07-18-2005, 01:21 AM
Perspective
The Advani Adjustment and Kashmir
Since the end of the 19th century, the question before the political leadership of the subcontinent has been this: is India a âcivilizational nationâ in continuity over millennia or is it a âcomposite stateâ needing a new definition in the post-colonial modern world. Those who adopted the slogans of restoration of Ram Rajya or the Khilafat during the freedom struggle tended to see India as a civilizational legacy, modeled along the lines of modern China and Japan. They did not address the complexity of what this meant for ânationhoodâ. Divergent though these perspectives were, political expediency occasionally allowed alliances between the adherents of the two perspectives. Gandhiâs support of the Khilafat movement and Muslim support for changes in nomenclature, such as to Swaraj Sabha from Home Rule League are two cases in point. Mahatma Gandhi and Allama Iqbal tended assert the âcivilizationalâ contributions of Hinduism and Islam respectively in undivided India. On the other hand Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, albeit advocating divergent mechanisms for power sharing, tended to see the future of India as a composite society needing a new definition in the modern world.
The arguments of the two perspectives evolved over the course of half a century and boiled over into a bitter dispute in early 1940s resulting in the partition of the country. Officially, both India and Pakistan declared themselves to be states composed of several civilizations. The preeminent status of Nehru and Jinnah were responsible for this declaration. But in both countries, those who espoused civilizational pride and an identity based on this pride remained political forces to be reckoned with. In the late-1970s, Pakistan veered sharply towards such a definition as Zia ul-Haq began using the mullah to consolidate power. In India this sentiment was to find political ground a decade later resulting in the ascendancy of an aggressive Hindutva brigade.
In political terms, the debate runs something like this. The civilizational argument is: we are a state that places a common civilization at center stage. It is what gives us our identity, our strength and our purpose. To further the ends of our nation-state, you must conform and be one of âusâ. The composite argument is: we are a state that recognizes the existence of multiple civilizations within our borders. We believe that the state must cater to the flowering of all of these civilizations in equal measure and find agreement amongst ourselves on other issues such as poverty, health care, education and so on. The civilizational nation perspective demands conformity and the composite state perspective seeks agreement; two very different paths.
<b>The recent controversy surrounding Lal Krishan Advaniâs comments on Jinnah is an extension of this polemic and, in that context, a healthy one that goes to the very root of politics in Southasia. At face value, Advani seems to have discovered the dangers of asserting a purely civilizational definition of the Indian state and has rightly started to back-track towards âsecularismâ, Southasiaâs quaint contribution to the English language, meaning an ability to tolerate religious co-existence and not necessarily the negation of religion itself, which is the strict meaning of the word.</b>
If it is a back-tracking, then Advaniâs statement must be carefully considered. If it is not, it will show it self sooner or later. Regardless, the Advani adjustment is crucial to the civilizational-nation versus composite-state debate. It is also eminently relevant for the Kashmir issue.
We demand conformity in many ways. Three years ago, as I stopped for tea in Sonamarg en route from Leh to Srinagar, I observed a group of young men, pilgrims, from North India on their way to the Amarnath Cave. They had just washed their clothes, draped these over the chairs of the small dhaba and were awaiting their order. Loud, demanding and abusive, their message to the owner was clear. âThis land belongs to us, not you. Your insurgent rebellion is at an end and we are back, masters.â I could not help thinking of what this did to the mind of the meek, poverty-stricken and business-starved owner of the dhaba. He served the men quietly; but resentment, alienation and anger are mild words to describe the writ on his face.
The young men were right in a way, of course. Technically the modern state owns the land within its borders and rebels against those who claim otherwise. As members of the majority religion in that State, the yatris were staking their majoritarian claim. That is the theory and I was witnessing its implementation on the ground. <b>The young yatris were also taking to its logical conclusion the worldwide trend of identity politics in the post-1990s mood. For example, Amarnath and Vaishno Devi were hardly todayâs media celebration prior to 1989. They were accepted ecumenical events, low key and matter-of-fact. Since then, however, they have taken on an aggressive tone to the point of blatant invention, such as the Sindhu Darshan in Ladakh. It represents a war against the composite character of the State; an ideological war that has marched some distance without discourse. The frontline of this war has been the belligerent state-sponsorship of yatras and darshans in the interests of an aggressively civilizational nation-state.</b>
The problem of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is reaching a climax as Delhi and Islamabad collaborate to find ways to numb its populace into acquiescence. Given the tattered state of the dissident leadership, it is difficult as yet to tell where this will lead. At the same time, the historical idiosyncrasies and legal ambiguities of the Kashmir question are such that it highlights the composite-state-seeking-agreement versus the civilization- nation-seeking-conformity debate. The argument falls within the rubric of the legitimate legal and political claims for authentic, and extra, autonomy for the mosaic of constituencies that is Southasia. <b>It is not about to go away, but this is not to say that there are not elements in India and Pakistan that would like to erase the voices in the state that lay claim to its legitimacy. It behooves the citizens of the state, in its entirety, to be aware that through their responsible articulations about their own future they can contribute positively to this wider debate in the politics of Southasia.</b>
(The column, From the Margins, will be appearing in Greater Kashmir every first and third Tuesday of the month. It is authored by Prof. Siddiq Wahid, the Maharaja Gulab Singh Chair Professor at the University of Jammu. He is also a Director of the J&K Waqf Board and a member of the Governing Board of Peoples Convention on Environment and Development India. Prof. Wahid is also an author and consultant on Tourism).
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.a...mID=6384&cat=11
The Advani Adjustment and Kashmir
Since the end of the 19th century, the question before the political leadership of the subcontinent has been this: is India a âcivilizational nationâ in continuity over millennia or is it a âcomposite stateâ needing a new definition in the post-colonial modern world. Those who adopted the slogans of restoration of Ram Rajya or the Khilafat during the freedom struggle tended to see India as a civilizational legacy, modeled along the lines of modern China and Japan. They did not address the complexity of what this meant for ânationhoodâ. Divergent though these perspectives were, political expediency occasionally allowed alliances between the adherents of the two perspectives. Gandhiâs support of the Khilafat movement and Muslim support for changes in nomenclature, such as to Swaraj Sabha from Home Rule League are two cases in point. Mahatma Gandhi and Allama Iqbal tended assert the âcivilizationalâ contributions of Hinduism and Islam respectively in undivided India. On the other hand Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, albeit advocating divergent mechanisms for power sharing, tended to see the future of India as a composite society needing a new definition in the modern world.
The arguments of the two perspectives evolved over the course of half a century and boiled over into a bitter dispute in early 1940s resulting in the partition of the country. Officially, both India and Pakistan declared themselves to be states composed of several civilizations. The preeminent status of Nehru and Jinnah were responsible for this declaration. But in both countries, those who espoused civilizational pride and an identity based on this pride remained political forces to be reckoned with. In the late-1970s, Pakistan veered sharply towards such a definition as Zia ul-Haq began using the mullah to consolidate power. In India this sentiment was to find political ground a decade later resulting in the ascendancy of an aggressive Hindutva brigade.
In political terms, the debate runs something like this. The civilizational argument is: we are a state that places a common civilization at center stage. It is what gives us our identity, our strength and our purpose. To further the ends of our nation-state, you must conform and be one of âusâ. The composite argument is: we are a state that recognizes the existence of multiple civilizations within our borders. We believe that the state must cater to the flowering of all of these civilizations in equal measure and find agreement amongst ourselves on other issues such as poverty, health care, education and so on. The civilizational nation perspective demands conformity and the composite state perspective seeks agreement; two very different paths.
<b>The recent controversy surrounding Lal Krishan Advaniâs comments on Jinnah is an extension of this polemic and, in that context, a healthy one that goes to the very root of politics in Southasia. At face value, Advani seems to have discovered the dangers of asserting a purely civilizational definition of the Indian state and has rightly started to back-track towards âsecularismâ, Southasiaâs quaint contribution to the English language, meaning an ability to tolerate religious co-existence and not necessarily the negation of religion itself, which is the strict meaning of the word.</b>
If it is a back-tracking, then Advaniâs statement must be carefully considered. If it is not, it will show it self sooner or later. Regardless, the Advani adjustment is crucial to the civilizational-nation versus composite-state debate. It is also eminently relevant for the Kashmir issue.
We demand conformity in many ways. Three years ago, as I stopped for tea in Sonamarg en route from Leh to Srinagar, I observed a group of young men, pilgrims, from North India on their way to the Amarnath Cave. They had just washed their clothes, draped these over the chairs of the small dhaba and were awaiting their order. Loud, demanding and abusive, their message to the owner was clear. âThis land belongs to us, not you. Your insurgent rebellion is at an end and we are back, masters.â I could not help thinking of what this did to the mind of the meek, poverty-stricken and business-starved owner of the dhaba. He served the men quietly; but resentment, alienation and anger are mild words to describe the writ on his face.
The young men were right in a way, of course. Technically the modern state owns the land within its borders and rebels against those who claim otherwise. As members of the majority religion in that State, the yatris were staking their majoritarian claim. That is the theory and I was witnessing its implementation on the ground. <b>The young yatris were also taking to its logical conclusion the worldwide trend of identity politics in the post-1990s mood. For example, Amarnath and Vaishno Devi were hardly todayâs media celebration prior to 1989. They were accepted ecumenical events, low key and matter-of-fact. Since then, however, they have taken on an aggressive tone to the point of blatant invention, such as the Sindhu Darshan in Ladakh. It represents a war against the composite character of the State; an ideological war that has marched some distance without discourse. The frontline of this war has been the belligerent state-sponsorship of yatras and darshans in the interests of an aggressively civilizational nation-state.</b>
The problem of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is reaching a climax as Delhi and Islamabad collaborate to find ways to numb its populace into acquiescence. Given the tattered state of the dissident leadership, it is difficult as yet to tell where this will lead. At the same time, the historical idiosyncrasies and legal ambiguities of the Kashmir question are such that it highlights the composite-state-seeking-agreement versus the civilization- nation-seeking-conformity debate. The argument falls within the rubric of the legitimate legal and political claims for authentic, and extra, autonomy for the mosaic of constituencies that is Southasia. <b>It is not about to go away, but this is not to say that there are not elements in India and Pakistan that would like to erase the voices in the state that lay claim to its legitimacy. It behooves the citizens of the state, in its entirety, to be aware that through their responsible articulations about their own future they can contribute positively to this wider debate in the politics of Southasia.</b>
(The column, From the Margins, will be appearing in Greater Kashmir every first and third Tuesday of the month. It is authored by Prof. Siddiq Wahid, the Maharaja Gulab Singh Chair Professor at the University of Jammu. He is also a Director of the J&K Waqf Board and a member of the Governing Board of Peoples Convention on Environment and Development India. Prof. Wahid is also an author and consultant on Tourism).
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.a...mID=6384&cat=11