11-27-2005, 08:09 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-Bharatvarsh+Nov 27 2005, 07:25 AM-->QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Nov 27 2005, 07:25 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin--><!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->but i will maintain that the beginning of the problem was the lack of unity amongst the various kings against the camel jockey onslaught. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
This is a false reason propagated, the following is taken from the book "Heroic Hindu Resistance to Muslim Invaders" by Sita Ram Goel:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->MISTAKEN ANALYSIS
Coming to serious and scholarly explanations of Hindu defeats, Dr. Misra deals, first of all, with âthe defects of the political system of the Hindu statesâ and observes that disunity among the Hindu states was not a very material cause of these defeats. âNo doubt the Hindu states were for ever engaged in internecine conflicts among themselves but such quarrels were a common feature of the Middle Ages everywhere and more so in Central Asia. If such almost intermittent struggle among the Muslims of Central Asia did not prevent them from expanding their rule over other lands, it is useless to blame Indian rulersâ internecine struggle for their ultimate collapse.â3 It may be added that in spite of their disunity, not a single Indian state ever sided with the invader, nor failed to put up a resolute resistance in its own turn.
Also, Dr. Misra does not agree with the thesis that Indians at that time lacked ânational consciousness, love of country and pride of freedomâ. He writes: âThat Indians were fully alive to the dangers of foreign invasion and their love of the country was equally matched by desire to fight for it, is a reality that can be substantiated. Each wave of Muslim invasion created a profound stir among the Indian states and they often pooled their resources to meet the aggressor.â4 He cites evidence of at least four confederacies formed by Hindu states during this period. The evidence is not a Hindu concoction but has been culled from the accounts of medieval Muslim historians.
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REAL CAUSES OF HINDU DEFEATS
Finally, Dr. Misra lays his probing finger on the real factors which contributed to Hindu defeats during this period. The very first factor, according to him, was the lack of a forward policy vis-a-vis the Muslim invaders. In his own words, âWhat the Rajputs really lacked was a spirit of aggression so conspicuous among the Muslims, and a will to force the war in the enemyâs dominions and thus destroy the base of his power.â5
Secondly, a forward policy could not be pursued in the absence of a âstrong central government for even the whole of northern India which could think and act for the whole countryâ. As a result, âThe Rajput rulers found it difficult to look beyond the territorial limits of their own kingdoms and their regional interests pushed the national issues into the background.â6 Compared to a strong central authority, the various confederacies organised by the Rajputs proved to be patch-works which came apart either under the impact of military defeat, or as soon as the immediate purpose of stopping the enemy had been served.
Thirdly, the military organisation of the Rajputs was inferior as compared to that of the Muslims. The Rajputs depended mainly on feudal levies assembled on the spur of the moment. âThese feudal levies with no unity of training and organisation, coming together at the last moment, fighting under the leadership of and for their individual leaders, could not be expected to beat back an enemy united in purpose and organisation and acting as on coordinate unit.â A medieval Muslim historian quoted by Dr. Misra said so in so many words: âA commander with a heterogeneous army consisting of soldiers - a hundred from here and a hundred from there - cannot achieve anything. An army with so varied and so many component elements has never been able to achieve anything great.â7
Fourthly, âThe cavalry and mounted archers of the invading armies gave them a decisive superiority over the home forces. The Indian rulers too maintained cavalry units. But the Arabic and Turkoman horses were much better adapted to warfare⦠The second strong point of the Turkish military machine was its mounted archery. Their deadly arrows easily covered a range of eighty to hundred paces⦠Reference to archery among the Indian armies after the age of the epics is conspicuous by its absence.â8
Lastly, âthe strategy and tactics employed by the invaders on the battlefield proved decisive in their favour. Indians failed to keep pace with the developments of military strategy taking place in Central Asia before the advent of Islam. The Arabs and Turks perfected them⦠Besides, the traditional Rajput chivalry looked upon the battle as a ritual or a tournament for displaying their fighting skill and swordsmanship under well-recognised rules of sport. Did not Manu, the ancient law-giver proclaim â âA battle was ideally a gigantic tournament with many rules: a warrior fighting from a chariot might not strike one on foot; an enemy in flight, wounded or asking a quarter, might not be slain; the lives of enemy soldiers who had lost their weapons were to be respected; poisoned weapons were not to be used; homage and not annexation was the rightful fruit of victory.â The Arabs and the Turks, on the other hand, knew no rules and waged a grim and ruthless struggle to destroy their enemies. Feints and sudden attacks, manoeuvering under the cover of darkness and pretending defeat and flights, keeping a large reserve to be used only at critical moments - all these took the Indians by surprise and crippled their fighting capacity. The Indians never tried to take advantage of their enemyâs weakness and perhaps considered it unchivalrous to do so. Such magnanimity on the part of Indian kings⦠was a sure invitation to disaster against a ruthless foe who recognised no moral or ideological scruples in the pursuit of victory.â
http://voiceofdharma.com/books/hhrmi/ch5.htm<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
[right][snapback]42065[/snapback][/right]
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well i am not going to try and argue with what sita ram goel had to say.
even if rajputs and other indians princely states did unite, it was clearly not enough.
i wish the marathas and others had teamed up with the rajputs instead of taking the camel jockeys on, serially one after the other. wish we could have produced a chanakya or even a bismark during the days when sind fell.
i do see sita ram goel's point about the lack of expansionist designs costing us dear and also ensuring that we never came to know whether our fighting techniques were up to date or lagging.
This is a false reason propagated, the following is taken from the book "Heroic Hindu Resistance to Muslim Invaders" by Sita Ram Goel:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->MISTAKEN ANALYSIS
Coming to serious and scholarly explanations of Hindu defeats, Dr. Misra deals, first of all, with âthe defects of the political system of the Hindu statesâ and observes that disunity among the Hindu states was not a very material cause of these defeats. âNo doubt the Hindu states were for ever engaged in internecine conflicts among themselves but such quarrels were a common feature of the Middle Ages everywhere and more so in Central Asia. If such almost intermittent struggle among the Muslims of Central Asia did not prevent them from expanding their rule over other lands, it is useless to blame Indian rulersâ internecine struggle for their ultimate collapse.â3 It may be added that in spite of their disunity, not a single Indian state ever sided with the invader, nor failed to put up a resolute resistance in its own turn.
Also, Dr. Misra does not agree with the thesis that Indians at that time lacked ânational consciousness, love of country and pride of freedomâ. He writes: âThat Indians were fully alive to the dangers of foreign invasion and their love of the country was equally matched by desire to fight for it, is a reality that can be substantiated. Each wave of Muslim invasion created a profound stir among the Indian states and they often pooled their resources to meet the aggressor.â4 He cites evidence of at least four confederacies formed by Hindu states during this period. The evidence is not a Hindu concoction but has been culled from the accounts of medieval Muslim historians.
Â
REAL CAUSES OF HINDU DEFEATS
Finally, Dr. Misra lays his probing finger on the real factors which contributed to Hindu defeats during this period. The very first factor, according to him, was the lack of a forward policy vis-a-vis the Muslim invaders. In his own words, âWhat the Rajputs really lacked was a spirit of aggression so conspicuous among the Muslims, and a will to force the war in the enemyâs dominions and thus destroy the base of his power.â5
Secondly, a forward policy could not be pursued in the absence of a âstrong central government for even the whole of northern India which could think and act for the whole countryâ. As a result, âThe Rajput rulers found it difficult to look beyond the territorial limits of their own kingdoms and their regional interests pushed the national issues into the background.â6 Compared to a strong central authority, the various confederacies organised by the Rajputs proved to be patch-works which came apart either under the impact of military defeat, or as soon as the immediate purpose of stopping the enemy had been served.
Thirdly, the military organisation of the Rajputs was inferior as compared to that of the Muslims. The Rajputs depended mainly on feudal levies assembled on the spur of the moment. âThese feudal levies with no unity of training and organisation, coming together at the last moment, fighting under the leadership of and for their individual leaders, could not be expected to beat back an enemy united in purpose and organisation and acting as on coordinate unit.â A medieval Muslim historian quoted by Dr. Misra said so in so many words: âA commander with a heterogeneous army consisting of soldiers - a hundred from here and a hundred from there - cannot achieve anything. An army with so varied and so many component elements has never been able to achieve anything great.â7
Fourthly, âThe cavalry and mounted archers of the invading armies gave them a decisive superiority over the home forces. The Indian rulers too maintained cavalry units. But the Arabic and Turkoman horses were much better adapted to warfare⦠The second strong point of the Turkish military machine was its mounted archery. Their deadly arrows easily covered a range of eighty to hundred paces⦠Reference to archery among the Indian armies after the age of the epics is conspicuous by its absence.â8
Lastly, âthe strategy and tactics employed by the invaders on the battlefield proved decisive in their favour. Indians failed to keep pace with the developments of military strategy taking place in Central Asia before the advent of Islam. The Arabs and Turks perfected them⦠Besides, the traditional Rajput chivalry looked upon the battle as a ritual or a tournament for displaying their fighting skill and swordsmanship under well-recognised rules of sport. Did not Manu, the ancient law-giver proclaim â âA battle was ideally a gigantic tournament with many rules: a warrior fighting from a chariot might not strike one on foot; an enemy in flight, wounded or asking a quarter, might not be slain; the lives of enemy soldiers who had lost their weapons were to be respected; poisoned weapons were not to be used; homage and not annexation was the rightful fruit of victory.â The Arabs and the Turks, on the other hand, knew no rules and waged a grim and ruthless struggle to destroy their enemies. Feints and sudden attacks, manoeuvering under the cover of darkness and pretending defeat and flights, keeping a large reserve to be used only at critical moments - all these took the Indians by surprise and crippled their fighting capacity. The Indians never tried to take advantage of their enemyâs weakness and perhaps considered it unchivalrous to do so. Such magnanimity on the part of Indian kings⦠was a sure invitation to disaster against a ruthless foe who recognised no moral or ideological scruples in the pursuit of victory.â
http://voiceofdharma.com/books/hhrmi/ch5.htm<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
[right][snapback]42065[/snapback][/right]
<!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->
well i am not going to try and argue with what sita ram goel had to say.
even if rajputs and other indians princely states did unite, it was clearly not enough.
i wish the marathas and others had teamed up with the rajputs instead of taking the camel jockeys on, serially one after the other. wish we could have produced a chanakya or even a bismark during the days when sind fell.
i do see sita ram goel's point about the lack of expansionist designs costing us dear and also ensuring that we never came to know whether our fighting techniques were up to date or lagging.