11-29-2005, 04:54 AM
http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/upl...962war.htm
In September 1951, the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, proposed to the Indian ambassador to stabilize the Tibetan frontier through discussions between India, China and Nepal, confirming that China had decided to accept the McMahon Line as India�s northwest boundary. But India passed the opportunity to formalize the McMahon Line. In July 1952, when China proposed to settle "pending problems" related to commercial intercourse and trade in Tibet, the boundary question was not raised.
There was doubt in India about the decision not to raise the boundary questions with China. But it was decided that McMahon Line might be the "scars left by Britain in the course of her aggression against China" and that to "seek to heal or ease this scar" was not in the liking or interest of India. The Indian government was fully aware that China, "never having accepted � as the frontier between Tibet and us," would not regard the McMahon Line as the settled boundary. They decided to treat the Line as the boundary and leave it for China to either agree or ignore the statement. In 1954, when the Indian delegation went to negotiate trade and intercourse in Tibet, they even went out of their way to avoid the subject.
The agreement stated the famous "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence," or "Panch Sheel" as Indians called them, the first of which was "mutual respect for each other�s territorial integrity and sovereignty." China�s sovereignty in Tibet was unequivocally recognized, and the British attempts and latter Indian attempts to treat Tibet as independent were formally buried. India formed a crucial China policy that India would make clear and treat what India regarded as proper boundary, leaving it to China to protest, and then "refuse to reopen the question." Based on the first principal of the Panch Sheel, China would have not choice but to accept the boundary.
It was understood, based on Chinese acquiescence in the 1951 Indian takeover of Tawang, that China was going to accept the McMahon Line. The decision not to renegotiate transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries were undetermined and to be negotiated. Indians held that the boundaries were already determined and decided to establish checkposts all along them.
In September 1951, the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, proposed to the Indian ambassador to stabilize the Tibetan frontier through discussions between India, China and Nepal, confirming that China had decided to accept the McMahon Line as India�s northwest boundary. But India passed the opportunity to formalize the McMahon Line. In July 1952, when China proposed to settle "pending problems" related to commercial intercourse and trade in Tibet, the boundary question was not raised.
There was doubt in India about the decision not to raise the boundary questions with China. But it was decided that McMahon Line might be the "scars left by Britain in the course of her aggression against China" and that to "seek to heal or ease this scar" was not in the liking or interest of India. The Indian government was fully aware that China, "never having accepted � as the frontier between Tibet and us," would not regard the McMahon Line as the settled boundary. They decided to treat the Line as the boundary and leave it for China to either agree or ignore the statement. In 1954, when the Indian delegation went to negotiate trade and intercourse in Tibet, they even went out of their way to avoid the subject.
The agreement stated the famous "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence," or "Panch Sheel" as Indians called them, the first of which was "mutual respect for each other�s territorial integrity and sovereignty." China�s sovereignty in Tibet was unequivocally recognized, and the British attempts and latter Indian attempts to treat Tibet as independent were formally buried. India formed a crucial China policy that India would make clear and treat what India regarded as proper boundary, leaving it to China to protest, and then "refuse to reopen the question." Based on the first principal of the Panch Sheel, China would have not choice but to accept the boundary.
It was understood, based on Chinese acquiescence in the 1951 Indian takeover of Tawang, that China was going to accept the McMahon Line. The decision not to renegotiate transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries were undetermined and to be negotiated. Indians held that the boundaries were already determined and decided to establish checkposts all along them.