Pakistan : Terrorist Wahabi Islamic Rep Pakistan 6

[Naresh]

.

[url="http://www.geo.tv/5-4-2011/81076.htm"]No drop of petrol available in Karachi[/url]



KARACHI: The business hub of Pakistan, Karachi, came to complete standstill due to acute shortage of petroleum products at fuel stations across metropolis after All Pakistan Oil Tankers Association (APOTA)’s strike for an indefinite period entered 2nd day on Wednesday, Geo News reported.



Earlier on Tuesday, the association announced to observe strike for an indefinite period in protest against recent increase in petroleum product prices, Geo News reported.



The representative of APOTA, Asrar Shanwari, said that with swift hike in prices of POL products, there is no increase in transporters’ fares, which has played topsy-turvy to their financial status to a great extent.



Inflation has hit a hard blow at the back of oil tankers’ owners, he maintained.



A member of APOTA, Mir Mohammed Yusuf Shawani, vowed to continue with strike of transport of petroleum products unless their demands are met.



He demanded raise of 60 percent in fares of oil tankers.



It is worth mentioning here that all the petrol pumps and diesel stations had gone out of stock till 11pm on Wednesday.





Cheers

[Guest]

Paki fora is under deep deep depression. Never seen mass depressed country and its diaspora.

[Guest]

Very interesting information



Watch today.s episode of Aapas ki Baat with Najam Sethi and Muneeb Farooq.

http://pkpolitics.com/2011/05/04/aapas-k...-may-2011/

[Naresh]

[quote name='ramana' date='03 May 2011 - 01:20 AM' timestamp='1304365320' post='111491']

You are right. The sat dish was for Bollywood movies!

[/quote]



ramana Ji :



I think this is more like a "Communication Dish" and explains the "Lack" of Normal Telephones and Internet Connections :







Cheers

[Naresh]

.

Mudy Ji :



Posting this "Long Article" as it is from a subscription site :



[url="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8712/friends-like-these-the-u-s-pakistan-strategic-partnership"][center][size="6"][color="#006400"]Friends Like These : The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic



Partnership![/color][/size][/center][/url]



Jeff M. Smith | 03 May 2011



The United States and Pakistan have sustained a decades-old partnership on the strength of a Cold War alliance and a set of narrow but shared vital interests. However, the relationship has undergone profound changes as a result of the Afghan War, which on one hand has forced the two countries into an awkward but necessary embrace, and on the other exposed deep and potentially irreconcilable differences.



At the core of this rift is Pakistan's duplicitous regional strategy, whereby Islamabad provides critical logistics and intelligence support to America while aiding or turning a blind eye to its extremist enemies. For years this provoked barely a whimper of protest from Washington, which was fearful of criticizing its volatile ally. That is now changing. In public statements and leaked accounts, the Obama administration, Congress and the U.S. military have demonstrated a profound evolution in thinking about Pakistan.



Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for instance, told a congressional committee in 2009 that Pakistan "poses a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world." President Barack Obama, we learned from Bob Woodward's "Obama's Wars," thinks his administration needs to "make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan." Even Pakistan's most ardent defenders in the administration are showing signs of fatigue. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who on more than 20 trips to Pakistan has always portrayed the relationship in a favorable light, recently raised eyebrows by publicly accusing Pakistan's military intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of having "a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network," a ruthless Taliban ally. Such openly expressed criticisms from top American officials would have been heresy just a few years ago.



Indeed, the terms of Washington's debate over Pakistan are shifting. The new generation of policymakers have no fond Cold War memories to draw from, only a strong association between Pakistan and Islamist extremism. Behind closed doors, even Pakistan's many remaining advocates in Washington have lost the zeal to defend the country from charges that it is playing a "double game"; they have too few interlocutors left who would believe them.



However, there remains a fundamental disconnect between this maturing view of Pakistan and the policy it informs. At the same time that U.S. officials have become increasingly candid about Pakistan's malignant role in the Afghan War, they appear determined to pursue the same failed strategies that perpetuate this behavior. Only months after issuing a report to Congress stating that Pakistan's refusal to confront militancy "is as much a political choice as it is a reflection of an under-resourced military prioritizing its targets," the White House conducted a war review in December that concluded the U.S. must provide Pakistan with more military, intelligence and economic support.



One need only look at the views of the government's own experts to expose the absurdity of this strategy -- a task made easier by the thousands of diplomatic cables made public by the whistleblower Web site WikiLeaks. In their own words, U.S. officials put the lie to the notion that Pakistan has the will to confront militants but remains in need of more capabilities and aid from America. Exposing this myth as false is the easy part. The real challenge is determining why Pakistan is playing this double game and what the U.S. can do about it.



No Shortage of Capability



At the risk of stating the obvious, a jihadist nexus comprising the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans, al-Qaida and allied groups like the Haqqani network have for years used Pakistan's tribal regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as a springboard for attacks on Afghanistan and, increasingly, on Pakistan itself.



For years, Islamabad has explained away the existence of these safe havens by insisting it is perfectly willing to flush out the extremists but lacks the capability to do so. Successive U.S. governments have accepted and catered to this reasoning, despite its obvious dishonesty. The nuclear-armed, million-man Pakistani army is the most powerful institution in the country. Pakistan has already deployed six to seven divisions -- 120,000 troops -- to the violent border regions, with hundreds of thousands in reserve to the east. Yet there is little need to speculate about Pakistan's capabilities: We know the Pakistani military is able to confront the Taliban because it has done so with overwhelming force when Pakistan's leaders have deemed it in their interest. In the spring of 2009, the Pakistani Taliban was on a bloody march toward Islamabad. Feeling genuinely threatened, the military drew a line in the sand and handed the terrorist group stinging defeats in the Swat Valley and later that year in South Waziristan.



The operations demonstrated that Pakistan has abundant capability, thanks in no small part to the U.S., which has provided more than $10 billion in military assistance to Pakistan since Sept. 11. If civilian assistance and future pledges are included, the number is closer to $20 billion. But Pakistan's cavalier allocation of U.S. aid suggests that upgrading its counterterrorism capabilities is no great priority. The AP reported in 2009 that of $6.6 billion in U.S. military aid delivered to Pakistan from 2002 to 2008, all but $500 million was diverted to other nonmilitary programs. American funds were more likely to be channeled to domestic subsidies designed to prop up Pakistan's dysfunctional economy than to meet counterterrorism needs. Meanwhile, the Pakistani government has tirelessly lobbied Washington for large conventional weapons platforms -- and received more than a dozen U.S. F-16s last year -- while boosting its nuclear weapons arsenal at a faster rate that any country in the world. None of this describes a country desperately in need of aid for counterterrorism efforts.



In a 2009 State Department cable revealed by WikiLeaks, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson debunked the myth that confronting the Taliban simply requires the provision of more resources to Islamabad: "There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support for [militant] groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India." Indeed, far from bringing the desired results, aid has at times had the opposite effect. Nevertheless, despite the ambassador's prescient warning, the Obama administration approved an unprecedented $7.5 billion civilian aid package to Pakistan in 2009. The Pakistani parliament was incensed that certain conditions were attached to make Pakistan accountable for the funds. "Aid with strings attached would fail to generate the desired goodwill and results in Pakistan," said Prime Minister Yousef Gilani. He was right: It has generated neither results nor goodwill. Yet the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, appears undeterred, resolved to double down on a tainted investment.



[size="4"]Pakistan's double game . . . [/size]



And Not a Shred of Will



Islamabad has for years angrily denied the existence of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan, even when confronted with volumes of U.S. intelligence showing they operate openly from the Pakistani city of Quetta, in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. "Those who say that Quetta Shura or Taliban leadership exists in Baluchistan are involved in a conspiracy to destabilize the region. No extremist elements are present in the region," says the inspector general of Pakistan's Frontier Corps. Yet when the Taliban's second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, began a series of secret negotiations with the Afghan government in 2009, he was immediately arrested by Pakistani forces, who clearly knew the intimate details of his location and day-to-day activities. "We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us. We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians," a Pakistani security official explained to the New York Times.



The story demonstrates clearly that Pakistan suffers not from a lack of capability but a lack of will. This point was expressed most lucidly by the former vice chairman of the U.S. Army, retired four-star Gen. Jack Keane in an interview with PBS Newshour. "Make no mistake about it," said Keane. "The evidence is unequivocal that the government of Pakistan and the military leadership of Pakistan aids and abets [militant] sanctuaries. We have clear evidence to that [effect]. That's the reality. It's not a question of unable or unwilling. They willingly support those sanctuaries."



Keane's final point is worth restating: Pakistan's problem is not a passive lack of will. According to hundreds of news reports, intelligence intercepts, militant confessions and third-party investigations, Islamabad is actively supporting and sheltering militant groups. The intelligence community has resigned itself to this fact. A 2008 presentation to NATO by Peter Lavoy, now chairman of the National Intelligence Council, describes how the ISI "provides intelligence and financial support to insurgent groups to conduct attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government, [the U.S.-led coalition], and Indian targets." In a similar vein, a 2009 State Department cable by then-Ambassador Patterson warned that Pakistan will "dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan" if a pro-Indian -- meaning non-Taliban -- government takes power in Kabul.



Misguided Strategy



The evidence is so overwhelming and the consensus so broad that exposing Pakistan's double game is at this point elementary. Deciphering why Islamabad continues to support militant groups, however, is a more challenging task, and determining what the U.S. can do about it harder still.



We know the Pakistani military and the ISI have a long history of ties to Islamist militants, from supporting the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s; to backing the original Taliban movement as it swept to power in Kabul in 1990s; to fostering and empowering anti-India jihadist groups to sow terror in Kashmir. But why? The most basic answer is that Pakistan believes these groups advance its "strategic interests" abroad. In Kashmir and other parts of India, using militant proxies allows Pakistan to export terror to its arch-nemesis while avoiding direct confrontation with India's superior military and allowing Islamabad a sliver of implausible deniability.



In Afghanistan, the picture is considerably more complicated. Islamabad has determined that supporting the Taliban will ensure it the greatest level of influence in Kabul. However, the more pertinent question remains: Why is Pakistan so obsessed with influence in a country that lacks resources, infrastructure and access to the sea?



The most frequently cited explanation is that Pakistan seeks "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. Pakistan is geographically narrow and strategically vulnerable: Islamabad is just 50 miles from Indian-controlled Kashmir, and the industrial and cultural heartland of Pakistan, the Punjab, stretches along the Indian border. There is military value in having a desolate, mountainous space on the country's western flank to which Pakistani forces can retreat from a potential Indian invasion and from which they can subsequently counterattack. A less-recognized fear among Pakistanis is that Afghanistan, recently linked by road to the Iranian port of Chabahar, could challenge Islamabad's attempts to become an energy corridor linking Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.



However, the core reason behind Pakistan's support for the Taliban lies with the "Pashtun question," of which the Durand Line -- the colonial-era border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan -- is an integral part. In 1893, the British struck a deal with a weak Afghan government to stretch the northwest border of British India deeper into the Afghan frontier. London sought to use this territory as a buffer zone between India, their prized colonial possession, and the expansionist Russian Empire. However, the new border cut a line through the middle of the Pashtun nation, leaving half of this stateless, fiercely independent ethnic group in what would become West Pakistan. Today there are 25 million Pashtuns in Pakistan and 15 million in Afghanistan.



Since Pakistani independence from Britain in 1947, there have been sporadic periods of agitation among the Pashtun community, with some groups calling for an independent Pashtunistan and others seeking incorporation into Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan, dominated by Punjabis, is obsessively fearful of Pashtun nationalism. These fears were heightened after Pakistan lost 15 percent of its territory to another independence-minded ethnic group in 1971, the year that Bengali-majority East Pakistan fought a successful war for independence to form the country now known as Bangladesh.



Pakistan was formed on the notion that a common religion, Islam, was sufficient to bind together disparate ethnic groups with little shared history, language or culture. However, those bonds are at constant risk of fraying, which is why Pakistan is obsessed with Pashtun nationalism and, consequently, Afghanistan. For its part, Afghanistan holds a potent form of leverage over Pakistan: No government in Kabul, including the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, has ever recognized the Durand Line. Thus, Islamabad sees a strong Afghanistan that could challenge the Durand Line or, worse, incite Pashtun nationalism as an existential threat, and it considers a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as the best safeguard against this possibility.



Pakistan also views Taliban rule as a bulwark against foreign influence in its western neighbor. This foreign influence includes Iran, Russia and the Central Asian nations, who all supported the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s. But it primarily means India, which Pakistan obsessively believes is trying to encircle it despite New Delhi's benign role in Afghanistan thus far.



Finally, Pakistan supports the Taliban and other jihadist groups as a method to channel its own domestic cocktail of frustration, anger and extremism, all fed by grinding poverty, poor education, a dysfunctional judicial system and an army of radical preachers that have filled the country's yawning social void. This is outlined in a U.S. intelligence assessment revealed by WikiLeaks that stated, "Urging militant groups to be outwardly focused is perceived by Pakistani officials as a method to safeguard internal security." By fostering the sense of an impending threat from foreign infidels, Pakistan deflects Pakistanis' frustration with their own government.



[size="4"]The Afghan War limits U.S. influence . . . [/size]



What to Do?



Today, America's options to influence Pakistani behavior are seriously constrained by the Afghan War. It was not always this way. In an epic failure of U.S. foreign policy, America squandered an opportunity in the days after Sept. 11 to demand and ensure a complete end to Pakistani support for Islamist militancy. The Bush administration had Islamabad's full attention when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage warned Pakistani leaders the country would be "bombed back into the Stone Age" if it did not cooperate with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. However, that leverage was wasted when Washington identified al-Qaida as its top priority and looked the other way as Pakistan allowed the "defeated" Taliban to seek haven and regroup within its territory. Nine years later, America is in a much weaker position.



Dealing with Pakistan will always require unique sensitivity given its strategic location, its rivalry with India, its relationship with Islamist militants and, not least, its nuclear weapons arsenal. However, those complications are exponentially compounded by Pakistan's importance to the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. Geography makes Pakistan vital to the massive challenge of supplying more than 100,000 troops with enough food, fuel and arms to sustain a decade of war. Most of those supplies enter Afghanistan via two road links through Pakistan, after being offloaded at the Pakistani port of Karachi. The U.S. has doggedly pursued alternative logistics routes into Afghanistan, but even with the establishment of a Northern Distribution Network through Russia and Central Asia, and the airlift of sensitive military equipment and fuel, the Pakistani road links still account for at least half of all supplies. And it is improbable that share will be reduced much further.



Islamabad also has others means of leverage over the U.S. war effort. It could curtail the CIA's controversial unmanned aerial drone campaign, which is conducted from inside Pakistan; stop patrolling the already porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border; or cut off existing intelligence cooperation. Indeed, Pakistan has threatened such actions in the past, and twice shut the border -- in September 2008 and September 2010 -- to NATO supply trucks to protest crossborder raids into Pakistani territory. The risk that Pakistan may resort to such countermeasures has heightened in the aftermath of the incident surrounding Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor who was detained on Jan. 27, 2011, in Lahore after shooting and killing two Pakistanis he alleged were trying to rob him. Davis was released months later after a grueling diplomatic spat between Washington and Islamabad, but the affair has sent intelligence cooperation to an all-time low. In the months since Davis' release, Pakistan's leadership has grown more vocal in publicly calling for an end to the drone strikes entirely. CIA Director Leon Panetta has rejected that demand, insisting the strikes were a part of his "fundamental responsibility." However, the reality remains that Pakistan has a potent set of sticks at its disposal should it choose to brandish them.



In short, Washington is hamstrung and facing a terrible dilemma: confront Pakistan forcefully and risk suddenly and critically undermining the Afghan war effort, or continue to play the friendly benefactor while allowing Islamabad to gradually undermine the war effort. Most everywhere else in the world this is known as blackmail; in Washington it is called "strategic partnership."



The optimal but elusive third way entails convincing Pakistan that abandoning militant groups is in its own interest. Using diplomatic persuasion and a carrot-heavy approach has failed successive U.S. administrations. Obama should instead focus on employing more sticks, ideally to find the perfect balance that coerces a change in Pakistani behavior without causing an open rift in the relationship. However, Washington should be prepared to deal with the consequences of that rift should it materialize. A falling out with Pakistan would indeed be disastrous for the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, but it would be potentially fatal to the Pakistani government.



First, even if the U.S. is not in a position to force Pakistan's hand on the Taliban, nothing obliges Washington to provide Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid while it harbors the group. That so much of the aid is wasted, misspent and unappreciated simply adds insult to injury. Whether or not Pakistan could brave a cutoff of U.S. aid is open to debate. It weathered U.S. sanctions in the 1990s but is in a much weaker economic position today. However, it is inconceivable that Pakistan's economy would survive if the U.S. coordinated with Pakistan's other patrons to condition all aid to Islamabad on a verifiable end of support to all extremist groups. While Washington would likely find it difficult to bring China on board, it might enjoy more support from other Western partners and international institutions such as the IMF.



Even if it does nothing in the short-term, Washington should make it clear that when the Afghan War -- and with it a great deal of Pakistani leverage -- comes to an end, America is prepared to support a virtual aid embargo on Pakistan unless it decisively ceases its support for Islamist militant groups now. That is by no means the only tool available to the U.S. Multilateral sanctions can also be crafted at the United Nations. The provision of spare parts for military equipment can be suspended. Pakistani military and intelligence officials with known ties to the Taliban can be put on the terrorist watch list. If all else fails, the ISI itself can be added to the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.



To be sure, wielding these sticks is far from an optimal solution, but neither is showering money on those who harbor one's enemies. There was a time when America insisted it wouldn't distinguish between terrorists and the states that shelter them. Pakistan has made a mockery of that pledge. At long last, U.S. officials seem to have recognized this travesty. Hopefully, in this case, admitting we have a problem will be the first step to recovery.



Jeff M. Smith is the Kraemer Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, a think tank based in Washington, D.C.



Cheers

[Naresh]

.





[url="http://www.tripline.net/trip/Map_of_the_Bin_Laden_Raid%3A_Operation_Geronimo-1566654170501003BC91C1F902FE5C9B"][center][color="#FF0000"][size="5"]Map of the bin Laden Raid : Operation Neptune Spear.[/size][/color][/center][/url]



Cheers

[acharya]

[quote name='Naresh' date='06 May 2011 - 01:10 AM' timestamp='1304623923' post='111532']

.





[url="http://www.tripline.net/trip/Map_of_the_Bin_Laden_Raid%3A_Operation_Geronimo-1566654170501003BC91C1F902FE5C9B"][center][color="#FF0000"][size="5"]Map of the bin Laden Raid : Operation Neptune Spear.[/size][/color][/center][/url]



Cheers

[/quote]







Watch the US lawmakers to wash their hands of Pakistan since they see imminent war - Pak may try to attack India with PRC help and US does not want to be caught unaware after the war starts.

One Senator has already said that US does not want to be any part of the Pak war with India. See if there is urgency in the part of the US administration with any initiatives.



Foreign lobby firms was OK if it was between state but OBL is personal for American people and this cannot be changed with lobby firms. US has for the first time allowed general American public to be part of the foreign policy towards Pakistan. Until now Pakistan was shielded from US public by giving them complete immunity. Watch of this is done to what extent.

[Guest]

Watch the US lawmakers to wash their hands of Pakistan

They can't. Pakis are in full control of supply line to Afghanistan and don't forget US are still renting two airbase.

[Naresh]

[quote name='Mudy' date='06 May 2011 - 08:21 PM' timestamp='1304693034' post='111534']

They can't. Pakis are in full control of supply line to Afghanistan and don't forget US are still renting two airbase.

[/quote]



Mudy Ji:



I would humbly disagree.



The United States does not really need Pakistan except possibly for transporting Fuel and Ammunition.



1. The Berlin Airlift LASTED FOR NEARLY AN YEAR (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949)during which Period the UK's Royal Air Force and the USAF flew over 200,000 flights in one year, providing up to 4700 tonnes of daily necessities such as fuel and food to the Berliners.



IOW the Berlin Air Lift transported over a Million Tonnes of every type of Commodity.



The United States has been providing Aid as well as on a Commercial Basis Grain i.e. Rice and Wheat to the Central Asian Republics.



Other commodities like Butter, Powdered Milk etc. etc. has also been provided and the goods emanating from the US East Coast as well as US Gulf have been transported through St. Petersburg, Riga and Hamburg.



Goods emanating from the US West Coast have always been transported to the C A Republics via Vladivostock.



As such one does find that the You Knighted States of America and Pakistan have a special relationship - and I would bet my bottom Dollar that it is not India - which makes the US always take care of Pakistan's Interest and respect its Sensitivities.



The recent act of Obama "Binning" Laden should make the US think hard of continuing its relations with Pakistan "as to before".



The US is going to kick Paki Ar*e and might even make it subservient as well as to kowtow totally to the US which in turn will turn a blind eye to Pakistan continuing to perpetrate its IT - I mean Islamic Terrorism - on India.



Lets see which way the Cocoon Spins!



Cheers

[Naresh]

.

[url="http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-05-06/pakistans-intellifence-chief-expected-to-resign-ahmad-shuja-pasha/"]Pakistan’s bin Laden Scapegoat[/url]



Ron Moreau



Pakistani officials tell The Daily Beast that the head of Pakistan’s notorious intelligence service may step down, as the government looks for a fall guy for the bin Laden debacle.



To allay both domestic and international anger and dismay over the presence of Osama bin Laden in a military cantonment town close to the capital, senior Pakistani officials have told The Daily Beast they recognize that an important head has to roll and soon. They say the most likely candidate to be [color="#FF0000"]the fall guy is Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the director general of the country’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate[/color]. In a last ditch effort to control the damage and to assure the US that the ISI was not harboring him and was unaware of his presence in Pakistan, Pasha reportedly flew to Washington today. But these high-level sources who refused to be quoted or named say his resignation is only a matter of time.



Savvy Pakistani analysts who have close connections to the military agree. “It would make a lot of sense,” says retired Pakistani Lt. Gen. Talat Masood. “It’s in his (Pasha’s) personal and the national interest to take the heat off.”



Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the director general of the Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, is the most likely candidate to step down following the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's compound.



The heat has been fierce. Whether they supported or loathed bin Laden, Pakistanis across the board are furious that the ISI and the powerful military, which control national security policy, could have been so incompetent not to know that the al Qaeda leader was comfortably holed up in Abbottabad, only 80 miles north of the capital. “Never before have the military and the ISI come under such criticism,” Masood says. People are also angry, if not embarrassed, that the military, which eats the lion’s share of the national budget and is seen as the country’s protector from invading forces, particularly neighboring India, could be totally unaware that American helicopters had violated Pakistani airspace. The U.S. choppers had hovered over the town during the 40 minute-long operation in the town, and then returned to Afghanistan without a response. “People are outraged,” says Masood. “They see this as the fault of the military in which they have invested so much trust.”



A senior ISI officer told The Daily Beast he couldn't confirm the report, saying he has no knowledge of Pasha being pressured into resigning. “It's far from routine for someone to resign over failures,” he said. “But someone has to resign.” A former ISI officer was more blunt. “It was a great failure of, and an embarrassment to, Pakistani intelligence,” he said. “The pressure is mounting for Pasha to resign.” Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, spokesman for the Pakistani armed forces, said reports of Pasha's resignation are "baseless, without one iota of truth."



Pasha’s resignation could be the first step in a process of rebuilding that badly damaged confidence, Masood and the senior Pakistani officials say. “It could ease a lot of pressure,” Masood says. It would also help rehabilitate the army’s and the ISI’s badly tarnished image. Under Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. who assumed the military’s top position in late 2008 from the autocratic Pervez Musharraf, the army has made a public-relations comeback. Under Musharraf, the military was seen as meddlesome and oppressive force. Kayani pulled it back from direct involvement in government and politics. Pakistanis were also impressed by the humanitarian work the military carried out last year in rescuing victims of the devastating floods. Now those good works have largely been forgotten as a result of the bin Laden fiasco.



[center][color="#FF0000"]“People are outraged,”[/color] says retired Pakistani Lt. Gen.

Talat Masood. [color="#FF0000"]“They see this as the fault of the military

in which they have invested so much trust.”[/color][/center]



Personally, Pasha could go out with honor and also dispel the notion that he was personally incompetent if he does step down soon as is widely expected. “It would help Pasha as an individual because in Pakistan, no one resigns to accept blame for anything,” says Masood. “It would be a first.”



Apparently, he would not be leaving a job he loves. The senior Pakistani sources say that Pasha was never keen on the ISI job in the first place. He had no background in intelligence and was an infantry and armor officer in previous commands. He was, however, very close to Kayani, who insisted he take the job when he was nominated in 2008. “No one would have been as trustworthy to Kayani,” says Masood. “Kayani thought it was very useful to have him there.” Pasha had served under Kayani’s command as an infantry officer and had served as head of military operations just as Kayani had. Kayani also headed the ISI from 2004 to 2007 until Musharraf appointed him army chief. Kayani, the sources say, wanted to maintain a high degree of control over his powerful, former bailiwick and thought his friend Pasha would allow him to do so.



Even some family members are said to be urging him to step down. His two daughters had opposed him taking the ISI job and now they are pressing him to retire and take an honorable exit from the military. Even so, he is reluctant. He feels his resignation would widely be seen as an admission of responsibility, if not guilt, the sources say. The senior Pakistani officials who know Pasha and have spoken to him since the raid say they are convinced that the ISI chief did not know of bin Laden’s whereabouts. That may be true, but he may have no choice but to fall on his sword. It’s likely that Pakistani generals will decide that someone will have to become the scapegoat in an effort to limit the damage to the armed forces---and that Pasha will most likely be the man.



But Pasha’s resignation will not affect the US investigation of how bin Laden was able to hide right under the noses of the Pakistani military for so long. Clearly Washington suspects there must have been some official collusion at the highest level of the Pakistani security forces. The trove of documents, hard drives and memory sticks that the Navy SEALS removed from bin Laden’s residence during the raid could provide some clues to American investigators.



According to a U.S. official, Washington is now reassessing its view of Kayani. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was his main American interlocutor and became something of his pal during the long hours they spent together. Mullen is said to believe that Kayani could eventually be brought around to the American viewpoint that the Pakistani military has to move forcefully and rapidly against Taliban and al Qaeda havens in North Waziristan and around Quetta. But this same source says that the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, sees Kayani in a less favorable light. Indeed, many senior U.S. officials see Kayani as being too wedded to the traditional Pakistani line as laid down by the late dictator Ziaul Haq: [color="#FF0000"]that India is a clear existential threat to Pakistan and that Islamabad must do all it can to ensure its influence in Afghanistan and to limit New Delhi’s growing presence there. And that means turning a blind eye to the Taliban.[/color]



Gen. Masood doesn’t believe senior Pakistani officers were colluding with bin Laden and al Qaeda. “It was sheer incompetence,” he says of Pakistan’s failure to find him. Rather he believes that local civilian and security officials in Abbottabad could have protecting him. “There could have been some connivance in the civil administration, the police and the drug mafia that are powerful there,” he says. “There had to be some kind of umbrella.” “Otherwise it was not possible to bin Laden to hide,” Masood adds. “People are very nosy. They would have asked who is living there.” If they did, no Pakistani official seemed to listen.



Ron Moreau is Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent and has been covering the region for the magazine the past 10 years. Since he first joined Newsweek during the Vietnam War, he has reported extensively from Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.



Cheers

[Arun_S]

NightWatch for the night of 5 May 2011

Burma (Myanmar)-China: Update. General Min Aung Hlaing is to make his first official visit to China and his first foreign visit since the establishment of an elected government under President Thein Sein. Burmese analysts describe China as Burma's closest ally, no doubt rankling the Indian government. The Burmese General intends to discuss border security issues with the Chinese, according to press releases. Railroads, pipelines and Chinese access to Burmese ports almost certainly will be on the agenda.



Pakistan-US: In an official statement on 5 May, the Pakistan Army announced that US military personnel in Pakistan will be cut to the "minimum essential" levels. It also warned that if the United States conducts another raid similar to the one that led to Usama bin Laden's death, the Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies will review their ties with Washington.



[color="#0000ff"]Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir said that any attempts by any country to mimic the US raid on Pakistani soil that resulted in the death of Usama bin Laden will "result in a terrible catastrophe." Bashir said Pakistan has the capacity to protect itself and that the US helicopters managed to evade Pakistani radars (sic.). [/color]Bashir specifically mentioned remarks from Indian military officials discussing mounting such a raid, calling them a concerning attempt to subvert the agenda of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.



Military deliberations. Pakistani military officials discussed the US raid in Abbottabad and its implications for US-Pakistani military-to-military relations during the Corps Commanders' Conference, chaired by Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, the Inter-Services Press Relations department said on 5 May.



The conference admitted shortcomings in developing intelligence on Usama bin Laden's presence in the country but emphasized that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate's achievements against al Qaida and others were unmatched; approximately 100 senior al Qaeda leaders or operators have been captured or killed by the ISI, with or without CIA support. The CIA developed intelligence on bin Laden based on initial information from the ISI, but it did not share additional information on the case, the statement said. An investigation of the circumstances that led to this situation has been ordered.



Comment:[color="#0000ff"] By far the most damaging and disconcerting ripple effect of the Abbottabad raid for the Pakistani security elite is its exposure of basic Pakistani military vulnerabilities to the Indians, as well as to the rest of the world.[/color] A few points need stress.



Pakistan fundamentally is and has always been a military state. Civilian elected government is a thin veneer that wears away quickly. The pillar of the state is the Pakistan Army, but it has been humiliated and bested by 79 or so - the number seems to keep changing - US Navy SEALs.



[color="#0000ff"]The tone and substance of the comments above indicate Pakistan considers this a traitorous act, a betrayal by an ally, in the face of the Indian enemy. For Pakistan Army corps commanders the US raid exposes a potentially existential, strategic weakness. Instead of being grateful, they are angry and vindictive.[/color]



That anger explains the ultimatum language in the Army and Foreign Secretary's statements. [color="#0000ff"]Some of the bluster is for public consumption, but the core is genuine. This is a watershed development that will not be forgiven or forgotten. [/color]China will be the beneficiary of Pakistani military anger at the US, over the mid term.



The irony of the corps commanders' outrage is that this is not the first time they and their leaders have come up short, but it is the most sensational. [color="#0000ff"]These guardians of Pakistan's patrimony failed to match Indian war preparations in 2002, twice, after Pakistani-based terrorists attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001.[/color]



General Kayani's primary mission was to restore respect for the Pakistan armed forces, after the years of politicization and decline under Musharraf's leadership of the armed forces and the country. The US raid showed Kayani has succeeded in rebuilding public admiration for the forces, but that it might not be merited. [color="#0000ff"]Pakistan's defense forces pose no challenge to a world class attacker, which India is rapidly becoming, far surpassing Pakistan.[/color]



It seems important to note that bin Laden in Abbottabad posed no direct threat to Pakistan. That is obvious from the length of time he resided there. [color="#0000ff"]The exposure of strategic vulnerabilities to India is a far more pressing worry for Pakistani leaders.[/color]



Internal security. Pakistani security forces will launch a massive search operation in Quetta and tribal areas of North Waziristan to capture Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar or al Qaida senior leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, according to top government sources in Islamabad, The News reported on 5 May. [color="#0000ff"]According to the sources, Islamabad wants to make sure neither Mullah Omar nor al-Zawahiri are hiding in Pakistan and if they are, to capture them before the United States can embarrass Pakistan again.[/color]



Comment: The most important psychological effect of the bin Laden raid on a variety of anti-government leaders resident in Pakistan is the heightened sense of vulnerability. If Pakistan lives up to today's pledge, then the combined pressure of the US and Pakistan will have "poisoned the host," meaning the anti-government leaders will have no safe place to hide.



[color="#0000ff"]The announcement above is not an epiphany but damage control. It is bad news for Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar and Haqqani, if Pakistan lives up to its promise.[/color] The one suspicious omission in the announcement is mention of Karachi, major portions of which are under Sharia and populated by Pashtuns. Two years ago, Mullah Omar and his shura were reported to have moved to Karachi from Quetta. Mention of Karachi would have made the announcement seem more sincere.



Pakistan-US: The United States does not possess "definitive evidence" that Pakistan was aware of Usama bin Laden's presence, but Islamabad must do more to show its commitment to defeating al Qaida, US Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy said 5 May.



For example, Pakistan could help exploit materials collected during the raid on bin Laden's compound, Flournoy said. She said there was an opportunity to make further gains against al Qaida. Previously scheduled meetings at the Pentagon with a Pakistani delegation still occurred on 2 and 3 May, Flournoy said. In those sessions, Flournoy said she made clear that the U.S. Congress would be increasingly skeptical about continuing to give Pakistan billions of dollars in aid.



Special Comment: No news services have recalled that the events involving bin Laden's sanctuary in Pakistan [size="2"][color="#0000ff"]all occurred during Musharraf's tenure, the Chief of Army Staff and later President-General. [/color][/size][size="2"][color="#0000ff"] His military background was well-rounded, but he prides himself as the former commander of the Pakistan Army Special Services Group, the special forces.[/color][/size]



Musharraf has a history of clever ruses and dangerous initiatives. He brought Pakistan to the brink of war with India in 1999 over Kargil, trying to steal a march on India during the winter.



Later that year he overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, when the chief executive attempted to replace Musharraf as Chief of the Army Staff for the Kargil fiasco. He also was deeply and continuously involved in supporting the Taliban regime of Mullah Omar, reportedly, in exchange for an agreement that Afghanistan would serve as Pakistan's strategic rear in a potential fight with India.



[color="#0000ff"]As a matter speculation, Musharraf is clever enough to have not informed ISI Directorate of any black bag deals he arranged with bin Laden and the Taliban, who obtained safe haven in Pakistan when the US attacked in 2001. There are several intelligence and security bureaux, including the military intelligence branch in the Army and Pakistan's premier domestic intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau, which is subordinate to the Chief Executive. In any of these, Musharraf could have created special arrangements for supporting terrorists, without necessarily involving ISI Directorate.[/color]



[color="#0000ff"]Consequently, active ISI Directorate officers genuinely might not know about arrangements for providing hospitality and protection to bin Laden, Mullah Omar and others because the responsibility for tracking them inside Pakistan would fall to the Intelligence Bureau. During the time bin Laden was in Pakistan and during Musharraf's tenure, the Intelligence Bureau had seven directors. All must be brought in for questioning.[/color]



In Abbottabad, the first people who should be investigated are the local police. In most countries, the local police station maintains a register of the names, number and gender of every resident in every house in the jurisdiction. Every person who speaks a foreign tongue, every foreigner in particular, would be checked every day and his or her location noted and dated in the police station. In Indonesia, for example, this was done by hand on a chalk board, even in the most remote jungle districts of the Celebes.



Four points are clear. Pakistan is much more concerned about India than about internal terrorism or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan has many alternatives to the ISI Directorate for managing clandestine arrangements with terrorists. The Intelligence Bureau must be investigated. The timing of all known clandestine arrangements falls within Musharraf's tenure.



Syria: Residents of Daraa on 5 May refuted government claims that the Syrian Army had withdrawn its units from Darraa. One resident said the Army still controlled Daraa and that all communications had been cut off. Witnesses told the U.S.-based Reform Party of Syria that thousands of security forces remained on the city's outskirts, snipers were on the rooftops and scores of tanks were in the city.



In a separate action, hundreds of Syrian soldiers entered the Damascus suburb of Saqba overnight on 5 May, broke into houses and made arrests, a resident said. Note: This is the third Damascus suburb that security forces have suppressed.



Palestinian Authority: Senior Gaza-based Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh urged militant groups to abide by the ceasefire with Israel in order to give the new unity government with rival Palestinian faction Fatah a chance to succeed, Reuters reported. He said Hamas has always sought to avoid a new war (sic). He also urged security forces under Fatah's control in the West Bank to stop arresting Hamas sympathizers because such moves do not help unity efforts.



Comment: Haniyeh also said he would resign and bring the government of the Gaza Strip under the Fatah-led coalition. This means that Hamas is serious about cooperating this year in a united front to achieve recognition of Palestinian statehood. Hamas refuses to recognize or accept the existence of Israel, regardless of the ceasefire.



Tunisia: Tunisians protested in Sfax, Kairouan, Sousse, central Tunis and other towns on 5 May, demanding the government's resignation, Reuters reported. The protests came after a former interior minister, Farhat Rajhi, was shown in a video saying a coup would occur if Ennahda took power from the July democratic elections.



Those loyal to ousted President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who are based in and around Ben Ali's hometown of Sousse, will not give up power and will orchestrate a coup if they lose elections, Rajhi said. Some protesters said the government was using the threat of a coup to derail efforts toward democracy



Comment: Ennahda is an Islamist party that was banned by Ben Ali. It intends to participate in the July elections for the first time in 23 years and has a good chance of winning enough votes to form a government, according to local analysts. Ennadha has support in the interior and the south, which are conservative Muslim regions. The "people of the coast" are Ben Ali loyalists.



The threat of a coup tends to prove that the Ben Ali political machine still governs Tunisia and will not permit a free and fair election. If Ennadha appears likely to win, a military coup is almost unavoidable.



The election campaign period looks to be the test whether there might be a revolution in Tunisia. There has not been one yet, clearly.

End of NightWatch for 5 May.



NightWatch is brought to you by Kforce Government Solutions, Inc. (KGS), a leader in government problem-solving, Data Confidence® and intelligence. Views and opinions expressed in NightWatch are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of KGS, its management, or affiliates.

[Guest]

[url="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/asia/07policy.html?_r=1"]Probing Link to Bin Laden, U.S. Tells Pakistan to Name Agents[/url]

WASHINGTON — Pakistani officials say the Obama administration has demanded the identities of some of their top intelligence operatives as the United States tries to determine whether any of them had contact with Osama bin Laden or his agents in the years before the raid that led to his death early Monday morning in Pakistan.



...



Still, this official and others expressed deep frustration with Pakistani military and intelligence officials for their refusal over the years to identify members of the agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, who were believed to have close ties to Bin Laden. In particular, American officials have demanded information on what is known as the ISI’s S directorate, which has worked closely with militants since the days of the fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan.



“It’s hard to believe that Kayani and Pasha actually knew that Bin Laden was there,” a senior administration official said, referring to Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the ISI director-general, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha. But, added the official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the issue, “there are degrees of knowing, and it wouldn’t surprise me if we find out that someone close to Pasha knew.”

This is so sweet. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[Naresh]

.

This "Long Article" is from a subscription site :



[url="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8713/running-out-of-everything-how-scarcity-drives-crisis-in-pakistan"]Running Out of Everything : How Scarcity Drives Crisis in Pakistan[/url]



David Steven



While pessimism is not in short supply in Pakistan, other resources are increasingly scarce. This is driving the country toward a crisis characterized by interlocking economic, political and security dimensions, and has already brought the government close to fiscal collapse.



Yet the dangers are poorly understood. Few of the country's policy elite fully grasp how Pakistan's energy, food and fiscal challenges intersect, nor how quickly problems will spiral as the country's population grows. Meanwhile, the international community is equally fragmented and short-term in its outlook, still working through sector-based silos that leave it unable to see the big picture. With regard to Pakistan, the United States, along with other international actors, still lacks a coherent vision for what it can do to help build a more stable state. On the global stage, Washington has barely begun to address the impact that an era of higher and more volatile resource prices will have on countries such as Pakistan that are both fragile and strategically significant.



In 2011, popular uprisings throughout the Middle East finally made it respectable to admit that resource scarcity will be a major driver of global change in coming decades, as high food prices proved a major irritant for the region's young population already starved of other opportunities. There is more turbulence to come. Over the next 15 years, the world's population will increase from almost 7 to almost 8 billion people. The "next billion" will be Asian or African, and most will live in unplanned, and often chaotic, towns and cities. They will face fierce competition for resources from the rich world, long accustomed to dominating commodity markets, as well as from increasingly assertive middle classes in China, India, Brazil and the other rising powers.



At the same time -- and depending on levels of investment, rates of innovation and political foresight -- the world will bump up against limits to the sustainable consumption of highly strategic commodities such as energy, land, water, food and "atmospheric space" for greenhouse gases and other emissions. The fallout will play a crucial role in the "long crisis" of globalization (.pdf).



In an age of resource constraints, Pakistan is a canary in the coal mine. On any given day, newspaper stories about food prices, energy subsidies and water shortages jostle for space with those on suicide bombings, corruption and the government's failure to deliver basic services to its citizens. When asked what they think is the country's greatest problem (.pdf), 55 percent of Pakistanis single out inflation, which is overwhelmingly driven by food and energy prices. That compares to just 21 percent who pick terrorism -- in a country where a few thousand people are killed by terrorists each year -- and 16 percent who choose unemployment, at a time when only 70 percent of men and 21 percent of women have jobs (.pdf).



The average Pakistani eats less than the average African, while last year's devastating floods pushed rates of acute malnutrition (.pdf) among the country's children to nearly 25 percent in the worst-affected areas. This winter, trees throughout Pakistan's major cities were stripped bare for fuel by people desperate to heat their houses and businesses. And the government is running out of money as it struggles to pay energy subsidies that it lacks the political strength to reduce, while the security implications of resource scarcity are growing in what is already an extremely insecure country.



Going Hungry?



To understand scarcity in Pakistan, one needs to start with the country's demographics. While Pakistan's population growth rate peaked at 3.5 percent in the early 1980s, it is still well more than 2 percent today. There will be 60 million more Pakistanis by 2025, at which time the population will still be growing by 4 million every year. The country is very young, with almost half the population below the age of 20. The scale of its projected population alone presents Pakistan with daunting demographic challenges (.pdf). It must find ways to educate its youngest children (.pdf), who currently make up more than 10 percent of the global population of children not attending primary school. It also needs to build a city the size of Lahore every three years, as population growth begins to peak in rural areas but continues to soar in urban ones.



Most of all, Pakistan needs jobs. A "baby boom" generation is entering the workforce in growing numbers, its members bringing with them a toxic combination of high expectations and extremely meager skills. If improved economic prospects allow them to find work, the country could enjoy a demographic dividend. If they remain unemployed, a demographic disaster beckons.



Unfortunately, Pakistan has few natural resources, and land is also in short supply. The country now has only 0.32 acres of arable land per capita, and this will decline by almost a third by 2025 if new land is not brought into production. Water is similarly scarce. Per capita freshwater availability is less than a third of that of India and will fall to less than 35,000 cubic feet by 2025 (.pdf). Already, groundwater is becoming increasingly expensive to extract and surface water steadily more polluted. These are worrying trends, since competition for water and land, when combined with the demographic stress of a young population, have been shown to increase the risk of conflict (.pdf) within, and perhaps between, countries. That prospect, it should go without saying, is something Pakistan can do without.



A shortage of land and water has an inevitable impact on agriculture. Pakistan has long been a net importer of food, but its agricultural trade deficit (.pdf) has grown considerably over the past decade. Imports have declined somewhat in recent years, but this actually reflects worsening, rather than improving, food security. World food prices saw rapid increases after 2007, with prices spiking a year later, when the FAO Food Price Index reached 200. Prices subsequently eased, but they have recently shot up again and are now well above the previous 2008 peak. Pakistan is importing less food, not because it doesn't need it, but because it is being priced out of the world markets. Domestic agricultural production, meanwhile, remains soft, registering only 2 percent growth in 2010 in spite of booming prices (.pdf). That this can be ascribed in part to the floods is a sobering reflection of how vulnerable the sector is to regular droughts and irregular, but devastating, natural disasters. A good crop is expected this year, as is usually the case after a flood, but this cannot be taken as a sure sign that Pakistan's agricultural sector is on an upward path.



Unsurprisingly, Pakistani consumers have seen rapid increases in the prices they pay for food. The Asian Development Bank Food Price Index for Pakistan, which is set at 100 for 2001, reached 216 in 2009, with prices up by 45 percent on the previous two years (.pdf). More recently, food inflation has been more than 20 percent for the past six months. Prices have also been increasingly volatile, with commodities hit by a series of mini-shocks: including the sugar crisis of 2009, the flour crisis of 2010 and the onion war of 2011, among others. Food inflation in Pakistan is greater than in any of the Middle Eastern countries that experienced civil unrest this year (although Iran has seen its prices rise even faster). At the same time, Pakistan also has lower per capita income and higher rates of poverty than any of these countries.



Worse still, when the food crisis hit, many in Pakistan had little room for maneuver, as nutritional standards, especially among the hardest-hit poor households, were already conspicuously low. Pakistanis eat no more than they did in 1970, although per capita GDP has more than doubled in that period. In 2008, after the first price spike, it was estimated (.pdf) that half the population was eating less than the recommended minimum of 2,100 calories per day, with 28 percent -- or 45 million people -- classed as suffering from severe food insecurity (defined as less than 1,700 calories per day). Children were particularly affected by the recent floods, but have long been at high risk of malnutrition. In 2001, a household survey (.pdf) found that 40 percent of Pakistani children were stunted and 37 percent were underweight for their age, while one-third of all childhood deaths are thought to be due to poor nutrition (.pdf). According to the World Bank, Pakistan's child malnutrition levels are among the highest in the world.



The composition of Pakistan's diet increases its vulnerability. According to FAO data, cereals, sugar, oil and dairy products account for 80 percent of Pakistan's caloric intake. Overdependence on wheat is especially problematic. Only a quarter of Pakistani households produce it, but almost all consume it, usually as their primary staple (.pdf). The market is heavily regulated, with the government struggling to set prices that, while remaining affordable to consumers, incentivize producers and reflect the growing cost of inputs -- especially fertilizer, whose price is linked to oil -- and demand from global commodity markets. In 2007, the government made the disastrous decision to export wheat (.pdf) in the hopes of earning foreign currency as global prices rose, but was soon back in the market to import -- at a $100 per ton loss -- as food shortages began to bite. Vegetable oils, meanwhile, reveal a more direct dependence on international markets, with more than 7 percent of daily caloric intake coming from imported oil. Pakistan's struggle to feed its population will only worsen as its population continues to grow and competition for food intensifies on the global markets on which it depends.



The Energy Roller Coaster?



Pakistan's energy troubles are, if anything, even more complex and deeply entrenched. Energy use in Pakistan while roughly comparable with India, remains low, at just more than a quarter of the global average. But demand is growing fast, as Pakistanis struggle to climb the energy ladder. Wood and other biomass still account for 46 percent of total energy use, with nearly 90 percent of rural households dependent on these fuel sources. But the country's rapidly growing cities have a voracious appetite for more-advanced forms of energy, with natural gas heavily used by households and industry, for both transportation, in the form of compressed natural gas (CNG), and electricity generation. Gas is Pakistan's most important indigenous fuel source, accounting for 42 percent of total energy use. It is cheap, with government policy holding down prices, and is being rapidly used up. Although reserves lie undiscovered, prices are too low to attract investment in further exploration, and supply is expected to decline rapidly over the coming years. As a result, Pakistan is becoming increasingly reliant on imported oil, gas and, to a lesser extent, coal.



Energy scarcity has been intensifying since the middle of the last decade. Demand for electricity outstripped supply in 2005, while the same threshold was passed for gas a year later. The future also looks bleak. According to the Pakistan Energy Outlook for 2025, "with indigenous natural gas supply expected to decline in the near future, 'business-as-usual' policies will be unable to meet Pakistan's energy demand for the next 15 years, even for a 4.5 percent per annum GDP growth rate." Energy demand will almost double by 2025 if the economy grows at 4.5 percent, but indigenous production of gas is projected to decline by a third. According to the same report, energy demand currently outstrips supply by more than 10 percent, biomass excluded. Even under a best-case business-as-usual scenario, this gap will grow to 50 percent by 2025. Clearly, Pakistan's economy will be unable to achieve any significant growth if it continues on its current trajectory.



By 2006, Pakistan was already gripped by what energy analyst Muhammad Asif has described as "the worst energy crisis in the country's history." In 2008, however, things got worse, as the country absorbed the global energy shock, with oil reaching $147 a barrel. Electricity companies had become increasingly reliant on imported fuel oil and found their costs rocketing. At the same time, the government was holding down tariffs, with electricity being sold at 30 percent below cost in 2007. (The sector is still running at a loss despite subsequent efforts to charge consumers more.) The result was an explosive growth of "circular debts" (.pdf), with downstream power producers failing to pay upstream energy suppliers, who have in turn been forced to borrow large sums of money. All players rely on explicit or implicit government guarantees for their debt. The sums at stake are not in the public domain, but one company alone, the state owned Oil and Gas Development Company, is said to be owed $1.4 billion.



For consumers, the results have been no happier: Demand outstripped supply by 50 percent in the peak months of 2008, resulting in the use of regular load-shedding to ration electricity. These scheduled outages are often savage, lasting for up to 18 hours a day. In Lahore, for example, residential users are currently subject to (.pdf) more than eight hours of load-shedding each day, while the situation is worse in rural areas. Gas is also increasingly rationed, with regular and sometimes lengthy interruptions of both supplies to industry and deliveries to CNG stations, which cripples transportation.



Public reaction to the energy crisis has swung from resignation to violent protest and back again. Energy riots have become commonplace since 2008, with Asif dubbing the period "the modern Stone Age." The first day of 2009, for instance, was greeted by "blockade of roads, gunshot injuries, destruction of public and private properties, looting and clashes with the police." The offices of WAPDA, the state-owned utility, were attacked, as were the offices and homes of politicians. Pakistani authorities have lost control of the energy crisis and of the public's response to it.



Undermining Resilience?



Pakistan's struggle with resource scarcity is a reflection of a broader lack of resilience: its vulnerability to more-expensive commodities compounded by chronic underinvestment, calamitous policy decisions and a failure to respond to signs of impending crisis.



But there is also a feedback loop at work, as scarcity further undermines the immune system of a country that has long languished on the critical list. Most obvious is the economic damage scarcity causes, with the government estimating losses from the energy crisis (.pdf) at 2 percent of GDP during 2009-2010 alone. Indeed, according to the International Monetary Fund, high and volatile food and energy prices bear a heavy responsibility for knocking Pakistan's economy off the robust growth path it enjoyed between 2001 and 2007. Strong growth is simply not possible without increased access to energy, while food and fuel inflation have rapidly eroded the living standards of both the poor and the middle class. Moreover, there is no sign of Pakistan's economy breaking free of the shackles that resource scarcity has placed on it any time soon. The State Bank continues to warn of a disproportionately high risk (.pdf) to domestic growth from further increases in global commodity prices. If commodity markets sneeze, Pakistan is likely to catch something much nastier than a cold.

The politics of scarcity have also proved corrosive for a country that has a turbulent political history, and which is being pushed to the brink by multiple domestic security threats. Pakistan's government has been teetering on the edge of bankruptcy since 2008, when it required an IMF rescue. The $11 billion loan package was conditional on rapid cuts to the deficit, to be achieved by cutting energy subsidies and increasing the tax base. Attempts to implement these measures have pushed the government close to collapse. In January 2011, for example, the government tried to cut fuel subsidies but was forced into an embarrassing U-turn in order to maintain its splintering majority. (It still hopes to be the first democratically elected government for decades to serve a full term.) Energy subsidies accounted for more than 7 percent (.pdf) of all government expenditure in the second quarter of the current financial year, not including hidden subsidies to the electricity sector. As a result, the Asian Development Bank warned that the government will overshoot even its revised -- and unsustainable -- target of 5.5 percent for its annual budget deficit.



Finally, there are obvious, but unpalatable, security implications for a state that cannot meet demand for basic commodities. Few commentators see popular unrest as posing a systemic threat in Pakistan, but the examples of Egypt and elsewhere suggest the risks should not be underestimated. The country has already seen energy riots in urban areas, while protests by farmers and fishermen have also become common. Meanwhile, competition for water, and perhaps for energy, has the potential to poison already fragile relationships between Pakistan's provinces as well as to increase ethnic tensions. Water is also already one of many irritants (.pdf) in the country's relationship with India.



Of most immediate concern, however, is the opportunity offered by resource scarcity to Pakistan's vibrant ecosystem of terrorists and militants. In 2005, production from the Sui gas field, which accounts for 45 percent of national production, was halted for more than a week due to sabotage. The main gas pipeline to Lahore was cut at the same time. Attacks on gas pipelines and electricity grids have continued with depressing regularity ever since. Water is also a potential target, with analysts warning (.pdf) of the threat from the Taliban to the Tarbela Dam, Pakistan's largest dam. When a country is already teetering under the weight of resource limits, disruptive action becomes ever more appealing to militants as a means of pushing it over the edge.



Facing Up to Scarcity?



Here then, are five implications for the future.



First, scarcity already has Pakistan in its clutches, and its grip is likely to tighten. In an era of scarce resources, Pakistan brings few cards to the table, and at the same time has a knack for making the worst of its poor hand. Demographic trends mean that pressure on land and water, as well as demand for food and energy, will grow fast and for a long time. Supply constraints, especially for energy, seem very likely to constrain economic growth and may also continue to weaken governments, thereby threatening security. A resource-related collapse cannot be ruled out, especially if the price of oil climbs to unprecedented levels. The effect of climate change is further darkening an already bleak picture, and its impact will intensify. Pakistan is extremely vulnerable to climate impacts and is likely to experience increased monsoon variability, loss of glacier flow, reduced agricultural productivity and more-frequent natural disasters - all of which will threaten food, water and energy security.



Second, efforts to address these problems are very likely to fail, unless policymakers start to treat scarcity as an interrelated challenge, with implications for economics, politics, society and security, as well as a strong international dimension. As energy becomes more expensive, so does food -- due to higher costs of fertilizers and transport, for instance -- and water, due to higher extraction costs. Water scarcity degrades hydroelectric capacity and agricultural productivity. Economic stagnation and an empty public purse reduce or eliminate the country's ability to invest its way out of trouble, and starve young people of the opportunities they need to advance. Political weakness at home will increase the likelihood that the Pakistani government will continue to make a hash of its response. Meanwhile, international decisions have the potential to make things worse for Pakistan, with downstream consequences that will subsequently rebound on the rest of the world. Higher commodity prices are probably a given over the short to medium term, but steps to at least dampen volatility could help Pakistan step back from the brink.



Third, it is important not to lose sight of the potential upside. In the best-case scenario, Pakistan could become a laboratory for increasing resilience, as the intensity of its problems forces innovation at all levels from the national to the local. Already, the country is experimenting -- at scale -- with social protection and some highly original public-private partnerships (.pdf). Perhaps Pakistan could develop the next generation of social protection schemes, by including access to a basic quota of energy with existing cash transfers. It could also use public-private partnerships to expand access to solar water heaters and other proven distributed energy systems. To make the most of its agricultural potential, it could invest in readily available technologies such as drip irrigation, while shifting production from wheat to less-water-dependent crops.



Fourth, in the long term, a great deal will depend on how quickly Pakistan's explosive population growth is brought under control, so that better-educated parents -- especially mothers -- can invest more resources in fewer children. By mid-century, the country is projected to have 335 million citizens under the United Nation's medium variant scenario. That is 150 million more people than today, with no peak in sight. Under the low variant, the population would still see daunting growth, but would be less than 300 million in 2050 and close to stabilizing, offering Pakistan some chance of coping in a resource-constrained world. The relationship between demography and scarcity is a complex one, however. On the one hand, insecurity has the paradoxical effect of slowing the transition toward smaller families. On the other, demographic change is associated with urbanization and the rise of an educated middle class, which will increase competition for resources. Escape from the demographic trap, in other words, will not be easy to achieve.



Finally, we must also confront the fact that failure is likely, and that collapse cannot be ruled out. Pakistan is going to continue to face more than its fair share of disasters, and many of them will have a resource or environmental dimension. The international community still has an extremely poor understanding of what can be done to keep a fragile society functioning, and has far too few resources available to protect citizens when their governments fail them. In the long crisis of globalization, many states will struggle with living in a world where resources are scarce. Pakistan is already on the front line. We should remember that where it leads, others will follow.



David Steven is a fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.



Cheers

[Naresh]

.



[url="http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1616964&SM=1"]8 Killed In Pak Cricket Stadium Shooting[/url]



Up to eight people were killed when unidentified gunmen went berserk firing at spectators and players at a cricket ground in southwestern Pakistan on Friday, reports said.



The incident took place in a suburb of Balochistan capital Quetta which has lately witnessed an uptick in sectarian violence.



Police told mediapersons that the assailants stormed the ground in two vehicles, initially firing rockets and then shooting indiscriminately at spectators. Fifteen people were also injured in the attack. The dead included spectators as well as cricketers.



Even though there was no apparent motive for the killings, the dead were members of the Shia Hazara community often targeted by Sunni extremists. The Shia Hazaras had also come under attack in the past from Baluchi tribesmen who demand greater autonomy for the region and a bigger share of its mineral wealth.



No one has claimed responsibility for the attack so far.



Cheers

[Naresh]

.



[url="http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011/05/08/story_8-5-2011_pg5_3"]Pakistan external debt, liabilities up 9.2% YoY[/url]



KARACHI : Pakistan’s external debt and liabilities (EDL) [color="#FF0000"]rose by $5.05 billion or 9.2 percent to $59.53 billion by the end of the third quarter of 2010/11[/color] against $54.74 billion during the corresponding period last year, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) said on Saturday. In the total EDL, the public debt mounted to $55.60 billion by March 30 against $50.63 billion during the same period last year. The public debt includes government debt, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign exchange liabilities. The government debt is around $45.56 billion at the end of the third quarter of the current fiscal year. The loan from the IMF grew to $8.93 billion from the same period figures of $7.2 billion a year ago. However, foreign exchange liabilities declined to $1.1 billion from $1.2 billion. The guaranteed debt for the public sector enterprises (PSEs) witnessed a sharp decline to $105 million by March 2011 from $169 million by March 2010, it said, adding that the non-guaranteed debt declined to $1.02 billion from $1.08 billion. The payment for debt servicing also increased with the rise of EDL. The country has paid $182 million as interest during Jan-March 2011. The payment of principal amount amounted to $2.512 1.43 billion during the period against $988 million by the end of September 2009, it added.



Cheers

[Guest]

LATEST: Reports of loud explosion heard near compound where Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan.



My take,

Pakistan Army destroyed evidence. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[Arun_S]

[url="http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/right-and-wrong/entry/wimpish-india-may-lose-the-great-game"]Wimpish India may lose the Great Game[/url]

[url="http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/right-and-wrong/page/authorProfile?page=authorProfile"] [/url]Swapan Dasgupta 08 May 2011, 01:36 AM IST

[Guest]

[url="http://politics.foxnews.mobi/quickPage.html?page=23877&content=51662121&pageNum=-1"]After Bin Laden Killing, Lobbyists Pursue Assurances of U.S. Aid to Pakistan[/url]



Nareshji,

Here is AIDS train.

[Naresh]

[quote name='Mudy' date='09 May 2011 - 08:05 PM' timestamp='1304951271' post='111548']

[url="http://politics.foxnews.mobi/quickPage.html?page=23877&content=51662121&pageNum=-1"]After Bin Laden Killing, Lobbyists Pursue Assurances of U.S. Aid to Pakistan[/url]



Nareshji,

Here is AIDS train.

[/quote]



Mudy Ji :



Terroristan has received US$ 20 Billion - if not more - from the USA in the last Ten Years - and what have they got to show?



Industry? Education?? Health & Welfare???



90 to 95 Per Cent of this Aid has gone to buy Arms and built up the "Off-Shore" Bank Accounts of the Satanic Pakistani Leadership of the Islamic Terrorist.



One must keep any eye on the Pakistani Economic "Phront"!



The way S P L I T is carrying on one can safely say that in thext Five Years or so Terroristan will be divided into Three to Five Parts.



Herein lies the Danger to India in the sense that with Lotastan broken up or even destabilized India will received 50 to 100 Million "Nanga Bhookhas" - words of Ardeshir Cowasjee - and MMS along with the WKK Brigade will receive them with open arms.



As such it is best to keep Pakistan in it present stage until the Time the Indian Economy hits the Figure of say US$ Five Trillion when the corresponding Pakistan Economy is possibly US$ 250 Billion.



Cheers

[Guest]

One never become rich on welfare. So Paki will keep begging, Now they will use Nukes to blackmail world.