Nuclear Deterrence

[Arun_S]

Wah wah Hillary Clinton,



and PM Man Mohan Singh is towing his masters commands on flight to Brazil to join Pakistan as an equal.







URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2010/04/11/stori...801200.htm



[size="4"][color="blue"] [url="http://www.thehindu.com/2010/04/11/stories/2010041158801200.htm"]Hillary: India, Pakistan have upset nuclear deterrent balance[/url][/color][/size]

Narayan Lakshman

11/04/2010

‘U.S. working with both countries to ensure that their stockpiles are safeguarded' The risk of a nuclear attack has increased



U.S. to boost funding for maintaining weapons stockpile



WASHINGTON DC: India and Pakistan have pursued nuclear weapons “in a way that has upset the balance of nuclear deterrent,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Friday.



That was why the United States was working with both countries “very hard to try to make sure that their nuclear stockpiles are well tended to, and that they participate with us in trying to limit the number of nuclear weapons,” she said.



Speaking at at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, Ms. Clinton argued that the nature of the nuclear threat had changed. “As President Obama has said, the risk of a nuclear attack has actually increased. And the potential consequences of mishandling this challenge are deadly.” Nuclear terrorism presented a different challenge, but the consequences would still be devastating, she said.



Doomsday scenario



Highlighting the growing threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation a few days ahead of the 47-nation Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, Ms. Clinton illustrated what a doomsday scenario would look like, given these risks. “A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb detonated in Times Square in New York City could kill a million people. Many more would suffer from the haemorrhaging and weakness that comes from radiation sickness.”



In the light of these risks, Ms. Clinton outlined three main elements of the U.S.'s strategy to safeguard itself and its allies from nuclear attacks: support for the basic framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); a global effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material and enhance nuclear security; and efforts to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for the U.S. itself.



Disarmament move



As for the impact of the new U.S.-Russia START on countries where non-proliferation challenges remained, Ms. Clinton said she did not suggest that moves towards disarmament by the U.S. and Russia would convince Iran or North Korea to change their behaviour. “But ask yourselves, can our efforts help…persuade other nations to support serious sanctions against Iran? I believe they could.”



Following the recently announced Nuclear Posture Review and its implications for military expenditure, the Secretary said: “Our budget devotes $7 billion to maintaining our nuclear weapons stockpile and complex…And over the next five years, we intend to boost funding for these important activities by more than $5 billion.”

[Arun_S]

Sunday, April 11, 2010



[url="http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C04%5C11%5Cstory_11-4-2010_pg1_6"]Pakistan fully qualified for civil nuclear cooperation: FO[/url]

* Spokesman says Pakistan’s nuclear installations fully protected, secure



ISLAMABAD: Highly trained manpower and a well established foolproof safety and security culture fully qualified Pakistan for equal participation in civil nuclear cooperation at the international level, Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit said during a weekly briefing at the FO.



To a question on civil nuclear energy, he said Pakistan considers nuclear safety, security and safeguards vehicles for facilitating international civil nuclear cooperation. He said the country needed access to civilian nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis. About Iran’s nuclear issue, Basit said, “Pakistan believes all countries should have the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”



He said nuclear power generation offered viable solutions for energy security and addressing climate change. He further reiterated that Pakistan’s nuclear installations were fully protected and secured under foolproof security layers.



Meanwhile, Basit also said any future meeting between Pakistan and India depends on Indian response to the proposal and roadmap submitted during the secretary-level talks. app

[Guest]

Islamic world is trying to put pressure on Jew world on Nukes. Next they will target Hindu World.



Israel is already boycotting 46 countries Nuke conference.

India's appointed PM will toe his master's wishes.

[neel.vohra]

Raking back up an important issue. Where has Santhanam disappeared? Why is he quiet for so long now?

[Arun_S]

Good move to circumvent the NPT and play in its own class.



[url="http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_india-to-set-up-global-centre-for-nuclear-energy-partnership-pm_1371059"]India to set up Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership: PM[/url]

PTI Tuesday, April 13, 2010 22:04



Washington, DC: Demonstrating India's responsible behaviour, prime minister Manmohan Singh today announced setting up of a '[color="#0000ff"]Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership' for conducting research and development of design systems that are secure, proliferation resistant and sustainable.[/color]



As soon as Singh made the announcement at the Nuclear Security Summit, US President Barack Obama intervened to welcome it, saying "this will be one more tool to establish best practises" in the quest for nuclear safety.



Addressing the Summit convened by Obama here, Singh said the Centre will consist of four schools dealing with Advanced Nuclear Energy System Studies, Nuclear Security, Radiation Safety and application of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technology in areas of healthcare, agriculture and food.



The Centre is visualised to be a state-of-the-art facility based on international participation from IAEA and other interested foreign partners.



It will conduct research and development of design systems that are intrinsically safe, secure, proliferation resistant and sustainable, the prime minister told leaders from 47 countries.



Singh invited participation in the venture by other countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make the Centre's work a success.



India is continually upgrading technology to develop nuclear systems that are intrinsically safe, secure and proliferation resistant. It recently developed an Advanced Heavy Water Reactor based on Low Enriched Uranium and thorium with new safety and proliferation-resistant features.



As a founder member of the IAEA, India has consistently supported the central role of the UN nuclear watchdog in facilitating national efforts to strengthen nuclear security and in fostering effective international cooperation.



India has so far conducted nine Regional Training Courses on Nuclear Security in cooperation with the IAEA.



The objective of the School of Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems Studies would be to pursue design studies and analysis of advanced nuclear energy systems with features to achieve intrinsically enhanced safety, security, proliferation resistance and sustainability.



The programme modules will encompass reactor systems and applications, fuel cycle studies, accelerator driven systems, risk assessment studies, emergency planning and management and sustainability parameters assessment.

[Shaurya]

[quote name='NeelV' date='13 April 2010 - 09:18 AM' timestamp='1271167814' post='105870']

Raking back up an important issue. Where has Santhanam disappeared? Why is he quiet for so long now?

[/quote] What do you want him to do or say. He has said as much, probably more than he wanted to already. There is nothing more to do or say, at least in public.

[ramana]

[quote name='Mudy' date='11 April 2010 - 04:40 AM' timestamp='1270960329' post='105832']

Islamic world is trying to put pressure on Jew world on Nukes. Next they will target Hindu World.



Israel is already boycotting 46 countries Nuke conference.

India's appointed PM will toe his master's wishes.

[/quote]





Its because the new adminsitration sees

Muslim world = Sunni Wahabi Arab world



Seeing this mis perception the SWA(Rs) are making the US take care of their challengers.

[sai_k]

The objectives laid by a global research initiatives would not carry much weight.. even more so in the areas of Thorium based research. It is a nice thing to say and announce, but it would be just to near impossible for America and it allies to work with us on a global initiatives. The very ego nature and more than that, India not being part of P5 itself makes it a down-rated nation to be doing something like that.



Punching the event, should have been, MMS announcing that we have thrown open our latest technology for the world, especially using Th resources.. with an advanced reactor. I hope, we are on the right path, and we would soon start seeing to realize Bhaba's dreams, and thorium power starts functioning.



I hope we are very near to that state, where the P5 deals us with respect in terms of our capability and maturity rather associating with pakistan every other second. The P5 nation needs to be thought a lesson, and for this India must be economically so strong, that they just can't ignore us.



Demonstrating to the world is better than asking someone, hey, I have a plan, do you want to join? Well, not in this area, and not definitely from P5 nations.



Why waste time?

[Guest]

I read parts of Bharat Karnad's book "India's nuclear policy"...This is a very interesting book. There was an interesting excerpt on fissile production. He cites responsible sources who tell him that from about 2001 onwards, many CANDUs were used for low burn mode Pu production - and that this led to a drop in the power they supplied to the grid. This is very interesting. Apparently this practise seems to have continued in the MMS regime. If true, it means that the NPA estimates of India's WGPu production go for a six: BK says that by 2010-2012, fiss. mat. for 200+ warheads is to be accumulated. He repeated cites 200 + reserves as the force that will be fielded by 2012. This is consistent with 5-7% of CANDU output being used for this purpose.



The book also remarks that this was done to hedge against early FMCT. Which means that soon, the main issue will be testing to perfect a TN. BK writes in the book that in spite of the N-deal, the issue is not if - but when. What do you say, Arunji ?

[Arun_S]

As for CANDU in low burn mode, pls refer to



India Research Foundations:



[size="3"][url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf"]Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program: Arun Sharma[/url][/size]



I had envisioned it my assessment 4 years ago before Bharat Karnad sahib's latest magnum opus was published last year.



As regarding FMTC the pivitol issue is not just having low burn spent fuel but having reprocessed and extrated the WgPu in explicit pre-FMTC stockpile. No evidence that is happenign under MMS watch.



Secondly 200 fission warheads with their limited yield is equivalent to being "Half Pregnent" nuclear deterrence; IOW there is no such thing unless the yield of those 200 warheads is in "High Yield" class, or the number of warheads and delivery vehicles have to to be increased by ~ 3 to 4 times.



The current Indian deterrence based on puny delivery capability (as of now) is less then "Half Pregnent Detrrence" it deters nobody. Not even Terrorist Pakistan !

India Research Foundation



[size="3"]Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program:[/size][size="3"]

Will it make available more indigenous Uranium reserve for Indian Weapons Program?[/size]



Introduction

On July-18,2005 President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in a major breakthrough announced

an agreement on ‘Global Strategic Partnership’ involving many sub-agreements, including civil

nuclear energy cooperation, whose details were further agreed on March 2, 2006. The civil

nuclear power cooperation envisages United States to remove sanctions legislated by US

Congress in 1978 on nuclear fuel and power-plant technology, and work with US lead NSG to

accommodate nuclear fuel supply for Indian civilian nuclear plants. India in turn will separate its

strategic facilities from civilian facilities and put all current & future civilian nuclear power plants

and facilities under site specific IAEA safeguards.



Some opponents of this agreement have argued that India has small Uranium reserve thus

letting India purchase nuclear fuel supply for civilian power plants from NSG will somehow help

Indian nuclear weapons program by making available greater fraction of indigenous Uranium

reserve for military nuclear weapons program.



Assessment

Let us look at facts to understand merit of this argument.

1. Indian strategic nuclear weapons use approximately 3 Kg Plutonium.



2. India has large un-safeguarded Plutonium stockpile (conservatively estimated to between

3,000 Kg and 6,000Kg), a fraction of that will suffice to make hundreds of nuclear weapons if

India choose to exercise the option.



3. [color="#0000ff"]Indian PHWR reactors that are outside IAEA safeguard when operated for efficient power

generation would have cumulatively required just 5,842 tonnes. India is estimated to have

mined about 9,200 tonnesI of natural-uranium, indicating that about 55%II of the fuel and 8%

of its reactor capacity was used in low fuel burn mode, generally associated with operating

the reactors in mode optimized to generate weapon grade Plutonium. This corresponds to

about 2,400Kg weapon grade Plutonium enough for 800 strategic nuclear weapon.[/color]



4. Current Indian reserves of uranium estimated between 77,500 – 94,000 metric tonnes,

enough to support 12,000 MWe power generation for 50 yearsIII.



5. Current Indian PHWR reactors that are outside IAEA safeguard annually require 116 tonnes

of natural-uranium when operated in a mode optimized for power generation. When

operated in a mode optimized to generate weapon-grade Plutonium they require just 747

tonnes of natural-uranium annually, in the process they generate 745 Kg weapon grade

Plutonium, which is enough for 248 nuclear weapons per year.

From above one can clearly see that there is no merit in the argument that US-India civilian

nuclear agreement will be of any consequence to Indian nuclear weapons programs.



Conclusion

In conclusion the Indo-US agreement on civil nuclear reactors does not help Indian military

program:



1. India already has fissile material enough to make more than 800 warheads.



2. Its Fast Breeder Reactors can generate limitless fissile material for weapons or civilian

applications.



Date: 02-May-2006 Author: Arun Sharma

For Appendix pls see teh original PDF linked above

[Guest]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='14 April 2010 - 09:45 AM' timestamp='1271259438' post='105900']

As for CANDU in low burn mode, pls refer to



India Research Foundations:



[size="3"][url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf"]Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program: Arun Sharma[/url][/size]



I had envisioned it my assessment 4 years ago before Bharat Karnad sahib's latest magnum opus was published last year.



As regarding FMTC the pivitol issue is not just having low burn spent fuel but having reprocessed and extrated the WgPu in explicit pre-FMTC stockpile. No evidence that is happenign under MMS watch.



Secondly 200 fission warheads with their limited yield is equivalent to being "Half Pregnent" nuclear deterrence; IOW there is no such thing unless the yield of those 200 warheads is in "High Yield" class, or the number of warheads and delivery vehicles have to to be increased by ~ 3 to 4 times.



The current Indian deterrence based on puny delivery capability (as of now) is less then "Half Pregnent Detrrence" it deters nobody. Not even Terrorist Pakistan !





For Appendix pls see teh original PDF linked above

[/quote]





BK also says in the same book says the following



1. By 2010, sizeable nos. of A-II AND A-III will be available. I would make this 2012 taking into account our tendency to run behind schedule.



2. 2010 was the time frame for the 200+ number (again, make it 2012). He clearly indicated that this is an intermediate step in the deterrent development. The actual number aimed for in the long term is at least twice this according to BK



3. "Sizeable nos." still does not probably mean 200 or so. Our delivery capability will keep up with warhead numbers only if we induct MIRVs. For this another series of A-III and A-V tests will be reqd. This is especially true if we are constricted by lack of testing to limited yield warheads.



4. Even K Subrahmanyam regards MIRVs as an essential part of our doctrine.



5. BK also cites PKI saying our reprocessing rate has crossed a threshold that NPAs like ashley tellis thought was not possible. I also remember some years ago in a Frontline article about a strike at a kalpakkam reproc. facility : the unions were accusing the authorities of neglecting safety in their hurry to reprocess.



6. All this goes to show that NPAs for sure have no accurate idea of howmuch wpn. grd. fissile material we may have separated. They can only speculate. After all, in principle we have a capacity of >250tHM/year ~ 200-250 kg of WGPu/yr. Not all of this may have been used for WGPu itself.



7. Makes sense to manufacture large nos. of the corrected TN and put them atop MIRVs. When the opportunity arises, testing will then upgrade the deterrent from a minimum creduble one to a hefty one.

[Arun_S]

[quote name='Kritavarma' date='15 April 2010 - 10:14 PM' timestamp='1271349361' post='105920']



4. Even K Subrahmanyam regards MIRVs as an essential part of our doctrine.

[/quote]



Could you please substantiate the above with the source/article?

[Guest]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='17 April 2010 - 04:02 PM' timestamp='1271541251' post='105956']

Could you please substantiate the above with the source/article?

[/quote]



http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/...ssile.html



Read the last few lines. I also remember reading KS saying that min. cred. deterrent. was never meat to have anything less than a 3 digit number of warheads.



BK also writes in his book that it is not "If" we will test again but "when". Surprising, given our political situation. If testing is constrained, MIRVs become even more important.

[sai_k]

perhaps, Santanam ji is silent 'cause we are in a messed up situation (babudom) to take this up. we could have had a psychological advantage enemies (main landers) thinking about 6 200Kt in a MIRV hitting them, had we not declared moratorium and continued on.. but our economic might and lotus flower bearings are not projected correct by our babooze.



The faster we change our babooze, the better would our nuclear deterrence appear. But, we might want to hide under their foolishness for some more time.

[Arun_S]

Massive amount of arm twisting behind the scene to snuff dissent of the insider.

[Guest]

That can be always expected. Once the news item shifts away from mainstream news, the potato mashers move in.

[Arun_S]

[url="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303695604575183071648257784.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines"]India's Nuclear Example [/url]

APRIL 14, 2010



Delhi is trying to manage its arsenal responsibly. It deserves respect, and some help.



By [url="http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=RORY+MEDCALF&bylinesearch=true"]RORY MEDCALF[/url]

U.S. President Barack Obama's nuclear-security summit this week raised speculation in the media once again about a South Asian arms race. There is understandably deep concern in [color="#0000ff"]many capitals about the apparent acceleration of Pakistan's production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, a potential source of leakage to terrorists.[/color] But the implication that India is also participating in some sort of unbridled nuclear-arms race needs to be treated with caution. In fact, in some ways New Delhi's nuclear-weapons posture could be the model to which President Obama's new policy of American nuclear restraint aspires.



India appears to be shaping—through choice as much as necessity—a minimum credible nuclear deterrent. Publicly available estimates of its arsenal size suggest that the second most populous nation in the world, located in a dangerous regional neighborhood and with two nuclear-armed neighbors, [color="#0000ff"]has only tens of nuclear warheads at its disposal, perhaps none of them thermonuclear[/color]. By comparison, the United States has about 2,700 deployed strategic warheads, and Russia has around 3,900. Both countries also have substantial tactical stockpiles—yet both are presenting their new treaty to reduce those figures to 1,550 apiece as a great leap for disarmament.



New Delhi has, by and large, a declared "no first use" nuclear-weapons policy. [color="#0000ff"]India qualified this policy in 2003 to reserve the right for India to strike back at chemical or biological attacks—a stance which the U.S. is now beginning to move away from. But India's nuclear doctrine remains overwhelmingly defensive and focused on deterrence.[/color]



Of all the nuclear-armed states, India has been the most active in promoting global agreement on no first use—including through bilateral and multilateral treaties—and on negative security assurances, or guarantees not to strike non-nuclear states. [color="#0000ff"]Even China, the most self-righteous doctrinal champion of no first use, has rejected India's overtures for a bilateral pact, not wishing to be seen to bestow any form of nuclear legitimacy on a power it likes to pretend is not a rival.[/color]



Questions remain about the effectiveness of New Delhi's deterrent, and its likely need to enhance, if not expand, the arsenal. Ultimately, [color="#800080"]a no-first-use policy can be credible only if it is accompanied by what security wonks like to call an "assured second-strike capability." In other words, India needs to be confident that enough of its assets would survive an enemy's first strike for New Delhi to be able to retaliate.[/color]



The best chance of assuring second-strike capability comes from a submarine-based deterrent, and that is exactly what New Delhi has slowly and unevenly been pursuing over the years. Progress is finally being made on this front, with sea trials of an indigenously produced nuclear-powered submarine—presumably with Russian help, indirect or otherwise—and advances toward developing a suitable missile, albeit with short range.



But India is, at the very least, years away from being able to use submarines to deter its two potential nuclear adversaries, Pakistan or China. Though many arms-control scholars might not like to acknowledge it, India's eventual success in fashioning such a strategic tool might just end up being a net benefit for strategic stability in Asia as China increases its power, reach and confidence.



In the meantime, Pakistan's efforts to expand its arsenal could be seen as a bid to gain not just parity but even nuclear superiority over India. This is especially troubling given the context of the Pakistani army's continued forbearance, if not support, for the use of Pakistan's territory as a base for terrorism against Indian targets, despite India's conventional military advantage.



So it is surprising how relaxed the Indian effort at expanding its nuclear capability continues to be. Of course, this could change, were New Delhi genuinely to see nuclear weapons as its top national defense priority—in other words, were India to adopt the Cold War superpowers' arms-race mentality.



Paradoxically, treating India as part of the proliferation problem, rather than part of the solution, may only encourage New Delhi down such a dire path. Closer U.S.-India strategic ties are needed partly as a way of giving India the sort of strategic confidence it needs to keep its arsenal small.



Some critics of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal argue that it has helped drive nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, by "freeing up" for weapons purposes parts of India's small domestic atomic-energy infrastructure. After all, although the deal puts a growing majority of India's reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, New Delhi has declined to allow such "safeguards" to be enacted for its experimental fast-breeder program and eight indigenous power reactors, though they are far from ideal for bomb making.



However, Pakistan's actual behavior and India's potential behavior are very different things. Treating them with artificial equivalence, in the old hyphenated way, is a sure way to alienate India from the U.S. nuclear arms control and security endeavors.



[color="#0000ff"]Of all the powers, India was the one most short-changed by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[/color] The world can no longer afford to leave it out of the nonproliferation and nuclear security tent, which is why it was a relief that even though the media talked about it, a South Asian nuclear arms race remained off the official agenda in Washington this week.



Mr. Medcalf directs the international security program at the Lowy Institute in Sydney.

[laltaputu]

http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/2010...front.html



is this report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) credible

if it is they why are we lagging in nuclear weapons although our nuclear program started before pakistan

pakistan now have more warheads than us

[laltaputu]

http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jun/0...k-tank.htm



THIS IS ANOTHER CONFLICTING REPORT SAYING THAT INDIA IS INCREASING ITS WEAPONS

BUT STILL WE LAG BEHIND PAKISTAN

HOW DOES THIS EFFECT OUR CREDIBLY DETERRENCE.

[gangajal1]

[quote name='laltaputu' date='04 June 2010 - 10:09 AM' timestamp='1275625899' post='106719']

http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jun/0...k-tank.htm



THIS IS ANOTHER CONFLICTING REPORT SAYING THAT INDIA IS INCREASING ITS WEAPONS

BUT STILL WE LAG BEHIND PAKISTAN

HOW DOES THIS EFFECT OUR CREDIBLY DETERRENCE.

[/quote]



Expansion of India's highly enriched Uranium production is necessary for running the Nuke Sub fleet. It is highly unlikely that India will use this HEU for weapons production.