Nuclear Thread - 4

[acharya]

http://india.merinews.com/catFull.jsp?articleID=137314

http://india.merinews.com/allArticles.do?c...erId=satchandra

S.No. Title Date Views: Comments
1. IAEA inspections should not be allowed in India 53 0
2. Suppression by the media 304 7
3. Defence scientists are India's real warriors 603 10
4. Which weapons to produce? 462 1
5. In defence of India's nuclear supremacy 689 3
6. Nuke deal hurts India's national objective 4521 19
7. In defence of India's nuclear supremacy 600 6
8. What can save India? 446 4
9. How India's economy can grow 30 percent per year 840 10
10. What is nuclear supremacy? 827 6
11. A Harvard sophomore's plagiarism and BF Skinner's 808 5
12. Manmohan Singh's treachery 423 4
13. India's technological and economic emanicipation 427 3
14. Imminent end of 'White' rule over India 2236 7

[Guest]

<b>Left~write | Understanding the US-India nuclear deal</b>

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The real danger of this nuclear deal is not that it makes India a subordinate ally but that it formally recognises India as a legal nuclear weapons' state and provides the platform for a closer integration of the Indian nation-state and its economy with the global economy and power structure. <b>The danger is that India is turning into an imperialist state and being welcomed with open arms into that despicable club of global parasites and plunderers</b>.  <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/tongue.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='tongue.gif' /><!--endemo--> This simple truth is evident to almost all Leftists outside India who have pitched their opposition to the India-US nuclear deal on the issues of non-proliferation and denuclearisation. By opposing this nuclear deal on the grounds of national interest, <b>the Left in India stands in danger of becoming Left-nationalists and losing their internationalist and humanist moorings</b>. It is no mere accident that the scientists opposing the nuclear deal from the national interest standpoint were equally at ease with the fascist-nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) as they were with the communist parties.

<b>It needs some introspection among us Leftists as to why India's missile tests, which are clearly meant for nuclear weapons, do not get criticised by the Left parties.</b> Globally the Left has been in the forefront of opposing the militarisation and nuclearisation of their own governments and states; why has India and its Communist Party been an exception? Is this also a symptom of the nationalisation of the Left? Why is it that the establishment of an Indian military base at Farkhor in Tajikistan with up to 14 MiG-29s and 500 military personnel has not got any comment from the Left? In fact, the history of this airbase is itself an example of how specious the supposed subordinate ally argument is. Farkhor used to be a Soviet era airbase which was subsequently taken over by the Tajik government which, after 2001's Nato foray into Central Asia, was almost handing over to the US. The Russians intervened, removed the Americans and got the Tajik's to offer this airbase to India on the promise that India will base Russian equipment there. For this deal, India gave 'aid' of $ 5 million to Tajikistan, which was but a feebly veiled bribe to its corrupt president. <b>Farkhor is two kilometres from the Afghan border and a shorter flying time to Islamabad than from the Ambala airbase of the India Air Force. It is shocking that there has not been one word on this from the Left in India.</b> Is it again 'national interest' which stops the Left in India from expressing opposition to India's expansion of military might? <b>Where will this defence of national interest end? Or are their no limits to defending national interest? Addressing and answering these and similar questions will define the very nature and trajectory of the Left movement in India</b>. Even if we do not speak, history is not going to remain silent.

<i>Despite spending much of his youth as an active communist, the writer managed to acquire a PhD in History. <b>He was a journalist with The Hindu newspaper and now works for an NGO in Delhi</b>, India</i>
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[dhu]

<b>A corrupt deal pushed corruptly </b>
Brahma Chellaney
Covert magazine, August 16-31, 2008
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Those who egged on the prime minister to take the nuclear deal to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board even if it meant breaking the governing alliance didn’t have much to do: Manmohan Singh himself led the charge. With his V signs for the media cameras, Singh took the lead to survive the confidence vote in Parliament by hook or by crook.

That the government triumphed by winning over or neutralizing a number of opposition MPs through various illicit inducements now hangs as a national shame — a stigma that will haunt Singh forever and undermine his leadership during his remainder months in office. The subsequent terrorist bombings in Bangalore and Ahmedabad, and the popular uprising in the Jammu region, have helped reinforce the image of a weak, irresolute prime minister fixated on one issue, to the detriment of a balanced, forward-looking approach on advancing national interests.

When history is written, Singh will be remembered for the two nasty surprises he sprung on the nation, not for his legacy in continuing high GDP growth. The first was the nuclear deal whose “final draft came to me from the U.S. side”, as he confessed in Lok Sabha on August 3, 2005, after he had already reached Washington in July 2005, without any nuclear scientist in his delegation. And the other was his action, on the fifth anniversary of 9/11, in turning Indian policy on its head by embracing Pakistan as a fellow victim of and joint partner against terror  — a blunder that brought more deadly attacks scripted by the Pakistani intelligence. Both the nuclear deal and the joint anti-terror mechanism were the product not of institutional thinking but of personal caprice.

<b>The imports-oriented nuclear deal centres on big bucks, with exporters hoping for a windfall and importers looking forward to commissions and kickbacks. </b><b>If the deal takes effect, India, over the next two decades, is likely to spend more than $100 billion expanding its national-power capacity, according to Ron Somers, president of the Washington-based U.S.-India Business Council. </b>Such spending would not only help revive the moribund U.S. nuclear-power industry, but also bring billions of dollars worth of business to European, Russian and Japanese firms. The deal additionally comes with auxiliary understandings, including on U.S. arms exports to India. <b>It is such interests that have helped lubricate a deal whose very rationale is fundamentally flawed: Generating electricity from high-priced imported reactors dependent on foreign fuel makes little economic or strategic sense.  </b>

Against that background, it should come as no surprise that a corrupt deal has been pushed corruptly. In fact, never before in independent India’s history has a major strategic issue been pushed in such a blatantly partisan way — with no regard to solemn promises made in Parliament. Such has been Singh’s partisan doggedness that, unlike for instance on the Jammu-agitation issue, he never called an all-party meeting on the deal, despite pledging in Parliament to “seek the broadest possible consensus within the country to enable the next steps to be taken”.

With Singh repeatedly acquiescing to goalpost shifting, the deal has acquired more and more conditions at every step of a still-continuing process. <b>The civil-military “Separation Plan”, the Hyde Act, the so-called 123 Agreement and the latest IAEA safeguards accord have helped change the original terms, seeking to firmly tether India to the U.S.-led international non-proliferation regime in order to tame its nuclear waywardness. </b>The way has been cleared to draft India into the NPT as a de facto party. Today, Singh’s pledges to Parliament stand belied, including that India will accept only the “same responsibilities and obligations as other advanced nuclear states like the U.S.”, that it will get “the same rights and benefits” as the U.S., and that it will “never accept discrimination”.

In that light, it is predictable that the deal would attract more grating conditions as it traverses the final two stages — clearances from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and the U.S. Congress. <b>The U.S. ambassador has publicly dismissed India’s demand for an unconditional NSG clearance as “provocative”. </b>In fact, India’s position has been undermined from within, with the prime minister’s irrepressible special envoy, Shyam Saran, terming as “unrealistic” the demand that the NSG put no condition, not even a test ban. When the new conditions come, you can be certain that Singh and his handlers would spin reality to present the outcome as another “victory” for India. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[acharya]

<b>Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade
by Bill Emmott (Author)</b>


Last is India, the oft-forgotten emerging power whose role as a strategic counterweight on the balance-of-power chessboard could be the determining factor in the future course of the region. While India remains nowhere near as developed as China or Japan, it is nevertheless beginning to make its presence felt in some regional institutions, joint military exercises, and through the modernization of its forces. Furthermore, sensing its utility as a means to tie down China, the US and Japan have struck deals with India that could help buttress the modernization of the world's largest democracy.
<b>
In fact, Emmott opens his book by arguing that even if it meant blowing a hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, US President George W. Bush's nuclear pact with Delhi in 2006 was a strategic tour de force, as it added a third leg to the regional balance and ensured that Delhi would side with the US and Japan should relations with China deteriorate. In response, Beijing has continually sought to exclude India from regional multilateral organizations.
</b>

[ramana]

I have been re-looking at US Foreign Policy during and since WWI. In WWI, US intervened on side of Anglo-Saxons to ensure Balance of Power in Europe. Here they borrowed a leaf from the Great Britain. The fact they intervened means there was no single major power in Europe henceforth for the rest of the century. Yes GB was there but with US help.

During WWI, Japan used its Anglo-Japan alliance to intervene in China as European powers were unable to intervene. Japan was able to use its Alliance with GB to do this. So in the aftermath of WWI, US offered the Washington Treaty on naval ship tonnage to induce GB to break its Japan alliance. This ensured the viability of China as a nation state. All the Western powers intervention in China was removed when power for tariffs was restored to China.

During WWII, US pressured the GB to give up the colonies especially India for that was the basis of power for GB. I don't know how much they built up Gandhi via press and saintdom. It was mainly US journalists and media that portrayed him and gave international press to him in the English language media. GB was off course depicting him as naked fakir etc.

Then Cold War came and ended with FSU dissolution.

The purpose of the narration is that US goal is to ensure there are no single challengers to its power since WWI.

However PRC emerged with no competition and would require a challenger. Has to be indirect as there is a lot at stake.

So this deal is a step in that direction . As important as the Washington Treaty.

So the deal will go thru with out anymore conditions as should not give any chance for India to walk away.

[Capt M Kumar]

<!--emo&<_<--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/dry.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='dry.gif' /><!--endemo--> http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/07ndeal.htm

REDIFF INDIA ABROAD

US lawmaker opposes NSG exemption for India

Aziz Haniffa in Washington, DC | August 07, 2008 03:34 IST

Even before the India-United States civilian nuclear agreement gets a nod from the Nuclear Supplier’s Group, a hint of the US Congressional opposition has surfaced, in the form of a salvo fired by Congressman Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

In a missive to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Berman has stated that he is "a friend of India and a supporter of US-India nuclear cooperation.

But he added, "I find it incomprehensible that the administration apparently intends to seek or accept an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines for India with few or none of the conditions contained in the Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006."

[dhu]

Ramana,

It is like with recent "Hindu Taliban" allegation against Jammu. We cannot conclude from the allegation that seculars must be opposed to islamics since they refer to taliban disparingingly, especially since their pattern of involvement argues against such. Same is with the communist-china bogey always brought up by manmohan and fellows. Why is China letting deal pass at end stage, along with pakistan? because they have been taken into confidence regarding true nature of the deal, and their bad cop services are no longer required. Even colonial period can be characterized as an alliance between India and Britain but such would militate against general colonial experience of Indians. America was a party in imperialist plunder of China, in fact most missionaries in South china were of american baptist/methodist origin. Existence of British-American rivalry cannot be used to negate general experience of chinese and indians under western imperialism. This deal is not about China but about controlling India. during colonial period, what threat China posed to britain that they decided to intervene in India to balance chinese power? I am sure such arguments must have been brought up at the time. Some will take these confusionistic arguments at face value, some will even call them as the colonizer's self-rationalizations, but in fact these are parcel part of imperialist strategy. at least this is my unexpert reading.

[acharya]

<b>
Is nuke deal worth wasting so much time on: Bhargava</b>

New Delhi (PTI): Amid efforts to seek a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) P M Bhargava has raised questions over the government's obsession with the Indo-US nuclear deal wondering whether it was worth "wasting" so much time on.

Bhargava, former vice chairman of National Knowledge Commission, insisted that the nuclear deal will not help the country meet its energy needs even after 20 years of implementation as it will contribute "only 7-8 per cent" to the total power generation.

He said the government should have "put a stop to the deal long back" and wondered why Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has taken so much of risk for the atomic deal.

"My personal opinion is that the government should not have come to this level on the nuclear deal issue and so much of time has been wasted on this particular deal. It should not have done so," the founder Director of Centre for Molecular Biology, Hyderabad, told PTI.

"The government has put all the major issues on the back-burner and is concentrating only on this particular issue. They should have not come to this level," Bhargava said.

He also felt that the Hyde Act would have some implications on the country. However, he declined to elaborate.

The comments come at a time when India and the US are engaged in all-out efforts to garner support among the 45 members of the NSG for an unconditional waiver.

[acharya]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->One undeniable fact is that the N-deal was always touted by our dear PM right from the start as India's official acceptance into the "nuclear club".However,along the way with each layer of onion of the deal being peeled off,it has become depressingly evident being clearly expressed from the mouths of the nuclear club members themselves, that we are NOT being recognised as a "full member" of the nuclear weapons club,nor ever will and to even get our "turd" class status,we will have to make a multitude of compromises to suit them,before we are graciously allowed to squat only on the verandah!

There is going to be NO admittance into the hallowed, cosy,radioactive sanctum sanctorum for us,no matter even if MMS dances the bhangra ad nauseum,bearing a lifetime's supply of sarson ka saag and chicken a la tikka. If we are to be allowed in at all,like the great colonial clubs of yore,the rule is that "natives are to be allowed in only as bearers" .In one of my clubs abroad,the founding fathers composed of the elite of that nation, who included knights of the realm,dons of Ox-Bridge and the aristocracy of that country, were so riled at this rule,that they founded their own rival club for their elite where the membership rule was that "Europeans would not be allowed in even as bearers" !

So let everyone not fool themselves into thinking that we are up there with the nuclear Gods and frankly,we are in a far better position in developing our own N-technology and plants our own,answerable to none,where we can uplift the finger to any condescending blighter,rather than shamefully allow our nuclear "private parts" to be inspected whenever and by whomsoever, at the diktat of the N-club and its agents.All the nuclear food that we will be able to consume will only generate 7% of our energy needs,that too only by 2020 and if there are no delays at all with the supply of fuel,equipment and building of plants.A very tall order given our past experience!

Lastly,the overwhelming pressure already being put upon
India by the statements from various US politicos,is that if we ever have the audacity to "fart" further,the unwritten threat is that we can expect to be unceremoniously kicked out of the verandah of the club into the cold and will be forced to vomit all the radioactive crumbs that we have consumed ,paid for at exorbitant cost,for the great privilege of squatting outside like serfs.

The sad truth is that our current rulers have betrayed our founding fathers who fought for freedom,sacrificed their lives and stood tall as equals with the rest of the world in a day and age when we were not even self sufficient in food and had to suffer the ignominy of pleading and genuflecting each time to Lyndon Johnson's "generosity" for every Pl-480 wheat shipment and the toxic parthenium weed that was given free with it.We now want to grandly reclaim our erstwhile status of being colonial slaves,always bowing and scraping at the white man's behest,some ever ready to even clean his backside too in the bargain!
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[dhu]

Mayawati takes on Rahul Gandhi, point by point
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She went on to point out, "Do you know that only six per cent of the world's power production comes from nuclear energy."

Urging her audience not to get carried away by "Rahul Gandhi's false propaganda", she lambasted him by adding, "He is busy claiming that the nuclear deal will once day bring about removal of poverty in this country, but I would like to tell him to stop misleading and misguiding common masses."<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[dhu]

"Safeguards" Cartoon

[dhu]

India set to lose nuclear freedom
Shobori Ganguli

<i>US exemption draft with NSG places country permanently under NPT regime</i>

With a week to go before the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) starts deliberating on India's future in the global nuclear market, the draft US exemption proposal submitted to NSG chair Germany last week irrevocably places India under the global non-proliferation regime, robbing it of its nuclear independence.

Barring a cosmetic relaxation in a provision of the NSG Guidelines -- that it will not be brought under the IAEA's "comprehensive safeguards" -- India has been unsparingly placed under the non-proliferation norms of the NSG.

Seeking to "limit the further spread of nuclear weapons", the draft underlines the NSG's resolve, "to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime".

Lauding India for the steps it has taken "voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime", the draft says India's "non-proliferation commitments" include "continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty." In effect, India's sovereign and unilaterally imposed self-ban on further tests is being turned into a multilateral agreement.

On the face of it, India seems to have got concession on a key provision in the NSG guidelines, which calls for full-scope or "comprehensive safeguards" on all its nuclear facilities. The case being made out is that in India's case the civilian-military separation plan acknowledges the "special status" it has been seeking at the NSG.

However, barring concessions on paragraphs 4(a), 4 (b) and 4 © of Part 1 and 4(b) of Part 2 of the NSG guidelines, the draft says India will be allowed nuclear imports "for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions" of Part 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines. These provisions, which essentially cover non-nuclear weapons states continue to bind India to its commitment to non-proliferation, including a moratorium on testing.

"What was 'unilateral' is to become a requirement for civil nuclear cooperation with other states. The implication treating India as a non-nuclear weapons state and implicitly of 'multilateralising' its unilateral test moratorium is that India will face a supply cut-off if it ever dared to test, leaving its imported power reactors high and dry," says strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney. He asserts that Part 2 of the guidelines "incorporates a presumption of denial of reprocessing and enrichment equipment and technology even under safeguards".

Seen alongside the 123 agreement and the Hyde Act, the draft effectively places India under the CTBT, turning a bilateral provision with the US into a requirement at a multilateral level. The Hyde Act unambiguously states that the US can scrap the deal in the event of India's non-compliance with non-proliferation norms. The draft at the NSG takes this bilateral non-proliferation requirement to a multilateral realm.

Part 3 of the draft says regular channels of communication will be established "on matters connected with the implementation of the (NSG) Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India." While compliance with the NSG's non-proliferation guidelines is an "international commitment" imposed on India, the "bilateral agreements" point to the 123 agreement India has signed with the US. Again, the draft holds India up to its commitment to "sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol (with the IAEA) with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities." While placing India under IAEA safeguards is only a corollary to any such multilateral agreement, it must be borne in mind that the Additional Protocol can be highly invasive because the IAEA reserves the right to conduct inspections on any nuclear facility "safeguarded or unsafeguarded" if it suspects a country of violating the non-proliferation code.

The US has also bought itself an insurance cover in the Hyde Act if at a future date the NSG were to redefine its guidelines. "No item subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on the date of the transfer," the Hyde Act specifies.

"The implications for India entering into cooperation on the basis of unilateral adherence to the NSG guidelines is that this cartel could change its guidelines in the future to impose new conditions on India and India would have no recourse after having invested billions of dollars in imported reactors," feels Chellaney.

As for amendments to the NSG Guidelines, the draft takes away from India more than what it gives. Underlining India's non-member status at the NSG it says, "The NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member may wish to make." The operational part of this clause, however, is that while India's comments may be welcome, "participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India." The keyword is "implementation," consultations not necessarily arming India with decision-making.

[dhu]

<b>Please don’t nuke facts </b>
Brahma Chellaney


With the future shape of the Indo-US nuclear deal now out of India’s grasp and in the hands of foreigners, two things stand out domestically. The first is that the line between fact and fiction has become so blurred that spin now dominates the discourse. Indeed, such is the bullish partisanship on the issue and the shutting out of parliamentary scrutiny — mirrored in the astonishing postponement of the Parliament’s traditional monsoon session to the end of the monsoon season — that little room has been left for an informed debate.

The second is that the risks of serious misunderstandings and tragedy in the years later have been compounded through deliberate ambiguities in the agreed documents. Ambiguities may be fine with the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency because the leverage lies with them. But for a recipient state to turn a deaf ear to the stated positions and interpretations of other parties is to court trouble.

In fact, New Delhi has publicly prided its ingenuity in fashioning ambiguities. Take the claim that the safeguards accord has been cleverly worded to enable India to take “unspecified sovereign actions” in a contingency — an assertion out of sync with the negotiating record.

Such claims flow out of a contested reference in that accord’s preamble, which records that an “essential basis” of India’s “concurrence to accept Agency safeguards” is the “conclusion of international cooperation arrangements” to help secure “uninterrupted” fuel supply and build a “strategic reserve” of fuel. Whether such rights-empowering international arrangements exist or not is merely a preambular insertion by India without tying the IAEA to anything.

The preamble also notes that India “may take corrective measures” in the event of fuel-supply disruption. But “corrective measures” neither find mention in the numbered articles of the accord nor have been defined in the text, although Section XI on “definitions” spells out simple terms like “facility”, “reactor”, “nuclear material” and “Director General”. In effect, the accord precludes real correction by making safeguards indefinite and legally irrevocable.

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, in his statement introducing the accord for board approval, made clear that the preamble merely provided for “contextual background”. He pointed out “the agreement is of indefinite duration” and its termination provisions “are the same as for other INFCIRC/66-type agreements” (designed for non-nuclear-weapons states to cover individual plants and shipments of fuel). The IAEA will enforce inspections until any safeguarded Indian facility — indigenous or imported — is “no longer usable for any nuclear activity”.

Did India contest ElBaradei’s statement? No, although ElBaradei implicitly rubbished the India-specific claim by saying, “The text before you is an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement based on the Agency’s standard safeguards practices and procedures”. Several states also put on the record the cosmetic and non-operational nature of the aforesaid preambular references. Still, despite presenting a three-page statement at the end, India chose not to deny such contentions or even to stress its right to take corrective measures.

So, apart from claims publicly proffered at home by officials, there is nothing in the negotiating record about India explicitly staking any right to take any corrective step. All it has is a dubious reference in the preamble, which the IAEA chief has dismissed as “contextual background”. In his subsequent news conference, ElBaradei went on to say that a “concrete result” would be India’s co-option to help implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and conclude the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Against this background, would India have any case if it were stopped from building a strategic fuel reserve or slapped with a fuel cut-off? The onus will always be on India to behave well or risk a double whammy — a fuel squeeze or suspension while saddled with everlasting international inspections on its entire civil nuclear programme. Despite getting none of the rights the five established nuclear-weapons states have vis-à-vis the IAEA, India has accepted the Agency’s paramount authority to settle “any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this agreement”.

The board easily ratified the accord by consensus because it meets non-proliferation standards and opens the path to drafting India into the NPT regime as a de facto party. While this accord sets the technical parameters for co-opting India into the non-proliferation regime, the impending exemption by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group will set the political parameters.

The potential costs of equivocation primarily flow out of the earlier-negotiated 123 agreement with the US — an accord that fudges or tiptoes around key issues relating to strategic fuel reserves, reprocessing right, corrective measures and a linkage between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply. It also stands out for its lack of a dispute-resolution mechanism and for merely recording that India would seek the right to corrective measures in the safeguards accord.

Clearly spelled-out provisions, not equivocation and semantic subterfuge, was what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had pledged in Parliament to “ensure there is no repeat of our unfortunate experience with Tarapur”. Yet the accords negotiated with the US and IAEA risk making India an easier prey to external pressures. A quick comparison of these accords with the 1963 Indo-US 123 agreement and the 1971 safeguards pact underscores that danger.

While the 1963 agreement guaranteed fuel “as needed” by India, the equivocation in the latest 123 accord is manifest from the fuel-related assurances left hanging in Article 5.6, which says the US is “willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement” — that is, at some point in the future. The accord arms the US with an open-ended right to suspend supplies forthwith simply by issuing a one-year termination notice on any ground, however extraneous.

While the 1963 agreement permitted India to reprocess after a “joint determination” with the US that the reprocessing facility was “safeguardable”, the latest accord requires India not only to build a new dedicated facility to US satisfaction but also to separately negotiate and sign a congressionally vetted agreement on reprocessing. Although the US overrode the terms of the 1963 agreement through a new 1978 domestic law, the latest 123 accord says its implementation will be governed by national laws, underscoring the Hyde Act’s primacy.

The more-equitable 1971 safeguards accord was trilateral, with the US as a party. The applicability and duration of safeguards were explicitly tied to American fuel supply. Its structure and provisions were uniquely India-specific.

By contrast, the latest accord — modelled on the upgraded, NPT-system safeguards for non-nuclear-weapons states — is little India-specific. Despite a preambular reference to India’s civil-military separation plan — a mention that forms part of what ElBaradei sneeringly calls “contextual background” — the accord in none of its articles acknowledges the existence of an Indian nuclear-weapons programme even for the purpose of defining the scope or limits of safeguards.

The blunt fact is that India secured better agreements in an era in which the Chinese military invasion had shattered its confidence and the US PL-480 aid had fostered the image of a country with a begging bowl than in a period marking its rise as a knowledge powerhouse and nuclear-weapons state.

Little surprise, therefore, that spin is being aggressively employed to shroud inconvenient truths. In his July 22 speech in Parliament, the prime minister stated that while the G-8 passed a “harsh resolution” after the 1998 tests, at the “meeting of the G-8 held recently in Japan, the chairman’s summary has welcomed cooperation in civilian nuclear energy between India and the international community”. Really?

This is what the chair’s summary said: “We look forward to working with India, the IAEA, the NSG and other parties to advance India’s non-proliferation commitments and progress so as to facilitate a more robust approach to civil nuclear cooperation with India to help it meet its growing energy needs in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime”. Note the reference to cooperation is secondary. The primary thrust is on advancing “India’s non-proliferation commitments and progress”. Civil nuclear cooperation is just the means to achieve the objective to reinforce the NPT regime. The G-8 leaders, in their separate declaration, actually pledged to “redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen” the NPT, which perpetuates a five-nation nuclear monopoly.

The prime minister also made the following dream-selling claim on July 22: “It will open up new opportunities for trade in dual-use high technologies, opening up new pathways to accelerate industrialization of our country”. The deal, however, is intended to open commercially lucrative exports for safeguarded Indian facilities while specifically denying dual-use nuclear technologies. Easing high-technology and civilian space export controls is not part of this deal.

New Delhi, after agreeing to more and more conditions, is now threatening to turn its back on the imports-centred deal unless the NSG waiver is “clean” and “unconditional”. This is redolent of what the prime minister told Parliament on August 17, 2006: “It is clear if the final product is in its current form, India will have grave difficulties in accepting the bill. The US has been left in no doubt as to our position”. But when the Hyde Act was passed ignoring that warning, New Delhi didn’t make even a peep.

More misrepresentation will come when the NSG makes multilateral some of the bilateral conditions of the 123 Agreement and unilateral terms of the Hyde Act. The latest US draft submitted to the NSG after consultations with India shows that New Delhi has already acquiesced to its test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. But to deflect attention, spinmeisters introduced a red herring — the draft’s “full-scope safeguards” objective, presenting that as the main sticking point and then claiming India has upheld its interest by making the US drop that reference.

[G.Subramaniam]

Actually my analysis shows that India is blessed with a fat right hand IQ tail
and sooner or later the nuclear technology can be indigenously mastered
without the need for kissing ass

[dhu]

<b>Serious implications for India in NSG draft proposal</b>
Brahma Chellaney

The cleverly worded US draft to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group for carving out an exemption for India from the NSG rules (called "guidelines") seeks to irrevocably tether New Delhi to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. What is significant is that this draft proposal was submitted last week to the NSG chair, Germany, after consultations with the Indian government.

Although New Delhi may have expressed satisfaction with its inoffensively packaged wording, the draft proposal carries serious implications for India. The draft is likely to attract even more India-specific conditions when it is taken up for consideration by the NSG, given the cartel's consensual decision-making process. But consider the following implications of the existing draft, which in essence conforms to the Hyde Act provisions:

1<i>.�India is being brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with the US draft tying it to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. </i>Apart from being allowed to retain some nuclear facilities in the military realm, India will be treated, for all intents and purposes, as a non-nuclear weapons state by the NSG and thus subject to the non-proliferation conditionalities applicable to such states. India, in other words, is to be drafted into the NPT as a de facto party.

Except for exempting India from one key NSG provision, the draft permits� exports to "safeguarded" Indian facilities "provided the transfer satisfies all other provisions" of Part 1 & 2 of the NSG Guidelines -- that is, all the rules pertinent to non-nuclear-weapons state.

The exemption relates to the "full-scope" (comprehensive) safeguards rule listed in paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), 4© of Part 1 and 4(b) of Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines, which have been published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as document INFCIRC/254. India had to be exempted from the application of safeguards on each and every nuclear facility, given the fact that it has some nuclear military facilities.

2<i>.�India is acquiescing to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality.</i> The draft US proposal, in Section 2, first lists India's commitments, including to "continuing its unilateral moratorium to nuclear tests". Then, in Section 3, it recommends permitting exports to India for peaceful purposes for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities, "provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions" of Part 1 & 2 of the NSG Guidelines.

Bearing in mind that the NSG Guidelines relate to transfers to non-nuclear weapons states, India will have to live up to all the stipulated non-proliferation commitments and abjure activities proscribed for non-nuclear-weapons states. What was a unilateral test moratorium is to become, in effect, a requirement for civil nuclear cooperation with other states. The implication of treating India as a non-nuclear-weapons state and of implicitly "multilateralizing" its voluntary test moratorium is that India will face a fuel supply cut-off if it ever dared to test, leaving its imported power reactors high and dry.

This has to be seen against the backdrop of the Hyde Act and the so-called 123 Agreement. The 123 Agreement incorporates an implicit test ban by: (i) granting the US the right to seek the return of supplied items and materials on account of a US-determined Indian non-compliance with non-proliferation conditions; and (ii) arming the US with an open-ended right to suspend supplies forthwith simply by issuing a one-year termination notice on any ground, however extraneous.

The Hyde Act's Section 106 explicitly bans Indian testing forever. That section is the mother of all prohibitions.
In effect, India is being dragged through the backdoor into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

3<i>.�Instead of the "full" civil nuclear cooperation that the original July 18, 2005, deal promised, India access to civil enrichment and reprocessing technologies will be restricted through the proposed NSG waiver. </i>The US draft to the NSG, in Section 3b, states that transfers may take place to safeguarded facilities in India, "provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of Part 2". But Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines incorporates a presumption of denial of reprocessing and enrichment equipment and technology even under safeguards.

The presumption of denial in Part 2 of the Guidelines is contained in the following words in its Section 4: A supplier-state "should exercise prudence in order to carry out the basic principle and should take relevant factors into account, including � Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is to be used in research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any reprocessing or enrichment facility".

That India will face a continued embargo on importing equipment and components related to reprocessing and enrichment, even when such activities are under IAEA inspections and for peaceful purposes, has been underscored both by the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act.

Not only does the Hyde Act debar transfer to India of any "sensitive" civil nuclear equipment or technology, but also its Section 105(a)(5) directs Washington to "work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers" of reprocessing, enrichment and heavy-water technologies to India. And to underscore the primacy of the Hyde Act, the 123 Agreement's Article 5(2) states, "Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies."

Contrast such restriction with what the prime minister had pledged in Parliament on August 17, 2006 -- that India will only settle for the "removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy, ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to reprocessing spent fuel".

4<i>.�The various good-faith declarations made by India in the July 18, 2005, joint statement with the US are all being turned into binding, enforceable commitments multilaterally through the NSG, after having been incorporated into the Hyde Act. </i>In other words, the NSG is being asked to allow exports to "safeguarded" Indian facilities as long as India continues to fully meet the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments it voluntarily made on July 18, 2005. Those commitments have been listed in Section 2 of the US draft.

Furthermore, by additionally linking transfers to India to compliance with Part 1 and Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines, the US draft enlarges the non-proliferation net. For example, paragraph 4(e) of Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines demands that a supplier-state first consider, before making any transfer, "Whether governmental actions, statements, and policies of the recipient state are supportive of nuclear non-proliferation and whether the recipient state is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation".

5<i>.�The good-faith commitments being multilateralized include the following: India adhere to the NSG rules unilaterally, although the NSG will not admit India as a member. </i>The implication for India of entering into cooperation on the basis of unilateral adherence to the NSG guidelines is that this cartel could change its guidelines in the future to impose new conditions on India -- and India would have no recourse to being at the receiving end, after having invested billions of dollars in imported reactors.

The Hyde Act actually holds out the threat of termination of cooperation if NSG amends its rules by saying, "No item subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on the date of the transfer".

The US draft to the NSG merely suggests consultations with India on future amendments to the NSG guidelines, but gives India no say in the final decisions. As stated in Section 4 of the draft proposal, the NSG will "solicit such comments" from a non-member like India on proposed new amendments as to "facilitate their implementation by India". The objective of soliciting "comments" would be to ensure India's acceptance and compliance with a future amendment.

[acharya]

EDITORIAL
<b>
Honour NPT's 'second pillar'</b>

United States President George Bush made a surprisingly triumphant visit to Bangkok in celebration of the 175th year of bilateral relations between the US and Thailand. The centrepiece of his address to a VIP crowd at Government House on Wednesday was a challenge to the leaders of the Burmese military regime to release Nobel Prize winner and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and make real strides towards democratisation of the country. In this area the foreign policy of the Bush administration has been steadfast, although like the rest of the world it has been unable to offer a clear strategy on how to realise these noble goals.

Earlier in his Asian tour in Seoul, Mr Bush highlighted what may be the most enduring policy accomplishment of his tenure as US president when he offered economic hope to North Korea in exchange for verifiable compliance in that country's denuclearisation process, which was agreed to in a six-party negotiation involving North and South Koreas, the US, Japan, China and Russia. Mr Bush said that in order to gain the world's trust the North must take concrete steps to get rid of its relatively small nuclear arsenal and make it compliant with the "first pillar" of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which seeks to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. What is too often forgotten in today's world is the NPT's "second pillar", which also makes demands on the established nuclear powers to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament, and on a "treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Mr Bush cannot be blamed entirely for the total lack of progress during his administration in achieving this goal, but without a proactive stance on nuclear disarmament from the US there is no hope that it will come to pass.

It is encouraging therefore that four highly prominent officials in previous US administrations - former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former secretary of defence William Perry and a former chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Sam Nunn - to begin taking the steps to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, at least as far weapons production is concerned.

As their credentials would suggest, the proposals offered by these statesmen, sometimes called the "Gang of Four", are well thought out. They include as a preliminary step the removal of US and Russian missiles from a hair-trigger readiness status.

Mr Shultz has said the next president must have the political will and the available technical support to "launch an initiative to reduce and eventually eliminate the world's arsenals". A new president will be in office when the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or Start, agreement between the US and Russia expires in 2009. Democrat Barack Obama has already expressed support for the "Gang of Four" initiative. Republican John McCain has not as yet, but has called for renewed arms control negotiations with Russia leading to deep cuts in nuclear arsenals.

Apparently, and hopefully, North Korea has realised the futility of maintaining and developing nuclear weapons if it means ostracisation by the rest of the world. For different reasons, might not the rest of the nuclear club, led by the US and Russia, realise the wisdom in actively reducing nuclear stockpiles which have the potential to destroy the world many times over?

[Capt M Kumar]

<!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/sad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='sad.gif' /><!--endemo--> Also India should join the other original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped fissile material production for weapons purposes and transform its nuclear test moratorium into a meaningful, legally-binding commitment.

"If nuclear testing is to be deterred, meaningful penalties must be available. If NSG states do agree to supply fuel for India's 'civilian' nuclear sector, they must avoid arrangements that would enable or encourage future nuclear testing by India. Otherwise, you and your government may become complicit in the facilitation of a new round of destabilising nuclear tests," the letter has said.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Fu...-specific+draft

[acharya]

<b>China not concerned about India-US nuke deal: Ambassador</b>

Thiruvananthapuram (PTI): China has no concern over the Indo-US civil nuclear deal so long as New Delhi fulfilled relevant international obligations, Chinese Ambassador to India Zhang Yan said on Monday.

"India can enjoy right to peaceful nuclear energy provided it fulfils international obligations....provided it does not undermine international nuclear non-proliferation regime," he said here on Monday.

"If the concerns of the international community are taken care of, then, I think you can achieve your objective," Zhang Yan, on a visit to Kerala, said.

Asked if China was worried over India moving closer to the United States, he said "It is your foreign policy. How can I say anything about it."

On Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's decision to step down, he said he did not have any comment on it. "I do not have any comment on it. It is news to me," he said.

Asked whether Musharraf's exit would have any impact on fundamentalist trends in Pakistan, he said "I prefer not to discuss. We will watch the developments

[acharya]

A bad nuclear deal

Published: August 25 2008 18:30 | Last updated: August 25 2008 18:30

The Bush administration has long been guilty of a fundamental inconsistency on the issue of nuclear proliferation. On the one hand, it insists that international sanctions must be targeted on Iran until it suspends its uranium enrichment programme. The US says sanctions are necessary because it argues that Iran wants to build a nuclear weapon – while Tehran says it merely wants to develop a civil nuclear energy programme.

On the other hand, President Bush makes the opposite argument when it comes to India. In 1974, India stunned the world by detonating a nuclear weapon using Canadian technology that had been imported ostensibly to develop peaceful atomic energy. But the Bush administration says India’s illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons can be forgiven. Three years ago, the White House declared it was prepared to allow India to buy nuclear fuel and equipment for its civil nuclear programme. India was required to offer nothing in return – such as a promise not to expand its nuclear arsenal or to stop atomic testing.

This was a foolish move by the Bush White House, undermining international rules on nuclear proliferation. It is therefore refreshing to see many states make clear how unhappy they are. If the US Congress is to approve the pact, it must first be ratified by an obscure body called the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organisation set up to ensure no country exploits foreign nuclear assistance as India has. At a meeting last week, NSG member states failed to give the deal the green light, tabling extensive conditions that India must meet if it is to receive nuclear material.

Mr Bush’s allies say it is a pity the international community is dragging its feet in this way. They argue that the deal is strategically smart because it has ended 40 years of hostility between India and the US and balances the rising power of China. But the costs far outweigh any benefits. This deal makes a mockery of the non-proliferation treaty. And it threatens to accelerate the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. This is because every pound of uranium that India is allowed to import for its power reactors frees up a pound of uranium for its bomb programme.

The NSG will again convene next month and must apply as many conditions as possible to India’s nuclear programme before giving the deal the go-ahead. Better still, the next US president should ditch the entire policy. He should opt for an approach that reforms the rules of the nuclear game both for America’s friends and foes.

[acharya]

NSG debacle

This refers to the article “Looking beyond the NSG debacle” (Aug. 25). I agree what happened in Vienna — where the U.S.-prepared draft seeking a waiver of NSG guidelines to India could not get clearance — was an attack in which smaller states were encouraged by the U.S. to do its bidding. The U.S. was not really keen on pushing for a clean and unconditional waiver for India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must call it a day and prove wrong the U.S. calculation that he will go to any extent to operationalise the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal.

Lokesh Jangid,

New Delhi<b>
The NSG wants, among other things, some of the clauses of the Hyde Act to be incorporated in the waiver agreement with India. This, despite the assurances given by the UPA government that the Hyde Act is an internal legislation of the U.S. and will not bind India in any way. What we see today is the classic ‘boiled frog’ strategy (a frog dropped in very hot water will jump out of it. But if it is placed in cold water which is heated slowly, it will stay in for so long that by the time it discovers that the water is too hot, it is too late) being adopted by the U.S. to push the deal through.
</b>
Don’t introduce controversial amendments and clauses at one go for India will not accept them. Instead, bring them in stage by stage, so that it does not feel more than vaguely uncomfortable.

R.P. Subramanian,

New Delhi
I have been a staunch supporter of the nuclear deal as I believe it would allow India to improve its energy options. However, the NSG debacle has convinced me that Dr. Singh should walk away from the deal if India is asked to submit to the unfair restrictions being demanded by the NSG. Agreeing to such a humiliating and restrictive deal would undermine India’s long-term strategic options and nullify the benefits.

Jit Dutta,

California<b>
The U.S. is obviously trying to go on a fishing spree without getting wet. The agreement signed between India and the U.S. is very clear and Washington cannot go back on its commitments without losing face.</b> And hence it is employing a group of insignificant nations to raise objections to the waiver agreement.

Y. Parameswaran Menon,

Thrissur
It was all along known that the NSG was a tough nut to crack. Whether the U.S. underestimated the NSG or Dr. Singh overestimated the U.S.’ capability to get the waiver through is a moot point now.

Having taken the great plunge, getting disowned by one of its coalition partners and taking on board a party whose sincerity of purpose is questionable, the Congress has nothing but Hobson’s choice. Dr. Singh is certainly not in a very enviable position.

K.R.A. Narasiah,

Chennai
In the circumstances, it is better to withdraw than compromise bit by bit in the name of negotiation. The Prime Minister should appeal to the Indian youth to come forward and make the country energy sufficient.

Immediate planning and fund allocation should be done to develop indigenous technologies.

Mahidhar Pant,

Jaipur