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India and US - III - Guest - 04-20-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>India-US: Wrong assumptions? </b>
S Raghotam | April 20, 2006 | 17:32 IST
Ever since the March 2005 visit of Condoleeza Rice to New Delhi when she announced that the US wanted to make India a global power, strategic analysts around the world have been wondering what India's reaction would be and what kind of a worldview it would be based on.
The several agreements India and the US have signed since then and President Bush's visit to India earlier this month have answered the first question: India has gratefully clutched at the US straw.

But it remains a mystery as to what assumptions regarding the big questions of global strategic order underlie India's unrestrained cosying up to the US embrace.

K Subrahmanyam's article Nuclear Deal: Boon for India, US, World offers a view into the thinking at the highest levels of the Indian government. Subrahmanyam chairs the Prime Minister's Task Force on Global Strategic Developments and is a key proponent of the recent nuclear deal.

Written primarily to critique those criticising the India-US nuclear deal, the article nonetheless offers upfront the several assumptions that Mr Subrahmanyam, and the Manmohan Singh government, seem to have made on themes far larger than the nuclear deal itself.

Unfortunately, many of these assumptions are not original Indian perspectives but those gleaned from Condoleeza Rice's public pronouncements of the US view and preferences of the global strategic order.

But regardless of the source of those ideas, it is necessary to examine whether they hold good from an Indian perspective and whether they should be the assumptions on which India seeks to build its strategic partnership with the US.

<b>Assumption 1:</b> The Cold War is over. The world is no longer bipolar but a balance of power among six powers.

But who are these six balancers? and who are they balancing against? It is not explicit in the proposition, but it is implied that the world has transited from the Cold War bipolar system through a period of US preponderance to a classical balance of power system in which the greatest power ? the US ? is being balanced by the other five powers, presumably China, Russia, the European Union, Japan and India.

If this proposition were true, India can build its relations with the US without agonising anymore over the fact of US preponderance, without agonising over whether India is inadvertently fuelling the rise of an imperium, and in the hope that it could build equally good relations with the other major powers and thus temper American power. But is the proposition true?

Let's examine the six assumed balancers, one by one and then by any partnerships or alliances they may have formed for the purpose of balancing.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has generally been acknowledged as the world's lone superpower. The French call it a 'hyperpower'. It has a nearly $13 trillion economy that is still growing at close to 4%. In dollar terms, just the New York metropolitan area produces nearly as much as the GDP of the whole of India.

The US has the most technologically advanced nuclear forces which are being continually upgraded. It will soon come to have numerical superiority as well in important categories over the rival nuclear forces of Russia.

Indeed, according to an article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, the US is close to achieving a first-strike capability against Russian nuclear forces.

Spending nearly $400 billion ? more than the combined military spending of the next 14 top military budgets or close to 50% of the military spending of the entire world -- the US' conventional military is the most advanced and most 'ready' fighting force. It is now in the process of a military transformation that, if successful, will put it into quite a different orbit than the other powers.

With its vast and advanced carrier task forces operating in every sea of the world, with the global reach of its air force, with major and minor military bases spread across the world, and with its military space assets, the US exercises command over the global commons ? land, air, water and space.

With the dollar as the global reserve currency and with American-led international financial institutions, instruments and trading arrangements, the US also has command of the global economy.

America also remains the most innovative ? in technology, in finance, in diplomacy and in military and strategic thinking. It continues to be the greatest magnet for talent and brainpower from around the world. European, Russian, Chinese, Japanese and especially Indian scientists, engineers, economists and managers go away to the US and help increase its economic and technological power.

Finally, the US is pre-eminent in the ability to convert every other form of power ? economic, technological, institutional, moral ? into military and diplomatic power.

Any major power or combination of powers that wishes to balance American power will need to be able to compete with the American command of the global commons, its nuclear superiority now approaching primacy, its immense economic power, its unmatched ability to attract brainpower and innovate and its ability to convert all other forms of power into strategic power.

Is Russia a balancer against US power? The rump state of the former Soviet Union continues to feature in American strategic imagination raising fears of an economic and military revival and renewed threat to the US.

American policy has therefore continued its Cold War-era quest: to diminish the one factor of continued Russian great power status ? its vast nuclear arsenal and its ability both to conduct strategic nuclear diplomacy vis-à­¶is the US as well as proliferation-impacting policy with states such as China, Iran and India.

Through a combination of cleverly negotiated Cold War-era arms limitation pacts, post-Cold War-era 'co-operative threat reduction' programmes such as Nunn-Lugar, and by drawing Russia into US-led nuclear non-proliferation regimes and cartels such as the NSG and MTCR with economic and technological inducements, the US has managed to greatly diminish Russia's ability to conduct nuclear strategic policy and diplomacy in the foreseeable future.

<b>The US gives hundreds of millions of dollars each year to Russia to implement the arms reduction agreements, technologically assists in the dismantling of Russian nuclear and missile arsenals, and physically carts away dismantled nuclear material for safeguarding, which Russia seems incapable of doing on its own</b>.

Russia's own continued economic problems have forced it to cut down on its nuclear arsenal far more than stipulated under the arms control agreements. With a military budget just a fifth of what the US spends -- much of which is spent to reform a monumentally inept conventional military force ? all arms of Russia's nuclear triad have declined and degraded.

According to the Foreign Affairs article, ''Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days?What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use''.

Russia's strategic bombers and mobile land-based ICBMs rarely patrol, sit in de-alerted postures and are vulnerable to a surprise US attack.

The Russian submarine force is so rusty that several tests of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 2004 and 2005 all failed: some failed to launch, others veered off-course.

Worse still, plans announced by Moscow to further reduce its land-based ICBMs will leave it with possibly as few as 150 ICBMs by 2010, down from the 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. Even most of these will be old missiles whose life has been extended beyond the original date. Plans to replace them with new missiles have been plagued by failed tests and low production rates.

As the Foreign Affairs article notes: ''The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the United States to carry out a first strike''.

Russia's economy is in a shambles, dominated as it is by oligarchs and mafias. The oil sector, which could potentially catapult Russia's economy, suffers from lack of technology and capital. Russia is forced to look to the West for these.

Even help from the West may not help Russia emerge from its spectre. It is faced with declining demographics. A rapidly falling birth rate is compounded by rapidly falling life expectancy. Russia's population is expected to decline from around 140 million today to about 100 million by 2050. Crucially, Russian men now live only 58 years on average and their life expectancy continues to fall by the year.

As its leaders struggle to come to terms with democracy and free market economics, as the population declines, as its dependence on the West continues and as the US and NATO expand all around it, Russia is in no position to balance against the United States.

Next: Could the EU and Japan Balance American Power?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
URL for this article:
http://www.rediff.com//news/2006/apr/20guest.htm
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India and US - III - Guest - 04-26-2006

<b>Why's the Jewish lobby thwarting the nuke deal</b>?<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Israel is trying to weaken Iran as much as it can economically before a war of words becomes a war of weapons. Isolating Iran on the issue of the gas pipeline to India is part of the wider strategy. The United States can dictate policy to a client-State like Pakistan, but handling India is tougher. <b>(Although rumours were swirling around Delhi at the time of the last Cabinet shuffle that Mani Shankar Aiyer had been kicked out of the petroleum ministry because the Americans thought he was going overboard in pressing for the gas pipeline from Iran.)</b>

American politicians may not understand all the finer nuances of international relations but they understand their own voters quite as well as Mulayam Singh Yadav understands his. The Jews account for more votes -- and are far better organised -- than Indians in the United States. Elections are due in just over seven months. If the Jewish lobby wants to put pressure on India to be a little less friendly with Iran, then American Representatives and Senators will oblige. But the Jewish lobby will happily reverse itself if India and Israel come closer together, since there is no underlying fear of India.

The mood in Washington seemed to be that the American Senate might still, on balance, give its nod to the nuclear pact with India. But nobody was willing to say how long the process might take. Letting foreign policy play second fiddle to domestic politics may not be the best way to conduct diplomacy. But the compulsions of vote-seeking should be familiar to all of us in India. After all, how many politicians ventured to criticise Mulayam Singh Yadav when he made a play for Muslim votes over the Iran issue?
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd--> <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->


India and US - III - Guest - 05-11-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->[PDF] I The Evolution of US-Indian TiesFile Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat[PDF] I The Evolution of US-Indian TiesFile Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
Ashley J. Tellis is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International ... to India’s interest in missile defense, see Kaushal Vepa, “India and ...
www.mitpressjournals.org/ doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.113 - Similar pages
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Apparently the great ashley tellis himself noticed my paper and remarked on it.
does anybody know how to get a free copy without paying 10$. Mine has been posted in IF frrontpage


India and US - III - Guest - 05-11-2006

<!--emo&:thumbsup--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/thumbup.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='thumbup.gif' /><!--endemo--> Kaushal


India and US - III - Guest - 05-11-2006

Congrats Kaushal!! <!--emo&:clapping--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/clap.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='clap.gif' /><!--endemo-->
Your article he had refered What's in a name; India and the Indian Identity


I will check local library. People around Boston can do same.


India and US - III - acharya - 05-15-2006

Monday, May 15, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

‘Keep foreigners out’: How the policy puts US on losing end

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: “Today, the xenophobes and the protectionists have taken over. In the aftermath of 9/11, with the same analytic sophistication that identified WMDs as a great threat, Congress slashed the number of H1-B visas from more than 200,000 a year to 65,000. American businesses consumed all of the available visas two months before the beginning of this fiscal year,” an opinion piece published in the Chicago Sun-Times on Sunday read.

The piece by Matin H Singer recalls that the United States used to welcome workers with special skills. H1-B visas that permitted highly trained foreign workers to fill engineering and computer science positions used to be issued easily and J-1 visas allowed architectural and other firms to bring over interns on exchange programmes. “It was a no-cost import. It was as if other countries were willingly filling up our strategic oil reserves. Scientists, who someone else paid to educate and train, were clamouring to work and settle in our country and help our companies compete in a global marketplace,” he adds.

Singer writes that on one side of the “congressional aisle,” it is declared that Americans must know the whereabouts of all foreigners. Such congressional leaders ignore the requirement of H1-B visa holders to work for a sponsoring firm, but on the other side of the aisle, it is said that immigrants take “American” jobs. “No one has ever offered one iota of credible evidence that US graduates with engineering, software or other degrees have lost jobs to H1-B visa holders,” he points out. According to him, there is evidence today that the xenophobic climate in the United States, coupled with improved opportunity in their county of origin, have motivated some technologists to leave the United States and go home. Other English-speaking countries, such as Australia and South Africa, have established stronger engineering programmes at their universities so that they can train and keep the students that used to welcome to America.

Singer argues that as the US government increases its hostility to foreigners and denies American businesses access to necessary resources, technology companies exercise the other option before them, namely outsourcing. He writes, “The politicians who puff up their chests and represent themselves as protectors of the American worker are doing nothing more than accelerating the tsunami of jobs going overseas. The panderers, who would use 9/11 to advance an anti-foreigner agenda in the name of national security, make us less secure by stripping the United States of valuable human resources. Have they forgotten the role of foreign-born scientists in our development of defence technologies? Would they have sent Albert Einstein back home? Not allowed Andy Grove to stay and build Intel? We should be talking about solutions. We should address the crisis of US competitiveness at home and abroad.”

Singer recommends that the US should staple a green card to every foreign-born student who completes a college-level programme in engineering. “We want those human resources to stay in this country, help us build and support our businesses and raise families,” he concludes.


India and US - III - Guest - 06-10-2006

<!--emo&:argue--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/argue.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='argue.gif' /><!--endemo--> Must India have and act on a Monroe Doctrine of its own? Or must the country go for a modified version of the doctrine? Far from academic is the debate on these questions that Indian foreign policy and security experts of a certain description have set in motion. The debate can portend a danger that merits note by the peace-preferring majority in the region.

The questions are a natural corollary to recent developments seen as the dawn of an India-US "strategic partnership." The developments - including a US-India nuclear deal and President George Bush's mission to India that promised even more in a common cause of "democracy" - have raised hopes here of a greater regional role for the leading and largest country of South Asia. The debaters are, in fact, discussing a role for India that is remarkably similar to the one that its strategic partner seeks to arrogate for itself in the international arena.

The Monroe Doctrine, propounded by US President James Monroe in 1823, demanded a discontinuation of all efforts by European powers to colonize the Americas and offered US non-intervention in European affairs in return. The avowedly anti-colonial doctrine then rapidly degenerated into one for an especially US form of colonialism. Bush, as we know, has carried this neo-colonialism far beyond the USA's own backyard.

India's variant of the document, as peddled by its votaries, gives the country the right of interference and intervention, including the military kind, in the internal affairs of its immediate neighbors. The "strategic partnership," according to them, reinforces this right.

There have been two major instances of such intervention in the past. The first was India's all-important role in the Bangladesh war of 1971, which created a new state that has not become a staunch ally of the country. The second was the intervention in Sri Lanka by an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in the 80s, which proved a costly mis-adventure and led (according to the official version) to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The experience has served to keep India away from military embroilment in neighbors' affairs ever since.

There are two instances, again, where pundits of the "strategic partnership" camp would like India to intervene now - effectively, if not militarily, in the immediate context. It is Nepal, where the masses have just overthrown a hated monarchy, to which these experts want India to turn its attention first. They see an opportunity in the current visit to India of new Nepal prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala for four-day talks on cooperation in many fields, especially the economic.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government is under considerable pressure from these quarters to try to conclude an India-Nepal Treaty to replace the pact of 1950, which has no popular support in the Himalayan nation all these years. The counsel for a revised treaty, "more representative of the times we live in" as one of these experts puts it, is being proffered and pressed despite the clear mandate to Koirala against signing any new treaty now from two major political blocs in Nepal - the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) in power in Kathmandu and the Maoists, whom the SPA seeks to bring into the political mainstream.

Along with the treaty, the experts are also selling the idea of pro-active New Delhi moves to tame the Maoists. The subject deserves separate treatment at the end of the Koirala mission, but it is already clear that the Indian government will be increasingly under pressure to participate in Nepal's ceasefire process, possibly under the auspices of the United Nations (with the Maoists willing to accept UN monitoring of the process). Such participation by India, obviously, can come perilously close to military intervention.

Sri Lanka, according to the same experts, provides the second opportunity for India to spread its wings under the "strategic partnership." With the "peace process" between Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) breaking down and armed conflict rocking the island nation again, they argue, it is time for New Delhi to think of options other than a defense pact with the Sri Lankan regime under President Mahinda Rajapakse. This subject, too, merits a separate discussion, but the main point of the security think-tank is that the Singh regime should not let embarrassing memories of the 80s stop it from intervening.

Says C. Raja Mohan, an eminent member of this elite club of experts: "India staying aloof from the peace process in Sri Lanka has not helped in any way. India now needs to prepare itself for a more direct role as well as build an international coalition to raise the pressure on both parties to see reason." This course is commended all the more for the failure of Norway as a mediator in the conflict.

The experts, ably aided by editorial writers, insist upon the international dimension also as an inevitable corollary to the newfound "strategic partnership." The support of Washington and its Western allies for an enlarged regional role for India, it is argued, makes eminently possible the country's intervention in its neighborhood as part of a multilateral initiative. This indeed will be the "smart intervention," as some put it.

Bangladesh may not figure as a case for immediate or early intervention in the campaign, but the far right in India has long projected the country's eastern, Islamic neighbor as a source of "demographic invasion." Not surprisingly, the fervently patriotic calls for India to adopt an interventionist role in its proximity raise fears in the nation born of an Indian military intervention over three decades ago. And it is a Bangladeshi critic who has brought out best a striking similarity between the Bush doctrine and the interventionism that the Indian experts advocate.

Writing in Dhaka's Daily Star two years ago, when a Maoist blockade of Kathmandu led to calls for India's intervention in Nepal, former Bangladeshi general Shahedul Anam Khan said that these were based "on the now commonly touted rationale of President Bush: the principle of preemption. If India's interest is threatened, and its predominance in South Asia diluted, it would do well not to stick to soft options only but go for the more direct (and the more dangerous) option" The similarity between the two doctrines has only become more striking.

Advocates of a modified version of the Monroe Doctrine for India, modified to provide for multilateral interventionism, ignore a major fact of history. The doctrine may have let the US stay insular for a long period, but India will be denied such a luxury under the "strategic partnership." Can India hope to play the regional role the campaigners envisage without becoming a camp-follower in the Bush crusades elsewhere?
Disclaimer: sorry to state that I don't have link or source for either this article or earlier article posted in Cong undemocratic ideology.


India and US - III - Guest - 06-13-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->India, U.S.: Washington Grooms New Delhi
June 07, 2006 20 26 GMT

Summary

India's June 6 announcement that it will test-fire its Agni-III
missile sometime in August came just a day after U.S. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace said such a firing would not
affect the pending U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal. Pace also
indicated that the United States would like India to assume a much
greater role in patrolling the Strait of Malacca. Pace's four-day
visit to New Delhi and his comments have a geopolitical undercurrent:
The United States is developing India into a junior partner in the
Indian Ocean region.

Analysis

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace wrapped up
his four-day visit to India on June 7. Pace indicated June 5 that
Washington would accept India's test-firing of the Agni-III missile;
the next day, New Delhi announced that the test-firing would take
place in August. Pace also said the United States looks forward to
India assuming greater responsibility in patrolling the Strait of
Malacca.

Pace's trip to India marks the first time the highest-ranking U.S.
military commander visited since Washington and New Delhi signed a
10-year defense cooperation agreement in 2005. That agreement set in
motion negotiations of a U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal that
involved the United States giving significant help in India's
development of a nuclear power infrastructure in exchange for India's
putting some restrictions on its military nuclear program. The nuclear
deal has been stalled in the U.S. Congress; U.S. President George W.
Bush has found it increasingly difficult to push his international
agenda forward because of his precipitous decline in popularity in
opinion polls. India knows that Bush has faced much opposition to the
nuclear deal, and so put off testing its Agni-III missile for fear of
further endangering the agreement. This is why India did not respond
in kind, as it typically does, when Pakistan tested a missile -- the
ShaheenII/HatfVI ballistic missile -- May 7.

Pace's June 5 announcement that Washington would not see the missile
test as a nuclear-proliferation concern changed New Delhi's reasoning.
India, realizing that the United States likely would not approve the
civilian nuclear deal until at least autumn, was happy to get the
go-ahead from at least the U.S. executive branch.

India's attention to -- and desire for -- U.S. approval suggests that
India is playing its role in the development of a strategic
partnership between Washington and New Delhi. The relationship is a
potentially deep one: the United States will provide India with
nuclear technology, development capital, and military hardware and
training; in return, India will help safeguard U.S. interests in the
Indian Ocean region. The partnership could also powerfully demonstrate
to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that the United States
would not act to block a resurgent India from attacking Pakistan (not
that such a scenario is likely) and also help take New Delhi out of
Iran's orbit.

A formal alliance it is not; India does not want to be seen as being
anti-Moscow or anti-Beijing, even as it develops stronger ties with
the United States. Geopolitically, China and India have been off of
each other's radar screens (despite a piddling border skirmish in
1962), as they are geographically sealed from each other by the
natural wall of the Himalayas and jungle.

India wants to continue to buy arms from Russia, such as parts for the
MiG-29Ks that will be flying off the deck of the INS Vikramaditya
aircraft carrier, which is to be handed over after a Russian refit in
2008. New Delhi wants the United States to continue to train the
pilots of those MiGs for carrier operations. The United States has
also agreed in principle to sell India an Austin-class Landing
Platform Dock, the USS Trenton, significantly enhancing New Delhi's
maritime power-projection capabilities.

In return, Washington would like India to do exactly what it wants to
anyway: shoulder responsibility and become a powerhouse in the Indian
Ocean, second only to the U.S. Navy. The United States hopes that an
India more involved in the Malacca Strait and with an improved navy
will make China nervous. As Malacca is a chokepoint for Chinese trade
and energy supplies, the naval frontier is essentially the only
potential conflict point between New Delhi and Beijing, which
otherwise are for all intents and purposes a continent away from one
another.

Pace's visit merely formalized what has already been occurring: a
coming together of Indian and American interests in a confederation of
convenience. Washington would like New Delhi to break out of its shell
and exert enough influence in the region to at least annoy China and a
recalcitrant Pakistan. India would like to get whatever it can from
its latest patron, the United States, in order to help alleviate its
massive infrastructure problems, which are preventing India from
becoming a major world power.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/r...e.php?id=267303
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India and US - III - acharya - 06-13-2006

Guest Opinion/Commentary*
http://americandaily.com/article/14033

The United States & India: Rocky Waters Ahead?
By Matthew A. Roberts (06/13/2006)

In the past two years, many pundits have pondered the future prospects of Indian-American relations. Are ties really so tight? Is India a threat?

In the economic realm, to many Americans, India certainly remains a menace. Western countries are unable to compete with India's slave-labor market, and India has captured countless American jobs through ominous outsourcing. First-world countries simply cannot compete with India, which is why some economists – even Republican free-trade enthusiasts – have suggested that America should buoy more trade barriers.

But the threat does not stop here. We know that India has at least 65 active nuclear warheads, of which the delivery systems differ. Some have short-range capacity, aimed at Pakistan, but India has engaged in research to develop ICBMs. The production of nuclear weapons persists today and, even under Rice's plans, India still develops nuclear weapons vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. There also are grave concerns that India has shared or will share nuclear technology with Iran.
<b>
What remains deeply disturbing about India increasing its nuclear weapons is its instability. Terrorists, bombings, assassinations, potential secessions, and violent struggles persistently plague the Indian Government – so often that incidents rarely make the international news. <span style='color:blue'>Given the constant chaos, it is likely that nuclear weapons will someday fall into unfriendly hands.</span></b>

At least 14 percent of India is Muslim, making its Muslim population at least 140 million, and growing. The Hindu religion rarely converts people, and Hindus have smaller families. The Muslims, however, with their large families, are actively converting much of the countryside. <span style='color:red'>At the present conversion and growth rates, some have concluded that by the year 2050 the majority of Indians will be Muslim, at which time you will have a Muslim state with a massive nuclear arsenal. In the meantime, much strife will endure between Hindus and Muslims, making many areas of the country perennially unstable.</span>

Muslim terrorists, however, are not alone. Incidents of Hindu terrorism, even against Christians, have also risen. As reported recently by Agape Press (March 14,2006), Hindu terrorists in the state of Rajasthan, in some cases supported by the local police, have attacked Christian missionaries who work at local charities and orphanages. And as evidenced by the recent protests, anti-Western sentiment still persists in India among the Hindu population.

Another problem confronting India is the fact that the Indian Government blatantly lies about its HIV infection rate. International organizations and public health experts vehemently dispute the Government's "official statistics" downplaying the HIV epidemic. In reality, health experts argue, India has surpassed South Africa with the most HIV infections in the world, with infections spreading at epidemic rates. The reason India lies about these figures, more than likely, is to maintain a pro-business posture. <span style='color:red'>But many Western countries recognize the reality, and have begun to restrict travel and visas from India, due to the recent infections.</span>

In short, India is reliably unstable, and an unstable country is an unreliable ally. There has been much unjustified hype about prospect American-Indian relations. But the more analysts look at India, the more perilous it appears, and the future of friendly American-Indian relations seems fickle at best. Americans should tread with great trepidation.


Matthew A. Roberts is a freelance columnist whose articles have appeared in dozens of publications. He also co-edits a weblog at: http://www.conservatoroccidentalis.com/





India and US - III - Bharatvarsh - 06-13-2006

I also see the American gov't hand in 9/11.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Clinton’s carnage claim
- Ex-President sees ‘Hindu militants’ behind massacre 
CHARU SUDAN KASTURI

New Delhi, June 5: Former President Bill Clinton has blamed Hindu militants for the Chattisinghpora massacre in March 2000 in his introduction to former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright’s new book.

In the introduction to Albright’s book, The Mighty and the Almighty — Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs, Clinton writes: “During my visit to India in 2000, some Hindu militants decided to vent their outrage by murdering 38 Sikhs in cold blood.”

The March 20 violence, one of the worst communal massacres in Jammu and Kashmir, took place on the eve of Clinton’s state visit to India.

The book, published by Harper Collins US Publishers, was released last week in Washington and is to be released in India by the end of this month.

Clinton, however, does not give reasons in the introduction as to why he believes “Hindu militants” had carried out the attack.

He also links the massacre to his visit, saying: “If I hadn’t made the trip, the victims would probably still be alive.”

“If I hadn’t made the trip because I feared what militants might do, I couldn’t have done my job as the President of the United States,” he adds.

Earlier, too, Clinton has spoken about the Chattisinghpora massacre as “heartbreaking”.

At a function in Atlanta, Georgia, on April 14, 2000, Clinton had reportedly said: “The most heartbreaking thing that happened on my trip to the Indian subcontinent is that about 40 Sikhs were murdered in Kashmir.”

Security forces had initially held Pakistan-based terrorists responsible for the incident and had killed five alleged terrorists. But local villagers had said the five were innocent civilians, forcing the state government to order a probe.

The bodies were exhumed and DNA tests were conducted on them in Calcutta and Hyderabad by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory.

It was later alleged that the DNA samples were fudged by Jammu and Kashmir police.

After the Mufti Mohammed Sayeed government came to power in Kashmir in 2002, it set up a three-member ministerial team to investigate these allegations.

On July 22, 2003, three police officers and two doctors were arrested after being found guilty by the committee.

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060606/asp/...ory_6316224.asp<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - Guest - 06-14-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In the introduction to Albright’s book, The Mighty and the Almighty — Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs, Clinton writes: “During my visit to India in 2000, some Hindu militants decided to vent their outrage by murdering 38 Sikhs in cold blood.”

<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Must be before Bill & Hillary Clinton moved into New York. New York Times had covered an article where the LeT scum from across the border in TSP had confessed to this crime.
NY Times article

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->To their relief, however, another militant had recently been captured, someone, they said, who truly had partaken in the massacre -- someone who had even fired shots. His name was Mohammad Suhail Malik.

"Would you like to talk to him?" I was asked.

ddly enough, I had already interviewed the new prisoner. This had happened unexpectedly. On the return drive from Chittisinghpora, the Sikh businessman spotted a friend, another prominent Sikh, in a car going the other way. The vehicles stopped, and the two men went off for a private chat. This friend, using his influence, had just met Suhail Malik, who, so far as he could tell, was rendering an authentic confession. He agreed to help us get into the small compound that served as the Indian interrogation center.

Malik is an 18-year-old with an upstart beard and hair that falls down into his eyes. He appeared somber and tired, a suitable look for someone in his predicament. I twice offered him a chair, but he refused, preferring the floor. A heavy chain sagged between the tight manacles on his wrists. He barely moved.

Conditions for the interview were far from ideal. There were six of us in a small, dark room, including a nervous guard who felt the liaison lacked adequate approval. A display on one wall carried horrid snapshots of dead militants. Malik responded to every question, but his answers were spare, repeating details I had already read in a police dossier in Srinagar: he was from the city of Sialkot, in Pakistan. He belonged to the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which had tutored him in marksmanship and mountain climbing. He sneaked into India in October 1999, carrying the rupee equivalent of $200 in expense money. He took part in only two missions before Chittisinghpora, one an attack on an army outpost, the other an assault on a bus carrying soldiers. He knew nothing about the plot to kill the Sikhs until immediately beforehand, as he stood in an orchard. He used his weapon when commanded. "I fired, but I don't know if I killed anyone," he said laconically. "I suppose I did. I don't know."

The conversation was mostly in Urdu, once again a language I did not speak. I could study his eyes but not his phrasing or inflections, the little clues as to what was being held back in the privacy of his head. When we left, I asked Surinder Oberoi, my journalist friend, if he thought Malik was telling the truth.

"Yes, I think so," he answered after a pause. Then he added a cautionary shrug and a sentence that stopped after the words "But you know. . . . "

Malik showed no signs of physical abuse, but, as with Wagay, the torture of someone in his situation would not be unusual. Once, over a casual lunch, an Indian intelligence official told me that Malik had been "intensively interrogated." I asked him what that usually meant. "You start with beatings, and from there it can go almost anywhere," he said. Certainly, I knew what most Pakistanis would say of the confession -- that the teenager would admit to anything after persistent electrical prodding by the Indians. And it left me to surmise that if his interrogators had made productive use of pain, was it to get him to reveal the truth or to repeat their lies?

My second talk with Malik came the next day, courtesy of the more formal invitation. This session was less hurried but still unsatisfactory. Three of us were asking questions, including someone from the authorities. The prisoner, chains in tow, still refused a chair. I told him again that I was an American journalist trying to get at the facts. I could only imagine how far-fetched that sounded to an 18-year-old Pakistani in an Indian jail.

I asked about his family. His mother was dead, and his father ran a small general store. Malik had attended a government school through the fifth grade, but like many boys in Pakistan, he had switched over to a madrassah, a religious academy, where the books and courses were free. He knew parts of the Koran by heart. "If I could, I would spend my entire life learning about the holy prophet," he said.

We again went over the details of the massacre. I tried to test him, asking for descriptions of the village. But he said he had not seen much in the darkness. He had been ordered to shoot -- and so he shot. He did not have much more to add. "We were told what to do and not why," he said. "Afterward, we were told not to talk about it."

He allowed that he was likely to spend the rest of his life in an Indian prison -- and yes, he said, this was a dreary prospect. He would have preferred the glory of martyrdom.

His eyes, usually downcast, had occasionally drifted about, and with this talk of a purposeful death, all of us in the room grew aware of a loaded Kalashnikov leaning against a wall in the corner. With a flicker of a smile, the gun's careless owner slowly rolled the wheels of his chair to the right, blocking the manacled prisoner's path to the weapon. Malik never looked that way again.

I was curious to know how he had linked up with Lashkar-e-Taiba. It was one of the largest -- and perhaps the most unflinching -- of the dozen or so militant groups. Malik said he had heard their speeches while he studied in the city of Lahore. He trusted their vision of the world -- and said he trusted it still. Penance did not accompany his confession. As for the 35 dead Sikhs, he said they may have been civilians, but they could not have been innocents. "The Koran teaches us not to kill innocents," he said. "If Lashkar told us to kill those people, then it was right to do it. I have no regrets."

This one time, he seemed to think his answer too abbreviated. His lips pursed, his eyebrows narrowed. He said: "When I was sent here from Pakistan, I was told the Indian Army kills Muslims. It treats them badly and burns their mosques and refuses to let them pray. They must be freed from these clutches."

Then he looked at me curiously, seeming to ask, Isn't that so?
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - acharya - 06-14-2006

BETWEEN THE LINES
Small images, big images
By Kuldip Nayar

IT was an Indian voice that attracted my attention while I was loitering around downtown Manhattan, New York, last week. He took me to a nearby eating store, a common feature in America where a retail outlet offers you hot, cooked food along with everyday necessities like toothbrush, shampoo and medicine. I discovered he was the owner who had some 12 similar stores in the city.

“We are noticed now,” he said. “Never before were we, the Indians, given even a cursory look. Now the Americans know that our country is doing well.” What he was trying to convey to me was that India had suddenly become a success story. Newspapers and even TV networks mentioned it prominently. Many Indians occupied key positions in the fields of technology, medicine, education and business.

“We can even influence the US Congress and the government,” said my middle-aged Punjabi friend. He took pride in the fact that he had come from India with $5 and was now worth at least $10 million. “All of us have done well,” he claimed. However, the NRI success in the US is only part of the story. India’s eight per cent annual growth has made all the difference in changing the perception of policy-makers, editors and businessmen. India is no more the land of maharajas, snake charmers or dancing girls. It is considered a country which is trying to catch up with the West through science, technology and economic development.
<span style='color:red'>
Probably, this is the time when we should be thinking of addressing the long-term image of our country in America. Duplicating think-tanks or institutions may not serve our purpose. I have in mind an Indian university in the US. Maybe, we can start with the extension of some leading Indian university like the JNU. Indian subjects could be taught along with</span>

American history or whatever else is part of their culture and political scene. Hindu extremist organisations may find in the university an outlet for their contribution to India. At present they are funding the RSS which they believe is a cultural organisation.

The proposed university or whatever else set up has to put across India’s ethos: democracy and pluralism.

America is impressed by our open and secular society, but the image has been damaged because of Gujarat. The anti-conversion legislation, which the BJP’s state governments have passed, has made the Christian world suspicious. It should be told that this is not India. It is only a political party seeking more votes, behaving irresponsibly and even spoiling the country’s reputation in the process. Image-making is an enormous task. It cannot be done exclusively by the government or Foreign Office. They can contribute and they have taken a good step, for example, by opening Nehru Centres at important world capitals. Unfortunately, the bureaucracy has taken them over. This is what I fear may come in the way of image building. The approach of the bureaucrats is too stultified and their ideas too set in the face of a fast changing world.
<span style='color:red'>
On the other hand, America is too squeamish when it comes to India. Washington is still plagued by New Delhi’s independent attitude during the cold war and feels more comfortable with dictatorial and military regimes than democratic India.</span> If we are able to develop the country economically, without disparity while keeping the society open and pluralistic, it would be a miracle which American or even the rest of the world might buy.

During my stay in America I was disappointed to find that a country where I inhaled free air some 50 years ago, and read the liberal thoughts of George

Washington and Abraham Lincoln in a university there, is now embedded in conservatism, fanaticism and arrogance which an unchallenged superpower develops.
<b>
There is little concern for the weak, the poor and the underprivileged. The treatment meted out to Muslims is, indeed, shameful. It looks as if America has launched an unofficial war against the Islamic world. This is where New Delhi should play its role. It must re-secularise that society. I was, however, happy to find Hindus and Muslims friendly. People from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are meeting socially all the time. At present they face too much fuss over immigration. I find in it traces of racism. What it really means is that the non-whites should not be given entry. True, Indians are mostly treated deferentially but that is because they have been found superior in intellect and entrepreneurship. When it comes to the West versus the rest, they too are tarred with the same brush of discrimination.

It is strange that America wants markets to open and even the tariffs to go. But it does not realise that India and such other countries have manpower to export when America has goods. If Washington can insist on demolishing the walls of customs and excise, why not bring down the walls of visas and entry permits? People to people contact will bring the different parts of the world closer to one another.</b> Yet this argument does not go down well with the West which wants markets abroad but not people - black or brown - from the countries to which it sells the goods. The UK is like a country which also ran. Coming from America what hits you is the lack of confidence. It looks as if the country cannot do without a set of crutches that once was represented by the colonies and their resources.

The Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are doing better on the whole than the Britons of the same level. The main reason is that Asian parents pay more attention to the studies and other activities of their children. Also the value system of British has got jumbled up. They look towards America and Euorpe, but it is like living in awe of rich relatives. What still impresses you is the dignified behaviour even in poor circumstances.

When I was in London, the British were in the midst of a debate over Prime Minister Tony Blair’s remark that he was not America’s poodle. Even if he is not, what does he prove by saying so? The fact is that London looks to the State Department and Blair looks to Bush for daily guidance. It is pathetic to see the Tory criticising the Labour but not suggesting how they would be any better if they were in office.

Nations have to work hard and relentlessly to start again when they fall from the peak. I did not find that kind of spirit in the UK. Sometimes, I wonder if these were the people who changed their defeat at Dunkirk into a victory. Indomitable and courageous, they did not give in when any other nation would have surrendered. Where is that spirit? Have the people changed, or were their forefathers made up of different mettle?





India and US - III - Guest - 06-23-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
India is a mature and a stable democracy.-United States Vice  President
Cheney

The Vice President Cheney mentioned  at the U.S.-India Business Council's
31st Anniversary Leadership Summit.

"Indians can also be  optimistic because they live in a mature and a stable
democracy. In six decades  of independence, the people of India have erased any
doubt that a multiethnic  society can thrive under self-rule. If you consider
that the religious majority  is Hindu, the largest political party is led by
a Christian, the President is  Muslim, and the Prime Minister is Sikh, it
becomes very clear that the decisive  factor is not anyone's heritage, but
everyone's devotion to certain ideals.  India's political system ensures the
broadest possible participation. And the  political system respects diversity and
assures legitimate means of dissent.  India shows the world that the best hope
for harmony and success in a  pluralistic country is individual liberty,
equality, and  democracy."

- United  States Vice  President Cheney

<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->




The following is a transcript of remarks by Vice President Cheney to the
U.S.-India Business Council's 31st Anniversary Leadership Summit:
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington, D.C. 12:17 P.M. EDT

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Blackwill and -- for the introduction. And  I appreciate the warm welcome today, and the
opportunity to be with all of you.  It's good to see a strong turnout for the
leadership summit of the USIBC. And  I'm also glad that Minister Nath and
Ambassador Sen are here with us today, as  well.

I want to welcome all of you to Washington, particularly those who  have made
the journey from India and the distinguished Indian-Americans who've  joined
us today from all across the country. And I bring good wishes from the 
President of the United States, George W. Bush.

The President has covered  a lot of miles lately -- Baghdad last week, this
week Vienna and Budapest, back  to the White House later tonight. Another very
important journey he made  recently, obviously, was his trip to India, where
he received an extremely kind  reception from Prime Minister Singh, from
President Kalam, and the Indian  people. The President's visit was immensely
productive and historic, and it  underscored a basic fact of our world today: In
this new century, America's  relationship with India is better than ever before.

That relationship is  vital for reasons of economic progress, national
security, and global stability.  And part of the closeness is due to the work of
the U.S.-India Business Council,  and to the commitment of many of you here in
the room today. For more than a  generation, the USIBC has been a major link
between entrepreneurs who live and  work half a world away from one another, but who have common values and a common  outlook. You've promoted sensible trade practices, spoken out for economic  reform and market-based policies, as you've provided leadership in complex  areas, from telecom to capital investment to issues of intellectual property  rights. As leaders in commerce, finance, and
industry, you've helped to generate  trade, jobs, and wealth in the United
States and India. You personify the good  will that prevails between our two
nations. And I commend you for your hard  work, for your high standards, and
your consistent leadership.

The  31-year history of this organization tracks the rise of India as a world
leader.  In our time we have witnessed the swift transformation of India into
a healthy,  vibrant, growing economic power. Annual growth in India is now in
the  neighborhood of 8 percent, and the size of the economy has more than
doubled in  the last 15 years. The country is on its way to becoming the world's
most  populous nation -- and thanks to the future-oriented leadership you've
had in  recent years, the Indian people can look forward to greater heights of 
achievement and prosperity.

Indians can also be optimistic  because they live in a mature and a stable
democracy. In six decades of  independence, the people of India have erased any
doubt that a multiethnic  society can thrive under self-rule. If you consider
that the religious majority  is Hindu, the largest political party is led by a
Christian, the President is  Muslim, and the Prime Minister is Sikh, it
becomes very clear that the decisive  factor is not anyone's heritage, but
everyone's devotion to certain ideals.  India's political system ensures the
broadest possible participation. And the  political system respects diversity and
assures legitimate means of dissent.  India shows the world that the best hope
for harmony and success in a  pluralistic country is individual liberty, equality,
and  democracy.

That fundamental commitment to democracy, central to  both our republics,
makes the U.S. and India natural partners in the world. Yet  the fact is that
many years passed without much progress, and the dynamics of  the Cold War made that period a time of missed opportunities. These last five  years, however,
have seen a completely transformed relationship. Early on,  President Bush made
clear that it was time to put relations with India onto a  new footing. Today
there is a new strategic partnership between our countries --  a partnership
based on democratic values, common interests, strong commercial  ties and a
climate of trust and good faith between our governments. And we have  moved
ahead with an agenda that is ambitious and forward-looking -- to fight  terror,
advance democracy, expand free and fair trade, and provide for our  common
energy
needs.

Together, the U.S. and India are determined to  confront and defeat the
global terror network, which has harmed people in so  many parts of the world.
The United States experienced multiple terrorist  attacks during the '80s and
'90s, culminating in 9/11. Similarly, India has  suffered through acts of terror,
including the attack on its parliament in 2001,  the October 2005 bombing in
New Delhi that targeted innocent civilians preparing  for holiday celebrations,
and the bombings earlier this year in  Varanasi.

As victims of terror, both our countries accept a duty to join  in the fight
against these enemies. American and Indian forces have worked  closely in many
different ways, including sophisticated joint operations with  our armed
forces. These coordinated efforts are useful not just in confronting  danger,
but in bringing relief to disaster victims, as we did following the  Asian
tsunami. We have also had great cooperation in law enforcement and  intelligence
operations. And the United States is proud to stand with such a  strong partner.

I also want to say that we admire the moral clarity of  India's leaders,
reflected in the words of Prime Minister Singh in a speech to  the United States
Congress. He said, "We must fight terrorism wherever it  exists, because
terrorism anywhere threatens democracy everywhere." We are  confident that India will continue to play a leading role in ensuring that  terrorists are not free
to operate in South Asia. And we're confident that India  will work closely with
its neighbors to resolve long-standing disputes in order  to concentrate on
rooting out terror and to maintain stability in the  region.

The U.S. and India also understand our duty to help build a safer  world
beyond the war on terror. The adversary in this war is more than a tactic;  it
is an expansionist ideology, trying to gain influence by exploiting  resentments
and stirring ancient hatreds. And the way to overcome that ideology  in the
long run is to offer a better alternative. Our vision recognizes the  right of
men and women to govern their own affairs; to live and work in freedom;  to
have the protection of laws that uphold equality, justice, and the dignity of 
the individual.

The United States and India strongly support the advance  of democratic
values as the surest way to long-term security and peace. Through  our joint
Global Democracy Initiative, our support for the U.N. Democracy Fund,  and the daily help both of our nations have provided to the peoples of  Afghanistan and
Iraq, we are helping to lift the sights of whole nations, giving  them real hope
for a better life, and building the long-term peace that freedom  brings. This
support is not without cost, and, in particular, the United States  mourns
the loss of Indian citizens working in Afghanistan. But it is imperative,  as
India's government has made clear, that we must not and will not bow to the 
intimidation tactics of the terrorists.

The most visible element of our  strategic partnership is the broad and
expanding bilateral trade relationship.  The U.S. is India's largest trade
partner, and we intend to remain so. Many  billions of dollars in goods and services flow between the two countries, and  the linkages are multiplying steadily. Prime Minister Singh has pointed out that  a vast majority of Fortune 500
companies are already operating in  India.

The U.S. and India are working to enhance our trade relationship  in areas
from agriculture to defense to information technology. And through the  creation
of the CEO Forum, we have integrated the private sector's  recommendations on
how to expand this relationship. We have signed a science and  technology
agreement, to expand relations between our extensive scientific and 
technological communities and to promote technological and scientific 
cooperation in areas of mutual benefit. In aviation, we concluded an open skies  agreement. Boeing has sold $15 billion worth of aircraft to India, and four U.S.  airlines have opened direct routes to India.

We have worked successfully  to reduce barriers to bilateral trade through a
reinvigorated Economic Dialogue,  Trade Policy Forum, and the High Technology
Cooperation Group.

Yet,  despite this tremendous success, there is much more that we can do to
expand our  trade relationship. The United States welcomes the recent reforms
that India has  made to open its markets to trade and to capital investment; we
hope India will  also remove its remaining restrictions on foreign direct
investment; will reduce  tariffs on agricultural and industrial products; and
will strengthen the  protection for intellectual property rights. India can also
show the same reform  minded leadership by pressing for the conclusion of an
ambitious agreement this  year at the Doha Round.

It seems clear that there's a consensus building  in India toward greater
economic reform. And that is a very encouraging sign.  The consequences -- in
new opportunities, new markets, and new wealth -- add up  to a bright economic
future for India's people and her trading  partners.

As our business continues to grow, there is, naturally, some  anxiety in the
United States over the outsourcing of jobs to India. When a job  is sent
elsewhere, it's a heavy blow to the person who no longer has that  paycheck and
now has to look for something else. The real question for  policymakers is how to
face that challenge. One option is to attempt to freeze  the status quo, and
to close ourselves off from the global economy. The obvious  problem is that
protectionism invites more of the same; if we turn our backs on  other
countries, we can expect them to respond in kind. Protectionism would also  take
away our competitive edge, cost jobs in exporting industries, harm American 
consumers, and cause a long-term decline in our standard of living.

There  are far better ways to answer the challenge of outsourcing. We need to
focus on  job training and educational excellence, so that we can prepare our
citizens to  fill the good, knowledge-based, high-wage jobs of the 21st
century. We need to  continue on the economic course we set five years ago, with
a low-tax,  pro-growth policy that encourages risk taking and investment, and
rewards  entrepreneurship instead of punishing it.

And we need to engage the  global marketplace with confidence. President Bush
often reminds Americans that  we have about 5 percent of the world's
population -- so 95 percent of our  potential customers live outside the United
States. By itself, India has a  middle class of 300 million people -- more than
the entire population of the  United States. India is one of the fastest- growing
markets for American goods  and services, and in fact our exports to India
grew by more than 30 percent last  year alone. In addition, American companies
that have research centers in India  have become more competitive worldwide.
From almost every angle you look at it,  our bilateral trade relationship with
India brings tremendous benefits to both  countries. And for the good of the
peoples we serve, American and Indian leaders  have a duty to keep that
relationship strong.

A strategic partnership in  the 21st century also requires a new and
realistic approach to nuclear energy.  For decades -- that issue, there was no
cooperation at all between the U.S. and  India. India had developed nuclear
power as a non-signatory to the  Nonproliferation Treaty, and we never departed from the basic stance we took  during the Cold War. Now we believe it's time to
update our policy and to bring  it into line with modern realities. And that is
the primary purpose of the civil  nuclear initiative that President Bush and
Prime Minister Singh agreed to  several months ago.

Under the agreement, America will support the  development of civil nuclear
power programs inside India. And for its part,  India will place its civil
nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy  Agency safeguards.

The logic of the deal is straightforward. First, there  is no question that
nuclear power is critical to meeting India's energy needs.  Those needs are
already immense, as we see every day in the competition for  crude oil in the
world market. Given the forecasts for India's increased energy  needs in the
future, diversifying India's sources of energy is important in  relation to the
world energy market and to U.S. energy prices. And as the United  States begins
a serious effort to reduce our dependency on fossil fuels, it  makes sense to
encourage others to do the same -- and to do so without slowing 
modernization, sacrificing economic growth, or bringing needless harm to the 
environment.

Nuclear energy, with production and spent-fuel disposal under IAEA  standards,
is safe and clean. India now gets about three percent of its  electricity
from nuclear energy, and the government plans to increase that  substantially
over the next several decades. The notion of generating that much  power --
without releasing an ounce of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere --  is an
extremely worthwhile enterprise, and good news for the environment. This 
initiative will also create new business opportunities for U.S. firms, which  translates into new jobs for American workers.

The second key factor is  that India will enter the international
nonproliferation mainstream by  separating its civil and military nuclear
programs, adopting international  safeguards, and conforming to international standards.

For more than 30 years,  India has remained outside the international
nonproliferation fold. As IAEA  chief Mohamed ElBaradei recently put it, India
will get safe and modern  technology to help lift more than 500 million people from
poverty, and it would  be part of the international effort to combat nuclear
terrorism."

Under  the deal, India will maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing, and put
in place  very strict measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials
and  technology. By taking these steps, the agreement strengthens the
international  nonproliferation regime and plays a vital role in enhancing
international  security and stability. In a time when terrorists are bound and
determined to  gain access to weapons of mass destruction, nothing is more important than  keeping weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear technology, out of  the wrong hands. So India's commitment to nonproliferation clearly serves the  interest of us all.

Third, India has a very good nonproliferation track  record. India has no
interest in the spread of this deadly technology. By taking  additional steps to
secure its nuclear materials and technology, India continues  to build upon
this track record.

Fourth, like the United States, India is  an open, transparent society with a
vigorous political process, an energetic  free press, oversight, and
accountability. The Indian people and their leaders  understand the
responsibilities of a nuclear nation -- indeed they have acted  more responsibly than some countries that actually signed the Nuclear  Nonproliferation Treaty.

It is only right and sensible that we begin  cooperating with India on civil
nuclear programs. The civil nuclear deal is  plainly in the interest of both
countries -- economically, environmentally, and  from the standpoint of
national security. The U.S.-India civil nuclear  initiative also symbolizes the
great potential of the U.S.-India relationship.  It is one of the most important
strategic foreign policy initiatives of our  government. There is a great deal
of discussion in India's Parliament and the  U.S. Congress about what this deal
means for our countries. And that's how  democracies do business.

At the same time, given this agreement's  strategic importance, we must be
sure that amendments or delays on the U.S. side  do not risk wasting this
critical opportunity. And as the discussion proceeds,  President Bush and I are
confident that this agreement will receive the strong  bipartisan support it
deserves.

The Indian-American Caucus in the United  States Senate is led by Republican
Senator John Cornyn and Democratic Senator  Hillary Clinton. In the House,
Republican Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and  Democratic Representative Gary Ackerman lead the caucus. We encourage these  members to use their leadership role to help usher through a critical agreement  that benefits both the
United States and our friends in India. We hope Congress  will move quickly to
enact legislation that enables our two nations to move  forward on this
important agreement without delay.

As I said a few  moments ago, our strategic partnership with India gives rise
to a broad and  ambitious agenda. And that's the way it should be for the two
great nations at a  time of challenge. President Bush has described our
relationship as warm and  results-oriented. It is strengthened every day by a
kinship of high ideals --  and by deep, personal connections. Some 80,000
students from India go to school  here. America is home to more than 2 million people of Indian origin. The  contribution of the Indian-American community to the
U.S. economy is tremendous.  Indian Americans are leaders in business, science,
medicine, technology and many  other fields, and we must work to continue to
implement an immigration policy  that encourages highly-skilled and talented
immigrants, including many Indians,  to come to America.

Our peoples know each other, we like each other, and  we see greatness in our
shared, common future. It is now up to us to build upon  the new relationship
-- with a forward-looking agenda that promotes free  institutions, open
trade, and a future of prosperity and peace.

It is my  privilege to serve with a President who has done so much to
strengthen the bond  between our two great democracies. And I am honored to
stand with all of you,  and to thank you for being part of this fine organization. I
accept your award  with confidence that close ties of commerce, and security,
and above all  friendship, will always define India and the United States of 
America.

Thank you very much.  (Applause.)<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - Guest - 06-27-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Non-Partisan Report to Congress on India Nuclear Deal Warns of "Key Loopholes" and "Windfall For the Weapons Program"</b>

<i>Press Release from Rep. Edward Markey: Non-Partisan Report to Congress on India Nuclear Deal Warns of "Key Loopholes" and "Windfall For the Weapons Program" </i>

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Today, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA), a senior member of the House Homeland Security Committee and co-chair of the Bipartisan Non-Proliferation Task Force, released an analysis today prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Legislation to exempt India from certain provisions of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law will be the subject of House and Senate Committee markups. 

CRS Analysis
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - Guest - 06-28-2006

<b>US House panel approves N-deal bill</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The House International Relations Committee on Tuesday approved a legislation to implement the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal by a vote of 37 to 5, sending it to the full House floor for debate and vote next month. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - Guest - 06-28-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->109th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 5682
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 26, 2006
Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. CROWLEY, and Mr. ETHERIDGE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<b>A BILL </b>
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006'.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States foreign policy;

(2) sustaining the NPT and strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;

(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable international security situation;

(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the NPT's international obligation to prohibit the spread of dangerous nuclear technologies;

(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not NPT members are responsible with any nuclear technology they develop;

(6) it may be in the interest of the United States to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as set forth in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has never been an NPT member with respect to civilian nuclear technology if--

(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to deliver them;

(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the United States in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation;

© such cooperation induces the country to implement the highest possible protections against the proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and

(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give greater political and material support to the achievement of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups, that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons; and

(7)(A) India meets the criteria described in this subsection; and

( it is in the national security interest of the United States to deepen its relationship with India across a full range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

(a) In General- The following shall be the policies of the United States:

(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty' or the `NPT').

(2) Encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the right to `develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes', as described in Article IV of the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations, as determined by the IAEA.

(3) Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

(b) With Respect to South Asia- The following shall be the policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:

(1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China at the earliest possible date.

(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India become parties.

(3) Secure India's--

(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;

( formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles;

© public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement;

(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph ©; and

(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997.

(4) Secure India's full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, <b>if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich or process nuclear materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.</b>  <!--emo&:angry:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo-->

(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.
SEC. 4. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the President makes the determination described in subsection (b), the President may--

(1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of such Act, and such agreement for cooperation may only enter into force in accordance with subsections (f) and (g);

(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to India, provided that such waiver shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has engaged in any activity described section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other than section 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)© of such Act, at any time after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(3) with respect to India--

(A) waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005; and

( section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act.

(b) Determination by the President- The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the following actions have occurred:

(<b>1) India has provided the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA.

(2) India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear facilities.

(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear program.

(4) India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

(5) India is working with and supporting United States and international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, including through--

(A) the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations;

( harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, policies, and practices with the policies and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and

© adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.

(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.

© Submission to Congress-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate information concerning any determination made pursuant to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis for the determination.

(2) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED- To the fullest extent available to the United States, the information referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United States and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration.

( A summary of the agreement that has been entered into between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and a description of the progress toward its full implementation.

© A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such Additional Protocol.

(D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a description of the steps that the United States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.

(E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, including enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons technology, as well as the support that India is providing to the United States to further United States objectives to restrict the spread of such technology.

(F) A description of the steps that India is taking to secure materials and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, Wassennaar guidelines, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

(G) A description of the decision taken within the Nuclear Suppliers Group relating to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.

(H) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation envisioned by the United States and India that will be implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, including whether such cooperation will include the provision of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

(d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers to India-

(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would violate the transfer guidelines of the NSG as in effect on the date of the transfer. </b>

<b>(2) TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO INDIA- Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if India makes any materially significant transfer of--

(A) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines, or

( ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology that does not conform to MTCR guidelines,
unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.</b>

(3) PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO INDIA- If nuclear transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source.

(e) Approval of Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Required-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to subsection (m), an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India submitted pursuant to this section may become effective only if--

(A) the President submits to Congress the agreement concluded between the United States and India, including a copy of the safeguards agreement entered into between the IAEA and India relating to India's declared civilian nuclear facilities, in accordance with the requirements and procedures of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (other than section 123 a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act; and

( after the submission under subparagraph (A), the agreement is approved by a joint resolution that is enacted into law.

(2) CONSULTATION- Beginning one month after the date of the enactment of this Act and every month thereafter until the President submits to Congress the agreement referred to in paragraph (1), the President should consult with the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding the status of the negotiations between the United States and India with respect to civilian nuclear cooperation and between the IAEA and India with respect to the safeguards agreement described in subsection (b)(2).

(f) Joint Resolution- For purposes of this section, a joint resolution referred to in subsection (e)(1)( is a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress--

(1) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress hereby approves the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of India submitted by the President on XXXXXXXXXXX.', with the blank space being filled with the appropriate date;

(2) which does not have a preamble; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: `Joint Resolution Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and India'.

(g) Introduction and Referral-

(1) INTRODUCTION- A joint resolution shall, on the day on which the submissions under subsection (e)(1)(A) are made (or, if either House of Congress is not in session on that day, the first day thereafter when that House is in session)--

(A) be introduced in the House of Representatives by the majority leader, for himself and the minority leader of the House, or by Members of the House designated by the majority leader and minority leader of the House; and

( be introduced in the Senate by the majority leader, for himself and the minority leader of the Senate, or by Members of the Senate designated by the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate.

If either House of Congress is not in session on that day, the joint resolution shall be introduced on the first day thereafter when both Houses are in session.

(2) REFERRAL- The joint resolution shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(h) Discharge of Committees- If a committee to which a joint resolution is referred has not reported such joint resolution by the end of 60 days beginning on the date of its introduction, or the date of the submission of the nonproliferation assessment statement described in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), whichever is later, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(i) Floor Consideration in the House of Representatives-

(1) IN GENERAL- On or after the third calendar day (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays, except when the House of Representatives is in session on such a day) after the date on which the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged from further consideration of, such a joint resolution, it shall be in order for any Member of the House to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution. A Member of the House may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the House the Member's intention to do so. Such motion shall be privileged and shall not be debatable. The motion shall not be subject to amendment or to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution which shall remain the unfinished business until disposed of.

(2) DEBATE- Debate on a joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than six hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. An amendment to the joint resolution shall not be in order. A motion to further limit debate shall be in order and shall not be debatable. A motion to table, a motion to postpone, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution shall not be in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(3) APPEALS- Appeals from the decisions of the Chair to the procedure relating to a joint resolution shall be decided without debate.

(j) Floor Consideration in the Senate- Any joint resolution shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

(k) Consideration by the Other House- If, before the passage by one House of a joint resolution of that House, that House receives a joint resolution from the other House, then the following procedures shall apply:

(1) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in paragraph (2)(.

(2) With respect to a joint resolution of the House receiving the joint resolution--

(A) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House; but

( the vote on final passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House.

(3) Upon disposition of the joint resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the joint resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(l) Computation of Days- In the computation of the period of 60 days referred to in subsection (h), there shall be excluded the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain or because of an adjournment of the Congress sine die.

(m) Section 123 of Atomic Energy Act Not Affected- Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), this section does not preclude the approval, under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), of an agreement for cooperation in which India is the cooperating party.

(n) Sunset- The procedures under this section shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution under this section.

(o) Reports-

(1) POLICY OBJECTIVES- The President shall, not later than January 31, 2007, and not later than January 31 of each year thereafter, submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on--

(A) the extent to which each policy objective in section 3(b) has been achieved;

( the steps taken by the United States and India in the preceding calendar year to accomplish those objectives;

© the extent of cooperation by other countries in achieving those objectives; and

(D) the steps the United States will take in the current calendar year to accomplish those objectives.

<b>(2) NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO INDIA-

(A) IN GENERAL- Not later than one year after the date on which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing United States exports to India for the preceding year pursuant to such agreement and the anticipated exports to India for the next year pursuant to such agreement.

( NUCLEAR FUEL- The report described in subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a classified form if necessary)--

(i) an estimate for the previous year of the amount of uranium mined in India;

(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices;

(iii) the rate of production of--

(I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and

(II) nuclear explosive devices; and

(iv) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected such rate of production of nuclear explosive devices</b>.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - Guest - 06-28-2006

Let's see how fast spineless will comeup with some logic and hide conditions attached with this deal from Indian public.


India and US - III - Guest - 06-28-2006

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>India wins first vote on N-deal with US </b>
Pioneer.com
Sridhar Krishnaswami | Washington
US lawmakers on Tuesday defeated amendments that wanted India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and put moratorium on fissile material production during a hearing on a Bill that seeks the implementation of the India-US nuclear accord.

The amendments to the Bill, which seeks exemptions to Atomic Energy Act 1954 to enable US to sell nuclear fuel and technology in return for non-proliferation and safeguards commitments from India, were defeated in the 50-member House International Relations Committee that discussed the proposed legislation before it is sent for Congress's approval.

<b>An amendment offered by a California lawmaker, which sought to add language in the Bill to the effect that India should sign the NPT, was defeated 36-4.</b>

Another amendment seeking to place limitations on nuclear transfers unless a presidential determination has been made regarding India's adherence to a unilateral moratorium on production of fissile material was also defeated 31-12.

The Committee approved by a voice vote another amendment brought by Joseph Crowley that stipulated the President would submit to the House and Senate international committees a report describing any nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities that India has designated as civilian and placed under inspection or has designated as military.

<b>During the debate, supporters of the agreement described it as an "unmistakable gain" for non-proliferation.</b>

But opponents said other countries would also seek similar nuclear cooperation with the US if the agreement is approved. 
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->


India and US - III - Guest - 06-28-2006

Be Indian; Buy Indian and Sell Indian
<!--emo&:argue--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/argue.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='argue.gif' /><!--endemo--> India-US nuclear deal clears first hurdle

- Maya Mirchandani

Tuesday, June 27, 2006 (Washington DC):

The landmark Indo-US nuclear deal has sailed through the powerful House International Relations Committee.

The committee approved changes in US law on Tuesday, giving the go ahead to the deal, which allows nuclear cooperation between India and the United States.

The hearing lasted nearly four hours but at the end of it, the legislation, proposed to be cited as the 'United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006', was supported by both Republicans and the Democrats.

The 50 member committee approved by a vote of 37 to 5 the legislation designed to make exemptions in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act to enable US to sell nuclear fuel and technology in return for non-proliferation and safeguard commitments from India.

Under the existing Act, US companies are restricted from engaging in nuclear commerce with countries that are not members of the NPT.

But as expected the Left says it's unhappy with some of the amendments made especially on the non-binding clause, which talks about India supporting the US on foreign policy on Iran.

Be like India

Many on the committee argued that letting India import uranium from the US and other NSG suppliers will free up India's own uranium stock for weapons use, But an amendment calling for India to freeze domestic uranium production for weapons use was defeated during the mark up process.

"We simply cannot use India's strained energy situation, as some advocate, as leverage over the strategic choices New Delhi makes in terms of its own national security and its very national existence," said Tom Lantos, a Democrat.

Others also argued that such a deal would set precedents for other countries to ask for similar favour from the US. But those in favour were clear that this was India specific legislation.

"Clearly countries like Iran, North Korea and Pakistan will be looking for clues as to what this deal would mean for them. I think the message to them is clear. If you want to be treated like India, be like India," said Gary Ackerman, another Democrat.

"Be a responsible international actor with regard to WMD technology. Don't sell your technology to the highest bidder, don't provide it to terrorists, be a democracy," added Ackerman.

Non-proliferation priorities

In a significant departure from the original draft, the new bill ensures that the US Congress will get a second chance to cast a vote on the deal, after the bilateral 123 agreement between the US and India is concluded.

Other conditions that must be met before the deal can come into effect include,

* An agreement between India and the IAEA putting in place safeguards in perpetuity for existing and future nuclear reactors under the civilian programme
* A commitment that India will work actively with the US for an early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and also support international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology
* A commitment that India's export control regulations conform to the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR

The Bill asks the US administration to provide detailed descriptions of all the steps India is taking towards these stated objectives.

"Among many provisions, the bill articulates the US non-proliferation priorities to oppose the efforts of any country to develop nuclear weapons capability, to achieve a halt of production of materials for nuclear explosives, and to secure India's full and active cooperation in US non proliferation efforts," said Ileana Ros Lehtinen, a Republican.

The senate committee would go through the same process by the end of this week.

The hope is that the entire US congress of 435 congressmen and women and 100 senators will take their cues from the respective committees and a final vote to amend US law can be scheduled as early as the end of July.



India and US - III - Guest - 07-01-2006

<b>Another Rabindra Singh??</b>

See this NSC Secretariat employee arrested

How many more??