. It should not be inferred from the easy victories of the Marathas over the Imperialists, that they were due to the halfhearted attempts of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing. The Marathas were victorious, because they surpassed (27) in guerilla tactics, and there was hardly any general to match them in the unweidly Mughal army which amounted nearly to two lakhs as per the Maratha letter(28).

What is needed to be understood is that the compaigns of 1735 A.D. led by Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing were not carried on for the sake of any formality. If the Marathas could have been defeated, there is no reason to believe that out of any policy or partiality (29), Sawai Jaysing and Khan Dauran would have spared them. After all it was a fight on the part of Sawai Jaysing to retain Malwa and his leading position in Rajasthan in general and Bundi in particular.

But after saying this much let it be said that even though finally over powered by the Marathas, Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing had no will to carry on the issue to extremity by supporting whole-heartedly Kamrudding Khan and the Turani party. They knew that in the final suppression of the Marathas, they themselves would be the losers in the politics of Delhi where they had to face the powerful opposition of the Turani party and hence while opposing the Marathas, they could never afford to allow the Turani party to grow more stronger so as to threaten their political existence in the Court of Delhi. In fact for Khan Dauran it was a fight on two fronts. But the ultimate effect was the gain of the Marathas who were shrewed enough to utilize (30) this under current for their Northen expansion. Finally the more the Maratha arms were victorious against the imperial generals, the more Turani Party gained in the confidence of the Emperor and consequently the losing Hindusthani party leaned more towards the Marathas.

(v) Imperial Campaign of 1735 A.D. :
In early 1735 A.D., a formidable Mughal army in two seetions, well equipped with guns and ammunition, marched against the Marathas. The one under Kamruddin Khan by way of Agra encountered Pilaji Jadhao near Orchha (beginning of March 1735 A.D.) Pilaji Jadhao succeeded in capturing two to three hundred camels and horses from the Mughal army, then he went to Pohri Shivpur (31) , while Kamruddin Khan was at Narwar, Pilaji then proceeded to Deccan via Bundelkhand, Chanda, and Deogadh route.

The other section under Khan Dauran, (32) Sawai Jaysing and Abhaysing and Malharrao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde in Rampura. But the Marathas completely surrounded the host of the Mughal army and totally stopped the supply of grain and folder. Then leaving the unwieldy Mughal army behind they descended Mukundara and marching through Bundi and Kota, entered into the territory of Sawai Jaising and Abhaysing. On February 28 (33), they plundered the rich commercial town of Sambhar. The Mughals ran after them. Khan Dauran halted at Bundi, where as Sawai Jaysing went to Jaypur to save hiss territory from plnder. Malharrao was ten Kos beyond him.

Holkar and Ranoji (34) then come to Bundi, while Khan Dauran was at Kota. There the Maratha Sardars met Khan Dauran through Sawai Jaysing. After affecting a successful (35) treaty with Khan Dauran and Jaysing, both Ranoji and Malharrao went to Deccan and reached Poona on 6th July 1735 A.D.

It is definite that Khan Dauran had to pay a certain (36) sum to the Maratha in the name of Chauth of Malwa, but there is no mention of the exact sum received by them in the available Marathi record.

Generally (37) it is held that the Marathas got in cash or promise, a sum of 22 lakhs of rupees.

Thus even with the Wazir and Mir Bakshi in the campaign, the Mughals met with a grand failure. The Emperor (38) was displeased tohear it. Especially, he was pained to learn that Sawai Jaysing and Khan Dauran purchased the peace by paying off the Marathas.

(vi) Sawai Jaysing Loses the Subhas of Malwa and Agra :

Having been proved incompetent to check the Marathas beyond the Narmada, Jaysing was afraid that he would lose the Subhas of Malwa and Agra. His fear proved to be true (39).

The Emperor was convinced by now that the appeasement policy of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing was incapable to check the tide of the Marathas and was intending to hand over the two provinces of Malwa and Agra to Sadat Khan.

Sawai Jaysing, called the Peshwa's agent (40) with Srichand Diwan and Vyaharidasji for a confidential talk (August 1735 A.D.). He told the agent that he had up till then tried to raise the prestiage of Bajirao because he had no faith in the Turks. He knew that had they been victorious over the Marathas, they would have thought little of the Rajputs. He told the agent that he and Khan Dauran were of one mind. But Sadat Khan and Sarbuland Khan had been successful in gaining an upper hand over them by convincing the Emperor that Jaysing had ruined the Empire by siding with the Decanis. Sadat Khan demanded the Subhas of Malwa and Agra and told that while others demanded crores (for driving away the Marathas) he demanded nothing for his treasury was full. Jaysing told the agent that Sadat Khan was in league with the Nizam who had written to the Emperor, that he would not allow the Marathas to cross the Narmada. Khan Dauran and Jaysing pleaded that they had adopted the policy of appeasement because they were convinced that the Marathas could not be defeated in fighting. They had promised the Emperor, that they would affect a treaty with the Marathas so that either Bajirao or his brother Chimaji Appa would come to the presence, and having got their demands satisfied, no further trouble would be caused to the Emperor's territory by them. Khand Dauran and Sawai Jaysing further had hinted that if Sadatkhan and the Nizam were united, they would place another Prince on the throne. The Emperor seemed to be convinced by the trught behind the argument but Jaysing could trust him no more.

(vii) Sawai Jaysing Plans to Retain Malwa :
He told the Peshwa's agent that he was prepared to pay 20 lakhs in cash, instantly, if the Peshwa would come to him, with his Sardars, without devastating his territory. This amount was to be paid in lieu of the amount received by the Marathas in Malwa, Sironj, Datiya, Orchha and from the talus of Pilaji Jadhao. Besides, he would pay 5 thousand rupees per day for expenses (after the Marathas had crossed the Narmada). After meeting with Sawai Jaysing, if any settlement was to be effected at the Court through Khan Dauran, Bajirao was to visit the Emperor or he was free to return to Deccan.

This was the last effort of Sawai Jaysing to retain the two Subhas of Malwa and Agra. The object of calling the Maratha force to Jaypur was three fold. Firstly it would bring moral force on the Emperor and would help Jaysing and Khan Dauran to retain their positions at the Court against the combination of Kamruddin Khan, Abhaysing, Muhammad Khan Bagash and Sadat Kha. Secondly, it would serve the immediate purpose of Sawai Jaysing of the retention of the Subhas in question. The acceptance of money in cash by the Marathas, meant the end of their direct contact with the territories beyond the Narmada for the realization of the dues. (Had the Marathas accepted the proposal, their position would amount to nothing more than an auxiliary force subordinate to Sawai Jaysing). The last object of calling htem was his personal safety. He was in danger of being attacked by Sadat Khan (41), who was also a rival of Khan Dauran (42)

The Maratha agent hesitated to commit anything to the plan of Jaysing. By accepting 20 lakhs in cash, without 'Makta' they would lose the right of possession of the conquered territories beyond the Narmada till Chambal. However, Jaysing was prepared to permit them to collect in their usual manner dues in Gujarat, which was not under him. There was little possibility of the acceptance of the plan as it was, by Bajirao. It was the policy of the Marathas to accept 'Patta' (fief) in preference (43) to accepting annual dues in cash. Sawai Jaysing had not realized the true aim of Maratha penetration (44) in to the North, which behind the apparent object of collection of dues to feed the army, was nothing less than possession of the territory.

Mean while another letter came from Sadashio Ballal (45) dated 10th of January 1735 A.D., who had been to Muhammad Khan Bangash to arrange for the safe journey of Radhabai, Peshwa's mother.

It was reported as told by Bangash, that Sadat Khan had demanded 4 Subhas and 2 crores of rupees for the expulsion of the Marathas and that Khan Dauran's brother and Muhammad Khan Bangash would be deputed to Malwa against the Marathas. Bangash had no desire to obstruct the Marathas collection in Malwa, but only expected concession in that respect to his Jagir in Malwa. He was further prepared to co-operate with Bajirao in destroying the 'mawa' (robbers) in Malwa on the basis of equal division of the freed territory. Sadashio Ballal then came to Jaypur. Rajadhiraj was expecting a reply from Bajirao to his proposal. He urged the envoy to convince Bajirao of his sincere friendship to wards him. He was confident that if Sadat Khan became the Subhadar of Malwa, Bajirao (46) would certainly defeat him. While Sadashio Ballal was still at Jaypur, news came, that the Emperor had agreed to the proposal of Sadat Khan and had assigned him the two Subhas (Malwa and Agra) and granted him two crores of rupees for the expedition and sent Laxshmi Narayan Vakil with the customary robes for Sadat Khan. Sadashio Ballal, then, proceeded to Udaypur.

Thus Sawai Jaysing was finally deprived of the two Subhas. But Sadat Khan had yet to justify his appointment as the Subhadar (47) of Malwa by displacing the Marathas from there. His appointment as Subhadar of Malwa was totally disagreeable to Khan Dauran who was one with the cause of Sawai Jaysing. Thus with Khan Dauran and the Rajputs (excepting Abhaysing) completely on the Maratha side, Sadat Khan had little chance of getting success against them. It appeared that nothing but a whole-hearted reception awaited (48) Bajirao in the North, if he accepted the invitation of Sawai Jaysing.

Very soon (October 1735 A.D.) a letter came from amyaram the Peshwa's Vakil at Delhi, confirming the news previously received and communicating the plans of the opposition of the Emperor. The Emperor had conciliated Abhaysing (49) with Kamrudding Khan (Sadat Khan) to whom he entrusted the Subhas of Agra, Malwa and permitted him to punish Sawai Jaysing, if the latter did not join the Mughal army with his force. The Emperor had been highly displeased with Khan Dauran and Jaysing for their compromise with the Marathas by paying them money. Khan Dauran tried to explain his Maratha policy by stating that he had given them only that portion in Malwa as Jagir, which was infested with the robbers and the Rohillas and had asked to disturb the Mughal territory no more. He told that Bajirao was ready to serve the Emperor and had sent his mother on pilgrimage, which showed his confidence and oneness with the Empire. Thus Khan Dauran tried but invain. An invitation was sent to Sadat Khan to repair to Delhi. He further asked for himself the Subha of Patna and some jagir and the Subha of Prayag (Alahabad) for Muhammad Khan Bangash, so that he would recover the lost territory by punishing Chhatrasal (i.e. sons of Chhatrasal). The Vakil further-stated that the Emperor himself intended to March with all his forces after the floods were over. Amir-ul-umrao (Khan Dauran) with Sawai Jaysing were to march Via Jaypur, whereas Kamrudding Khan, Abhaysing and Sadat Khan were to march by Gwalior route.

(viii) Bajirao Proceeds to the North (Ocotober 1725 A.D. ) :

By the 1st week of October 1735 A.D.(50) Bajirao prepared himself for the big enterprise of his life which was full of promises (51) as well as obvious dangers. He ordered him prominent Sardars like Pilaji Jadhao, to enter tents for the coming expedition to the North. Bajirao's well  wishers advised him (52) to step into the matter after a full thought and adequate preparation as the issue was a complicated one. Kamrudding Khan, the Wazir was expected to march in person to Malwa, and even the Emperor might come to his help, and the Nizam was still there to add to the complications.

The Nizam was at Ajantha (53) in November 1735 A.D., and was suspicious hearing about the march of Bajirao to the North. He was in constant touch with Sadat Khan whom he instigated to beat down the prestige of Bajirao. It was also rumored that he would march towards Burhanpur. But finally he declined to go, as Bajirao and Pilaji both were in the North.

Bajirao issued from Poona during the Divali (54) of 1735 A.D. By the time he had crossed Tapi, Sadat Khan (55) on his way to Agra had given a fight with Bhagwantsing the Jamindar of Adaru and had killed him. But the contest had been a severe one and even Sadat Khan had to lose 16 Chiefs on his side. This crippled him so much that he had to leave aside his intended march on Sawai Jaysing. (November 1735 A.D.) The relation between Sawai Jaysing and Sadat Khan had strained beyond limits and dreading an assult from Sadat Khan, Sawai was anxiously awaiting Bajirao's arrival in the North.

On 10th of December 1735 A.D. Bajirao had crossed the Narmada (56) and was at Jaypalpur in Malwa. In January 1736 A.D., after capturing Kulasis (57), Bajirao was marching through Dongarpur Banswada in Mewad. His march to the North effected favourably on the position of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing in the Court and the opposition party toned down. Bajirao sent Mahadeo Bhat Hingane to Sawai Jaysing who sent along with him and Raja Malji two lakhs in cash, besides jewellery, robes, five horses and an elephant all told five lakhs of rupees and called the Peshwa to Jaypur without losing time. Sadat Khan had reached his distination. Rajoji Shinde and Ram Chandra Shenwai were active in formulating a treaty. It was proposed that Peshwa should get after meeting the Emperor 20 lakhs of rupees in cash, a jagir of 40 lakhs in Malwa and the subsidy was to be assigned on Dost Muhammad Khan of Bhopal.

While Bajirao was marching through Mewad, one of his Sardars Baji Bhivrao had marched to Datiya, Orchha (58) and by the end of january 1736 A.D. had realized dues from both these states. He then proceeded to Bhadawar and Jatwad territory (59). He came to know that in Delhi politics, Khan Dauran (60) and Jaysing were on one side and Sadat Khan, Kamruddin Khan and the rest were on the other side. He suggested to Bajirao that unless Sadat Khan and Kamruddin Khan and the rest were defeated, his plan had no chance of success. He further wrote Bajirao that there was no possibility of getting money for him after crossing the Chambal. Whatever, he might get, was from Jaysing only. He further advised Bajirao not to hurry to the Emperor relying on the vastness of his forces, for Delhi was a powerful place and it was yet dangerous for Bajirao to venture to go there. He should be, under the circumstances, cautious and should not hanker after money too much. He should not bring undue pressure on Ranaji for exacting money but should see that he was kept pleased. Also he should be satisfied with whatever Jaysing would do for him. He should not try to gather the whole world in a single day.

Baji Bhivrao was one of the most sincere adherents of the Peshwa. His letter depicts the sober Maratha policy towards the Rajputs in the first phase of their friendship. Had there been such dashing and beloved peshwa in future times and sincere friends like Baji Bhivrao, one feels that much wanton bloodshed would have been averted.

(ix) The Rana's Anxiety Over the Question of a Fief :

After capturing Kuksi Mawasi (61) and realizing 'Khandani' from lonwada Dangarpur, Bajirao entered Mawad (62) proper by the end of January 1735 A.D. and was about to ascend the Ghat. He learnt that Nijyabat Alikhan from Khan Dauran and Ayamalgi from Sawai Jaysing were approaching him with money. The Peshwa informed his mother on he return from the pilgrimage, that the Emperor was inclined for a peaceful settlement and that a favourable treaty was in sight.

Having learnt that the Peshwa had entered his territory, the Ranaji (63) sent Kesharsing to receive him. Bajirao, sent the bulk of his army to Shahapur and taking to eight thousand men with him went to meet the Rana (64) (February 1736 A.D.).

It seems that by 1734 A.D. the Rana of Mewad had definitely come under the sway of the Marathas. Full contacts had been established of the Court of Udaypur with that of Satara. One the occasion of the coming to throne of Jaysing, after the death of Maharana Sangramsing in 1734, Nagraj the foster brother (Dhybhai) of the new Rana and Somaram Munshi requested for 'Tika' (recognition) from the Chhatrapati at Satara, through the Pant Pradhan. Accordingly robes suited for the occasion, an elephant and other customary things were sent to the new Rana (65).

Peshwa had in his view a recovery of a fief (Patta) amicably from the Rana since 1729 A.D., when Chimaji Appa sent Chinto-Girmaji to the Rana for that work from Gujarat(66). But since the Rana and his Court disliked to alienate land from their territory in this way, the demand remained unattended. But with the coming of the new Rana to throne, the matter was taken up again by the Peshwa, who sent Sadasho Ballal to the Rana's Court to effect a settlement in respect of the fief. Sadashio Ballal advised his master that the Rajputs would pay the dues for a year or two, but once a fief was got, it would be a thing for ever. Atlast after a stay for a year Sadashio Ballal came to the conclusion that the land would not be acquired unless recourse to force was taken (68). < check this para >(67)

Hence, even though the political situation in the North necessitated that the Marathas should be on the side of the Rajputs and even though Byanaridas (69) the minister of the Rana of Udaypur was a party to the calling of the Marathas by Sawai Jaysing, the Rana was not as happy as Sawai Jaysing, overcming of Bajirao to his Court. He wrote to his minister Byaharidas (70) Pancholi. "The Deccani question you have settled well, but if a meeting is to take place (with Bajirao) let it be byond Deola, nearer is not advisable". He wrote furthe "Bajirao has come, and he will derive reputation from having compelled a contribution from me, besides his demand of land. Malhar came last year, but it was nothing. Bajirao is (more) powerful. But if God hears me, he will not get my land". Samvat 1792. (1736 A.D.) (71)

(x) Peshwa Meets the Ranaji :

Champabag (72) palace was reserved for the accommodation of Bajirao in Udaypur. The next day after his arrival, the Peshwa was honoured in the open Darbar, where two gold embroidered seats were arranged for the guest and the host. Bajirao was shrewd diplomat, he politely declined to accept the position of equality with the Rana and occupied a seat just below. Dresses and presents were offered and entertainments took place for five days from 3rd to 7th of February 1736 A.D. Bajirao visited various sights and monuments (73) like Jalmandir (74) at Udaypur and then left for Nath-Dwara. The Rana agreed to pay a lakh and a half annually as Chauth Bajirao did not  insist for the (Patta) land as was suggested by his adviser.

At Nath-Dwara Bajirao and his wife Kashibai offered their joint devotion to the celebrated deity and proceeded further.Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Kanthaji Kadam and Anandrao Pawar had been dispatched towards Marwad as all the host of Maratha forces could not be fed in the territories of friendly Ranoji and Sawai Jaysing. There was alsoanother object in sending these forces into Marwad. It was to bring pressure on Abhaysing who had joined the party of Kamrudding Khan (75) (October 1735 A.D.). This more satisfied Sawai Jaysing who was displeased with Abhaysing for his joining hands with the Turani Party(76)

The Maratha forces (77) then marched upon Medta (February ary 1736 A.D.) guided by Pratapsing Hada, who went within the town of Medta and met the Chief, Umedsing, but as no settlement could be effected, the Marathas occupied the town on the very first day and laid siege to the fort. The garrison made repeated sorties on the trenches and heavy exchange of fire went of from day to day.

In another theatre of war (78), Bagash was facing Baji Bhivrao, south of Chambal, posted in a ravine created by the confluence of the Kosi river with the Chambal. The latter waited in vain at his base at the Nurabad, 15 miles north of Gwalior, hoping that Bangash would leave his difficult position and come out to measure strength. Finally he reported the Peshwa that Bangash was coward.

But as peace overtures were received (79) from Delhi, through Sawai Jaysing, Bajirao sent orders to suspend hostilities and the State of war came to an end by the first week of March 1736 A.D.

(xi) Bajirao's Meeting with Sawai Jaysing:

Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing (80) had their first meeting at Bhambhola near Kishangadh on 4th of March 1736 A.D. They arrived both ridding on their elephants, and as soon as they sighted each other, they dismounted, embraced each other and sat as the same Mansad in an open Darbar. This visit lasted upto 8th March. Presents and tributes poured upon Bajirao from all quarters.

There were plentiful demonstrations (81) of Joy and respect for Bajirao during February to April on the part of the Rajput Chief's since he entered Udaypur. But the settlement was to be effected not with Sawai Jaysing but with the Emperor. The Peshwa sent Mahadeo Bhat Hingane, Yadgar Khan munshi with Jaysing;s envoy Kriparam to Delhi, with his demands, with instructions to sent the reply about the settlement within 20 days. But even though Bajirao (82) waited eagerly for 2 months (April and May 1736 A.D.) no reply came, nor did he learn anything about the proposal or about the envoys.

(xii) Bajirao Returns Disappointed to the South :
Thus even though Bajirao's march to North during 1735 A.D. to 1736 A.D. was a success in establishing cordial relations with the Rajput Chiefs, it was not productive of any substantial gains. Even though it was proposed that Bajirao should get rupees 20 lakhs (83) in cash and a Jagir of 40 lakhs in Malwa, the entries reveal that he did not get more than a lakh from Khan Dauran (84). Add to this rupees two lakhs in cash (and three lakhs in kind) sent by Jaysing (85), and all told about half a lakh sent by way of presents by the various Rajput Chiefs. Delhi was more liberal in assurances but hardly so in actual payments. This was to be the experience of the Marathas onwards.

It was difficult (86) to feed the host of 50 to 60 thousand men with friendly territories all around. The season had advanced enough, and there seemed no immediate prospects of any reply about the settlement from Delhi. Bajirao was dejected at heart at the delaying tactics of the Court and in the long run, losing all hopes to get any money, was compelled to return south so that at least the army should not be destroyed (87) for want of funds.

Bajirao's left Malwa, by the end of May 1736 A.D. keeping Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Tukoji Pawar and Yashwantrao Pawar withan army of 15 thousand. He returned to Deccan with the rest of army to save it from starvation. Nothing had been received from Delhi and Bajirao had grave doubts whether the Court would keep its promise.


Foot Notes (Description)

(1) S.P.D. 14-9.

(2)S.P.D. 30-pp 307 to 311.

(3)'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p 252, 'New Hist.' Vol. II p. 156.

(4) S.P.D. 10-1.

(5) "??????????????????????????????????? " - S.P.D. 14-9

(6) S.P.D. 14-9

(7) 'Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans', p. 58-27. 'The Cambridge Hist. of India', Vol. IV, p. 346.

(8) S.P.D. 15-29

(9) 'Ait. Charitra' - 3. S.P.D. 15-75, M.I.S. 6-137.

(10) S.P.D. 30-229, 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 356.

(11) 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 297. 'Hingne Dafter' I - 19, 23.

(12) S.P.D. 14-17, S.P.D. 15-30.

(13) S.P.D. 14-10, 11, 13 S.P.D. 30-61 (The date of this letter is 17th December 1733 A.D. and not 17th December 1734 A.D. This letter corresponds to letter No. 10 of S.P.D. 14th of December 1733 A.D.).

(14) 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, pp. 277-78.

(15) Shiwaji Shankar Odhekar, a Maratha Sardar, after realizing Khandani from Kasba Sipri and Kularas in Subhas Agra, marched upto Kasha Sopar in Ajmer Subha, S.P.D. 14-15.

(16) Ibid - 12, 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 281.

(17) S.P.D. 14-16, "Even if the Emperor's forces approach us, we shall feed by moving to the left or right as would suit us".

(18) Ibid - 13.

(19) 'New Hist.' , Vol. II, p. 158.

(20) 'Satara Ait. Lekh' 2-270, "Rajadhiraj, assuming to be the servant (of the Emperor) seizes the territory as far as possible", Fall I, p. 250.

(21) Fall I, p. 251.

(22) Fall I, p. 252.

(23) 'Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans', p. 60-41

(24) 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 279, 'New Hist.', Vol. II, p. 158.

(25)Fall I, p. 252.

(26) S.P.D. 30-108

(27) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, pp. 283 and 284.

(28) S.P.D. 14-23.

(29) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 255) "In Rajputana, Khan-I-Dauran, after wasting many weeks at Bundi, in utter inaction, listened to Jaysing's advice and induced the Marathas to retire beyond the Narmada by promising them, on behalf of the Emperor, 22 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa."
Now compare this statement with the following :-
(a) "During January and February several Rajput princes headed by Khan Dauran fought many stiff battles with Shindia and Holkar near Rampura, Sindia kept them engaged while Holkar moved rapidly in to the North, devastated the territories of Marwar and Jaypur,… Jaysing and the Emperialists found thas, that they paid Rs. 22 lakhs in cash and purchased peace…." New Hist.', Vol. II, pp. 158 and 159.
(b) "In a short time, all suplies of grass and grain were cut off. The horses were no longer able to stand. When a Regiment of Ahadis-mostly of Baluch and Mughal race-some 1000 to 1500 marched out without harm and was busy collecting anything they could lay hands upon in the villages about 8 miles from the camp, were surrounded was cut-off to pieces. It was three days before Jaysing could collect the dead bodies." 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, pp. 283 and 284.

(30) 'Bramhendra Swami Charitra' - 7.

(31) S.P.D. 14-21 TO 23, and 28

(32) Ibid - 21 and 23.

(33) "Tarikh-I-Hindi' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 51.

(34) S.P.D. 14-24, 26, 27, S.P.D. 22-284.

(35) S.P.D. 22-293390,391,441.

(36) S.P.D. 14-39.

(37)
(a) "Raja Jaising, gave the enemy in the district of Kishangarh a sum of twenty lacs of rupees on the part of the Emperor to induce them to return to Dakin" - Tarikh-I-Hindi' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 52.
(b) "An annual sum of 22 lakhs of rupees from Malwa was promised", 'Later Mughals', Vol. II, p. 280.
© "22 lakhs were promised as the Chauth of Malwa". Fall I, p. 255.
(d) "They paid 22 lakhs in cash and purchased peace." 'New Hist.' , Vol. II, p. 159.
(e) "On behalf of the Emperor, Khan Dauran offered the Marathas, 22 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa" - 'Malwa in Tran', p. 232. Thus the total revenue of Malwa during 1719 A.D. to 1725 A.D.under the Nizam, as the Subhadar of Malwa, was 30 to 40 lakhs of rupees a year, the 'Chauth' of which comes to 10 lakhs. Deepsing had also promised Chhatrapati Shahu 11 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa, (S.P.D. 10-66) Hence it is clear that 22 lakhs could never be the 'Chauth' of Malwa. In similar circumstance, Jaysing had paid six lakhs of rupees and the 'Khandani' of 28 paraganas already recovered in 1733 A.D. (S.P.D. 14-2) to the Maratha. In 1734 A.D., the Marathas had exacted their dues with vigorous movement. (S.P.D. 14-10, 11, 13, 18) . In all probability the sum paid by Khan Dauran in April 1735 A.D. cannot exceed rupees 12 lakhs.

(38) S.P.D. 14-29.

(39) S.P.D. 14-31.

(40) Ibid - 47, 31.

(41) S.P.D. 30-143, S.P.D. It is clearly stated that Sadat Khan was permitted to attack Sawai Jaysing, if the latter did not join the Mughal army against the Marathas. - Ibid-42 Sadat Khan had marched with all intention to fall upon Sawai Jaysing, also Fall I, p. 259..

(42) S.P.D 30-134.

(43) S.P.D. 30-128.

(44) S.P.D. 14-31 ( especially the half of the letter ) S.P.D. 30-301, also 325.

(45) S.P.D. 30-134.

(46)(46) "??????????????????????????????????????????"

(47) S.P.D. 14-39

(48) "Shivdas the Nayab Subha of Agra told Sadashiv Ballal that Raya's (Bajirao's) prestige had attained such a level that if he intended to capture the Empire of Hastinapur (Delhi) and handed it over to Chhatrapati of Satara, it was possible" . -

(49) S.P.D. 30-134.

(50) S.P.D. 14-39.

(51) Writes Sir Jadunath (in Fall I, p. 267) "At the close of 1735 A.D. when peace talks broke down. Chimaji advanced with large army towards Gwalior by way of Sironj and Bundelkhand". Now, the first thing to be noted here is that Bajirao's march into the North at the close of 1735 A.D. was not due to any break down of peace talks but due to the invitation from Sawai Jaysing (as per S.P.D. 14-31, -47, S.P.D. 12-76 and S.P.D. 30-134) to serve the purpose of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing, and the second thing to be noted is that Chimaji did not accompany Bajirao is this expedition to the North. In 1735 A.D. he was in Deccan and from March to July 1736 A.D., he was in kokan - M.I.S. II, p. 27.

(52) S.P.D. 14-35, S.P.D. 10-19.

(53) S.P.D. 14-40, 41, 42.

(54) Ibid, 39, 43, S.P.D. 30-144, 158.

(55) 'New Hist.' , II, p. 162.

(56) S.P.D. 14-43.

(57) Ibid, 50.

(58) Ibid, 48, 52, S.P.D. 15-14.

(59) S.P.D. 14-54.

(60) S.P.D. 14-54.

(61) S.P.D. 30-158.

(62) S.P.D. 14-51.

(63) S.P.D. 30-160.

(64) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall, I p. 260.), "The agreement of 22nd March 1735 A.D. (A promise of payment of 22 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa-Fall I, p. 255) not having been ratified by the Emperor, Bajirao planned a grand campaign under his own command in the coming winter. The failure of the entire force of the Empire. In the first quarter of 1735 A.D. had convinced the Rajputs in particular tat the Marathas were invincible. The news of coming of the Peshwa in prson threw all Rajputana into and despair." (i) It has been already stated that Bajirao was going to the North, of the invitation of Sawai Jaysing besides his object of obtaining the 'Sanad' of Malwa, and hence his visit had nothing to do with the agreement of 22nd March 1735 A.D.
(ii) Bajirao's march was to assist to maintain the position of Sawai Jaysing at the Court of the Emperor. He was going to the North as the friend of the Rajputs and hence no question arises of the feeling of alarm or dispair in Rajputana. The particular letter of the Rana to Biharidas Pancholi, is in connection of a grant of fief, which the Rana was averse to grant. Instead of a feeling of alarm or despair, the reception given to Bajirao by the Rajput Chiefs, display a feeling of Joy and friendship, (S.P.D. 30-p. 321-26).

(65) S.P.D. 14-20

(66) S.P.D. 12-32

(67) S.P.D. 30-128, S.P.D. 9-12

(68) S.P.D. 30-142.

(69) S.P.D. 14-47.

(70) 'Annals' Vol. I (1960), p. 335. Fall I, p. 261.

(71) The above letter do not exhibit a felling of alarm and disperse as Sir Jadunath Sarkar infers (Fall I, p. 260) but a false anxiety of losing the dignity by way of meeting one who was superior in power but lower in dignity from his own pint of view and a determination to save from the demand of land.

(72)S.P.D. 30-32

(73) Marathi record is silent over the suspected trap of murder of Bajirao in Jalmandir palace Udaypur (Fall I, p. 262.), Sir Jadunath states that as fine 7 lakhs was agree, out of which 3 lakhs were paid in cash. Sardesai ( New Hist. Ii, p. 163) makes no mention of the episode. The only sum that seems to have been promised was of a lakhs of rupees for the feast ('mejawani') and forty five thousand rupees for a village, Utall in Banheda paragan, for the payment of which Bajirao had to remained devichand Pancholi, the surety-B.I.S.M letters from Vyas family-5.

(74) S.P.D. 14-54

(75) S.P.D. 14-39.

(76) S.P.D. 13-49 (February 1736 A.D.) Sir Jadunath places this letter (S.P.D. 13-49) wrongly in April 1735 A.D. He writes (Fall I, p. 255 footnote). "But before this, in April 1735 A.D. Holkar and Shinde invaded Marwad, under orders of Bajirao to punish Abhaysing for his recent hostile actions. The orders were to spare the territories of Jaypur and Mewad with scrupulous care. Bajirao wrote this to his master that this would please Jaysing." Now (I) Abhaysing had not committed any hostile action by joining. Kamrudding Khan 'recently' i.e. before April 1735 A.D. but he certainly had committed a hostile action 'after the said campaign was over', in Oct. 1735 A.D. (S.P.D. 14-39). (II) In the campaign of early 1735 A.D., Abhaysing was with Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing in Malwa, and hence the question of sparing "territories of Jaypur and Mewad with scrupulous care" and "to punish Abhaysing for recent hostile actions" did not arise in April 1735. (III) It was not Bajirao who wrote that "this would please Jaysing", but it was written by Purandare to Bajirao, communicating Shahu's approval of the letter's action. (IV) The political situation with Mewad and Jaypur being friendly to the Marathas and Marwad being hostile occurred in the campaign of early 1736 A.D. and hence this letter must be of February 1736 A.D. Because the Peshwa then only could askhis Sardars to punish Abhaysing for his 'recent' hostile action.

(77) S.P.D. 14-14, 56, S.P.D. 30-151 (1936 A.D.) - Sir Jadunath writes (Fall I, p. 266-foot-note), "This letter (S.P.D. XIV-14) is dated Ist April 1736 A.D. by the Editor but as Sambhar was sacked on 28 February 1735 A.D., that year is most likely for this letter." But that year is most unlikely for this letter. In early 1735 A.D., with a host of Mughal army amounting to two lakhs with Artilary and ammunition carts beyond count in the rear in Malwa (S.P.D. 14-23), It seems unreasonable that malharrao and Ranoji Shinde would commit to siege operation of such severty. It was only possible in early 1736 A.D., with the backing of the powerful Maratha army under Peshwa himself in the North. Secondly as per S.P.D. 14-56, Baji-Bhivrao from paragana somavali enquires Bajirao before the latter's meting with Sawai Jaysing (8 March 1736 A.D.) Whether the forces from marwad had been recalled or not further suggested that they should be ordered to join him with out loss of time. Hence this reference to Marwad campaign in S.P.D. 14-56, and the above conclusins make it obligatory to place this letter (S.P.D. 14-14) in February 1736 A.D.

(78) S.P.D. 14-55, Fall I, p. 26.

(79) S.P.D. 14-53, 56.

(80) S.P.D. 30-156, also p. 322, 'New Hist' Vol. II, p. 163.

(81) S.P.D. 30-pp. 322 to 326. On 4th of March 1736 A.D. sawai Jaysing paid rupees five thousand for feast, presented an elephant with its accessories and 35 camels (all told worth rupees 13,500). In return the Peshwa presented him with a palanquin wth the accessories. On 17th March 1736 A.D., Gopalsing of Keroli presented Bajirao various guns and articles, on 7th of April. Roop Ray, the son of Bhagwantsing of Adaru presented the Peshwa a 'Baj' bird. On 30th of April, the kings of Nagore and Datiya presented various decorated guns.

(82) Bajirao's letter to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne, 'Hingne Daftar' I-6.

(83) S.P.D. 14-50.

(84) S.P.D. 30-pp. AND 22.

(85) S.P.D. 14-50.

(86) 'Hingne Daftar, I, -6.

(87) Wites Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 264) , "It was settled in the meeting (with Jaysing) that the time was not favourable for Bajirao's intended attack on Delhi. However Jaysing promised to use his influence at the imperial Court to secure for Raja Shahu the grant of Chauth and cession of Malwa from the Emperor". Firstly: - This was not at all the cause of Bajirao's return to Deccan.
Secondly :- No where it is stated that this march of Bajirao to the North at the close of 1735 A.D. was to attack Delhi. And
Thirdly :- When Jaysing was himself in the anxiety to save the two provinces of Malwa and Agra, and when his influence was at the lowest ebb in early 1736 A.D. the statement of Bajirao's return to Deccan on receiving the promise of jaysing in nearly meaningless. Infact the breakdown of talks meant the defeat of the last effect of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing to retain their positions with the Emperor, through the medium of peaceful settlement with the Marathas. For the first time, diplomacy had go a set back, and the Maratha strength and prestige came face to face with the grim determination of the Emperor and the Turani party, to retain their remaining Empire against the eneroaching Marathas.


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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 4 <b>BAJIRAO AT HIS MISSION</b>
(i)Break Down of Peace – Settlement – The Real Cause :
Hopes had been raised that if the Peshwa meant it could be possible for him to capture Hastinapur (Delhi) (1) for the Chatrapati of Satara, what actually he was promised and for what he was expecting a favourable (2) reply from Delhi, was –

(1) Five lakhs of rupees for expenses.
(2) A Sanad for, a Jagir in Malwa
(3) A ‘Khilat’ with the accompanying articles.
(4) A promise of asistance in the joint enterprise for the recovery of territory under the Rohilas in Malwa and
(5) A Sanad of the Subha of Malwa within 4 months.

But the Peshwa after waiting hinvain for two months had to return to Deccan to save his army from utter starvation.

The main reason for the breakdown of peace talks was not any high tone in Bajirao’s behaviour or any excess in the demands but the unpreparedness (3) of the Delhi Court for the parting of the Subha of Malwa. Even though Malwa passed (4) under the Marathas from 1732 A.D. (excluding the forts held by the officers of the Emperor) the Turani party and the Emperor were not prepared for handling over the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao in 1736 A.D.

The appointment of Bajirao as the Subhadar of Malwa was quite a different thing from the appointment of Giridhar Bahadur in 1725 A.D., or Sawai Jaysing for the third time in 1732 A.D. or even of the Nizam in 1737 A.D. as Subhadars of Malwa. It was a legal recognition for the actual possession of the Marathas. The Emperor was not prepared yet for such a deed. Even Khan Dauran could not go beyond (5) granting a jagir to Bajirao in the territory of the Afgans, which was obiviously a shrewd policy that needs no further explanation (6). Delhi was nt prepared to grant legally the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao and hence was employing delaying tactics in order to avoid an unpleasant deed.

It was clear for Bajirao in Deccan that unless force was applied, the Court would not be ready for a compromise. On 6th July 1736 A.D., Bajirao (7) got the much eagerly awaited letter from Hingne. Yet the Sanads were under preparation. As for the expenses, the Court had sent a Hundi of a lakh rupees, which dejected Bajirao mostly as it was sufficient to meet the expenses of the Malwa-force for a week only.

How to meet the daily expenses was great question before the Maratha army in Malwa. Nothing had come out of the 5 lakhs that were expected within a fortnight. Ranoji (8) wrote Hingne that for want of money for expenses, Bajirao had gone to the South with all the army excepting himself. He asked Hingne to press with urgency for expenses, Sanad for 25 lakhs and the Sanad of Malwa as per the settlement. The real object of keeping the Maratha force in Malwa was to bring pressure on the Delhi Court for the grant of the Sanad.

June 1736 A.D. (9) came to an end. The Maratha force in Malwa had done its assigned work. The money problem was acute. The Maratha army in Mlawa required rupees 25 thousand for expenses per day. Ranoji lost patience and wrote Hingne that he should stay there only if they were really going to hand-over the Sanad of the jagir, the promised expenses, and the Sanad of the Subha or he should come back. In fact he had lost all hopes that the Mughals would keep the word.

Instead of the news of the expected Sanad, a stern warning of a new Mughal campaign against the Marathas came through the letter of Hingne. Taking offence at a (false) news received in the month of June 1736 A.D., Khan Dauran told Hingne that the Marathas, professing friendship, had captured treacherously the fort of Ujjain and hence he had cancelled sending the proposed money and the Sanad. He further warned Hingne that the Emperor had enough force and treasury to meet the treacherous (10) challenge of the Marathas.

Ranoji (11) wrote Hingne, in reply to above charges, that he should keep in mind that the Marathas had been exerting for the last two years so that he should get success. It was not in their nature either to care for or to serve anybody. God was favourable to them. In fact they were worried only in the time of peace with the Mughals. They were quite happy in a state of war. Bajirao wrote that he had already left his army in Malwa and it would not take much time for him to repair to the North again.

It was proved that the Marathas were to get nothing by a peaceful (12) settlement. For the first time they were opposing a grim determination of the Mughal Court to save Malwa from there clutches. Nothing but a repetition of the miracle performed in Malwa in 1728 A.D. was needed. Diplomacy had come to an end and they were face to face with the Malwa problem for the first time.neverth-less, they were determined to reap what they had sowed in 1728 A.D. Under such circumstances, the question of the Rajput influence in the Court of Delhi in their favour did not arise at all. The Rajput sympathy was on their side no doubt, but as Chimaji (13) had written once, it was their own strength that was to pay them in the long run. The last chapter of the battle for Malwa at the gates of Delhi had begun.

(ii)Bajirao’s March on Delhi :
After making his full preparations Bajirao left for the North on 12th November 1736 A.D.(14), met Ranoji (15) on 5th December at Bhilsa which was under siege. After realizing dues from Bhilsa, the Peshwa moved to After which was besieged and captured. The plunder was enormous. From Ater, the Peshwa once more moved to Sironj. The Nizam was watching his activities from Makodi District, to the south (16) of Narmada.

Abhaysing (17) with an army of 15 thousand was at Maujabad. He remained aloof from the ensuing contest. On receipt of the letters from the Emperor and Sadatkha, Sawai Jaysing entered tents without going to Jaypur, and instantly proceeding 9 kos with fifteen thousand men and artillery, towards Agra, halted at Jambaroli. He was to reach Agra soon. But actually he never reached Agra but halted at Gadhasi (18) 20 kos from Jaypur. His joining the cause of the imperial army was infact a mere show. He had written everything for the knowledge of Peshwa.

Taking leave of the Peshwa (19) in the middle of October 1736 Baji Bhivrao proceeded to Datiya (20) and Orchha and realized the dues. Himmatrao and Krishnaji (21) from the Bundelas joined him with 5 to 6 thousand men. Meanwhile, he realized udes from Suklora Gujrola, Pachor, Uchat, Jatwada, and Banwar. Bhadawar (22) was given a warning to clear off everything. He sent an expedition with the Bundela force of 2 thousand and a half into Antarwed (23) and prepared to join Bajirao (24) with his detatchment with Hirdeshah the Bundela Chief as per the orders of the Peshwa.

By the end of January Baji Bhivrao had reached Yamuna. Delhi was not far away from him. He informed Bajirao that Khan Dauran and Jaysing were on the side of the Marathas whereas Kamruddin Khan, Turebaz Khan, Sadat Khan and Abhaysing were in league with the Nizam who was keeping constant touch with them. Delhi was most unfavourable to ways and means without marching to proper Delhi, which was taking advice of (25) its leader Nizam. The Turani party was definitely against an amicable settlement between the Emperor and Bajirao.

By March 1737, Maratha advance detachments had reached Chambal (26) . News came that Kamruddin Khan was to start from Delhi to affect a junction with Sadat Khan at Agra. By the end of March 1737, Bajirao was 8 kos away from Agra. He sent a picked force of 10 to 12 thousand men under Pilaji Kadhao(27), Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde and Baji Bhivrao across Yamuna to plunder the territory. Accordingly this force sacked completely two towns of Antarwad. But the Marathas had no idea that Sadat Khan with his main army was near at hand, about 5 kos from them. He dispatched his nephew Mansur Ali Khan with 15 to 20 thousand men. The Marathas were caught unawares. The fight was a severe one and the Marathas lost about 1000 to 1500 men in the fight and many of them were drowned while crossing back the river in haste. Fortunately for the Marathas, all the Sardars with the remaining army reached safely and joined the main army. Even though it was not a big victory as Sadat Khan reported to the Emperor, it was not an insignificant one as well.

Sadat Khan (28) had reported to the Emperor that he had destroyed the main army of the Marathas, and hence it was a point of prestige for Bajirao to show that the Marathas were still there. He dispatched the ‘Bungas’ (camp followers) to Malwa and with 50 to 55 thousand men, he prepared himself for the dash.

Two (29) ways were open to Bajirao, either to attack Sadat Khan or to fall upon Delhi itself. But as Sadat Khan would not venture out of Agra, he took the latter course. Avoiding the main Mughal concentration near Agra, he rapidly advanced through the Mewati territory while Khan Dauran and Bangash marched towards Agra, and joined Sadat Khan on 23rd of March.

In two long marches Bajirao reached Delhi on 28th March and encamped outside the city. He wisely gave up the idea of setting fire to the adjoining Suburbs, as this wanton outrage would have cost him permanently the sympathy of the Emperor and would have further made it difficult for Khan Dauran and Jaysing to plead his case. In fact, the presence of the Maratha army itself was sufficient to strike terror in the minds of the inhabitants of Delhi. On 30th March, he crushingly defeated a force of about 8 thousand sent by the Emperor. News came that Wazir Kamrudding Khan was closing upon him. Bajirao’s purpose was already served. He had practically desolated the environs of Delhi. While returning he was met by Kamruddin Khan and a severe fight took place on 31st March(30). But it was soon dark and the Marathas retired. News came that all the combined Mughal army was coming upon them. Bajirao, avoiding them marched towards Rewadi and kotputali. Leaving Jaypur territory then, he proceeded towards Gwalior for the collection of arrears. Such was the outcome of the great offensive.

While in Jaypur territory, he received a letter from Vyankatram (31) who wrote, I read to him (Sawai Jaysing) every word of your letter, after which he replied, “We are the Peshwa’s loyal servants, it behooves him to take care of us in every possible way. His revered mother has given us her blessings and he must continue to do the same.” Jaysing was in his camp at Gandhhasi (32) 20 kos from Jaypur. He took no part in this compaign. Khan Dauran wrote letter after letter to Sawai Jaysing to send reinforcement. He accordingly started with a force of 15 to 16 thousand men and artillery and arrived at Basava. He intended to visit Khan Dauran. Jaysing was zealous in communicating to Bajirao that he was gratified at the brotherly attention exhibited by the latter towards him. He requested him through Vankatram, the Peshwa’s agent in his camp, not to molest his territory. He had not yet sent his army to Agra. Bajirao got supplies of grain and fodder on his way from Sawai Jaysing. From Gadhhasi, Jaysing went to Amber and then to Jaypur. He sent handiest of a lakh of rupees to Bajirao. Abhaysing was at Jodhpur.

Sadat Khan (33) went to Delhi after the Marathas had left it. He assured the Emperor that if the four Subhas of Agra. Gujarat, Malwa, and Ajmer were given to him, he would not allow the Marathas to cross Narmada. But the Emperor knew that Khan Dauran would never like this, moreover it would displease Sawai Jaysing. He feared that the Rajputs and the Marathas both being Hindus would thereby unite against him. Moreover, he knew that Khan Dauran had also sympathies for them. Hence Sadat Khan’s proposal was not accepted and he went to Oudh disappointed. Abhaysing also took leave of the Emperor (34) and was expected to see Bajirao.

But Mughal side stiffened after this onslaught of Bajirao, even though he opened negotiations with Samsamuddaula in the Capital.“By this time (35) opinion prevailed that Nizam-ul-Mulk was the only man who could save the monarchy and steam the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion.” Even Khan Dauran became in a advocate of reconciliation with Nizam-ul-Mulk The Emperor was soon brought over to the same view and pressing letters of invitation were sent to the Nizam.

Expecting that Bajirao was coming to Agra, Bangash, Khan Dauran and Kamrudding Khan proceeded there. Nizam-ul-Mulk had started from Burhanpur after receiving the invitation of the Emperor(36) . Sawai Jaysing sent his force under Rajamalji (37) towards Agra, and also sent his munshi Mushkhas chand to the Nizam.

Nizam was jealously watching (38) the Maratha advances into the North for the last foru-five years. Meanwhile he was writing constantly to the Emperor about them. Recently (39) (Ocotober 1736 A.D.) he had sent 12 selected horses worth two and a half lakhs and jewellery worth a lakh of rupees to him. After Bajirao had proceeded to the North in October 1736 A.D., Nizam left Aurangabad for Burhanpur and waited there for further development. At the invitation of the Emperor, he proceeded to the fort of Handia (40) to cross Narmada in the month of April 1737 A.D., leaving Nasirjang at Aurangabad, he went to Sironj (41), and waited there to know by what route bajirao was coming to South, avoiding a clash with him. A shrewd diplomat, he declared (42) that he was going to Delhi to remove the blemish on his character that he had rebelled against the Emperor and that he had sided with the Marathas. Bajirao, even though, he fully knew his intentions, avoided an open clash with him in that hot season (close of May 1737 A.D.) as his troops were already worn out by the arduous campaign of several months and further were eager to reach their houses in Deccan to deposit the booty they had collected. From Sironj Nizam-ul-Mulk proceeded to Delhi. The Emperor and the whole Court accorded him a hearty welcome. The highest title that a subject could bear, that of ‘Asaf Jah’, was conferred (43) upon him.

Vyankojiram wrote (44) from Delhi on 10th August 1737 A.D. “Nizam-ul-Mulk had demanded from the Emperor the Government of the five Subhas in addition to a crore of rupees, for removing the Maratha pest from North India. The Emperor has freely granted him all that he asked for. His son Gazi-udding has been given the Subhas of Agra, and Malwa. The three Subhas of Allahabad, Ajmer and Gujarat are being bestowed on the nominees of the Nizam.”

             Nizam-ul-Mulk left Delhi in October 1737 A.D. with 30 thousand select-troops and a powerful park of artillery, and proceeded to Malwa. Bajirao took his departure (45) from the South on 18th October 1737 A.D., stationing Chimaji Appa at Varangaon on the Tapti to prevent Nasir Jang from proceeding beyond Burhanpur. Bajirao crossed the Narmada early n December 1737 A.D. From the beginning of December the Maratha bands started hovering about the Mughal camp, harassing them from a distance. The Maratha (46) tactics soon proved effective and the Nizam was trapped (47) in the fortified town of Bhopal. The siege commenced from 14th December and within less than a week the Nizam finding his position intolerable tried to move out with his whole camp under shelter of his guns. But after nearly a fortnight of intense pressure,he was forced to beg Bajirao for terms of peace.

             Wrote Bajirao to his brother, “Fortified as the Nawab (48) was with a strong artillery and with the Bundela and the Rajput princess as his staunch allies, I accepted your advice and agreed to much lower terms than could have been exacted. You can realize what a severe mortification it must have been to Asaf Jah to sign a document with his own hand parting with Malwa and the rights therin of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of which he never allowed even a mention till then.”

             Jaysing minister Ayamalji (49) had arrived on behalf of the Nizam with Sayyad Lashkar Khan and other agents to Bajirao to arrange terms of peace.

Nizam-ul-Mulk affixed his signature to the following terms (50)  on 7th January 1738 A.D. at Dorahe Sarai about 84 miles north of Sironj :

(i)         Nizam-ul-Mulk solemnly undertook to grant the Marathas a formal cession of Malwa under the imperial seal
(ii)        To deliver to them all the territory between the Narmada and the yamuna and;
(iii)       To pac them 50 lakhs in cash from the imperial treasury by way of expenses.

             When the negotiations were completed, Bajirao left he vicinity of Bhopal and proceeded to Kota, whence he exacted (51) 10 lakhs of rupees. He then returned to Poona.

             Even though it has been stated in “Tarikhi ibrahim Khan’ that, “Malwa was bestowed on Bahirao through the mediation of Khan (52) Dauran”, in 1738 A.D., the victory seems to be barren from the point of view of getting the ‘Sanad’ of Malwa. What Bajirao received (53) on 8th September 1738 A.D. was a ‘Farman’ with the seal of Sawai Jaysing, of a Jagir and Mansab-mahals of his ‘Vatan’ with robes of honour with accompanying due articles. There is no record to show that Bajirao ever go ‘Sanad’ of Malwa from the Emperor. This naturally disappointed him. He regarded the Nizam a deceitful man and one of his motives in marching on Nasir Jang (December 1739 A.D.) was to avenge his disappointment(54).

(iii)                   The Invasion of Nadirshah :
The next momentous happening in the North was the invasion of Nadirshah. Lahor was lost to him on 12th January. On 13th February 1739 A.D., the imperialists attacked the persians from their base at Karnal but were easily repulsed with great slaughter(55). Khan Dauran, the Mir Bakshi, received mortal wound and died two days later. Sadat Khan was wounded and captured. Nadir Shah would have accepted 50 lakhs as offered by the Nizam on behalf of the Emperor, and would have retired, but being instigated by Sadat Khan out of jealousy for the Nizam, decided to advance on Delhi for the recovery of the proposed 20 crores.

             Making the Emperor, Kamrudding Khan and the Nizam, his captives, proceeding to Delhi, Nadirshah took possession of the city on 7th March 1739 A.D. Being pressed to procure for the Shah the promised 20 crores, Sadat Khan (56) ended his life by swallowing poison.

The Rajputs (57) not only kept aloof from the Mughal Emperor at the time of his distress, but they were happy at the discomfiture of the Mughal Empire at the hands of Nadirshah. The Rajpurts and especially Sawai Jaysing thought it a proper time to unite with the Marathas and Bundelas to assert as Hindus; Abhaysing (58) caputred Sambhar and was thinking of Communication between the Rajput Chiefs began with vigour and a creation of Hindu Monarchy flashed before the eyes of some. But soon the news came that nadirshah was too powerful and it was felt that in him a calamity had befallen the Chiefs of the North.

             The Mughal rule in Delhi collapsed completely, and with it there arose all confusion in the North. Everbody believed that the Mughal rule (59) had ended once for all. Bajirao wrote (Dated 31-3-1739 A.D.) (60) from the vicinity of Burchanpur to his brother Chimaji Appa, “Apprehend the magnitude of the situation. A foreign rule is disastrous for all!”.  He asked Chimaji to start preparations and expressed his determination to face nadirshah on Chambal with all the forces from Deccan and the North. It was reported that after setting affairs at Delhi, Nadirshah was to proceed towards Ajmer to visit the ‘Peer’ there. Hearing of it, Jaysing sent the families to Udaypur. In case Nadirshah marched, it was impossible for him to oppose him and hence in this  case he would have to go to Udaypur. He started employing courageous men like Umedsing of Shahapur and called Ranaji with his army 20 kos towards Jaypur to have a juncture with the army of Jaypur. But Ranaji was not confident about the success against Nadirshah depending on the Rajput strength along. He ws ready to join after the coming of Bajirao. In case, he did not come, Ranaji contemplated to go to the hills to avert the calamity. It is very clear that being nearer to Delhi, the have created by Nadirshah had created consternation in the hearts of the Rajput Chiefs and Bajirao had become a national hero, in whom all hopes of safety for the Hindu religion were concentrated. The common danger had united the Rajputs completely with the Marathas as Hindus.

 

(iv)       A Plan to Create Hindu Empire at Delhi:

Dhondo Govind (61) wrote from Delhi to Bajirao :

“Nadirshah is no God, that he could destroy the earth. He possesses sense enough and knows business. He will not break with you, but will effect a friendly understanding when he know that you are strong enough to oppose him…. I don’t expect actual hostilities to break between him and you… Jaysing and yourself aided by the Bundela Chiefs will be quite a strong Hindu front which rovidence will surely crown with success. Jaysing is anxiously waiting for your arrival to take the lead. Nizam-ul-Mulk … is playing a mischivous game. Some of his spies, found roving  about prying into Jaysing’s secret counsels, were captured by him. They confessed that they were deputed by Nizam-ul-Mulk ……all voices agree that the two nobles…. Nizam-ul-Mulk and Sadat Khan alone induced nadirshah to undertake the invasion of India…victory at this moment crowns the Peshwa alon. Many here desire that the Rana of Udaypur should be seated on the throne of Delhi and made Emperor of the Hindus. The Northern Rajas are anxiously expecting the Peshwa’s arrival, a momentous change appears to be in sight.”

The question of creating a Hindu Empire took firm hold. The Rana of Udaypur was fully prepared now for this proposal, when Bajirao had undertaken to stand behind it. The Rana sent Gumansing (62) to Sawai Jaysing, who told him that Raya wished to place Ranaji on the throne of Delhi. Ranaji had told that all his wealth (for this purpose) belonged to Raya and that Raya and Sawaiji were his men of trust. Gokulchand was sent to Abhaysing and Bundelas were expected to join the union. Thus by the end of May1739 A.D., the Rajput Chief’s prepared themselves for the drastic change and were eagerly expecting Bajirao’s arrival in the North.

             Bajirao was at Burhanpur (63) at the time of the sack of Delhi, by Nadirshah. About the question of creating a Hindu monarchy at Delhi, Shahu informed him his sentiments in a letter dated 31st May 1739 A.D. The letter reads (64) , “that it should be our duty to resuscitate the falling Mughal Empire, that the Chhatrapati, as you are already aware, does not aspire to secure the imperial position for himself, that he considers it a higher merit to renovate an old dilapidated edifice than to build a new one. If we attempt the other course (i.e. a Hindu monarchy) it would involve us in enmity with all our neighbors with the consequence that we would be exposed to unnecessary dangers and court a crop of trouble all round.”

Shahu was moderate in his aims and desired to secure only the administrative management for the Marathas in the capacity of the Amir-ul-Umara of the Mughal Empire. It was his desire that by supporting whole-heartedly Muhammad Shah’s regime, they should collect the revenue of the Country and after recovery of the expanses for the troops, should pay the balance into the Imperial treasury.

But even though the Peshwa complied finally with the commands of the Chhatrapati, he was really much more ambitious and definitely a Hindu State was in his mind (65).

             See the following clearly worded letter of Bajirao depicting his future plans to oppose Nadirshah by the united front of the Hindus, dated 23rd March 1739 A.D.

             “I am enjoying (66) good health till this day. You must have heard the happenings at Indraprastha (i.e. atrocities of Nadirshah). It is time for us to assert. As per the directions expressed in the letter from here, try to induce Diwanji so that he takes the cause of the protection of our religion. Otherwise, if we remain inactive overpowered by the strength of enemy, it wil be detrimental for us not only for the good (‘Kalyan’) of this but for the next world also. I am very much glad to know that Diwanji is giving you importance. This is the proper time (hence) for you to exert to achieve something by serving Diwanji, so that the opportunity he gave you is well served, as well as, for me who wish to achieve the object of my life. You will know much more (about oru plans) from Ranawat Khumansing and Vijaysing and the letter we have sent toSadasiv Pandit. You should form friendship with the Rajput Chief like Sawai Jaysing and gather the armies of all the Hindus which would be a force of one and a quarter of lakh. After our (Maratha) armies unite with it, that would be a total force of two lakhs. Then we should try to defeat the enemy. If we fall in this, it would mean that the courage of the Hindus and their religion have both departed from them. You have complained about Mathar Pandit, but we shall punish Malharrao, when he comes over here. When great things are to be achieved through our friendship, what about such trifling things? Whatever you have in your mind, will be got through. “

Bajirao had to restrain his hand as the Chhatrapati aimed at only renovating the fallen edifice. However he was determined not to allow Nadirshah (67) to cross Chambal if he intened to march South. For that he called Chimaji Appa after finishing off the business at Wasai. But fortunately Nadirshah departed to his native land on 1st of May 1739 A.D., issuing emphatic commands to India potentates to render obedience to Muhammad Shah (68) whom he had restored to the throne of Delhi.

(v)The Nizam’s Move :

It was well-known, then, to the political circle (69) that the Nizam and Sadat Khan were responsible for Nadirshah’s invasion of Delhi. Even though Muhammad Shah was still on the throne, the invasion had terribly shaken the foundation of the Mughal Empire which lost all the glory and with it the remaining strength to preserve it. From this moment the Chiefs began to treat themselves as semi-independent, besides, the Nizam, the cause of the whole ruin, was still there in Delhi.

Khan Dauran, throughout his career as Mir Bakshi, successfully opposed the Nizam and never gave him a chance to dominate the Delhi politics. But he was killed and even Sadat Khan was no more. Having at his back the Wazir kamrudding Khan and the Turani party, the ground was thus clear for the Nizam to dominate.

Even though the Nizam had always professed to the true to the salt of the Emperor, it was he who had openly rebelled against the Emperor and had carved out an independent State in the Deccan. He had never lost touch with the politics of Delhi. His ambition (70) was a threat to the existence of Muhammad Shah as Emperor, who was warned for the same by Khan Dauran during his life time and even by Nadirshah (71) .

Even though the Emperor had called him to Delhi to oppose the Marathas in 1737 A.D., he had known him fully well and after Nadirshah’s invasion, wanted to chestise (72) him for the damage he had done to the Empire.

From his letter and actions, it is very clear that the Nizam detested the Marathas thoroughly and desired their complete destruction. He had tried by all means to thwart their progress but at Bhopla he learnt a lesson that it was beyond his power to subdue them. A shrewd diplomat and a worthy politician as he was, he tried to substitute diplomacy for force in his relations to the Marathas. Instead of trying to destroy them, he desired to use them as a force to secure his own ends to gain supremacy at Delhi. Only the Marathas were there to hinder him to achieve his objects. He had seen the rise in the friendly feelings of the Marathas and Rajputs he was a determined opponent of the Rajputs (73) and wanted to punish them. The Rajputs would have been nowhere, if the Nizam would have been successful in detaching the Marathas from them. For separating the Marathas he was ready to pay all that was offered by the Rajputs to the Marathas. With these objects in his view, he sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan .(74) to Bajirao who had already effected a settlement and had come to an understanding with Nasir Jang in Deccan.

             With Nasir Jang in Deccan, with the powerful force mobilized at the time of battle of Bhopal (1738 A.D.), with the full support of the Turani party at Delhi, and none to oppose, there was nothing difficult, as he wrote, for the Nizam to achieve.

(vi) The Emperor Woos Bajirao :

The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing felt anxious on hearing the move of the Nizam. But the Marathas were no auxiliary force as the Nizam thought   them to be. They had their own policy and their aims to achieve. Bajirao (75) informed Jaysing

That he was his friend. The latter with great relief (76) informed the Emperor that Bajirao had decided to accept their party. The Emperor in joy wrote back to Jaypur, that after the necessary assurance from Jaysing, the work (of Bajirao) would be done.

On receiving the letter from the Emperor, Jaysing called Bajirao to Ujjain and told the envoy that 5 lakhs out of the promised 15 lakhs would be sent forthwith, and the remaining 10 lakhs would be sent in the rainy season. He reminded the Peshwa’s envoy that in order to create a breach between the Emperor and the Peshwa, the Nizam would promise more than what was promised by the Emperor but the Peshwa should not mind it but should stick up to the Emperor’s side which would be profitable in the long run.

Jaysing told the envoy that after sending 5 lakhs of rupees with Ayamal and the envoy (Hingne) he, along with the Rana, would proceed 20 kos to meet Bajirao after which deliberations would be made on the plans approved by the Emperor.

But when his life mission was about to be fulled, when the Maratha-Rajput combination was nearing maturity, and when he was to shine as the savior of the shattering Mughal Empire, Peshwa Bajirao died suddenly on 28th of April 1740 A.D. at River on the south bank of Narmada.

(vii)      The Life Mission of Bajirao :

  It was the lot of Chimaji Appa (77) to answer to the call of Sawai Jaysing. The following is the relevant portion from Chimaji Appa’s letter (June 1740 A.D.) to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne at Jaypur which throws ample light on the role played by Bajirao in his North Indian politics, and states clearly the aims of the Maratha rule in general.

  “Read the details of your letter…The objects of the late Rao for the last eight or ten years were to please the Emperor by way of integrating the Imperial rule by bringing back to Imperial fold the Semi-Independent Amirs who cared little for the Emperor’s orders at their posts and thus to strengthen the administrative forces (resulting into peace and properity) and to gain thereby the good will of the rayat, the poor and the needy, to enhance the Imperial treasury and thus to acquire highest fame and the esteem of the Emperor. For all this he had kept constant touch with Nawab Khan Dauran thorugh Sawai Jaysing, and many schemes had been planned. The Emperor's help to meet the (daily) expenses and the repay the debts incurred, could not be received in time and hence the grand schemes envisaged could not be materialized for the lack of money, besides there were though the Nizam Asaf Jah sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan with promises (to bring him over to his side) he did not yield. It was not in his natur ot change words for a trifling gain of money, rather he was prepared to receive less (in comparison) from the Emperor and stick to his word…The Raya was to go to Malwa (as per the invitation)…he sent you (Hingne) to Sawai and afterwards left Burhanpur…but after he crossed Rewa (Narmada) he fell ill and died at Vaishakha Shuddha Trayodashi. The Almighty did most unjust thing in this, but there is no remedy to it…The late Nana (Balalji Vishwanath) aiming at the welfare of the people at large, destroyed the bad elements in the society and encouraged revalidation in the region that seemed like forest…Nana died and Rao became Pradha….Nana had to his credit the goo-will of the people and the blessings due to the establishment of Gods and Brahmins. Those blessings Nana handed over to Rao (as his legacy). Raya also aimed at the welfare of the people, the establishement of Gods and Brhamans, and renovation of the great centres of religion like Kashi. He strived hard by that path, protected, where great religious centres were renovated. His fame reached North (but he soon died). It was his desire (till last) to restore Vishweshwar at Kashi. Raya's fame shown in the world ten fold in proportion to that of Nana. Rao was brave, and a creator of new world…

The Emperor and Sawaiji desire a chastisement of the Nizam. The same will be done. But he (Sawai Jaysing) should stick to the terms settled with Raya, nay, he should do much more. This is in fact proper for him (since Bajirao is dead). He was about to send 5 lakhs out at of 15 lakhs to Raya. Manage to send the same without losing time by asking Sawaiji. After full preparation, the army and one of us (i.e. either Chimaji or Balaji) will come over to meet us with Rayamalji. Then arrange for the meeting of Sawaiji and Ranaji and if the both tof them think it proper even Abhaysing may be called. Thus after gaining strength, we shall perform whatever task the Emperor assigns us. Meanwhile, if the Nizam and the rest, thinking short-sightedly, that we have been reduced to nothing after the death of Raya, and march on us, we shall bring them round with in no time, with a lakh of army and the brave Sardars at our disposal. Sawaiji knows us too well to entertaiin any low opinion about us. He knows too what Rao stood for, and what he was striving for, we and the Sardars stand for the same…

Rao was the great asylum of the Hindus. There was none equal to him in the Deccan and the whole of Hindustan. Be as it is, but after all what did Rao carry with him? He left all behind him. The rest and we have been with the Rao from the first, and are still there. The enhancement of the success and the fame attained by Rao, is the only objective (Before us). By the grace of God, and the blessings of the strenuous and virtuous life led by Rao, we intend to punish all those who behave improperly towards the Emperor. If Sawaiji, Ranaji., Abhaysing and we are one, what is impossible there fore us that we intend to     attain ?

Foot Notes (Description)
(1)  S.P.D. 30-134.
(2) Hingne Daftar : 1-6, M.I.S. Vol. VI - 95.
(3) S.P.D. 15-33, see Appendix - D.
(4) "Tarikh-I-Hindi" in E.D. Vol. VIII p. 50.
(5) S.P.D. 14-39.
(6) As per a Marathi saying it aimed at killing a serpant at the hands of (uninvited) guest.
(7) Even in 1741 A.D., when the Subha was finally handed over to Balajirao, the Emperor had prepared for an armed resistence, which was practically impossible for the Mughal strength then. - S.P.D. 13-4, M.I.S. Vol. VI, 97.
(8) Ibid - 95
(9) M.I.S. Vol. VI, 96, 97.
(10) 'Hingne Daftar' I-5, 7.
(11) Ibid - 7.
(12) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 268), "As the Delhi Court had inclined towards peace, the Marathas withdraw from Malwa-March 1737 A.D." - The truth was just the opposite.
(13) S.P.D. 12-27.
(14) S.P.D. 12-341, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
(15) S.P.D. 15-5, S.P.D. 30-192, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
(16) S.P.D. 15-31.
(17) Ibid, 18.
(18) Ibid, 29.
(19) S.P.D. 14-38.
(20) S.P.D. 15-12 to 14.
(21) Ibid, 10, 16
(22) Ibid, II, 90.
(23) Ibid, 32.
(24) Ibid, 35.
(25) S.P.D. 15-99, 91.
(26) S.P.D. 30-196.
(27) S.P.D. 30-198, S.P.D. 15-27, 28.
(28) Ibid, 22.
(29)  "Pawar Sadhane" - 75, Letter of Bajirao to Brahmendra Swami, 'Brahmendra
(30) 'Later Mughal' Vol. II, p. 297.
(31) S.P.D. 15-23, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 167.
(32) S.P.D. 15-529, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 298.
(33) S.P.D. 15-29.
(34) S.P.D. 15-30.
(35) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 299.
(36) S.P.D. 15-33.
(37)  Ibid, 29.
(38) S.P.D. 10-91, 92.
(39) Ibid, 101 (Oct. 1736)
(40) S.P.D. 15-25, 26, 29.
(41) Ibid, 42
(42) S.P.D. 10-34.
(43) 'Later Mughals' Vol. Ii, p. 301.
(44) S.P.D. 15-53.
(45) S.P.D. 22-262.
(46) 'Holkar Shahi' I-34, M.I.S. Vol. VI-107, 117.
(47) S.P.D. 30-207, 'New hist.' Vol. II, p. 170.
(48)  M.I.S. Vol. VI-114, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 172.
(49) Later Mughals Vol. II, p. 366.
(50) S.P.D. 15-p, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 306, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 171.
(51)  S.P.D. 15-68.
(52) "Tarikhi Ibrahim Khan' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 262.
(53) S.P.D. 15-p. 86.
(54) M.I.S. Vol. VI, p. 85.
(55) S.P.D. 15-71, 75.
(56) S.P.D. 30-229, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 356.
(57) 'Itihasa Sangraha' - Letters of Dhondo Govind.
(58) 'Satara Hist. Papers' Vol. II, 270.
(59) S.P.D. 15-75, 'Purandare Daftar' III - 183. M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 133, 134, 'Satara Hist. Papers' Vol. II-266.
(60) S.P.D. 15-72.
(61) 'Itihasa Sangrah, Aitihasik Charitra' - 4, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 178, 179.
(62) 'Itihasa Sangrah - Aitihasik Charitra' - 7.
(63) 'Brahmendra Swami Charitra' - p. 118, S.P.D. 15-72, 75, S.P.D. 30-229 M.I.S. Vol. VI, - 133, 134..
(64) 'Satara Hist.Papers' Vol II-268, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 180.

(65)
For the present Tohmast Kuli (Nadirshah) has won the fight. But if all the Hindus take to courage (and unite) and if our greaty armies reach North (it is a lime) for the Hindu Empire to come into existence. " 'Brahmendra Swami Charitra', p. 118.

(66) From Bajirao Ballal Pandit Pradhan to Dhayabhai, dt. 23-3-1739, B.I.S.M. (July 1920), from the collection of letters from the family of Vyas of Udaypur.
(67)  'Brahmendra Swami charitra' , p. 118.
(68) S.P.D. 15-80.
(69) 'Itihasa Sangraha, Atitihasik Charitra' 3., S.P.D. 15-75.
(70) "Nizam-ul-Mulk was a very ambitious person. In addition to the extensive province of the Deccan, he at one time controlled the provinces of Gujarat, Malwa and Agra, either directly or through his kinsmen. He was even at is revealed in his letters.There is no doubt, that if he had had his way, Nizamulmulk would have ended by becoming the dictotor of the entire Mughal Empire. " - p. Setu Madhava Rao in Preface of 'Eithteenth Century Deccan' , p. ix.
(71) "The Cambridge Hist, of India' , Vol. IV, pp. 362. 363.
(72) "The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing desire a severe chastisement to the Nizam. It will take place accordingly" - From the letter of Chimaji Appa in 'Hingne Daftar' I-15.
(73)  Ibid, 19
(74)  'Hingne Daftar' - I-13, 15.
(75) Ibid, 13, 15
(76)  'Satara Hist. Papers' , Vol. II - 264.
(77)  'Hingane Daftar', I -15
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 5 <b>JAISING KEEPS HIS WORD </b>
(i)The Nizam Plays Mischief :

The Sudden death of the able Peshwa in the prime of his age, was really felt to be a set back to the Maratha cause by all their well wishers. It was no wonder (1) that their foes at Delhi were over Joyed and wanted to profit by the dissension (they expected) created thereby. Sawai Jaysing informed (2) Chimaji that Nizam especially wanted to play mischief and create trouble and hence urged him to station the Maratha army in Malwa. But the arrangement had already been made and Vithaji Bule had already been kept and Pilaji Jadhao, Ranoji Shinde and Malharrao had been asked to remain in Malwa and probably all were to be there. Chimaji again remainded Jaysing to sent to promised 5 lakhs from the Emperor treasury immediately and the remaining 10 lakhs in the rainy season. Sawai Jaysing and the Marathas were completely in accord with each other this time. (1740 A.D.) Chimaji and the young Peshwa regarded him as an elderly person from their family and looked to him for guidence and moral support due to the sudden death of Bajirao. Even though all felt the loss of Bajirao’s personality, the Marathas were well prepared for any task having their full loyalities with the young Peshwa. When it was known that Ajmal Khan (3) was to be deputed from Delhi by the Nizam to snatch away Malwa from the Marathas, Ranoji Shinde wrote to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne, “Even previously the servants of the Peshwa used to defeact the enemies, hence even now there is nothing to worry about, God is kind and whoever will come down here will be received happily”. Malharrao (5) wrote in the same manner. But the union

Of the three Hindu rulers of the North with the Peshwa from the South never took place. It seems that opportunity, once lost, never comes again, in the same agreeable from. The moment to assert the Hindu element for managing Patshahi and establishing (Hindu) religion in all – India politics departed forever. Soon Nizam came to Deccan to meet the threat of his rebellious son and even Sawai Jaysing (6) was involved in a quarrel with Abhaysing on the question of Bikaner.

(ii)The Young Peshwa at Work :

But the young Peshwa (7) did not even get the parental protection of his uncle Chimaji Appa for a long. The latter died on 17th of December 1740 A.D. (8) at Poona and followed his beloved brother within eight months.

Meanwhile the Nizam had hastened to Deccan, (August 1740 A.D.) to face the rebellion of his son Nasir Jang. As per the Peshwa, it was the time of the Nizam to lose all, as “Nasir Jang was young and was backed by a strong army and guns and was confident of success”. It was quite clear (9) that the side which the Peshwa would join, would only win and hence both sought his assistance. But the young and inexperienced Peshwa (age 19) decided to side with Asaf Jah on the childish ground that”. Had I helped him (Nasir Jang), after achieving success he would have boasted of his own velour and people would have thought that we  had taken his side thinking that he was powerful. It was better for our prestige to help the weaker party and looking at the plight of Asaf Jah, I decided to help him”. The effect was the complete discomfiture of Nasir Jang against such a powerful combination.

The letters (10)and the deeds of Nizam-ul-Mulk clearly reveal the fact that he had been a deadly opponent of the Marathas throughout his career. This fact must  have been known to the Peshwa. He must have known that Bajirao had a mind to destroy the Nizam (11) completely. He was equally an opponent of the Rajputs and wanted to chastise (12) them. Again it was quite clear from the recent letter received from the envoy at Jaypur (13) that the Nizam was among those who were overjoyed at the sudden death of Bajirao and wanted to profit by the disadvantageous situation that they expected. He also knew that Bajirao and after his death Chimaji Appa had taken the side of the Rajputs especially against the Nizam. Leaving all this, the Peshwa sided with Asaf Jah. There is no wonder that the reception given by the Nizam to the Peshwa, “was more grand than the ceremony of the meeting of the late Rao”. But decisions of great political importance like this are hardly taken in the way the Peshwa had taken. Perhaps the young Peshwa was not mentally prepared to face the revolutionary situation that would have been created after the defeat of the Nizam, or perhaps the diplomacy of Nizam must have been more successful. But one thing is certain; that had the Peshwa not sided the Nizam the political career of the latter would have certainly come to an end. What the Peshwa ought to have done, was only neutrality, the rest of the work would  have been performed by Nasir Jang himself.

(iii)The Nizam Open His Heart to the Peshwa :

One good turn creates expectation for another one. The Nizam once nearly freed from the home-trouble, thought of utilizing the favourable opportunity to his full advantage. He informed the Peshwa (14) through Baburao Malhar thus : “When I was at Delhi, I had in my mind the question of the re-establishment of the Emperor’s rule and I had written accordingly to Bajirao Peshwa, but (unfortunately) he had then few days to live. I also had to come to Deccan for (home) management. Due to your (Peshwa’s) help, the trouble has come to an end and everything being set right properly, no trouble is left now. I have grown old and wish once more to got to Delhi for the management of the Emperor’s administration. Afterwards, whatever may be in the store of the fate, may happen. You (Peshwa) are in debt,  it must be paid off. Due to Nadir Shah’s invasion, the Emperor’s treasurty has been swept of it also needs attention along with the re-establishment of the Emperor’s authority. All this is in my mind. By re-establishment of authority I have in my mind, the Rajputs, who have since long grown wealthy out of the (illegal) acquisition of the Emperor’s territories. When the calamity of Nadir Shah befell the Emperor, he had a (vain) hope that the great armies of the Rajputs might reach him (in times of danger). I had also (up till then) heard much about the dexterity of their swordsmanship and desired to see its display (against Nadir Shah). With this object, I sent them letters of join forthwith. But nobody came, inbattle was lost due to Khan Dauran and Sadat Khan. But the Emperor has in his mind the treacherous conduct of the Rajputs. I have also a mind to recover the hoard of money from them to fill up the Emperor’s treasury. For al these things, if you and I combine, then nothing is impossible.”

The Nizam pormised the Peshwa, if he accepted the friendly proposal,
(1)To pay him 15 lakhs of rupees from the Emperor’s treasury and 5 lakhs more,
(2)To procure the Sanad for Malwa, the territory to the south of Chambal and the taluqas from Agra,
(3)To manage for the expected meeting of the Peshwa with the Emperor,
(4)To grant the jagir of Waranashi and
(5)To secure an order for the discontinuance of the collection of tax from the religious centre of Prayag, and
(6)To recover money from a few rich places to pay off the debt of the Peshwa.

Thus the Nizam once more promised to fulfill all the known demands of the Peshwa to secure his assistance to achieve supermancy at delhi.

(iv)The Peshwa Sticks to Rajputs Friendship:

But even though the Peshwa had helped the Nizam against his son, he knew his artful nature fully well (15) and refused to fall a victim to his enticing trap. This he did because the change of side from Sawai Jaysing to the Nizam was unthinkable for him. He had seen for years the existence of brotherly feeling in all their dealings between Sawai Jaysing and Bajirao. He still remembered the dutiful attitude of an affectionate son that Sawaiji exhibited towards the Peshwa’s mother while She was on her pilgrimage (in 1735-36 A.D.), and he had known thoroughly the common objects Sawaiji and Bajirao namely – the regeneration of the great Hindu centers of religion like Kashi and Prayag from the rule of the Yawanas (the Muslims), which was also the ideal of the young Peshwa. As for the practical gains, he believed that Jaysing was much more campetent to the Nizam, for the fulfilment of the Maratha demands through the Emperor.

(v)The Peshwa Proceeds to Meet Sawai Jaysing :

With this firm belief, rejecting the friendly overtures of the Nizam, he proceeded to meet Sawai Jaysing in the territory near about Orchha and Datiya and reached Nemad region in January 1741 A.D., with his full force. But the most urgent thing for him besides the procurement of the Sanads, was his pressing need of the money. The peshwa urged Sawai Jaysing, to manage to pay the promised 15 lakhs from the Emperor’s treasury and as it would take some time, requested him to provide the same, for the time being, from his own treasury to be adjusted later on.

Shinde and Holkar were already operating in Malwa. On 5th of Jauuary 1741 A.D., Malharrao Holkar captured Dhar(16) from the Mughal keeper. Malharrao then entered Rampura about which Sawai Jaysing complained (17) to the Peshwa. Holkar

Kar was accordingly told by the Peshwa, to crease troubles in Rampura as many things were to be got doen through Sawaiji and hence it was improper to displease him. (19)

Besides the pressing question of the recovery of 15 lakhs from the Emperor’s treasury, another question to be decided with Sawai Jaysing was of Ater. Jaysing had placed Humanizing on the throne of this principality with the consent of Bajirao who regarded this privilage of placing or dethroning any one to the South of Chambal, to be of the Marathas. Bajirao had a mind to acquire ½ of the territory worth 20-25 lakhs of rupees of Ater. But this question remained undecided during his remaining lifetime. Now after his death, Ajmulla Khan had replaced Bhimsing by certain Raysing. But since the new Peshwa was on his march with his army to the North, Sawaiji decided to place once more Bhimsing on the throne and accordingly the Peshwa, who took the occasion to put forth the previous demand of the ½ territory and the place of Ater for the Marathas.

The capture of Dhar by the Marathas, seriously upset the Emperor who once more thought of offering them armed opposition (18) . The Marathas had devastated Doab in the previous year and hence fearing that they would do the same this year too, the Emperor ordered all his Amirs, and Amir Khan, the Subha of Prayag and Mansur Ali Khan, the Subha of Ayodhya to co-operate with Sawai Jaysing to check the Marathas from crossing into Antarwed. Knowing of the plan, the Peshwa sent Awaji Kawade and Govind hari with detachment, by the South bank of Yamuna upto Prayag. This move effectively checked Mansur Ali Khan and Amir Khan from coming over to Jaysing. Sawai Jaysing who had come to Agra in fact wanted no quarrel with the Peshwa. Declaring that it was impossible for him to face the Marathas, he sent Ayamal to the Peshwa who came to Dhawalpur to the North of Chambal with Ranoji Shinde. Malharrao Holkar and Pawar. Infact the Emperor could neither displease Jaysing nor evade the Marathas. Mahadeo Bhat Hingne pressed the Maratha demand for the Subha of Gujarat and Malwa. Jaysing proceeded to Agra and met the Peshwa

Between Agra and Dhawalpur. The visit (20) lasted for a week from 12th to 19th of May 1741 A.D An agreement was reached on the following points viz.

(i)The Peshwa and Jaysing should act in complete friendship and help each other in all circumstances.

(ii)The Marathas should be strictly loyal towards the Emperor and

(iii)The grant of  Malwa for the Peshwa should be secured by Sawai Jaysing within six months.

Having accomplished his objects, the Peshwa, returned to the South and reached Poona on 7th of July 1741 A.D

(vi) Closure of the Friendly Chapter

The ‘faman’ was issued on 7th of September 1741 A.D entrusting the whole management of the Subha of Malwa to the Peshwa as Deputy to Shah Jada Ahmad, the Subhadar of Malwa (which was all nominal), including the civil and criminal jurisdiction. tHus from the first i.e. calling the Maratha in to Malwa, till the final grant of Subha of Malwa to the Marathas, Sawai Jaysing was connected with the affair. The manipulation for the grant of the Subha a Malwa for the Peshwa was the last act of Sawai Jaysing in favour of the Marathas.

This renowned ruler of Jaypur, for a along a great figure in Rajputana and Delhi, Court, the patron of Hindu-learning and religion, died on 23rd of September 1743 A.D at the age of 55. The death of Bajirao in 1740 A.D followed by the death of Sawai Jaysing within three years, mark the end of the epoch of the friendly relations between the Marathas and the Rajputs. With the change of personalities, there came a sudden change of political situation, with the result that the Marathas and Rajputs departed from their common aims to different directions never to meet again on the same plain of friendship.

When Sawai Jaysing called the Maratha armies (21) into Malwa in 1728 A.D, on behalf of the Emperor, he regarded them as not more than an auxiliary force. But with the knowledge of their political institutions (22) and the character and ideals of the personalities a work, a gradual understanding came about the Marathas with their persistant efforts to expand in all directions. The common background of religion and culture facilitated the development of social contacts which brought him nearer to the Marathas in general and the Peshwa family in particular.

In fact as a subordinate of the Emperor and the Subhadar of Malwa, Jaysing was duty-bound to oppose the Marathas. But he very skillfully changed the Phase of opposition into that of concilation and exerted to justify the same before the Emperor. The Marathas perfectly understood the situation in which Jaysing was placed and assisted him in his policies that were in fact favourable to them. This partiality of Sawai Jaysing towards the Marathas cost him the enmity of Sadat Khan and the Nizam. The former called him a traitor to the cause of the Emperor (23) and the latter was alwaysa claimant for the Subha of Malwa and disliked him thoroughly (24).

It is to be noted that from the murder of Farrukh Siyar till the end of his career, Sawai Jaysing exhibits complete independence of actions, though he had never severed his connections with the Emperor, on the contrary he was closely connected with him along with Khan Dauran. From the fact that even when he was asked to join the imperial forces against Nadir Shah, he remained aloof, it is quite clear that he had no attachment for the cause of the survival of the Mughal rule (25) . His attitude towards the shattering Mughal Empire in fact differed little from that of Bajirao and hence both had come closer together. Like the Marathas, he aimed at the enlargement of his dominions and wanted to retain the Subha of Malwa for himself. But when he saw that the powerful Marathas would not allow him its peaceful acquisition and having no strength and will to resist them, he sided with them in its possession, lest it Should fall in the hands of the crafty Nizam, who had been persistently trying for the same.

Certainly Sawai Jaysing had his political ends to meet behind his friendship with the Marathas. He was convinced that the days of the Mughal rule were numbered and was still convinced by 1736 A.D that the Marathas were the power to substitute it. He had no love lost for the ambitious Sadat Khan or the Turani party headed by Nizam-ul-Mulk (26) and Kamruddin Khan. The Emperor was a non-entity. In the intricate and changing power politics of Delhi, he wanted the Maratha force at his back to use it was a shield against the possible attacks of the powerful faction of the Court (27). Their moral support was definitely of use to him in 1736 A.D when Sadat Khan was expected to fall on him. Similarly after the invasion of Nadir Shah when all the remaining power of the Emperor had departed from him, when the Nizam created a threatening situation with Kamruddin Khan, (28) that was dangerous to the Emperor and himself alike, the choice of Bajirao to side with his party was of hearty relief for him (Sawai Jaysing). Inspite of their apparent marches even at the gates of Delhi, the role in general played by the marathas during 1724 A.D to 1740 A.D was that of a safeguard for Sawai Jaysing, Khan Dauran and even the Emperor and hence the letters calling Bajirao to the presence of the Emperor 29) or calling his forces in Malwa (30) and hence the Maratha’s pressing demands of payment at the treasury of the Emperor.

But political aspirations in the dealings of a king and a politician of the first mark like Sawai Jaysing are quite justificable

Be, for he was not a sage so as not to use the Maratha friendship for his own self when the Maratha themselves were profited by his taking their side.

But leaving this practical side, we have to admit that there was definitely more genuine, more sublime part in the attachment of Sawai Jaysing towards Bajirao and his family. Letters writen by Chimaji Appa (31) and Balaji Bajirao Peshwa do reveal to us that they had come from the heart where  ever they touched to brotherly feeling that existed between Sawai Jaysing and Bajirao. There were certainly strong reasons besides political necessity, between the friendship of the Marathas and the Rajputs. Culturally and religiously they stood on the same plain. History must record that after the invasion of Nadir Shah there definitely had come into the minds of the Hindu Chiefs (32) of the North and the South, an idea of creating Hindu predominance at Delhi for the regeneration of Hindu ideas in the society. The premature death of Bajirao gave a blow to such ideas of mutual assistance. With all the Maratha raids in Rajputana during Bajirao’s time, there existed nothing but a regard for the name and fame of Bajirao in the hearts of Rajputs, who looked to him as a tower of strength at the time of danger.

The political situation after Bajirao’s death changed rapidly at Delhi. Sawaiji’s relations with Abhaysing were strained beyond repairs. Even though the Emperor (33) was constant in his favors towards him, he had really lost a supporter at Delhi in the death of Khan Dauran. Moreover, Bajirao’s death certainly disabled him. Sawaiji’s last days were clouded with the apprehension of a civil war in Jaypur after his death on the question of the succession to the throne of Jaypur.

The friendly chapter in the relations of the Marathas and the Rajputs closes after the death of this apparently dependent but really independent Hindu Chief of Jaypur. It only stresses the point that personalaties do count in the course of history.

Foot Notes (Description)
(1) M.I.S. Vol. VI - 145.
(2) 'Hningne Daftar' I-17.
(3)."Tarikh-I-Hindi" in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 67.
(4) 'Hingne Daftar' I - 18.
(5) 'Holkar Shahi' I - 48.
(6) 'Hingne Daftar' I - 17.
(7) Peshwa Balaji was invested with the robes of the office of Peshwa on 25th of June 1740. 'Purandare' I - 147.
(8) Ibid - 148.
(9) 'Hingne Daftar' I - 20.
(10) 'Eighteenth Century Deccan' pp. 135, 198.
(11) (I) "Bajirao marched upon Aurangabad in Jan. 1740 - to annihilate the Nizam in Deccan". M.I.S. Vol. II - 85. (ii)"If the king orders all the forces to join, it is the time, that Mughal (Nizam) would be destroyed completely.." - Bajirao. B.I.S.M. 6 - 'Purandare Daftar' I - 139.
(12) 'Hingne Daftar' I-13, 15, 19.
(13) Ibid - 17-18.
(14) 'Hingne Daftar' I-19, 23.
(15) "Behind his sweet words, it was his intention to take all the credit of the things, the Emperor was going to do for us, with his own accord". Hingne Daftar' I - 19.
(16) S.P.D. 13-4. 'New Hist.' I - p. 213.
(17) 'Hingne Daftar' I - 24, M.I.S. VOL. VI-151.
(18) 'Hingne Daftar' I - 21.
(19) S.P.D. 13-4.
(20) 'Purandare Daftar' I-149. M.I.S. Vol. VI, 152, 'New Hist.' Vol. II p. 214.
(21) S.P.D. 13-10.
(22) Deepchand's mission S.P.D. 10-66, also see Appendix B.
(23) S.P.D. 14-47.
(24) See Nizam's letter about Jaysing - 'Elighteenth century Deccan' p. 141.
(25) 'Hingen Dafter' I-19.
(26) The discomfiture of the Nizam of the hands of Nadir Shah highly pleased Sawai Jaysing - 'Itihas Sangraha, Ait Charitra' - letter of Dhondo Govind.
(27) (a) "he (Jaysing) wants the Marathas to be his allies. In this he has two aims, that disturbance should subside, and the Marathas should be shielded". - From the letter of Nizam, 'Eighteenth Century Deccan' p. 141. (b) "He desired to combine his duty to his sovereign with his friendship with the Marathas. He also wanted to use the latter as auxiliaries". - 'Central India' p. 88.
(28) 'Hingne Daftar' I-13-15.
(29)  S.P.D. 15-pp. 87 to 89.
(30) S.P.D. 13-10, 'Hingne Daftar' - 17.
(31) 'Hingne Daftar' I-15, 17 and 19.
(32) 'Itihasa Sungraha, Ait. Chartra' - letter of Dhondo Govind, 'Hingne Dafter' I- 15, 'New Hist.'' - II-p-180-Shahu's letter in this respect.
(33) 'Fermans, Manshurs and Nishans', p. 61-43 and 44.
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 6 <b>ABHAYSING IN GUJRAT </b>

(I) Gujarat During 1720 A.D. To 1725 A.D.

Khanderao Dabhade was appointed ‘Senapati’ (1) by Chhatraati Shahu on 11th of January 1717 A.D., and was assigned the province of Gujarat and parts of Khandesh as the sphere of his activities. Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Damaji Gayakwad, his nephew Pilaji Gayakwad (from 1719 A.D.onwards) were his famous commanders, who established by almost annual incursions into Gujarat, the Maratha claim to ‘Chauth’ of Gujarat. But it was the civil war for a year (1724 –25 A.D.), waged in defiance of the commands of the Central Government, by the Nizam’s deputy Himid Khan, that really helped them to exact ‘Chauth’ from all the paraganas North (2) of the Mahi river.

The fall of Sayyad brothers was an act of great consequences that affected the Mughal administration in Malwa and Gujarat particularly. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the prime actor behind the plot, naturally became the Wazir of Delhi (February 1722). He replaced Ajitsing Rathod, the Subhadar of Gujarat, being the nominee of the Sayyads, by Haidarkuli Khan and asked him to depart to his province without loss of time. But not long after wards, he himself assumed the Subhadarship of Gujarat by dimissing Haidarkuli Khan and appointed his uncle Hamid Khan to act as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat (February 1723 A.D.)

But events followed too rapidly. The ambitious Nizam himself rebelled against the Emperor and established an independent Kingdom in Deccan after the battle of Sakhar-Kherda (30th September 1724 A.D.) (4) As a result, the Emperor deprived Him of his provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. In Gujarat, Sarbulad Khan Mubariz-ul-Mulk was appointed as Subhadar in his place. With this appointment, the above-mentioned civil war started in Gujarat.

Instigated by the Nizam, Hamid Khan (5), who represented him in Gujarat, defeated and killed Shujat Khan (17th December 1724 A.D.) the deputy of Sarbuland Khan near Ahmedabad, seeking the help of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gayakwad. A second attempt, by the brother of Shujat Khan, also met with the same fate. Thus two armies were defeated within a short period of less than three months with the help of Marathas, who naturally profited thereby.

Realizing the gravity of danger from the Turani faction led by Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Emperor asked Sarbuland Khan to depart to his province in person. Hamid Khan at last became powerless, with the coming of Sarbuland Khan (6) in Gujarat in December 1725 A.D., but as legacy, he had left the Marathas powerful in Gujarat. It was impossible for even Sarbuland Khan, to continue the struggle with the numerous Marathas for a longer time with all his resources. He, in 1726 A.D. came, to terms with Kanthaji (7) and agreed of the river Mahi, with the exception of the Capital and Haveli paragana.

(ii)The Peshwa Enters the Politics of Gujarat :

A new addition to the complicated situation of Gujarat was made when Peshwa Bajirao invaded Gujarat in early 1725 A.D. (8) to secure the right of ‘Chauth’ for himslef. Hereafter, the encroachment of the Peshwa through his brother Chimaji Appa and his Sardars continued (9) vigorously. In 1726 A.D., Udaji Pawar entered Gujarat from Dhar in Malwa, and tried to snatch Dabhoi (10) from Pilaji and Kanthaji, but failed. Never-the-less Peshwa’s hold on Gujarat was sufficiently established (11). In 1727 A.D. Chimaji Appa, entering Gujarat, penetrated as far as Dholke, within 25 miles of Ahmedabad. He sent his representatives to the viceroy to negotiate about the ‘Chauth’ but for various reasons, the terms could not be settled (12).

At the end of 1729 A.D., Chimaji again entered Gujarat with a considerable force. Laying siege to the hill fort of Pavgadh in January 1730 A.D. (13), he captured it in the first week of February 1730 A.D. Some of his halts in this expedition (1729 –30 A.D.) were – Nadiyad, Dhawalake, Viramgaon, Godai, Bichwa, Sabarmati, Tarapur and Petlad (14). In May 1730 A.D., but due to the opposition of the Khan’s Counsellers, it could not (15) take place. By the end of 1729 A.D., Peshwa’s hold on Gujarat was considerable (16).

(iii)Treaty of Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa. (1730 A.D.)

With no help from Delhi, as the monthly subsidy of three lakhs of rupees for the maintenance of his troops had been cut off, (17) the powerful army of 1725 A.D., had mostly been dispersed. Having left no resources to carry on the administration and the struggle with the Marathas, and espeically as the activities of Kanthaji and Pilaji had been supplemented by the Peshwa’s troops under Chimaji, Sarbuland Khan had no other remedy but to enter into a formal treaty (18) with the Peshwa on 23rd March 1730 A.D.

Meanwhile new changes had taken place at Delhi. To break the Turanian faction, Kamruddin Khan had been dismissed from his post, and Khan-Dauran had succeeded (19) him as Wazir. The new Wazir refused to recognize the treaty effected by Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa granting him ‘Chauth’ and ‘Sardeshmukhi’ of Gujarat, and relieving him of his office appointed Abhaysing, the Maharaja of Jodhpur, in his place as he believed that the great Hindu Rajas were the proper person (20) who could effectively confront the onrush of the Marathas.

(iv) Maharaja Abhaysing Appointed as Subhadar of Gujarat :

Maharaja Abhaysing was the third ruler of Rathod dynasty to hold this imperial office. He was granted eighteen lakhs (21) of rupees from the royal treasury for his expenses. Leaving Delhi, he reached his own Capital Jodhpur and enlisted 20,000 well-trained Rathod cavalry from Marwad and Nagor. His total army consisted of 30,000 horses and 10,000 foot and his military expenses came to seven lakhs of rupees per month. With this army and accompanied by his brother Bakhtsing, and his minister Ratansing Bhandari, he advanced towards Gujarat. When the new of his arrival at Jalor reached Sarbuland Khan at Ahmedabad he prepared to resist him. A sharp battle took place between the two sides, opposite the Capital, in which Sarbuland Khan was defeated. But by the intercession of friends, a reconciliation was effected and the ex-Viceroy left the Capital on receiving from his successor a lakh of rupees for the expenses of his journey.

(v) Decline of the Mughal Rule in Gujarat :

On the departure of Sarbuland Khan, Abhaysing applied himslef to the ardous task of driving the Marathas from Gujarat. His own letter (22) to his agent Bhandari Amarsing and Purohit Vardhaman, at Delhi reveal the true picture of the devastated conditions prevailing then in Gujarat.

“Nothing is left out of the Kharip crop. Nawab (Sarbuland Khan) has squeezed every pie of the income, whether it was given willingly or under pressure. As regards the income from customers, it can only be realized when the trade flourishes and that can only be collected when people will re-inhabit their homes…the Nawab (Khan Dauran) is fully aware of the forces kept here and the expenditure required, while the Emperor provided us in all 15 lakhs of rupees, 40 guns, 200 maunds of gun-powder and 100 mounds of lead…A person like Sarbuland Khan was the Governor of this place, who, inspite of receiving a crore of rupees as well as a large amount of military assistance from the Emperor, sat idle in the city while the enemy devastated the province, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered paid ‘Chauth’. This shows the strength of the enemy ! They are not even satisfied by the levy of ‘Chauth’, but Badoda, Dabhoi, Jambusar etc., yielding a revenue of 30 lacs, have also passed under their control. Surat including 28 districts is under the away of Pilu and any remittance of their revenue depends upon his sweet-will.

Pavagadh is held by Chimana (Chimaji Appa) and the fort of Champaner is under the possession of Kantha (Kanthaji Kadam Bande). They pretend to be lords of the land, and collect ‘Chauth, ‘Deshmukhi’ , ‘Peshkashi’ and administer some of the places also. Such is their audacity.. the enemy, if not fully crused, will again raise his head. This is the reason why we have to keep a force at an approximate cost of Rs. 5,00,000 per month and accordingly will require 40 lakhs of rupees for the coming period of 8 months. In Gujarat, the winter crop has been damaged, and the condition of the crop of rainy season has already been narrated. A dispute sbout the ‘Chauth’ between Kantha and Chimaji is going on, hence they both will returen here.”

(vi) Peshwa – Dabhade Rivalry in Gujarat :

Khanderao Dabhade, who had retired from active service from about 1723 A.D., and his son Trimbakrao, who had been already exercising his father’s powers, was invested with Senapati’s dignity on January 9, 1730 A.D. Gujarat (23) and parts of Khandesh had been assigned by the Chhatrapati, as the special sphere of activity of the Dabhades. It was they, who had taken the foremost part in the conquest of Gujarat. Their lieutenants Bandes and Gayakwads had established the right to collect ‘Chauth’ to the North and South of ‘mahi’ , since the days of Hamid Khan (1725 A.D.).

Naturally Trimbakrao resented Peshwa’s interferance and the agreement between Chimaji Appa and Sarbuland Khan concluded on 23rd March 1730 A.D. His stand that the Peshwa should restrict himself to Malwa, which was assigned to him by the Chhatrapati, was based on justice. Had he insisted upon this point with the Chhatrapati, there is no reason to doubt, that the Chhatrapati would not have listened to his arguments (24). But, instead, he preferred to settle the issue, taking recourse to armed conflict, and for that entered into negotiations with the Nizam. The fact was, that the Peshwa’s interference had provided only on outward cause for the Dabhade-Peshwa conflict, which infact had been aflamed due to the personal jealousy (25) felt by Trimbakrao and many other Maratha Chiefs for the enterprising Peshwa who had forced all of them into secondary position by raising his own armies and bravely leading them against the enemies of the Marathas from success to success

(vii) The Nizam-Dabhade Combination :

Smarting under the humiliating defeat at Palkhed (28th February 1728 A.D.) the Nizam had since then regarded Bajirao as a dangerous rival (26) to his policies of consolidating Muslim rule in Deccan. Such dissensions among the chief Sardars of Shahu were a gift from heaven and as such were eagerly welcomed and encouraged by him. Thus once having got the opportunity to thrust his had into Maratha’s internal politics, the Nizam never slackened his hold but determined to utilize the opportunity to fulfill his cherished ambition of making himself the supreme authority not only in Deccan but in Malwa and Gujarat as well, by removing Bajirao from his exhaled position in Maratha politics.

With perfect diplomacy and patience of a shrewd politician the Nizam labored over the plan. Many prominent Maratha Sardars who had their personal grievances against the Peshwa, were seduced through assurances that suited the occasion. Thus besides Dabhades, the Pawars, the Bandes, the Gayakwads and many other Maratha Chiefs joined him against the Peshwa in the common front.

The Peshwa was well informed of these activites, for example in one of his reports in November 1730 A.D. writes the Peshwa’s agent to him, (27) “Kanthaji, Udoji and Kanhoji are freequent visitors here and are being seduced by Anandrao Sumant who has assured the Nizam that the King Shahu would not be sorry at all if Bajirao is put down and that not a dog would bark at such a result.” He further stated, “ Dabhade and Bande have wirtten to Nizam asking for assurance for shelter…They contemplate making Sambhaji the Chhatrapti, Dabhade his Senapati and Kanthaji Bande his Sarlshkar… upon which the Nawab (Nizam-ul-Mulk) declared that such a chance has been presented to us without our asking, which of the two, Shahu or Sambhaji loses, is immaterial, one opponent will be less for us. Therefore we won’t reject the proposal.”

To ensure the success of these ambitious designs the Nizam left no stone unturned and by way of strngthening his position arranged a meeting (28) on Narmada, with Muhammad Khan Bangash who had been recently as Subhadar in Malwa, to enlist his co-operation in the coming enterprise.

Had the Peshwa hesitated in striking the blow at the most appropriate time, in all probability, this combination would have been fatal to the rising Maratha-Raj and as such Trimbakrao and his Maratha associates were playing with nothing but fire. Even though, initially truth was on his side, Trimbakrao had forfeited his claims to justice having placed personal jealousies above his duties to State. Shahu’s letter of strong remonstrance to him in which he wrote, “You have been a loyal Hindu servant of the State and as such we have all along dealt with you most kindly. You have nevertheless deserted us, to side with the enemy, taking offence at something we are not aware of. You must know what fate traitors meet with. We urge you, therefore, to forget all wrongs and to remember how your ancestors behaved and served the State, instead of the enemy, so that the nation may be proud of your conduct….you have to subdue the nation’s enemies and not to join them. You must work to extend the Maratah-raj. This warning is addressed to you in full confidence that you will remain a loyal servant of the State and not molest the poor, innocent rayats.”

The fact is that Shahu was all the while trying to settle (30) the issue amicably. At a time he thought of issuing ‘Sanad’ in favour of Dabhade by paying some cash to the Peshwa so that he should cease to interfere in Gujarat. When (31) asked by Bajirao, Chimaji consented to such an arrangement but insisted that Dabhade’s claims should be  removed by the Chhatrapati if he joined the Nizam. Shahu sent special messengers (32) and in the long in league with the Nizam and in one of his letters through Gayas Khan (33) (1st November 1730 A.D. ) he had urged the Nizam thus, “we do not demand any thing from you except your support, on which we shall destroy Pradhan Pant giving him a battle. If he succeeds, grant us a Jagir and Mansab. It we are successful, in that we are destroying the kingdom of Shahu declaring that it is the king who is instigating us to fight with the Peshwa. After the kingdom of Shahu is destroyed, Sambhaji should be placed on the throne and Trimbakrao and Kanthaji be made Senapati and Sarlashkar respectively. In it the fame of the Nawab (Nizam) would be enhanced…” Shahu (34) seems to be ignorant of these dangerous designs of Trimbakrao, for had he known them, it is impossible to believe that he would have cancelled the Mokasa of half of Gujarat assigned by him to Chimaji and transferred it to Trimbakrao on 15th December 1730 A.D. only a fortnight before the battle of Dabhoi.

Shahu’s letter produced little effect on Trimbakrao. He was uncompromising (35) and was not prepared to lose even a village of his territory. The Nizam (36) had already left Aurangabad to follow Bajirao. Dabhade had assembled a force of 10 thousand at Talegaon and was to follow him soon. In fact he had gone too far in his plans to destroy Bajirao, to listen to any suggestion of Shahu or Bajirao. It is no wonder, hence, that the efforts of Chhatrapati Shahu to bring Dabhade in his presence at Satara met with little success (37) (December 1730 A.D.).

Bajirao could not be deaf to the reports that poured upon him from his agents about the gathering of the clouds against him and did not deem it wise to wait till they got time to burst upon him.

Along with Chimaji he marched towards Khandesh leaving Poona on 10th October 1730 A.D. Leaving Chimaji (38) to watch the movements of the Nizam in Khandesh, Bajirao proceeded to Badoda (December 1730 A.D.) . Chimaji soon joined him, having made sure that the Nizam, who had proceeded to meet Bangash, would probably bring large forces including those of Bangash to help Dabhade.

Towards the end of November 1730 A.D., (39) the Nizam started from Aurangabad to meet Bangesh on Narmada. He Informed Dabhade not to engage with Bajirao rashly until a fully concerted plan was arranged between them all (40). The meeting took place on Narmada (41) at Akbarpur ferry near the fort of Mandavgadh from 17th to 28th of March 1731. Bajirao’s success to a greater extent depended on keeping himself fully informed of the enemies movements and hence he had posted Malharrao Holkar in the vicinity of Narmada.

Malharrao harassed the Bangash during the said conference and at the same time sent vital information to his master in Gujarat from time to time (42).

(viii) The Role of Abhaysing in the Conflict :

On his arrival near Badoda, Bajirao wrote a letter to Maharaja Abhaysing (43), who deputed the faujdar of Bhadoch to meet him on the Mahi. Thereafter the Peshwa and his brother advanced to Ahmadabad and encamped at the Chandola tank. Negotiations were carried on through Ratansing Bhandari. A meeting took place at Shahi-Bag between Bajirao and Abhaysing when terms of agreement were settled. (February 1731 A.D.). The Maharaja agreed to pay 13 lakhs of rupees in lieu of ‘Chauth’ of Gujarat, 6 lakhs of which were paid down immediately and the remaining amount was to be paid after Kanthji and Pilaji (44) were expelled from Gujarat.

As per the agreement (45) a body of Rajputs joined Bajirao to secure Badoda from Pilaji. The combined army laid siege to Badoda fort, which was ably defended by the Gayakwad’s general. But the Peshwa could not remain there for a longer time and had to raise the siege on receiving the grave news of the arrival of the Nizam on the Narmada with his army, intending to march into Gujarat.

The Senapati with the help of Kanthaji, Pilaji and Udaji had collected an army of about 40,000 men including the Nizam’s (46) contingent of about 5,000 under Muhammad Yar Khan and Kuwar Bahadur, on the plain of Dabhoi and Bilapur. Bajirao sent his repeated messages (47) from Savli to Dabhade to proceed to Satara and have the dispute settled amicably in  the presence of Chhatrapati, reminding him that it was not proper that the two prominent Servants of the king should engage in a personal contest. But Trimbakrao was in no mood to listen to such proposals. Probably he was waiting for the definite instructions from the Nizam as to the time of his action. In fact the Nizam and the Bangash needed sometime more before they were to unite their forces with those of their Maratha allies. But It would have been a dangerous folly on the part of Bajirao had he waited more. The Peshwa was too foresighted and too quick in his action to give the Nizam and his allies enough time to mature their plans. As Trimbakrao had refused his overtures of peace, the Peshwa fell upon him with a comparatively smaller force of about 20,000 horse at the village of Bhilapur, between Badoda and Dabhoi on 1st of April 1731 A.D. Dabhade fought with determination and courage, but a chance shot, probably from his maternal uncle killed him instantly. There upon his troops broke and fled, which completed the victory of the Peshwa in this civil struggle. He wrote thus about the victory to his Guru Brahmendra Swami. “Dabhade with his allies came forward for an encounter on 4th Shavval. Trimbakrao himself, Jiwaji Dabhade, Maloji Pawar and Pilaji Gayakwad’s son Sabhaji were killed outright. Udaji Pawar and Chimmaji Damodhar were captured. Pilaji Gayakwad and Kuvar Bahadur escaped wounded. A large booty was secured. Out side too lost a few brave ones in the battle (48).

Before Nizam could render any help to Dabhade, Bajirao had disposed him of. He did not wait a moment after the battle but returned with all haste to Satara. On the way, he had a brush with a party of Nizam’s troops near Kador. After receiving

The news of Peshwa’s victory, the Nizam had advanced from Nandurabar upto the neighbourhood of Surat and attacked the retiring army under Bajirao, capturing some of its baggage (49). The Nizam boasts of this victory in the following way:

Asaf Jah to Abdul Nabi Khan (50) – April 1731 A.D., “Immediately on hearing rumours of the approach of the Islamic army by way of All Mohan, (the enemy) in utter bewilderment quickly crossed the Narmada and entered the limits of Deccan.

Therefore, this follower of Mustafa’s from the ford of Akbarpur, near the fort of Mandu, sent off his baggage and camp with the big guns to Burhanpur, and with great rapidity arrived at Nandurbar, and reached the environs of Surat in a few days. We surprised the Marathas when they were sleeping in great negligence and ignorance of our whereabouts and they fied away in utmost disorder. The dead were countless. Out troups made spoil of their property and the wretches suffered total losses.

The Subha of Gujarat has been freed from the disturbance created by Bajirao and the Subha of Malwa too has remained safe from that wretche’s mischief making, and the holy port (of Surat) has been saved from falling into the cloches of the villain.”

It is to be noted that the Nizam does not make any mention of the Victory of Gujarat, on the contrary he speaks of Gujarat being, “unoccupied by defenders.” He boasts of having saved Gujarat, Malwa as well and the port of Surat from falling into the hands of the Marathas. His pretensions over Malwa and Gujarat are quite obvious from the above letter. He very conveniently connives at the great victory of Bajirao over Dabhade and puts it as if Bajirao fled from Badoda on hearing the approach of the muslim army.

Let us see the version of Abhaysing (51) about the victory of Bajirao over Dabhade. “There was fight between the armies of Trimbakrao Dabhade and those of Bajirao and ours. Trimbakrao, Mughal Mominyar Khan the commander of Nizam’s army, and Mula Pawar were killed. Pawar Uda, Chimma (Chimanaji Damodhar) and Pandit of the side of the Nizam and Pilu’s son were captured, and we were victories. You must have imparted these news to the Nawab (khan Dauran).

Pilu, Kantha, Anandrao and others have fled with their armies. Pilu fled to Dabhoi and his brother is at Barods. We have dispatched our armies to both these places and hope to get them vacated soon. As Kantha had fled to Nizam-ul-Mulk, you should ask the Nawab to inform the Emperor and get his orders issued to Nizam with a strict warning, that he should comply with the commands of the ‘Darbar’ (Maharaja) and should not give shelter to Kantha, Pilu and others.

The army of the Nizam too is destroyed and if he comes again to this place to avenge himself, there will be a battle with him.

This time Bajirao has rendered meritorious services to the Emperor. So a robe of honour, a ‘Farman’ and an elephant should be bestowed upon him as well as Raja Shahu and a robe of honour on Chimna. Further, after explaining everything to the Nawab, also arrange for the bestowal of a ‘Mansab’.

Sometime back we wrote about the case of Bajirao, but owing to the verbal or written misrepresentations, the Nawab could not grasp the reality and has informed to Emperor that Bajirao, only being afraid of Trimbakrao, has joined us in this way, and therefore he could not help us in any biggest task. These days there was a large concentration of the forces of the enemy, and both the armies arrived here. When we failed to see any provision being made by adverse result, it was we who would be blamed for it, as no one would say that the Nawab did not do any thing in the matter. In these circumstances we tried hard to bring Bajirao to the side of the Emperor, and giving him every assurance dispatched him with our forces equipped with strong artillary to punish Kantha, Pilu and others. We have thus created a split among them and managed to crush the rising.

We thought that the Nawab would appreciate our action but instead of that he has written to us to punish Bajirao, drive him away and give him no help what-so-ever. It appears that the Nawab has written to us at the instigation of the Nizam. Is it fair that the Nawab should act on the advice of others when the task has been entrusted to us? Only consider that though kantha and Pilu had been usurping the land of Gujarat for the last eight years, he (Khan Dauran) favours them and gives no weight to winning Bajirao over to the side of the Emperor. Tell all these facts to the Nawab plainly and inform that we have done all this with full faith in him. But it he does not care, we are not prepared to keep this province. What advantage can one have in Gujarat these days? On the contrary though we have to bear all the expenses from the revenue of Marwad, he has neither done anything for our own jagir or for that of Rajadhiraj (Baktsing).

Recently the enemy threatened us again and therefore we managed the affair in this way. He writes to Nizam to punish Bajirao, while we brought him whole-heartedly to our side and sent him to punish the Nizam. It appears that though the Nizam wants to create misunderstanding between the Nawab, and us yet he has no courage to advance. Had he come forward, he would have been punished, and further if he thinks of advancing against us, he shall be punished.”

Top and side lines in Maharaja’s own hand writing: “May Almighty always protect us. By the grace of God we have achieved victory. The helping force of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, which too was with the enemy has also been destroyed. But Bajirao has not been favoured with thanks and assuance for his help. If the Nizam himself comes here, we are prepared to deal with him. Also arrange to remit money soon. Here there is no source of income, and therefore, inform the Nawab and arrange to send money without fail, we belong to the Rajput race and therefore believe that whatever the Almighty desires will happens, but the Emperor will lose the province.

As Abhaysing puts it, there was no source of income for the viceroy in Gujarat. He could not continue for a long his expenses in Gujarat at the cost of revenue of Marwad. Money was the necessity without which hs was unable, “to manage the affaris of the province even for a single day.” The Maratha menace to Gujarat as Abhaysing puts it correctly, had been in existance for the past eight years i.e. from 1722 A.D. Even Sarbuland Khan was unsuccessful to face the Maratha tide. Confronted with great concentration of Maratha troops in combination with the Nizam, Abhaysing had no other means to save the province ghand to enter into an alliance with Bajirao, who had been won over to the Emperor’s side and was supplied with artillary and troops to face the enemy. But his diplomacy was  not appreciated by the Nawab Khan Dauran, far from it, he had written to punish Bajirao. Abhaysing felt that it was not fair for him to write in that way. He strongly recommanded due recognition for the meritorious services rendered by Bajirao and even a ‘Mansab’ also. Finally he wrote that if his polices were not accepted, he was not prepared to keep the province for himself.

Even though Abhaysing was conscious of the fact that by winning over Bajirao to his side, he had created a split among the Marathas, his joy over the success of Bajirao seems to be more unrest than what is warranted of a shrewd and practical diplomat. In fact, it was not he who had won over Bajirao against Dabhade, but it was due to the common interest that they both and come together. But there was something more. Even though he was not a through observer of the Maratha internal politics like the Nizam, the sense of self interest must have warned him that in the success of the Nizam Dabhade combination against Bajirao, lay a dangerous threat to his existence in Gujarat. Hence Bajirao’s men were his men and his victory was ‘Our Victory’. His choice of the party of Bajirao was not accident. Since Ajitsing, the House of Rathod belonged to anti-Turanian group and even then Abhaysing was a partisan of Khan Dauran and as such was naturally opposed to the politicizes of Nizam whose pretensions to Gujarat under any form were jealously resented by him (52).

(ix) After Dabholi :

Being doubtful about the policy of the Emperor (53) and as per the agreement (54) with the Chhatrapati Shahu, Bajirao here after did not personally (55) interfere in the polities of Gujarat and hence Abhaysing’s alliance with the Peshwa was short-lived. But, nevertheless, it had not been barren of fruits. In main, it had put down the ambitious plans of the Nizam, which if successful, could have stirred the political atmosphere not only of Deccan but also of the whole Hindusthan. The success of the Nizam would have up set the chance of Rajput dominance as they had then, in the politics of Delhi.

After his defeat at Dabhoi at the hands of Bajirao, the reputation of Pilaji Gayakwad, suffered considerably. Nevertheless, by his hold of Songadh fort and his recent acquisitions of Badoda and the fortress of Dabhoi, he had made himself still more formidable. However, Abhaysing was determined to secure the territory lost to the Marathas. With little resources left in Gujarat, the task was beyond his power to perform. Fully realizing this, Abhaysing thought to take recourse to baser methods and managed Pilaji to be assassinated at Dakor, on 14th of April, 1732 A.D.

With satisfaction the Maharaja wrote to Amarsing Bhandari, his Vakil at Delhi, in a letter dated 26th March 1732, “By the grace of Goddess, Pilu has been killed”. The reason was “without dong away with him, we cannot take Badoda, as he would never fight a pitched battle”. As per the details given in the letter, a contingent of two thousand selected cavalry, was specially despatched to fall upon the camp, after the treachery was successful. Pancholi Ramanand, Bhandari, Ajabsing and Inda Lakhdhir entered into negotiations with Pilaji at Dakor, the famous place of Hindu pilgrimage and when the latter had little suspicions of any foul act, affected his murder. At once, the two thousands Rathod horse fell upon the confused Maratha camp two hours after the dark. Pilaji’s brother, along with five to seven persons of note, were killed, Five hundred Marathas fell on the spot and a great amount of botty was taken, including 700 horses and a large number of heavy fire locks. The Maharaja then marched to Badoda, which was abandoned by the Marathas in confusion.

Occupying Badoda, the Maharaja laid siege to Debhoi where the Marathas had retired. But owing to the unseasonable rains he failed to capture it and subsequently retired to Ahemadabad (1732 A.D)

But by now the Marathas (56) had fully recovered from the shock. The Kolis, Bills, Waghris and other wild tribes enraged at the murder of Pilaji rose every where against the viceroy, Pilaji’s brother, Mahadaji, marched from Jambusar on Badoda and took it by storm. In 1733 A.D, Umabai Dabhade (57), widow of the Senapati Khanderao, accomapnied by Kanthji Kadam Bande and Pilaji’s able son Damaji Gayakwad, with an army of 30,000 troups approached Ahmadabad to avenge the death of Pilaji. The threatening Marathas encamped at the Shahwadi about three miles from the Jamalpur gate of Ahmadabad. Being impossible to face them, the Maharaja was foreced to pay a ransom of 80,000 rupees over and above the ‘Chauth’ and ‘Sardeshmukhi’ of the province (58).

Shortly after this, the Maharaja left Ahmedabad for Jodhapur leaving Ratansing Bhandari as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat and hence during 1733 A.D to 1736 A.D his contact with the Marathas in Gujarat was through his deputy who tried to oppose them in vain.

By 1736 A.D, the Maratha hold on Gujarat was nearly complete except for the capital Ahemadabad and the seaports bhadoch. Surat and Cambay. In 1736 A.D, the Emperor appointed Momin Khan as the Successor to Maharaja Abhaysing as Subhadar of Gujarat.

The deputy Subhadar informed Abhaysing about the ‘Farman’ received by Momin Khan and about his intended march to the capital with the help of the Marathas. Taking offence at his supersession, the Maharaja left the Court. As Ratnsing refused to surrender Ahemadabad, as per the orders of his master, Momin Khan and his Maratha ally Rangoji (59), the agent of Pilaji Gayakwad, laid siege to Ahemadabad. From the end of August 1736 A.D to the end of May 1737 A.D, for nine months. Ratansing with considerable capacity and resource-fulness, defended Ahmadabad against the combined strength of the enemy. But during this trying period, the Maharaja failed to send him any help in men or money. At last for lack of provisions, the Bhandari and his Rajputs abandoned the defence and left for Marawad (60) on 25th of May 1737 A.D

(x) The Relations of Abhaysing with the Marathas from 1733 A.D Onwards

Maharaja left Gujarat in 1733 A.D and went back to Jodhpur because that was the only honourable way left for him. Owing to the constant Maratha raids, the revenue of the province had dwindled and a horrible famine which ravaged the land made the economic condition all the more pitiable (61) and yet the Imperial Court did not send the expected help in men and money, even on repeated demands. Under such circumstances, the Maharaja was convinced, as he had previously written, that the province was lost to the Emperor. Hence he left his deputy to look after Gujarat affairs, as far as it was possible and returned to Jodhpur having left all interest in the defence of the Mughal Empire hereafter.

In 1734 A.D he attended the assembly of the Rajput Chiefs at Hurda along with the rulers of Jaypur, Udaypur, Kota, Bikaner and Kishangadh. All signed a pact of mutual assistance. But the pact could be of little use in prevalence of mutual jealousies among the Chiefs.

Inspite of the foul murder of Pilaji at his instance in 1732 A.D, Abhaysing was not opposed in general to Maratha cause from the point of view of his policy. He blonged to the party of Khan Dauran and hence was much more inclined (62) towards them. His moral support to Bajirao in 1731 A.D, against the combination of Kanderao Dabhade and the Nizam was definitely of consequences (63). Later on also, his participation in the campaigns against Bajirao during 1734 A.D to 1736 A.D was only nominal.

But his influence with Khan Dauran dwindled by degrees as the threats of the Marathas to the security of the Mughal Empire increased in seriousness since 1736 A.D In the longrun, Khan Dauran was disillusioned in his high opinion about the Rajput Rajas that their appointment to the Subhas of Malwas and Gujarat would effectively check the tide of Maratha aggression. With the attack of Bajirao on Delhi, the idea to call Nizam for the defence of the Empire got root, even Khan Dauran sided with it, and with the coming of the Nizam at Delhi in 1737 A.D, Abhaysing nearly lost all his interest in Delhi Politics.

He died in 1749 A.D and was definitely a strong Hindu minded ruler like his illustrious father Ajitsing.


Foot Notes (Description)
(1)  'New Hist.' Vol. II pp. 134 and 135.
(2) 'History of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 413.
(3) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 517, 518, 527.
(4) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 526.
(5) Ibid, pp, 528, 529.
(6) 'A Hist. of Gujarat', Vol. II, p. 424.
(7) Ibid, p. 426.
(8) S.P.D. 30-312 :- Bajirao's expedition into Gujarat. His comprador Baji Bhivrao was active in the territory of Khambayat in Feb. 1724 A.D. It is doubtful whether Bajirao personally invaded Gujarat this time. 'Pehswas' Shakawali' (M.I.S. Vol.II, p. 24) states that during January to March 1725 A.D., Bajirao was in Malwa, whereas in No. 312 to S.P.D. 30, it is clearly stated that Baji Bhivrao was in Gujarat along with Rajashri Pant Pradhan. ( ????????????????????????????????????????????????????

(9) S.P.D. 30-p. 272 : Half of Bagad, in Gujarat, was assigned for expenses of the contigent of Gajaji Dewakate, under Chimaji, on 19th July 1724 A.D. Ibid, p. 277 : Malhar Govind was appointed 'Chitnis' to collect 'Sardeshmukhi' and 'Babti rights' in Gujarat by Chimaji. Ibid pp. 280, 281 : The day to day collection of 'Chauth' from Gujarat (along with Malwa) by Tryambak, agent of Pilaji Jadhao, Convinces the gradual hold of the Peshwa on Gujarat during 1725 - 26 A.D.)

(10) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 426.
(11) A circular order from Raja Shahu to Pilaji Gayakwad, Kanthaji Kadam and Ambaji Pant, (23-4-1726 A.D.) states that Ambak, Mutalik of the Peshwa, had settled with Sarbuland Khan for the surrender of 'Chauthai' and 'Sardeshmukhi' of Gujarat and directed them not to interfer with its payment to Chimaji and Trimbakrao Dabhade. Baroda I.

(12) "Bajirao I and  Maratha Expansion" (1944 A.D.) p. 30, 'A Hist. of Gujarat'. Vol. II p. 426.

(13) S.P.D. 30 - entries on page 426.

(14) S.P.D. 30 - pp. 295, Itinerary of Chimaji Appa.

(15) S.P.D. 12-32 (The date of letter should be 22-5-1730 and not 22-5-1729 as the editor has wrongly stated, for the abvous reason that Chimaji had just returned from his Malwa expedition on 4th May 1729 A.D., (Itinerary of Chimaji Appa - Item No. 10, p. 6 of S.P.D. 22.).
Daniel Inners's letter, dated 25th March 1730 A.D., in Hist, of Gujarat, Vol. II, p. 427 reproduced from the 'Gaikwad of Baroda' 1-10 Reads as follows: - "The Ganims under Chimaji Raja, it is said, before they left Petlad, got from the town nearly two lakhs of rupees, whence they moved off Dholka way, they have pillaged the greatest part of it, the loss sustained cannot as yet be known but must be great multitudes say a crore of rupees, others more moderate, say half at least. "
Now compare this 'it is said' , with the reality : Letter from Chimaji Appa to Bajirao dated 22nd May 1730 A.D. from Pavgadh, - "We have returned from Viramgaon. Sarbuland Khan had agreed to a meeting with us when Anandrao Pawar had been there. But he did not come as his men opposed the meeting. We then went to Dhawalake Petlad. At present we art at Pavagadh. The provisions are to be made in the fort. Anandrao Pawar thinks of staying more. If we stay, the (captured) territory and the fort will be retained. But (if we decide to stay) how to feed this army is the great questions. No money has been recovered to pay off the creditors. Hence, the difficulty from both the sides. If we decide to stay, the bellies will have to be filled and if we leave, the territory is lost. Hence we are (still) here. After making due provisions, and making one or two, halts to have time to take further decision about our plan, we shall write (to you) definitely. "
Thus when the anxiety of Chimaji was how to retain the territory and at the same time feed his army, the contemporary writer Daniel Innes puts up the exacted ransom from a crore of rupees to 50 lakhs as a moderate estimate. There is hardly any need to add anything more in his respect!

(16) S.P.D. 30 - entries on pp. 293, 294. Dated 16th September 1729 A.D., reveal that along with other Mahals from Malwa, Udaji Pawar and Anandrao Pawar, were assigned a saranjam of 29 Mokasa-mahals in Gujarat.

(17) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 426.
(18) S.P.D. 15 - pp. 84, 85 (The date given is 9-2-1728), 'Grant Duff' - I (1921) p. 374. Bajirao I & Maratha Expansion (1944) ; pp. 32, 33.
(19) 'The Cambridge Hist. Vol. IV ; p. 351, 'A Hist. of Gujarat' , Vol. II, p. 430.
(20) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205, 'A Hist of Gujarat' Vol. II p. 430.
(21) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205.
(22) Relevant extract from the Maharaja's letter, dated 10th November 1730 A.D. - from 'Gloriess of Marwar' , pp. 144 to 148.
(23) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 135.
(24) S.P.D. 12-39, Letter of Chimaji to Bajirao in which the former consented to the settlement of Gujarat, proposed by Shahu.
(25) S.P.D. 14-32, Letter of Purandare to Bajirao, which reveals the jelousy felt by Fattesing Bhosale (& the Pratinidhi) who complains, "Rajashri Pradhan Pant is engaged in military exploits and therefore his name is renowned, also he has a (big) army. We have been sitting idle at home and hence have no connection with the army and thus have been disabled from every point of view."

(26) S.P.D. 10-27, 61, 65, 67 to 70, 72 to 76, S.P.D. 12-44.

(27) S.P.D. 10-72.

(28) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 251.

(29)  S.P.D. 17-12, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 137.

(30) (A) Dr. V. G. Dighe, in his unrestrained remarks over Shahu (Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion; pp. 33 to 35) states that "the weak and vacillating monarch who had risen to authority by the prowess of others, was incapable to pacify his warring chiefs, the more so, as he was specially indebted to Bajjirao and his father for his exalted position not hence could wield but nominal control over his activities. " (B) Writes Sardesai, "When he (Trimbakrao) found that Shahu was too soft to control Bajirao effectively, he began open preparations for an armed conflict," (New Hist. Vol. II, p. 123). These remarks save Trimbakrao from much of the blame; his treacherous conduct deserves, and places it on the powerful Peshwa who could not be controlled by the Chhatrapati as per the above remarks. But this is nothing but injustice to both the Chhatrapati and his Peshwa.

(31) S.P.D. 12-33, 39.
(32) Ibid, 35.
(33) S.P.D. 10-72.
(34) S.P.D. 30-p. 229.
(35) S.P.D. 12-42.
(36) S.P.D. 10-75
(37) S.P.D. 12-35, 42.
(38) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 139.
(39) S.P.D. 10-75.
(40) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 138.
(41) 'Later Mughals' , Vol. II, p. 251, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139.
(42) New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139
(43) 'Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, pp. 438.
(44) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 140.
(45) S.P.D. 12-27.
(46) "What makes the action greater is that Chimaji (Bajirao) had but 15,000 or 16,000 horse and the joint force of Pilaji and Kanthaji are said to have been upwards 50,000." A letter from Daniel innes at Canebay to the Chief of the factory of Surat dated 7th April 1731, quoted in "A Hist. of Gujarat" Vol. II, p. 140.
(47) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 140, 'Kincaid and Parasnis' p. 229.
(48)  S.P.D. 12-46, Bajirao's letter of his victory to Krishnaji Kadam of 2nd of April 1731 A.D.
(49) :"A Hist. of Gujarat" Vol. II, p. 443.
(50) 'New Hist'. Vol. II, pp. 142 and 143.
(51)  Relevant extracts from Abhaysing's letter to his envoy at Delhi dated 10th April 1731 A.D.
(52) The Nizam was conscious of the opposition of Abhaysing to his policies. He wrote to the Emperor. "If Maharaja Abhaysing does not give protection to Bajirao and abstains from treacherous collusion, your servant (Nizam) by the help of Almighty will be able to destroy and capture. If Abhaysing acts in accordance with your Orders and undertakes to chastise the enemy in his province, the faction of Bajirao will be dispersed and he will be absolutely ruined." Citecd from - 'The porceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress' 1938, p. 617.

(53) Abhaysing wrote to his agent at Delhi from Ahmadabad, dated 10th of April, in which he has stated that, relying on the words and commands of the Maharaja (Abhaysing) he has served the Emperor whole-heartedly in the battle against Trimbakrao and others. But the Nizam-ul-Mulk has recently sent him the original ordersof the Emperor, communicated to him (Nizam) , to Bangesh and to us (Abhaysing) and informed him that while such are the orders of the Emperor, he is weakening the side of the invaders by fighting against his own men. On whose assurance is the doing all this? The Emperor has already ordered for his capture and punishment. This information has dishearted him. Though he was already getting such news from different sources, we retained him by giving assurances. At present after reading the original letters, he is perplexed and relies more on the news and intends to leave us. We had already written to the Nawab (Khan Dauran) to send a 'Farman' , but the same has not been yet received. Therefore arrange immediately to dispatch the 'Faman' etc., as was stated in our previous letter".'Glories of Marwad', pp. 162 to 164. But the good relations continued, for e.g. a letter dated 13th October 1731 A.D. (Baroda Vol. I) states that "It is essential for the Peshwa to maintain the friendly relations with Rajashri Abhaysing and hence Rajashri Yashwantrao Dabhade Senapati, Pilaji Gayakwad and Kadam Bande he informed not to molest Gujarat." It seems that after the treacherous murder of Pilaji by Abhaysing, it was impossible for Bajirao to continue the friendly relations with him.

(54) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 62.
(55) As per S.P.D. 14-2, dated 16-3-1732 A.D. Malharrao and Ranoji had been to Gujarat, captured Champaner, provided Pavgadh and then went to Malwa.

(56) The Maharaja wrote, "All the Southern people have been hostile to us and we have left no stone untured to serve the Emperor. We have captured 24 fortresses…the rest of the possessions of the enemy will be speedily takne…by the grace of God the enemy does not stay within 50 miles of us…." Again, "we have conquered the forts of Badoda and Jambusar and the siege of the fort of Dabhoi is in progress" - 'Glories of Marwad'.

(57) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 446.
(58) S.P.D. 14-1.
(59) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 80.
(60) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, pp. 459 to 465, 'Glories of Marwad' pp. XLV-XLVIL.
(61) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 457. 'Glories of Marwad' Maharaja's letter p. XLIV. 
(62) His appointment as Subhadar of Gujarat, was to detach him from the Turani party - 'later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205.
(63) 'New Hist'. Vol. II, p. 140.

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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE SECOND PHASE : (1743 TO 1766 A. D.)
<b>Chapter 1 THE MARCH OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE </b>
(i)The Change in the Relationship, Reasons:

There existed nothing but cordial relations between the Rajputs and the Maratha till 1743 A.D., but within less than 10 years, the former turned into the most bitter enemies of the latter and conspired with Najib Khan Rohilla and the Durani Chief Ahmad Shah Abdali for their destruction. And even though this enmity turned into a friendship for a temporary period of a few years during 1764 to 1769 A.D., it was the effect of the Jat ascendancy and the individual policy of Malharrao Holkar in befriending the Rohillas and the Rajputs persistently played the role of the opponents of the Marathas, throughout the latter half of the 18th century What was the reason that turned the friendly Rajputs into the deadly enemies of the Marathas?

The Maratha-Rajput friendship started on the background of Malwa politics, due to the need of coming together against Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah and the Turani party. Nizam’s role in Delhi politics after 1720 A.D. till 1723 A.D. was that of the Sayyads before him. In fact even from Deccan, it was ever possible for him to dominate Delhi with his powerful Turani supporters and create untenable situation for the weak Emperor. Even in 1741 A.D. (1), the Nizam in Deccan told the Peshwa Balajirao that he would send a word to fulfill his demands for the grant of Sanad for Malwa and 20 lakhs from Emperor’s treasury.

Emperor Muhammad Shah had the misfortune to behold the loss of provinces from his empire one after another. His inglorious career turned him a revengeful man. He forgot nothing and forgave none. He ended the powerful Sayyads by conspiring with the Nizam but when he saw that he had only added to the tyranny of the Turani faction thereby, the Nizam became his next target. The latter, thereupon, left Delhi for Deccan and created an independent kingdom for him. This was the first direct blow to the solidarity of the Mughal Empire and Mohammad Shah never pardoned the Nizam for his grave crime. As an effect, much of the development in Gujarat and Malwa during 1724 A.D. to 1735 A.D. was the result of the Emperor’s revengeful policy towards the Nizam (2). For this, he nearly ignored Kamruddin Khan, the Turani Wazir, and the nearest relative of the Nizam, and relied much on Khan Dauran, the Mir Bakshi, and the friend of Sawai Jaysing of Jaypur. The main politics centred at Malwa, so as not to allow it to fall into the hands of the Nizam, Khan Dauran naturally wanted Jaysing to be the Subhadar of Malwa but since the Marathas had to be introduced as an opposing element to the Nizam, it was they in the long run, who put aside Sawai Jaysing to be the Subhadar of Malwa but since the Marathas had to be introduced as an opposing element to the Nizam, it was they in the long run, who put aside Sawai Jaysing and became the masters of Malwa by 1732 A.D. The Marathas did not halt there, but with in a few years crossed Chambal and entered Ajmer and Agra Subha. To save the Mughal Empire from the threat of the Marathas, the Nizam was at last called to Delhi in 1737 A.D., which resulted into his defeat at the hands of Bajirao resulting into the complete hold of the Marathas on Malwa. But even after the Nizam’s coming to Delhi, friendship among the Emperor, the Mir Bakshi and Sawai Jaysing continued till the death of Khan Dauran in 1739 A.D. And even after his death the Emperor needed Sawai Jaysing’s support, when the Nizam and the Turani Party created a threatening situation (3) for him after Nadir Shah’s departure.

But with the departure of the Nizam from Delhi in 1740 A.D.(4) to face his rebellious son, Nasir Jang, in Deccan, the threat of the Turani party to the existence of the Emperor came to an end. The energies of the old Nizam were absorbed in maintaining his hold in Deccan against the powerful Marathas, and the possession of Malwa by the Maratha was ever a bar to his coming to Delhi. This was so effective that when later on Nasir Jang conspired with the Emperor against the Marathas and the Wazir Safdar Jang, the barring Maratha armies in Malwa, did not allow him to cross even the Narmada (5). It is enough to say hence that even though the Nizam held his ambition of dominating Delhi as Wazir till last, the prospects of his coming to Delhi as opposed with the exit of the powerful Turani faction in the Court with the Delhi Court dwindled and there ended the political necessity for the Rajputs of the Friendship of the Marathas as before. In another way, with the acquisition of the Sanad of Malwa by Balajirao, the Malwa politics came to an end.

Ajitsing and Rana Sangram were dead long before. Bajirao died in 1740 A.D. Sawai Jaysing followed him after three years. With the departure of these Hindu Chiefs from the political stage, the generation that had witnessed or heard of the religious atrocities of Aurangzeb, came to an end. After 1739 A.D., the Mughal Empire at Delhi was a mere shadow of its former self and could scarcely be held as the symbol of the oppose of Hinduism. Thus the Hindu element in the politics of the North vanished after 1740 A.D. and there remained no necessity of Maratha-Rajput friendship on this score. On the contrary with the diminishing Mughal Empire the aggression of the Maratha imperialism became a real source of anxiety for the Rajputs.

In 1736 A.D., the Rana of Udaypur was perturbed to save his honour in the meeting with Bajirao Peshwa who courteously accepted a seat below the one of the Rana and thus the Rana’s exalted position was saved. But the Marathas advanced in power with such rapidity that the king of Jaypur (6) felt honoured in 1751 A.D. when he was carried to throne seated on the same elephant by a Sardar of the Peshwa. By 1751 A.D., the Peshwa had been all-in-all in the Maratha also wad dead. The Peshwa mainly looked to the Maratha expansion in the South and his Sardars Shinde and Holkar looked to the affairs of the North under the Guidance of the Peshwa. The Maratha Empire from the South to the North and from the West to the East had come into existence. Sardars like Gayakwad, Shinde, Holkar, Bhosale, Patwardhan, Raste, Pethe and so many others were active in different spheres. Inevitably, the Rajputs became the payers of regular Khandani to the Marathas. The former equality of the Rajputs gave place to subordinate position in their relationship with the Marathas.

With the departed Mughal Empire, the prospects of being appointed as Subhadars of Gujarat, Malwa, Orissa or Kabul vanished forever for the Rajputs. Their vision became limited by the boundaries of their own territories. Their vanity never allowed them to be one with the Maratha Empire as they had been one with the previous Mughal Empire. With dwindling prospects of political opportunities and limited sphere at home, Civil wars started in most of the Rajput States one after another. Each side resolutely tried to win the coveted object and approached the Maratha Sardars for help. They vied with each other in raising the sum in return for the help sought. The Marathas were ever in need of money to feed the huge armies and maintain administration. It is no wonder that they fell a victim to the alluring bait. The subsequent result was that they were held deceitful, dishonest, and greedy and a bad element by the party that suffered at their hands.

By now the Marathas had grown too powerful and their help was sought by the Wazir against the Rohillas (1751 A.D.) and by the Emperor against his Wazir (1753 A.D.) The remaining provinces of the Emperor were handed over to them under Chauth or Subhadari. The Rajputs, who had departed from the former friendship, grew jealous of their position. They felt bitterly for the cession of the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer by the Emperor to them (1752 A.D.) Meanwhile, the Maratha demands were raised to territory besides Khandani. The Rajputs saw no justification for these demands. They became the bitter enemies of the Marathas and looked to the Rohillas and the Pathans, the enemies of the Marathas, as their saviours from the wanton Maratha aggressions.

Had the Rajputs a mind to took, there was much with the Marathas, that they could have appreciated. The Maratha spear, crossing Doab, had entered even Oudh (7)(1751 A.D.). Bengal had seen enough of their velour and as a result Orissa was ceded to them (1751 A.D.). In the North, Punjab had come under their Chauth, though Abdali hardly allowed them to collect it. In the South the Nizam had been rounded off by 1760 A.D. and excepting the Nawab of Karnatak (8), the rest of the South had nearly come under there away. In 1758 A.D., they had reached Sindhu at Atak and their gaze (9) had reached Persia to finish off Abdali in between them. As a Hindu power, the Marathas had gained enough to be proud of. With this expansion of their Empire, they never lost sight of relieving the Hindu holy places of Kashi, Prayag, Gaya and Mathura from the hands of the yawanas. This was the constant demand of the Peshwa to his Sardars even after(10) the defeat of Panipat.

But the Rajputs, after Ajitsing, Abhaysing and Sawai Jaysing, never exhibited any religious outlook touching other spheres than their own. To them the Rohilla Najib Khan and the Brahman Peshwa of Poona were alike. They sided with the former and opposed the latter on political grounds alone. Hence inspite of the heart burning massacres of the Hindus and the destruction of the holy places like Mathura, Vrundavan in 1757 A.D. at the hands of Abdali, they could be one with his schemes in destroying the Marathas. The Marathas and the Rajputs differed fundamentally in their religious zeal in 18th century. The former had from the first till last opposed the Muslims, and their association with the Mulsim rulers was an exception. Whereas with their long association, though forced, with the Mughals from Akbar (with the lonely exception of Mewad) much of the Rajput opposition by the end of 17th century and in the first quarter of 18th century was reactionary to the Islamic rule of Aurangzeb and hence was mostly restricted for the first Rajput generation of 18th century. This period of the Rajput opposition to the Muslim rule co-incided with the career of Bajirao I, and hence we find the Rajputs and the Marathas standing on the same footing of religion. But once the Marathas took firm hold of Delhi, the Rajputs, consequently losing all broader out-look consumed their energies in regional feuds and cared little for the Hindu ideals of Sawai Jaysing (11) and had little to appreciate in the religious zeal of the Marathas. They only looked towards them as aggressors from the political point of view. The errors on the part of the Maratha Sardars added fuel to the fire and the Rajputs traversed rapidly from dislike to revengeful attitude towards them.

(ii)Malharrao Holkar Shapes the Rajput Policy :

Even when Bajirao was alive, the Sardars, Holkar and Shinde, had become famous in the North India, Sawai jaysing complained of their harassing activities to the Peshwa and hinted (12) that one day they might grow too powerful even for him.

Malharrao(13) , from the first had created his own sphere, rather independent of Peshwa (but with his understanding) at Bundi. His activities there became a source of anxiety to Sawai Jaysing, a friend of the Peshwa. In a letter to a Udaypur Chief, Peshwa Bajirao I asked to ignore Malharrao (14), whose activities were coming in between the Maratha-Rajput co-operation in 1739 A.D.

After Bajirao’s death and with the coming of the young Peshwa Balajirao’s to Peshwa-ship, Malharrao took liberty to shape the Rajput policy. It was he (15) who brought pressure on the inexperienced Peshwa, to ignore the arguments of Ramchandra Baba putup in favour of Ishwarising and raising his demands (16) left no way open for Ishwarising but to fight. For Kachhwada hatred of the Marathas in 1751 A.D. and onwards, Malharrao’s hasty and shortsighted policy was responsibly to a greater extent.

What the Sardars did in respect of the Rajputs till 1740 A.D., was what the Peshwa planned or guided. But what the Sardars did after that till 1766 A.D., was not all that was desired by the Peshwa. As has been explained already, there were certain political and other reasons that were responsible for the change of Rajput attitude towards the Marathas, but after stating this much, let it be said that the blunders of the Sardars at Jaypur or Jodhpur were also equally responsible for the Rajput feeling that ran so high that they preferred foreign Abdali to the Brahman Peshwa from Deccan. In both these cases, Peshwa’s instructions to his Sardars, were reasonable, just and moderate ones.

In the last days of Ranoji Shinde (17), his relations with Malharrao, were far from cordial. Peshwa was then at a loss to understand how to keep them together. After Ranoji’s death Jayappa and Malharrao soon parted company with each other and the Peshwa had to reprimand Malharrao (18) for not cooperating with Jayappa in Bundelkhand. Jayappa’s Marwad affair (1754 A.D. to 1766 A.D.) was in a reaction to Malharrao’s Jat policy. It was a selection of a special sphere for himself just as Agra Subha was a selected sphere by Malharrao for himself. Just as the Peshwa had again and again desired that Ishwarising’s affair should not go beyond control (19), he also proposed (20) to Jayappa that after placing at different places both Ramsing and Vijaysing, he should release himself of the complications and take up other urgent tasks like relieving Kashi, Prayag etc., from the Muslim hands. It will not be too much to say that the delay of two years (1754-56 A.D.) in Marwad affair not only cost the Peshwa a Sardar of repute, but also frustrated his plans that needed to be carried on keeping other political developments into consideration. This had definitely damaging repercussions on the great battle of Panipat. Moreover they spoiled the relation of those two Houses namely the Shinde and the Holkar beyond healing. Jankoji suspected the hand of Malharrao in Jayappa’s murder and refused to see him at poona (21) . One reasonably feels that besides the trap of Madhaosing in not allowing him to depart for the succour of Dattaji, the personal ill feeling must have played to some extent a part in the delay of Malharrao in responding to the urgent calls of Dattaji in December 1759 A.D.

There was a lot of difference between the out-look of these two Houses towards the Rajput policy. During this phase (1743 A.D. to 1766 A.D.) the Shindes seem to have been comparatively much more loyal to the interests of the Peshwa and exhibited little individuality in the execution of the orders of the Peshwa (22) who was equally confident of their support, and relied mainly on them, whereas he was at pains to see that Malharrao was equally loyal to his master’s cause. The reason for this difference in the apt language (23) of the Peshwa, was that the Shindes were soliders whereas Malharrao was a Sardar. The formers were more sensitive, more manly and more consistant to their given words, whereas the latter could assist Madhaosing after 1763 A.D., against the Jat and the Sikhs in spite of his dishonesty in 1751 A.D., and his siding Najib Khan and Abdali in 1761 A.D., and was unscrupulous to the extent of helping Najib Khan and calling him his ‘adopted son’ (Dharmaputra) inspite of the fact (24) that the letter was an avowed enemy of the Marathas. Malharrao’s policy was to maintain his Sardari, to avoid extremes and to serve his purpose by a mere show of power and prestige as far as it was possible by a mere show of power and prestige as far as it was possible(25) to do. In the Panipat episode three of the brave personalities sacrified themselves for their nation’s cause with the whole of the Shinde army that cripped the Shinde Sardari at least for 8 years, whereas Malhrarao, though old, was nearly intact with all his force after Panipat and was active till his death in 1766 A.D., serving his State while keeping his own policies before him.

The grief-stricken Peshwa, while departing to Deccan gave his sole authority in the Northern affairs to Malharrao Holkar. At Poona he soon followed his beloved brother and faithful Sardars to heaven. The new Peshwa was quite young and though energetic, was handicapped to do sufficient justice, to the Northern affairs due to Nizam, Bhosale, the aggressive Haidar and ambitious uncle at home. With no Shindes to check him, Malharrao was the sole arbitrator of the Maratha policies in the North, including the Rajput policy after Panipat.

The generation of Bajirao Peshwa, under whom he had served, had gone. The following generation of Balaji Peshwa nearly perished in the national calamity of Panipat. The enemies in the North rose from all quarters, but old and infirm Malharrao was firmly facing the onslaught that came from all directions, like an old tree that heroically maintains against many a changing seasons. With his death in 1766 A.D., the IInd phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations rightly closes in.

Foot Notes (Description)
(1) 'Hingne Daftar' I - 19.
(2) "Alas! Alas! The heedless Emperor is after an innocent person like me. If only I had been assured of the satifactory conduct of the Emperor, even to a small extend, God is witness, that within the course of one year I would root out these wretches (the Marathas) from the provinces of Deccan." "The Emperor, however was day and night platting to lay his hands on Nizam-ul-Mulk. He offen asked his nobles to embark on a campaign against him." -
(3)'Hingne Daftar' I-13,15,17.
(4) Ibid - 19.
(5)'Purandare Daftar' I-157, 220
(6) S.P.D. 2-31.
(7) 'Patre Yadi' - 83.
(8)'Marathi Riyasat' (Peshwa Balajirao), pp. 146 to 149.
(9)S.P.D. 27-218, 'Marathi Riyasat' (Peshwa Balajirao), pp. 314, 315
(10) S.P.D. 29, 118.
(11) 'Hingne Daftar' I-15, 17, 19
(12)S.P.D. 14-47.
(13)'Purandare Daftar' I-185.
(14)B.I.S.M (July 1920)
(15)S.P.D. 2-1, 25, S.P.D. 27-17, 18 and 19
(16)'Purandare Daftar' I-185, 196.
(17) 'Purandare Daftar' I-157, 159.
(18) S.P.D. 21-15.
(19)S.P.D. 27-26.
(20) 'Patre Yadi' - 121, 141.
(21) M.I.S. Vol. VI-318.
(22)'Patra Yadi' - 92-127, 166.
(23)Ibid - 141.
(24)M.I.S. Vol. I-48, 'Fall of the Mughal Empire' by H. G. Keene, pp. 80 and 81, 'marathi Riyasat' Vol. VI, p. 30.
(25)'Holkar Shahi' I-226 and 227, 'Panipat' - p. 26.
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These posts also give an excellent window on Mughal ruling party divisions - Turani and Hinsutani. In addition I always wondered at the different paths of development of both Karnataka and Telengana even though both had Muslim rulers- Hyder Ali of Mysore, Bijapur, Bidar and Golconda and Hyderabad. I realize that it was the Nizam's move to Deccan to found a new kingdom that has dhimmified Telengana and created its state of 'other'.

I think Aurganzeb's destruction of the Shia Kingdoms who were based on Turkish origins was a significant event in the growth of Islam. Are there any accounts of Mughal writers if the destruction was based on fears of Shia rise in India? Recall it was the same time as Safavid rise in Iran.

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->I think Aurganzeb's destruction of the Shia Kingdoms who were based on Turkish origins was a significant event in the growth of Islam. Are there any accounts of Mughal writers if the destruction was based on fears of Shia rise in India? Recall it was the same time as Safavid rise in Iran. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I think so but I haven't come across them because so far I have been only concentrating on Hindu-Muslim relations druing those times but Aurangzeb hated Shias as much as Hindus, I think I remember one of his letters which has an outburst against the accursed Shias, the Shia-Sunni factor played a big role in the rivalry between the Deccani Sultanates and the Mughals, it also gave Shivaji a breathing space, Sita Ram Goel when quoting Shah Waliullah's letters says that these have been translated by a Shia into English and that in these letters he pours as much venom against Shias as he does against Hindus (specifically Marathas and Jats).

Here is a letter of Aurangzeb that might throw some light into his feelings about Shias (the Persians ofcourse were Shias):

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->LETTER II.*

Happy son, Mahammad Mūazzam, may God protect and save you. I came to know from the representation of a disinterested person that this year you observed the Nowroz* festival in the manner of the (present) Persians*. By God’s grace, keep your faith firm. From whom have you adopted this heretical innovation? Evidently you have been instructed by that Arab who lays claim to the title of Saiyad,* (but) who is the cause of disgrace to some good persons (the Saiyads). Anyhow this is a festivity of the Majūsis.* According to the belief of the infidel Hindus it is the coronation day of the accursed Vikramájit* and the commencement of a Hindu era. Henceforward you should not observe it and repeat such folly. (Verse) “I have advised you often; but none of you (my sons) have searched after secrets”. I seek forgiveness from God, my Lord, for every sin that I have committed; and I turn to Him (in repentance).

http://persian.packhum.org/persian/pf?fi...03020&ct=5<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 2
THE JAIPUR EPISODE

(1) Ishwarising the King of Jaypur :

In Janurary 1744 A.D. the Peshwa sent the robes, elephant and horses for the occasion of ‘Tika’ for Ishwarising. He deputed Bapuji Mahadeo Hingne on his behalf to Jaypur. Ishwarising and Rajamalji had sent him letters (1)in which friendly feelings were expressed and assistance of army was sought. Peshwa was favourable to him and wrote to his Sardars in the North to take up the cause of Ishwarising (2) against his brother Madhaosing. Jagatsing, the Rana of Udaypur, had taken up the cause of Madhaosing and, with an intention of fighting, had marched upto Jamoli near Jahajpur at the end of 1743 A.D. There upon Ishwarsing had promised to give a fief to his brother Madhaosing.

As per the orders of the Peshwa, Rachandra Baba (3) and the Sardars asked Ranoji to handover Madhaosing to their care and promised to give him a fief worth five lakhs, besides Rampura and some cash (Janurary 1745 A.D.). But no settlement could be affected as Madhaosing was hardly satisfied over this much share. His ambition was to snatch away half of the kingdom from Ishwarising. His second attempt in 1745 A.D., also met with a failure and he and his maternal uncle had to save himself by running back to Udaypur.

(II)Malharrao Pleades for a Changes of Side :

Judging correctly (4) the strength of Ishwarsing in his friendship with the Marathas, the Maharana approached the right person for his cause among the Marathas, namely Malharrao Holkar who inclining favourably dispatched Keshao Pancholi, Jaysing Sekhavat from Ranaji’s side and Kaniram from Madhaosing to Peshwa to secure Maratha help to the side of Madhaosing (December 1747 A.D.).

But Ramchandra Babu, the Diwan of Shinde, was opposed to such a move of change of side. He wrote, “Madhaosing’s offer is false. There is no chance of getting any money from him. People here know that we have up till now supported Ishwarsing. It would now be scandalous to shift our ground”.

But Malharrao had already committed himself to Madhaosing’s cause. Ranoji being already dead, he was the only elderly person left in Peshwa’s Sardars. With experience in warfare, and constant success he had grown over-confident and was in no position to hear such an opposition to his policy. He vehemently pleaded his case before the Peshwa. He wrote (5) to the Peshwa not to mind the writing of Ramchandra Baba since he was interested in Ishwarising. He further added that Ramchandra Baba was too proud of his own judgment, to care little for the Peshwa’s work even if it would be ruined thereby. He informed the Peshwa that Ranaji had promised him to pay 20 lakhs as ‘Nazr’ if Madhaosing was assigned a jagir of 25 lakhs. He further assured the Peshwa that there was no chance of any trouble since all the Amirs of Delhi were favourable to Madhaosing’s cause and with the Hadas and the Rathods on their side, Ishwarising had no way but to come to terms. He also urged the Peshwa to take the cause of Umedsing the son of Budhsing of Bundi, so that the issue be not tackled successfully by Ishwarising himself, if they delayed to intervene in the matter.

Malharrao viewed the whole affair from practical point of view. He was sure of forcing a settlement (6) on Ishwarising of granting a fief of 25 lakhs to Madhaosing by sheer weight of combination. Thus the Marathas would get 20 lakhs of rupees by a mere show of force. It never entered in his mind that Ishwarising or the people of Jaypur would oppose the proposal of the partition of their kingdom. Sawai Jaysing never wished Madhaosing to be the king of Jaypur, inspite of his assurance at Pushkar (1709 A.D. to 1710 A.D.). Madhaosing has been all the while with his maternal uncle at Udaypur and Ishwarishing had already become the king of Udaypur. It was not only unjust but also immoral to force a partition on Ishwarising who had proved he to be a capable ruler. But practical Malharrao hinted to the Peshwa that if they neglected the chance of interference into the internal affair, the Rajput Chiefs would decide the matter amongst themselves and thus the Marathas would be not where. But if they only chose to take up the lead in the matter, not only they would be monetarily profitted, but the Rajputs would come under their influence.

He assured the Peshwa that he was capable enough to settle the issue between the brothers, Ishwarising and Madhaosing avoiding any possible mishap and for that he was ready to take a pledge. He urged the Peshwa not to be carried away by the writing of Ramchandra Baba who was trying his best to prove him a false man. He finally wrote that the Peshwa knew that he would stand for his pledge and that he should not take it to be a mere writing. (August 1747 A.D.)

Thus, as opposed to Ramchandra Baba (7) , Malharrao made Madhaosing’s affair a prestige point at the cost of rightful Ishwarising and plunged the State of Jaypur into a civil war making the Maratha name of to suffer for the first time in the North Indian politics. For all the affair-effects of this shortsighted policy, only Malharrao was responsible with his pride, his recklessness, his greed for money and his under-rating of the Rajput character, chivalry and valour.

(iii)The Role of the Peshwa :

Even though the Peshwa needed money badly to pay off the debt of Satara, he was not a greedy man like Malharrao who could not convince him of the justness of his policy. Infact Peshwa agreed fully with Ramchandra Baba. Malharrao, feeling that he was losing ground with the Peshwa, wrote finally (8) that it was not good for the Peshwa (9) to insult him by following the advice of Ramchandra Baba and that he had not undertaken Madhaosing’s cause for the destruction of the Maratha cause. Matters had reached the extreme limit. After all, the Peshwa could not displease Malharrao. He tried to soothe him by writing that there was no need of so much dejection (10) on his part. What they were expected to do was not to encourage any strife in the Kachhwah family by their actions. The Peshwa hinted that if the matter went to extremity, it was Malharrao in the long run, who would be obliged to settle the issue. He urged Malharrao to view Ranaji and Ishwarising in the same light. According to him, the problem needed to be solved thoughtfully and with due pressure. (January 1747 A.D.).

(iv)Malharrao Takes Up the Cause of Madhaosingh :

Malharrao viewed Madhaosing’s affair as a challenge to his capacity as a Sardar in the same way some forty years hence Mahadaji took up the challenge of the insignificant Jaypur Darbar.

Malharrao (11) effected a treaty with Ranaji by which it was settled that :

The paraganas of Tonk, Toda, Malpura and Newai with a total revenue of 18 lakhs were to be handed over to Madhaosing.
Bundi was to be given to Umedsing, who should be loyal to Ishwarising and pay the dues to the Marathas.
Nenwe, Samadhi and Karwar paraganas were to be with the Rao Raja and Pratapsing Hada.
With this understanding, he sent Khanderao Holkar to Ranoji and Nimbaji Khatke, Ramrao Munshi and Bakshi Ram to Ishwarising for soliciting his approval to the treaty.

Ishwarising was then engaged in a fight with Shivsing Sakhtawat but hearing of the designs of the Rana and Malharrao he effected a settlement with Shivsing and made him his adherent. He assambled all the Rajputs in his kingdom and prepared for the coming fight (February 1747 A.D.).

(V)The Battle of Rajmahal (1747 A.D.)

Ranaji sent his army under Bharatsing towards Jayspur. Khanderao joined thim army on the border of Jaypur and Mewad. The Chiefs of Kota and Shahapur were to join them soon. Ishwarising, hearing of it, sent Narayandas with full preparation to oppose the Rana’s army and was to send Rayamalji on the Chiefs of Kota. But suddenly Rayamalji died (9th of February 1741 A.D.) causing a national grief. However this did not deter Ishwarising who asked Narayandas to fall upon the Ranaji’s army under Bharatsing before he go reinforcements. Raja Narayandas accordingly encamped 2 kos from the Rana’s army with an intention to give a fight.

But dreading further complications, Narayandas decided to come to terms in order to avoid the battle. He went back to Jaypur and tried to convince Ishwarsing. He told that even Malharrao wanted amicable settlement and it was better to avoid the battle since Malharrao’s son had joined the Rana’s army. Not only the Rana, but the Marathas would become their enemy, moreover no Rajput would lend a willing support and hence, he proposed that conciliation was the best possible way out. But Ishwarising had thought over the matter more perfectly and hence was not ready to succumb to any pressure. He said, “I should rule, if I am destined for it. Whatever may happen, a fight is essential. Rajamalji is dead, Vidyaadhar is confined to bed, Rajputs are lukewarm and you (Narayandas) advise me for a compromise. It clearly means that ultimately, I have to make myself ready to bear the burden and hence whatever may happen, I have to move.” Thus speaking he entered the tents and joined his army.

The fight (12) between the armies of Ishwarising and Ranaji was a severe one and continued for two days. Khanderao Holkar and Bhopatrao charne from Bundi had not taken any part in the fight, but when they tried to loot the baggage, the Shekhawats kept to guard the same, defended themselves successfully. Finally the Rana’s army gave way and fled away. Not only the expectation of Malharrao, that Ishwarising would listen to his proposal thought sheer weight of the combination, had proved false, but also that he had won a battle in the presence of Khanderao to the opposite side. The matter had gone now beyond the reach of Malharrao since Maratha name was involved in the defeat.

(vi) “The Kingdom is the Gift of god” :

But the Peshwa (13) still wanted peaceful settlement and hence wrote his envoy (April 1749 A.D.) at Jaypur that he wished nothing but the well being of Ishwarising and hence desired that the would come to a peaceful settlement with the Sardars and end the dispute. Ishwarising there upon addressed Govind Tamaji thus, “The friendly relations between the House of Jaypur and the Peshwa are hereditary and exceptional. Sawai Jaysing and Bajirao had been friends and Balajirao knows the things doen by Sawai Jaysing for the Srimant. Even now we value the word of Balajirao. But this is a family feud and moreover we are kings, we are bound by the policy followed through generations. This is a quarrel over land. How can it be given? I have given (go Madhaosing) whatever was possible in the name of service. If pressed for more, how can it be given without a fight? By handing over the territory to a younger brother, whole of my kingdom? Srimant and the Sardars are determined to give him more, but that will not take place. Kingdom is a gift of God. He alone will get it on which God bestows it. But the Marathas have changed side.”

Thus firm in his attitude, Ishwarising assembled his forces and destroying all the supplies so that they should not be of use to the Marathas, he go ready to receive them. Very soon the Peshwa (14) came to the North, in connection with his assistance to the Emperor against Abdali. On his way to Deccan, he halted at Newai (15) 39 miles south of Jaypur ( 21st may 1748 A.D.). Madhaosing met him there. But Ishwarising shut himself up in Jaypur feeling humiliated for his flight from Manpur, where he had gone to assist the imperial army against Abdali. He sent Keshaodas, son of Rajamal to the Peshwa. This proved to be his mistake, for it made Peshwa lean completely on the side of Madhaosing. Peshwa sent his agents to Jaypur and demanded 50 lakhs of rupees from Ishwarising and desired him to accept the demand of half the territory for Madhosing. Ishwarising was ready to pay 25 lakhs to the Peshwa, but was not ready to divide his kingdom as per the Peshwa’s demand, as he regarded the kingdom as the secred trust of his ancestors. No settlement (16) hence was possible.

(vii) Battle of Bagru-Ishwarising Defeated, (August 1748 A.D.) :

The Jaypur question now entered into the last phase. Malharrao (17) entered Jaypur in July 1748 A.D. and occupying Tonk, Toda and Malpura, handed the same to Madhaosing. He advanced further. Umedsing Hada and Durjansal Hada joined him. They met no opposition till they were  faced by Ishwarising at Bagru, 23 miles east of Sambhar. Surajmal Jat was on the side of Ishwarising.

The battle raged for 6 days inspite of heavy rains. The Maratha cut the supplies of Jaypur force and Gangadhar Tatya lockaded the way towards Jaypur and looted the territory up to Sambhar. Ishwarising, being overpowered, took shelter in the fort of Bagru in distress. Though Keshaodas he agreed to give five paraganas for Madaosing and Bundi to Umedsing. He then met Holkar an 9th of August and pledged for friendship. The next day the Marathas and their allies returned to Malpur Todiya accompained by Ishwarising’s men namely Harnathsing, Mahabatsing, Sawantsing Naruka to evacuate the places. Ishwarising went back to his capital.

(viii) The Triagic End of Ishwarising :

Bagru had convinced Ishwarising that he could not continue the fight against the combination for a long. As the opposition was gaining ground, frustration seized his heart. He grew suspicious. Meanwhile his mind was  being poisoned by Hargovind Natani against Keshaodas, as he was jealous of the latter. Ishwarising was convinced that Keshaodas was the man of Malharrao. One day (18) he called Keshaodas to his persence and gave him poison to drink. Invain Keshaodas pleaded his innocence, but it was of no avail. At last uttering “Govind, Govind” he drank the poison, immediately fainted and died. When the people of Jaypur knew about this incident (19) , they felt very much for the innocent minister. (August 1750 A.D.)

Keshaodas was a devoted minister who had served his master faithfully on many trying occasion. He was well acquainted with the Maratha way of living and according to the poet Suryamal he could speak Marathi very well.

The death of Keshaodas made the position of Ishwarising worst. Hardly any sagacious advisor was left with him. Vidyadhar (20) was nearly invalid, and Shivnath Bhayya was thrown into prison with his entire family, wives and children. He was nearly forsaken by all even by his prudence.

Malharrao in Deccan came to know about the death the Keshaodas from his commandar in the North, Rajerao. He determined to avenge the death of Keshaodas. Starting from Deccan, he reached Betwad (September 1750 A.D.) and halted there in expectation of the arrival of Jayappa Shinde. Maharao Durjansal (21) of  Kota, sent his agent Veiram Bhat to see Malharrao, as the latter came on the Narmada. Malharrao then reached Indore and waited there for the rest of the Sardars to join him (October-November 1750 A.D.).

Ishwarising’s position had grown weaker still. Deserted by all his allies, driven to desperation, he expected nothing but vengence at the hands of Malharrao over the death of Keshaodas.

On 19th of November 1750 A.D., (22) Malharrao and Gangadhar Tatya reached Mukundara Ghat. On 28th they seized Nenwe and turned it into a Maratha post by turning out the queen of the Chief, and handed it over to Balaji Shamraj Kamavisdar of Bundi. At Nenwe they halted for 10 days. From there they advanced towards Jaypur. When they were at a distance of three days march from Jaypur, Malharrao met the envoy of Isharising with two lakhs of rupees, but he was highly displeased at the little sum offered and paying no heed to the request resumed his march.

The frightened envoy wrote the king that Malharrao meant to avenge the death of Keshaodas. Now Hargovind Natani and Vidyadhar, previous ministers, who had been removed from their posts by the king, advised him to collect force and meet Malharrao either in the field or from the protected city. Ishwarising now was not his former self. He asked his men to pacify Malharrao by paying 4 to 5 lakhs of rupees. But nobody was ready to approach Malharrao for fear of being killed by hi in revenge for Keshaodas’s death. They implored the king to kill them but not to send them to Malharrao. This shows the dread Malharrao had created in the hearts of Ishwarising’s supporters. The king felt helpless. He kept silence and began to brood over his lot.

On December 12 1750, news came by the evening that Malharrao was only 20 miles away from Jaypur. But Ishwarising had nothing to face the Maratha challenge. The sun that set in the West was the last one for Ishwarising to behold. His end was drawing near. It was impossible for him to humble himself before Malharrao. That was worse than death. He asked his servant to procure live Kobra and Somal-Khar to prepare medicine. In the dead of night, the king swallowed the poison and bit the kobra to himself. His three queens also drank the poison. Thus Ishwarising paid back for the life of Keshaodas and for the thoughtless pleadge of Sawai Jaysing given at Pushkar (1709-10 A.D.). The four corpses lay unheeded in the palace nearly for four ‘Prahars’ of the day. This was what Malharrao achieved by the pledge (23) he had given to Peshwa. Ishwarising had preferred death to accepting division of his territory. He thought like a true Rajput and died like a true Rajput. Malharrao had no business to interfere in his family affair.

There is no parallel example in the whole of Maratha History where Maratha influence-directly or indirectly-effected such an unlucky mishap. Malharrao knew only one thing and that was the force of the sword. He was hardly capable of going into the thought of Ishwarising who treated the kingdom as heavenly inheritance.

This hideous act from which the Marathas could never shake off their responsibility, had many repercussions in future in the Maratha-Rajput relations. It sealed forever the character of the Marathas in the eyes of the Rajputs. From hereafter common religion and culture played but a little part in their relationship. This was the starting point of the deadly enmity that the Rajputs bore towards the Marathas throughout the 18th century that resulted into cowardly murders and ruthless devastation. The brotherly feeling created by the first Peshwa was scarified for ever, as hereafter the Marathas had little time, chance, patience or foresight to heal up the wounds of the Rajput mind. The latter actions of Madhaosing and the Rajputs prove that they were acting, besides other things, under the spell of the tragic death of Ishwarising, who was a victim of Maratha aggession in the eyes of Kachhawa State.

(ix)Madhaosing Made the King of Jaypur :

On 13th of December 1750 A.D., the advance party of the Marathas under Khanderao Holkar and Gangadhar Tatya appeared before Jaypur and Malharrao with the rest of army encamped 6 miles away from the city. There was no reaction to the Marathas either from the king or his ministers till the noon. At last the servant revealed the truth of the suicide of the king and the whole city was plunged into grief. Hargoving and Vadyadhar pacified the people and went outside the city to meet the Maratha Chiefs. The sad new was despatched to Malharrao who came near the city from the camp by the evening. He sent his men to ascertain the truth. The corpses were still lying there, the next day till evening. Malharrao managed to send the required material for the funeral ceremony, which took place in the palace garden. With Ishwarising his three queens and 20 concubines burnt themselves on the funeral pyre.

Next day on 14th of December 1751, a courier was dispatched to Madhaosing immediately. On 29th of December, he came and was welcomed by Malharrao as the king of Jaypur and was carried to the palace on his own elephant.

Jayappa Shinde arrived with his army on 6th January 1751 A.D. it was agreed that the city should be given protection on receipt of money. But the Maratha demand (24) of one third or at least one fourth of Jaypur territory annoyed the king and his ministers. On the background of recent tragedy a feeling of retaliation seized the heart of Madhaosing. A big army of Shekhawats

Nothing (25) but a total destruction of the Marathas was what he aimed at. He persistently called the Maratha Chiefs for a dinner. At first Malharrao agreed but when Jayappa flatly declined, he also cancelled his going. It was a providential relief, and the Maratha were saved, for Madhosing had mixed poison with food as well as with drinking water.

Another trap to destroy the Marathas was hatched the next day. Madhaosing called the Maratha Chiefs including Gangadhar Tatya for a talk to his palace. It was pre-planned that as soon as the palankins were inside the city, the gates should be closed. But the Maratha Chiefs luckily came separately and this attempt also failed. But Madhaosing had still another scheme in his view and he succeeded, at last in bringing the Marathas in his trap.

(x)Massacre of the Marathas in Jaypur City :

Jaypur with its fine construction, beautiful temples and huge places was then a brilliant city in India. On 10th of January the Marathas entered the city gates, having no suspicion of any treachery, on the contrary, with a feeling of confidence, as it was Madhaosing on the throne of Jaypur, whom they had placed there. Treachery is highly successful when the victim is in complete ignorance of its existence. The unsuspected Marathas had come to have a leisurely look at the beauty of the city and to make purchases of horses, camels and the rest of articles of soldiers of this group belonged to Jayappa who had least connection with the fateful incident of 13th December. A few of these soldiers had palankins,  that indicated their high ranks. There were young men as well as old, women as well as children, in the group.

All of a sudden, the doors of the rampart were closed at the instance of Madhaosing and a general massacre of the bewildered Marathas began, that continued for 12 hours, from midday to midnight. Madhaosing got ample satisfaction of revenge on those who had recently helped him to rise to the exalted position. About fifteen hundred (26) men were killed outright, one thousand were wounded, only seventeen returned safely. Most of the wounded had broken their limbs in their attempt to jump from the rampart. Among those who were killed, many were higher officers of Jayapp’s army, about a hundred were Brahmans, many lady servants and there were even small children. A thousand fine horses, ornaments of gold, pearl necklesses and other valuables were lost to the plunderers.

If it was all in the name of revenge for Ishwarising’s death, what was the punishment for Madhaosing himself whose hands were equally stained with the blood of Ishwarising? It Malharrao Holkar had been greedy and hasty in the affair; it was Ranaji and Madhaosing who forced him with alluring inducements to forsake the cause of Ishwarising. But, nevertheless, it was a lesson to Malharrao indeed. In opposition to Ramchandra Baba, he had placed Madhaosing on the throne of Jaypur and the latter had paid him in right coins for his short-sighted-policy.

(xi)The out come :

The reaction of the deadly on slought in the city was highly detrimental to the safety of the Marathas outside. As if a racial hatred seized the hearts of Rajputs. Roads were closed to them and their men (27) , carrying news letters were killed. After two days (i.e. on 12th of January 1751 A.D.) the Marathas leaving the vicinity of Jaypur, encamped 8 miles away from it. Madhaosing, sent his envoys to them, pleaded innocence and requested for a peaceful settlement. The Maratha Chiefs knew all but could do little to retaliate. They had no force sufficient to storm the city and hence they deemed it wise to consent to the request of Madhaosing and the settlement was effected on the following terms:

All the horses captured, should be returned to the Marathas.
All the plunder be returned.
The bankers of the city be asked to pay off the settled fund.
But Madhaosing was hardly sincere. He avoided the payment on this or that pretext for three weeks. Meanwhile as all supplies were cut off, the Maratha camp suffered from scaricity of grain.

At this time, Safdar Jang, the Wazir (28) was engaged in a fight with the Rohillas of the Doab, and was hard pressed by them. He had sent his envoys, Ram Narayan and Raja Jugal kishor, who were present in the Maratha camp and pressing them to start for the assistence (29) of Safdar Jang. On 7th of February Malharrao was 24 miles away (30) from Jaypur. After a few days (31) (12-2-1751 A.D.) he resumed his regular march towards Oudh.

The Kachhawas got a new king and the Marathas a new enemy. They got nothing out of the expected fund excepting 25 to 30 elephants and 50 to 75 horses that were carried in the Maratha camp after the suicide of Ishwarising (32) . The Kachhawas, the Hadas and the Rana united against them and a new chapter (33) began in the history of the Maratha-Rajput relations.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1)
'Hingne Daftar' I-28.

(2)
Ibid - 27.

(3)
Ibid - 29.

(4)
S.P.D. 21-27.

(5)
S.P.D. 27-18, 19.

(6)
S.P.D. 27-28.

(7)
S.P.D. 2-25

(8)
'Purandar Daftar' I-199.

(9)
S.P.D. 2-25.

(10)
S.P.D. 27-26.

(11)
S.P.D. 2-1, 3.

(12)
S.P.D. 21-24, S.P.D. 2-4.

(13)
S.P.D. 2-11.

(14)
S.P.D. 2-9, Purandare Daftar I-168.

(15)
S.P.D. 27-30, M.I.S. Vol. VI-190, 191, 581, Purandare Dafter I-168.

(16)
S.P.D. 27-35.

(17)
'Hingne Daftar' I-30, M.I.S. Vol, VI, 291, 648, 'Purandare' I-185, 196.

(18)
S.P.D. 21-34. S.P.D. 2-15, 19.

(19)
"????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

(20)
S.P.D. 2-15.

(21)
S.P.D. 21-34

(22)
S.P.D. 2-31.

(23)
S.P.D. 27-28.

(24)
S.P.D. 27-64.

(25)
S.P.D. 2-31

(26)
S.P.D. 27-64, M.I.S. Vol. VI-291, S.P.D. 27-65-Hari Vithal while reporting (12-2-1751) Bhausaheb, states the figure for 5 to 6 hundred. S.P.D. 27-67, Sardars also report to Antaji the figure to be from 500 to 1000.

(27)
S.P.D. 2-29, S.P.D. 2-3.

(28)
S.P.D. 27-65.

(29)
S.P.D. 21-38, 40, S.P.D. 2-26, 28, 30.

(30)
S.P.D. 27-64.

(31)
S.P.D. 27-65, 'Jaypur Kharitas' 7-2

(32)
S.P.D. 2-31.

(33)
S.P.D. 2-30, S.P.D. 27-67.

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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 3
CIVIL WAR IN DELHI


(i)Sardar Jang Seeks Maratha Help Against the Pathans :

Wazir Safdar Jang held the Subhas of Allahabad and Oudh. The Rohillas of Barelli and the Bangash Pathans of Farrukhabad were his bitter enemies. They were fanatic Sunni Musalmans and hated the Shia Wazir. They had close contacts with Ahmed Shah Abdali of Kabul who always entered the plains of Northern India at their call (1). These Pathans were the hereditary foes of the Mughals and dreamed of the, “restoration (2) of their rule at Delhi, and failing this, they wished to coerce the Emperor, so far as to secure for themselves the posts of Wazir and the Mir Bakshi, doing away with Safdarjang’s power.” The Emperor was also opposed to his Wazir and had attempted to depose him with the help of the Turani party and had called Nasir Jang from Deccan for the same purpose. But Safdar Jang was successful in frustrating his plan with the help of the Marathas (3) .

The Pathans rose against the Wazir in 1749 (4). The next year, they suddenly attacked his camp near Farrukhabad and on 3rd of August, killed his Bakshi Nawalray and plundered his whole camp. Safdar Jang fought (5) a severe battle near Farrukhabad on 12th September 1750, to save his territory, but the Pathans defeated him thoroughly. They then plundered (6) his capital, Lucknow, burnit and plundered the city Allahabad, took possession of Jaunpur and Gazipur and then marched on Benaras by crossing Ganga.

In sore distress Safdar Jang sent his personal agents – Rajaram Narayan (7) and Jugul Kishor to the Marathas inviting them speedily for his help. After settling their work at Jaypur Malharrao and Jayappa proceeded (8) to join him and met him on 2nd March 1751 A.D. It was settled that they should be paid rupees 25 thousand per day (9) for help.

In March and April 1751 A.D., the Marathas exerted so vigorously that the Rohillas and the Pathans were routed (10) completely. Wrote Govind Pant bundele (11) , “Ahmad Khan met the fate he deserved on the banks of Ganga. Had he not been so routed, the Marathas would have lost their labours and acquisitions of former years. The most faithless of all the Pathans, Turai Khan had joined Ahmad Khan Bangash and was killed with all his followers.”

In lieu of their expenses and dues the Marathas obtained a large territory in Doab by the treaty of Lucknow. (February 1752 A.D.).

(ii)Kanauj Agreement (12th April 1752 A.D.):

Meanwhile the Pathans had invited Abadali to put down their enemy Safdar Jang and his Maratha allies. In response to the call, Abadali had reached the vicinity of Lahor, leaving Kabul in December 1751 A.D. In fear, the Emperor sent urgent summons to his Wazir to repair at once to the Capital with the Maratha contingents to save the situation. Safdar Jang at once saw Shinde and Holkar at Kanauj as they were about to leave for Deccan. He effected with them a formal agreement for their support to the Emperor’s cause, on behalf of the Emperor, on 12th April 1752 A.D. The agreement contained the following terms (12) .

That the Peshwa should defend the Emperor from his internal enemies like Pathans, the Rajputs and other Rebels, and from external foes like the Afgan king Abdali.
That the Emperor should pay 50 lakhs to the Marathas for their help, of which 30 lakhs was to be paid on account of Abdali and 20 lakhs for internal foes like the Pathans.
That in addition, the Peshwa was given the right to levy Chauth from the Punjab, Sindh and Doab.
That if Peshwa could not come personally to serve the Emperor, he should depute his Sardars for the purpose.
To put this contract into execution, Safdar Jang, with Shinde and Holkar immediately went to Delhi. But before they reached Delhi, an agreement was signed by the Emperor by which the two Subhas of Lahor and Multan had been delivered to Abdali in order to prevent his march on Delhi (13) . (23rd April 1752 A.D.)

The main cause for which the Maratha help was sought was over. But the Marathas would not move out of Delhi, unless they were paid their promised 50 lakhs. At this very moment, a call to the Sardars from the Peshwa, to repair to South (14) with Gaziuddin, came. The Emperor granted Gaziuddin, the Subhadarship of Deccan for which he paid 30 lakhs as Nazar. The same amount was paid to the Marathas as part payment of the amount promised and the Sardars (15) with Gaziuddin left for Deccan on 14th May 1752 A.D.

(iii)The Wazir, The Jat and The Rajputs Combine Against The Marathas :

The friendship of Safdar Jang with the Marathas did not last for a long. Antaji (16) informed that though he spoke in a sweet tone with the Sardars, he was conspiring with Salabat Jang the Nizam to engage the Marathas in the South so that he would come to Malwa with the Jat and the Rajputs. Antaji had intercepted letters from Salabat Jang to the Wazir in which he had stated that even if he was forced to conclude peace with the Marathas for the time being, he would see them again, when their forces would be away on some errand.

The reason for the change of attitude of the Wazir towards the Marathas was that the Emperor had appointed Imad-ul-Mulk the son of late Gaziuddin (17) (who accompanied the Sardars to Deccan on 14th May 1751 A.D., and who was poisoned on 16th of October 1752 A.D.) as Mir Bakshi and had conferred on him the Suibhadari of Deccan and given him the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk, inspite of the fact that Safdar Jang had been pressing the Emperor for the appointment of his son as Mir Bakshi and to assign the Subha of Agra to Madhaosing and Surajmal Jat.

The Emperor told Antaji that Ajmer and Agra belonged to the Peshwa as per the previous agreement (12th April 1752 A.D.) and that he had appointed the son of Gaziuddin as Mir Bakshi in view of Peshwa’s wishes.

The natural outcome of this appointment was the unity of Safdar Jang, Surajmal Jat, Madhaosing and Salabat Jang the Nizam.

As Gaziuddin II was the Maratha nominee, appointed against the wish of Safdar Jang as Mir Bakshi, it was natural that Safdar Jang should go against the Marathas. Jats and the Rajputs were the natural enemies of the Marathas over the question of the acquisition of the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer respectively (and for Agra Subha, Jaypur and the Jats were again the natural rivals.) It is very clear, hence, that the Maratha-Rajput rivalry in the second phase of their relations, was a natural outcome of the political advancement of the Marathas towards supremacy. And hence, even if the Maratha-Jaypur relations had not been strained due to the mishap of Ishwarising and the subsequent massacre of the Marathas in Jaypur city in January 1751 A.D. the Rajputs and the Marathas would never have been friends for political reasons (18) . Even though the Kachhwah, and the Jat rivalry was inevitable for Agra Subha, they tended to unite against the powerful Marathas, their common enemy.

Surajmal Jat met Madhaosing and Bakhtsing and then the Wazir at Delhi and told him that the Nawab (Gaziuddin) had handed over the Empire to the Marathas. The Emperor and the Peshwa had become brothers exchanging their turbans and asked him where lay his Wazirship (19) . He resented that he had given Agra and Ajmer to the Marathas, as a result of which their (Jat and Rajput) places had also gone to them. He proposed that under such circumstances, when the Maratha forces were engaged in Deccan (against the Nizam in 1752 A.D.) they should do away with the Nawab (Gaziuddin II) and carrying away the Emperor to Agra, all united, should drive away the Marathas. Thus it was settled (July 1752 A.D.).

(IV)The Anxiety of the Emperor:

The Emperor grew anxious over the intrigues of his all-powerful Wazir. Meanwhile Bakhtsing died (21st September 1752 A.D.). The Emperor seems to have faith in him, for, on hearing of his death, he told Bapuji Hingne that he had none on his side excepting the Peshwa. He (20) sent urgent calls to Madhaosing to proceed to Delhi. It seems he had no knowledge about Madhaosing’s friendship with the Wazir, who had sent Muhammad Alibeg to Madhaosing with a ‘Tika’. Madhaosing was to proceed to Delhi after his junction at Jaypur with Vijaysing who was near Ajmer with a force of 5 thousand. At the same time he was waiting for the news from Deccan about the struggle between the Peshwa and Salabat Jang. North and South thus alienated against the Marathas. Surajmal Jat was in Delhi with the Wazir. Even the mother of the Emperor sided with the Wazir (December 1752 A.D.).

Meanwhile Abdali had crossed Atak (21) and sent his envoy to Delhi to demand 50 lakhs of rupees. The Emperor was afraid that either Abdali would march on Delhi which being a divided house was unable to stand against him, or he would occupy his three Subhas of Kabul, Multan and Lahor worth rupees 10 Crores. He asked his counselors the way out. They all retorted him that he should ask that question to the Marathas whom he had given the fine Subhas of Ajmer and Akbarabad and the ‘Chauth’ of 22 Subhas. The Rajputs, the Mughlia party, and the Jats had all become jealous of the Marathas and hated them (22) for their predominance at Delhi.

(V) Civil War in Delhi (March to November 1753 A.D.)

The Rajputs tried to profit at the dissension between the Emperor and the Wazir. Both the parties were trying to enlist co-operation of Madhaosing. The Emperor had good opinion about Madhosing who tried to utilize the situation for the gain of Ranthambhor (23) .

The Jat Chief (24), Madhaosing and Bakhtsing (then alive) pressed the Emperor, for the Subhas of Ajmer and Agra when the Sardars were in Deccan but he did not listen to them in this respect and prepared a force of 25 thousand men with the help of Bapuji Mahadeo Hingne and Imad-ul-Mulk (Gaziuddin II). Salabat Jang’s wakil was pressing for the ‘Farman’ of the Subhas of Deccan through the Wazir, but the Emperor turned him away saying that they belonged to Imad-ul-Mulk under the guidance and supervision of the Peshwa and that Salabat Jang at the most should accept Bhaganagar and serve Imad-ul-Mulk and should not interfere with the rest of the five Subhas.

This alienated completely(25) the Rajputs and the Jats who sided with the Wazir. With their support, and with the divided Turani party, the Wazir became too powerful for the Emperor. The question involved in the civil war was the grant of ‘Chauth’ of the rest of India excepting Lahor, Multan and Kabul, and the Subhas of Ajmer and Agra to the Marathas. The Emperor naturally depended mostly on the Peshwa whom he and Gaziuddin wrote pressing letters for support, offering one crore of rupees (26) and the two Subhas of Oudh and Allahabad in return for help.

The Peshwa in return despatched Raghunathrao along with Shinde and Holkar from Poona. But before they could reach Delhi, the civil war was over. Madhaosing and Surajmal exerted effectively for a treaty which was concluded finally on seventh November 1753 A.D. Safdar Jang after that, departed for Lucknow.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1)
Patre Yadi - 83, 'The first two Nawabs of Oudh' - p. 177, 'New Hist.' Vol. II - p. 376.

(2)
M.I.S. Vol. III-160.

(3)
'Hingne Daftar' I-34, 38 to 41, S.P.D. 2-12a to 12e, 13, 14.

(4)
S.P.D.2-15.

(5)
S.P.D. 21-31.

(6)
S.P.D. 2-20 to 24.

(7)
S.P.D. 2-26, 28, 31, S.P.D. 27-65, 67, S.P.D. 21-38.

(8)
'Jaypur Kharitas' - 3-7, S.P.D. 21-40, 41, 'Hingne Daftar' 1-58.

(9)
'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 375.

(10)
'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-14, S.P.D. 2-32, S.P.D. 21-43, 'Holkar Shahi' - I-79, 80, 84, 145, M.I.S. Vol. III-384, 'Patre Yadi' - 79, 83.

(11)
M.I.S. Vol. III-160

(12)
'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-18, 'New Hist.' Vol. II-p. 379, M.I.S. Vol. VI p. 82, 'Kota Daftar' I-86.

(13)
'New Hist.' Vol. II-p380.

(14)
'Hingne Daftar' I-54.

(15)
'Holkar Shahi' I-88, 'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-31, 32.

(16)
S.P.D. 24-44, 45.

(17)
Ibid - 45, Hingne Daftar I-58.

(18)
The Maratha relations with Jaypur strained after the 'Kanauj pact' - See 'Jaypur Kharitas' - 3-24,27,28,33,35,41,47,62., 'Hingne Daftar' I-57

(19)
S.P.D. 21-50.

(20)
S.P.D. 27-68.

(21)
S.P.D. 21-45.

(22)
S.P.D. 21-53.

(23)
'Hingne Daftar' I-81, 82.

(24)
S.P.D. 21-57.

(25)
Ibid - 55.

(26)
'New Hist.' Vol. II-p.383

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Chapter 4
The MARWAD AFFAIR


(i) Ramsing Seeks Maratha Help :

Abhaysing of Jodhpur died on 10th of June 1749 A.D., leaving his son Ramsing to succeed him to the throne. Bakhtsing, the brother of Abhaysing, was the king of Nagor and was far away from friendly terms with thim while he was living (1), and now after his death, determined to capture the throne of Jodhpur and for that started a civil war with Ramsing. In December 1749 A.D., a battle (2) was fought between the two near Medta in which Ramsing was victorious. Bakhtsing then sought the help of Salabat Khan, Mir Bakshi of the Emperor, whereas Ramsing called Ishwarising to his side. But as both the supporters had little interest (3) in the cause, nothing came out of it (September 1750 A.D.).

Nevertheless, Bakhtsing (4), being powerful as compared to Ramsing, was successful in capturing Jodhpur and Ajmer and was crowned as the king of Jodhpur. Most of the Rathod chiefs joined him and Ramsing was left with a force of 3 to 4 thousand at Medta (July 1751 A.D.).

Ramsing, being legally the King of Jodhpur, was not prepared to leave his cause unattempted. Ranaji (5) of Udaypur was inexperienced having just come to the throne and hence to seek help from him was out of question. Madhaosing, had no desire to follow the policy of Ishwarising towards Jodhpur, Bakhtsing’s Wakil was already in his Court and the approach of Ramsing’s Wakil to him for help was totally a disagreeable thing for him. Delhi had little interest in this strife and would have acknowledged any one who would have been victorious, as the king of Jodhpur. The only power capable to help him, was the Marathas, who had just saved the Wazir from the clutches of the Rohillas. But they had not yet freed themselves from the Rohilla-affair. He sent his Wakil-Purohitji- to them promising daily expenses for 10 thousands force, with an advance of expenses for 2 months, for their help to his cause.

There could be no other agreeable offer to the Marathas than this. Ramsing’s cause was taken up by Jayappa as he wa specially interested in Ajmer Subha. But as he was busy in carrying Gaziuddin to Deccan, he sent a small contingent of 6 thousand under Sabaji Shinde and Ranoji Bhoite to Ramsingh. But it was easily  routed by Bakhtsing at Ajmer. The Marathas then returned from Marwad. Meanwhile Bakhtsing died on 21st September 1752 A.D. and was succeeded by his equally able son Vijaysing.

The Marathas (6) came up again to the North, at the invitation of the Emperor, to help him against his Wazir. Raghunathrao, the Peshwa’s brother, entered Jaypur (7) territory in November 1753 A.D. At Kharopada, Madhaosing’s envoy Hargovind, met him (16th December 1753 A.D.), in respect of the arrears he had to pay the Marathas. Madhaosing, in fact, had no desire (8) to pay his dues and only wanted to evade the demand and Raghunathrao could little afford to go deep into the matter. At Nayke, near Jaypur, Ramsing met him on 26th December 1753 A.D. (9) and requested him to help him. Raghunathrao assured him to help after the Jat affair at hand was over.

(ii) Jayappa in Marwad :

After concluding the Jat affair, the Marathas went to Delhi On 1st of June, 1754, Waziri was given to Gaziuddin II, and a new Emperor Alamgir II (10) , was installed on the throne deposing the previous Ahmad Shah, on 30th June 1754 A.D. Jayappa then left Delhi for Marwad. Malharrao’s attack on the Jats (January 1754 to May 1755 A.D.) and Jayappa’s attack on Marwad (1754-1755 A.D.) taking the cause of Ramsing, were initiated by the same desire i.e. for bringing the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer grated to them by the ‘treaty of Kanauj (1752 A.D.), into the Maratha-possession.

Success seemed to crown Jayappa from the very beginning. On 12th July he reached Narnol, on 25th he reached Sambhar. Leaving Ajmer, which was far off from his territory, Vijaysing had fallen back on Medta on the border of Marwad. Hence laying siege to Ajmer, and capturing Kishangadh, 18 miles north-east of Ajmer, Jayappa, with Ramsing, reached Medta on 6th August 1754 A.D. Raghunathrao had given ten to twelve thousand Hujarat force with him. At Medta, Shivsing Rathod from Kota, joined him with a thousand men.

The siege of Medta commenced. Vijaysing gallantly defended the place. On 15th of September, a free battle raged from morning till night in which Vijaysing was completely defeated. He then left Medta for Nagor (33 miles away to the north-west of Medta). Jayappa and Ramsing entered Medta on 17th of September (11). Jayappa then marched to Nagor forthewith and besieged it.

(iii )Peshwa Cautions Jayappa :

Peshwa (12) enquired Jayappa on 3rd September 1754 A.D. about his progress, the strength of his opponent, the general Rathod support to Ramsing whose cause he had taken, and cautioned him that the Marwad affair as if had burst all of a sudden on him. It was a grave affair as the Marwadi Rajputs were extremely proud and had not been yet humbled by the Marathas. But, (the Peshwa further wrote) “by the grace of God, you are a brave soldier and a born commander and know how to bring pressure for getting the things done. I am sure you will achieve what looks impossible. If they are ready to cede half of Jodhpur kingdom, accept it.” In the last, he cautioned him to be alert always, and to use force only when it was essential, for it was the policy of the great.

Peshwa’s anxiety was to avoid repetition of what took place at Jaypur in 1751 A.D. Moreover (13) he could not afford a sardar like Jayappa to be entangled at one place. Those were the days of Maratha success and many a works needed immediate attention. Rana of Gohad had siezed territory in Gwalior region, he needed to be chastised. The Rohillas had grown again powerful in Doab, they were to be looked at, Safdar Jang of Oudh had recently died. That afforded a chance to recover large sum from his son Shujauddaula and the release of the holy places like Kashi, Prayag on which the Peshwa had set his heart from years together.

(iv) Jayappa’s March to Victory :

But Jayappa (14) himself knew the situation very well and was cautious. In fact, it was impossible that Vijaysing could have accepted the division of Jadhpur kingdom with Ramsing. But about this Jayappa had no reason to be anxious. He was concious of his own strength. Unlike Malharrao in Madhaosing’s case, his cause was just. Ramsing was the rightful master of Jodhpur and a faction of Rathods was on his side.

Along with Nagor (15) , Jodhpur also was invested by the men of Ramsing and the Marathas under Jagannath Purohit and Santaji Wabale. All supplies of the besieged places were stopped. A tank at Nagor dried up and there remained only one tank there. Articles of daily use became scarece. Grain and salt were sold at a very high cost. Opium, which was badly needed by the Rajputs, was sold 20 rupees a seer. Fuel was used up. People began to desert the town. Zalor, 100 miles to the south west of Jodhpur, where the hereditary treasury of the Rathods was stored, was the centre of severe struggle. It  was again recaptured by the Rajputs. On 21st of January, a section of Maratha army attacked Ajmer fort.

Peshwa (16) was happy to receive the news of the success of Jayappa. He complimented Jayappa for having nearly completed the work of placing Ramsing on the throne of Jodhpur by defeating Vijaysing and his Marwadis who were famous swordsmen. He gave the credit of this success to the devotion of Jayappa to the cause of his master. He asked Jayappa to arrange for the meeting of Ramsing with the prominent Rajput chiefs and to free himself from the complicated affair. He further wrote that if he determined to root out Vijaysing, it would take considerable time, as it was a serious affair. Raghunathrao had not much force with him and hence it was better for him to handover that part of Jodhpur kingdom of Abhaysing, to Ramsing. Then after conciliating them with each other, he should look to the Maratha profit from Vijaysing, and recover the amount from Ramsing as per the settlement. Thus getting himself relieved he should join Raghunathrao as early as possible as all his hopes were with him (15th November 1754 A.D.).

But it was impossible for Jayappa to relieve himself from his job so easily. Vijaysing (17) was not ready to cede anything, far from accepting Nagor which was the kingdom of Bakhtsing. Moreover complete success seemed not far away. The siege of Nagor was pressed to extremity. It was expected that it could not be held long. The problem  of water with the Marathas was solved by capturing Usar, a place near Nagor, where water was in plenty. Jagannath Purohit and Santaji Wable were investing Malharrao were on their way to Marwad after finishing their work at Delhi. It was generally held that the important Subhas of Ajmer was captured by Jayappa. Madhaosing in alarm was collecting all his forces. Udaypur had grown powerless due to the internal strife with Nathaji. Ranaji was warned by the Marathas to comply with the terms settled in respect of Nathaji and even though money was spent the trouble was not over. In Marwad, the Rathods were on the verge of collapse. Delhi had not cleared the dues towards the Marathas, but Maratha rule was virtually established in parts in four paraganas of the Empire. Rupnagar was very soon to be converted into a Maratha post. In Sambhar Mukasdar from Rathod (Ramsing) had been placed. After the expected division of territory, the Mahals from Marwad were to come under the Maratha possession and by the yearly coming of the Maratha forces; probably Ajmer was to be the centre of Maratha camp. With Ajmer in Maratha possession, not only Malwa, but Gujarat  and the rest of the Provinces of the North would be dominated by the Deccanis. Such was the anxiety of Madhaosing (18) .

The Peshwa’s letter (19) , advised Jayappa not to entangle himself further in the affair by carrying it to extremity and to conclude it in whatever possible way, and to join Raghunathrao. Jayappa answered that Ajmer was captured (21st February 1755 A.D.) and that influential persons were trying for a compromise  which would not take much time. Raghunathrao had reached Pushkar and was 25 kos from him.

After effecting a settlement with the Emperor and the Wazir (beginning of March 1755 A.D.) Raghunathrao entered Jaypur (20) territory through Rewadi. Madhaosing sent 4 to 5 lakhs of rupees with Kaniram to save his territory from devastations. Raghunathrao then marched through Narnaul and reached Lohgadh as per the request of Madhaosing, but warned him that unless the dues were paid in full, he would not leave(21) Jaypur territory. Madhaosing had to pay rupees sixteen and a half lakh (22) (February end, 1755 A.D.)

Malharrao Holkar (23) and Sakharampant came to Sambhar (February end) and were about to proceed to Nagor to help Jayappa but he informed them that his work was nearly finished and hence instead of coming to Nagor, they should take up the work of Rupnagar in their hand. Jayappa was determined not to give any scope to Malharrao in Marwad affair.

Meanwhile Raghunathrao also reached Sambhar. Here, Vijay-Bharati, from Vijaysing met him in connection of the settlement-talks. Hearing him, Raghunathrao decided to end the Marwad affair by establishing Ramsing on the throne of Jodhpur and conciliating Vijaysing with Jayappa and with this intention he started for Pushkar, and wrote to Malharrao Holkar to join him there. But when he reached Pushkar (3-3-1755 A.D.), he received a letter from Jayappa informing him the news of recent victories. That, Ajmer was made Maratha post, and the fort of Zalor, wherein lay the hereditary treasury of the Rathods and for the defence of which Vijaysing had tried hard, was captured by the men of Ramsing. Nagor was about to fall and thus finishing the work there, he would join him soon and till then he should take up the task of punishing the Chief of Rupnagar. Accordingly, Raghunathrao gave up the idea of going to Nagor and proceeded to Rupnagar. Meanwhile, seeing that he could not escape from paying the dues this time, Madhaosing sent Diwan Kamiram to Raghunathrao (24) .

Sakharam Bapu (25), rightly cautioned Jayappa not to be hasty, as haste would have only killed the people. He again remineded him not to be entagled in the affair like Kumbher, for in that case the work would be spoilt.

After concluding (26) his work at Rupnagar by the end of March 1755 A.D., Raghunathrao started for the Deccan via Bundi Kota. In the middle of April he was in Kota state, in June in Malwa, by the 1st week of July he had reached the Narmada, by July end he had reached Nashik Trymbak and on 10th of August, he had reached Poona.

Even though Vijaysing’s cause was nearly ruined as accepting Nagor he had lost all, he held on still. After making it sure that the main Maratha army had definitely reached Deccan, he now decided to swoop down (27) on the Marathas by collecting all his forcces. The talks of negotiating peace terms were continuing still, but that was only as a part of his scheme. The question involved was not of giving Ramsing his rightful share of the kingdom, but handing over the possession of the whole of Ajmer Subha to the Marathas and to this the Rahods as well as Kachhawahas were not prepared. Feelings ran so high, that when Jayappa (28) demanded Madhaosing 22 lakhs of rupees and warned him that if he failed to send the sum, he would have to march straight to Jaypur to recover it, Madhaosing replied in the same tone that he need not take that much trouble for he himself was coming over there (to Nagor). Vijaysing at last had found out a stratagem to make a short work of the oppressive Marathas.

The Rathod envoys were often coming and going from the fort of Nagar to Jayappa’s camp on peacock lake (Taus-sar), about seven miles from Nagor, for peace talks. On the morning of Friday, 25th of July (Ashadh Vadya 2 ) the Jodhpur Vakil Vijay Bharati Gosavi accompanied by Rajsing Chauhan and Jagneshwar came with armed and disguised assassins as beggars to Jayappa’s camp and held long discussions over the terms. Rawat Jaitsing Sisodiya Vakil of Udaypur, who used to be in the camp was also rows. About 11 o’clock in the morning, as it was time for a bath, Jayappa went out and finished it in open, seated on a wooden stool and was drying his hair with a towel as usual. Suddenly two assassins, dressed as beggars, who had been loitering there on the pretext of picking up the horse grain, got the opportunity for which they were waiting, stabbed, wounding (29) him mortally.

A great cry was raised and the ambassadors and the members of the party were at once cut to pieces. In confusion that ensued, the innocent Vakil of Udaypur, Rawat Jaitsing was also killed. All the Rajputs of the camp were held as suspects and killed. Sardarsing of Rupnagar only could save himself. Before his death, Jayappa gave full instructions to his brother Dattaji and son Jankoji for avenging the wrong without being disheartended due to his death.

Leaving Jayappa (30) in his wounded condition, the Marathas had to rush to the flag, for the Rathods had marched on them to make the best use of the critical moment, Killing two to three thousand Rathods, the Maratha forced them back into the fort. Meanwhile Jayappa had died. Dattaji and Jankoji coming from the field performed his funeral ceremony. Thus ended the valiant Dattaji, a true soldier till last, due to the foul play (31) of the Rajputs.

(v) The Rajput Reactions :

As soon as the news of Jayappa’s murder (32) reached Jaypur, Madhaosing imprisoned Govind Tamaji, Peshwa’s Vakil at Jaypur in his house and kept his guards on it. To save himself from dishonour, the Vakil ended his life by swallowing poison. Madhaosing (33) then sent his Vakil to Delhi and informed the Emperor that he had killed the Maratha (Govind Tamaji). He urged the Wazir and the Emperor to encamp outside Delhi so that he would join them, there. When the Wazir expressed his inability, as he had yet to pay his soldiers, Madhaosing assured them that if they only encamped outside the capital, he would pay the expenses for the campaign on the Marathas.

It fell on Dettaji and Jankoji to carry on Jayappa’s work to completion. They rose to the occasion and carried on the way still more vigorously. Wrote Jankoji (34) to Hingne brothers (August 1755 A.D.) “Jayappa wanted to place both the Rathods (Ramsing and Vijaysing) in Marwad. But Vijaysing treacherously committed a foul act. I have determined to destroy Nagor in revenge. God will help me in this.”

(vi) The Peshwa’s Anxiety to Rescue Dattaji :

It was a great blow for the Peshwa to hear of the treacherous murder of Jayappa. He consoled Ramji (35) Anant the Diwan of Shinde in the following way, “God had done great injustice and there is no remedy for it. It was never expected that a Sardar like Jayappa would meet his death by such foul means. Be it so. Dattaji Shinde is brave and capable and you all are safe and sound. Console Dattaji and carry on the task under taken by Jayappa to successful completion by crushing the enemy. Dattaji is a soldier and hence his actions in anger at times would be a cause of further trouble. But guide him properly at such times. If the Rajputs are read for a treaty on the lines they were speaking to Appa, accept it. But they must have been now puffed up and hence be cautious in every way. Even if they march on you with 25 to 40 thousand men, face them by guerilla tactics for three months, till the armies reach there. By the grace of God, everything will be set right.”

To Dattaji (36) , while assuring him his sincere interest in the cause of late Jayappa, he gave some practical hints in the following way, “The distance (of Marwad) is great (from here). The troops from hindusthan come here after two years. It takes time to prepare and send them for another expedition. It is no time now for collecting the troops and the way is long, hence there will be (some) delay in sending you reinforcements. But by the grace of God, within a month and a half, a force of 5 to 6 thousand will reach there. After wards Khasa (from Peshwa’s family) would come there with an army of 20 thousand. We have full interest in the work you have undertaken. Appa, as if destined in spite of my cautioning letters, entangled himself in the affair, and met his death as soldier. But he failed as a Sardar. After he had won a great battle like Bhara-war, had he accepted a treaty, taking into consideration the danger involved, he could have relieved himself and could have been useful by releasing the territories like Kashi, Prayag, Khechiwada etc. to the profit of the Government. But there is no remedy for what has taken place. You have also behaved till now like a soldier. Now look to the affairs like a Sardar and manage the business successfully with prudence. Show bravery as a soldier, only when it is essential. God is ready to help you and I am blessed by Him. He will never fail to help you. The members of your family have been the faithful servants (of the Government) for three generations. If will never happen that you would be neglected and especially when your services (to State) are highly essential. Be at ease on that score. Take decisions thoughtfully as the occasion would demand. The armies from here will reach there without delay. The Vakil of Vijaysing was ready to pay 50 lakhs of rupees and some place for Ramsing for his maintenance. But after the (foul) deed was done, we informed leave to depart. The Rajputs might have adopted hightone, and since the middlemen were killed, in the scuffle, no body might be forthcoming for the job (of negotiating peace settlement). But even now, if they are ready to cede territory worth 15 to 20 lakhs of rupees for Ramsing, and are ready to pay 10 lakhs besides the affair. This is befitting a diplomat. Act as the occasion demands. We are sending the army for your help. What more?” (18th September 1755 A.D.)

As the Peshwa had rightly judged from the South, the murder of Jayappa had emboldened the Rajputs in general. Madaosing was busy in collecting all the forces in the North India that were opposed to the Marathas. Letters (37) were sent, besides the Emperor to the Jat Chief, the chiefs of Karoli, Kota, Bundi and the Chiefs of Malwa. As a result, Nagarmal son of Jat Chief and Gopalsing of Karoli reached Jaypur with armies. Wazir (38) was already displeased with the Marathas for seizing the territory in Antarwad. He was contemplating to assign a jagir of 18 lakhs to the Jats, to hire their help against the Marathas. Thus the general jealousy felt by the North Indian potentates for the Marathas, added with the persistent efforts of Madhaosing bore and the Emperor (39) and the Wazir encamped outside Delhi. As there was no Maratha force then near Delhi, the allied forces intended to march towards Nagor to drive away Dattaji from Marwad. (September 1755 A.D.)

Peshwa got the news of these movements in the South. He strived hard from Deccan to save Dattaji and at the same time to crown his expedition with success. What appeared a moment of complete dominance(40) over the North had turned, as if, with a foul stroke to be a critical time for the Maratha army in Marwad. All those powers, that bore hatred towards the Marathas due to the strength of their army, had got a chance to unite and strike a blow. The Peshwa wrote Hingne (41) to use his personal friendship with the Jats to refrain him from joining Madhaosing. He asked him to remind the Jat that it was unbecoming of him to assist Madhaosing against the brother of Jayappa who had saved him at the time of Kumbheri (1754 A.D.). He also asked him (Hingne) to inform Madhaosing that all his misdeeds would be kept in mind and that he would not be spared after the Maratha forces reached the north. He also suggested to him to speak at length with the Wazir and to remind him of the assurances of friendship he had givne to Dada (Raghunathrao) and to tell him that (as a friend) it was expected that he should help Dattaji a (42) *** gainst Madhaosing and the rest of Rajputs. He informed Hingne that Samsher Bahadur and Yashwantrao Pawar had been sent to the succor would be coming with sufficient army to the North. Finally he asked him to watch the situation till the armies reached the North and see to it that the opposite forces were not united to create trouble for Dattaji and be writing to him often about the situation.

To Ramji Anant and Dattaji he informed that Antaji Mankeshwar had been dispatched for his help and Samsher Bahadur, and Yashwantrao Pawar had been sent with a force of 10 thousand and that they would reach Marwad without delay. ‘Khasa’ was also preparing to come over there. He advised further, “Among the Rajputs, the Jats should be kept conciliated. Some should be kept on friendly terms with sweet tongue, while others are on inimical terms. All should not be made enemies at one time.”

Jayappa’s murder had shaken the Peshwa. Hence he tried diplomacy, tact, prestige and force alike to save Dattaji in Marwad from Deccan. In 1755 A.D., the Maratha strength was a reality. No force was equal to them in India. The Shinde were courageous and brave soldiers. With a watchful and interested master at the back, they rose to the occasion and destroyed the Rajputs even before reinforcements had reached Marwad.

(vii) Madhaosing Crippled:

Vijayram Purohit (43) from Vijaysing was sent to Madhaosing for requesting him to sent help. Madhaosing there-upon had assembled his army at Ramgadh under Jagannath Saha and under Aniruddhsing at Narayangadh. But hearing of the poor strength of the on coming Marathas under Ranoji Bhoite, Aniruddhsing went to Ramgadh and united there all the Rajput forces. All the Sardars of Madhaosing Shekhawants, Rajawants, narukas, Kubhawanis, Nathawants, Chauhans had gathered there under Aniruddhsing. They were further joined by men of Umedsing of Shahapur, men of Bahadursing of Rupnagar, men of Gopalsing of Karoli, Deepsing Hada-brother of Umedsing of Bundi, men from Gaud Sopar, Bakhtwarmal Diwan of Bikaner and men from Vijaysing. All told a host of 25 to 30 thousand marched towards Nagor to drive away Dattaji from Marwad (15th October 1755 A.D.). Hearing of the Rajput strength, Narsingrao Shinde, Kanhoji Jadhao and Sawai Ram Bhandari from Ramsing were sent by Dattaji to reinforce Ranoji Bhoite.

They faced the Rajput force as it entered the Marwad territory on 16th October early in the morning. In spite of the heavy fire from the enemy, the Marathas boldly marched on and silencing the guns, cut down about seven to eight hundred Rajputs by sword. About twelve hundred horses, two guns and eighty  camels were carried by them as spoil. The casualties on the Maratha side were 53 men killed, 43 wounded, 25 horses killed and 45 horses wounded. It was grand victory for them.

Aniruddhsing then leaving the way to Nagor, proceeded to Didwana (44) , protecting his men with his guns. The Marathas harrassed them at every step and carried away bullocks, and carts. Hence the Rajputs could march only 5 miles a day with great difficulty. On the way, the wells were filled in and the tanks were  held by the Marathas and hence many men, horses, oxen and camels from the Rajput side perished due to thirst.

The Marathas then attacked the exhausted army for the second time. Three to four hundred Rajputs were killed and one hundred (45) and twenty-five horses were carried  away by the Marathas. On the Maratha side two men were killed, and twenty-three were wounded, twenty-five horses, were killed, and thirty-five horses wounded. Aniruddhsing could save complete destruction only by entering Didwana (20th of October 1755 A.D.). Vijaysing;s men from Didwana and Dipalpur, total of 5 thousand joined him. But he lost all courage to proceed further. The Marathas completely blockaded them. All supplies were cutdown. Supplies coming from Bikaner were looted at Daulatpur 6 miles to the South-East of Didwana. 100 men from the party were killed and the rest ran away to Daulatpur. Grain and foddere became scarce at Didwana. Letters from Aniruddhsing and Bakhtwarmal Diwan of the king of Bikaner were intercepted. They revealed the miseries the Rajputs were put to. Aniruddhsing had no strength to proceed further or to go backward. When he learnt that the Marathas were to assault him for the third time with guns, with hundred men he saw the Maratha Chiefs and sued for peace.

Thus Dattaji on his own strength had destroyed the force of Madhaosing that had marched on him with high hopes. No way was hence left for Vijaysing but to surrender. He had fared ill on other front too.

(viii) Collapse of Vijaysing and Treaty of Nagor :

It was the strategy of Vijaysing to attack the Marathas from all sides at once so as to destroy them by dividing their strength before any reinforcements reached them. While Aniruddhsing was marching on Nagor, another (46) army marched on Jodhpur under Bhatis of Jaisalmer, men of Pokharan with men of Vijaysing from Zalor. Hearing of the approach of the Rajputs, Santaji Wable, Malji Shinde, the Hujarat of Shinde, men of Jiwaji Pawar and Tukoji Pawar marched to meet them keeping Jagannath Purohit, Janrao Wable, and Satwoji Bande at Jodhpur. They met the enemy at Godawar, 32 miles north-east of Zalor. Defeating them completely they were forced into Godawar. Guards were placed around the place and all the supplies were stopped. Grain was sold two seers a rupee. While the Rajput army was thus locked into Godawar, Jodhpur was held by  Jagannath Purohit, Janrao Wable and Satwoji Bande.

Siege of Nagor continued with usual vigour whereas the Marathas were successful in crushing the Rajputs wherever they tried to raise their heads. Thus Dattaji and Jankoji proved more than match for the Rajput combination (November 1755 A.D.). Jayappa’s murder could help Vijaysing in no way.

Antaji Mankeshwar (47), who was at Kalpi, started for the succor of Shinde with a force of ten thousand as per the orders of the Peshwa and urgent letters of Shinde. It was a feat in itself to march to Marwad avoiding the forces of the Jat and Madhaosing that barred his way to Marwad. By forced marches of 12 kos at a time by way of Indragadh, Khatoli and through mountainous region of Lakheri, Antaji entered Jaypur territory avoiding them near Niwai and devastating Jaypur territory reached Didwana. With his coming Dattaji’s position grew stronger. Vijaysing had left Nagor on 12th of November at 300 foot and 100 horse intending to join Kachhwahas at Didwana, but seeing that place surrounded by the Maratha, he drew back and ran to Bikaner. There also he could do nothing.

Maratha strength had prevailed at least. Vijaysing had tried to oust them in everyway. He had sent 5 lakhs as Nazar to the Emperor and asked him and his Wazir to come to Ajmer, promising 10 thousand rupees per day for expenses. He had also called the son the Mansur Ali (Suja-Uddaula) and the Pathan and the Rohillas to help him. He had sent letters to the Chiefs of Bundi, Kota and those of Malwa and Bundelkhand. He had also sent his Vakil to Abdali at Lahor, calling his aid on payment of expenses.

But all these efforts were of little use for Vijaysing. Finally he bowed down to the inevitable and in January 1756 A.D. met Dattaji and sued for peace. By February end (48) , the Marwad expedition of the Shindes was over by the treaty of Nagor (49) by which :

Fort of Zalor with half of Marwad went to Ramsing.
Vijaysing agreed to pay 50 lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, out of which 25 lakhs were to be paid in cash and the remaining 25 lakhs were to be paid in next 2 years and
Ajmer was given to the Marathas.
After realising money Dattaji (50) and Jankoji went to Rupnagar (51) (March, April 1756 A.D.). Samsher Bahadur sent by the Peshwa joiined them there. They laid siege to the forth. After placing the Chief Samantsing of his choice and realising dues, Dattaji then went to Ujjain (beginning of June 1766 A.D.). But before that he had visited Kota (52) and realised substantial Khandani from that State on the occasion of the new Chief on the throne of Kota.

The two-year expedition of Jayappa and Dattaji produced nothing but the death of Jayappa, deadly enmity with the Rathods and Kachhwahs, loss of money and men and the differences between (53) the Shinde and Holkar. Ajmer (54) had come under the Maratha possession no doubt, but with the fear of Abdali’s invasion looming large over North India, the Maratha held on Rajasthan in 1756 A.D. was all but precarious.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1)
'Proceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress,' 1949, p. 196 - Letter of Bakhtsing to Khan Dauran, 'Hingne Daftar' I-32.

(2)
S.P.D. 2-15.

(3)
S.P.D. 2-16, 17, 22, S.P.D. 21-25, 27, 32.

(4)
'Hingne Daftar' I-59. 'Holkar Shahi' I-143.

(5)
Pratapsing II, succeeded Rana Jagatsing on 6th June 1751 A.D.

(6)
'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-40.

(7)
S.P.D. 27-70

(8)
'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-40, 41, 42, 'Hingne Daftar' I-83.

(9)
Sardesai and Sarkar both state '17th December' as the date of this meeting. But as per the itinerary of Raghunathrao (S.P.D. 27- P. 73) the date seems to be 26th December 1753.

(10)
'Hingne Daftar' I-93, S.P.D. 21-60, 85.

(11)
'Patre Yadi' - 143

(12)
'Patre Yadi' - 125.

(13)
'Shinde Shahi' - 3-59, 61, 'Patre Yadi' - 141.

(14)
'Shinde Shahi' - I-117.

(15)
S.P.D. 21-66, 67, 69.

(16)
'Patre Yadi' - 131.

(17)
'Shinde Shahi' I-117.

(18)
A general picture of the Sound position of the Marathas in North reported by Govind Tamaji, Peshwa's envoy at Jaypur (February 1755 A.D.), S.P.D. 27-106.

(19)
Ibid - 105.

(20)
'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-52, 55., S.P.D. 27-p. 75.

(21)
Ibid - 105.

(22)
S.P.D. 27-18, 'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 5-47.

(23)
S.P.D. 27-107, 'Hingne Daftar' I-145, 'Shinde Shahi' I-131.

(24)
Jaypur Darbar was to pay Rs. 16,50,000 being the total arrears of Khandani. Even after the settlement Rs. 16,25,000 remained to be paid, which means that Raghunathrao go actually in cash Rs. 1,25,000 - 'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 5-47, of ±b¼á P¯£a 2, P}. 1810.

(25)
'Patre Yadi' - 135.

(26)
S.P.D. 27-PP. 77 and 78.

(27)
Ibid - 112.

(28)
S.P.D. 2-48.

(29)
S.P.D. 27-116, S.P.D. 2-48, 52, M.I.S. Vol. III-152 'Hingne Daftar' I-161, 'Shinde Shahi' I-140, 141, 'Shinde Shahi' III-320, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 398.

(30)
Patre Yadi - 143.

(31)
"Sir Jadunath's efforts to prove (Fall II, p. 129) that the murder was not plotted deliberately in advance, but was the effect of Jayappa's insolent utterness during the discussion, based on Tod, 'Vamsha Bhaskar', are all in vain. The presence of armed and disguised assassins in the party of the ambassadors is a complete refutation of the defense." - 'Marathai Riyasat' Vol. VI P. 280.

(32)
'Hingne Daftar' I-169, S.P.D. 21-27, M.I.S. Vol. III-152.

(33)
S.P.D. 21-73.

(34)
'Hingne Daftar' I-161.

(35)
'Patre Yadi' - 139.

(36)
'Patre Yadi' - 141.

(37)

S.P.D. 27-119.

(38)
Ibid - 129, 'Hingne Daftar' I-157, 167.

(39)
Ibid - 159, 163, 171.

(40)
S.P.D. 27-106.

(41)
'Hingne Daftar' I-171, 172, 177.

(42)
S.P.D. 27-120.

(43)
S.P.D. 21-74, 77 S.P.D. 2-50, 51, 54 55, S.P.D. 27-117, 'Shinde Shahi' I-p. 129, 'Patre Yadi' - 143

(44)
Didwana is 38 miles to the west of Ramgadh and 55 miles to the North east of Nagor.

(45)
S.P.D. 2-55. (Jankoji gives this figure as four hundred) 'Shinde Shahi' I-143.

(46)
S.P.D. 2-49.

(47)
S.P.D. 2-52, 54, 56, S.P.D. 21-70, 79, S.P.D. 27-119, 'Patre yadi' - 143.

(48)
Writing from Rupnagar Antaji Mankeshwar on 29-3-1756 A.D. clearly states that it was one month before, that the treaty of Nagor was effected - S.P.D. 21-83.

(49)
S.P.D. 27-127, 128, S.P.D. 2-58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 'Hingne Daftar' I- 189,

(50)
S.P.D. 21-82 and 83. (50) 'Marathi Riyasat' Vol. VI p. 285.

(51)
S.P.D. 2-63, S.P.D. 21-85, 'Shinde Shahi' I -136.

(52)
S.P.D. 2-65 and 66, 'Shinde Shahi' I-179.

(53)
'Marathi Riyasat Vol. VI, p. 285. 'New Hist.' II, p. 400.

(54)
'Jaypur Kharitas' 3-65.

http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/4sp.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 5
THE PANIPAT AND THE RAJPUT ROLE


(i) Invasion of Abdali : (1757 A.D.) :

With the Maratha armies in the South, Abdali descended on Delhi on 22nd of January 1757 A.D. (1), at the call of Najib Khan Rohilla, who joined him before he reached Delhi. Najib Khan was too ambitious (2) and aimed a pathan Empire at Delhi. Madhaosing and Vijaysing had joined him in this enterprise, in order to relive themselves from the clutches of the detested Marathas.

Nobody (3) could withstand Abdali. Even Wazir Gaziuddin was forced to see him personally (16th of January 1757 A.D.). With the Jat sympathy on his side, Antaji Mankeshwar (4), a Maratha Sardar; with insufficient force dared to give him stand single-handedly, but he too was over-powered.

Meanwhile, Raghunathrao, who had been deputed to the North by the Peshwa, had reached Indor on 14th of February 1757 A.D. Abdali was then looting Delhi (5). Peshwa, himself, had gone to the south, on Shrirang Pattan (6), and he could not provide Raghunathrao, with adequate force. He had only 15 thousand men with him, and contingent (7) of Samsher Bahadur, Naro Shankar, and Antaji had not yet joined him. Hence it was natural for Raghunathrao to wait till sufficient army was assembled. Antaji (8) pressed Raghunathrao from Mathura again and again to move towards Delhi, to bring pressure on Abdali, leaving the (in-significant) job of capturing petty fortresses in Jaypur territory. Even though (9) his letters revealed a confident tone of his determination to annihilate Abdali, Raghunathrao showed no sign of moving on and facing Abadali, with his insufficient force. Consequently with Raghunathrao near at hand in Jaypur territory, Abdali committed atrocities in Delhi and its vicinity, uninterrupted by any one. It was felt that the Pathans (10) had grown too powerful even for the Marathas. This affected adversely the prestige of the Maratha rule in the North in general and Doab (11) in particular. But the Jats (12) in Agra Subha, leaving the enmity with the Marathas, sympathized with them and made a common cause against Abdali. They held firm for (13) a considerable time but at last were over-powered and were obliged to take shelter in their forts.

(ii) The Rajput Attitude :

A curious fact to note is that the real cause of the Jat and Rajput opposition to the Marathas was the same, namely the question of territorial acquiring by the Marathas in the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer respectively. The Jat Chief was afraid of the stand that would be taken by the Marathas and the Wazir after departure of Abdali. Even then he co-operated with the Marathas mainly on the ground of religion. The Jats always distinguished religion from politics and never sided with the Rohilla Pathas against the Marathas but strangely enough whenever the Rohillas stood against the Marathas after 1752 A.D., they had the Rajputs on their side.

For no reason, not even for facing the Maratha aggression of Rajputana, can be Rajput stand to ally with Abdali be justified. On calling Abdali to their aid, the Indian Pathans (14) aimed at dominating Delhi. Being bigoted Sunnis, they had no reason to feel for the loss of Hindu lives and culture at the ravages of Abdali. But what could the Rajputs gain by destroying the Marathas at the hands of Abdali? It would only lead to the replacement of one foreign master by another foreigner, medieval in outlook and barbarous in actions, alien to their religion and culture (15). The Rajput policy towards the Marathas during the time of Abdali’s invasions (1757 to 1761 A.D.) of India, depicts a clear lack of any foresight.

No convincible justification is ever possible for any imperialism, neither of Alexander the great nor of Akabar. There is nothing wrong, hence, if Maratha imperialism is criticized  mercilessly by the historian like Sir Jadhunath in his ‘Fall of the Mughal Empire’ at length. But it will be unbecoming of a worthy historian to deny facts and observe sarcastically (16) thus, “True, the Marathas, after sucking the Delhi-Agra region and the Doab on the other bank dry for three years, had fled away. Not a single Maratha bled in defense of the holiest of Vaishnave Shrines; their Pan-Indian suzerainty (Hindupad Padshahi) did not involve the duty to protect.”

There are innumerable proofs available in Marathi sources that give the religious (17) centered activities of the Peshwa and his Sardars. In a way, the object of Maratha Raj was the release of the Hindu (18) religious centre in general and Kashi, Prayag, Mathura and Gaya in particular from the clutches of the Yawanas. It was the unfulfilled desire of the Peshwa from Bajirao to Madhaorao. Upheaval (19) of the Hindu religion was the main aim behind the incessant activities of the Marathas. Ali believed that it was the only power to check Abdali and save Hindusthan.

The harrowing accounts of Abdali’s attrocities (20) at Mathura, Varundawan and the rest of places within about a hundred miles radius from Delhi, in the lines of Changiz Khan and Taimulang, are even today most painful to read. But the terrible wail of grief and cries of the sufferers, were unable to move the Rajput sympathy to action against Abdali like this Jats. Far from it, not a finger was raised nor a word was spoken.

The racial bitterness against the Deccani Marathas, over looking the common bond of religion that had served once the strongest link between the two, had so completely cptured the hearts of Madhaosing and Vijaysing that forgetting the Rajput stand of defending their religion and culture for which their fore-fathers had shed ample blood, they were busy in inviting Abdali and were blind to his barbarous acts. And all this was done within less than ten to fifteen years from the deaths of Abhaysing and Sawai Jaysing who could have never acted on these lines, not even for driving away the Maratha aggressors. Sacrificing the innocent people of Delhi, Agra, Mathuran and Vrundavan for saving Rajasthan from the clutches of the Maratha was a queer solution indeed!

(iii) The Marathas in Jaypur Territory (1757 A.D.) :

Click here for the "Maratha Empire 1758 A. D. " Map

Raghunathrao reached Jaypur territory from Indor via Mewad. The presence of Abdali at Delhi, and the Maratha weakness in not facing him forth-with, encouraged Madhaosing to take a bold stand inspire of the presence of Raghunathrao and Malharrao in his territory.

Meanwhile a siege was laid to Barwada fort (21) (20 miles to the west of Ranthambhor). Madhaosing contacted (22) his Chiefs and decided to appose till last.

The Maratha Sardars (23), now began to gather. Thus in April 1757, Antaji Mankeshwar had joined Raghunathrao, Samsher Bahadur was to join soon, Naro Shankar was expected to join within 15 days and thus the Maratha strength numbered 30 thousand.

Raghunathrao (24) now took a sterner view and demanded Madhaosing 40 t0 50 lakhs of rupees. In addition he demanded the fief of Ranthabhor worth 14 lakhs of rupees assigned to Madhaosing by the Emperor year before last (i.e. in 1755 A.D.), along with Ramputa, bhanpura, Tonk Toda and the fort of Hinglag. Mahdaosing showed his readiness to give the usual dues at the most but Raghunathrao prepared to remain in Jaypur territory till the recovery of 40 to 50 lakhs of rupees. But even though three months were wasted nothing could be accomplished due to the strange behaviour (25) of Malharrao Holkar. At last Raghunathrao accepted elevan lakhs of rupees (26), out of which six lakhs were paid in cash, and left Jaypur territory for Delhi.

(iv) The Marathas Retaliate :

Meanwhile Abdali had left India (27) with immense loot, due to unbearable summer heat and the outbreak of terrible epidemic of cholera in his camp. Raghunathrao then marched to Delhi and captured it.(28) (6th of September 1757 A.D.) Najib Khan was driven from Delhi but was spared for all his mischief’s (29)due to the intervention of Malharrao Holkar. Antarwed (30) was cleared (December 1757 A.D.) Raghunathrao then marched to Lahor (20th of April 1758 A.D.) and capturing Punjab (31) came back to Jaypur territory. The Maratha victory of Punjab created a feeling of awe over the Chiefs of the Northern India. Abdali’s impressions of his excesses (January to March 1757 A.D.) were completely wiped out. Hindus (32) were overjoyed at the  success of the Peshwa and it was held that the Peshwa had taken a revenge over Abdali (33) for his atrocities of the previous year.

Jankoji reached Kota (middle of May 1758 A.D.) starting from (34) Ujjain. Then he went to Mewad and settled the affair of Umedsing Sisodia of Shahapur, a ‘Patait’ of the King of Udaypur (July 1758 A.D.), Then he went to Jaypur territory to meet Raghunathrao, who had returned there from Lahor. The envoys of Marwad had seen Raghunathrao, but he decided to entrust the Marwad affair to Jankoji, after meeting him, as news had reached that Vijaysing was threating to oust Maratha posts in Marwad.

In October 1758 A.D. Jankoji looked after the affairs of Marwad (35), Jaypur and Kota from Pushkar. He then left for Delhi. On his way to Delhi, Dattaji, who was coming from Deccan, met him at Rewadi (November 1758 A.D.). From Delhi, the Shinde went to Punjab and placing Sabaji Shinde at Lahor (36), they returned to Delhi (May 1759 A.D.). It seemed that the Marathas had nearly accomplished everything, and that they had really attained glory (37).

(v) The Rohilla Pathan and The Rajput Combination :

In 1759 A.D. it seemed that the Marathas had reached their goal of All-India supremacy. But they were not destined to attain it as their enemies were already active (38) against them. Madhaosing had sent Har Jasrao to Taimur Shah and through him established his contacts with Abdali in December 1759 A.D. The Shah now informed him that taking advantage of his absence in Iran, where he had led his forces, the Marathas had thrown the whole of Hindusthan into disorder and hence he was forced to turn his attention to Hindusthan. The Shah asked Madhaosing to join hands with Vijaysing and stop the passages of the Marathas towards Deccan and to keep him informed of everything. He was assured that, “Najibuddaula has impressed me of your sincerity, fidelity and devotion and God willing, you will attain pre-eminence and distinction greater than the days of preceding sovereigns of Hindusthan.”

Thus Madhaosing (39) began his active participation in the designs of Najib Khan and Abdali, for the downfall of the Marathas, and it continued throughout till the object was achieved on the fatal field of Panipat, in 1761 A.D. For that, Madhaosing was kept well informed by Abdali  and Najib Khan of all the developments during 1759 to 1761 A.D. and in return he kept the Durani fully acquainted with what was happening on his side. He was praised for his fidelity, encouraged over his successes and contantly asked to repel the Marathas from his dominion. For that he was asked to stop the ways and passages to the South, to be in close contact with Vijaysing and to cooperate fully in wiping out the traces of the Marathas from the North to prevent the possibility for them of raising their heads again. Madhaosing was equally a firm ally of Rahilla-Pathans. He sent the copy of the letter sent by him to Pant Pradhan, to the Durani Chief for his knowledge, engaged Malharrao in Jaypur territory when his help was badly needed by Dattaji in December 1760 A.D. rejected the overtures of Gaziuddin and Jankoji Shinde and also the friendly had of the Peshwa (40), and did everything to promote the Durani cause excepting the actual participation against the Marathas. The last act he did not do only because he was not sure of Abdali’s disposition (“If only his promise of safety could be relied upon, the Rajputs would certaily wait upon him” – Badrinath, son of Keshwada) when finally the plan succeeded at Panipat, Abdali himself in a long letter informed Madhaosing about his victory over the Marathas. Vijaysing also was equally in sympathy with Abdali (41).

The Marathas were ignorant of these activities till last. They realized of the conspiracy against them when Abdali dashed into Punjab driving away Sabaji Shinde from Punjab and when the latter arrieved with his wornout soldiers in Doab in 1759, November A.D. Govind Ballal wrote from Ganga in Nowad conspired for the last two years to bring Abdali once more to uproot the Maratha rule (in the North). Thus the secret correspondence continued. Vakils were active in their reciprocal visits. We had no knowledge of all this till no. we  (recently) knew of it, when everything was clear (42).

(vi) Dattaji Trapped in Doab :

After his return (43) from Punjab in May 1759 A.D., Dattaji decided to go the Bengal, post haste before the Monsoon had set in, through the territory of Shujauddaula for conquering the North-Estern provinces. As per the suggestion of Malharrao, he thought of using Najib Khan, who even though was the originator (44) of the conspiracy against the Marathas, professed to be sincere to their cause, and agreed to help in building a bridge over Ganga and to accompany him with troops to Bengal. But Najib Khan with his delaying and promising tactics completely foiled his plan. No bridge was constructed even though the were over. Thus the conspiracy against the Marathas with the help of Abdali, backed (45) by Emperor Alamgir, Malika Zamani, Madhaosing and Vijaysing, was complete as Abdali had starrted from Kandahar. The whole project was carried on in such secrecy that the Marathas had no idea of the internal correspondence carried on for two years. Finally realizing fully that he was duped by Najib Khan (46) Dattaji in rage, besieged the post of Kunjpura of Najib but he had to raise the siege to meet Abdali, who had reached Punjab by now from where he had driven the Maratha outposts (47). (December 1759 A.D.).

Malharrao Holkar (48) was deputed by the Peshwa to go to Dattaji’s help. But Madhaosing having full knowledge of these happenings on his part held Malharrao Holkar (49) in his territory Jotsing (50) Nathawat with 4 thousand horse and foot marched on Malharrao at Lakheri. In the battle that ensued, Malharrao routed the Rajputs killing 20 Kachhawa Sardars from the Nathawat, Rajawat, Shekhawat clans.

Even though (51) Malharrao knew that Madhaosing was in league with Abdali, he seems to be ignorant of their plan. His conduct in not realising the gravity of the situation and falling an easy victim to Madhaosing trap, had an effect of putting the whole brunt of the Rohilla Pathans on Dattaji alone (52).

Dattaji gave a final call to Malharrao before he left Doab to defend Delhi against Abdali. Malharrao accordingly prepared to start for his help but the Rajputs made it impossible for him to leave Jaypur territory without giving them a fight. He, at last (53) laid siege to Barwadi fort which  was ably defended by Vikramsing and other captains of Rajawat and Shekhawat clans and the Rajput-Pathan strategy to pin down Malharrao in Rajputana was fully accomplished. Dattaji, who was expecting Malharrao to reach soon for his assistance was forced to face Abdali single handedly and was killed on Barrari-Ghat (54) on 10th of January 1760 A.D. Malharrao (55) at last leaving the task unfinished started for Dattaji’s help on 1st of January 1760 A.D. But he was too late. He met the disheartened (56) and running army of the Shinde with wounded Jankoji at Kotputali on 15th of January. Delhi had fallen into the hands of Abdali. Malharrao and Jankoji then thought of facing him by guerilla tactics.

Abdali (57) now asked Madhaosing to see him personally or to send him money and force. But Madhaosing had no will to do either, as he did not believe in him. Abdali then proceeded towards Jaypur with an intention to reach Ajmer to bring pressure on the Rathod, Kachawa and Mewad Chiefs. Even though Madhaosing was his ally of whose sincerity and attachment he was fully convinced, he ransomed the small local Rajas of Kadhake and Kobari and slaughtered the inhabitants of the resisting Mahwat but spared those of Baswa as they offered ransom for their town. (Third week of February 1760 A.D.).

The Maratha guerilla campaign started on 25th of January. But they soon realized that Abdali (58) was too powerful for them. Seeing Abdali’s march towards Jaypur, they began to plunder Doab. Abdali hearing of the threatening activities of the Marathas towards Delhi, left the direction of Jaypur to save Delhi and Daob from the Maratha raids. His strong detachment under Jehan Khan, caught the plundering Maratha division unawares near Sikandarabad (59) and dispersed it with heavy slaughter on 4th of March 1760 A.D. With this, the Maratha guerilla tactics came to an end, and retreating towrds the borders of Jaypur territory they encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. Nevertheless, their activities had saved not only the Jats, but also the Rajput provinces (60).

(vii) Panipat and After-Math :

Full reports of these occurrences reached the Peshwa who sent a strong army with efficient artillery under Sadashiorao Bhau (61) to the North to recover the lost ground. With their full sympathies on the side of the Rohilla-Pathans, the Rajputs watched the combat between the two. At Panipat on 14th January 1761 A.D., the Marathas suffered (62) a terrible defeat in which they lost nearly 75 thousand men and all their fine artillery; elephants and other property fell to the victor.

The Peshwa, who had come to the North, with an intention to reinforce Bhau (63), go the terrible news of the crushing defeat, at Bhilsa on 24th January. The complete destruction of his huge and splendid army, along with his promising son, his beloved brother, and twenty Sardars of eminence including Jankoji, making thereby the debt of 50 lakhs of rupees in vain (64), plunged the Peshwa into grief. From Bajirao I, the Marathas had heard nothing but he news of success in their enterprises. This was hence a stunning blow to their prestige and power, which nearly crippled (65) his delicate body and mind. For days together he centred his hopes on the coming of Bhau and Jankoji alive from the carnage. Panipat was indeed a national calamity (66) for the Marathas.

Nevertheless, the Peshwa’s presence in Malwa for more than two months helped to re-establish Maratha prestige in Malwag, Bundelkhand (67) and Doab. But the Peshwa himself seems to have lost all hopes of retaining the territories of Bundelkhand and the North and imparted instruction to his Sardars how to retreat southwards. Even in defeat, he stood for the Hindu ideal. He wrote (68), “If it is confirmed that Bhau is no more in this world, Hindusthan (North) is lost to us. Our hopes, centred on his coming, will vanish within a fortnight. And then the force at hand will be ineffective either to face Abdali or to subdue the rebellious Chiefs of this region, not a man will remain with you. If Bhau is lost, this territory is lost. In that case, the region beyond and to the South of Gwalior should not be allowed to be occupied by the Jats and the Muslims, but should be handed over to the Hindu Chiefs of Orchha, Datiya or to the son of Khanderaya.” In the background of Rajput attitude towards the Marathas during Panipat episode, the Peshwa’s attitude is worth our attention.

(viii) Peshwa Reminds Madhaosing to Know the Meaning of the Times :

On 29th of January 1761 A.D., Abdali made a formal entry into Delhi. But he could not rest at peace till he left Delhi on 20th of March for Afganisthan. His troops openly mutinied for their pay for the last 18 months. Najib, being helpless to relieve the Shaha suggested an attack on the Jats to recover treasury. Being hard pressed Abdali forced Madhaosing for money through letters and men. As the pressure of Abdali for money grew intense, Madhaosing wrote letters to Peshwa who was at Pachhor (32 miles North of Bhilsa) to come to Bundi to give a united stand against Abdali. The Peshwa thereupon wrote to (69) Nana Purandare, then at Gwalior, and referred in it Madhaosing’s plight thus, “Abdali has sent his men to Madhaosing and asked him to repair to his presence with a cross of rupees. Hence, being frightened, he is writing to me (Peshwa) daily and has called me to Bundi, where he proposes to join me with all his Rajputs. I wrote to him to meet Bhau first at Ajmer (Peshwa believed that Bhau was at Ajmer) and bring Vijaysing with him. Bhau had given him an assurance of Ranthambhor and had asked Malharrao to forgive his misdeeds. (Still, Madhaosing had not joined the Marathas at Panipat) But, let us forget whatever had taken place. If you (Madhaosing) meet first Malharrao and Bhau, your Hindu force immediately becomes strong. Your father in those days used to be friendly and co-oprated in such occasions. But you believed in him (Abdali). Be it so. After all Rajputs are Hindus know the meaning of times. Previously when Khan Dauran and Kamruddin Khan captured Madhaogadh, they thought us to have been destroyed and driven to the Narmada. We are least afraid of Abdali. After 4 months Dada (Raghunathrao) will come to the North with 20 thousand forces, then they will come to know Maratha strength. Thus I have written.”

(ix) Death of Nanasaheb Peshwa :

Peshwa had only 10 thousand men with him and as he was striken with grief he had least energy to undertake such a venture. His hopes (70) having vanished of the safe arrival of Bhau by the first week of March and having heard that Abdali (71) had left Delhi for his country, he decided to start for Deccan. He entrusted (72) all powers to Malharrao Holkar who was at Gwalior and told him to encamp for two months at Gwalior and then at Indor. He asked him to conciliate Madhaosing (73) by promising Ranthambhor, (even though he had full knowledge of his mischief from July), keeping, an eye on the change of times. Again and again he urged him to capture Gohad. With these instructions, leaving everything to the destiny of the Hindus (74) at large, the Peshwa retraced his steps to Deccan (22nd of March) and reaching Poona about 5th of June died a broken hearted man at Parvati on 23rd of June 1761 A.D.(75). After the funeral rites were over, his son, Madhaorao, received the Peshwa’s robes from the Chhatrapati at Satara on 17th of July 1761 A.D.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1)
S.P.D. 21-101, 106, 107, S.P.D. 2-71, 'Marathi Riyasat' Vol. VI-288, Fall-

(2)
S.P.D. 27-144.

(3)
S.P.D. 21-95, 96,101, 105 and 106.

(4)
S.P.D. 21-99.

(5)
S.P.D. 21-104, 105 S.P.D. 27-'Marathi Riyasat' Vol. VI, 303,

(6)
S.P.D. 21-106.

(7)
Ibid - 107.

(8)
S.P.D. 21-100, 105, 110 and 111, 'Hingne Daftar' I-193.

(9)
'Hingne Daftar' I-195, 197, S.P.D. 27-147.

(10)
S.P.D. 21-117 and 119.

(11)
S.P.D. 27-147, S.P.D. 2-68.

(12)
S.P.D. 21-96, 100, 105.

(13)
Fall II - S.P.D. 2-72, 80, S.P.D. 27-152, 155, S.P.D. 27-107, 111 MIS Vol. I-3.

(14)
S.P.D. 27-144.

(15)
Abdali gave clear orders to his men that, "Mathura and other places are holy cities of the Hindus. It is your sacred duty to kill as many non-Muslims as you can and make heaps of their severed heads", promising that he would pay them Rs. 5 for each head. Mathura had no fortifications and fell an easy victim to the enemy's ferocious swords. Several houses were burnt down; idols in the temples were broken to pieces and trampled under feet. During the week of the spring festival of the Hindus, (5th to 12th March), the Afghans squirted the blood spray to imitate Hindu gaiety. They plundered Mathura, Brindavan and Gokul and filled the roads literally with corpses. For days together the roads were impassable. Several thousand Hindus were cut down, Jahan Khan alone being responsible for slaying three thousand Bairagis and pilgrims." 'New Hist.' II pp. 404 and 405.

(16)
Fall II - p-82.

(17)
<span style='color:red'> (a) On 18th of June 1751 A.D. a Maratha agent writes, "Malharrao has pitched his monsoon camp in the Doab. He intends to pull down the grand Musjid near Dnyanwapi of vishweshwar (built by Aurangzeb) and restore the original temple (of Kashi Vishweshwar at Kashi) and if another cruel emperor comes to the Throne, he will kill the brahmans of Kashi. Hence they are extremely terrified at such move, for they know the Muslim strength in these places. They even cannot oppose the move, as it would be a sin to oppose the renovation of the God. What the holy Ganga and the protector Vishweshwar can ordain will come true. If they begin to demolish the Masjib, the Brahmans are going to send an appeal to the Peshwa (against any such attempt of his Sardar)." - M.I.S.Vol. III-397. </span>

(b) "The object of the Marathas in all these undertaking was religious as well as political. They particularly intended to get the holy places of Prayag and Kashi back into Hindu possession." - 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 377.

(18)
'Patre Yadi' - 165, 166, 167, S.P.D. 27-114, 153, 178, 209, 240, 242; S.P.D. 2-69, S.P.D. 21-163, 'Bramhendraswami Charatra' p. 118, 'Hingne Daftar' I-17, 19, 'Ajit Lekh Sangrah' - 1035.

(19)
'Ait. Sahitya 3-262, S.P.D. 21-163. S.P.D. 2-27, S.P.D. 21-104., 107, 108, 111, 117, 118, Fall II, pp. 82 to 87

(20)
S.P.D. 2-27, S.P.D. 21-104, 107,108,111,117,118, FALL II , pp. 82 to 87

(21)
S.P.D. 27-153.

(22)
S.P.D. 21-120,121.

(23)
S.P.D. 21-152 (a)

(24)
'Jaypur Kharitas' - 3-63.

(25)
S.P.D. 21-138.

(26)
M.I.S. Vol. I-71, for the remaining money Raghunathrao had to write from Deccan. See Appendix.

(27)
S.P.D. 27-146, S.P.D. 2-71.

(28)
S.P.D. 27-194, S.P.D. 21-136.

(29)
S.P.D. 21-148, S.P.D. 2-79, 'Marathi Riyasat' Vol. VI p. 306.

(30)
S.P.D. 2-79, 84.

(31)
S.P.D. 21-162, S.P.D. 27-218.

<span style='color:red'>(32)
"The disgrace of the Muslims is a credit for the Hindus". S.P.D. 27-219.</span>

(33)
S.P.D. 27-220.

(34)
S.P.D. 2-87, S.P.D. 21-162, S.P.D. 27-221.

(35)
S.P.D. 2-96, 101, S.P.D. 27-236, 239, 'Jaypur Records Maratha Papers' - 253, 255.

(36)
'Ait. Tipane 2-41. S.P.D. 2-83, 104, 'Hingne Daftar' I-198, 199 'Jaypur Records Maratha Papers' - 107.

(37)

"God has bestowed on Maharaja, the kingdom of the world, surrounded by occeans. Such valour has never been heard of anyone among the Brahmans. The Emperor of Delhi, his Wazir and princes, due to ill luck and discord among themselves, have been ruined. Who can have a hold on the'Time' for all the time? Now, it seems, that the God intends to feed the whole world through the hands of Maharaja. Excepting the eastern territory, the Subha of Lahor up to Atak of 10 crores, has come under the possession of Mahraja. Now Multan and Kabul to the west and Bengal, Ayodhya and Prayag to the east are (only) to be acquired. Even from that many a regions are already under Maharaja's rule. What is the reason now of Yawana name at Kurukshetra, Prayag, Waranasi and Gaya? When the Maharaja is there to protect cows and Brahmans, the whole world should come under him. What remains is the work of a year only. The Sardars, having not gone to Deccan due to dearness, are in the camp. If they are ordered, the work can be taken for granted to have been accomplished (by them)." S.P.D. 21-163, also S.P.D. 2-83, 104, Hingne Daftar I-198, 199.

(38)
S.P.D. 2-106. (4) Madhaosing-Abdali negetiations and his activities, are based on Persion manuscript of a collection of letters (1759 to 1761 A.D.), from the Records of the former Jaypur State, published in the 'Pro. Of the Indian History - Congress', 8th session 1945, pp. 257 to 269, also Jaypur Draft Kharitans 5-168. (39) "In a way it may be called a contest between Hinduism and Islam, the former being represented by Marathas and the latter by one individual, Najib-ud-daulah. It was not the fault of the Marathas that the Rajputs, the Jata, and the Sikhs or even Ahirs did not join them. It was the defect of Hinduism." - Dr. Hariram Gupta in 'Preface' to 'Marathas and Panipat' , p. xiii.

(39)
  

(40)
'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 7-76.

(41)
'Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans ' - p. 48-14, 15, 16.

(42)
S.P.D. 40-126.

(43)
S.P.D. 2-104, Panipat, p. 14.

(44)
S.P.D. 21-176.

(45)
S.P.D. 27-245.

(46)
S.P.D. 21-176, S.P.D. 2-144-u

(47)
S.P.D. 2-107.

(48)
S.P.D. 21-117.

(49)
S.P.D. 2-115, 116.

(50)
S.P.D. 21-115, 177.

(51)
S.P.D. 21-116, 117, 177.

(52)
Ibid - 178, 181, 'Holkar Shahi' 1-147.

(53)
S.P.D. 21-177, 180.

(54)
Ibid - 114, S.P.D. 2-112, 114.

(55)
'Holkar Shahi' I-151, S.P.D. 21-177, 183, S.P.D. 2-13.

(56)
S.P.D. 21-181, 182, S.P.D. 2-114, 'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 7-52, 70.

(57)
S.P.D. 21-186, 187, S.P.D. 2-118.

(58)
S.P.D. 21-185, 186, 188, 'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 7-144, 8-76,

(59)
S.P.D. 2-21.

(60)
'Panipat' p 30.

(61)
'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 8-36.

(62)
'Jaypur Draft Kharitas' 7-79, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 459.

(63)
'Purandare Daftar' I-39.

(64)
Ibid - 399, 400, 403.

(65)
Ibid - 415.

(66)
Ibid - 397, 417, 425.

(67)
'Hingne Daftar' I-107, 218.

(68)
'Ait. Sankeerna Sahitya' - 25.

(69)
'Purandare Daftar' I-402.

(70)
'Purandare Daftar' I-400, 405.

(71)
Ibid - 410, 418, 'Hingne Daftar' I-205, 210.

(72)
'Purandare Daftar' I-411, 413, 416, 418, 419, 'Hingne Daftar' I-202, 205, 210.

(73)
'Purandare Daftar' I-402.

(74)
Ibid - 403. "???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????"

(75)
S.P.D. 2-147, 'Hingne Daftar' I-219.

http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/5sp.html
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
If you read these letters, it becomes clear why partition happened, to a Hindu Peshwa Baji Rao is a national hero and the Marathas were (atleast initially) a force that liberated the Hindu nation but to a Muslim (even an Indian Muslim) they are the scum of the earth, as indicated by Shah Waliullah's (an Indian Muslim) letters to Abdali asking him to invade India and destroy Marathas, Jats and Sikhs, so how can it be possible to yoke the 2 communities as a nation when our national heroes are polar opposites. This question was also raised by Lala Lajpat Rai after he made a detailed study of the Quran and Hadiths (before he used to think that Hindus and Muslims were one and an Indian nation has been created), in his zeal he even thought that history should be rewritten so as not to rake up old issues. This is mentioned in the preface of one of R.C Majumdar's bulky volumes where he says that he is pained by this white washing of history by the national leaders and mentions Lala Lajpat Rai as an example.

This is Lala Lajpat Rai before he made the study of Quran and hadiths:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Lala Lajpat Rai propagated the proposition that “the Hindus and Muslims have coalesced into an Indian people, very much the same way as the Angles, Saxons, Danes and Normans formed the English people of to-day” and that “the Muslim rule in India was not a foreign rule.”3

http://voi.org/books/tcqp/chi9.htm<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

This is the same Lala Lajpat Rai after making a study of Islamic scriptures:

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->At about the same time Lala Lajpat Rai came to the conclusion that this behaviour pattern had its primary source in the Quran and the Hadis. Lalaji wrote as follows in a confidential letter to Deshbandhu C.R. Das: “I have devoted most of my time during the last six months to the study of Muslim history and Muslim Law and I am inclined to think that Hindu-Muslim unity is neither possible nor practicable… Assuming and admitting the sincerity of the Mohammedan leaders in the Non-Co-operation Movement, I think their religion provides an effective bar to anything of the kind. There is no finer Mohammedan than Hakim [Ajmal Khan] Sahab, but can any Muslim leader override the Koran? I can only hope that my reading of the Islamic Law is incorrect and nothing would relieve me more than to be convinced that it is so… I do honestly and sincerely believe in the necessity and desirability of Hindu-Muslim unity. I am also fully prepared to trust the Muslim leaders, but what about the injunctions of the Koran and the Hadis? The leaders cannot override them.”9

http://voi.org/books/muslimsep/ch11.htm<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[quote=Bharatvarsh,May 3 2006, 04:20 AM]
[quote]Chapter 5



There is much in these accounts that smacks of fiction.

e.g


""The Maratha guerilla campaign started on 25th of January. But they soon realized that Abdali (58) was too powerful for them. Seeing Abdali’s march towards Jaypur, they began to plunder Doab. Abdali hearing of the threatening activities of the Marathas towards Delhi, left the direction of Jaypur to save Delhi and Daob from the Maratha raids. His strong detachment under Jehan Khan, caught the plundering Maratha division unawares near Sikandarabad (59) and dispersed it with heavy slaughter on 4th of March 1760 A.D. With this, the Maratha guerilla tactics came to an end, and retreating towrds the borders of Jaypur territory they encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. Nevertheless, their activities had saved not only the Jats, but also the Rajput provinces (60)""

<b>quote "" But they soon realized that Abdali (58) was too powerful for them. Seeing Abdali’s march towards Jaypur, they began to plunder Doab. ""

Why would they plunder the Doad, becaus ethey were scared of Abdalli???</b>

The Jat- Mahratta relations were in two parts

1) The Jats of then Haryana( old Agra province, Modern Haryana , East Punjab, Western U.P. were governed by a Panchayat( republic) headquartered at what is now the village of Shoron, 10 km from modern Muzzafarnagar, U.P, about 200 Km north on the Delhi- Dehradun road

They fought along with Dattaji, in this area, with their fort at Sukartal. With Abdalli’s entry, Dattaji withdrew, and was killed near Kanjpura, modern Karnal, on the Delhi Chandigarh GT road.

These relationships went back to the time of Shivaji and Guru Ramdas.


2) In the Agra, Mathura/Braj region, the situation was different. There was no love for the Mahrattas, who were simply plunderers.

This talk of them defending the Hindu religion is a bit of nonsense, for in their plunders they did not spare the Hindu ever

Sadly, The Rajput position was clear, they were supporting the Muslim, and not the Hindus whether they were Mahratta or Jat. ethey knew where their support was, and if not for Muslim support they would have wiped off from Rajastahn.


When Abdalli came into the Mathura region, only the Jats stood up to fight him, the Mahrattas ran away, and the rajputs were cowering in Jaipur, Jodhpur, in their petty estates.

Malhar Rao was not any better, he consistently supported the Muslims over the Hindu Jats.

For more information and references visit the Jathistory group , and search the archives

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/JatHistory/

History is complex and not always as taught to us...

Ravi Chaudhary

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->This talk of them defending the Hindu religion is a bit of nonsense, for in their plunders they did not spare the Hindu ever<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
They were defenders of Hindus initially, if they were not why were Hindus inviting Baji Rao to come and liberate them from Bassein which was under Portuguese occupation?, after Baji Rao was gone, the later Peshwas had no vision nor did any of the other Marathas. It was only Shivaji who had the vision and Baji Rao tried to make it into a reality but things went awry after his death and everything came crashing down at Panipat.

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE THIRD PHASE : (1766 TO 1795 A.D.)

Chapter 1
THE INEVITABLE

With the exit of the Jat power under Nawalsing, after its rout at Gowardhan (5th of April 1770 A.D.) at the hands of the Marahtas, from the politics of Delhi and with the entry of Mahadaji as Vakil-ul-Mutlak (November 1784 A.D.) subsequent to the treaty of Salbye with the English, the Maratha-Rajput relations entered into the last phase of severe contest in which both sides, disregarding that they belonged to the same religion, culture and land, fought with the determination to annihilate each other. This was the strange culmination of the relationship that started with the friendship that between Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing. But such an end though shocking was inevitable.

With his embarrassing financial needs, with the tremendous task of managing the fallen House of the Mughals with its scanty resources unequal to check the jealous enemies that surrounded him on all sides, it was natural for Machhedi in his camp, to instigate him. It was the scheme of the latter to replace Pratapsing, the ruling king of Jaypur, by Mansing, to use him as a puppet in his hands. The price for the help for such a change was 50 lakhs of rupees,  that the needy Mahadaji could hardly afford to miss. The result was Mahadaji’s invasion of Jaypur in 1786 A.D. long with the Emperor in his camp.

With the possibility of bringing Jaypur under his complete sway like Gwalior, Gohad and Khichiwada, Mahadaji started with an extravagent demand of 3 crore (1) and 40 lakhs of rupees. It clearly explains his high tone of approach and also his wrong notion of the fabulous riches of the tiny Rajput State of Jaypur. When the Jaypurians saw that Mahadaji was committed to the side of Rao Raja, who was clearly bent on the destruction of Jaypur State, to meet his selfish ends, they gathered around their king and prepared to face the aggressor till last, With this view, they adopted delying tactics to tax Maahadaji’s poor resources and patience to his complete destruction, while strengthening their side at the same time.

The Kachhwahas and the Rathods rightly felt that Mahadaji’s efforts aimed at ending the means of their livelihood and this sense of survival aroused, as if by miracle, a strength into the same State which seemed completely spent up not only to Mahadaji but to all in 1785 A.D. the same Pratapsing who was despised (2) for indulging in insane practices of dancing into women’s apartment in the garb of a woman, then marched with manly courage at the head of a host of about 50 thousand Rajputs and banished Patil Baba with his supreme dignities and De Boigne’s artillery, not only from Jaypur territory but from the politics of Delhi for a complete year, causing thereby unseen and unheard degradation of the House of Babar at the hands of Gulam Kadar. Lalsot proves onces more the eternal truth that no individual with whatsoever superior strength, is ever capable to stand the might of a united nation that has determined to face injustice at all costs.

Nothing can be said against Mahadaji as a politician and a diplomat, it he desired to bring the prostrate State of Jaypur under his control in 1786 A.D. Even Najib Khan (3) had previously desired the same thing. But without pursuing the atter to extremity, he had returned after accepting the settled dues from Jaypur. But having once brought the Emperor with him in 1786 A.D. to Jaypur to awe the Jaypurians, Mahadaji had lost the retreating ground, even though he strived hard for a rescue from the complicated affairs, wherein he saw few chances of an easy success that he had expected previously. But now the shrewd Rajputs realizing his difficulties, dragged him on and thoroughly crippled him at Lalsot in 1787 A.D. Lack of valour was not the cause of Mahadaji’s ruin which was mainly caused by the loss of resources. This dishonour of Mahadaji at Lalsot made the final subjugation of the Rajputs at Patan and Medta inevitable on his part.

But however Mahadaji as a politician was justified to invade Jaypur in 1786-87 A.D., he can  not escape blame from one point of view. He was a prominent Sardar of the Peshwa and the Vakil-ul-Mutlak of the Emperor. But his Rajput policy, that was rash at the outset and lacked moderation completely, had neither the sanction of the Peshwa (4) nor any approval of the Emperor (5). By his shortsighted policy towards Jaypur he was neither serving the Peshwa nor the Emperor, but his own designs at the instigation of Rao Raja. There is not a single instance where any Peshwa has hinted to extinguish any Rajput State. What the Peshwa ever expected from his Sardars was ‘Sardari’ i.e. tactful menagement of the affairs without deep involvement, always keeping an eye on the profit and nothing more. Even, Holkars never meant to extinguish any Rajput State and hence with their sober out look they were comparatively more popular with the Rajputs in comparison with the Shindes. Mahadaji’s policy, without any sanction or any possibility of immediate support from Deccan and with his unreliable Northern forces, had little chance of success in 1786-87 A.D. A severe chastisement at Lalsot at the hands of the same Rajputs whom he had despised in 1785-86 A.D. for their weakness, was the inevitable culmination of his hasty action.

Vijaysing was still on the throne of the Jodhpur in 1785 A.D. and utilized the same policy adopted by him in the pre-Panipat days. He called Taimur Sah on promise of 20 lakhs of rupees for his help against Mahadaji and tried to create a confederation wherein the Mughalias figured prominently under Ismail Beg. The battles of Patan and Medta were fought in 1790 A.D. for the same reason of opposing the Maratha supremacy at Delhi, for which Najib Khan forming a grand opposition had been the cause of the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761 A.D. It does not mean that the Rajputs were not religious minded, But it only stresses the point that when politics comes to forefront, religion plays but an insignificant part.

The Rajputs faced the Marathas at Patan and Medta in 1790 A.D. apparently to reject to territorial demands of the Marathas but in fact there was a deeper meaning to their opposition. It was a challenge to the Maratha supremacy at Delhi as like the Mughalias they felt their political existence threatened by the firm establishment of the Maratha rule at Delhi. The Rajputs who regarded themselves to the pillars of the North, looked with envy, at the predominance of the Marathas over them. It was not the real fact that they regarded Tukoji or Ali Bahadur as more favourable to them, but it was the fact that they dreaded the perfect dominance of Mahadaji as compared to the rest of the Maratha Sardars. Mahadaji on his part was following the same policy of Maratha expansion that Bajirao had pursued some 40 years before him. Bajirao’s march on Delhi in 1737 A.D. was made a reality by making the  Emperor his prisoner by Mahadaji. By way of forced association, the Rajputs, though reluctantly, had adjusted themselves in the role of the mansabdars of the Mughals, but when the Deccani Marathas began to play the role of the masters by substituting the Mughals, the Rajputs ego was hurt. In their heart of hearts, they had not forgotten for the past five centuries that they had been once the masters of the North before the coming of the Turks. This Rajput pride was fully exhibited in the attitude, deeds and utterances of Vijaysing and retention of Ajmer became the symbol of his pride. For Ajmer he did every thing that was possible for him. Jayappa was done away with his life for Ajmer and had Mahadaji been less cautious, he would have also followed the same path. In a way, the struggle that continued from Lalsot and seemed to end at Medta was all for Ajmer. Rajputs with Vijaysing at their back would have never acknowledged a willing subordination to the Marathas, unless Mahadaji had crushed their pride. And from this point of view also the battle of Patan and Medta were inevitable.

Patan and Medta were soon  followed by Lakheri (1793 A.D.). This time it was the two Sardars of the Marathas that were bent on destroying each other. But in fact it was Mahadaji who wanted to remove the obstacle of the Holkars from his path to predominance. Dominance demands submission and after the submission of the Rajputs, Tukoji’s pride and interference could not be tolerated by Mahadaji for a long time. Lakheri was the result of the past injuries of some 50 years back that were nourished in the bosoms by both the parties. Holkars being equal in position to Mahadaji, insisted scrupulously to have their say in framing the Maratha policies and especially the Rajput ones in the North. And being inferior in strength as compared to Mahadaji, they felt most acutely the disegard they met with, on the part of Mahadaji and his Sardars. They had in their memory the past practices when Malharrao shared the far inferior after Panipat in strength to the formers. But Mahadaji had little patience to tolerate one whom he thought to be nothing but a hindrance to his policies. With the same force that crushed the Rajputs, he silenced Tukoji who fled to Indore burning with a wrath of a powerless person. The Holkars suffered the penalty of mismanagement for a long time resulting into lethargy and thereby causing them to lag far behind their superior colleague who utilized Holkar’s incompetence to further his own advancement in the North. The Holkars tried to avoid the impending blow for a long time by pleading their case at Poona but in vain ! In the long run they had to face the inevitable. Lakheri proves that politics is not always the game of justice but it is one of strength and power. With their complete collapse at Lakheri the Holkars, learnt this lesson by heart and after 9 years under Yashwantrao, preparing themselves thoroughly, charged the Shindes at Hadapsar near Poona in 1802 A.D., with a desperate courage and repeated the same performance which Mahadaji had enacted at Lakheri. But that had a disastrous effect not only on the Shindes, but on the whole Maratha power. What was sown at Lakheri in Jaypur territory in 1793 A.D. bore sufficiently ill fruits to destroy the Maratha Empire in the long run. In a way it was also inevitable.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1)
Dil, Raj. I-163.

(2)
M.D. I-19, 'Mar, Riyasat (U.V. Vol. II), p. 115, 'New Hist. Vol. III, p. 151.

(3)
'Jaypur Draft Kharitas 15-11, 25, 97, 104, 106, 107, 180, 16-21, 22, 71, 81, 135, 150, 151, see 'Appendix'.

(4)
'Hist. Papers' - 509.

(5)
25th July 1787. Mahadaji's generals received Emperor's letters urging them to "persuade Patil Bahadur" to make peace with the Rajputs, who were "old Khanazads" - 'Shinde Regent of Delhi', p. 8.

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