Why Was There No Tranfer Of Population?

[G.Subramaniam]

CHAPTER IX
LESSONS FROM ABROAD
Hindus who will not yield to the demand of the Muslims for the division of India into Pakistan and
Hindustan and would insist upon maintaining the geographical unity of India without counting the
cost will do well to study the fate that has befallen other countries which, like India, harboured
many nations and sought to harmonise them.
It is not necessary to review the history of all such countries. It is enough to recount here the story
of two, Turkey and Czechoslovakia.
I
To begin with Turkey. The emergence of the Turks in history was due to the fact that they were
driven away by the Mongols from their home in Central Asia, somewhere between 1230-40 A.D.,
which led them to settle in north-west Anatolia. Their career as the builders of the Turkish Empire
began in 1326 with the conquest of Brusa. In 1360-61, they conquered Thrace from the Aegean to
the Black Sea; in 1361-62, the Byzantine Government of Constantinople accepted their supremacy.
In 1369 Bulgaria followed suit. In 1371-72 Macedonia was conquered. In 1373 Constantinople
definitely accepted Ottoman sovereignty. In 1389 Servia was conquered, in 1430Salonica, in 1453
Constantinople, in 1461 Trebizond, in 1465Quraman, and in 1475KaffaandTana were annexed.
After a short lull, they conquered Mosul in 1514, Syria, Egypt, the Hiaz and the Yaman in 1516-17
and Belgrade in 1521. This was followed in 1526 by victory over the Hungarians at Mohacz. In
1554 took place the first conquest of Baghdad and in 1639 the second Conquest of Baghdad. Twice
they laid siege to Vienna, first in 1529 and again in 1683 with a view to extend their conquest
beyond. But on both occasions they were repulsed with the result that their expansion in Europe
was completely checked forever.
Still the countries they conquered between 1326 and 1683 formed a vast empire. A few of these
territories the Turks had lost to their enemies thereafter, but taking the extent of the Turkish Empire
as it stood in 1789 on the eve of the French Revolution, it comprised (1) the Balkans, south of the
Danube, (2) Asia Minor, the Levant and the neighbouring islands (i.e., Cyprus), (3)Syria and
Palestine, (4) Egypt, and (5) North Africa from Egypt to Morocco.
The tale of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is easily told. The first to break away de facto, if
not de jure, was Egypt in 1769. The next were the Christians in the Balkans. Bessarabia was taken
by Russia in 1812 after a war with Turkey. In 1812 Serbia rebelled with the aid of Russia and the
Turks were obliged to place Serbia under a separate government. In 1829 similar concessions were
granted to two other Danubian provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia. As a result of the Greek war of
independence which lasted between 1822-29, Greece was completely freed from the Turkish rule
and the Greek independence was recognised by the Powers in 1832. Between 1875-77 there was
turmoil amongst the Balkans. There was a revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bulgarians
resorted to atrocities against the Turks, to which the Turks replied with atrocities in equal measure.
As a result, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey and so did Russia. By the Treaty of
Berlin, Bulgaria .was given self-government under Turkey and Eastern Rumania was to be ruled by
Turkey under a Christian Governor. Russia gained Kars and Batourn. Dobrudja was given to
Rumania. Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria for administration and England
occupied Cyprus.In 1881 Greece gained Thessaly and France occupied Tunis. In 1885 Bulgaria and
Eastern Rumania were united into one state.
The story of the growth and decline of the Turkish Empire upto 1906 has been very graphically
described by Mr. Lane Poole in the following words 44[f.44] :—
"In its old extent, when the Porte ruled not merely the narrow territory now called Turkey in
Europe, but Greece, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumania, Rumania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
with the Crimea and a portion of Southern Russia, Egypt, Syria, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and
numerous islands in the Mediterranean, not counting the vast but mainly desert tract of Arabia, the
total population (at the present time) would be over fifty millions, or nearly twice that of Europe
without Russia. One by one her provinces have been taken away. Algiers and Tunis have been
incorporated with France, and this 175,000 square miles and five million inhabitants have
transferred their allegiance. Egypt is practically independent, and this means a loss of 500,000
miles and over six millions of inhabitants. Asiatic Turkey alone has suffered comparatively little
diminution. This forms the bulk of tier present dominions, and comprises about 680,000 square
miles, and over sixteen millions of population. In Europe her losses have been almost as severe as
in Africa where Tripoli alone remains to her. Serbia and Bosnia are administered by Austria and
thereby nearly 40,000 miles and three and a half millions of peoples have become Austrian
subjects. Wallachia and Moldavia are united in the independent kingdom of Rumania, diminishing
the extent of Turkey by 46,000 miles and over five millions of inhabitants. Bulgaria is a dependent
stale over which the Ports has no real control and Eastern Rumania has lately de facto become part
of Bulgaria and the two contain nearly 40,000 square miles, and three millions of inhabitants. The
kingdom of Greece with its 25,000 miles and two million population has long been separated from
its parent In Europe where the Turkish territory once extended to 230,000 miles, with a population
of nearly 20 millions, it now reaches only the total of 66 thousand miles and a population of four
and a half millions. It has lost nearly three-fourths of its land, and about the same proportion of its
people."
Such was the condition of Turkey in 1907. What has befallen her since then is unfortunately the
worst part of her story. In 1908 taking advantage of the revolution brought about by the Young
Turks, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria declared her independence. In 1911
Italy took possession of Tripoli and in 1912 France occupied Morocco. Encouraged by the
successful attack of Italy in 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro formed themselves into
a Balkan League and declared war on Turkey. In this war, known as the first Balkan War, Turkey
was completely defeated. By the Treaty of London(1913) the Turkish territory in Europe was
reduced to a narrow strip round Constantinople. But the treaty could not take effect because the
victors could not agree on the distribution of the spoils of victory. In 1913 Bulgaria declared war on
the rest of the Balkan League and Rumania declared war on Bulgaria in the hope of extending her
territory. Turkey also did the same. By the Treaty of Bukharest (1913), which ended the second
Balkan War, Turkey recovered Adrianople and got Thrace from Bulgaria. Serbia obtained Northern
Macedonia and Greece obtained Southern Macedonia (including Salonika), while Montenegro
enlarged her territory at the expense of Turkey. By 1914 when the Great European War came on,
the Balkans had won their independence from Turkey and the area in Europe that remained under
the Turkish Empire was indeed a very small area round about Constantinople and her possessions
in Asia. So far as the African continent is concerned, the Sultanas power over Egypt and the rest of
North Africa was only nominal, for the European Powers had established real control therein. In the
Great War of 1914 the overthrow of Turkey was complete. All the provinces from the
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf were overrun, and the great cities of Baghdad, Jerusalem,
Damascus and Alleppo were captured. In Europe the allied troops occupied Constantinople. The
Treaty of Sevres, which brought the war with Turkey to a close, sought to deprive her of all
her outlying provinces and even of the fertile plains of Asia Minor. Greek claim for territory was
generously allowed at the expense of Turkey in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor and Italy was
to receive Adalia and a large tract in the South. Turkey was to be deprived of all her Arab provinces
in Asia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Hedjaz and Nejd. There was left to Turkey only the capital,
Constantinople, and separated from this city, by a " neutral zone of the straits," part of the barren
plateau of Anatolia. The treaty though accepted by the Sultan was fiercely attacked by the
Nationalist Party under Kemal Pasha. When the Greeks advanced to occupy their new territory,
they were attacked and decisively beaten. At the end of the war with Greece, which went on from
1920 to 1922, the Turks had reoccupied Smyrna. As the allies were not prepared to send armies to
help the Greeks, they were forced to come to terms with the Nationalist Turks. At the conference at
Mudiania the Greeks agreed to revise the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, which was done by the
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which granted the demands of Turkey except in Western Thrace. The
rest of the Treaty of Sevres was accepted by the Turks which meant the loss of her Arab provinces
in Asia. Before the War of 1914, Turkey had lost all her provinces in Europe. After the War, she
lost her provinces in Asia. As a result of the dismemberment of the old Turkish Empire, what now
remains of it is the small state called the Republic of Turkey with an area which is a minute fraction
of the old Empire 45[f.45] .

[G.Subramaniam]

II
Take the case of Czechoslovakia. It is the creation of the Treaty of Trianon which followed the
European War of 1914. None of the peace treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of
Trianon. Says Prof. Macartney, " By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even
if we exclude Croatia, Slavonia, which had stood only in a federal relationship to the other lands of
the Holy Crown—although one of eight hundred years' standing—Hungary proper was reduced to
less than one-third (32.6 per cent.) of her pre-war area, and a little over two-fifths (41.6 per cent.)
of her population. Territories and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no less than
seven states." Of these states, there was one which did not exist before. It was a new creation. That
was the state of Czechoslovakia.
The area of the Republic of Czechoslovakia was 54,244 square miles and the population was about
13,613,172. It included the territories formerly known as Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and
Ruthenia. It was a composite state which included in its bosom three principal nationalities, (i)
Czechs occupying Bohemia and Moravia, (ii) Slovaks occupying Slovakiaand(iii) Ruthenians in
occupation of Ruthenia.
Czechoslovakia proved to be a very short-lived state. It lived exactly for two decades. On the 15th
March 1939 it perished or rather was destroyed as an independent state. It became a protectorate of
Germany. The circumstances attending its expiry were of a very bewildering nature. Her death was
brought about by the very Powers which had given it birth. By signing the Munich Pact on 30th
September 1938—of which the protectorate was an inevitable consequence. Great Britain, France
and Italy assisted Germany, their former enemy of the Great War, to conquer Czechoslovakia, their
former ally. All the work of the Czechs of the past century to gain freedom was wiped off. They
were once more to be the slaves of their former German overlords.
Ill
What are the reasons for the disruption of Turkey ?
Lord Eversley in his Turkish Empire 46[f.46] has attempted to give reasons for the decay of
Turkey, some internal, some external. Among the internal causes there were two. First the
degeneracy of the Ottoman dynasty. The supreme power fell into the hands either of the Vazirs of
the Sultans or more often in the hands of women of the harem of the Sultan. The harem was always
in antagonism to the official administration of the Porte, which ostensibly carried on the
administration of the state under the direction of the Sultan. The officials of every degree from the
highest to the lowest were interested in the sale of all offices, civil and military, to the highest
bidders. For securing their object, they found it expedient to bribe the inmates of the harem and
thereby win the assent of the Sultans. The harem thus became the centre from which corruption
spread throughout the Turkish Empire and which was one of the main causes of its decay. The
second main cause of the decadence of the Turkish Empire was the deterioration of its armies due
to two causes. During the last 300 years the army had lost the elan and the daring by which the
Ottomans won their many victories in the early period of their career. The loss of this elan and
daring by the Turkish army was due to the composition of the army, recruitment to which was
restricted to Turks and Arabs, and also to the diminution of opportunities of plunder and the hope
of acquiring lands for distribution among the soldiers as an incentive to victory and valour in the
latter period when the Empire was on the defensive and when it was no longer a question of making
fresh conquests, but of retaining what had already been won,
Among the external causes of the disruption of Turkey, the chief one is said to be the rapacity of
the European nations. But this view omits to take note of the true cause. The true and the principal
cause of the disruption of Turkey was the growth of the spirit of nationalism among its subject
peoples. The Greek revolt, the revolts of the Serbs, Bulgarians and other Balkans against the
Turkish authority were no doubt represented as a conflict between Christianity and Islam. That is
one way of looking at it, but only a superficial way. These revolts were simply the manifestations
of the spirit of nationalism by which they were generated. These revolts no doubt had for their
immediate causes Turkish misrule, Christian antipathy to Islam and the machinations of European
nations. But this does not explain the real force which motivated them. The real motive force was
the spirit of nationalism and their revolts were only a manifestation of this inner urge brought on by
it. That it was nationalism which had brought about the disruption of Turkey is proved by the revolt
of the Arabs in the last war and their will to be independent. Here there was no conflict between
Islam and Christianity, nor was the relationship between the two that of the oppressor and the
oppressed. Yet, the Arab claimed to be freed from the Turkish Empire. Why ? Because he was
moved by Arab nationalism and preferred to be an Arab nationalist to being a Turkish subject.
What is the cause of the destruction of Czechoslovakia ?
The general impression is that it was the result of German aggression. To some extent that is true.
But it is not the whole truth. If Germany was the only enemy of Czechoslovakia, all that she would
have lost was the fringe of her borderland which was inhabited by the Sudeten Germans. German
aggression need have cost her nothing more. Really speaking the destruction of Czechoslovakia
was brought about by an enemy within her own borders. That enemy was the intransigent
nationalism of the Slovaks who were out to break up the unity of the state and secure the
independence of Slovakia.
The union of the Slovaks with the Czechs, as units of a single state, was based upon certain
assumptions. First, the two were believed to be so closely akin as to be one people, and that the
Slovaks were only a branch of Czechoslovaks. Second, the two spoke a single * Czechoslovak *
language. Third, there was no separate Slovak national consciousness. Nobody examined these
assumptions at the time, because the Slovaks themselves desired this union, expressing their wish
in 1918 by formal declaration of their representatives at the Peace Conference. This was a
superficial and hasty view of the matter. As Prof. Macartney 47[f.47] points out.
". . . . ' the central political fact which emerges from the consideration of this history (of the
relations between the Czechs and Slovaks) for the purposes of the present age is the final
crystallization of a Slovak national consciousness , . . .' The genuine and uncompromising
believers in a single indivisible Czechoslovak language and people were certainly never so large, at
least in Slovakia, as they were made to appear. Today they have dwindled to a mere handful, under
the influence of actual experience of the considerable differences which exist between the Czechs
and the Slovaks. At present Slovak is in practice recognized by the Czechs themselves as the
official language of Solvakia. The political and national resistance has been no less tenacious, and
to-day the name of ' Czechoslovakia' is practically confined to official documents and to literature
issued for the benefit of foreigners. During many weeks in the country I only remember hearing
one person use the term for herself; this was a half German, half-Hungarian girl, who used it in a
purely political sense, meaning that she thought irridentism futile. No Czech and no Slovak feels or
calls himself, when speaking naturally, anything but a Czech or a Slovak as the case may be."
This national consciousness of the Slovaks, which was always alive, began to burst forth on seeing
that the Sudeten Germans had made certain demands on Czechoslovakia for autonomy. The
Germans sought to achieve their objective by the application of gangster morality to international
politics, saying " Give us what we ask or we shall burst up your shop." The Slovaks followed suit
by making their demands for autonomy but with a different face. They did not resort to gangster
methods but modulated their demands to autonomy only. They had eschwed all idea of
independence, and, in the proclamation issued on October 8 by Dr. Tiso, the leading man in the
autonomist movement in Slovakia, it was said " We shall proceed in the spirit of our motto, for God
and the Nation, in a Christian and national spirit." Believing in their bona fides and desiring to give
no room to the Gravamin Politic of which the Slovaks were making full use to disturb the friendly
relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the National Assembly in Prague passed an Act in
November 1938—immediately after the Munich Pact—called the " Constitutional Act on the
Autonomy of Slovakia." Its provisions were of a far-reaching character. There was to be a separate
parliament for Slovakia and this parliament was to decide the constitution of Slovakia within the
framework of the legal system of the Czechoslovak Republic. An alteration in the territory of
Slovakia was to be with the consent of the two-third majority in the Slovak parliament. The consent
of the Slovak parliament was made necessary for international treaties which exclusively concerned
Slovakia. Officials of the central state administration in Slovakia were to be primarily Slovaks.
Proportional representation of Slovakia was guaranteed in all central institutions, councils,
commissions and other organizations. Similarly, Slovakia was to be proportionally represented on
all international organizations in which the Czechoslovak Republic was called upon to participate.
Slovak soldiers, in peace time, were to be stationed in Slovakia as far as possible. As far as
legislative authority was concerned all subjects which were strictly of common concern were
assigned to the parliament of Czechoslovakia. By way of guaranteeing these rights to the Slovaks,
the Constitution Act provided that the decision of the National Assembly to make constitutional
changes shall be valid only if the majority constitutionally required for such changes includes also a
proportionate majority of the members of the National Assembly elected in Slovakia. Similarly, the
election of the President of the Republic required the consent not merely of the constitutionally
determined majority of the members of the parliament, but also of a proportionate majority of the
Slovak members. Further to emphasize that the central government must enjoy the confidence of
the Slovaks it was provided by the constitution that one-third of the Slovak members of parliament
may propose a motion of ' No Confidence. '
These constitutional changes introduced, much against the will of the Czechs, a hyphen between
the Czechs and the Slovaks which did not exist before. But it was done in the hope that, once the
relatively minor quarrels between the two were got out of the way, the very nationalism of the
Slovaks was more likely to bring them closer to the Czechs than otherwise. With the constitutional
changes guaranteeing an independent status to Slovakia and the fact that the status so guaranteed
could not be Changed without the consent of the Slovaks themselves, there was no question of the
Slovaks ever losing their national identity through submergence by the Czechs. The autonomy
introduced by the hyphen separated the cultural waters and saved the Slovaks from losing their
colour.
The first Slovak parliament elected under the new constitution was opened on January 18, 1939,
and Dr. Martin Sokol, the President of the parliament, declared, " The period of the Slovak's
struggle for freedom is ended. Now begins the period of national rebirth." Other speeches made on
the occasion indicated that now that Slovakia had its autonomy the Slovaks would never feel
animosity towards the Czechs and that both would loyally abide by the Czecho-Slovak State.
Not even a month elapsed since the inauguration of the Slovak parliament before the Slovak
politicians began their battle against the hyphen and for complete separation. They made excited
speeches in which they attacked the Czechs, talked about Czech oppression and demanded a
completely independent Slovakia. By the beginning of March, the various forms of separatism in
Slovakia were seriously threatening the integrity of the Czechoslovak State. On March 9 it was
learnt that Tiso, the Slovak Premier, had decided to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. On the
10th, in anticipation of such an act, troops were moved in Slovakia and Tiso, the Prime Minister,
was dismissed along with other Slovak ministers by the President of the Republic, Dr. Hacha. On
the next day Tiso, supposed to be under police supervision, telephoned to Berlin and asked for help.
On Monday Tiso and Hitler met and had an hour and a half talk in Berlin. Immediately after the
talk with Hitler, Tiso got on the phone to Prague and passed on the German orders.
They were:—
(i) All Czech troops to be withdrawn from Slovakia;
(ii) Slovakia to be an independent state under German protection;
(iii) The Slovak parliament to be summoned by President Hacha to hear the proclamation of
independence.
There was nothing that President Hacha and the Prague Government could do except say ' yes ' for
they knew very well that dozens of divisions of German troops were massed round the defenceless
frontiers of Czechoslovakia ready to march in at any moment if the demands made by Germany in
the interest of and at the instance of Slovakia were refused. Thus ended the new state of
Czechoslovakia.

[G.Subramaniam]

IV
What is the lesson to be drawn from the story of these two countries ?
There is some difference as to how the matters should be put. Mr. Sydney Brooks would say that
the cause of these wars of disruption is nationalism, which according to him is the enemy of the
universal peace. Mr. Norman Angell, on the other hand, would say it is not nationalism but the
threat to nationalism which is the cause. To Mr. Robertson nationalism is an irrational instinct, if
not a positive hallucination, and the sooner humanity got rid of it the better for all.
In whatever way the matter is put and howsoever ardently one may wish for the elimination of
nationalism, the lesson to be drawn is quite clear: that nationalism is a fact which can neither be
eluded nor denied. Whether one calls it an irrational instinct or positive hallucination, the fact
remains that it is a potent force which has a dynamic power to disrupt empires. Whether
nationalism is the cause or the threat to nationalism is the cause, is a difference of emphasis only.
The real thing is to recognize, as does Mr. Toynbee, that " nationalism is strong enough to produce
war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be
reckoned with." As was pointed out by him, " the right reading of nationalism has become an affair
of life and death." It was not only so for Europe. It was so for Turkey. It was so for
Czechoslovakia. And what was a question of life and death to them could not but be one of life and
death to India. Prof. Toynbee pleaded, as was done before him by Guizot, for the recognition of
nationality as the necessary foundation of European peace. Could India ignore to recognize this
plea ? If she does, she will be acting at her peril. That nationalism is a disruptive force is not the
only lesson to be learnt from the history of these two countries. Their experience embodies much
else of equal if not of greater significance. What that is, will be evident if certain facts are recalled
to memory.
The Turks were by no means as illiberal as they are painted. They allowed their minorities a large
measure of autonomy. The Turks had gone far towards solving the problem of how people of
different communities with different social heritages are to live together in harmony when they are
geographically intermingled. The Ottoman Empire had accorded, as a matter of course, to the
non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities within its frontiers a degree of territorial as well as
cultural autonomy which had never been dreamt of in the political philosophy of the West. Ought
not the Christian subjects to have been satisfied with this ? Say what one may, the nationalism of
Christian minorities was not satisfied with this local autonomy. It fought for complete freedom and
in that fight Turkey was slit open.
The Turks were bound to the Arabs by the tie of religion. The religious tie of Islam is the strongest
known to humanity. No social confederacy can claim to rival the Islamic brotherhood in point of
solidarity-. Add to this the fact that while the Turk treated his Christian subjects as his inferior, he
acknowledged the Arab as his equal. All non-Muslims were excluded from the Ottoman army. But
the Arab soldiers and officers served side by side with Turks and Kurds. The Arab officer class,
educated in Turkish school, served in military and civil capacities on the same terms as the Turks.
There was no derogating distinction between the Turk and the Arab, and there was nothing to
prevent the Arab from rising to the highest rank in the Ottoman services. Not only politically but
even socially the Arab was treated as his equal by the Turk and Arabs married Turkish wives and
Turks married Arab wives. Ought not the Arabs to have been satisfied with this Islamic
brotherhood of Arabs and Turks based on fraternity, liberty and equality ? Say what one may, the
Arabs were not satisfied. Arab nationalism broke the bonds of Islam and fought against his fellow
Muslim, the Turk, for its independence. It won, but Turkey was completely dismantled.
As to Czechoslovakia, she began with the recognition that both the Czechs and the Slovaks were
one people. Within a few years, the Slovaks claimed to be a separate nation. They would not even
admit that they were a branch of the same stock as the Czechs. Their nationalism compelled the
Czechs to recognize the fact that they were a distinct people. The Czechs sought to pacify the
nationalism of the Slovaks by drawing a hyphen as a mark indicating distinctness. In place of
Czechoslovakia they agreed to have Czecho-Slovakia. But even with the hyphen the Slovak
nationalism remained discontented. The act of autonomy was both, a hyphen separating them from
the Czechs as well as a link joining them with the Czechs. The hyphen as making separation was
welcome to the Slovaks but as making a link with the Czechs was very irksome to them. The
Slovaks accepted the autonomy with its hyphen with great relief and promised to be content and
loyal to the state. But evidently this was only a matter of strategy. They did not accept it as an
ultimate end. They accepted it because they thought that they could use it as a vantage ground for
destroying the hyphen which was their main aim and convert autonomy into independence. The
nationalism of the Slovaks was not content with a hyphen. It wanted a bar in place of the hyphen.
Immediately the hyphen was introduced, they began their battle to replace the hyphen between the
Czechs and the Slovaks by a bar. They did not care what means they should employ. Their
nationalism was so wrong-headed and so intense that when they failed they did not hesitate to call
the aid of the Germans.
Thus a deeper study of the disruption of Turkey and Czechoslovakia shows that neither local
autonomy nor the bond of religion is sufficient to withstand the force of nationalism, once it is set
on the go.
This is a lesson which the Hindus will do well to grasp. They should ask themselves : if the Greek,
Balkan and Arab nationalism has blown up the Turkish State and if Slovak nationalism has caused
the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what is thereto prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the
Indian State ? If experience of other countries teaches that this is the inevitable consequence of
pent-up nationalism, why not profit by their experience and avoid the catastrophe by agreeing to
divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan ? Let the Hindus take the warning that if they refuse to
divide India into two before they launch on their career as a free people, they will be sailing in
those shoal waters in which Turkey, Czechoslovakia and many others have foundered. If they wish
to avoid shipwreck in mid-ocean, they must lighten the draught by throwing overboard all
superfluous cargo. They will ease the course of their voyage considerably if they—to use the
language of Prof. Toynbee—reconcile themselves to making jetsam of less cherished and more
combustible cargo.

[G.Subramaniam]

V
Will the Hindus really lose if they agree to divide India into two, Pakistan and Hindus'?
With regard to Czechoslovakia it is instructive to note the real feelings of its government on the
loss of their territory caused by the Munich Pact. They were well expressed by the Prime Minister
of Czechoslovakia in his message to the people of Czechoslovakia. In it he said 48[f.48] :—
" Citizens and soldiers.... I am living through the hardest hour of my life; I am carrying out the most
painful task, in comparison with which death would be easy. But precisely because I have flight
and because I know under what conditions a war is won, must tell you frankly... that the forces
opposed to us at this moment compel us to recognize their superior strength and to act
accordingly....
"In Munich four European Great Powers met and decided to demand of us the acceptance of new
frontiers, according to which the German areas of our State would be taken away. We had the
choice between desperate and hopeless defence, which would have meant the sacrifice not only of
the adult generation but also of women and children, and the acceptance of conditions which in
their ruthlessness, and because they were imposed by pressure without war, have no parallel in
history. We desired to make a contribution to peace; we would gladly have made it But not by any
means in the way it has been fenced upon us.
" But we were abandoned, and were alone.... Deeply moved, all your leaders considered, together
with the army and the President of the Republic, all the possibilities which remained. They
recognized that in choosing between narrower frontiers and the death of the nation it was their
sacred duty to save the life of our people, so that we may not emerge weakened from these terrible
limes, and so that we may remain certain that our nation will gather itself together again, as it has
done so often in the past. Let us alt see that our State re-establishes itself soundly within its new
frontiers, and that its population is assured of a new life of peace and fruitful labour. With your
help we shall succeed. We rely upon you, and you have confidence in us."
It is evident that the Czechs refused to be led by the force of historic sentiment. They were ready to
have narrower frontiers and a smaller Czechoslovakia to the ultimate destruction of their people.
With regard to Turkey the prevalent view was the one that was expressed in 1853 by the Czar
Nicholas I, during a conversation with British Ambassador in St. Petersburg in which he said " We
have on our hand a sick man—a very sick man . . . . He may suddenly die upon our hands." From
that day the imminent decease of Turkey, the sick man of Europe was awaited by all his
neighbours. The shedding of the territories was considered as the convulsions of a dying man who
is alleged to have breathed his last by affixing his signature to the Treaty of Severs.
Is this really a correct view to take of Turkey in the process of dissolution? It is instructive to note
the comments of Arnold Toynbee on this view. Referring to the Czar's description of Turkey as the
sick man who may suddenly die, he says 49[f.49] :
" In this second and more sensational part of his diagnosis Czar Nicholas went astray because he
did not understand the nature of the symptoms. If a person totally ignorant of natural history
stumbled upon a snake in course of shedding its skin, he would pronounce dogmatically that the
creature could not possible recover. He could point out that when a man (or other mammal) has the
misfortune to lose his skin, he is never known to survive. Yet while it is perfectly true that the
leopard cannot change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin, a wider study would have informed our
amateur naturalist that a snake can do both and does both habitually. Doubtless, even for the snake,
the process is awkward and uncomfortable. He becomes temporarily torpid, and in this condition he
is dangerously at the mercy of his enemies. Yet, if he escapes the kites and crows until his
metamorphosis is complete, he not only recovers his health but renews his youth with the
replacement of his mortal coils. This is the recent experience of the Turk, and ' moulting snake ' is
better simile than sick man for a description of his distemper."
In this view, the loss of her possessions by Turkey is the removal of an anomalous excrescence and
the gain of a new skin. Turkey is certainly homogeneous and has no fear of any disruption from
within.
The Muslim areas are an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous
excrescence on them. Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia. Welded together
they will make India a heterogeneous unit. If Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of
India, it has also the merit of introducing harmony in place of conflict.
Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit. The homogeneity of the two areas is
obvious enough. Each has a cultural unity. Each has a religious unity. Pakistan has a linguistic
unity. If there is no such unity in Hindustan, it is possible to have it without any controversy as to
whether the common language should be Hindustani, Hindi or Urdu. Separated, each can become a
strong and well-knit state. India needs a strong Central Government. But it cannot have it so long as
Pakistan remains a part of India. Compare the structure of the Federal Government as embodied in
the Government of India Act, 1935, and it will be found, that the Central Government as
constituted under it is an effete ramshackle thing with very little life in it. 50[f.50] As has already
been pointed out, this weakening of the Central Government is brought about by the desire to
placate the Muslim Provinces who wish to be independent of the authority of the Central
Government on the ground that the Central Government is bound to be predominantly Hindu in
character and composition. When Pakistan comes into being these considerations can have no
force. Hindustan can then have a strong Central Government and a homogeneous population, which
are necessary elements for the stability of the state and neither of which will be secured unless there
is severance of Pakistan from Hindustan.

[G.Subramaniam]

Contents PART IV
[f.1]See Times of India dated 25-7-1925, " Through Indian Eyes ".
[f.2]On the question whether the Hindu Religion was a missionary Religion and if it was, why it
ceased to be so, see my essay on Carte and Conversion in the Annual Number of the Telugu
Samachar for 1926.
[f.3]See Report in Times of India 27-11-24, "Through Indian Eyes
[f.4]Speech at the Calcutta Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in December 1939, p. 14.
[f.5]Speech Ibid., p. 25.
[f.6]Ibid..pp.24—27
[f.7]Speech 1939, Ibid.. p. 18.
[f.8]Ibid., pp. 19-20.
[f.9]Speech 1939, pp. 21,22,23.
[f.10]Language of Gods
[f.11]Basically Sanskrit
[f.12]National Language
[f.13]Ibid., p. 4.
[f.14]Ibid., p. 16.
[f.15]Ibid.. pp. 14-17
[f.16]It should be noted that Mr. Savarkar is not opposed to separate electorates for the Muslims. It
is not clear whether he is in favour of separate electorates for Muslims even where they are in a
majority
[f.17]See his Manifesto dated 23rd March 1919
[f18]Young India, 2nd June 1920.
[f.19]" In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial Governments
have signally failed in their duty towards the Muslims of India and the Prime Minister has
deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-Muslim
Indian if every legitimate manner to assist his Muslim brother in his attempt to remove the religious
calamity that has overtaken him;
" And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the events of the April of 1919, both the said
Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab and
punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and have exonerated
Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself directly responsible for most of the official crimes and
callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the debate in the
House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, and systematic
terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is
proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab ;
" This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without redress of the two
aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to
prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of Swarajya.
" This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to
approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent non-co-operation inaugurated by
Mahatma Gandhi, until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established. "
Mrs. Annie Besant says : " It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi, in March 1920, had forbidden
the mixing up of non-co-operation in defence of the Khilafat with other questions ; but it was found
that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive to Hindus ", so at the meeting of the All-India
Congress Committee held at Benares on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies
of the Reforms Act were added to the list of provocative causes.—The Future of Indian Politics, p.
250.
[f.20]Mr. Gandhi repudiated the suggestion of the Modern Review and regarded it as " crudest cut
". Dealing with the criticism of the Modern Review in his Article in Young India for 20th October
1921 Mr. Gandhi said " I claim that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana
Mahomed Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafal, I
ensure safely of the cow, that is my religion, from the Musalman knife. "
[f.21]The Resolution of non-co-operation was carried by 1886 voles against 884. The late Mr.
Tairsee once told me that a large majority of the delegates were no others than the taxi drivers of
Calcutta who were paid to vote for the non-co-operation resolution
[f.22]Liberator 22nd April 1926.
[f.23]Young India, 10th December 1919.
[f.24]Young India. 9th June 1920
[f.25]Young India dated 4th May 1921
[f.26]It is reported that for earning merit for the soul of Abdul Rashid, the murderer of Swami
Shradhanand, in the next world, the students and professors of the famous theological college at
Deoband finished five complete recitations of the Koran and had planned to finish daily a lakh and
a quarter recitations of Koranic verses. Their prayer was " God Almighty may give the marhoom
(Le.. Rashid) a place in the ' a ' ala-e-illeeyeen (the summit of the seventh heaven) "— Times of
India. 30-11-27 Through Indian Eyes columns.
[f.27]The resolution says that then were only three cases of forcible conversion ! ! In reply to a
question in the Central Legislature (Debates 16thJanuary 1922)Sir William Vincent replied: - The
Madras Government report that the number of forcible conversions probably runs to thousands but
that for obvious reasons it will never be possible to obtain anything like an accurate estimate ".
[f.28]The series is known as " India in 1920 " & so on.
[f.29]Rangila Rasul was written in reply to Sitaka Chinala—a pamphlet written by a Muslim
alleging that Sita, wife of Rama, the hero of Ramayana, was a prostitute.
[f.30]Report of the Court of Inquiry appointed under section 3 of the Sind Public Inquiries Act to
inquire into the riots which occurred at Sukkur in 1939, p. 65. The total of 142 Hindus under '
murdered ' seems to be a mistake. It ought to be 72.
[f.31]Ibid., pp. 66-67.
[f.32]This is an English version of the report which appeared in the Savadhan, a Marathi weekly of
Nagpur, in its issue of 25th August 1936
[f.33]Quoted in " Through Indian Eyes "columns of the Times of India, dated 16-8-26.
[f.34]The Unity of Western Civiliazation (4th Ed.,) p. 27.
[f.35]The Christian Church did not play a passive pan in the process of unification of the Holy
Roman Umpire, It took a very active part in bringing it about. " Seeing one institution after another
falling to pieces around her, seeing how countries and cities were being severed from each other by
thr eruption of strange tribes and the increasing difficulty of communication the Christain Church, "
says Bryce, " strove to save religious fellowship by strengthening the ecclesiastical organization, by
drawing lighter every bond of outward union. Necessities of faith were still more powerful. Truth,
it was said, is one, and as it must bind into one body all who hold it, so it is only by continuing in
that body that they can preserve it. There is one Flock and one Shepherd. "
[f.36]Beside the Central Legislature there are to be constituted under the scheme of Reforms other
popular bodies such as Panchayats, Rural Boards, Municipalities and Town Committees.
[f.37]The distribution of population of Hyderabad State (excluding Berar) is according to the
census of 1931 as follows;—
"Hindus Untouchables Muslims Christians Others Total
96,99,615 24.73.230 15.34,666 1.51,382 5,77.255 1.44.36.148
[f.38]See Bombay Sentinal, June 22nd, 1940. Mr. Mir Akbar Ali Khan says that he discussed his
proposals with Mr. Srinivas Iyengar, ex-president of the Congress and the proposals published by
him are really proposals as approved by Mr. lyengar.
[f.39]Mufti Kifay at Ullah, a prominent member of the conference, in the course of his speech is
reported to have said : "They had to demonstrate that they were not behind any other community in
the fight for freedom, He wished to declare in clear terms that they did not rely on the British
Government for the protection of their rights. They would themselves chalk out the safeguards
necessary for the protection of their religious rights and would fight oat any party, however
powerful, that would refuse to accept those safeguards as they would fight the Government for
freedom " (Prolonged cheers.) Hindustan times. april 30, 1940.
[f.40]See the speeches of Maulana Hafizul Rehman and Dr. K. M. Ashraf in the same issue of the
Hindustan Times.
[f.41]This report has not appeared even now
[f.42]Macht Politic means Power Politics.
[f.43]Gravamin Politic mews in which the main strategy is to gain power by manufacturing
grievances.
[f.44]Turkey, pp. 363-64.
[f.45]The area of Turkey is 294,492 square miles exclusive of 3,708 square miles of lakes and
swamps. The area of Turkey in Europe is only 9,257 square miles.
[f.46]See abridgement by Sheikh Abdur Rashid.
[f.47]C. A. Macartney—Hungary and Her Successors (Oxford), 1937, p. 136.
[f.48]Alexander Henderson—-Eye-witness in Czechoslovakia (Harrap. 1939). pp. 229-30.
[f.49]Amold Toynbee—Turkey, p. 141
[f.50]For further light on this topic, mx my tract on Federation vs. Freedom

[G.Subramaniam]

AKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
________________________________________________________________
Contents
PART IV : PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE
Chapter X : Social stagnation
Chapter XI : Communal aggression
PART IV
PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE
The Hindu-Muslim problem has tow aspects to it. In its first aspect, the problem that presents itself is the problem of
two separate communities facing each other and seeking adjustment of their respective right and privileges. In its
other aspect, the problem is the problem of the reflex influences which this separation and conflict produces upon each
of them. In the course of the foregoing discussion we have looked at the project of Pakistan in relation to the first of
the aspects of the Hindu-Muslim problem. We have not examined the project of Pakistan in relation to the second
aspect of that problem. Yet, such an examination is necessary because that aspect of the Hindu-Muslim problem is not
unimportant. It is a very superficial if not an incomplete view to stop with the problem of the adjustment of their
claims. It cannot be overlooked that their lot is cast together as such they have to participate in a course of common
activity whether they like it or not. And if in this common activity they face each other as two combatants do, then their
actions and reactions are worth study, for they affect both and produce a state of affairs from which if it is a deceased
state, the question of escape must be faced. A study of the situation shows that the actions and reactions have produced
a malaise which exhibits itself in three ways <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/sad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='sad.gif' /><!--endemo-->l) Social Stagnation, (2) Communal Aggression, and (3) National
Frustration of Political 'Destiny. This malaise is a grave one. Will Pakistan he a remedy for the malaise ? Or, will it
aggravate the malaise ? The following chapters are devoted to the consideration of these questions.
CHAPTER X
SOCIAL STAGNATION
I
The social evils which characterize the Hindu Society, have been well known. The publication of Mother India by
Miss Mayo gave these evils the widest publicity. But while Mother India served the purpose of exposing the evils and
calling their authors at the bar of the world to answer for their sins, it created the unfortunate impression throughout
the world that while the Hindus were grovelling in the mud of these social evils and were conservative, the Muslims in
India were free from them, and as compared to the Hindus, were a progressive people. That, such an impression should
prevail, is surprising to those who know the Muslim Society in India at close quarters.
One may well ask if there is any social evil which is found among the Hindus and is not found among the Muslims ?
Take child-marriage. The Secretary of the Anti-Child-marriage Committee, constituted by the All-India Women's
Conference, published a bulletin which gives the extent of the evil of child-marriage in the different communities in
the country. The figures which were taken from the Census Report of 1931 areas follows :—
TABLE
MARRIED FEMALES AGED 0-15 PER 1000 FEMALES OF THAT AGE
Hindus Muslims Jains Sikhs Christians
1881 208 153 189 170 33
1891 193 141 172 143 37
1901 186 131 164 101 38
1911 184 123 130 88 39
1921 170 III 117 72 32
2931 199 186 125 80 43
.
Can the position among the Musalmans so far as child-marriage goes, be considered better than the position among the
Hindus ?
Take the position of women. It is insisted by Muslims that the legal rights given to Muslim women, ensure them a
greater measure of independence than allowed to other Eastern women, for example, Hindu women, and are in excess
of the rights given to women in some Western countries. Reliance is placed on some of the provisions of the Muslim
Law.
Firstly, it is said the Muslim Law does not fix any age for marriage, and recognizes the right of a girl to marry any
time. Further, except where the marriage is celebrated by the father or the grandfather, a Muslim girl, if given in
marriage in childhood, has the power to repudiate her marriage on attaining puberty.
Secondly, it is held out that marriage among the Musalmans is a contract. Being a contract, the husband has a right to
divorce his wife and the Muslim Law has provided ample safeguards for the wife which, if availed of, would place the
Muslim wife on the same footing as the husband in the matter of divorce. For, it is claimed that the wife under the
Muslim Law can, at the time of the marriage,' or even thereafter in some cases, enter into a contract by which she may
under certain circumstances obtain a divorce.
Thirdly, the Mahomedan Law requires that a wife can claim from her husband, by way of consideration for the
surrender of her person, a sum of money or other property—known as her " dower ". The dower may be fixed even
after marriage and if no amount is fixed, the wife is entitled to proper dower. The amount of dower is usually split into
two parts, one is called " prompt " which is payable on demand, and the other " deferred " which is payable on
dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. Her claim for dower will be treated as a debt against the husband's estate.
She has complete dominion over her dower which is intended to give her economic independence. She can remit it or
she can appropriate the income of it as she pleases.
Granting all these provisions of law in her favour, the Muslim woman is the most helpless person in the world. To
quote an Egyptian Muslim leader :—
" Islam has set its seal of inferiority upon her, and given the sanction of religion to social customs which have deprived
her of the full opportunity for self-expression and development of personality."
No Muslim girl has the courage to repudiate her marriage, although it may be open to her on the ground that she was a
child and that it was brought about by persons other than her parents. No Muslim wife will think it proper to have a
clause entered into her marriage contract reserving her the right to divorce. In that event, her fate is " once married,
always married." She cannot escape the marriage tie, however irksome it may be. While she cannot repudiate the
marriage, the husband can always do it without having to show any cause. Utter the word " Tallak "' and observe
continence for three weeks and the woman is cast away. The only restraint on his caprice is the obligation to pay
dower. If the dower has already been remitted, his right to divorce is a matter of his sweet will.
This latitude in the matter of divorce destroys that sense of security which is so fundamental for a full, free and happy
life for a woman. This insecurity of life, to which a Muslim woman is exposed, is greatly augmented by the right of
polygamy and concubinage, which the Muslim Law gives to the husband.
Mahomedam Law allows a Muslim to marry four wives at a time. It is not unoften said that this is an improvement
over the Hindu Law which places no restriction on the number of wives a Hindu can have at any given time. But it is
forgotten that in addition to the four legal wives, the Muslim Law permits a Mahomedan to cohabit with his female
slaves. In the case of female slaves nothing is said as to the number. They are allowed to him without any restriction
whatever and without any obligation to marry them.
No words can adequately express the great and many evils of polygamy and concubinage and especially as a source of
misery to a Muslim woman. It is true that because polygamy and concubinage are sanctioned, one must not suppose
they are indulged in by the generality of Muslims; still the fact remains that they are privileges which are easy for a
Muslim to abuse to the misery and unhappiness of his wife. Mr. John J. Pool, no enemy of Islam, observes [f1] 1:—
"This latitude in the mailer of divorce is very greatly taken advantage of by some Mohamedans. Slohart, commenting
on this subject in his book, Islam, and its Founder, says: ' Some Mohamodans make a habit of continually changing
their wives. We read of young men who have had twenty and thirty wives, a new one every three months: and thus it
comes about that women are liable to be indefinitely transferred from one man to another, obliged to accept a husband
and a home whenever they can find one, or in case of destitution, to which divorce may have driven them, to resort to
other more degrading means of living. Thus while keeping the strict letter of the law, and possessing only one or
certainly not more than four wives, unscrupulous characters may yet by divorce obtain in a lifetime as many wives as
they please.
" In another way also a Mohammedan may really have more than four wives, and yet keep within the law. This is by
means of living with concubines, which the Koran expressly permits. In that sura which allows four wives, the words
are added, ' of the slaves which ye shall have acquired.' Then in the 70th suru. it is revealed that it is no sin to live with
slaves. The very words are: ' The slaves which their right hands possess, as to them they shall be blameless.' At the
present day, as in days past, in multitudes of Mohamedan homes, slaves are found; as Muir says, in his Life of
Mahomet ' so long as this unlimited permission of living with their female slaves continues, it cannot be expected that
there will be any hearty attempt to put a stop to slavery in Mohamedan countries.' Thus the Koran, in this matter of
slavery, is the enemy of the mankind. And women, as usual, are the greater sufferers.'
Take the caste system. Islam speaks of brotherhood. Everybody infers that Islam must be free from slavery and caste.
Regarding slavery nothing needs to be said. It stands abolished now by law. But while it existed much of its support
was derived from Islam and Islamic countries.[f2] 2 While the prescriptions by the Prophet regarding the just and
humane treatment of slaves contained in the Koran are praiseworthy, there is nothing whatever in Islam that lends
support to the abolition of this curse. As Sir W. Muir has well said 3[f.3] :—
"...rather, while lightening, lie riveted the fetter.... There is no obligation on a Muslim to release his slaves. ... "
But if slavery has gone, caste among Musalmans has remained. As an illustration one may take the conditions
prevalent among the Bengal Muslims. The Superintendent of the
Census for 1901 for the Province of Bengal records the following interesting facts regarding the Muslims of Bengal
:—
" The conventional division of the Mahomedans into four tribes— Sheikh, Saiad, Moghul and Pathan—has very little
application to this Province (Bengal). The Mahomedans themselves recognize two main social divisions, (1) Ashraf or
Sharaf and (2) Ajlaf Ashraf means ' noble ' and includes all undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from
high caste Hindus. All other Mahomedans including the occupational groups and all converts of lower ranks, are
known by the contemptuous terms, ' Ajlaf , ' wretches ' or ' mean people ': they are also called Kamina or Itar, ' base '
or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, ' worthless '. In some places a third class, called Arzal or ' lowest of all ', is added. With
them no other Mahomedan would associate, and they are forbidden to enter the mosque to use the public burial
ground.
"Within these groups there are castes with social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the
Hindus.
' 1. Ashraf or better class Mahomedans.
(1) Saiads.
(2) Sheikhs.
(3) Pathans.
(4) Moghul.
(5) Mallik.
(6) Mirza.
II. Ajlaf or lower class Mahomedans.
(1) Cultivating Sheikhs, and others who were originally Hindus but who do not belong to any functional group, and
have not gained admittance to the Ashraf Community, e.g. Pirali and Thakrai.
(2) Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir, and Rangrez.
(3) Barhi, Bhalhiara, Chik, Churihar, Dai, Dhawa, Dhunia, Gaddi, Kalal, Kasai, Kula Kunjara, Laheri, Mahifarosh,
Mallah, Naliya, Nikari.
(4) Abdal, Bako, Bediya, Bhal, Chamba, Dafali, Dhobi, Hajjam, Mucho, Nagarchi, Nal,Panwaria, Madaria,Tunlia.
III. Arzal or degraded class. Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugia, Mchlar."

[G.Subramaniam]

The Census Superintendent mentions another feature of the Muslim social system, namely, the prevalence of the "
panchayat system." He states :—
" The authority of the panchayat extends to social as well as trade matters and... marriage with people of' other
communities is one of offences of which the governing body lakes cognizance. The result is that these groups are often
as strictly endogamous as Hindu castes. The prohibition on inter-marriage extends to higher as well as to lower castes,
and a Dhuina, for example, may marry no one but a Dhuina. If this rule is transgressed, the offender is at once hauled
up before the panchayat and ejected ignominiously from his community. A member of one such group cannot
ordinarily gain admission to another, and he retains the designation of the community in which he was born even if he
abandons its distinctive occupation and takes to other means of livelihood.... thousands of Jolahas are butchers, yet
they are still known as Jolahas."
Similar facts from other Provinces of India could be gathered from their respective Census Reports and those who are
curious may refer to them. But the facts for Bengal are enough to show that the Mahomedans observe not only caste
but also untouchability.
There can thus be no manner of doubt that the Muslim Society in India is afflicted by the same social evils as afflict
the Hindu Society. Indeed, the Muslims have all the social evils of the Hindus and something more. That something
more is the compulsory system of purdah for Muslim women.
As a consequence of the purdah system a segregation of the Muslim women is brought about. The ladies are not
expected to visit the outer rooms, verandahs or gardens, their quarters are in the back-yard. All of them, young and old,
are confined in the same room. No male servant can work in their presence. A woman is allowed to see only her sons,
brothers, father, uncles and husband, or any other near relation who may be admitted to a position of trust. She cannot
go even to the mosque to pray and must wear burka (veil) whenever she has to go out. These burka women walking in
the streets is one of the most hideous sights one can witness in India. Such seclusion cannot but have its deteriorating
effects upon the physical constitution of Muslim women. They are usually victims to anaemia, tuberculosis and
pyorrhoea. Their bodies are deformed, with their backs bent, bones protruded, hands and feet crooked. Ribs, joints and
nearly all their bones ache. Heart palpitation is very often present in them. The result of this pelvic deformity is
untimely death at the time of delivery. Purdah deprives Muslim women of mental and moral nourishment. Being
deprived of healthy social life, the process of moral degeneration must and does set in. Being completely secluded
from the outer world, they engage their minds in petty family quarrels with the result that they become narrow and
restricted in their outlook.
They lag behind their sisters from other communities, cannot take part in any outdoor activity and are weighed down
by a slavish mentality and an inferiority complex. They have no desire for knowledge, because they are taught not to
be interested in anything outside the four walls of the house. Purdah women in particular become helpless, timid, and
unfit for any fight in life. Considering the large number of purdah women among Muslims in India, one can easily
understand the vastness and seriousness of the problem of purdah 4[f.4]
The physical and intellectual effects of purdah are nothing as compared with its effects on morals. The origin of
purdah lies of course in the deep-rooted suspicion of sexual appetites in both sexes and the purpose is to check them
by segregating the sexes. But far from achieving the purpose, purdah has adversely affected the morals of Muslim
men. Owing to purdah a Muslim has no contact with any woman outside those who belong to his own household.
Even with them his contact extends only to occasional conversation. For a male there is no company of and no
commingling with the females except those who are children or aged. This isolation of the males from females is sure
to produce bad effects on the morals of men. It requires no psychoanalyst to say that a social system which cuts off all
contact between, the two sexes produces an unhealthy tendency towards sexual excesses and unnatural and other
morbid habits and ways.
The evil consequences of purdah are not confined to the Muslim community only. It is responsible for the social
segregation of Hindus from Muslims which is the bane of public life in India. This argument may appear far fetched
and one is inclined to attribute this segregation to the unsociability of the Hindus rather than to purdah among the
Muslims. But the Hindus are right when they say that it is not possible to establish social contact between Hindus and
Muslims because such contact can only mean contact between women from one side and men from the other 5 [f.5]
Not that purdah and the evils consequent thereon are not to be found among certain sections of the Hindus in certain
parts of the country. But the point of distinction is that among the Muslims, purdah has a religious sanctity which it
has not with the Hindus. Purdah has deeper roots among the Muslims than it has among the Hindus and can only be
removed by facing the inevitable conflict between religious injunctions and social needs. The problem of purdah is a
real problem with the Muslims—apart from its origin—which it is not with the Hindus. Of any attempt by the Muslims
to do away with it, there is no evidence.
There is thus a stagnation not only in the social life but also in the political life of the Muslim community of India. The
Muslims have no interest in politics as such. Their predominant interest is religion. This can be easily seen by the
terms and conditions that a Muslim constituency makes for its support to a candidate fighting for a seat. The Muslim
constituency does not care to examine the programme of the candidate. All that the constituency wants from the
candidate is that he should agree to replace the old lamps of the masjid by supplying new ones at his cost, to provide a
new carpet for the masjid because the old one is torn, or to repair the masjid because it has become dilapidated. In
some places a Muslim constituency is quite satisfied if the candidate agrees to give a sumptuous feast and in other if he
agrees to buy votes for so much a piece. With the Muslims, election is a mere matter of money and is very seldom a
matter of social programme of general improvement. Muslim politics takes no note of purely secular categories of life,
namely, the differences between rich and poor, capital and labour, landlord and tenant, priest and layman, reason and
superstition. Muslim politics is essentially clerical and recognizes only one difference, namely, that existing between
Hindus and Muslims. None of the secular categories of life have any place in the politics of the Muslim community
and if they do find a place—and they must because they are irrepressible—they are subordinated to one and the only
governing principle of the Muslim political universe, namely, religion.

[G.Subramaniam]

II
The existence of these evils among the Muslims is distressing enough. But far more distressing is the fact that there is
no organized movement of social reform among the Musalmans of India on a scale sufficient to bring about their
eradication. The Hindus have their social evils. But there is this relieving feature about them—namely, that some of
them are conscious of their existence and a few of them are actively agitating for their removal. The Muslims, on the
other hand, do not realize that they are evils and consequently do not agitate for their removal. Indeed, they oppose any
change in their existing practices. It is noteworthy that the "Muslims opposed the Child-Marriage Bill brought in the
Central Assembly in 1930, whereby the age for marriage of a girl was raised to 14 and of a boy to 18 on the ground
that it was opposed to the Muslim canon law. Not only did they oppose the bill at every stage but that when it became
law they started a campaign of Civil Disobedience against that Act. Fortunately the Civil Disobedience campaign of
the Muslims against the Act did not swell and was submerged in the Congress Civil Disobedience campaign which
synchronized with it. But the campaign only proves how strongly the Muslims are opposed to social reform.
The question may be asked why are the Muslims opposed to social reform ?
The usual answer given is that the Muslims all over the world are an unprogressive people. This view no doubt accords
with the facts of history. After the first spurts of their activity the scale of which was undoubtedly stupendous leading
to the foundations of vast empires—the Muslims suddenly fell into a strange condition of torpor, from which they
never seem to have become awake. The cause assigned for this torpor by those, who have made a study of their
condition, is said to be the fundamental assumption made by all Muslims that Islam is a world religion, suitable for all
people, for all times and for all conditions. It has been contended that :—
"The Musalman, remaining faithful to his religion, has not progressed; he has remained stationary in a world of swiftly
moving modern forces. It is, indeed, one of the salient features of Islam that it immobilizes in their native barbarism,
the races whom it enslaves. It is fixed in a crystallization, inert and impenetrable. It is unchangeable; and political,
social or economic changes have no repercussion upon it.
" Having been taught that outside Islam there can be no safety; outside its law no truth and outside its spiritual message
there is no happiness, the Muslim has become incapable of conceiving any other condition than his own, any other
mode of thought than the Islamic thought. He firmly believes that he has arrived at an unequalled pitch of perfection;
that he is the sole possessor of true faith, of the true doctrine, the true wisdom ; that he alone is in possession of the
truth—no relative truth subject to revision, but absolute truth.
" The religious law of the Muslims has had the effect of imparting to the very diverse individuals of whom the world is
composed, a unity of thought, of feeling, of ideas, of judgement."
It is urged that this uniformity is deadening and is not merely imparted to the Muslims, but is imposed upon them by a
spirit of intolerance which is unknown anywhere outside the Muslim world for its severity and its violence and which
is directed towards the suppression of all rational thinking which is in conflict with the teachings of Islam. As Renan
observes 6[f.6] :—
" Islam is a close union of the spiritual and the temporal; it is the reign of a dogma, it is the heaviest chain that
humanity has ever borne.... Islam has its beauties as a religion;.... But to the human reason Islamism has only been
injurious. The minds that it has shut from the light were, no doubt, already closed in their own internal limits; but it has
persecuted free thought, I shall not say more violently than other religions, but more effectually. It has made of the
countries that it has conquered 9 closed field to the rational culture of the mind. What is, in fact -essentially distinctive
of the Musalman is his hatred of science, his persuasion that research is useless, frivolous, almost impious—the natural
sciences, because they are attempts at rivalry with God; the historical sciences, because they apply to times anterior to
Islam, they may revive ancient heresies. Renan concludes by saying:—
"Islam, in treating science as an enemy, is only consistent, but it is a dangerous thing to be consistent. To its own
misfortune Islam has been successful. By slaying science it has slain itself; and is condemned in the world to a
complete inferiority."
This answer though obvious, cannot be the true answer. If it were the true answer, how are we to account for the stir
and ferment that is going on in all Muslim countries outside India, where the spirit of inquiry, the spirit of change and
the desire to reform are noticeable in every walk of life. Indeed, the social reforms which have taken place in Turkey
have been of the most revolutionary character. If Islam has not come in the way of the Muslims of these countries, why
should it come in the way of the Muslims of India ? There must be some special reason for the social and political
stagnation of the Muslim community in India.
What can that special reason be ? It seems to me that the reason for the absence of the spirit of change in the Indian
Musalman is to be sought in the' peculiar position he occupies in India. He is placed in a social environment which is
predominantly Hindu. That Hindu environment is always silently but surely encroaching upon him. He feels that it is
de-musalmanazing him. As a protection against this gradual weaning away he is led to insist on preserving everything
that is Islamic without caring to examine whether it is helpful or harmful to his society. Secondly, the Muslims in India
are placed in a political environment which is also predominantly Hindu. He feels that he will be suppressed and that
political suppression will make the Muslims a depressed class. It is this consciousness that he has to save himself from
being submerged by the Hindus socially and-politically, which to my mind is the primary cause why the Indian
Muslims as compared with their fellows outside are backward in the matter of social reform. Their energies are
directed to maintaining a constant struggle against the Hindus for seats and posts in which there is no time, no thought
and no room for questions relating to social reform. And if there is any, it is all overweighed and suppressed by the
desire, generated by pressure of communal tension, to close the ranks and offer a united front to the menace of the
Hindus and Hinduism by maintaining their socio-religious unity at any cost.
The same is the explanation of the political stagnation in the Muslim community of India. Muslim politicians do not
recognize secular categories of life as the basis of their politics because to them it means the weakening of the
community in its fight against the Hindus. The poor Muslims will not join the poor Hindus to get justice from the rich.
Muslim tenants will not join Hindu tenants to prevent the tyranny of the landlord. Muslim labourers will not join
Hindu labourers in the fight of labour against capital. Why ? The answer is simple. The poor Muslim sees that if he
joins in the fight of the poor against the rich, he may be fighting against a rich Muslim. The Muslim tenant feels that if
he joins in the campaign against the landlord, he may have to fight against a Muslim landlord. A Muslim labourer feels
that if he joins in the onslaught of labour against capital, he will be injuring a Muslim mill-owner. He is conscious that
any injury to a rich Muslim, to a Muslim landlord or to a Muslim mill-owner, is a disservice to the Muslim
community, for it is thereby weakened in its struggle against the Hindu community.
How Muslim politics has become perverted is shown by the attitude of the Muslim leaders to the political reforms in
the Indian States. The Muslims and their leaders carried on a great agitation for the introduction of representative
government in the Hindu State of Kashmir. The same Muslims and their leaders are deadly opposed to the introduction
of representative governments in other Muslim States. The reason for this strange attitude is quite simple. In all
matters, the determining question with the Muslims is how it will affect the Muslims vis-a-vis the Hindus. If
representative government can help the Muslims, they will demand it, and fight for it. In the State of Kashmir the ruler
is a Hindu, but the majority of the subjects are Muslims. The Muslims fought for representative government in
Kashmir, because representative government in Kashmir meant the transfer of power from a Hindu king to the Muslim
masses. In other Muslim States, the ruler is a Muslim but the majority of his subjects are Hindus. In such States
representative government means the transfer of power from a Muslim ruler to the Hindu masses, and that is why the
Muslims support the introduction of representative government in one case and oppose it in the other. The dominating
consideration with the Muslims is not democracy. The dominating consideration is how democracy with majority rule
will affect the Muslims in their struggle against the Hindus. Will it strengthen them or will it weaken them ? If
democracy weakens them, they will not have democracy. They will prefer the rotten state to continue in the Muslim
States rather than weaken the Muslim ruler in his hold upon his Hindu subjects.
The political and social stagnation in the Muslim community can be explained by one and only one reason. The
Muslims think that the Hindus and Muslims must perpetually struggle; the Hindus to establish their dominance over
the Muslims and the Muslims to establish their historical position as the ruling community—that in this struggle the
strong will win, and to ensure strength they must suppress or put in cold storage everything which causes dissension in
their ranks.
If the Muslims in other countries have undertaken the task of reforming their society and the Muslims of India have
refused to do so, it is because the former are free from communal and political clashes with rival communities, while
the latter are not.

[G.Subramaniam]

III
It is not that this blind spirit of conservatism which dose not recognize the need of repair to the social structure has
taken hold of the Muslims only. It has taken hold of the Hindus also. The Hindus atone time did recognize that without
social efficiency no permanent progress in other fields of activity was possible, that, owing to the mischief wrought by
evil customs Hindu Society was not in a state of efficiency and that ceaseless efforts must be made to eradicate these
evils. It was due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National Congress was accompanied by the
foundation of the Social Conference. While the Congress was concerned with defining the weak points in the political
organisation of the country, the Social Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the social organisation
of the Hindu Society. For some time, the Congress and the Conference worked as two wings of one common body and
held their annual sessions in the same pandal. But soon the two wings developed into two parties, a Political Reform
Party and a Social Reform Party, between whom raged fierce controversy. The Political Reform Party supported the
National Congress and the Social Reform Party supported the Social Conference. The two bodies became two hostile
camps. The point at issue was whether social reform should precede political reform. For a decade the forces were
evenly balanced and the battle was fought without victory to either side. It was, however, evident that the fortunes of
the Social Conference were ebbing fast. The gentlemen who presided over the sessions of the Social Conference
lamented that the majority of the educated Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to social reform and
that while the number of those who attended the Congress was very large and the number who did not attend but who
sympathized with it even larger, the number of those who attended the Social Conference was very much smaller. This
indifference, this thinning of its ranks was soon followed by active hostility from the politicians, like the late Mr.
Tilak. In course of time, the party in favour of political reform won and the Social Conference vanished and was
forgotten,7 [f7] With it also vanished from the Hindu Society the urge for social reform. Under the leadership of Mr.
Gandhi, the Hindu Society, if it did not become a political mad-house, certainly became mad after politics.
Non-co-operation, Civil Disobedience, and the cry for Swaraj took the place which social reform once had in the
minds of the Hindus. In the din and dust of political agitation, the Hindus do not even know that there are any evils to
be remedied. Those who are conscious of it, do not believe that social reform is as important as political reform, and
when forced to admit its importance argue that there can be no social reform unless political power is first achieved.
They are so eager to possess political power that they are impatient even of propaganda in favour of social reform, as it
means so much time and energy deducted from political propaganda. A correspondent of Mr. Gandhi put the point of
view of the Nationalists very appropriately, if bluntly, when he wrote 8[f.8] to Mr. Gandhi, saying:—
" Don't 'you think that it is impossible to achieve any great reform without winning political power ? The present
economic structure has got to be tackled? No reconstruction is possible without political reconstruction and I am afraid
all this talk of polished and unpolished rice, balanced diet and so on and so forth is mere moonshine."
The Social Reform Party, led by Ranade, died leaving the field to the Congress. There has grown up among the Hindus
another party which is also a rival to the Congress. It is the Hindu Maha Sabha. One would expect from its name that it
was a body for bringing about the reform of Hindu Society. But it is not. Its rivalry with the Congress has nothing to
do with the issue of social reform vs. political reform. Its quarrel with the Congress has its origin in the pro-Muslim
policy of the Congress. It is organized for the protection of Hindu rights against Muslim encroachment. Its plan is to
organize the Hindus for offering a united front to the Muslims. As a body organized to protect Hindu rights it is all the
time engaged in keeping an eye on political movements, on seats and posts. It cannot spare any thought for social
reform. As a body keen on bringing about a united front of all Hindus, it cannot afford to create dissensions among its
elements which would be the case if it undertook to bring about social reforms. For the sake of the consolidation of the
Hindu rank and file, the Hindu Maha Sabha is ready to suffer all social evils to remain as they are. For the sake of
consolidation of the Hindus, it is prepared to welcome the Federation as devised by the Act of 1935 in spite of
its many iniquities and defects. For the same purpose, the Hindu Maha Sabha favours the retention of the Indian States,
with their administration as it is. ' Hands off the Hindu States ' has been the battle-cry of its President. This attitude is
stranger than that of the Muslims. Representative government in Hindu States cannot do harm to the Hindus. Why then
should the President of the Hindu Maha Sabha oppose it ? Probably because it helps the Muslims, whom he cannot
tolerate.
IV
To what length this concern for the conservation of their forces can lead the Hindus and the Musalmans cannot be
better illustrated than by the debates on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act VIII of 1939 in the Central Assembly.
Before 1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married under the Muslim law ipso facto dissolved the
marriage with the result that if a married Muslim woman changed her religion, she was free to marry a person
professing her new religion. This was the rule of law enforced by the courts, throughout India at any rate, for the last
60 years.[f9] 9
This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939, section 4 of which reads as follows:—
" The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by
itself operate to dissolve her marriage:
Provided that after such renunciation or conversion the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of
marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2:
Provided further that the provision of' this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith
who re-embraces her former faith."
According to this Act, the marriage of a married Muslim woman is not dissolved by reason of her conversion to
another religion. All that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very intriguing to find that section 2 does not refer to
conversion or apostasy as a ground for divorce. The effect of the law is that a married Muslim woman has no liberty of
conscience and is tied for ever to her husband whose religious faith may be quite abhorrent to her.
The grounds urged in support of this change are well worth attention. The mover of the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L.A.
adopted a very ingenious line of argument in support of the change. In his speech 10[f.10] on the motion to refer the
Bill he said:—
" Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by any other religion, as a great crime, almost amounting to a crime against the
State. It is not novel for the religion of' Islam to have that provision. If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we
will find that similar provision also exists in other Codes as well. Fur the male a severer punishment was awarded, that
of death, and for females, only the punishment of imprisonment was awarded. This main provision was that because it
was a sin, it was a crime, it was to be punished, and the woman was to be deprived of her status as wife. It was not
only this status that she lost, but she lost all her suit us in society; she was deprived of her properly and civil rights as
well. But we find that as early as 1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850, Act
XXI of 1850.....
" .... by this Act, the forfeiture of civil rights that could be imposed on a woman on her apostasy has been taken away.
She can no longer be subjected to any forfeiture of properly or her right of inheritance or anything of the kind. The
only question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it has given her a certain amount of liberty of thought, some
kind of liberty of religion to adopt any faith she likes, and has removed the forfeiture clause from which she could
suffer, and which was a restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far we are entitled after that to
continue placing the restriction on her status as a wile. Her status as a wife is of some importance in society. She
belongs to some family, she has got children, she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind, she may
not like to continue the same old religion. If she changes her religion, why should we, according to our modern ideas,
inflict upon her a further penalty that she will cease to be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we are
advocating freedom of thought and freedom of religion, when we are advocating inter-marriages between different
communities, it would be inconsistent for us t support a provision that a mere change of faith or change of religion
would email forfeiture of her rights as the wife of her husband. So, from a modern point of view, I have got no
hesitation in saying that we cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition that apostasy must be allowed to
finish her relationship with her husband. But that is only one part of the argument.
"Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, is to the effect that a married woman may sue for divorce on
the grounds 'that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi ....'
" There are two things apparent from this. the first is, that it is a ground for dissolution, not from any religious idea or
religious sentiment, because, if two years have passed after the conversion and if plaintiff does not object, then either
the male or female has no right to sue for dissolution of marriage. The second thing is, that it is the plaintiff who has
got the complaint that the other party has changed the religion, who has got the right of getting the marriage
dissolved....... In addition to this Act, as regards other communities we can have an idea of the effect of conversion on
marriage tie from the Native Converts ' Marriage Dissolution Act, Act XXI of 1886 ........ It applies to all the
communities of India, and this legislation recognises the fact that mere conversion of an Indian to Christianity would
not dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a law court and saying that the other party., who is not
converted, must perform the marital duties in respect of him...... then they are given a year's time and the judge directs
that they shall have an interview with each other in the presence of certain other persons to induce them to resume their
conjugal relationship, and if they do not agree, then on the ground of desecration the marriage is dissolved. The
marriage is dissolved no doubt, but not on the ground of change of faith. . . .. .So, every community in India has got
this accepted principle that conversion to another religion cannot amount to a dissolution of marriage."
Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member of the Assembly and a protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank.
In support of the principle of the Bill he said 11[f.11] :—
" For a very long lime the courts in British India have held without reservation and qualification that under all
circumstances apostasy automatically and immediately puts an end to the married slate without any judicial
proceedings, any decree of court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which was taken up by the Courts.
Now, there are three distinct views of Hanafi jurists on the point. One view which is attributed to the Bokhara jurists
was adopted and even that not in its entirely but in what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition. What that
Bokhara view is has been already stated by Mr. Kazmi and some other speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage
is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I should be more accurate in saying—1 have got authority for that—that it is,
according to the Bokhara view, not dissolved but suspended. The marriage is suspended but the wife is then kept in
custody or confinement till she repents and embraces Islam again, and then she is induced to marry the husband, whose
marriage was only suspended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view is that on apostasy a married
Muslim woman ceases to be the wife other husband but becomes his bond woman. One view, which is a sort of
corollary to this view, is that she is not necessarily the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond
woman of the entire Muslim community and anybody can employ her as a bond woman. The third view, that of the
Ulema of Samarkand and Baikh, is that the marriage lie is not affected by such apostasy and that the woman still
continues to be the wife of the husband. These are the three views. A portion of the first view, the Bokhara view, was
taken hold of by the Courts and rulings after rulings were based on that portion.
" This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary instance that judicial error is sought to be corrected by
legislation, but in many other cases, too, there have been judicial errors or conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties
and vagueness of law. Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by legislation. In this particular mailer
there has been an error after error and a tragedy of errors. To show me those rulings is begging the question. Surely, it
should be realized that it is no answer to my Bill that because the High Courts have decided against me, I have no
business to come to this House and ask it to legislate this way or that way."
Having regard to the profundity of the change, the arguments urged in support of it were indeed very insubstantial. Mr.
Kazmi failed to realize that if there was a difference between the divorce law relating to Parsis, Christians and
Muslims, once it is established that the conversion is genuine, the Muslim law was in advance of the Parsi and the
Christian law and instead of making the Muslim law retrograde, the proper thing ought to have been to make the Parsi
and the Christian law progress. Mr. Nairang did not stop to inquire that, if there were different schools of thought
among the Muslim jurists, whether it was not more in consonance with justice to adopt the more enlightened view
which recognized the freedom of the Muslim woman and not to replace it by the barbaric one which made her a
bonds-woman.
Be that as it may, the legal arguments had nothing to do with the real motive underlying the change. The real motive
was to put a stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths, followed by immediate and hurried marriages with
some one professing the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to locking her in the new community and
preventing her from going back to the community to which she originally belonged. The conversion of Muslim woman
to Hinduism and of Hindu woman to Islam looked at from a social and political point of view cannot but be fraught
with tremendous consequences. It means a disturbance in the numerical balance between the two communities. As the
disturbance was being brought about by the abduction of women, it could not be overlooked. For woman is at once the
seed-bed of and the hothouse for nationalism in a degree that man can never be.12 [f12] These conversions of women
and their subsequent marriages were there-fore regarded, and rightly, as a series of depredations practised by Hindus
against Muslims and by Muslims against Hindus with a view to bringing about a change in their relative numerical
strength. This abominable practice of woman-lifting had become as common as cattle-lifting and, with its obvious
danger to communal balance, efforts had to be made to stop it. That this was the real reason behind this legislation can
be seen from the two provisions to section 4 of the Act. In proviso I the Hindus concede to the Musalmans that if they
convert a woman who was originally a Muslim she will remain bound to her former Muslim husband notwithstanding
her conversion. By proviso 2 the Muslims concede to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married woman and she
is married to a Musalman, her marriage will be deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and she will be free to
return to her Hindu fold. Thus what underlies the change in law is the desire to keep the numerical balance and it is for
this purpose that the rights of women were sacrificed.
There are two other features of this malaise which have not been sufficiently noted.
One such feature is the jealousy with which one of them looks upon any reform by the other in its social system. If the
effect of such reform is to give it increase of strength for resistance, it at once creates hostility.
Swami Shradhanand relates a very curious incident which well illustrates this attitude. Writing in the Liberator
13[f.13] his recollections, he refers to this incident. He says :—
" Mr. Ranade was there. . . . to guide the Social Conference to which the title of ' National ' was for the first and last
lime given. It was from the beginning a Hindu Conference in all walks of life. The only Mahomedan delegate who
joined the National Social Conference was a Mufti Saheb of Barreily. Well! The conference began when the resolution
in favour of remarriage of child-widows was moved by a Hindu delegate and by me. Sanalanist Pandits opposed it.
Then the Mufti asked permission to speak. The laic Baijnalh told Mufti Saheb that as the resolution concerned the
Hindus only, he need not speak. At this the Mufti flared up.
" There was no loophole left for the President and Mufti Saheb was allowed to have his say. Mufti Saheb's argument
was that as Hindu Shastras did not allow remarriage, it was a sin to press for it. Again, when the resolution about the
reconversion of those who had become Christians and Musalmans came up. Mufti Saheb urged that when a man
abandoned the Hindu religion he ought not to be allowed to come back."
Another illustration would be the attitued of the Muslims towards the problem of the Untouchables. The Muslims have
always been looking at the Depressed Classes with a sense of longing and much of the jealousy between Hindus and
Muslims arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become stronger by assimilating the Depressed
Classes. In 1909 the Muslims took the bold step of suggesting that the Depressed Classes should not be enrolled in the
census as Hindus. In 1923 Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address as the President of the Congress went much beyond the
position taken by the Muslims in 1909. He said:—
"The quarrels about ALAMS and PIPAL trees and musical processions are truly childish ; but there is one question
which can easily furnish a ground for complaint of unfriendly action if communal activities are not amicably adjusted.
It is the question of the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, if Hindu society does not speedily absorb them. The
Christian missionary is already busy and no one quarrels with him. But the moment some Muslim Missionary Society
is organized for the same purpose there is every likelihood of an outcry in the Hindu press. It has been suggested to me
by an influential and wealthy gentleman who is able to organize a Missionary Society on a large scale for the
conversion of the Suppressed Classes, that it should be possible to reach a settlement with leading Hindu gentlemen
and divide the country into separate areas where Hindu and Muslim missionaries could respectively work, each
community preparing for each year, or longer unit of lime if necessary, an estimate of the numbers it is prepared to
absorb or convert. These estimates would, of course, be based on the number of workers and funds each had to spare,
and tested by the actual figures of the previous period. In this way each community would be free to do the work of
absorption and conversion, or rather, of reform without chances of collision with one another. I cannot say in what
light my Hindu brethren will lake it and I place this suggestion tentatively in all frankness and sincerity before them.
All that I say for myself is that I have seen the condition of the ' Kali Praja ' in the Baroda Slate and of the Gonds in the
Central Provinces and I frankly confess it is a reproach to us all. If the Hindus will not absorb them into their own
society, others will and must, and then the orthodox Hindu loo will cease to treat them as untouchables. Conversion
seems to transmute them by a strong alchemy. But does this not place a premium upon conversion ?"
The other feature is the " preparations " which the Muslims and Hindus are making against each other without
abatement. It is like a race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the Benares University, the
Musalmans must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi movement, the Muslims must launch the
Tablig movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must meet it by Tanjim. If the Hindus have the R. S. S.
S.,14[f.14] the Muslims must reply by organizing the Khaksars.t This race in social armament and equipment is run
with the determination and apprehension characteristic of nations which are on the war path. The Muslims fear that the
Hindus are subjugating them. The Hindus feel that the Muslims are engaged in reconquering them. Both appear to be
preparing for war and each is watching the " preparations " of the other.
Such a state of things cannot but be ominous. It is a vicious circle. If the Hindus make themselves stronger, the
Musalmans feel menaced. The Muslims endeavour to increase their forces to meet the menace and the Hindus then do
the same to equalize the position. As the preparations proceed, so does the suspicion, the secrecy, and the plotting. The
possibilities of peaceful adjustment are poisoned at the source and precisely because everyone is fearing and preparing
for it that " war " between the two tends to become inevitable. But in the situation in which they find themselves, for
the Hindus and the Muslims not to attend to anything, except to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of each
other, is quite natural. It is a struggle for existence and the issue, that counts, is survival and not the quality or the plane
of survival.
Two things must be said to have emerged from this discussion. One is that the Hindus and the Muslims regard each
other as a menace. The second is that to meet this menace, both have suspended the cause of removing the social evils
with which they are infested. Is this a desirable state of things ? If it is not how then can it be ended ?
No one can say that to have the problems of social reform put aside is a desirable state of things. Wherever there are
social evils, the health of the body politic requires that they shall be removed before they become the symbols of
suffering and injustice. For it is the social and economic evils which everywhere are the parent of revolution or decay.
Whether social reform should precede political reform or political reform should precede social reform may be a
matter of controversy. But there can be no two opinions on the question that the sole object of political power is the
use to which it can be put in the cause of social and economic reform. The whole struggle for political power would be
a barren and bootless effort if it was not justified by the feeling that, because of the want of political power, urgent and
crying social evils are eating into the vitals of society and are destroying it. But suppose the Hindus and the Muslims
somehow come into possession of political power, what hope is there that they will use it for purposes of social reform
? There is hardly any hope in that behalf. So long as the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace, their
attention will be engrossed in preparations for meeting the menace. The exigencies of a common front by Musalmans
against Hindus and by Hindus against Musalmans generate—and is bound to generate—a conspiracy of silence over
social evils. Neither the Muslims nor the Hindus will attend to them even though the evils may be running sores and
requiring immediate attention, for the simple reason that they regard every measure of social reform as bound to create
dissension and division and thereby weaken the ranks when they ought to be closed to meet the menace of the other
community. It is obvious that so long as one community looks upon the other as a menace there will be no social
progress and the spirit of conservatism will continue to dominate the thoughts and actions of both.
How long will this menace last ? It is sure to last as long as the Hindus and Muslims are required to live as members of
one country under the mantle of a single constitution. For, it is the fear of the single constitution with the possibility of
the shifting of the balance—for nothing can keep the balance at the point originally fixed by the constitution—which
makes the Hindus a menace to the Muslims and the Muslims a menace to the Hindus. If this is so, Pakistan is the
obvious remedy. It certainly removes the chief condition which makes for the menace. Pakistan liberates both the
Hindus and the Muslims from the fear of enslavement of and encroachment against each other. It removes, by
providing a separate constitution for each, Pakistan and Hindustan, the very basis which leads to this perpetual struggle
for keeping a balance of power in the day-to-day life and frees them to take in hand those vital matters of urgent social
importance which they are now forced to put aside in cold storage, and improve the lives of their people, which after
all is the main object of this fight for Swaraj.
Without some such arrangement, the Hindus and the Muslims will act and react as though they were two nations, one
fearing to be conquered by the other. Preparations for aggression will 'always have precedence over social reform, so
that the social stagnation which has set in must continue. This is quite natural and no one need be surprised at it. For,
as Bernard Shaw pointed out:—
" A conquered nation is like a man with cancer ; he can think of nothing else . . . . A healthy nation is as unconscious
of' its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but
getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to no preacher until the demand of the nationalist is
granted. It will attend to no business, however vital, except the business of unification and liberation."
Unless there is unification of the Muslims who wish to separate from the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each
from the fear of domination by the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation will not be set
right.

[G.Subramaniam]

III
It is not that this blind spirit of conservatism which dose not recognize the need of repair to the social structure has
taken hold of the Muslims only. It has taken hold of the Hindus also. The Hindus atone time did recognize that without
social efficiency no permanent progress in other fields of activity was possible, that, owing to the mischief wrought by
evil customs Hindu Society was not in a state of efficiency and that ceaseless efforts must be made to eradicate these
evils. It was due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National Congress was accompanied by the
foundation of the Social Conference. While the Congress was concerned with defining the weak points in the political
organisation of the country, the Social Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the social organisation
of the Hindu Society. For some time, the Congress and the Conference worked as two wings of one common body and
held their annual sessions in the same pandal. But soon the two wings developed into two parties, a Political Reform
Party and a Social Reform Party, between whom raged fierce controversy. The Political Reform Party supported the
National Congress and the Social Reform Party supported the Social Conference. The two bodies became two hostile
camps. The point at issue was whether social reform should precede political reform. For a decade the forces were
evenly balanced and the battle was fought without victory to either side. It was, however, evident that the fortunes of
the Social Conference were ebbing fast. The gentlemen who presided over the sessions of the Social Conference
lamented that the majority of the educated Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to social reform and
that while the number of those who attended the Congress was very large and the number who did not attend but who
sympathized with it even larger, the number of those who attended the Social Conference was very much smaller. This
indifference, this thinning of its ranks was soon followed by active hostility from the politicians, like the late Mr.
Tilak. In course of time, the party in favour of political reform won and the Social Conference vanished and was
forgotten,7 [f7] With it also vanished from the Hindu Society the urge for social reform. Under the leadership of Mr.
Gandhi, the Hindu Society, if it did not become a political mad-house, certainly became mad after politics.
Non-co-operation, Civil Disobedience, and the cry for Swaraj took the place which social reform once had in the
minds of the Hindus. In the din and dust of political agitation, the Hindus do not even know that there are any evils to
be remedied. Those who are conscious of it, do not believe that social reform is as important as political reform, and
when forced to admit its importance argue that there can be no social reform unless political power is first achieved.
They are so eager to possess political power that they are impatient even of propaganda in favour of social reform, as it
means so much time and energy deducted from political propaganda. A correspondent of Mr. Gandhi put the point of
view of the Nationalists very appropriately, if bluntly, when he wrote 8[f.8] to Mr. Gandhi, saying:—
" Don't 'you think that it is impossible to achieve any great reform without winning political power ? The present
economic structure has got to be tackled? No reconstruction is possible without political reconstruction and I am afraid
all this talk of polished and unpolished rice, balanced diet and so on and so forth is mere moonshine."
The Social Reform Party, led by Ranade, died leaving the field to the Congress. There has grown up among the Hindus
another party which is also a rival to the Congress. It is the Hindu Maha Sabha. One would expect from its name that it
was a body for bringing about the reform of Hindu Society. But it is not. Its rivalry with the Congress has nothing to
do with the issue of social reform vs. political reform. Its quarrel with the Congress has its origin in the pro-Muslim
policy of the Congress. It is organized for the protection of Hindu rights against Muslim encroachment. Its plan is to
organize the Hindus for offering a united front to the Muslims. As a body organized to protect Hindu rights it is all the
time engaged in keeping an eye on political movements, on seats and posts. It cannot spare any thought for social
reform. As a body keen on bringing about a united front of all Hindus, it cannot afford to create dissensions among its
elements which would be the case if it undertook to bring about social reforms. For the sake of the consolidation of the
Hindu rank and file, the Hindu Maha Sabha is ready to suffer all social evils to remain as they are. For the sake of
consolidation of the Hindus, it is prepared to welcome the Federation as devised by the Act of 1935 in spite of
its many iniquities and defects. For the same purpose, the Hindu Maha Sabha favours the retention of the Indian States,
with their administration as it is. ' Hands off the Hindu States ' has been the battle-cry of its President. This attitude is
stranger than that of the Muslims. Representative government in Hindu States cannot do harm to the Hindus. Why then
should the President of the Hindu Maha Sabha oppose it ? Probably because it helps the Muslims, whom he cannot
tolerate.
IV
To what length this concern for the conservation of their forces can lead the Hindus and the Musalmans cannot be
better illustrated than by the debates on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act VIII of 1939 in the Central Assembly.
Before 1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married under the Muslim law ipso facto dissolved the
marriage with the result that if a married Muslim woman changed her religion, she was free to marry a person
professing her new religion. This was the rule of law enforced by the courts, throughout India at any rate, for the last
60 years.[f9] 9
This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939, section 4 of which reads as follows:—
" The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by
itself operate to dissolve her marriage:
Provided that after such renunciation or conversion the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of
marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2:
Provided further that the provision of' this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith
who re-embraces her former faith."
According to this Act, the marriage of a married Muslim woman is not dissolved by reason of her conversion to
another religion. All that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very intriguing to find that section 2 does not refer to
conversion or apostasy as a ground for divorce. The effect of the law is that a married Muslim woman has no liberty of
conscience and is tied for ever to her husband whose religious faith may be quite abhorrent to her.
The grounds urged in support of this change are well worth attention. The mover of the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L.A.
adopted a very ingenious line of argument in support of the change. In his speech 10[f.10] on the motion to refer the
Bill he said:—
" Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by any other religion, as a great crime, almost amounting to a crime against the
State. It is not novel for the religion of' Islam to have that provision. If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we
will find that similar provision also exists in other Codes as well. Fur the male a severer punishment was awarded, that
of death, and for females, only the punishment of imprisonment was awarded. This main provision was that because it
was a sin, it was a crime, it was to be punished, and the woman was to be deprived of her status as wife. It was not
only this status that she lost, but she lost all her suit us in society; she was deprived of her properly and civil rights as
well. But we find that as early as 1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850, Act
XXI of 1850.....
" .... by this Act, the forfeiture of civil rights that could be imposed on a woman on her apostasy has been taken away.
She can no longer be subjected to any forfeiture of properly or her right of inheritance or anything of the kind. The
only question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it has given her a certain amount of liberty of thought, some
kind of liberty of religion to adopt any faith she likes, and has removed the forfeiture clause from which she could
suffer, and which was a restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far we are entitled after that to
continue placing the restriction on her status as a wile. Her status as a wife is of some importance in society. She
belongs to some family, she has got children, she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind, she may
not like to continue the same old religion. If she changes her religion, why should we, according to our modern ideas,
inflict upon her a further penalty that she will cease to be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we are
advocating freedom of thought and freedom of religion, when we are advocating inter-marriages between different
communities, it would be inconsistent for us t support a provision that a mere change of faith or change of religion
would email forfeiture of her rights as the wife of her husband. So, from a modern point of view, I have got no
hesitation in saying that we cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition that apostasy must be allowed to
finish her relationship with her husband. But that is only one part of the argument.
"Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, is to the effect that a married woman may sue for divorce on
the grounds 'that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi ....'
" There are two things apparent from this. the first is, that it is a ground for dissolution, not from any religious idea or
religious sentiment, because, if two years have passed after the conversion and if plaintiff does not object, then either
the male or female has no right to sue for dissolution of marriage. The second thing is, that it is the plaintiff who has
got the complaint that the other party has changed the religion, who has got the right of getting the marriage
dissolved....... In addition to this Act, as regards other communities we can have an idea of the effect of conversion on
marriage tie from the Native Converts ' Marriage Dissolution Act, Act XXI of 1886 ........ It applies to all the
communities of India, and this legislation recognises the fact that mere conversion of an Indian to Christianity would
not dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a law court and saying that the other party., who is not
converted, must perform the marital duties in respect of him...... then they are given a year's time and the judge directs
that they shall have an interview with each other in the presence of certain other persons to induce them to resume their
conjugal relationship, and if they do not agree, then on the ground of desecration the marriage is dissolved. The
marriage is dissolved no doubt, but not on the ground of change of faith. . . .. .So, every community in India has got
this accepted principle that conversion to another religion cannot amount to a dissolution of marriage."
Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member of the Assembly and a protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank.
In support of the principle of the Bill he said 11[f.11] :—
" For a very long lime the courts in British India have held without reservation and qualification that under all
circumstances apostasy automatically and immediately puts an end to the married slate without any judicial
proceedings, any decree of court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which was taken up by the Courts.
Now, there are three distinct views of Hanafi jurists on the point. One view which is attributed to the Bokhara jurists
was adopted and even that not in its entirely but in what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition. What that
Bokhara view is has been already stated by Mr. Kazmi and some other speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage
is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I should be more accurate in saying—1 have got authority for that—that it is,
according to the Bokhara view, not dissolved but suspended. The marriage is suspended but the wife is then kept in
custody or confinement till she repents and embraces Islam again, and then she is induced to marry the husband, whose
marriage was only suspended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view is that on apostasy a married
Muslim woman ceases to be the wife other husband but becomes his bond woman. One view, which is a sort of
corollary to this view, is that she is not necessarily the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond
woman of the entire Muslim community and anybody can employ her as a bond woman. The third view, that of the
Ulema of Samarkand and Baikh, is that the marriage lie is not affected by such apostasy and that the woman still
continues to be the wife of the husband. These are the three views. A portion of the first view, the Bokhara view, was
taken hold of by the Courts and rulings after rulings were based on that portion.
" This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary instance that judicial error is sought to be corrected by
legislation, but in many other cases, too, there have been judicial errors or conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties
and vagueness of law. Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by legislation. In this particular mailer
there has been an error after error and a tragedy of errors. To show me those rulings is begging the question. Surely, it
should be realized that it is no answer to my Bill that because the High Courts have decided against me, I have no
business to come to this House and ask it to legislate this way or that way."
Having regard to the profundity of the change, the arguments urged in support of it were indeed very insubstantial. Mr.
Kazmi failed to realize that if there was a difference between the divorce law relating to Parsis, Christians and
Muslims, once it is established that the conversion is genuine, the Muslim law was in advance of the Parsi and the
Christian law and instead of making the Muslim law retrograde, the proper thing ought to have been to make the Parsi
and the Christian law progress. Mr. Nairang did not stop to inquire that, if there were different schools of thought
among the Muslim jurists, whether it was not more in consonance with justice to adopt the more enlightened view
which recognized the freedom of the Muslim woman and not to replace it by the barbaric one which made her a
bonds-woman.
Be that as it may, the legal arguments had nothing to do with the real motive underlying the change. The real motive
was to put a stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths, followed by immediate and hurried marriages with
some one professing the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to locking her in the new community and
preventing her from going back to the community to which she originally belonged. The conversion of Muslim woman
to Hinduism and of Hindu woman to Islam looked at from a social and political point of view cannot but be fraught
with tremendous consequences. It means a disturbance in the numerical balance between the two communities. As the
disturbance was being brought about by the abduction of women, it could not be overlooked. For woman is at once the
seed-bed of and the hothouse for nationalism in a degree that man can never be.12 [f12] These conversions of women
and their subsequent marriages were there-fore regarded, and rightly, as a series of depredations practised by Hindus
against Muslims and by Muslims against Hindus with a view to bringing about a change in their relative numerical
strength. This abominable practice of woman-lifting had become as common as cattle-lifting and, with its obvious
danger to communal balance, efforts had to be made to stop it. That this was the real reason behind this legislation can
be seen from the two provisions to section 4 of the Act. In proviso I the Hindus concede to the Musalmans that if they
convert a woman who was originally a Muslim she will remain bound to her former Muslim husband notwithstanding
her conversion. By proviso 2 the Muslims concede to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married woman and she
is married to a Musalman, her marriage will be deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and she will be free to
return to her Hindu fold. Thus what underlies the change in law is the desire to keep the numerical balance and it is for
this purpose that the rights of women were sacrificed.
There are two other features of this malaise which have not been sufficiently noted.
One such feature is the jealousy with which one of them looks upon any reform by the other in its social system. If the
effect of such reform is to give it increase of strength for resistance, it at once creates hostility.
Swami Shradhanand relates a very curious incident which well illustrates this attitude. Writing in the Liberator
13[f.13] his recollections, he refers to this incident. He says :—
" Mr. Ranade was there. . . . to guide the Social Conference to which the title of ' National ' was for the first and last
lime given. It was from the beginning a Hindu Conference in all walks of life. The only Mahomedan delegate who
joined the National Social Conference was a Mufti Saheb of Barreily. Well! The conference began when the resolution
in favour of remarriage of child-widows was moved by a Hindu delegate and by me. Sanalanist Pandits opposed it.
Then the Mufti asked permission to speak. The laic Baijnalh told Mufti Saheb that as the resolution concerned the
Hindus only, he need not speak. At this the Mufti flared up.
" There was no loophole left for the President and Mufti Saheb was allowed to have his say. Mufti Saheb's argument
was that as Hindu Shastras did not allow remarriage, it was a sin to press for it. Again, when the resolution about the
reconversion of those who had become Christians and Musalmans came up. Mufti Saheb urged that when a man
abandoned the Hindu religion he ought not to be allowed to come back."
Another illustration would be the attitued of the Muslims towards the problem of the Untouchables. The Muslims have
always been looking at the Depressed Classes with a sense of longing and much of the jealousy between Hindus and
Muslims arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become stronger by assimilating the Depressed
Classes. In 1909 the Muslims took the bold step of suggesting that the Depressed Classes should not be enrolled in the
census as Hindus. In 1923 Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address as the President of the Congress went much beyond the
position taken by the Muslims in 1909. He said:—
"The quarrels about ALAMS and PIPAL trees and musical processions are truly childish ; but there is one question
which can easily furnish a ground for complaint of unfriendly action if communal activities are not amicably adjusted.
It is the question of the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, if Hindu society does not speedily absorb them. The
Christian missionary is already busy and no one quarrels with him. But the moment some Muslim Missionary Society
is organized for the same purpose there is every likelihood of an outcry in the Hindu press. It has been suggested to me
by an influential and wealthy gentleman who is able to organize a Missionary Society on a large scale for the
conversion of the Suppressed Classes, that it should be possible to reach a settlement with leading Hindu gentlemen
and divide the country into separate areas where Hindu and Muslim missionaries could respectively work, each
community preparing for each year, or longer unit of lime if necessary, an estimate of the numbers it is prepared to
absorb or convert. These estimates would, of course, be based on the number of workers and funds each had to spare,
and tested by the actual figures of the previous period. In this way each community would be free to do the work of
absorption and conversion, or rather, of reform without chances of collision with one another. I cannot say in what
light my Hindu brethren will lake it and I place this suggestion tentatively in all frankness and sincerity before them.
All that I say for myself is that I have seen the condition of the ' Kali Praja ' in the Baroda Slate and of the Gonds in the
Central Provinces and I frankly confess it is a reproach to us all. If the Hindus will not absorb them into their own
society, others will and must, and then the orthodox Hindu loo will cease to treat them as untouchables. Conversion
seems to transmute them by a strong alchemy. But does this not place a premium upon conversion ?"
The other feature is the " preparations " which the Muslims and Hindus are making against each other without
abatement. It is like a race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the Benares University, the
Musalmans must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi movement, the Muslims must launch the
Tablig movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must meet it by Tanjim. If the Hindus have the R. S. S.
S.,14[f.14] the Muslims must reply by organizing the Khaksars.t This race in social armament and equipment is run
with the determination and apprehension characteristic of nations which are on the war path. The Muslims fear that the
Hindus are subjugating them. The Hindus feel that the Muslims are engaged in reconquering them. Both appear to be
preparing for war and each is watching the " preparations " of the other.
Such a state of things cannot but be ominous. It is a vicious circle. If the Hindus make themselves stronger, the
Musalmans feel menaced. The Muslims endeavour to increase their forces to meet the menace and the Hindus then do
the same to equalize the position. As the preparations proceed, so does the suspicion, the secrecy, and the plotting. The
possibilities of peaceful adjustment are poisoned at the source and precisely because everyone is fearing and preparing
for it that " war " between the two tends to become inevitable. But in the situation in which they find themselves, for
the Hindus and the Muslims not to attend to anything, except to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of each
other, is quite natural. It is a struggle for existence and the issue, that counts, is survival and not the quality or the plane
of survival.
Two things must be said to have emerged from this discussion. One is that the Hindus and the Muslims regard each
other as a menace. The second is that to meet this menace, both have suspended the cause of removing the social evils
with which they are infested. Is this a desirable state of things ? If it is not how then can it be ended ?
No one can say that to have the problems of social reform put aside is a desirable state of things. Wherever there are
social evils, the health of the body politic requires that they shall be removed before they become the symbols of
suffering and injustice. For it is the social and economic evils which everywhere are the parent of revolution or decay.
Whether social reform should precede political reform or political reform should precede social reform may be a
matter of controversy. But there can be no two opinions on the question that the sole object of political power is the
use to which it can be put in the cause of social and economic reform. The whole struggle for political power would be
a barren and bootless effort if it was not justified by the feeling that, because of the want of political power, urgent and
crying social evils are eating into the vitals of society and are destroying it. But suppose the Hindus and the Muslims
somehow come into possession of political power, what hope is there that they will use it for purposes of social reform
? There is hardly any hope in that behalf. So long as the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace, their
attention will be engrossed in preparations for meeting the menace. The exigencies of a common front by Musalmans
against Hindus and by Hindus against Musalmans generate—and is bound to generate—a conspiracy of silence over
social evils. Neither the Muslims nor the Hindus will attend to them even though the evils may be running sores and
requiring immediate attention, for the simple reason that they regard every measure of social reform as bound to create
dissension and division and thereby weaken the ranks when they ought to be closed to meet the menace of the other
community. It is obvious that so long as one community looks upon the other as a menace there will be no social
progress and the spirit of conservatism will continue to dominate the thoughts and actions of both.
How long will this menace last ? It is sure to last as long as the Hindus and Muslims are required to live as members of
one country under the mantle of a single constitution. For, it is the fear of the single constitution with the possibility of
the shifting of the balance—for nothing can keep the balance at the point originally fixed by the constitution—which
makes the Hindus a menace to the Muslims and the Muslims a menace to the Hindus. If this is so, Pakistan is the
obvious remedy. It certainly removes the chief condition which makes for the menace. Pakistan liberates both the
Hindus and the Muslims from the fear of enslavement of and encroachment against each other. It removes, by
providing a separate constitution for each, Pakistan and Hindustan, the very basis which leads to this perpetual struggle
for keeping a balance of power in the day-to-day life and frees them to take in hand those vital matters of urgent social
importance which they are now forced to put aside in cold storage, and improve the lives of their people, which after
all is the main object of this fight for Swaraj.
Without some such arrangement, the Hindus and the Muslims will act and react as though they were two nations, one
fearing to be conquered by the other. Preparations for aggression will 'always have precedence over social reform, so
that the social stagnation which has set in must continue. This is quite natural and no one need be surprised at it. For,
as Bernard Shaw pointed out:—
" A conquered nation is like a man with cancer ; he can think of nothing else . . . . A healthy nation is as unconscious
of' its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but
getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to no preacher until the demand of the nationalist is
granted. It will attend to no business, however vital, except the business of unification and liberation."
Unless there is unification of the Muslims who wish to separate from the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each
from the fear of domination by the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation will not be set
right.

[G.Subramaniam]

" The necessity for the powers referred to in the preceding paragraph is due to such reasons as the following :—
" (a) It is impossible to foresee when the necessity may arise for amending minor details connected with the franchise and the constitution of legislatures, and for such amendment it will be clearly disadvantageous to have no method available short of a fresh amending Act of Parliament, nor is it practicable statutorily to separate such details from the more important matter such as the terms of the Communal Award;
" (B) It might also become desirable, in the event of a unanimous agreement between the communities in India, to make a modification in the provisions based on the Communal Award ; and for such an agreed change it would also be
disadvantageous to have no other method available than an amending Act of Parliament.
" Within the range of the Communal Award His Majesty's Government would not propose, in the exercise of any power conferred by this Clause, to recommend to Parliament any change unless such changes had been agreed to between the communities concerned.
" In conclusion. His Majesty's Government would again emphasise the fact that none of the powers in Clause 304 can, in view of the provisions in Clause 305, be exercised unless both Houses of Parliament agreed by an affirmative resolution."
.After taking into account what the Muslims demanded at the R. T. C. and what was conceded to them, any one could have thought that the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that the 1932 settlement was a final settlement. But, it
appears that even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further list of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to be ready. In the controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress in the year 1938, Mr. Jinnah was asked to disclose his demands which he refused to do. But these demands have come to the surface in the correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the course of the controversy and they have been
tabulated by Pandit Nehru in one of his letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the following items as being matters of disputes and requiring settlement 33 [f.33] :—
( 1 ) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929.
(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute.
(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque.
(6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments.
(9) The ' Bande Mataram' song should be given up.
(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.
(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength.
(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.
(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed. With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is,
between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely 50 per cent. share in every thing, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there are some which on the face of them are extravagant
and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims insisted that in allotting seats in Legislatures, a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. 34 [f34] This principle, enunciated by themselves, it is now demanded, shall be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in 1929 admitted that the other minorities required protection and that they must have it in the same manner as the Muslims.
The only distinction made between the Muslims and other minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The Muslims claimed a higher degree of protection than was conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their political importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities the Muslims never denied. But with this new demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but they are also cutting into the political rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking the language of Hitler and claiming a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50 per cent. is nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebenuraum for Tthemselves,
irrespective of what happens to other minorities. Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not
spoken all, over India but is not even the language of all the Musalmans of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims
35[f.35] only 28 millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the language of 28 millions of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Musalmans or generally upon 322 millions of
Indians.
It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with some new political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the Muslims if the dispute relating to these new demands was referred to them for arbitration ? The more the Muslims demand the more accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked. Two such instances can be cited.
One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question was whether the British Government should accept the Pact. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to accept it for reasons which were very weighty.
Speaking of the weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the authors' of the Joint Report observed 36
[f36] :—
" Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the objection, that if any other community here after makes good a claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction
from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are not likely to agree which process should be adopted. While, therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently we assent to the maintenance of separate representation for Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals set before us, until we have ascertained what the effect upon other interests will be, .. and have made fair provision for them."
Notwithstanding this grave flaw in the Lucknow Pact, the Government of India, in its despatch referred to above, recommended that the terms of the Pact should be improved in so far as it related to the Muslims of Bengal. Its reasons
make a strange reading. It argued that :—
" The Muhammadan representation which they the authors of the Pact] propose for Bengal is manifestly insufficient It is questionable whether the claims of the Muhammadan population of Eastern Bengal were adequately pressed when
the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are conspicuously a backward and impoverished community.
The repartition of the presidency in 1912 came as a severe disappointment to them, and we should be very loath to fail in seeing that their interests are now generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a representation proportionate to their numbers, and no more, we should allot them 44 instead of 34 seats [due to them under the Pact]."
This enthusiasm for the Bengal Muslims shown by the Government of India was not shared by the British Government It felt that as the number of seats given to the Bengal Muslims was the result of an agreement, any interference to improve the bargain when there was no dispute about the genuineness of the agreement, could not but create the impression that the British Government was in some special sense and for some special reason the friend of the Muslims. In suggesting this augmentation in the seats, the Government of India forgot to take note of the reason why the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal were not given by the Pact seats in proportion to their population. The Lucknow Pact was based upon the principle, now thrown to the winds, that a community as such was not entitled to political
protection. A community was entitled to protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle underlying the Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and, therefore, was not entitled
to the same protection which it got in other Provinces where it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a majority, the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal felt the necessity of separate electorates. According to the principle underlying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by becoming a minority which they did by agreeing to a minority of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab did not get the majority of seats they were entitled to on the population basis. 37[f.37]
The proposal of the Government of India to give to the Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go through. But the fact that they wanted to do so remains as evidence of their inclinations. The second occasion when the British Government as an arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when
the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities Sub-Committee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi put forth the following
proposal as a basis for communal settlement 38[f.38] :—
" We are prepared to accept joint electorates on the conditions named by me : Firstly, that the rights at present enjoyed by the Musalmans in the minority Provinces should be continued to them; that in the Punjab and in Bengal they should have two joint electorates and representation on a population basis; that there should be the principle of reservation of seats coupled with Maulana Mahomed Ali's condition. 39[f.39]
In his speech on 14th January 1931 before the same Committee he made a different offer. He said 40[f.40] :—
" To-day I am authorized to make this offer : that in the Punjab the Musalmans should have through communal electorates 49 per cent. of the entire number of seats in the whole House, and should have liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province : so far as Bengal is concerned that Musalmans should have through communal electorates 46 percent, representation in the whole House, and should have the liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province; in so far as the minority Provinces are concerned, the Musalmans should continue to enjoy the weightage which they have at present through separate electorates, similar weightage to be given to our Hindu brethren in Sind, and to our Hindu and Sikh brethren in the North-West Frontier Province. If at any time hereafter two-thirds of the representatives of any community in any Provincial Legislative Council or in the Central Legislative Council desire to give up communal electorates and to
accept joint electorates then there after the system of joint electorates should come into being."
The difference between the two proposals is clear. "Joint electorates, if accompanied by statutory majority. If statutory majority was refused, then a minority of seats with separate electorates." The British Government took statutory
majority from the first demand and separate electorates from the second demand and gave the Muslims both when they had not asked for both. The second thing that is noticeable among the Muslims is the spirit of exploiting the weaknesses of the Hindus. If the Hindus object to anything, the Muslim policy seems to be to insist upon it and give it up only when the Hindus show themselves ready to offer a price for it by giving the Muslims some other concessions. As an illustration of this, one
can refer to the. question of separate and joint electorates. The Hindus have been to my mind utterly foolish in fighting over joint electorates especially in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a minority. Joint electorates can never suffice for a basis for nationalism. Nationalism is not a matter of political nexus or cash nexus, for the simple reason that union cannot be the result of calculation of mere externals. Where two communities live a life which is exclusive and self-enclosed for five years, they will not be one, because, they are made to come together on one day in five years for the purposes of voting in an election. Joint electorates may produce the enslavement of the minor community by the major community : but by themselves they cannot produce nationalism. Be that as it may, because the Hindus have been insisting upon joint electorates the Muslims have been insisting upon separate electorates. That this insistence is a -matter of bargain only can be seen from Mr. Jinnah's 14 points 41[f.41] and the solution 42 [f42] passed in the Calcutta session of the All-India Muslim League held cm 30th December 1927. Therein it was stipulated that only when the Hindus agreed to the separation of Sind and to the raising of the N.-W. F. P. to the status of a self-governing Province the Musalmans would consent to give up separate electorates. 43[f.43] The Musalmans evidently did not regard separate electorates as vital. They regarded them as a good quid pro quo for obtaining their other claims.
Another illustration of this spirit of exploitation is furnished by the Muslim insistence upon cow-slaughter and the stoppage of music before mosques. Islamic law does not insist upon the slaughter of the cow for sacrificial purposes and no Musalman, when he goes to Haj, sacrifices the cow in Mecca or Medina. But in India they will not be content with the sacrifice of any other animal. Music may be played before a mosque in all Muslim countries without any objection. Even in Afghanistan, which is not a secularized country, no objection is taken to music before a mosque. But in India the Musalmans must insist upon its stoppage for no other reason except that the Hindus claim a right to it.
The third thing that is noticeable is the adoption by the Muslims of the gangster's method in politics. The riots are a sufficient indication that gangsterism has become a settled part of their strategy in politics. They seem to be consciously and deliberately imitating the Sudeten Germans in the means employed by them against the Czechs.
44[f.44] So long as the Muslims were the aggressors, the Hindus were passive, and in the conflict they suffered more than the Muslims did. But this is no longer true. The Hindus have learned to retaliate and no longer feel any compunction in knifing a Musalman. This spirit of retaliation bids fair to produce the ugly spectacle of gangsterism against gangsterism.
How to meet this problem must exercise the minds of all concerned. There are the simple-minded Hindu Maha Sabha patriots who believe that the Hindus have only to make up their minds to wipe the Musalmans and they will be brought to their senses. On the other hand, there are the Congress Hindu Nationalists whose policy is to tolerate and appease the Musalmans by political and other concessions, because they believe that they cannot reach their cherished goal of independence unless the Musalmans back their demand. The Hindu Maha Sabha plan is no way to unity. On the contrary, it is a sure block to progress. The slogan of the Hindu Maha Sabha President— Hindustan for Hindus— is not merely arrogant but is arrant nonsense. The question, however, is : is the Congress way the right way ? It seems to me that the Congress has failed to realize two things. The first thing which the Congress has failed to realize is that there is a difference between appeasement and settlement, and that the difference is an essential one. Appeasement means buying off the aggressor by conniving at his acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons who happen for the moment to be the victims of his displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the aggressor. Settlement does. The second thing the Congress has failed to realize is that the policy of concession has increased Muslim aggressiveness, and what is worse, Muslims interpret these concessions as a sign of defeatism on the part of the Hindus and the absence of the will to resist. This policy of appeasement will involve the Hindus in the same fearful situation in which the Allies found themselves as a result of the policy of appeasement which they adopted towards Hitler. This is another malaise, no less acute than the malaise of social stagnation. Appeasement will surely aggravate it. The only remedy for it is a settlement. If Pakistan is a settlement, it is a proposition worth consideration.
As a settlement it will do away with this constant need of appeasement and ought to be welcomed by all those who prefer the peace and tranquillity of a settlement to the insecurity due to the growing political appetite shown by the Muslims in their dealings with the Hindus.
Contents Continued…
[f1]Studies in Mahetnedamsm, pp. 34-35
[f2]Ibid., Chapter XXXIX.
[f.3]The Koran, its Composition and Teaching . p. 58.
[f.4]For the position of Muslim women, see Our Cause, edited by Shyam Kumar Nehru.
[f.5]It is interesting to note the argument which the Europeans who are accused by Indians for not admitting them to their clubs use to defend themselves. They say, " We bring our women to the clubs. If you agree to bring your women t the club, you can be admitted. We can't expose our women to your company if you deny us the company of your women. Be ready to go fifty-fifty. them ask for entry in our clubs."
[f.6]Nationality and other Essays.
[f7] For a more detailed statement, sec my tract on Annihilation of caste.
[f.8]Harijan—11th January 1936.
[f9]The earliest retried decision was that given by the high Court of the North-West Province in 1870 in the case of Zabaroast Kluin vs. His wife
[f.10]Legislative Assembly Debates. 1938, Vol. V. pp. 1980 -1101.
[f.11]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938. Vol. V. pp. 1953-55.
[f12]The part played by woman in sustaining nationalism has not been sufficiently noticed. See the observations of Renan on this point in his Essay on Nationality.
[f.13]26lh April 1926.
[f.14]Short for the Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh which is a Hindu volunteer corps. Khaksar is a Muslim volunteer corps.
[f.15]See the speech of Sir Mahomad Shaif in the Minorities Sub-committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition). p. 57.
[f.16]See the speech of Raja Narendranath, lbid„ p. 65.
[f.17]The Musalinans had already been told by Sir Sayad Ahmad not to join the Congress in the two speeches, one delivered at Lucknow on 28th December 1887, and the other at Meerut on 16th March 1988. Mr. Mahomed Ali in his presidential address speaks of them as historic speeches.
[f.18]Mr' Mahomed Ali in his speech as the President of the Congress said that this deputation was a " command performance."
[f.19]The number in column 9 represents the maximum of Official members permitted under the Regulations.
[f.20]The C.P. Legislative Council was established in 1914.
[f.21]For some reason the pact did not settle the proportion of Muslim representation in Assam.
[f.22]Government of India Act, 1919, section 67(2) (h).
[f.23]Statutory Commission, 1929, Report, Vol. I, p. 189.
[f.24]Column 3 includes Indians elected by special constituencies, e.g. Commerce, whose communal proportions may of course vary slightly from time to time. Similarly column 2, including also officials and nominated non-officials, will
show slightly different results at different periods.
[f25]* Fifth despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Franchises) dated 23rd April 1919, para 21.
[f.26]The demands are known as Mr. Jinnah's 14 points. As a mailer of fact they are 15 in number and were formulated at a meeting of .Muslim leaders of' all shades of opinion held at Delhi in March 1927 and were known as the Delhi Proposals, for Mr. Jinnah's explanation of the origin of his 14 points, see All-India Register, 1929, Vol. 1., p. 367.
[f.27]Report, Vol. II, p. 71.
[f.28]Notification No. F. 173/31-R in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated 25th January 1932.
[f.29]The Simon Commission had rejected the claim saying: " We entirely share the view of the Bray Committee that provision ought now to be made for the constitutional advance of the N.-W. F. P. .............. But we also agree that the
situation of the Province and its intimate relation with the problem of Indian defence are such that special arrangements are required. . It is not possible, therefore, to apply to it automatically proposals which may be suited for provincial areas in other parts of India. " They justified it by saying: " The inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette must necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder magazine."—Report, Vol. H. paras 120-121.
[f.30]This resulted in the Poona Pact which was .signed on 24lh September 1932.
[f.31]For the efforts to gel the Muslim part of the Award revised, see All-India Register. 1932 Vol. II, pp. 281-315.
[f.32]The communique is dated Simla July 2,1935.
[f.33]Indian Annual Register. 1938. Vol. I, p. 369.
[f34]* See points no 3 in mr . jinnah’s 14 points
[f.35]These figures relate to the Census of 1921.
[f36]* Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 163.
The Government of India fell that injustice was done to the Punjab as well. But as there was no such special reason as there was in the case of Bengal, namely, the unsettling of the partition, they did not propose any augmentation in its representation as settled by the Pact.
[f.37]There is no doubt that this was well understood by the Muslims who were parties to the Pact. This is what Mr. Jinnah said as a witness appearing before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of India Bill, 1919, in reply to question No. 3808: " The position of Bengal was this: In Bengal the Muslims are in a majority, and the argument was advanced that any section or any community which is in the majority cannot claim a separate electorate: separate electorate is to protect the minority. But the counter-argument was perfectly true that numerically we are in a majority but as voters we are in the minority in Bengal, because of poverty and backwardness and so on. It was said: Very well, then fix 40 per cent., because if you are really put to test you will not get 40 per cent. because you will not be qualified as voters. Then we had the advantage in other Provinces."
[f.38]Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition), p. 96
[f.39] Mr. Mahomed Ali's formula was for Joint Electorates and Reserved Seats with this proviso that no candidate shall be declared elected unless he had secured at least 40 per cent. of the votes of his own community and at least 5 or 10 per cent. of the votes of the other community.
[f.40]Ibid., p. 123.
[f.41]See point No. 15 m Mr. Jimuh's points.
[f42]+ For the resolution and the speech of Mr. Baikal Ali thereon, see the Indian Quarterly Register. 1927. Vol. II. pp. 447-48.
[f.43]The unfortunate thing for the Hindus is that they did not get joint electorates although the Musalmans got the concessions.
[f.44]ln the Karachi session of the All-India Muslim League both Mr. Jinnah and Sir AbduUah Haroon compared the Muslims of India to the " Sudeten " of the Muslim world and capable of doing what the Sudelen Germans did to C'echoslovakia.

[G.Subramaniam]

PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
________________________________________________________________
Contents
PART V :
Chapter XIII : Must there be Pakistan
Chapter XIV : The problems of Pakistan
Chapter XV : Who can decide ?
EPILOGUE
PART V
Different people have thought differently of what has been said in the foregoing pages on the
question of 'Pakistan. One set of people have alleged that I have only stated the two sides of the
issue and the problems arising out of it but have not expressed my personal views on either of them.
This is not correct. Anyone who has read the preceding parts will have to admit that I have
expressed my views in quite positive terms, if not on all, certainly on many questions. In particular
I may refer to two of the most important ones in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims a Nation,
and Have they a case for Pakistan. There are others whose line of criticism is of a different sort.
They do not complain that I have failed to express my personal views. What they complain is that in
coming to my conclusions I have relied on propositions as though they were absolute in their
application and have admitted no exception. I am told, " Have you not stated your conclusions in
too general terms ? Is not a general proposition subject to conditions and limitations ? Have you
not disposed of certain complicated problems in a brief and cavalier fashion ? Have you shown
how Pakistan can be brought into existence in a just and peaceful manner ?" Even this criticism is
not altogether correct. It is not right to say that I have omitted to deal with these points. It may be
that my treatment of them is brief, and scattered. However, I am prepared to admit that there is
much force in this criticism and I am in duty bound to make good the default. This part is therefore
intended and is devoted to the consideration of the following subjects :—
1. What ate the limiting considerations which affect the Muslim case for Pakistan ?
2. What are the problems of Pakistan ? and what is their solution ?
3. Who has the authority to decide the issue of Pakistan ?
CHAPTER XIII
MUST THERE BE PAKISTAN ?
I
With all that has gone before, the sceptic, the nationalist, the conservative and the old-world Indian
will not fail to ask " Must there be Pakistan ?" No one can make light of such an attitude. For the
problem of Pakistan is indeed very grave and it must be admitted that the question is not only a
relevant and fair one to be put to the Muslims and to their protagonists but it is also important. Its
importance lies in the fact that the limitations on the case for Pakistan are so considerable in their
force that they can never be easily brushed aside. A mere statement of these limitations should be
enough to make one feel the force they have. It is writ large on the very face of them. That being
so, the burden of proof on the Muslims for establishing an imperative need in favour of Pakistan is
very heavy. Indeed the issue of Pakistan or to put it plainly of partitioning India, is of such a grave
character that the Muslims will not only have to discharge this burden of proof but they will have to
adduce evidence of such a character as to satisfy the conscience of an international tribunal before
they can win their case. Let us see how the case for Pakistan stands in the light of these limitations.
II
Must there be Pakistan because a good part of the Muslim population of India happens to be
concentrated in certain defined areas which can be easily severed from the rest of India ? Muslim
population is admittedly concentrated in certain well defined areas and it may be that these areas
are severable. But what of that ? In considering this question one must never lose sight of the
fundamental fact that nature has made India one single geographical unit. Indians are of course
quarrelling and no one can prophesy when they will stop quarrelling. But granting the fact, what
does it establish ? Only that Indians are a quarrelsome people. It does not destroy the fact that India
is a single geographical unit. Her unity is as ancient as Nature. Within this geographic unit and
covering the whole of it there has been a cultural unity from time immemorial. This cultural unity
has defied political and racial divisions. And at any rate for the last hundred and fifty years all
institutions—cultural, political, economic, legal and administrative—have been working on a
single, uniform spring of action. In any discussion of Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of,
namely, that the starting point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity of India. For it
is necessary to grasp the fact that there are really two cases of partition which must be clearly
distinguished. There is a case in which the starting point is a pre existing state of separation so that
partition is. only a dissolution of parts which were once separate and which were subsequently
joined together. This case is quite different from another in which the starting point at all times is a
state of unity. Consequently partition in such a case is the severance of a territory which has been
one single whole into separate parts. Where the starting point is not unity of territory, i.e., where
there was disunity before there was unity, partition—which is only a return to the original—may
not give a mental shock. But in India the starting point is unity. Why destroy its unity now, simply
because some Muslims are dissatisfied ? Why tear it when the unit is one single whole from
historical times ?

[G.Subramaniam]

III
Must there be Pakistan because there is communal antagonism between the Hindus and the
Muslims ? That the communal antagonism exists nobody can deny. The question however is, is the
antagonism such that there is no will to live together in one country and under one constitution ?
Surely that will to live together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of the provisions
of the Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus and Musalmans accepted the view that they
must live together under one constitution and in one country and participated in the discussions that
preceded the passing of the Act. And what was the state of communal feeling in India
between—say 1920 and 1935 ? As has been recorded in the preceding pages, the history of India
from 1920 up to 1935 has been one long tale of communal conflict in which the loss of life and loss
of property had reached a most shameful limit. Never was the communal situation so acute as it
was between this period of 15 years preceding the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935,
and yet this long tale of antagonism did not prevent the Hindus and the Musalmans from agreeing
to live in a single country and under a single constitution. Why make so much of communal
antagonism now ?
Is India the only country where there is communal antagonism ? What about Canada ? Consider
what Mr. Alexander Brady 1[f.1] has to say on the relations between the English and the French in
Canada :—
" Of the four original provinces, three. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario had populations
substantially of the same Anglo-Saxon stock and traditions. Originally a by-product of the
American Revolution, these colonies were established by the 50,000 United Empire Loyalists who
trekked north from persecution and cut their settlements out of the wilderness. Previous to the
American Revolution, Nova Scotia had received a goodly number of Scotch and American settlers,
and in all the colonies after the Revolution the Loyalist settlements were reinforced by immigrants
from Great Britain and Ireland."
* * * *
" Very different was the province of Quebec. French Canada in 1867 was a cultural unit by itself,
divorced from the British communities, by the barriers of race, language and religion. Its life ran in
a different mould. Stirred by a Catholic faith mediaeval in its intensity, it viewed with scant
sympathy the mingled Puritanism and other-worldliness of a Protestantism largely Calvinistic. The
religious faiths of the two peoples were indeed poles apart. In social, if not always in religious,
outlook, English Protestantism tended towards democracy, realism and modernism: the Catholicism
of the French leaned to paternalism, idealism and a reverence for the past."
* * * *
" What French Canada was in 1867 it remains substantially today. It still cherishes beliefs, customs,
and institutions which have little hold on the English provinces. It has distinctive thought and
enthusiasm, and its own important values. Its attitude, for example, on marriage and divorce is in
conflict with the dominant view, not merely of the rest of Canada, but of the remainder of
Anglo-Saxon-North-America."
* * * *
" The infrequency of intercourse between the two peoples is illustrated in Canada's largest city,
Montreal. About 63 per cent. of the population is French and 24 per cent British. Here, if anywhere,
is ample scope for association, but in fact they remain apart and distinct except where business and
politics force them together. They have their own residential sections; their own shopping centres,
and if either is more notable for racial reserve, it is the English."
* * * *
" The English-speaking residents of Montreal, as a whole, have made no effort to know their
French-speaking fellow citizens, to learn their language, to understand their traditions and their
aspirations, to observe with a keen eye and a sympathetic mind their qualities and their defects. The
separation of the two peoples is encouraged by the barrier of language. There is a wealth of
significance in the fact revealed by the census of 1921 ; viz., that about 50 per cent. of the
Canadians of French origin were unable to speak English and 95 per cent. of those of British origin
were unable to speak French. Even in Montreal, 70 per cent. of the British could not speak French
and 34 per cent. of the French could not speak English. The absence of a common language
maintains a chasm between the two nationalities and prevents fusion.
" The significance of Confederation is that it provided an instrument of government which enabled
the French, while retaining their distinct national life, to become happy partners with the British
and attain a Canadian super-nationality, embracing a loyally extending beyond their own group to
that of the Dominion as a whole."
* * * *
" While the federal system successfully opened the path for a wider nationality in Canada, the
co-operation which it sponsored has at times been subjected to severe strain by the violent clash of
opinion between the French and the British. The super-nationality has indeed often been reduced to
a shadow."
What about South Africa ? Let those who do not know the relationship between the Boers and the
British ponder over what ,Mr. E. H. Brooks 2 [f2] has to say :—
" How far is South African nationalism common to both the white races of South Africa ? There is,
of course, a very real and intense Afrikander nationalism ; but it is, generally speaking, a sentiment
confined to one of the white races, and characterised, significantly enough, by a love of the
Afrikans language, the tongue of the early settlers from Holland, as modified slightly by Huguenot
and German influence, and greatly by the passage of time. Afrikander nationalism has a tendency
to be exclusive, and has little place for the man who, while in every way a devoted son of South
Africa, is wholly or mainly English-speaking."
* * * *
" Is there a South African nation today ?
" There are certain factors in South African life which militate against an affirmative answer."
* * * *
" Among English-speaking South Africans there are found many tendencies inclined to hinder the
cause of national unity. With all the great virtues of the race they have its one cardinal defect—a
lack of imagination, a difficulty in putting one's self in the other man's place. Nowhere does this
come out more clearly than in the language question. Until recently comparatively few
English-speaking South Africans have studied Africans except as a business proposition or (as in
the Civil Service) more or less under compulsion; and fewer still have used it conversationally.
Many have treated it with open contempt—a contempt in inverse proportion to their knowledge of
it—and the majority with mere tolerance, exasperated or amused according to temperament."
Another witness on the same point may be heard. He is Mr. Manfred Nathan. 3 [f3] This is what he
has to say on the relations between the Boers and the British in South Africa :—
" They are also, in the main, both of them Protestant peoples—although this is not of too great
importance nowadays, when differences of religion do not count for much. They engage freely in
commercial transactions with each other."
* * * *
" Nevertheless it cannot with truth be said that hitherto there has been absolutely free social
intercourse between these two great sections of the white population. It has been suggested that this
is partly due to the fact that in the large urban centres the population is predominantly English, and
that the townsfolk know little of the people in the country and their ways of life. But even in the
country towns, though there is, as a rule, much greater friendliness, and much hospitality shown by
Boers to visitors, there is not much social intercourse between the two sections apart from
necessary business or professional relationship, and such social functions, charitable or public, as
require co-operation."
Obviously India is not the only place where there is communal antagonism. If communal
antagonism does not come in the way of the French in Canada living in political unity with the
English, if it does not come in the way of the English in South Africa living in political unity with
the Dutch, if it does not come in the way of the French and the Italians in Switzerland living in
political unity with the Germans why then should it be impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims
to agree to live together under one constitution in India?

[G.Subramaniam]

IV
Must there be Pakistan because the Muslims have lost faith in the Congress majority ? As reasons
for the loss of faith Muslims cite some instances of tyranny and oppression practised by the Hindus
and connived at by the Congress Ministries during the two years and three months the Congress
was in office. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah did not persist in his demand for a Royal Commission to
inquire into these grievances. If he had done it we could have known what truth there was in these
complaints. A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports 4[f.4] of the Muslim League
Committees, leaves upon the reader the impression that although there may be some truth in the
allegations there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The Congress Ministries concerned
have issued statements repudiating the charges. It may be that the Congress during the two years
and three months that it was in office did not show statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the
minorities, nay tried to suppress them. But can it be a reason for partitioning India ? Is it not
possible to hope that the voters who supported the Congress last time will grow wiser and not
support the Congress ? Or may it not be that if the Congress returns to office it will profit by the
mistakes it has made, revise its mischievous policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past
conduct ?
V
Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans are a nation ? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should
have become a votary and champion of Muslim Nationalism at a time when the whole world is
decrying against the evils of nationalism and is seeking refuge in some kind of international
organization. Mr. Jinnah is so obsessed with his new-found faith in Muslim Nationalism that he is
not prepared to see that there is a distinction between a society, parts of which are disintegrated,
and a society parts of which have become only loose, which no sane man can ignore. When a
society is disintegrating—and the two nation theory is a positive disintegration of society and
country—it is evidence of the fact that there do not exist what Carlyle calls " organic filaments
"—i.e., the vital forces which work to bind together the parts that are cut asunder. In such cases
disintegration can only be regretted. It cannot be prevented. Where, however, such organic
filaments do exist, it is a crime to overlook them and deliberately force the disintegration of society
and country as the Muslims seem to be doing. If the Musalmans want to be a different nation it is
not because they have been but because they want to be. There is much in the Musalmans which, if
they wish, can roll them into a nation. But isn't there enough that is common to both Hindus and
Musalmans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them into one people ? Nobody can deny
that there are many modes, manners, rites and customs which are common to both. Nobody can
deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on religion which do divide Hindus and
Musalmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized. If the emphasis is laid on things
that are common, there need be no two nations in India. If the emphasis is laid on points of
difference, it will no doubt give rise to two nations. The view that seems to guide Mr. Jinnah is that
Indians are only a people and that they can never be a nation. This follows the line of British
writers who make it a point of speaking of Indians as the people of India and avoid speaking of the
Indian nation. Granted Indians are not a nation, that they are only a people. What of that ? History
records that before the rise of nations as great corporate personalities, there were only peoples.
There is nothing to be ashamed if Indians are no more than a people. Nor is there any cause for
despair that the people of India—if they wish—will not become one nation. For, as Disraeli said, a
nation is a work of art and a work of time. If the Hindus and Musalmans agree to emphasize the
things that bind them and forget those that separate them there is no reason why in course of time
they should not grow into a nation. It may be that their nationalism may not be quite so integrated
as that of the French or the Germans. But they can easily produce a common state of mind on
common questions which is the sum total which the spirit of nationalism helps to produce and for
which it is so much prized. Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only differences and
ignore altogether the forces that bind ? Let it not be forgotten that if two nations come into being it
will not be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate design.
The Musalmans of India as I have said are not as yet a nation in the de jure or de facto sense of the
term and all that can be said is that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a
nation. But granting that the Musalmans of India are a nation, is India the only country where there
are going to be two nations ? What about Canada ? Everybody knows that there are in Canada two
nations, the English and the French. Are there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the
Dutch ? What about Switzerland ? Who does not know that there are three nations living in
Switzerland, the Germans, the French and the Italians ? Have the French in Canada demanded
partition because they are a separate nation ? Do the English claim partition of South Africa
because they are a distinct nation from the Boers ? Has anybody ever heard that the Germans, the
French and the Italians have ever agitated for the fragmentation of Switzerland because they are all
different nations ? Have the Germans, the French and the Italians ever felt that they would lose
their distinctive cultures if they lived as citizens of one country and under one constitution ? On the
contrary, all these distinct nations have been content to live together in one country under one
constitution without fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures. Neither have the
French in Canada ceased to be French by living with the English, nor have the English ceased to be
English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The Germans, the French and the Italians have
remained distinct nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a common country and a
common constitution. The case of Switzerland is worthy of note. It is surrounded by countries, the
nationalities of which have a close religious and racial affinity with the nationalities of Switzerland.
Notwithstanding these affinities the nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Germans,
Italians and French afterwards.
Given the experience of the French in Canada, the English in South Africa and the French and the
Italians in Switzerland, the questions that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India ? Assuming
that the Hindus and the Muslims split into two nations, why cannot they live in one country and
under one constitution ? Why should the emergence of the two-nation theory make partition
necessary ? Why should the Musalmans be afraid of losing their nationality and national culture by
living with the Hindus ? If the Muslims insist on separation, the cynic may well conclude that there
is so much that is common between the Hindus and the Musalmans that the Muslim leaders are
afraid that unless there is partition whatever little distinctive Islamic culture is left with the
Musalmans will eventually vanish by continued social contact with the Hindus with the result that
in the end instead of two nations there will grow up in India one nation. If the Muslim nationalism
is so thin then the motive for partition is artificial and the case for Pakistan loses its very basis.

[G.Subramaniam]

VI
Must there be Pakistan because otherwise Swaraj will be a Hindu Raj ? The Musalmans are so
easily carried away by this cry that it is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.
In the first place, is the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj a conscientious objection or is it a political
objection If it is a conscientious objection all one can say is that it is a very strange sort of
conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in India who are living under unbridled and
uncontrolled Hindu Raj of Hindu Princes and no objection to it has been raised by the Muslims or
the Muslim League. The Muslims had once a conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not
only have they no objection to it but they are the greatest supporters of it. That there should be no
objection to British Raj or to undiluted Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be
objection to Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj as though it was not
subjected to checks and balances is an attitude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.
The political objections to Hindu Raj rest on various grounds. The first ground is that Hindu society
is not a democratic society. True, it is not It may not be right to ask whether the Muslims have
taken any part in the various movements for reforming Hindu society as distinguished from
proselytising. But it is right to ask if the Musalmans are the only sufferers from the evils that
admittedly result from the undemocratic character of Hindu society. Are not the millions of
Shudras and non-Brahmins or millions of the Untouchables, suffering the worst consequences of
the undemocratic character of Hindu society ? Who benefits from education, from public service
and from political reforms except the Hindu governing class—composed of the higher castes of the
Hindus—which form not even 10 per cent. of the total Hindu population ? Has not the governing
class of the Hindus, which controls Hindu politics, shown more regard for safeguarding the rights
and interests of the Musalmans than they have for safeguarding the rights and interests of the
Shudras and the Untouchables ? Is not Mr. Gandhi, who is determined to oppose any political
concession to the Untouchables, ready to sign a blank cheque in favour of the Muslims ? Indeed,
the Hindu governing class seems to be far more ready to share power with the Muslims than it is to
share power with the Shudras and the Untouchables. Surely, the Muslims have the least ground to
complain of the undemocratic character of Hindu society.
Another ground on which the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority
community and the Musalmans are a minority community. True. But is India the only country
where such a situation exists ? Let us compare the conditions in India with the conditions in
Canada, South Africa and Switzerland. First, take the distribution of population. In Canada 5[f.5]
out of a total population of 10,376,786 only 2,927,990 are French. In South Africa 6 [f6] the Dutch
number 1,120,770 and the English are only 783,071. In Switzerland 7[f.7] out of the total
population of 4,066,400 the Germans are 2,924,313, the French 831,097 and the Italians 242,034.
This shows that the smaller nationalities have no fear of being placed under the Raj of a major
community. Such a notion seems to be quite foreign to them. Why is this so? Is it because there is
no possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy in those centres of power and
authority, namely the Legislature and in the Executive ? Quite the contrary. Unfortunately no
figures are available to show the actual extent of representation which the different major and
minor nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. That is because there is no
communal reservation of seats such as is found in India. Each community is left to win in a general
contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy to work out the probable number of seats
which each nationality can obtain on the basis of the ratio of its population to the total seats in the
Legislature Proceeding on this basis what do we find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the
Lower House is 187. Out of them the German population has a possibility of winning 138, French
42 and Italians only 7 seats. In South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the
English gaining 62, and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the total is 245. Of these the French 8 [f.8]
have only 65. On this basis it is quite clear that in all these countries there is a possibility of the
major nationality establishing its supremacy over the minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far
as to say that speaking de jure and as a mere matter of form in Canada the French are living under
the British Raj, the English in South Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in
Switzerland under the German Raj. But what is the position de facto ? Have Frenchmen in Canada
raised a cry that they will not live under British Raj ? Have Englishmen in South Africa raised a cry
that they will not live under Dutch Raj ? Have the French and Italians in Switzerland any objection
to living under the German Raj ? Why should then the Muslims raise this cry of Hindu Raj ?
Is it proposed that the Hindu Raj should be the rule of a naked communal majority ? Are not the
Musalmans granted safeguards against the possible tyranny of the Hindu majority ? Are not the
safeguards given to the Musalmans of India wider and better than the safeguards which have been
given to the French in Canada, to the English in South Africa and to the French and the Italians in
Switzerland? To take only one item from the list of safeguards. Haven't the Musalmans got an
enormous degree of weightage in representation in the Legislature ? Is weightage known in
Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ? And what is the effect of this weightage to Muslims ? Is it
not to reduce the Hindu majority in the Legislature? What is the degree of reduction? Confining
ourselves to British India and taking account only of the representation granted to the territorial
constituencies, Hindu and Muslim, in the Lower House in the Central Legislature under the
Government of India Act, 1935, it is clear that out of a total of 187, the Hindus have 105 seats and
the Muslims have 82 seats. Given these figures one is forced to ask where is the fear of the Hindu
Raj ?
If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country. No
matter what the Hindus say, Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that
account it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost. But is
Pakistan the true remedy against it ? What makes communal Raj possible is a marked disproportion
in the relative strength of the various communities living in a country. As pointed out above, this
disproportion is not more marked in India than it is in Canada, South Africa and Switzerland.
Nonetheless there is no British Raj in Canada, no Dutch Raj in South Africa, and no German Raj in
Switzerland. How have the French, the English and the Italians succeeded in preventing the Raj of
the majority community being established in their country ? Surely not by partition : What is their
method ? Their method is to put a ban on communal parties in politics. No community in Canada,
South Africa or Switzerland ever thinks of starting a separate communal party. What is important to
note is that it is the minority nations which have taken the lead in opposing the formation of a
communal party. For they know that if they form a communal political party the major community
will also form a communal party and the majority community will thereby find it easy to establish
its communal Raj. It is a vicious method of self-protection. It is because the minority nations are
fully aware how they will be hoisted on their own petard that they have opposed the formation of
communal political parties.
Have the Muslims thought of this method of avoiding Hindu Raj. Have they considered how easy it
is to avoid it ? Have they considered how futile and harmful the present policy of the League is ?
The Muslims are howling against the Hindu Maha Sabha and its slogan of Hindudom and Hindu
Raj. But who is responsible for this ? Hindu Maha Sabha and Hindu Raj are the inescapable
nemesis which the Musalmans have brought upon themselves by having a Muslim League. It is
action and counter-action. One gives rise to the other. Not partition, but the abolition, of the
Muslim League and the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims is the only effective
way of burying the ghost of Hindu Raj. It is, of course, not possible for Muslims and other minority
parties to join the Congress or the Hindu Maha Sabha so long as the disagreement on the question
of constitutional safeguards continues. But this question will be settled, is bound to be settled and
there is every hope that the settlement will result in securing to the Muslims and other minorities
the safeguards they need. Once this consummation, which we so devoutly wish, takes place nothing
can stand in the way of a party re-alignment, of the Congress and the Maha Sabha breaking up and
of Hindus and Musalmans forming mixed political parties based on an agreed programme of social
and economic regeneration, and thereby avoid the danger of both Hindu Raj or Muslim Raj
becoming a fact. Nor should the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims be difficult in
India. There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic, political and social needs
are the same as those of the majority of the Muslims and they would be far more ready to make a
common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends than they would with the high caste
of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of ordinary human rights for centuries. To pursue
such a course cannot be called an adventure. The path along that line is a well trodden path. Is it not
a fact that under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims,
the Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes united together and worked the reforms as members
of one team from 1920 to 1937 ? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving communal
harmony among Hindus and Muslims and of destroying the danger of a Hindu Raj. Mr. Jinnah
could have easily pursued this line. Nor was it difficult for Mr. Jinnah to succeed in it. Indeed Mr.
Jinnah is the one person who had all the chances of success on his side if he had tried to form such
a united non-communal party. He has the ability to organize. He had the reputation of a nationalist.
Even many Hindus who were opposed to the Congress would have flocked to him if he had only
sent out a call for a united party of like-minded Hindus and Muslims. What did Mr. Jinnah do ? In
1937 Mr. Jinnah made his entry into Muslim politics and strangely enough he regenerated the
Muslim League which was dying and decaying and of which only a few years ago he would have
been glad to witness the funeral. However regrettable the starting of such a communal political
party may have been, there was in it one relieving feature. That was the leadership of Mr. Jinnah.
Everybody felt that with the leadership of Mr. Jinnah the League could never become a merely
communal party. The resolutions passed by the League during the first two years of its new career
indicated that it would develop into a mixed political party of Hindus and Muslims. At the annual
session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937 altogether 15 resolutions were
passed. The following two are of special interest in this connection.

[G.Subramaniam]

Resolution 9[f.9] No. 7:
" This meeting of the All India Muslim League deprecates and protests against the formation of
Ministries in certain Provinces by the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the
spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the
Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the
interest of the Musalmans and other important minorities"
Resolution* No. 8:
" Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of
Full Independence in the form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and
interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the
constitution."
Equal number of resolutions were passed at the next annual session of the League held at Patna in
December 1938. Resolution* No. 10 is noteworthy. It reads as follows :—
"The All India Muslim League reiterates its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the
Government of India Act, 1935, is not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have
taken place or may take place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India
Muslim League to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a
suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other minorities in
India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common front between the
Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity and statesmanship that
underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah took a somersault and outlined the
dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution
in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the
Musalmans were a nation and not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether
the Muslims are a nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the
mere fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ?
Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this policy.
But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League the only
organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the possibility of having
to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always be sure of the first place for
himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan of isolation the Muslims from Hindu
Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans
are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is what would happen in the Muslim minority
Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of
Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it
cannot. What good is Pakistan then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims
are in a majority and in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is
unnecessary to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It
is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no Pakistan they
will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics of the Muslim League ?
The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by espousing the cause of
majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the Muslim League ! What a fall from
the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.
VI
These are some of the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me.
There might be others which have not struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How
do the Muslims propose to meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty
as a student of the subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have
nothing more to answer for.
There are, however, two other questions of such importance that this discussion cannot be closed
with any sense of completeness without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to
clear the ground between myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the
critics, the other the critics are entitled to ask me.
Beginning with the first question, what I feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect
from a statement of these weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they
are defeated in a controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what
method is adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the
procedure which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from
amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation, which was
open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former representing the
Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist of the Hindu religion with
the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his religion was bound to accept the
religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims
over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon there may be some use in setting out this string of
weaknesses. But let it not be forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy
which maybe called Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with
arguments of Bishop Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the
doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was
merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr. Johnson
with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he
rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the Musalmans will agree, as most
rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided by the tests of reason and argument. But
I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say "
Damn your arguments ! We want Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance
placed upon the limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no
use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.
Let me now turn to the other question which I said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my
position regarding the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have
no doubts as to my position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters
that follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I know
my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a
conclusion— extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the earlier part of this chapter
that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the compelling force
which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have
said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have
Pakistan there is no escape from conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that
conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not
one of them. In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue.
First is the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard
them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.
To begin with the first. One cannot ignore that what is important is not the winning of
independence but the having of the sure means of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the
independence of a country is a safe army—an army on which you can rely to fight for the country
at all time and in any eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed
of Hindus and Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be
trusted to defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the
invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question. Obviously,
the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the army have caught
the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of Pakistan. If they are infected, then
the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being the guardian of the independence of India, it will
continue to be a menace and a potential danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I
hear some Britishers argue that it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some
Hindus also sing the same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the
determining factor in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India
not as an independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be
defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The question is
not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no partition of India. The
question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India. To that, I repeat, the only answer is
that Indians will be able to defend a free India on one and one condition alone—namely, if the
army in India remains non-political, unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians
against the most stupid habit that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj
without reference to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize
that a political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no army.

[G.Subramaniam]

Equally important is the fact that the army is the ultimate sanction which sustains Government in
the exercise of its authority inside the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or recalcitrant
element. Suppose the Government of the day enunciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a
section of the Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use its army to enforce
its policy. Can the Government of the day depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its orders
and shoot down the Muslim rebels ? This again depends upon to what extent the Muslims in the
army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory. If they have caught it, India cannot have a
safe and secure Government.
Turning to the second governing factor the Hindus do not seem to attach any value to sentiment as
a force in politics. The Hindus seem to rely upon two grounds to win against the Muslims. The first
is that even if the Hindus and the Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The other
is that the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong sentiment rather than upon clear
argument. I don't know how long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such arguments. It
is true that the first argument is not without precedent. At the same time it does not call for much
intelligence to see that its value is extremely limited. two nations and one state is a pretty plea. It
has the same attraction which a sermon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders.
But instead of being uttered as a sermon if it is intended to issue it as an ordinance for the Muslims
to obey it will be a mad project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I am sure, defeat the very
purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally silly. That the Muslim case for Pakistan is
founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness; it is really its strong point. It does not
need deep understanding of politics to know that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of
theory. It is a matter of sentiment. A constitution like clothes must suit as well as please. If a
constitution does not please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a
constitution which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster
if not to invite rebellion.
It is not realized by the Hindus that, assuming there is a safe army, rule by armed forces is not the
normal method of governing a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body
politic and must be administered when the body politic becomes sick. But just because force is the
medicine of the body politic it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic must
work as a matter of course by springs of action which are natural. This can happen only when the
different elements constituting the body politic have the will to work together and to obey the laws
and orders passed by a duly constituted authority. Suppose the new constitution for a United India
contained in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. But suppose
the Muslims said " Thank you for your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you " ; and
suppose they boycott the Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment of taxes ; what is to
happen ? Are the Hindus prepared to extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets
? Is Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be an opportunity for Hindus to
conquer the Musalmans and for the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus ? Swaraj must be a
Government of the people by the people and for the people. This is the raison d'etre of Swaraj and
the only justification for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the Hindus and the
Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each other, the one planning to conquer its rival, why
should we have Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow such a Swaraj to come into
existence ? It will be a snare, a delusion and a perversion.
The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that they are presented with a situation in which they are
forced to choose between various alternatives. Let me state them. In the first place they have to
choose between Freedom of India and the Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the
Unity of India they put the quick realization of India's freedom into jeopardy. The second choice
relates to the surest method of defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in a free
and united India to develop and sustain along with the non-Muslims the necessary will to defend
the common liberties of both: or whether it is better to partition India and thereby ensure the safety
of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the Muslims and of non-Muslim India by leaving its
defence to non-Muslims.
As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to the Unity of India. The Sinn Feinners who were the
staunchest of nationalists to be found anywhere in the world and who like the Indians were
presented with similar alternatives chose the freedom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The
non-Muslims who are opposed to partition may well profit by the advice tendered by the Rev.
Michael O'Flanagan, at one time Vice-President of the Feinns to the Irish Nationalists on the issue
of the partition of Ireland. 10[f.10] Said the Rev. Father :—
" If we reject Home Rule rather than agree to the exclusion of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what
case have we to put before the world ? We can point out that Ireland is an island with a definite
geographical boundary. That argument might be all right if we were appealing to a number of
Island nationalities that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appealing, as we are, to
continental nations with shifting boundaries, that argument will have no force whatever. National
and geographical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would make one nation of Spain
and Portugal; history has made two of them. Geography did its best to make one nation of Norway
and Sweden ; history has succeeded in making two of them. Geography has scarcely anything to
say to the number of nations upon the North American continent; history has done the whole thing.
If a man were to try to construct a political map of Europe out of its physical map, he would find
himself groping in the dark. Geography has worked hard to make one nation out of Ireland; history
has. worked against it. The island of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coincide.
In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people."
These words have emanated from a profound sense of realism which we in India so lamentably
lack.
On the second issue I prefer the partitioning of India into Muslim India and non-Muslim India as
the surest and safest method of providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the safer of the two
alternatives. I know it will be contended that my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army
to a Free and United India arising from the infection of the two nation theory is only an imaginary
fear. That is no doubt true. That does not militate against the soundness of the choice I have made. I
may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any fear of contradiction that, to use the words of
Burke, it is better to be ridiculed for too great a credulity than to be ruined by too confident a sense
of security. I don't want to leave things to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of
India, to. chance is to be guilty of the grossest crime.
Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same
time, it would be a folly not to face what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense.
Equally would it be a folly to lose the. Part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the
whole.
These are the reasons why I hold that if the Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then
Pakistan must come. So far as I am concerned the only important question is : Are the Musalmans
determined to have Pakistan ? Or is Pakistan a mere cry ? Is it only a passing mood ? Or does it
represent their permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes
certain that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to
concede the principle of it.

[G.Subramaniam]

Equally important is the fact that the army is the ultimate sanction which sustains Government in
the exercise of its authority inside the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or recalcitrant
element. Suppose the Government of the day enunciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a
section of the Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use its army to enforce
its policy. Can the Government of the day depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its orders
and shoot down the Muslim rebels ? This again depends upon to what extent the Muslims in the
army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory. If they have caught it, India cannot have a
safe and secure Government.
Turning to the second governing factor the Hindus do not seem to attach any value to sentiment as
a force in politics. The Hindus seem to rely upon two grounds to win against the Muslims. The first
is that even if the Hindus and the Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The other
is that the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong sentiment rather than upon clear
argument. I don't know how long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such arguments. It
is true that the first argument is not without precedent. At the same time it does not call for much
intelligence to see that its value is extremely limited. two nations and one state is a pretty plea. It
has the same attraction which a sermon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders.
But instead of being uttered as a sermon if it is intended to issue it as an ordinance for the Muslims
to obey it will be a mad project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I am sure, defeat the very
purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally silly. That the Muslim case for Pakistan is
founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness; it is really its strong point. It does not
need deep understanding of politics to know that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of
theory. It is a matter of sentiment. A constitution like clothes must suit as well as please. If a
constitution does not please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a
constitution which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster
if not to invite rebellion.
It is not realized by the Hindus that, assuming there is a safe army, rule by armed forces is not the
normal method of governing a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body
politic and must be administered when the body politic becomes sick. But just because force is the
medicine of the body politic it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic must
work as a matter of course by springs of action which are natural. This can happen only when the
different elements constituting the body politic have the will to work together and to obey the laws
and orders passed by a duly constituted authority. Suppose the new constitution for a United India
contained in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. But suppose
the Muslims said " Thank you for your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you " ; and
suppose they boycott the Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment of taxes ; what is to
happen ? Are the Hindus prepared to extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets
? Is Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be an opportunity for Hindus to
conquer the Musalmans and for the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus ? Swaraj must be a
Government of the people by the people and for the people. This is the raison d'etre of Swaraj and
the only justification for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the Hindus and the
Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each other, the one planning to conquer its rival, why
should we have Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow such a Swaraj to come into
existence ? It will be a snare, a delusion and a perversion.
The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that they are presented with a situation in which they are
forced to choose between various alternatives. Let me state them. In the first place they have to
choose between Freedom of India and the Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the
Unity of India they put the quick realization of India's freedom into jeopardy. The second choice
relates to the surest method of defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in a free
and united India to develop and sustain along with the non-Muslims the necessary will to defend
the common liberties of both: or whether it is better to partition India and thereby ensure the safety
of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the Muslims and of non-Muslim India by leaving its
defence to non-Muslims.
As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to the Unity of India. The Sinn Feinners who were the
staunchest of nationalists to be found anywhere in the world and who like the Indians were
presented with similar alternatives chose the freedom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The
non-Muslims who are opposed to partition may well profit by the advice tendered by the Rev.
Michael O'Flanagan, at one time Vice-President of the Feinns to the Irish Nationalists on the issue
of the partition of Ireland. 10[f.10] Said the Rev. Father :—
" If we reject Home Rule rather than agree to the exclusion of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what
case have we to put before the world ? We can point out that Ireland is an island with a definite
geographical boundary. That argument might be all right if we were appealing to a number of
Island nationalities that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appealing, as we are, to
continental nations with shifting boundaries, that argument will have no force whatever. National
and geographical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would make one nation of Spain
and Portugal; history has made two of them. Geography did its best to make one nation of Norway
and Sweden ; history has succeeded in making two of them. Geography has scarcely anything to
say to the number of nations upon the North American continent; history has done the whole thing.
If a man were to try to construct a political map of Europe out of its physical map, he would find
himself groping in the dark. Geography has worked hard to make one nation out of Ireland; history
has. worked against it. The island of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coincide.
In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people."
These words have emanated from a profound sense of realism which we in India so lamentably
lack.
On the second issue I prefer the partitioning of India into Muslim India and non-Muslim India as
the surest and safest method of providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the safer of the two
alternatives. I know it will be contended that my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army
to a Free and United India arising from the infection of the two nation theory is only an imaginary
fear. That is no doubt true. That does not militate against the soundness of the choice I have made. I
may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any fear of contradiction that, to use the words of
Burke, it is better to be ridiculed for too great a credulity than to be ruined by too confident a sense
of security. I don't want to leave things to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of
India, to. chance is to be guilty of the grossest crime.
Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same
time, it would be a folly not to face what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense.
Equally would it be a folly to lose the. Part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the
whole.
These are the reasons why I hold that if the Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then
Pakistan must come. So far as I am concerned the only important question is : Are the Musalmans
determined to have Pakistan ? Or is Pakistan a mere cry ? Is it only a passing mood ? Or does it
represent their permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes
certain that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to
concede the principle of it.

[G.Subramaniam]

IV
Having defined the scope and limitations of the idea of self-determination we can now proceed to
deal with the question of boundaries of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim League for the
present boundary to remain the boundaries of Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations ?
The answer to this question seems to me quite clear. The geographical layout seems to decide the
issue. No special pleading of any kind is required. In the case of the North-West Frontier Province,
Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are intermixed. In these Provinces a case for
territorial separation for the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content with cultural
independence and such political safeguards as may be devised for their safety. The case of the
Punjab and Bengal stands on a different footing. A glance at the map shows that the layout of the
population of the Hindus and the Muslims in these two Provinces is totally different from what one
finds in the other three Provinces. The non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal are not found living
in small islands in the midst of and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the entire
surface as is the case with the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and
the Punjab the Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable. In these circumstances,
there is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the
present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western
Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.
Two conclusions necessarily follow from the foregoing discussion. One is that the non-Muslims of
the Punjab and Bengal have a case for exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance of the areas
they occupy. The other is that the non-Muslims of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and
Sind have no case for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence and political
safeguards. To put the same thing in a different way it may be said that the Muslim League claim
for demanding that the boundaries of Sind, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan shall remain as
they are cannot be opposed. But that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is untenable
and that the non-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire, can claim that the territory they occupy
should be excluded by a redrawing of the boundaries of these two Provinces.
V
One should have thought that such a claim by the non-Muslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal
for the redrawing of the boundaries would be regarded by the Muslim League as a just and
reasonable claim. The possibility of the redrawing of boundaries was admitted in the Lahore
Resolution of the Muslim League passed in March 1940. The Resolution 12[f.12] said :—
" The establishment of completely independent States formed by demarcating geographically
contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as
may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the
north-western and eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute independent States
as Muslim free national homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and
sovereign."
That this continued to be the position of the Muslim League is clear from the resolution passed by
the Muslim League on the Cripps Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But there are
indications that Mr. Jinnah has changed his view. At a public meeting held on 16th November
1942in Jullunder Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following terms:—
" The latest trick—1 call it nothing but a trick—to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses
purposely, and those playing the game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination
be confined to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities ? Having said that all
have the right of self-determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits ;
likewise the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of Pakistans.
SUB-NATIONAL GROUPS 13[f.13]
" Who is the author of this new formula that every community has the right of self-determination
all over India ? Either it is colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that
the Musalmans claim the right of self-determination because they are a national group on a given
territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you known
anywhere in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State ? Where are you
going to get a State for them ? In that case you have got 14 per cent. Muslims in the United
Provinces. Why not have a State for them ? Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national
group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional language they are characterized as a
sub-national group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilized
Government to a minority. I hope I have made the position clear. The Muslims are not a
sub-national group; it is their birthright to claim and exercise the right of self-determination."
Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point. The point raised by his critics was not with regard to
the non-Muslim minorities in general. It had reference to the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab
and Bengal. Does Mr. Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy
a compact and an easily severable territory by his theory of a sub-nation ? If that is so, then one is
bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any political
literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an ingenious concept but it is
also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a subnation connote ? If I understand its
implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must not be severed from the nation to which it
belongs even when severance is possible: it means that the relations between a nation and a
sub-nation are no higher than the relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or
between property and its incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a
sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah's argument. But does
Mr. Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels so
that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose to
drive them ? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any reasonable man. It is
also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be difficult for so mature a lawyer as
Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in
relation to a numerically larger nation and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be
said that taking India as a whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a
sub-nation they have no right to self-determination or territorial separation ?
Already there exists a certain amount of suspicion with regard to the banafides of Pakistan. Rightly
or wrongly, most people suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think that it has two
motives, one immediate, the other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the
neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim Federation. The ultimate motive is for the
Muslim Federation to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the Hindu and re-establish
Muslim Empire in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the scheme of hostages
which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen points, for the creation of
separate Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the Muslims and reach the real
motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The Hindu opponents of Pakistan if they suspect
that the real motives of the Muslims are different from the apparent ones, may take note of them
and plan accordingly. They cannot oppose Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But they
are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah, Why does he want to have a communal problem within Pakistan ?
However vicious may be the motives behind Pakistan it should possess at least one virtue. The
ideal of Pakistan should be not to have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues
one can expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a communal problem in the same way
as India has been, why have Pakistan at all ? It can be welcomed only if it provides an escape from
the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such a way that it will
be an ethnic State without a minority and a majority pitched against each other. Fortunately it can
be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will allow it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it.
Therein lies the chief cause for suspicion and Mr. Jinnah, instead of removing it, is deepening it by
such absurd, illogical and artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.
Rather than resort to such absurd and illogical propositions and defend what is indefensible and
oppose what is just, would it not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did in the
matter of the delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster ? As all those who know the vicissitudes
through which the Irish Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craigavon meeting held
on 23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated his policy that in Ulster there will be a
government of Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home Rule Government.
As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to withdraw its government, this policy meant the
establishment of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was embodied in a resolution
passed at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster Unionist Council, the County Grand
Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on 25th September 1911. The Provisional
Government of Ulster was to come into force on the day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An
important feature of this policy was to invest the Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over
all " those districts which they (Ulsterites) could control."
The phrase " those districts which they could control " was no doubt meant to include the whole of
the administrative division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included nine
counties. Of these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the
three Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward Carson do in the
end ? It did not take long for Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three overwhelmingly
Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage of a true leader he came out with a
declaration that he proposed to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In his speech in the
House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced that he was content with six counties
only. The speech that he made on that occasion giving his reasons why he was content only with
six counties is worth quoting. This is what he said 14[f.14] :—
" The truth is that we came to the conclusion after many anxious hours and anxious days of going
into the whole matter, almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that we would have no
chance of successfully starting a Parliament in Belfast which would be responsible for the
government of Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle for us to come here and
pretend that we should be in a position to do so. We should like to have the very largest areas
possible, naturally. That is a system of land grabbing that prevails in all countries for widening the
jurisdiction of the various governments that are set up ; but there is no use in our undertaking a
government which we know would be a failure if we were saddled with these three counties."
These are wise, sagacious and most courageous words. The situation in which they were uttered has
a close parallel with the situation that is likely to be created in the Punjab and Bengal by the
application of the principle of Pakistan. The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful
Pakistan should not forget to take note of them. It is no use asking the non-Muslim minorities in the
Punjab and Bengal to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not prepared to be content
with safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu majority why should the Hindu minorities be asked to
be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the Muslim majority ? If the Musalmans can
say to the Hindus " Damn your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you "—an argument which
Carson used against Redmond—the same argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab
and Bengal against the Muslim offer to be content with safeguards.
The point is that this attitude is not calculated to lead to a peaceful solution of the problem of
Pakistan. Sabre-rattling or show of force will not do. In the first place, this is a game which two can
play. In the second place, arms may be an element of strength. But to have arms is not enough. As
Rousseau said : " The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms
his might into right, and obedience into duty." Only ethics can convert might into right and
obedience into duty. The League must see that its claim for Pakistan is founded on ethics.
VI
So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn to the problem of the minorities which
must remain within Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two methods of
protecting their interests.
First is to provide safeguards in the constitution for the protection of the political and cultural rights
of the minorities. To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.
Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution
and would be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of
population is possible. But they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is
the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be
found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling.
To begin with consider the dimensions of the problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be ?
In determining the scale one is bound to take into account three considerations. In the first place, if
the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn there will be no question of transfer of
population so far as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the Musalmans
residing in Hindustan do not propose to migrate to Pakistan nor does the League want their
transfer. In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan
do not want to migrate. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of transfer of population is far
from being a staggering problem. Indeed it is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem
at all.
Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling problem ? Experience shows that it is not
a problem which it is impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it might be well
to begin by asking what are the possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of a person
migrating from one area to another on account of political changes. The following are obvious
enough : (1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of population. (2) Prohibition
by Government against migration. (3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on the transfer of
goods by the migrating family. (4) The impossibility for a migrating family to carry with it to its
new home its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of obviating a resort to unfair practices with a
view to depress unduly the value of the property of the migrating family. (6) The fear of having to
make good the loss by not being able to realize the full value of the property by sale in the market.
(7) The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to the migrating family from the
country of departure. (8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be made. If
these difficulties are removed the way to the transfer of population becomes clear.
The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the two States of Pakistan and Hindustan
agreeing to a treaty embodying an article in some such terms as follows :—
" The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree to appoint a Commission consisting of equal
number of representatives and presided over by a person who is approved by both and who is not a
national of either.
" The expense of the Commission and of its Committees both on account of its maintenance and its
operation shall be borne by the two Governments in equal proportion.
" The Government of Pakistan and the Government of Hindustan hereby agree to grant to all their
nationals within their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right to express their desire to
emigrate.
" The Governments of the States above mentioned undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise
of this right and to interpose no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All laws
and regulations whatsoever which conflict with freedom of emigration shall be considered as null
and void."
The fourth and the fifth difficulties which relate to transfer of property can be effectually met by
including in the treaty articles the following terms:
" Those who, in pursuance of these articles, determine to take advantage of the right to migrate
shall have the right to carry with them or to have transported their movable property of any kind
without any duty being imposed upon them on this account.
"So far as immovable property is concerned it shall be liquidated by the Commission in accordance
with the following provisions:
(1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee of Experts to estimate the value of the immovable
property of the emigrant The emigrant interested shall have a representative chosen by him on the
Committee.
(2) The Commission shall take necessary measures with a view to the sale of immovable property
of the emigrant"
As for the rest of the difficulties relating to reimbursement for loss, for payment of pensionary and
charges for specifying the currency in which payments are to be made the following articles in the
treaty should be sufficient to meet them :
" (1) The difference in the estimated value and the sale price of the immovable property of the
emigrant shall be paid in to the Commission by the Government of the country of departure as soon
as the former has notified it of the resulting deficiency. One-fourth of this payment may be made in
the money of the country of departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold bonds.
" (2) The Commission shall advance to the emigrants the value of their immovable property
determined as above.
" (3) All civil or military pensions acquired by an emigrant at the dale of the signature of the
present treaty shall be capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government, which must pay the
amount to the Commission for the account of its owners.
" (4) The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be advanced by the States interested in the
Commission."

[G.Subramaniam]

Are not these provisions sufficient to overcome the difficulties regarding transfer of population ?
There are of course other difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve questions of
policy. The first question is : is the transfer of population to be compulsory or is it to be voluntary ?
The second is : is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all or is it to be restricted to any
particular class of persons ? The third is : how long is Government going to remain liable to be
bound by these provisions, particularly the provision for making good the loss on the sale of
immovable property ? Should the provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability
be continued indefinitely ?
With regard to the first point, both are possible and there are instances of both having been put into
effect. The transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary basis while that
between Greece and Turkey was on a compulsory basis. Compulsory transfer strikes one as being
prima facie wrong. It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat if he does
not wish to, unless the peace and tranquility of the State is likely to be put in jeopardy by his
continuing to live where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own interest. What is
required is that those who want to transfer should be able to do so without impediment and without
loss. I am therefore of opinion that transfer should not be forced but should be left open for those
who declare their intention to transfer.
As to the second point, it is obvious that only members of a minority can be allowed to take
advantage of the scheme of State-aided transfer. But even this restriction may not be sufficient to
exclude all those who ought not to get the benefit of this scheme. It must be confined to certain well
defined minorities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure to be subjected to
discrimination or victimization.
The third point is important and is likely to give rise to serious difference of opinion. On a fair view
of the matter it can be said that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government to keep open for an
indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost .There is nothing unfair in telling a
person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration
contained in the forgoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and
that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it will have to
be at his own cost and without the aid of the State There is no inequity in thus limiting the right to
State aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant
consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no control. But migration
may not be the result of political change. lt may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes,
aid to the emigrant cannot bean obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether
migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time.
When it takes place with in a defined period from the happening of a political change it may be
presumed open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost. There is nothing
unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of
State-aided migration contained in the foregoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate
within a stated period and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to
migrate but it will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity
in thus limiting the right to State-aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the
migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no
control. But migration may not be the result of political change. It may be for other causes, and
when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way
to determine whether migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a
definite point of time. When it takes place within a defined period from the happening of a political
change it may be presumed to be political. When it occurs after the period it may be presumed to be
for private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The same rule of presumption governs the cases
of civil servants who, when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on proportionate
pensions if they retire within a given period but not if they retire after it has lapsed.
If the policy in these matters is as I suggest it should be, it may be given effect to by the inclusion
of the following articles in the treaty:
" The right to voluntary emigration may be exercised under this treaty by any person belonging to
an ethnic minority who is over 18 years of age.
" A declaration made before the Commission shall be sufficient evidence of intention to exercise
the right.
" The choice of the husband shall carry with it that of the wife, the option of parents or guardians
that of their children or wards aged less than 18 years.
" The right to the benefit provided by this treaty shall lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised
within a period of 5 years from the date of signing the treaty.
" The duties of the Commission shall be terminated within six months after the expiration of the
period of five years from the date when the Commission starts to function."
What about the cost ? The question of cost will be important only if the transfer is to be
compulsory. A scheme of voluntary transfer cannot place a very heavy financial burden on the
State. Men love property more than liberty. Many will prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their
political masters than change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam Smith said, of all the
things man is the most difficult cargo to transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody.
What about its workability ? The scheme is not new. It has been tried and found workable. It was
put into effect after the last European War, to bring about a transfer 15 [f.15] of population between
Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it has worked, has been tried
and found workable. The scheme I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had the effect of
bringing about a transfer* of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece.
Nobody can deny that it was worked with signal success. What succeeded elsewhere may well be
expected to succeed in India.
The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But it is not so difficult as it is made out to be provided the
principle and the ethics of it are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is heart-rending
and nobody wishes to think of its problems and their solutions as the very idea of it is so painful.
But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan, the problems arising
out of it are neither staggering nor baffling