09-09-2005, 07:51 PM
Book Review in The Telegraph, 9 Sept., 2005
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE MORE, THE SAFERÂ
Strike forceÂ
SECOND STRIKE: ARGUMENTS ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR IN SOUTH ASIA
By Rajesh Rajagopalan,
Viking, Rs 395
<b>From 1998 onwards, the view emanating from the Oval Office has been that south Asia has become the most dangerous place on earth owing to the nuclearization of both India and Pakistan. Most nuclear strategists (both Indian and foreign) tend to follow the above line. Ironically, successive Indian governments, by repeating the argument that nuclear weapons in the hands of unstable military dictatorships in the âfailedâ state of Pakistan has increased the likelihood of nuclear war, have strengthened the American position.</b>
In this slim volume, Rajesh Rajagopalan offers an alternative interpretation. <b>He argues that the American concern for the nuclearization of the subcontinent is a part of their policy to roll back the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan.</b> And that since the anti-nuclear lobby engages in polemics, it does not merit attention. De-nuclearization of the region, as demanded by the anti-proliferationists in the US and the anti-nuclear lobby, will not reduce the danger of nuclear war. As long as the big five retain their nukes, the danger to the world will remain.
According to Rajagopalan, the small nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan are less dangerous than the big arsenals of the US and Russia which remain on âhair trigger alertâ. Rajagopalan derives his theory from Kenneth Waltz, who had maintained that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world safer. The very possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of small and medium powers would prevent the outbreak of conventional war.
Deterrence stability, claims Rajagopalan, depends not only on technology and the number of nuclear warheads available, but also on doctrine. In contrast to the two superpowers, whose nuclear doctrine is based on âready to launchâ principle, India and Pakistan have a go-slow policy. <b>The nuclear warheads of India and Pakistan are not mated with their delivery vehicles. Further, Islamabad and Delhi are against the doctrine of massive retaliation or mutually assured destruction.</b>
Much heat has been generated over Pakistan not agreeing to the principle of âno first strike.â India, in contrast, has emphasized that it would launch its nukes only if its adversary were to mount a nuclear attack. <b>Pakistanâs logic is that if India decides to exert its conventional superiority in the battlefield, then it would resort to a nuclear attack in order to avert defeat. Rajagopalan has a benevolent interpretation of nuclear opinion in Pakistan. He asserts that Pakistanâs rejection of âno first useâ is not equivalent to a preemptive or first strike. The author assumes that in case Indian forces cross over into Pakistan, the latter would merely resort to a local nuclear strike against the Indian forces within Pakistan to stop further aggression. It is to be noted that the author has no data to back his claims.</b>
Further, Rajagopalan says that if India acquires a strategic nuclear triad (air-land-sea-based nuclear weapons) and anti-ballistic missiles, then Pakistan would be forced to increase its nuclear missiles and the stable deterrence between the two nations would disintegrate. If Rajagopalanâs thesis is accepted then it means stasis for Indiaâs nuclear arsenal.
<b>But India has to take into account China too. As long as Chinese nuclear missiles are stationed in Tibet, India needs submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. </b>
Small is not always beautiful for a countryâs security. But there is a lot in Rajagopalanâs argument that anti-ballistic missiles are useless. Like the bombers, at least a few missiles will âgo throughâ.
KAUSHIK ROY
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE MORE, THE SAFERÂ
Strike forceÂ
SECOND STRIKE: ARGUMENTS ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR IN SOUTH ASIA
By Rajesh Rajagopalan,
Viking, Rs 395
<b>From 1998 onwards, the view emanating from the Oval Office has been that south Asia has become the most dangerous place on earth owing to the nuclearization of both India and Pakistan. Most nuclear strategists (both Indian and foreign) tend to follow the above line. Ironically, successive Indian governments, by repeating the argument that nuclear weapons in the hands of unstable military dictatorships in the âfailedâ state of Pakistan has increased the likelihood of nuclear war, have strengthened the American position.</b>
In this slim volume, Rajesh Rajagopalan offers an alternative interpretation. <b>He argues that the American concern for the nuclearization of the subcontinent is a part of their policy to roll back the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan.</b> And that since the anti-nuclear lobby engages in polemics, it does not merit attention. De-nuclearization of the region, as demanded by the anti-proliferationists in the US and the anti-nuclear lobby, will not reduce the danger of nuclear war. As long as the big five retain their nukes, the danger to the world will remain.
According to Rajagopalan, the small nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan are less dangerous than the big arsenals of the US and Russia which remain on âhair trigger alertâ. Rajagopalan derives his theory from Kenneth Waltz, who had maintained that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world safer. The very possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of small and medium powers would prevent the outbreak of conventional war.
Deterrence stability, claims Rajagopalan, depends not only on technology and the number of nuclear warheads available, but also on doctrine. In contrast to the two superpowers, whose nuclear doctrine is based on âready to launchâ principle, India and Pakistan have a go-slow policy. <b>The nuclear warheads of India and Pakistan are not mated with their delivery vehicles. Further, Islamabad and Delhi are against the doctrine of massive retaliation or mutually assured destruction.</b>
Much heat has been generated over Pakistan not agreeing to the principle of âno first strike.â India, in contrast, has emphasized that it would launch its nukes only if its adversary were to mount a nuclear attack. <b>Pakistanâs logic is that if India decides to exert its conventional superiority in the battlefield, then it would resort to a nuclear attack in order to avert defeat. Rajagopalan has a benevolent interpretation of nuclear opinion in Pakistan. He asserts that Pakistanâs rejection of âno first useâ is not equivalent to a preemptive or first strike. The author assumes that in case Indian forces cross over into Pakistan, the latter would merely resort to a local nuclear strike against the Indian forces within Pakistan to stop further aggression. It is to be noted that the author has no data to back his claims.</b>
Further, Rajagopalan says that if India acquires a strategic nuclear triad (air-land-sea-based nuclear weapons) and anti-ballistic missiles, then Pakistan would be forced to increase its nuclear missiles and the stable deterrence between the two nations would disintegrate. If Rajagopalanâs thesis is accepted then it means stasis for Indiaâs nuclear arsenal.
<b>But India has to take into account China too. As long as Chinese nuclear missiles are stationed in Tibet, India needs submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. </b>
Small is not always beautiful for a countryâs security. But there is a lot in Rajagopalanâs argument that anti-ballistic missiles are useless. Like the bombers, at least a few missiles will âgo throughâ.
KAUSHIK ROY
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->