<img src='http://www.hindu.com/2006/10/24/images/2006102412060501.jpg' border='0' alt='user posted image' />
Mughals strained every nerve to take it
T.V. Sivanandan
BAD STATE: The main entrance of Wagengera fort in Surpur town of Gulbarga district
GULBARGA: The Wagengera fort, which witnessed a historic struggle between the Bedar kings and the Mughals, led by Aurangazeb to establish supremacy in Surpur town in Gulbarga district in the 18th century, is in ruins.
The Archaeological Survey of India and also the State Archaeology Department appear to have done precious little to protect the fort.
A plaque embedded on the wall to the entrance of the fort reads in Persian: "By command of the emperor, defender of faith Mohammed Mohi-u-din Aurangazeb king, conqueror of universe, may god preserve his country for ever," signifying the fall of the fort in 1705.
The Wagengera fort is situated on top of two hillocks and surrounded by rocky patches. The Bedar kings shifted here after losing their fort at Sagar, now in Shahpur taluk, to the Mughals in 1667. From the day they shifted to Wagengera fort, the Bedars were a thorn in the flesh of the Mughals.
The fort built in the shape of a pentagon with seven bastions is now in a shambles. The two huge gates on the east and west of the fort are in a state of collapse, but the outer wall constructed with big boulders and mortar is in good condition.
Many, particularly the younger generation, are not aware of the valiant struggle of the Bedar kings who zealously defended the fort. So fierce was their resistance that finally Aurangazeb himself had to lead the attack to capture the fort.
Although a well-trained army like the Mughals could have breached the fort easily, it was the warring skills of the Bedars that kept the enemy at bay for a long time.
The unfortunate thing is that so far the Government has not made any effort to convert this into a tourist spot. Besides Wagengera fort, Surpur can boast of many other historical monuments including the beautiful palace of the Surpur kings.
What are the different periods in Indian history? And how do they correspond to other regions? I think it is useful to get the terminology right and also the progress of Indian region.
While growing up the books used to refer to the Hindu period, Muslim period and the British period and we are now in the post British period. I believe this got changed to early Indian history, Medeival history and Colonial history and post Colonial or current history.
From Bharat-Rakshak:
Berad Resistance to Mughals
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->From Mysore north through the Malnad region and all the way to Bijapur were lands colonized by the Beradsâa race of aboriginal Kanarese belonging to the lowest Dhed caste on account of their life style. Although many of them were Lingayets or Vaishnavs they had no dietary restrictions and ate mutton, beef, pork, and fowl with gusto and drank to excess. Their race name means âhunterâ in Kanarese and they also indulged in cattle-lifting and other crimes. Alternatively called Bedars/Beydurs these people were dark, muscular, and of middle height; with round faces, thin lips, and frizzled hair. A popular story ran that the Mughal historians were so impressed by their fighting qualities that they changed the name Berad to Be-dar, meaning fearless.
It is these fighting qualities that are of importance to our study. For the purpose of hunting and war the Berads had adopted the matchlock and had become adept in the use of this firearm [1]. Their tribal organizationâwhere headmen controlled different bands of younger fightersâensured discipline and unity in their ranks. Not surprisingly they had become the steadiest and most accurate musketeers in 17th century South India. Another singular name used for them was kala-piadas or black foot-musketeers. Later on these same Berads formed the bulk of Tipu Sultanâs French-led infantry.
We are not concerned here with the history of the entire tribe; our focus is on their one large kingdom based in Sagar. The Berad King of Sagar used the title Nayak and is known in Persian histories as Pam Nayak.
<b>Geo-Political Background </b>
His opponent in 1680 was the Mughal commander, Dilir Khan, a Ruhela Afghan. These Ruhelas will be covered in detail in future articles; for they also provided examples of the superiority of infantry formations. Here it will suffice to say that Dilir Khanâs tribesmen had colonized the district of Shajahanpur in modern Uttar Pradesh, and Dilir Khan had won the position of a Mughal Mansabdar (Commander) under Shah Jahan.
In the 17th Century the North Indian Mughal Empire had planted its feet firmly into the southern peninsula. The outstanding historical fact of the Indian sub-continent has been its geographical unityâany empire; whether based in the northern plains, the eastern jungles, or the southern plateau; will attempt to bring the other regions under its control. The Mughals were living up to this idea of Indiaâs unity [2].
Dilir Khan had served in this region first under Prince Aurangzeb and later under Mirza Raja Jai Singh, playing an important part in the latterâs famous victory over Shivaji, the founder of the Maratha Kingdom. He thus had a good knowledge of the terrain, the forts, and the military forces in the peninsula. Apart from the young Maratha Kingdom these forces were; the two decaying Shia Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda, and the numerous remnants of the Vijaynagar Empire further south [3].
The Berads of Sagar had been tributaries to the Bijapur Sultans, but now that the Sultan was a mere figurehead and the various Bijapuri officers were carving out their own personal estates, Pam Nayak lived and functioned as an independent king.
The Mughal General had two duties to performâprotect Mughal territory from Shivajiâs raids and annex Bijapurâthe Sultanate of Golconda was expected to simply fall into the lap of the Mughal Empire because of its weak condition. In 1679-80 Dilir Khan set his eyes on Bijapur. He hoped to gain allies among its nobles and use the resources of this kingdom to crush Shivaji. Unfortunately these negotiations did not mature and the angry and stubborn Afghan went ahead and laid siege to the city of Bijapur.
In the meantime Shivaji sent his cavalry to raid and plunder the Mughal dominion to his heartâs content. Aurangzeb sent an angry letter to Dilir Khan ordering him to withdraw from Bijapur [4]. The disgraced general, foiled in his purpose and with nothing to show for his expenditure of men and money, decided to wreak vengeance on Bijapuri territory. He roamed about like a mad dog, slaying and looting with fiendish cruelty, and in his crazed, bloody wanderings came upon the fort of Sagar.
<b>The Battle of Sagar, 1680 </b>
To save his people from needless slaughter, Pam Nayak offered to pay 1.5 Lakh Rupees as ransom for his capital but Dilir Khan demanded no less than ten times that amount! The Mughals pitched their camp at Gogi, five kilometers north of Sagar, and laid siege to that fort.Â
On the first day (20th February) Dilir Khan decided to storm the village at the base of the fort. The village was manned by a force of Berad infantry and in addition was protected by a wall skirting its homes and fields, so Dilirâs initial plan was thwarted by the firing from the Berad matchlocks. The Mughals then laid siege and began firing their own matchlocks and swivel guns. The exchange of fire continued all day longâtowards sunset when the firing on both sides began dying down the Berad infantry delivered a sudden charge and drove the Mughals back with loss. Dilir Khan retired back to Gogi.Â
The next day he returned with his entire muster of artillery and cavalry [5]. The Berads took shelter behind rocks, in the nearby jungles, on the fort parapet, inside hutsâand manfully faced the reckless firing. At last the gate of the village was breached. The Afghan stood near the broken gate on his elephant while his men poured into the village and began looting the houses. But the fighting wasnât over just yet.Â
Dilir Khan imagined that the Berads had either been cowed or had made their escape from the pressure of the Mughal artilleryâno such luck. From the fort walls, from the nearby hillocks, and from the surrounding jungle, a blaze of fire descended on the crowd of Mughals, Sayyids, Rajputs, and Afghans [6]. As his soldiers began dropping like flies, Dilir ordered a retreat; soldiers around him and with his son in the nearby fields were still maintaining their order.Â
All of a sudden the firing ceased and through the smoke and the haze the Berad infantrymen tumbled down, sword in hand, to complete the rout. Attacked on all sides the two remaining Mughal wings gave up their order and bolted; the Berads bringing down the Afghan cavalrymen in their expensive armor and costly dresses. Dilir Khanâs son escaped with his bare lifeâthe total Mughal casualties on that day mounted up to 1700 men.
The battle was decisive. For some time Dilir Khan plotted revenge on the Berads but the spirit of his soldiers was utterly broken and they threatened to abandon him if he did not withdraw from this foreign land. The Afghanâs military reputation and finances alike were utterly ruinedâhis troubles ended with his death only three years later in 1683. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Google download book
<b>History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India Till the Year A. D. 1612</b>
Publisher: Printed for Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green
Author(s): John Briggs
Publication Date: 1829
10-31-2006, 03:51 AM
(This post was last modified: 10-31-2006, 10:44 PM by ramana.)
One thing I notice during the medieval period is that the political center of the Islamic rule shifted all over but there seems to be a point of view to present Delhi as being the focus of an immovable Islamic power.
For example from 1192 to about 1350 Delhi Sultanate was quite important. After that we see the rise of the Bahmani kingdom in Deccan and even the Madurai Sultanate. The defeat of Vijayanagar empire in 1565 saw the rise of Delhi again under the Mughals and then from 1757 to 1911 Calcutta was the center of political power.
For example from Dijvijay's blog
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Professor Herman Kulke in his book "A History of India, ISBN: 0415154820, Publisher: Routledge; 3rd edition (March 1998)" records:
Ala-ud-din was also quite realistic when he mentioned that his order would be obeyed only upto a distance of about 100 miles from Delhi; beyond that limit military intervention was required if he wanted to impose his will on the people."
This shows that even at the height of power, Khilji barely controlled the outskirts of Delhi and rest of India was not under his control. These two historians capture the conditions in India at the time of invasions quite well..<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Anyone read the book "Aurangazeb:Attitudes and Inclination: By Dr Rekha Joshi Mishra?
What I found was that A's mother was Shia as was Dara's mother. Yet A was responsible for destroying Bijapur and Golkonda the two biggest Shia Kingdoms in India. Was A driven to prove he was more beloved of the Sunni ulema and thus went about the conquest? If you recall Iran's Safavid dynasty was just establishing the Shiaism as state religion. Were the Sunni ulema fearful of the chance of Shias taking over in India and thus promoted Aurangazeb?
Another interesting thing about A was that his favorite wife was a Christian woman. And that drove the ulema mad.
Rekha Joshi's book studies the psyche of Aurangazeb.
What were the circumustances that led to the establishment of the Muslim kingdoms in Deccan? Was it just the destruction of the Deogiri and Kakatiya power by Malik Kafur?
What happened to the kingdom setup in South India? How did it disappear?
<!--QuoteBegin-ramana+Dec 22 2006, 01:34 AM-->QUOTE(ramana @ Dec 22 2006, 01:34 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->What were the circumustances that led to the establishment of the Muslim kingdoms in Deccan? Was it just the destruction of the Deogiri and Kakatiya power by Malik Kafur?
What happened to the kingdom setup in South India? How did it disappear?
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Unlike in other instances where one party would have economic superiority over another, in this case the conflict between the Hindu kingdoms of South India vs Sultanate, it was purely a military conquest. The Hindu kingdoms lost the battles or other engagements and hence their political power. In terms of resources (economic and manpower) they had plenty.
Why they lost is a difficult question to answer. There are many theories cited for the same. I dont know what fully explains the situation but from the top of my mind can cite a few theories
1. Ideological zeal of Islam: While this may seem subjectively okay, the problem is how you can measure something like ideological zeal
2. Already deteriorated state of the political power of the kingdoms: Here I would like to point out how feudalism had caused disintegration of the political power by 12th-13th c AD. In 9th-11th century you had strong powerful comparatively centralised states like Rashtrakuta, Western Chalukya and Chola. However by end of 12th century, feudatories of these such as Yadavas, Kakatiyas, Hoysalas, Pandyas etc had asserted their independance. They in turn were in a shaky state bcos their power was based on their feudatories. So there was a divisiveness and the political supremacy of these kingdoms was nothing compared to those of their parents viz. Western Chalukya and Cholas. In India we always have these cycles of political integration and disintegration. We had Mauryas coming up, then the states disintegrated, then Satavahanas came, after them the same thing, Guptas, Harsha, Pratihara, Chalukya, Chola etc. You always have a period of disintegration following one of consolidation. Again in the 18th century it was a period of disintegration with the decline of Mughal power. We also have the habit of getting caught at the wrong times of our history. So we had the Turco-Afghan Ghurids mounting their offensive and then the Khiljis penetrating into South India at a time when the political landscape of these areas was divided. Why did the consolidation break down in 12th-13th century AD is again a difficult question to answer
3. Social set up theories: Caste restrictions at their peak. Division in the society between upper castes and lower castes. I dont know how strong this theory is. In fact I feel to the contrary that in South India especially there was a religious revival during this period and the one preceeding it led by spiritual giants like Shankaracharya, Ramanuja, Madhva, Basava, the Alwars, the Veerashaivas etc.
4. Notions of chivalry and Superstitions of the ruling class: There is an interesting paper of Brajadul Chattopadhaya on this. Basically what it says is that the Hindu kingdoms with their notions of chivalry were in a constant mode of one-upmanship in trying to challenge each other and fight. The enemity between Prithviraja and Jayachandra Gahadavala and their other conflicts with the Gujarata Chalukya, Chandellas etc. at the onset of the Ghurid invasion is one example. Also the Western Chalukyas and the Cholas were involved in a constant state of warfare with each other, so also their successors like Hoysalas, Yadavas, Kakatiyas with each other, which gradually weakened them all. Again this view may have some strength but could overlook military conflicts for mainly economic reasons as some historians have the view of Hoysala incursions into Tamil territory.
5. Another important point is the military superioirty and tactics of the Islamic invaders. Firstly they relied very heavily on a fast mobile cavalry and on mounted archery, to which our mainly infantry based armies had no answer for. Their battle strategies suited for their kind of army, which also helped them. Hence they were able to harass numerically superior troops and dash off before they incur any heavy damages, regroup and attack again. Interestingly long after this period in 1761 in the 3rd battle of Panipat, you find similar elements in the struggle between Afghans and Marathas mainly because Bhau foolishly in an effort to modernise his army relied heavily on infantry which was harassed by the Afghan mounted archers and light artillery on camelback.
I think looking overall the last point about military superiority seems most relevant because from the Hindu kingdom's point of view, the loss was first and foremost a military loss. The South Indians kingdoms could not defeat them on the battlefied and hence lost their political power. So there must be some substance to this military superioirty theory. Having said that the points no 1-4 (mainly point nos 2 and 4 rather than the others) may be useful in trying to understand why the Hindu kingdoms on facing this kind of threat were not able to find a solution to counter it. Definitely it is because of their own weaknesses which they were not able to overcome due to the above stated reasons.
<b>This is a very nice graphical depiction of the changes that have taken place in the Middle East over the last 5000 Years.
Who Has Controlled the Middle East over the last 5000 Years
This graphic shows the History of Religion over the last 5000 Years.
History of Religion</b>
Op-Ed in Pioneer by Chandan Mitra, 12 jan., 2007
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Of Todd and toddlers
A largely unnoticed item about rewriting Rajasthan's history appeared in some newspapers last week, starting with The Pioneer. According to the report Rajasthan Education Minister Ghanshyam Tiwari told the media that his Government had decided to initiate a project to collate the State's rich rural history, village by village and eventually compile a few volumes of authentic people's history. It was pointed out that scholars hitherto relied upon Colonel James Todd's Annals and Antiquities of Rajputana, written almost two centuries ago as the basic source material for studying the region's historical lineage. Not surprisingly, it was also suggested that Todd's account smacked of colonial biases, which needed to be excised in order to present an accurate picture of Rajasthan's hoary tradition.
At the outset, I have a problem with dragging Todd's seminal work into controversy. That his humungous volume still remains the starting point for any historical research on Rajasthan speaks for its quality. It is a sad reality that Hindus would have remained largely ignorant of their own history had dedicated foreign scholars, especially early British administrators like Todd, James Sleeman, William Crooke and HH Risley not taken such passionate interest in chronicling India's unrecorded and mostly forgotten past. Add to that list archaeologists and patrons of archaeology like the much-maligned George Nathaniel Curzon, sociologists like Louis Dumont and Verrier Elwin, linguists like Max Mueller and many nameless scholars who took enormous pains to recreate the lost Indian identity, and you get to construct a pantheon of Europeans who revealed India to India.
Unfortunately, Indians have been congenitally incapable of adequately recording their past, so much so that even the nationalist writers of the early 20th Century who wrote of the Golden Age of the Guptas or the tales of valour of King Porus against Alexander and those of Rajputs vis-Ã -vis Muslim invaders, actually depended on the compilations of Arab travellers like al-Biruni or the same British administrators whom they reviled. Arguably, the shruti and smriti traditions survived from Vedic times and tales of triumph and tragedy were gleaned from the compositions of itinerant bards who toured the countryside narrating riveting stories of the past.
This background is important to understand why the Rajasthan Government may just be taking up a hugely daunting project. To begin with it will be difficult to find enough history-minded people to accurately compile records. Just because they will most probably be drawn from the ranks of local schoolteachers will not necessarily qualify them to execute what is a trained historian's job. The sifting of fact and outright fiction is a daunting task even for many professional historians. It would be unrealistic to expect reliable data to emerge from untrained hands. For instance, I wonder how many of the persons engaged to compile rural history would have even heard of MN Srinivas, a doyen of Indian sociology, whose The Remembered Village remains one of the most authentic and engrossing accounts of social structure and customs in a South Indian village. In fact, I would not expect the likely chroniclers of Rajasthan to have read RK Narayan's Malgudi Days or translations of Satinath Bhaduri's masterpiece on rural Bihar during the freedom struggle, Dhorai Charit Manas.
Admittedly, not every rural history compiler need be a PhD. But elementary skills would be needed to intelligently collate primary data mostly from oral sources in order to build a body of material, which in turn would be the basis for the macro study. Speaking purely from an academic standpoint, Rajasthan is at a disadvantage compared to those areas directly administered by the British. In British India, as opposed to princely states, it was mandatory to prepare district gazetteers and update them from time to time. These are invaluable source material for today's scholars for the British, with their remarkable sense of history, minutely recorded details of rural society, including social customs, fairs and festivals, economic activity, political tradition and so on.
However, on the positive side, the Princes too engaged scribes to sketch genealogical records, tales of valour and kept fairly exhaustive archives of landholdings, religious endowments and so on. The average Indian's disdain for history is manifested in the fact that few have so far bothered even to delve into these archives. When I visited Rajasthan's Shekhawati region some years ago, I was struck by the richness of the material contained in decaying chronicles at the havelis of well known Marwari families of today, some of which was used by Tomlinson in his manuscript on the prosperous community published nearly two decades ago. The murals and paintings adorning the outer walls of the havelis too have a tale to tell. But none to my knowledge has worked sufficiently on the available source material to recreate the region's glorious past.
William Dalrymple's latest work, The Last Mughal is a masterpiece in terms of bringing alive the Walled City of Delhi at the time of the Uprising of 1857. But it is a sad commentary on Indian scholars that over the last 100 years nobody seriously used the material comprising minutest details even of dhobi lists and meal menus of both the British and the Mughals. When I interviewed him for our sister publication Darpan recently, Dalrymple showed me a bound catalogue of 1857 records borrowed from the National Archives that had been issued only once since Independence, according to the library stamp!
In the West, local history, particularly community history is a cherished academic tradition. American scholars excel at this, although in fairness it must be pointed out that chronicling a few hundred years is significantly easier than covering several millennia. In France, the Annales school of historiography broke ranks with established history-writing by delving into church records, town planning details, marriage registers and so on to vividly describe how ordinary people as opposed to kings and nobles lived in times bygone. In India, while many young historians in the 70s and 80s got drawn into subaltern history or history from below, the volumes later degenerated into ideological diatribes against established historiography robbing the works of much academic value.
The point, therefore, is that the Rajasthan Government's laudable idea will need to cross almost insurmountable obstacles to achieve its objectives. I would be suspicious of untrained hands compiling history, which contrary to the prevailing philistine understanding is not just an account of dates of wars and names of rulers. On the other hand, the Marxist domination of history writing in India has ensured sterility and made history into a tool for ideological proselytisation, which is equally repugnant.
<b>Still, I welcome Rajasthan's initiative while hoping that adequate checks and balances will be built into the process of data collection and eventual collation</b>. Some years ago, West Bengal made a bold effort to write district gazetteers afresh and despite some snags and biases, it was a worthwhile endeavour. <b>If the Rajasthan Government entrusts the project to reasonably dispassionate historians (that's those without ideological blinkers), it might just emerge a pioneer in regenerating interest in people's history. Do that by all means, but please don't denigrate the Todds of Indian history in the process.</b>
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<!--QuoteBegin-ramana+Jan 13 2007, 12:24 AM-->QUOTE(ramana @ Jan 13 2007, 12:24 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->Op-Ed in Pioneer by Chandan Mitra, 12 jan., 2007
<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Of Todd and toddlers
A largely unnoticed item about rewriting Rajasthan's history appeared in some newspapers last week, starting with The Pioneer.....
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Indeed it is a sad reflection of our society that we all do not even know our history well. It is amazing that few institutions like JNU have hijacked the agenda of Indian history and colored it with the bigotry and onesidedness of muslim court historians.
On top of that few internet sites that could have made the difference are also run by utter and complete dimwits. case in point bharat rakshak.
-Digvijay
Thanks kartiksri. One point to look at is group dynamics. The various groups were trying to seek dominance over each other no matter how and often made alliances with the Muslims who were quite homogenous. It would be useful to do a comparative study of similar situations like the Crusaders states and their interactions with the Muslim states in the Middle East. Again how were the invasions from the Central Asian tribes stopped? I think you need strong central states to field the large armies that are needed to combat these invasions. Further group self interests have to be subsumed to face the bigger threat. However when ever there is a period of stability local groups jockey for dominance and this leads to the break down of central authority.
Also if you look at history of medieval India, the accounts talk of invaders who came as slaves etc but there is no info as to how and who they are? The Slave dynasty is really the Mameleuke dynasty which was the standard Islamic dynasty in Egypt, Syria and even Bagdad at that time. Who came up with the name Slave dynasty and how did it become the standard nomenclature? Eg. There was an Aibek ruling Egypt in that time frame after the overthrow of the Fatimid Shia Caliphs. And an Aibek in India. Was Aibek a tribe ? There is no integrated study of Muslim India as a continuum of the Middle East. By treating it as a isolated geographical place we lose the connections that forced the Islamic movements. For example why was there a lull between Qasim to Ghazni? I submit that was the time the Arabs were loosing ground to the Turco-Persians in Baghdad and then new mameleuke armies were being created and needed critical mass to explore further East.
The Capture of Maryam-uz-Zamani's Ship: Mughal Women and European Traders
Can some one get hold of the full text of the article?
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>The early colonial period in India produced a rash of piracies by Europeans against indigenous trading ships. </b>Although all attacks damaged Indian foreign trade, one attack in particular, in the autumn of 1613, precipitated an especially harsh response on the part of the Mughal government. The capture of the Rahimi by the Portuguese, even while she carried the necessary safe travel pass, proved especially odious to the emperor Jahangir (r. 1605-1627) primarily because the owner and patron of the ship was his mother, Maryam-uz-Zamani. An investigation of the event reveals that most Mughal noblewomen of the period were unusually wealthy, and that a number of them were active in a new and highly risky business, investment in foreign trade. Moreover, these trading ships often carried pilgrims to and from Mocha, a seaport within easy reach of the religious trading center of Mecca. <b>The capture of the Rahimi, then, was not only an illegal act by the Portuguese as well as an act of deliberate religious persecution, but an event which revealed the substantial involvement of women in the crucial beginnings of modern Indian foreign trade.</b>
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I guess Vijayanagara belongs to the medeival period.
The Student as Historian: The Possibilities of a Study Visit to a Historical Site
Gives a description of Hampi
<!--QuoteBegin-ramana+Feb 16 2007, 09:58 PM-->QUOTE(ramana @ Feb 16 2007, 09:58 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->Thanks kartiksri. One point to look at is group dynamics. The various groups were trying to seek dominance over each other no matter how and often made alliances with the Muslims who were quite homogenous. It would be useful to do a comparative study of similar situations like the Crusaders states and their interactions with the Muslim states in the Middle East. Again how were the invasions from the Central Asian tribes stopped? I think you need strong central states to field the large armies that are needed to combat these invasions. Further group self interests have to be subsumed to face the bigger threat. However when ever there is a period of stability local groups jockey for dominance and this leads to the break down of central authority.
Also if you look at history of medieval India, the accounts talk of invaders who came as slaves etc but there is no info as to how and who they are? The Slave dynasty is really the Mameleuke dynasty which was the standard Islamic dynasty in Egypt, Syria and even Bagdad at that time. Who came up with the name Slave dynasty and how did it become the standard nomenclature? Eg. There was an Aibek ruling Egypt in that time frame after the overthrow of the Fatimid Shia Caliphs. And an Aibek in India. Was Aibek a tribe ? There is no integrated study of Muslim India as a continuum of the Middle East. By treating it as a isolated geographical place we lose the connections that forced the Islamic movements. For example why was there a lull between Qasim to Ghazni? I submit that was the time the Arabs were loosing ground to the Turco-Persians in Baghdad and then new mameleuke armies were being created and needed critical mass to explore further East.
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Lets not assume too many things about Muslim political power. It was not a consistent, stable stste. Its political power waned and waxed. Even after Tarain, the Delhi Sultanate was not necessarily consistently dominant. Under able, aggressive rulers like Iltutmish, Balban, Alauddin Khalji, Sikander Lodhi it increased in dominance, under weak rulers it waned. There was Rajputana, where powerful Rajputs still maintained their strongholds and independance mostly safe within their massive forts till the coming of cannons and gunpowder in mid 15th century. Bengal though a Muslim power was always rebellious. There were independant Muslim states in Malwa, Gujarat. Bahmani became independant in mid 14th century, a century and a half after Tarain. And down south Vijayanagar was the bulwark against the Muslim tide. The point I want to make is till the time of Mughals, let us not make too much of the Delhi Sultanate. Yes it was a big power, the star attraction in India to Muslim immigrants from Persia and Central Asia, but not a consistently strong empire.
But yet the fact remains that with Tarain, Hindu kingdoms did lose political power to a large extent in large parts of India, especially in the north. The Muslims were never numerous enough to displace or dominate entire India, even though there was a large influx of immigrants and also conversions. Still India did not convert as easily as Persia, where loss of political power also meant wholesale change of religion. The reason is that Hinduism was on a revival path during this period. Post 8th century, we had a dharmic revival. That has kept our civilization intact. Also when our religious base was weak in 6-8th centuries, our political landscape had strong, centralised empires which could check an invasion like the Rashtrakutas, Chalukyas and Pratiharas checked the Arabs.
Secondly I believe there is boon in a bane too. In this case the bane is our political disunity. This meant that any power which wanted to centralise had to fight all that more different parties to achieve consolidation. Consolidation quickened only after gunpower was introduced. Gunpowder meant that recalcitrant lords were no longer safe in their forts as gunpowder can make mincemeat of those walls. It took a long time for Alauddin to defeat certain Rajput kingdoms, still he could not enjoy complete dominance of a threat centre so close to his capital. Because there were so many different powers to be fought and kept under check the Muslims could never completely dominate all part of India. The same could be said for any power since the beginning of our history. Except for a very brief time during the Mauryan period when the empire was not just widespread across almost whole of India, but also centralised, we never have had a political unity like China.
Just as an aside, sometimes strong centralisation and political unity can also be disastrous in the long run. In the fifteenth century China had by far the strongest navy in the world and it was poised to dominate the world proceedings in the era of trans oceanic mercantile empires. China was able to build up such an advanced navy because of its ability to generate huge resources due to its centralisation. However this centralisation proved to be its death knell. One emperor and one writ was sufficient to destroy the entire navy. This because the emperor felt the navy to be a strong threat to his power. Cant imagine something like that happening in India.
Just one more addition, its not as if there were not any incursions between 7-10th centuries from Muslims. There were in fact constant engagements on the western front in the 8th century after Sindh fell to Arabs. However the Arab incursions were strongly repulsed by the Pratiharas and their subordinate Rajput clans like Guhilots and also by Chalukyas (Solankis) and Rashtrkutas.
Its not clear what was the make up and tactics of the Arab forces and how different it was from the Turk-Afghan invaders post 11th century. Irrespective of that we got to acknowledge that the Indian potentates in 7th-10th c were far stronger than their successors. Also Pratiharas, Rashtrakutas were rising powers during these times and any rising power always seems to have a lot of energy.
Jus tot support my argument, its also interesting that even though the Muslim power in Delhi began in 1193, still it took more than a hundred years for them the eye and defeat Deccan powers. Is it possible that for over a hundred years when they went as far as Bengal and Gujarat and were able to defeat decadent dynasties, they not even once thought about or penetrated the Deccan. Has it got to do anything with the fact that during this time the Yadava, Kakatiya and Hoysala were on the ascendant and had just established themselves after eclipsing the Western Chalukya dynasty.
From Tribune, 18 June 2007
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Portrait of a rose princess</b>
by N.S. Tasneem
Little known facts about well-known personalities sometimes astonish the people. Babur loved his five daughters so much that he named four of them with the prefix of gul (rose). His eldest daughter was Masuma (Innocent) and then Gulrukh (Rose-Faced), Gulrang (Rose-Coloured), Gulchehra (Rosy-Cheeked) and Gulbadan (Rose-Body). The youngest Gulbadan has in her memoirs told the story from Baburâs conquest of India in 1526 till her death in 1603 during Akbarâs reign. Incidentally, Akbar died two years later in 1605.
Gulbadan (the rose princess) says, âBabur wanted his sons to be versed in the art of writing. If he had not been so great and constant a warrior he himself could have been a true poet.â Even when Humayun grew up, Babur wrote to him, âYou certainly do not excel in letter writing and you fail because you have too great a desire to show off.â
Rumer Godden in her book Gulbadan (Viking 1981) has commented, âHow surprised he would have been to know that it was his smallest daughter who would be the one to follow him in this love.â
There is an interesting episode in Gulbadanâs memoirs as to how Babur received his begum Maham when she came from Kabul to Agra in 1527. On June 27, Begum Maham reached Aligarh (then known as Kul-Jalali). Babur wanted to meet his wife as early as possible. At the evening prayer time someone told him, âI have just passed her Highness on the road, four miles out.â Gulbadan comments, âMy royal father did not wait for a horse to be saddled but set out on foot and met her.â
When Humayun ascended the throne, he continued to shower his affection on his sister Gulbadan, who was otherwise undemanding. In fact, he inspired her to note down from her memory all the significant events since Babur left Kabul to meet Ibrahim Lodhi at Panipat. She was four years old at that time but her memory was very sharp. Humayun, on his part, was not fond of writing like his father Babur, whose Tuzuk-i-Babari is considered a classic.
In fact, he did not find time to do so due to the turbulent period of his lifetime. Still he had some interest in reading as Gulbadan tells, âHumayun had gone up to the roof of the tower he used as a library. Then he had interested himself in astrology, especially the rising of the planet Venus, probably to find some auspicious date.â
During Akbarâs reign Gulbadan continued to get due regards from her nephew. Akbar had not shown any interest in studies during his childhood, but when he grew up he had âa real delight in books and philosophical debate.â He had such a memory that none could realise that he was illiterate. He is said to have more than 24,000 books in his library.
Regarding âhaughtinessâ it can be said that âBabur had never been imperious â he was too sensitive to his sins. Humayun was hardly imperious enough, but in the case of Akbar, despite his mother Hamidaâs remonstration, this trait was obvious.â Still for Gulbadan it was âthat innate and unswerving reverence for the title âEmperorâ and of the blood royal. She could not help but esteem Akbar, no matter what he did.â
In February 1603, Gulbadan was laid up with a fatal fever at the age of 80. Hamida was with her at that critical time. Her last words were âJiuâ, a sort of blessing from an elderly person to a younger one. Akbar himself helped to carry her bier. Rumer Godden concludes, âThere seems to have been no âdeath nameâ for Gulbadan. Hamida was to be known as Miriam Makhani in tribute, oddly enough, to the Virgin Mary, but Gulbadan lives on in history as herself, Princess Rosebody.â
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Book Review
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Iqtidar Alam Khan. Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India. Aligarh Historians Society Series. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiv + 263 pp. Illustrations, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-19-566526-0.
Reviewed by: Timothy May, Department of History, North Georgia College and State University.
Published by: H-War (August, 2006)
Guns, Influence, and Power
There is no question that the advent of gunpowder weapons permanently changed the course of warfare, but exactly how this happened varies from region to region. Often in the public's mind, the impact of firearms is relegated to Europe and its origins in China; somehow everything in between is overlooked. Thus, Iqtidar Alam Khan's volume, Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India will hopefully begin to fill that void.
<b>Khan's work is important for two reasons. First, it traces the origins and influence of gunpowder weapons in India as a regional history rather than as an ancillary to a larger work. The author critically examines when firearms appeared in India, and then what other influences--whether local or foreign--played in the development of the weapons. Moreover, he discusses their impact, not only on the medieval state, but on society as a whole.</b> Second, Khan's work serves as a model for other regional studies on firearms as well as the distribution of other forms of technology or goods.
<b>Chapter 1 of Gunpowder and Firearms discusses the diffusion of firearms into the subcontinent by focusing on the role of the Mongols as agents of transmission. Although the author notes that the Chinese had been using gunpowder weapons before the Mongols arrived on the scene, it is not until the end of the thirteenth century that firearms of any sort, particularly rockets, appear in the Sultanate of Delhi or in regional literary references. While he places the greatest emphasis on the Mongols as the agents of technological transmission, Khan does not rule out other sources such as a Himalayan or sea route. Regardless of their origin, knowledge and use of these weapons quickly spread.</b>
<b>Chapters 2 through 4 focus on the use of artillery from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. Although cannons became somewhat common throughout India, the Mughals used them the most effectively, thus giving rise to one of the popularly called Gunpowder Empires (along with the Ottomans and Safavids). Yet, these three chapters emphasize one key point.</b> As in late medieval Europe, the expense of cannons meant that few among the nobility besides the ruler possessed the resources to purchase them. <b>Fortress walls gave little shelter against cannons </b>and the nobility quickly learned to acquiesce to the authority of the ruler.
Although similar situations appeared among some of the regional Indian states, the rise of the Mughals brings this phenomenon into better focus. Chapter 3 continues to deal with centralization of power, but in the context of the arrival of not only the Mughals, but also the Portuguese with their European metallurgical and artillery advances. <b>From the Portuguese, the Mughals and others learned how to make cannons from wrought iron, thus reducing the cost of the weapon, while at the same time improving it. The Mughals, who learned from Ottoman advisors, quickly grasped the importance of light artillery as it became less expensive and more easily manufactured. While magnificent in siege warfare, the lack of maneuverability of heavy cannon left it virtually useless on the battlefield.</b>
Chapter 4 discusses the dominance of the Mughals. <b>By the time of Akbar, heavy mortars and cannons were rarely used in the Mughal military. Light cannons that could be used on the battlefield were the mainstay of the Mughal artillery corps, including the shaturnal, similar to swivel guns, but carried on the backs of camels and even in the howdahs of elephants. As this chapter ties into the arrival of the British East India Company, Khan continues to discuss technological developments, or the lack thereof.</b>
In addition to artillery, handheld firearms also became ubiquitous throughout the Mughal Empire. <b>Chapter 5 examines the nature and development of handguns in the Mughal Empire. In addition to local factors, Khan includes a good discussion of Western influences, which in this instance includes the Ottoman Empire. Western influences included new technologies in firearms manufacture. However, not all of these became widespread. As a result, stagnation occurred particularly in terms of standard weapons.</b> The preferred weapon became the matchlock, even after other technologies surpassed it. Why the matchlock remained the weapon of choice ties into chapter 6, which discusses the role of the matchlock musket in the centralization of Mughal authority.
Mughals also used musketeers to maintain their authority. <b>Babur began his career with a scant musket bearing force of just over a hundred men, but by the time of Akbar, over 35,000 musketeers existed in the Mughal military. One reason for this was that, despite the cost of their weapon, the musketeers were actually less expensive than garrisoning cavalry forces. The expense of feeding the man and his horse grossly exceeded that of a musketeer. Thus, a small but trained force of musket wielding troops allowed the Mughals to assert their authority in even the most remote provinces.</b> This was also possible as, for several decades, the nobility were forbidden to recruit their own forces of musketeers. <b>At the same time, this mass force of troops with firearms undermined the Mughals. As the matchlock became ubiquitous, its cost dropped, but it also was deemed very reliable by those using it. Thus, even when other technologies came into the region, like flintlock muskets, the Mughals failed to adopt them due to economic reasons as well as the matchlock's popularity.</b>
<b>While firearms aided the process of centralization, it also played a role in undermining the Mughal's authority. Because of the affordability of matchlocks and the relative simplicity in gaining expertise with them, one did not have to train for years to be a warrior. Ultimately this let to the diffusion of firearms into the general populace and resistance to central authority.</b> Beginning in the late-sixteenth century, not only political rebels, but <b>even peasants opposed to tax collection acquired firearms. As domestic tensions grew, the widespread use and manufacture of matchlock muskets played a role in the breakdown of central authority, and the Mughals, despite several innovative attempts, failed to halt the eventual Balkanization of their empire. Khan's work is impressive and is the result of twenty years of research that ranged over four hundred years of history. Utilizing Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, and English primary sources and supplemented by a wide array of secondary works, Iqtidar Khan has produced an excellent work.</b> The four appendices are useful supplements dealing with the use of firearms by the Mongols, the analysis of terminology in a couple primary sources, and <b>the origins of the Purbias, who were gunners for a few Indian states in the 1500s. The volume also contains almost thirty illustrations of firearms and their use. These dramatically illustrate Khan's points as well as show the reader the variances between the weapons.</b>
Yet, the book is not without faults. <b>While Gunpowder and Firearms is an insightful and well-argued work, the author exaggerates the Mongols' use of gunpowder. While it is true that the Mongols never met a weapon they did not find a use for, there is no concrete evidence that the Mongols used gunpowder weapons on a regular basis outside of China. Indeed, the author recognizes this and notes that his claims are based on Persian terms which could be interpreted as firearms.</b> Unfortunately, while many of these terms such as manjaniq are used to refer to cannons, during the medieval period manjaniq meant a mangonel. It is plausible that in later periods, the Mongols did make more extensive use of gunpowder weapons, <b>but in period of the conquests (1206-60), there is inadequate evidence to support Khan's assertion. </b>
One other minor criticism is the exclusion of Kenneth Chase's Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (2003). I suspect that, given their publication dates, Chase's and Khan's books crossed paths. Although Chase takes a global perspective, the authors reach similar conclusions. Nonetheless, Gunpowder and Firearms will appeal not only to historians of India, but also anyone interested in the development of weapons and military systems or the creation of states. <b>In summary, not only is Iqtidar Alam Khan's work an impressive study on the diffusion of firearms in India, it will also serve as a model for others pursuing similar research on the spread of technology or goods on a regional basis</b>.
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07-05-2007, 11:13 PM
(This post was last modified: 07-05-2007, 11:19 PM by ramana.)
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