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India And Asia
[url="http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=319285"]http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=319285[/url]



India's Dragon delusions

By Mohan Malik



In Sino-Indian relations, the more things change, the more they remain the same. One day after Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal beamed with joy on the eve of Atal Bihari Vajpayee-Wen Jiabao prime ministerial talks in Bali while waving a computer printout to the Indian media showing the removal of Sikkim from the list of countries from China's official website, interpreting it to signal a change in Beijing's policy over Sikkim and a new era of "peace in our time" (a-la Neville Chamberlain), Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue vehemently denied any such interpretation.



She insisted that Sikkim - which India and China claim - was an issue still to be determined by historical facts and hoped that it would be "resolved gradually". Zhang's refusal to confirm Sibal's optimism showed the Vajpayee government as gullible and in poor light. This was a repeat performance by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which had earlier denied China's acceptance of Sikkim as part of India soon after Vajpayee's talks with his counterpart in Beijing in June and India's reiteration of its stand on Tibet as China's integral part.



Worse, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) embarrassed Vajpayee by intruding deep into Arunachal Pradesh and torturing a group of Indian security personnel it had arrested and disarmed even as Vajpayee was in China being feted by the communist leadership and exulting over his visit. This armed intrusion was in clear violation of the 1993 and 1996 "peace and tranquility" accords, as Vajpayee later told parliament: "The behavior of Chinese authorities with the Indian patrol in Arunachal Pradesh was not dignified and in keeping with the agreements between us."



That the PLA's intrusion was premeditated was demonstrated by the official Chinese reaction that was harsh, unpalatable and undiplomatic. Instead of offering an apology or showing regret, it not only put the blame squarely on India, alleging that Indian security personnel had crossed into Chinese territory, but added insult to injury by claiming that Arunachal Pradesh was Chinese territory. The Vajpayee government could have countered China's claims to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh by repudiating Beijing's forced and illegal occupation of Tibet itself, but it chose not to do so in the larger interest of peace on the eastern front.



One explanation is that the powerful anti-India lobby of PLA commanders wants to continue the policy of confrontation while the post-Jiang Zemin political leadership is keen to forge closer economic ties with India. Yet another explanation is that incursions were timed to force India to induct more troops into the region to preempt further Chinese incursions - a move that further lessened the prospect of India acceding to the US request for a division-size force in Iraq.



A more plausible explanation is that the real issue, in fact, is not so much about Tibet or Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh, but the intensifying geopolitical power competition between China and India and India's unwillingness to accept a secondary role in a China-dominated Asia. Traditionally, the signs of that competition come in the form of a seemingly endless flow of "incidents" or "skirmishes" each arising over some infringement or perceived slight. They are basically trials of strength. In many ways, any pretext will do to demonstrate one's military superiority over the other and force the weaker side to give in.



In addition, the Chinese seem to relish humiliating the "Hindu-nationalist" Vajpayee every now and then, apparently because Beijing has neither forgiven Vajpayee for naming China as the reason behind India's nuclear tests in 1998, nor has it forgotten his traditional pro-Tibet stance.



It is worth recalling that when Vajpayee went to China in 1979 as the foreign minister in the Morarji Desai government, his hosts had also embarrassed him by invading Vietnam, forcing Vajpayee to cut short his visit. A quarter of a century later, Vajpayee's second visit, this time as as prime minister, "succeeded" in making a non-issue (Sikkim) a major issue, much to the advantage of the Chinese. Before Vajpayee's China visit in June, Sikkim was on the backburner, and negotiations were restricted to the border dispute. The Indian government had concluded that it did not care if China wanted to be the only country in the world that did not recognize Sikkim's accession in 1974. However, in its zeal to show "progress", Sikkim and Tibet were joined by the Indian side, and in return for Tibet's recognition as a part of China, Chinese recognition of Sikkim was sought. All the Chinese did was to approve Changgu in Sikkim as a trade point with Ranguinggang in Tibet, without recognizing Indian sovereignty over Sikkim.



Apparently, this "progress" can be attributed to the Indian side's neglect of advice offered by Richard Solomon in his Chinese Negotiating Behavior , which cautions against two Chinese tactics: (a) The Chinese adopt a tough "no compromise" stance until the eleventh hour, thereby putting the other side under intense pressure to yield in order to make the visit successful; and (<img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cool.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='B)' /> Raise a non-issue or an issue that is already settled and ask for more concessions. The Chinese leadership thus exploited Vajpayee's yearning for a successful visit to extract unilateral concessions. Even if the Sikkim irritant is eventually removed, a sour taste will remain over Chinese tactics, rooted in the Middle Kingdom's attitude of being a dominant power dealing with lesser mortals.



With China continuing to speak with two voices - one moderate, one menacing - New Delhi often finds itself caught on the back foot, largely because India's China policy is based on unrealistic expectations and faulty assumptions.



The first assumption is that the time is ripe for a "kiss-and-make-up" with China as there are signs of a "change in Chinese thinking and attitude towards India". The reality, however, is quite different. Despite growing interaction at all levels, the gulf between the two countries - in terms of their perceptions, attitudes and expectations from each other - has widened over the past half century. Indian and Chinese leaders are often talking at, rather than talking to, each other. Chinese leaders are loath to admit that their policies and actions are seen as threatening to their neighbors. They insist on India "changing its attitude towards China" without acknowledging any need for China to do the same. As US research professor Andrew Scobell points out, "Few, if any, of China's strategic thinkers seem to hold warm or positive views of India for China's future."



In their dialogues with Asian and Western leaders, Chinese leaders and officials are often very contemptuous of India's socio-economic achievements, India's courting of the US to contain China, and dismissive of New Delhi's claims as "the world's largest democracy". In a recent meeting with American academics, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed as meaningless all talk of learning from India's democratic experience, describing India as "a tribal democracy which poses a serious threat to India's existence in the long term". There exists in the Chinese mind a deep distrust of India - with the converse also holding true. There seems to be little give-and-take in bilateral relationship. Though many Indians claim that China's five-decade-long "contain India" policy has failed because China has not succeeded in its strategic objective of either unraveling India or boxing it within the sub-continent, the Chinese are convinced that it has paid rich dividends by keeping India preoccupied with sub-continental concerns.



One cliche in vogue these days is that the "Sino-Indian partnership will produce an Asian century" (not different from Jawaharlal Nehru's dream of joint Sino-Indian leadership of Asia) . But this is unlikely to be realized. The Chinese Communist Party has set the year 2049 - marking 100 years of the founding of the People's Republic - when China will re-emerge as the global superpower, overtaking the United States economically and militarily, if not earlier, and it would hate to see any country, least of all India, spoil the Middle Kingdom's celebration party.



Another assumption is that since India has two monkeys on its back - Pakistan and China - it makes sense to get at least one monkey off. Having failed to budge the Pakistanis, Vajpayee is trying to get the Chinese monkey off India's back. This assumption flows from the argument that growing India-China economic links could serve as a positive inducement to China that it could gain more from a more even-handed policy in South Asia than it would by supporting Pakistan against India. For example, China, like other countries, realizes that India's information technology (IT) products and skills could further boost the booming Chinese economy. However, the reality is again somewhat different. Even in the IT software sector, many Chinese policymakers are contemptuous of India's growth prospects over the long term, believing that just as they left India behind in the nuclear sector (where India had an edge in the 1950s), they would be able to steal a march over India in the IT sector as well.



Besides, India's desire to wean China away from Pakistan is nothing but wishful thinking because Beijing has made it clear that it will not improve ties with India at the cost of Pakistan. Interestingly, the PLA's General Xiong Guangkai, who calls Pakistan "China's Israel" and is said to have brokered Islamabad's nukes-for-missile deal with Pyongyang, was back in Pakistan to sign new defense deals two weeks after Vajpayee's return from China. On a cost-benefit calculus, the combined strategic and political advantages that China receives from its alliance with Pakistan (and, through Pakistan, other Islamic countries) easily outweigh any advantages China might receive from a closer relationship with India.



Beijing needs to prop up India's bete-noire because Pakistan is vitally important to China's energy security (by providing access to and bases in the Persian Gulf), military security (by keeping India's military engaged on its western frontiers), geopolitics (given its geostrategic location at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East), national unity and territorial integrity (control over Tibet and Xinjiang), maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean, as a staunch diplomatic ally (in international fora, including the Islamic world), a buyer and supplier of conventional and unconventional weaponry. And above all, a powerful bargaining chip in China's relations with India and the United States.



Beijing also shares Islamabad's deep mistrust of India's strategic ambitions and sees India as a rising power that must be contained. The Chinese believe that as long as India is preoccupied with Pakistan on its western frontier, it will not stir up trouble on the Tibetan border. Through Pakistan, China also retains the option of continuously creating momentum that sap India's military power. Since Pakistan is the only country that prevents Indian dominance of southern Asia, it fulfills a key objective of China's Asia policy.



In addition to Pakistan, the Chinese have lately tightened their embrace of India's neighbors - Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives - partly to counter India's "Look East" policy, which clashes with long-term Chinese objectives and interests in East Asia, and partly to gain access to naval bases in the Indian Ocean. If during the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing used Pakistan's enmity with India to transform it into its surrogate, Myanmar's isolation was exploited during the 1990s to transform it into China's client state. The same pattern now seems to be repeating itself with respect to Bangladesh in the first decade of the 21st century. At a time when India-Bangladesh ties were strained over issues such as trade, transit, illegal immigration and the alleged presence of al-Qaeda in Bangladesh, Beijing concluded a comprehensive Defense Cooperation Agreement with Dacca in December 2002.



Chinese and Pakistani generals were recently invited as observers at military exercises in Myanmar. Their next stop is likely to be Bangladesh. China's naval encirclement of India would be complete if and when Beijing is successful in persuading the strategically located Indian Ocean island nation of the Maldives to grant a naval base at Gan in the Indian Ocean. In what is tantamount to playing the "Islamic card" to secure naval bases, Chinese leaders and PLA generals visiting the Maldives have stressed that the Islamic island nation, much like Pakistan and Bangladesh, should be "in China's camp because China has always had close, special ties with the Islamic world".



Notwithstanding the recent decision to upgrade border talks between India and China to the political level, the prospects of a negotiated settlement in the near future seem remote because China cannot brush aside third party (its ally, Pakistan's) interests in the territorial dispute. This was not the case with the settlement of China's territorial boundaries with Russia or Vietnam. For a resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute would lead to the deployment of India's military assets on the India-Pakistan border, thereby tilting the military balance decisively in India's favor, much to Pakistan's disadvantage. This would deprive Beijing of powerful leverage in its relations with Pakistan and undermine its old strategy of keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts.



The harsh reality is that an unresolved territorial dispute with India suits Chinese interests more than a settled boundary. That is why China has declined to exchange maps, despite 22 years of border talks, to present even its version of the full line of control. An unsettled border gives China the opportunity to expose India's vulnerabilities and weaknesses. At the same time, following the demarcation of China's land borders with nearly all its neighbors, Beijing's propaganda machinery also milks it for what it's worth by blaming India's "unreasonable and uncompromising attitude" for lack of progress on the dispute.



Historically, China has negotiated border disputes with neighbors in their moment of national despair (Pakistan, Myanmar in the 1960s; Central Asian republics in the 1990s) or only after the regional balance of power has shifted decisively in China's favor and/or after they have ceased to be a major threat (land settlements with Russia and Vietnam in the 1990s). But not with those who are perceived as present rivals and future threats (India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan).



Dr Mohan Malik is Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Haiwaii. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
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Putin does not understand that the Ummah considers Russia as Dar ul Harb and will wage war continuously in one form or another. Right now they have targeted Russia for demographic expansion and the muslim population of Russia at the present rate will reach 50% before the end of the century - a situation not unlike that of India.



[url="http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/10/16102003162047.asp"]http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/10/...02003162047.asp[/url]



Russia, Putin Tells OIC That Muslims Are 'Inseparable' Part Of A Multiethnic Nation

By Sophie Lambroschini



Speaking at the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Malaysia, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Muslims in Russia are yearning for more cooperation with the rest of the Islamic world.



Moscow, 16 November 2003 (RFE/RL) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke today at the opening of a two-day Malaysia summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Russia is seeking official observer status with the OIC.



In his brief remarks, Putin stressed that Russia's 20 million Muslims are an inalienable part of Russia and that no religion should be equated with terrorism. "Russian Muslims are an inseparable, full-fledged, and active part of the multiethnic and multidenominational nation of Russia. Russia, as a unique Eurasian power, has always played a special role in building relations between East and West. I am convinced that our actions within the framework of the OIC can today become an important element of a just and secure world," Putin said.



Putin linked Moscow's unpopular war in the Muslim-majority republic of Chechnya to the international war on terrorism, while stressing the distinction between Islam and terrorism.



Some analysts say Moscow's desire for greater integration with the OIC is largely aimed at minimizing the negative perceptions of the brutal four-year war in Chechnya, which has sparked concern among Muslims both in and outside of Russia.



Putin appeared to be addressing concerns voiced by the OIC's secretary-general, Abdelouahed Belkeziz of Morocco, during a preparatory session last week. Belkeziz said Muslims are filled with "feelings of impotence and frustration as some of their countries are occupied, others are under sanctions, a third group threatened, and a fourth group accused of sponsoring terrorism."



In his speech today, Putin insisted the conflict in breakaway Chechnya should not be seen as an expression of a minority fighting for its rights.



"I would like to point out that attempts to drag the international community into what is, in essence, an artificial conflict exist both in the West and in the East. Some, hiding behind religious slogans, are mounting what comes down to armed aggression against their own brothers and partners, fighting with the legitimate authorities, provoking separatism, [and] practicing terrorism," Putin said. of course this applies to Kashmir as well



He also condemned critics of the war in Chechnya for misguided motivation: "Others use this situation, exploit it in their venal interests like an instrument of political pressure, to fulfill their own interests, having nothing in common with Islam, nor with defending human rights, nor with international law as a whole."



Putin also thanked the OIC and the Arab League for sending observers to the recent presidential election in Chechnya, which were largely disavowed by other international monitors. I believe India has done this too in Kashmir with not much of an acknowledgement from the Islamic world



In his speech, Putin did not refer to the situation in Iraq by name but repeated his call for an increased UN presence in the region.



"Like most Islamic states represented here, Russia defends the strengthening of international law, for a central coordinating role for the United Nations to solve international problems," he said.



Putin is attending the summit as a guest but repeated his hope that Russia can obtain official OIC observer status. He said Muslims in Russia are yearning for more cooperation with the rest of the Islamic world.



"Not only will Russia's presence complete the bright palette of the organization, it will also add new possibilities to its work. It will bring the weight and voice of Russia's important Muslim community," Putin said.



About 15 percent of the population of the Russian Federation is Muslim, and the figure is growing. There is nothing in the OIC charter requiring a certain proportion of a population to be Muslim before a nation can be considered for membership. The OIC charter does specify that a two-thirds majority vote is required to obtain membership, and population may be one factor that is reviewed, along with other factors.



India was rejected from membership in the OIC two years ago, although its Muslim population, the second-largest in the world, is far greater than Russia's.
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This originally appeared in the Atlantic, but i dont have the URL

The Perils of Partition



Our author examines the political—and literary—legacy

of Britain's policy of "divide and quit"



by Christopher Hitchens



.....



The public, or "political," poems of W. H. Auden,

which stretch from his beautiful elegy for Spain and

his imperishable reflections on September 1939 and

conclude with a magnificent eight-line snarl about the

Soviet assault on Czechoslovakia in 1968, are usually

considered with only scant reference to his verses

about the shameful end of empire in 1947. Edward

Mendelson's otherwise meticulous and sensitive

biography allots one sentence to Auden's "Partition."

Unbiased at least he was

when he arrived on his mission,

Having never set eyes on this

land he was called to partition

Between two peoples fanatically

at odds,

With their different diets and

incompatible gods.

"Time," they had briefed him in

London, "is short. It's too late

For mutual reconciliation or

rational debate:

The only solution now lies in

separation ..." Dutifully pulling open my New York

Times one day last December, I saw that most of page

three was given over to an article on a possible

solution to the Cyprus "problem." The physical

division of this tiny Mediterranean island has become

a migraine simultaneously for the European Union

(which cannot well allow the abridgment of free

movement of people and capital within the borders of a

potential member state), for NATO (which would look

distinctly foolish if it underwent a huge expansion

only to see two of its early members, Greece and

Turkey, go to war), for the United Nations (whose own

blue-helmeted soldiery has "mediated" the Cyprus

dispute since 1964), and for the United States (which

is the senior partner and chief armorer of Greece and

Turkey, and which would prefer them to concentrate on

other, more pressing regional matters).



Flapping through the rest of the press that day, I

found the usual references to the Israeli-Palestinian

quarrel, to the state of near war between India and

Pakistan (and the state of actual if proxy war that

obtains between them in the province of Kashmir), and

to the febrile conditions that underlie the truce

between Loyalists and Republicans—or "Protestants" and

"Catholics" —in Northern Ireland. Casting aside the

papers and switching on my e-mail, I received further

bulletins from specialist Web sites that monitor the

precarious state of affairs along the border between

Iraq and Kuwait, between the hostile factions in Sri

Lanka, and even among the citizens of Hong Kong, who

were anxiously debating a further attempt by Beijing

to bring the former colony under closer control.



There wasn't much happening that day to call a

reader's attention to the Falkland Islands, to the

resentment between Guatemala and Belize, to the

internal quarrels and collapses in Somalia and

Eritrea, or to the parlous state of the kingdom of

Jordan. However, there was some news concerning the

defiance of the citizens of Gibraltar, who had

embarrassed their patron or parent British government

by in effect refusing the very idea of negotiations

with Spain on the future of their tiny and enclaved

territory. I have saved the word "British" for as long

as I decently can.



I n the modern world the "fault lines" and "flash

points" of journalistic shorthand are astonishingly

often the consequence of frontiers created ad hoc by

British imperialism. In her own 1959 poem Marya Mannes

wrote,

Borders are scratched across the

hearts of men

By strangers with a calm, judicial

pen,

And when the borders bleed we

watch with dread

The lines of ink across the map

turn red. Her somewhat trite sanguinary image is

considerably modified when one remembers that most of

the lines or gashes would not have been there if the

map hadn't been colored red in the first place. No

sooner had the wider world discovered the Pashtun

question, after September 11, 2001, than it became

both natural and urgent to inquire why the Pashtun

people appeared to live half in Afghanistan and half

in Pakistan. Sir Henry Mortimer Durand had decreed so

in 1893 with an imperious gesture, and his arbitrary

demarcation is still known as the Durand Line. Sir

Mark Sykes (with his French counterpart, Georges

Picot) in 1916 concocted an apportionment of the

Middle East that would separate Lebanon from Syria and

Palestine from Jordan. Sir Percy Cox in 1922 fatefully

determined that a portion of what had hitherto been

notionally Iraqi territory would henceforth be known

as Kuwait. The English half spy and half archaeologist

Gertrude Bell in her letters described walking through

the desert sands after World War I, tracing the new

boundary of Iraq and Saudi Arabia with her walking

stick. The congested, hypertense crossing point of the

River Jordan, between Jordan "proper" and the

Israeli-held West Bank, is to this day known as the

Allenby Bridge, after T. E. Lawrence's commander. And

it fell to Sir Cyril Radcliffe to fix the frontiers of

India and Pakistan—or, rather, to carve a Pakistani

state out of what had formerly been known as India.

Auden again:

"The Viceroy thinks, as you will

see from his letter,

That the less you are seen in his

company the better,

So we've arranged to provide you

with other accommodation.

We can give you four judges, two

Moslem and two Hindu,

To consult with, but the final

decision must rest with you." Probably the

best-known literary account of this grand historic

irony is Midnight's Children, the panoptic novel that

introduced Salman Rushdie to a global audience. One

should never employ the word "irony" cheaply. But the

Subcontinent attained self-government, and also

suffered a deep and lasting wound, at precisely the

moment that separated August 14 and 15 of 1947.

Rushdie's conceit—of a nation as a child

simultaneously born, disputed, and sundered—has

Solomonic roots. Parturition and partition become

almost synonymous. Was partition the price of

independence, or was independence the price of

partition?



It is this question, I believe, that lends the issue

its enduring and agonizing fascination. Many important

nations achieved their liberation, if we agree to use

the terminology of the post-Woodrow Wilson era (or

their statehood, to put it more neutrally), on what

one might call gunpoint conditions. Thus the Irish,

who were the first since 1776 to break out of the

British Empire, were told in 1921 that they could have

an independent state or a united state but not both. A

few years earlier Arthur Balfour had made a

declaration concerning Palestine that in effect

promised its territory to two competing nationalities.

In 1960 the British government informed the people of

Cyprus that they must accept a conditional

postcolonial independence or face an outright division

of their island between Greece and Turkey (not, it is

worth emphasizing, between the indigenous Greek and

Turkish Cypriots). They sullenly signed the treaty,

handing over a chunk of Cyprus to permanent and

sovereign British bases, which made it a potentially

tripartite partition but also inscribed all the future

intercommunal misery in one instrument: a treaty to

which no party had acceded in good faith.



But it seemed to be enough, at the time, to cover an

inglorious British retreat. And here another irony

forces itself upon us. The whole ostensible plan

behind empire was long-term, and centripetal. From the

eighteenth to the twentieth century the British sent

out lawyers, architects, designers, doctors, and civil

servants, not merely to help collect the revenues of

exploitation but to embark on nation-building. Yet at

the moment of crux it was suddenly remembered that the

proud and patient mother country had more-urgent

business at home. To complete the Auden version:

Shut up in a lonely mansion, with

police night and day

Patrolling the gardens to keep

the assassins away,

He got down to work, to the task

of settling the fate

Of millions. The maps at his

disposal were out of date

And the Census Returns almost

certainly incorrect,

But there was no time to check

them, no time to inspect. The true term for this is

"betrayal," as Auden so strongly suggests, because the

only thinkable justification for the occupation of

someone else's territory and the displacement of

someone else's culture is the testable, honorable

intention of applying an impartial justice, a

disinterested administration, and an even hand as

regards bandits and sectarians. In the absence of such

ambitions, or the resolve to complete them, the

British would have done better to stay on their

fog-girt island and not make such high-toned claims

for themselves. The peoples of India would have found

their own way, without tutelage and on a different

timetable. Yet Marx and Mill and Macaulay, in their

different fashions, felt that the encounter between

England and India was fertile and dynamic and

revolutionary, and now we have an entire Anglo-Indian

literature and cuisine and social fusion that seem to

testify to the point. (Rushdie prefers the phrase

"Indo-Anglian," to express the tremendous influence of

the English language on Indian authorship, and who

would want to argue? There may well be almost as many

adult speakers of English in India as there are in the

United Kingdom, and at the upper and even middle

levels they seem to speak and write it rather better.)



T he element of tragedy here is arguably implicit in

the whole imperial project. Ever since Rome conquered

and partitioned Gaul, the best-known colonial precept

has been divide et impera—"divide and rule." Yet after

the initial subjugation the name of the task soon

becomes the more soothing "civilizing mission," and a

high value is placed on lofty, balanced, unifying

administration. Later comes the point at which the

colonized outgrow the rule of the remote and chilly

exploiters, and then it will often be found convenient

for the governor or the district commissioner to play

upon the tribal or confessional differences among his

subjects. From proclaiming that withdrawal, let alone

partition, is the very last thing they will do, the

colonial authorities move to ensure that these are the

very last things they do do. The contradiction is

perfectly captured in the memoir of the marvelously

named Sir Penderel Moon, one of the last British

administrators in India, who mordantly titled his book

Divide and Quit.



The events he records occurred beyond half a century

ago. But in the more immediate past it was Lords

Carrington and Owen—both senior Graduates of the

British Foreign Office—who advanced the ethnic

cantonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was Lord

Carrington who (just before Nelson Mandela was

released from prison) proposed that South Africa be

split into a white Afrikaner reservation, a Zulu area,

and a free-for-all among various other peoples. It was

Sir Anthony Eden who helpfully suggested in 1954 that

the United States might consider a division of Vietnam

into "North" and "South" at the close of the French

colonial fiasco. Cold War partitions or geopolitical

partitions, such as those imposed in Germany, Vietnam,

and Korea, are to be distinguished from those arising

from the preconditions of empire. But there is a

degree of overlap even here (especially in the case of

Vietnam and also, later, of Cyprus). As a general rule

it can be stated that all partitions except that of

Germany have led to war or another partition or both.

Or that they threaten to do so.



Pakistan had been an independent state for only a

quarter century when its restive Bengali "east wing"

broke away to become Bangladesh. And in the process of

that separation a Muslim army put a Muslim people to

the sword—rather discrediting and degrading the

original concept of a "faith-based" nationality.

Cyprus was attacked by Greece and invaded by Turkey

within fourteen years of its quasi-partitioned

independence, and a huge and costly international

effort is now under way to redraw the resulting

frontiers so that they bear some relation to local

ethnic proportions. Every day brings tidings of a

fresh effort to revise the 1947-1948 cease-fire lines

in Palestine (sometimes known as the 1967 borders),

which were originally the result of a clumsy partition

of the initial British Mandate. In Northern Ireland

the number of Catholic citizens now approaches the

number of Protestant ones, so that the terms

"minority" and "majority" will soon take on new

meaning. When that time arrives, we can be sure that

demands will be renewed for a redivision of the Six

Counties, roughly east and west of the Bann River. As

for Kashmir, where local politics have been almost

petrified since the arbitrary 1947 decision to become

India's only Muslim-majority state, it is openly

suggested that the outcome will be a three-way split

into the part of Kashmir already occupied by Pakistan,

the non-Muslim regions dominated by India, and the

central valley where most Kashmiris actually dwell. In

all the above cases there has been continuous strife,

often spreading to neighboring countries, of the sort

that partition was supposedly designed to prevent or

solve. Harry Coomer (Hari Kumar), the Anglo-Indian

protagonist of Paul Scott's Raj Quartet, sees it all

coming when he writes to an English friend in 1940,

I think that there's no doubt that in the last twenty

years—whether intentionally or not—the English have

succeeded in dividing and ruling, and the kind of

conversation I hear ... makes me realise the extent to

which the English now seem to depend upon the

divisions in Indian political opinion perpetuating

their own rule at least until after the war, if not

for some time beyond it. They are saying openly that

it is "no good leaving the bloody country because

there's no Indian party representative to hand it over

to." They prefer Muslims to Hindus (because of the

closer affinity that exists between God and Allah than

exists between God and the Brahma), are

constitutionally predisposed to Indian princes,

emotionally affected by the thought of untouchables,

and mad keen about the peasants who look upon any Raj

as God ... This is the fictional equivalent of Anita

Inder Singh's diagnosis, in The Origins of the

Partition of India 1936-1947:

The Labour government's directive to the Cabinet

Mission in March 1946 stressed that power would only

be transferred to Indians if they agreed to a

settlement which would safeguard British military and

economic interests in India. But in February 1947, the

Labour government announced that it would wind up the

Raj by June 1948, even if no agreement had emerged.

Less than four months later, Lord Mountbatten

announced that the British would transfer power on 15

August 1947, suggesting that much happened before this

interval which persuaded the British to bring forward

the date for terminating the empire by almost one

year. Also, the British have often claimed that they

had to partition because the Indian parties failed to

agree. But until the early 1940s the differences

between them had been a pretext for the British to

reject the Congress demand for independence ... S

igmund Freud once wrote an essay concerning "the

narcissism of the minor differences." He pointed out

that the most vicious and irreconcilable quarrels

often arise between peoples who are to most outward

appearances nearly identical. In Sri Lanka the

distinction between Tamils and Sinhalese is barely

noticeable to the visitor. But the Sinhalese can tell

the difference, and the indigenous Tamils know as well

the difference between themselves and the Tamils later

imported from South India by the British to pick the

tea. It is precisely the intimacy and inwardness of

the partition impulse that makes it so tempting to

demagogues and opportunists. The 1921 partition of

Ireland was not just a division of the island but a

division of the northeastern province of Ulster.

Historically this province contained nine counties.

But only four—Antrim, Armagh, Derry, and Down—had

anything like a stable Protestant majority. Three

others—Monaghan, Cavan, and Donegal—were

overwhelmingly Catholic. The line of pro-British

partition attempted to annex the maximum amount of

territory with the minimum number of Catholic and

nationalist voters. Two largely Catholic counties,

Fermanagh and Tyrone, petitioned to be excluded from

the "Unionist" project. But a mere four counties were

thought to be incompatible with a separate state; so

the partition of Ireland, into twenty-six counties

versus six, was also the fracturing of Ulster.



In a similar manner, the partition of India involved

the subdivision of the ancient territories of Punjab

and Bengal. The peoples here spoke the same language,

shared the same ancestry, and had long inhabited the

same territory. But they were abruptly forced to

choose between one side of a frontier and the other,

on the basis of religion alone. And then, with this

durable scar of division fully established between

them, they could fall to quarreling further about

religion among themselves. The infinite and punishing

consequences of this can be seen to the present day,

through the secession of Bangladesh, the Sunni-Shia

fratricide in Pakistan, the intra-Pashtun rivalry, and

the sinister and dangerous recent attempt to define

India (which still has more Muslims on its soil than

Pakistan does) as a Hindu state. To say nothing of

Kashmir. This "solution," with its enormous military

wastage and potentially catastrophic nuclear

potential, must count as one of the great moral and

political failures in recent human history. One of

Paul Scott's most admirable minor characters is Lady

Ethel Manners, the widow of a former British governor,

who exclaims about the "midnight" of 1947,

The creation of Pakistan is our crowning failure. I

can't bear it ... Our only justification for two

hundred years of power was unification. But we've

divided one composite nation into two and everyone at

home goes round saying what a swell the new Viceroy is

for getting it sorted out so quickly. The year 1947

was obviously an unpropitious one for laying down your

"confessional state" or "post-colonial partition"

vintage. The Arabs of Palestine, who gave place to a

half-promised British-sponsored state for Jews at the

same time, are now subdivided into Israeli Arabs, West

Bankers, Gazans, Jerusalemites, Jordanians, and the

wider Palestinian-refugee diaspora. If at any moment a

settlement looks possible between any one of these

factions and the Israelis, the claims of another, more

afflicted faction promptly arise to neutralize or

negate the process. Anton Shammas and David Grossman

have both written lucidly, from Arab-Israeli and

Jewish-Israeli perspectives respectively, about this

balkanization of a society that was fissile enough to

begin with. And perhaps that splintering is why Osama

bin Laden's fantasy of a restored caliphate—an

undivided Muslim empire, organic and hierarchic and

centralized—now exerts its appeal (as did the

Nasserite and later the Baath Party dream of a single

Arab nation in which the old borders would be subsumed

by one glorious whole).



In the preface to his 1904 play John Bull's Other

Island, George Bernard Shaw made highly vivid use of

the metaphor of fracture or amputation.

A healthy nation is as unconscious of its nationality

as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a

nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but

getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer,

to no philosopher, to no preacher, until the demand of

the Nationalist is granted. It will attend to no

business, however vital, except the business of

unification and liberation. This, mark you, was

seventeen years before the issue of Irish "liberation"

was forcibly counterposed to that of "unification."

"Unionist," in British terminology, means someone who

favors the "union" of the Six Counties of Northern

Ireland with the United Kingdom—in other words,

someone who favors the disunion of Ireland. Among

Greeks the word "unionist" is rendered as "enotist"

—someone who supports enosis, or union, between Greece

and John Bull's other European colony, Cyprus. (This

is why the Ulster Unionists in Parliament today are

among the staunchest supporters of the

ultra-nationalist Rauf Denktash's breakaway Turkish

colony on the island.) And Shaw might have done well

to add that preachers can indeed get attention for

their views, while the national question is being

debated, as long as they take decided and fervent

nationalist positions. Even he would have been

startled, if he visited any of these territories

today, to find how right he was—and how people discuss

their injuries as if they had been inflicted

yesterday.



I t is the admixture of religion with the national

question that has made the problem of partition so

toxic. Whether consciously or not, British colonial

authorities usually preferred to define and categorize

their subjects according to confession. The whole

concept of British dominion in Ireland was based on a

Protestant ascendancy. In the Subcontinent the empire

tended to classify people as Muslim or non-Muslim,

partly because the Muslims had been the last

conquerors of the region and also because—as Paul

Scott cleverly noticed—it found Islam to be at least

recognizable in Christian-missionary terms (as opposed

to the heathenish polytheism of the Hindus). In

Palestine and Cyprus, both of which it took over from

the Ottomans, London wrote similar categories into

law. As a partially intended consequence, any secular

or nonsectarian politician was at a peculiar

disadvantage. Many historians tend to forget that the

stoutest supporters of Irish independence, at least

after the rebellion of 1798, were Protestants or

agnostics, from Edward Fitzgerald and Wolfe Tone to

Charles Stewart Parnell and James Connolly. The

leadership of the Indian Congress Party was avowedly

nonconfessional, and a prominent part in the struggle

for independence was played by Marxist forces that

repudiated any definition of nationality by religion.

Likewise in Cyprus: the largest political party on the

island was Communist, with integrated trade unions and

municipalities, and most Turkish Cypriots were secular

in temper. The availability of a religious "wedge,"

added to the innate or latent appeal of chauvinism and

tribalism, was always a godsend to the masters of

divide and rule. Among other things, it allowed the

authorities to pose as overworked mediators between

irreconcilable passions.



Indeed, part of the trouble with partition is that it

relies for its implementation on local partitionists.

It may also rely on an unspoken symbiosis between

them—a covert handshake between apparent enemies. The

grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was in

many ways unrepresentative of the Palestinian

peasantry of the 1930s and 1940s (and it does not do

to forget that perhaps 20 percent of Palestinians are

Christian). But his clerical authority made him a

useful (if somewhat distasteful) "notable" from the

viewpoint of the colonial power, and his virulent

sectarianism was invaluable to the harder-line

Zionists, who needed only to reprint his speeches.

Many Indian Muslims refused their support to Mohammed

Ali Jinnah, but once Britain became bent on partition,

it automatically conferred authority on his Muslim

League as being the "realistic" expression of the

community. British policy also helped the emergence of

Rauf Denktash, whose violence was principally directed

at those Turkish Cypriots who did not want an

apartheid solution. More recently, in Bosnia, the West

(encouraged by Lords Carrington and Owen) made the

fatal error of assuming that the hardest-line

demagogues were the most authentic representatives of

their communities. Thus men who could never win a

truly democratic election—and have not won one

since—were given the immense prestige of being invited

as recognized delegates to the negotiating table.

Interviewing the Serbian Orthodox fanatics who had

proclaimed an artificial "Republica Srpska" on stolen

and cleansed Bosnian soil, John Burns of The New York

Times was surprised to find them citing the example of

Denktash's separate state in Cyprus as a precedent.

(The usual colloquial curse word for "Muslim," in Serb

circles, is "Turk." But there is such a thing as

brotherhood under the skin, and even xenophobes can

practice their own perverse form of internationalism.)

Most of these men are now either in prison or on the

run, but they lasted long enough to see

Bosnia-Herzegovina subjected to an almost terminal

experience of partition and subpartition, splitting

like an amoeba among Serb, Croat, and (in the Bihac

enclave) Muslim bandits. Now, under the paternal wing

of Lord Ashdown, the governorship of Bosnia is based

on centripetal rather than centrifugal principles. But

his stewardship as commissioner originates with the

European Union.



The straight capitalist and socialist rationality of

the EU—where "Union" means what it says and where

frontiers are bad for business as well as a reproach

to the old left-internationalist ideal—is in bizarre

contrast to the lived experience of partition. The

time-zone difference between India and Pakistan, for

example, is half an hour. That's a nicely irrational

and arbitrary slice out of daily life. In Cyprus, the

difference between the clocks in the Greek and Turkish

sectors is an hour—but it's the only in-country

north-south time change that I am aware of, and it

operates on two sides of the same capital city. In my

"time," I have traversed the border post at the old

Ledra Palace hotel in the center of Nicosia, where a

whole stretch of the city is frozen at the precise

moment of "cease-fire" in 1974, when everything went

into suspended animation. I have been frisked at the

Allenby Bridge and at the Gaza crossing between Israel

and the "Palestinian authority." I have looked at the

Korean DMZ from both sides, been ordered from a car by

British soldiers on the Donegal border of Northern

Ireland, been pushed around at Checkpoint Charlie on

the old Berlin Wall, and been held up for bribes by

soldiers at the Atari crossing on Kipling's old "Grand

Trunk Road" between Lahore and Amritsar—the only stage

at which the Indo-Pakistan frontier can be legally

negotiated on land. In no case was it possible to lose

a sense of the surreal, as if the border was actually

carved into the air rather than the roadway. Rushdie

succeeds in weaving magical realism out of this in

Midnight's Children: "Mr Kemal, who wanted nothing to

do with Partition, was fond of saying, 'Here's proof

of the folly of the scheme! Those [Muslim] Leaguers

plan to abscond with a whole thirty minutes! Time

Without Partitions,' Mr Kemal cried, 'That's the

ticket!'"



There is a good deal of easy analysis on offer these

days, to the effect that Islam was the big loser from

colonialism, and is entitled to a measure of self-pity

in consequence. The evidence doesn't quite bear this

out. In India the British were openly partial to the

Muslim side, and helped to midwife the first modern

state consecrated to Islam. In Cyprus they favored the

Turks. In the Middle East the Muslim Hashemite and

Saudi dynasties—rivals for the guardianship of the

holy places—benefited as much as anyone from the

imperial carve-up. Had there been a British partition

of Eritrea after 1945, as was proposed, the Muslims

would have been the beneficiaries of it. No, the

Muslim claim is better stated as resentment over the

loss of the Islamic empire: an entirely distinct

grievance. There were Muslim losers in Palestine and

elsewhere, mostly among the powerless and landless,

but the big losers were those of all creeds and of

none who believed in modernity and had transcended

tribalism.



The largely secular Muslims of Bosnia and Kosovo were,

however, the main victims of the cave-in to partition

in the former Yugoslavia, and are now the chief

beneficiaries of that policy's reversal. They were

also among the first to test the improvised but

increasingly systematic world order, in which rescue

operations are undertaken from the developed world,

assisted by a nexus of nongovernmental organizations,

and then mutate into semi-permanent administrations.

"Empire" is the word employed by some hubristic

American intellectuals for this new dominion. A series

of uncovenanted mandates, for failed states or former

abattoir regimes, is more likely to be the real

picture. And the relevant boundaries still descend

from Sir Percy, Sir Henry, and Sir Cyril, who, as

Auden phrased it, "quickly forgot the case, as a good

lawyer must." However we confront this inheritance of

responsibility (should it be called the global man's

burden?), the British past is replete with lessons on

how not to discharge it.
  Reply
Well this is part history, but then IMO, fits in here ...



[url="http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/00119120012.htm"]http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/00119120012.htm[/url]



Top Stories

Nehru throws light on 'Panchsheel'

London, Oct. 19. (PTI): History Talking.com, an online oral history of the South Asian diasporas, run by a non- profit organisation has come across a rare interview India's first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had given to a Kenyan journalist of Indian origin during the Chinese war of 1962.



Asked to throw light on the future of the Panchsheel - the policy of peaceful coexistence with China - during the interview, Nehru cryptically said "Throwing light is now difficult, as the Chinese have spread darkness all over.



"How can I throw light on Panchsheel. By this war they have totally acted against the spirit of Panchsheel.



"Panchsheel cannot take place in the air or cannot be implemented by one side alone. It can only work if both countries agree to follow it. If the Chinese don't want to follow Panchsheel, it's finished," he said.



The interview was recorded by Chaman Lal Chaman, who was specially deputed by the Director-General of the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation, Patrick Jubb, from Kenya to cover the war.
  Reply
It looks like the KSA kings visit to Pakistan has a lot to do with the recent Pakistani rants against 'countering Phalcon's'. I mean the Pakis need $$$ to counter it. Hence their boss (accounts section, KSA) is visiting Pakistan. We must also keep an eye to see the another Paki boss, (Arms and strategies division, China). I think Pakis are begging for $$ and ARMS to counter Indo-Israeli weapons deal. Thus Pakistanis are trying to maintain the equal-equal by begging methods. :mad:



India's security concerns doesn't arise from the Saudi concerns. :mad:

[url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/articleshow?msid=241267"]S Arabia concerned over Indo-Israel defence ties[/url]



ISLAMABAD: Expressing concern over Israel "making inroads" into South Asia, Saudi Arabia on Sunday said that the emerging India-Israel military co-operation may fuel instability and arms race in the region.



Riyadh also promised to make all efforts to find a "just settlement" to the Kashmir issue.
  Reply
[url="http://sify.com/news/internet/fullstory.php?id=13287671&vsv=94"]A rare Nehru interview on History Talking.com[/url]



Sunday, 19 October , 2003, 13:49



History Talking.com, an online oral history of the South Asian diasporas, has come across a rare interview of country's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru given to a Kenyan journalist of Indian origin Chaman Lal Chaman during the Chinese war of 1962.



When the Chinese army marched across the Himalayas, India was shocked. In those days the biggest concentration of the NRIs was then in the East African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. And they were naturally worried and wanted to know what was actually happening to their country. But news from India was hard to come by. The Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation had sent Chaman to Delhi to cover the war.



During the visit, Chaman managed to record an interview with the Prime Minister Nehru.



It’s a remarkably transparent testament of Nehru’s frustration and sadness. Nevertheless, as the prime minister of a nation Nehru never missed an opportunity of inspiring, advising and teaching his people. When asked about the prevalent fears that this war could deteriorate into a full-scale war, Nehru focussed on fear rather than the war: "First of all I will advise people to throw out this fear from their hearts. They have to be ready for every situation. If you are afraid, your strength declines."



So will you be changing the direction of your policy towards China, asked Chaman? Nehru acknowledged that China was a powerful country, but then India was not a small country either. "We don’t want to fight or defeat China, we want to keep every part of India in our possession and that we shall do, whether it takes one year or two year or what ever time it takes. It is not a small task."



When the young reporter asked him to throw light on the future of the Panchsheel – the policy of peaceful coexistence with China, Nehru sounded slightly irritated: "Throwing light is now difficult, as the Chinese have spread darkness all over. (He laughs faintly and rather nervously). How can I throw light on Panchsheel? (He sounds irritated) By this war they have totally acted against the spirit of Panchsheel. Panchsheel cannot take place in the air or cannot be implemented by one side alone. It can only work if both countries agree to follow it. If the Chinese don’t want to follow Panchsheel, it’s finished."



Chaman’s weeklong broadcasts from New Delhi had electrified the people back in Kenya. As his flight landed in Nairobi he was driven straight to the Nairobi City Hall. "I was given a hero’s welcome. I told the waiting crowds that a hard pushed India needs resources to fight this war. There was instant rush for donations; particularly women gave their gold bangles, chains, and rings. When I returned home that evening, I found my wife without earrings. I instantly knew what she has done with them," said a smiling Chaman.
  Reply
[url="http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20031009/wl_sthasia_afp/asean_india_031009080807"]Relations between Southeast Asia and India blossom[/url]

[url="http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20031019/wl_sthasia_afp/apec_singapore_india_031019132934"]Singapore, India to sign free trade agreement next year[/url]

[url="http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20031008/wl_sthasia_afp/asean_031008114335"]ASEAN signs security and trade pacts with regional giants[/url]

[url="http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20031020/wl_sthasia_afp/india_srilanka_031020123144"]Sri Lankan PM discusses economic partnership pact with India[/url]
  Reply
Here is a BBC newsreport about US and Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan. Together with Kazakhstan, it has rich oil reserves. More important, a region ripe for proselytization activities. We cannot understand geopolitics without understanding this dimension of nexus between proselytizers and the military-industrial complex.



Remember what started the terror war? Operations of Usama Bin Laden (UBL) in the Fergana valley in Central Asia to establish a caliphate there. Baptists are active in the region converting muslims to christian faith. They have succeeded somewhat in Kyrgyzstan.



The next flash-point will be the Himalayan ranges which extend from Teheran in Iran to Hanoi in Vietnam. I will be happy to send the map of the ranges showing its strategic position (how do I post a map on the Forum? send me an email kalyan97@yahoo.com since I may not be seeing all the India-Forum website threads).



Work has already begun with air-drop joint exercises on the glaciers of Alaska and Leh (what else, between US-Bharat military forces) and most recently joint naval exercises off Cochin. Voice of America (VOA) is active with 90% of its resources dedicated to achieving a broken-up China (this is the target after the break-up of the Soviet Union). VOA has virtually wound up its Free Europe broadcasts. Imagine how safe Bharat will be if China breaks up into Mongolia, Xinxiang and Tibet.



The key position paper of India-Forum has to be on the Himalayan front.



Kalyanaraman





Vladimir Putin has opened Russia's first new foreign military base since the collapse of the Soviet Union.



Speaking on the one-year anniversary of a Moscow theatre siege by Chechen separatists, the Russian president said the base would strengthen regional security.



"That tragic event still hurts in our hearts and shows that terrorism is not an empty threat," Mr Putin said.



"By creating an air shield here in Kyrgyzstan, we intend to strengthen security in the region, whose stability has became a tangible factor affecting the development of the international situation," he said.



The BBC's Moscow correspondent, Damian Grammaticus, says Russia has chosen a highly strategic location for its first new foreign military base, reversing a decade of closures in places like Cuba and Vietnam.



The snow-capped Tienshan mountains rise to the south; beyond them is China. Afghanistan and Pakistan are a short flight away.



Russia says it wants to preserve stability in the region against threats like that posed by extremist Islamic groups.



But many believe it also wants to counter the growing influence of the United States.



Less than five minutes flying time from the Russian base is Manas airfield, which American aircraft have been using to support operations in Afghanistan since shortly after the 11 September, 2001, attacks.



The Russian Defence Ministry has insisted that the US should only stay in the area until the situation in Afghanistan stabilises.



The Americans say they have had no direct talks with the Russians about their new base and will leave issues like air traffic control up to the Kyrgyz authorities.

[url="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3206385.stm"]http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3206385.stm[/url]
  Reply
Kalyan, when posting an image, press the "IMG" button and type in the url.



Anyways if US ultimate intentions are to break up China, then it makes sense why they are mollycoddelling the Pakistani army.
  Reply
[url="http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipeline_timeline.htm"]http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipe...ne_timeline.htm[/url]



Some background information regarding the tussle between Bridas and Unocal over Turkmenistan's gas and oil reserves from 1992 to 1999. My comments are in italics.





Timeline of Competition between Unocal and Bridas for the Afghanistan Pipeline

World Press Review, December 2001



The Principal Players: Unocal | Bridas (Bridas has since merged with BP Amoco Argentina)



1992



January

Gas exploration rights for Yashlar block in eastern Turkmenistan awarded to Argentine firm; Bridas Production profits to be split 50- 50 between Bridas and Turkmenistan government.



1993



February

Bridas awarded Keimir Oil and Gas Block in western Turkmenistan. 75- 25 split in profits, in favor of Bridas.



March

President Niyazov of Turkmenistan hires Alexander Haig (former U.S. National Security Adviser) to lobby for increased U.S. investment in Turkmenistan. and for a softening of position on pipelines through Iran. Niyazov gets greedy and starts first of his many betrayals.

1994



September

Bridas prevented from exporting oil from Keimir Block. Robin Raphael in the State department becomes Haig's and Unocal's pointwoman. Thus, she starts overturning long standing US policy regarding Kashmir.





November

Working group established to study gas pipeline routes. Taliban capture Kandahar.



1995



January

Keimir Block deal is renegotiated. Bridas's share of profits reduced to 65 percent. Oil exports allowed. N's betrayal against Unocal



March

Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Turkmen president Niyazov conduct feasibility study of Afghan pipeline. This was going to be a Bridas pipeline ... thus leading to the eventual downfall of BB.



April

Turkmenistan and Iran to build first 180 miles of proposed pipeline via Iran to Turkey. United States oppose financing pipeline through Iran. Turkmen officials in Texas at invitation of Bridas. While there, they also meet meet Unocal officials.



August

Oil and gas discovered by Bridas at Yashlar. Bridas representatives meet Taliban for first time.



October

President Niyazov signs agreement in New York with Unocal/Delta.



December

Ban on Bridas's oil exports from Keimir imposed by Turkmenistan for second time. N's second betrayal of Bridas





1996



February

Agreement between Afghan government and Bridas signed. Suit filed by Bridas in Texas against Unocal/Delta for interference in its business in Turkmenistan.



March

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Tom Simmons, urges Bhutto to give exclusive rights to Unocal. Bhutto offended and demands apology. There is really interesting story about this encounter



May

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agree that Turkmenistan should name the consortium to build the pipeline. Opening of 100-mile railway route linking Turkmenistan and Iran.



August

Unocal/Delta and Turkmenistan's Turkmenrosgaz along with Russia's Gazprom enter into agreement for pipeline project. Delta is wholly owned by the Saudis, who would prefer to keep the Central Asian gas and oil reserves off the market, so there is a contradiction in their actions.



September

Unocal says it will give aid to to Afghan warlords once they agree to form a council to supervise the project. Taliban take Kabul.



October

Unocal expresses suport for Taliban takover, saying it makes pipeline project easier. Unocal later says it was misquoted.



November

Bridas signs agreement with Taliban and Gen. Dostum to build pipeline. President Leghari fires PM Benazir Bhutto on Nov. 5, 1996



December

Turkey to buy Turkmen gas through Iran.



1997



January

Turkmenistan signs exploration agreement with Mobil and Monument Oil. U.N. Under Secretary General Akashi criticizes oil companies and warlords for pipeline projects.



February

Taliban in Washington to seek recognition. Taliban meet with Unocal. Taliban travel to Argentina as guests of Bridas. Upon return, Taliban meet with Saudi Intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faysal, in Jeddah. Saudis' man, Nawaz Sharif wins by a huge landslide on Feb 3, 1997



March

Unocal sets up office in Kandahar; Bridas does likewise in Kabul.



April

Taliban announce criteria for awarding contract: The company that starts work first wins.



Unocal President John Imle baffled by statement.



June

Unocal says peace is necessary for construction of pipeline, otherwise the project could take years. Bridas officials meet Taliban and say that they are interested in beginning work in any kind of security situation.



July

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Unocal sign new contract extending Unocal's deadline by one year to start project by December 1998. In a policy shift, United Staes says it will not object to Turkmenisatn- Turkey pipeline through Iran. They really get desperate ... imagine that US will ok a pipeline through Iran just for 10 billion dollars for Unocal. I think India should offer Haliburton few billion dollars (out of their 80 billion dollar FDI kitty) to build a pipeline through POK on one condition. India has to possess the POK. I bet that the Americans will turn on a dime.



August

Shell's Alan Parsley meets Niyazov and promises help on Turkmenistan- Turkey pipeline. Taliban say Bridas offer better terms and expect to enter into agreement with them. Richard Armitage, the current Deputy Secretary of State contracted by Unocal to work on Central Asia pipeline interests. Unocal also hires Robert Oakley and Zalmay Khalilzad to their cause.



September

Turkmenistan opens tenders for oil companies to take up new concessions along the Caspian. Niyazov, 57, has heart operation in Munich concern grows about his health, and who would replace him should he die. Bridas sells 60 percent of the company's stakes in Latin America to Amoco. The two agree to form a new company to run operations jointly. Taliban delegation in Argentina to discuss pipeline deal with Bridas. Remember that the Pashtuns for all their faults stand by their word. Unlike Niyazov, they honor the treaties they sign ... which eventually leads to their downfall.



October

Taliban delegation visits Ashkhbad and agrees to set up tripartite commission with Pakistan and Turkmenistan to explore Unocal pipeline project. Centgas Pipeline Ltd. formed in Ashkhabad: Unocal owns 46.5 percent, Delta Oil owns 15 percent, Turkmenistan's national gas company owns 7 percent, Itochu Oil owns 6.5 percent, Inpex owns 6.5 percent, Crescent Group owns 3.5 percent, Hyundai Engineering owns 5 percent. Taliban undecided which consortium to join.



November

Taliban in United States to visit Unocal and U.S. State Department officials.



December

Turkmenistan and Iran inaugarate 120-mile-long gas pipeline between the two countries.



1998



January

Bridas awarded US$50 million by International Court of Arbitration in Paris for money owed by Turkmen government for refined products provided to Keimir refinery.



February

Gazprom pulls out of Unocal consortium, shares re- distributed, giving Unocal 54 percent.



March

Unocal says pipeline on hold as unfeasible because of Afghan war. Turkmenistan anxious for work to begin soon. Unocal asks Pakistan to extend deadline to October 1998. Deadline cannot be met, says Unocal, because of Afghan civil war.



May

Pakistan lights their Chinese firecrackers and have sanctions put on them. US decides to strangle Pakistan's economy. So Unocal is encouraged to pull out.



June

Objections to Afghan pipeline deal by some shareholders at Unocal's annual meeting. Unocal says it has spent US$10-15 million on the project since 1995 and intends to give US$1 million to Afghan charities in 1998.



August

Aug 7, 1998 bombings against US embassies. Clinton orders strikes against Pakistan terrorist camps in Afghanistan killing a bunch of ISI officers and almost killing OBL. After U.S. missile strikes against Afghanistan, Unocal suspends pipeline project and asks American staff to leave. on Aug 22.



September

Environmentalists in California ask Attorney General to dissolve Unocal for crimes against humanity, the environment, and for its relationship with the Taliban.



October

A Texas judge dismisses Bridas's US$15 billion suit against Unocal for preventing them developing gas fields in Turkmenistan. Judge says dispute covered by Turkmen and Afghan law, not Texas law. Judge Brady Elliott.



November

Unocal withdraws from a US$2.9 billion pipeline project to bring natural gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey.



December

Citing low oil prices, concerns over Osama bin Laden, and pressure from women's groups, Unocal withdraws from Afghan pipeline consortium. Unocal also announces a 40 percent drop in capital spending for 1999 because of low oil prices. leaving the Pakistan high and dry



1999



January

Turkmenistan's foreign minister visits Pakistan; says pipeline project still alive.



February

Carlos Bulgheroni, co-chairman of Bridas, visits Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia for talks with leaders.



March

Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Sheikh Muradov meets with Mullah Omar in Kandahar to discuss pipeline.



April

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Taliban sign agreement to revive pipeline project.



May

Taliban delegation signs agreements with Turkmenistan to buy gas and electricity. Pakis intrude into Kargil.
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Image from Dr. Kalyan.



[Image: himalaya2.jpg]
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Very informative link O.V
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[url="http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper822.html"]MY JERUSALEM DIARY [/url]

B.Raman
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How does it all figure with relation to the Shanghai Five?
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India must not overlook another rogue nation on our borders, Bangladesh. It is evident and history is witness that India lost many of its brave sons and daughters to protect the Bengali culture and to put an end to largest genocide since Nazis in WWII.



Logic would have dictated that this nation would always remember the help and commitment of India. Instead, today this nation has been gripped with Anti-Hindu and anti-Indian policies.



Bangladesh has now become a breeding ground for formenting terrorist activities inside Indian border. Bangladesh is being pomped by China and Pakistan. We must not overlook the fact that this tiny enclave will one become a huge problem for our coming generations. We must effectively deal with Bangladesh as well.



Gill Confusedkull
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[url="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2003-daily/04-11-2003/main/main16.htm"]‘Pakistan not concerned about China-India ties’[/url]

BEIJING: Foreign Minister Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri on Monday said Islamabad had no concerns about China’s warming ties with India, saying Beijing was a close friend that it trusted.



"We don’t worry at all. The best test of that is not what you say or I say but what the Chinese say," he said in an interview with the BBC. "The Chinese say our relationship is one of a kind, so why should we be worried. China is a very close friend of Pakistan."



"Recently there has been greater interaction between India and China and we feel that is a positive development," said Kasuri. He denied that Pakistan was simply a dumping ground for Chinese-made military hardware, saying the country’s defence industry had proved it was self-sufficient. "Nothing could be farther from the truth," he said when asked the question.



"Thanks to US sanctions on Pakistan for the last eight or 10 years, not only we are self sufficient but we are exporting armaments all over the world. We have entered into treaties for selling basic armaments. We are self-reliant. And our relationship with China is excellent and it is mutually beneficial," the foreign minister added.



_________________

I can only add, Pakis are now worried. Good going between India and China
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[url="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-11/02/content_1156474.htm"]Japan considers joining ASEAN security pact[/url]
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This is where the Indian Ocean area begins. [url="http://www.dataxinfo.com/hormuz/"]http://www.dataxinfo.com/hormuz/[/url] With a large number of Bharatiya-s in the states surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and in Sabah (Malaysia), also in the Indian Ocean zone, this warning should be taken seriously by all NRIs.



Kalyanaraman



Britain warns of terror threats

Saturday, November 8, 2003 Posted: 1826 GMT ( 2:26 AM HKT)





DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (CNN) -- The British government is warning of "high threats" of terrorism against Westerners and other targets in the Gulf-Arab nations of Bahrain and Qatar.



Eyewitnesses in Bahrain confirmed to CNN that there is a tightening of security around the British Embassy and other Western sites. But a British Embassy spokeswoman said security has not been increased and security personnel are following normal procedures.



On Friday, the U.S. Embassy and consulates in Saudi Arabia were ordered closed temporarily because of concerns that terrorists may be planning to launch an attack inside the kingdom.



In travel alerts Saturday on the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Web site, it says "We judge that there is a high threat from terrorism against Western, including British, targets.



"We are particularly concerned about potential threats to places where Westerners might gather. You should review your security arrangements carefully. You should remain vigilant, particularly in public places."



The alerts said "developments in Iraq and on the Middle East peace process continue to have an impact on local public opinion in the region and this might be expressed by some people.



"You should follow news reports and be alert to regional developments. You should take sensible precautions for your personal safety and avoid public gatherings and demonstrations."



The British government has also issued lower-level terror alerts for Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, saying there are "significant" threats of terror in those countries.



An advisory put out Friday by the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh explained that the embassy "continues to receive credible information that terrorists in Saudi Arabia have moved from the planning to operational phase of planned attacks in the kingdom."



The closures affect the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and consulates in Jeddah and Dhahran. The advisory said they would be closed Saturday. One State Department official said they would remain closed Sunday and Monday.



The intelligence does not suggest any specific target or time, but officials said they assume American diplomatic and military facilities in Saudi Arabia would be high on terrorists' list of desired targets.



Officials said the intelligence includes "chatter on Web sites" and comments on publicly released audiotapes of al Qaeda leaders, as well as other information that has been gathered.



Another reason for concern about possible attacks, U.S. officials said, is that the Muslim holy month of Ramadan began last week.



The U.S. government has been working with Saudi authorities to fight terror since the triple bombings in May that targeted apartment complexes housing Westerners. Those bombings left 23 people dead, including nine Americans. Twelve bombers were also killed.



During the closures, U.S. diplomats will be reviewing security measures, explained the official.



Americans in the country will be informed when the review is done and the U.S. mission plans to go back to normal operations, the advisory said.



Also this week, the State Department warned of threats of anti-American violence in the Middle East and North Africa, "including terrorist actions that may involve commercial aircraft and maritime interests."



The public announcement specifically mentioned the risk of such actions in the Middle East, including the Red Sea area, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa.



And it reminded Americans about the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, especially urging them to avoid the Malaysian state of Sabah.



[url="http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/11/08/british.warning/index.html"]http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/11...ning/index.html[/url]
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India's `Pamir Knot'



By C. Raja Mohan





NEW DELHI Nov. 10. As the peripatetic Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, heads out on a three-nation tour this week, the most exciting part of the trip should be in the land of the Pamirs — Tajikistan.



Mr. Vajpayee's flight path would hopefully give him a spectacular view of the Pamir Knot from which some of the world's greatest mountain ranges — the Hindu Kush, Kunlun, Karakorum, and Tian Shan — radiate out in different directions.



Besides the Pamir Knot, the tightening geopolitical plot in Central Asia should be at the top of Mr. Vajpayee's agenda as he makes the first-ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Tajikistan.



Unlike some of its luckier neighbours in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Tajikistan does not have oil or natural gas. Mountainous Tajikistan has certain assets of its own — gold and uranium. But more importantly, it has a unique location.



But for the deliberately carved out sliver of territory called the Wakhan corridor in Eastern Afghanistan that was inserted between the British and Russian empires, Tajikistan would have shared a formal boundary with the subcontinent. It shares the most fertile part of the region — the Fergana valley — with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.



Sitting on top of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and sharing a long boundary with eastern frontier with China, Tajikistan could serve the same function as the Pamir Knot — the fulcrum of regional geopolitics.



Although India moved quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union to engage the newly independent republics, it was Tajikistan that drew real close to India and became New Delhi's natural ally in Central Asia.



The Indo-Tajik strategic relationship included joint support to the Northern Alliance that resisted the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. High-level political visits from India to Tajikistan were made difficult by a bloody civil war that had hobbled the nation until the late 1990s.



Mr. Vajpayee's visit to Tajikistan has been long overdue. One hopes the results from his visit will more than make up for the delay.





* * *

Meanwhile, Central Asia appears to be entering a new phase of strategic engagement with the great powers. As part of its war on terrorism after September 11, 2001, the United States established its military presence in many parts of the region.



At that time, Washington said that American military bases in Central Asia were temporary. Given the uncertain results from the American war on terrorism, and the inability to finish off the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban remnants in Afghanistan, it is now widely assumed that U.S. military is here to stay for a long time.



Russia, which seemed to cede ground to the U.S. throughout the 1990s, has under the assertive leadership of its President, Vladimir Putin, has begun to reclaim its right to be the principal security manager in Central Asia.



For the first time since the demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow last month unveiled a military base outside Russian territory at Kant in Kyrgyzstan. The Russian airbase is not too far from the Manas military facility at Ganci that the American forces use! Russian and Kyrgyz officials say there is no political contradiction between the two military bases.



The mere 30 km that separate American and Russian military facilities in Kyrgyzstan is symbolic of the new Central Asian geopolitics. Along with the awareness of the new threats to their security after September 11, there was an acute consciousness among the Central Asian regimes that they do not have the military capabilities to defend themselves.



External assistance was clearly needed; and the American enthusiasm for Central Asia after September 11 was welcomed in the region.



But none of the regimes want to tie their future to the whims and fancies of one great power. Diversification of security dependence, then, has become the new mantra for the region.



Besides America and Russia, the Central Asian Governments have been quite happy to expand their engagement with China which has begun to conduct frequent military exercises with the nations of the region.





* * *

The Government of India has rubbished speculation that it has established a military base at Farkhor in Tajikistan. The media reports, which have acquired a life of their own since last year, have also been denied by the Tajik Government.



But neither side denies their growing military links. The Indian military engagement with the Tajiks is said to be in the fields of training, high-level exchanges, the transfer of equipment and help in building some military facilities.



There are reports, for example, that India has agreed to reconstruct a former Soviet airbase at Aini in the suburbs of the Tajik capital Dushanbe.



The two sides, however, insist that there is no deployment of Indian military personnel or the establishment of a military base in Tajikistan.



India's military involvement with Tajikistan appears part of a new Indian forward policy in Central Asia.



Last week, the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, was in Kyrgyzstan offering help in mountain warfare. Moving on to Kazakhstan, Mr. Fernandes was promising the nation to build naval capabilities to defend its oil installations in the energy-rich Caspian sea.





* * *

For India, Central Asia means more than the former Soviet Republics. The term always included Tibet and Xinjiang in China and Mongolia. A great Indian who raised the nation's standing in Mongolia passed away last week without much notice in the capital.



Kyabje Bakula Rinpoche, one of the world's most venerated Buddhist figures, died on November 4 at the age of 86. Bakula Rinpoche was one of those extraordinary men who could straddle across many incompatible worlds with grace and distinction.



Bakula Rinpoche was one of the last surviving members of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly.



He served as a member of the State legislature during 1957-67, Minister from 1953-67, and as a Member of Parliament during 1967-77.



Until a few years ago, he served as India's ambassador to Mongolia. As a Buddhist monk, he was more of a godly figure in that nation than a mere plenipotentiary of another government. The Mongolians called him "Elchin Bagsha" — the teacher ambassador.



[url="http://www.hindu.com/2003/11/11/stories/2003111101861200.htm"]Link[/url]
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[url="http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Bangla_news/bangla072.htm"]http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Ban...s/bangla072.htm[/url]



Please I urge members that the link contains some horrific pictures. The link provided is to strongly present my case that Bangladesh will emerge as a potential security threat in next 10 years.



Question that needs to be asked is are we going to let Bangladesh go through the same steps by which Pakistan is finally taken over by Jihadis?



Gill <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/sad.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='Sad' />
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