10-20-2005, 06:27 AM
Pioneer
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>The day fidayeen hit Ayodhya, PAC had rifles, no bullets </b>
Pramod Kumar Singh/ New Delhi
On July, 5, 2005 when heavily armed terrorists attacked the 'Rama Janmabhoomi Parisar' in Ayodhya, the Provincial Armed Consta-bulary (PAC)<b> deployed for the safety of the disputed structure were armed with rifles, but without ammunition</b>.
PAC is considered to be one of the better para-military forces in the country and 12 of its companies were deployed in the outer and inner security zone of Ram Janmabhoomi campus. However, <b>the fidayeen attack exposed the fragility of this force when its' personnel fled from the spot because their rifles were not loaded</b>.
The preparedness of the PAC men has come under a lot of criticism. Just two days before the Ayodhya attack, when Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Faizabad had conducted a surprise-check on July 3 to test the efficacy of the PAC personnel, he had found them "sluggish".
That was around the time when the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had alerted the State Government and the concerned agencies about the threat perception to the disputed site. The terrorist strike in Akshardham temple and Ragunath temple and recovery of explosives from a house in Varanasi in February this year were enough to suggest that Ayodhya was on the hit list of various terrorist outfits owing allegiance to the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.
According to a confidential report of the Home Ministry,<b> when the attack took place on the morning of July 5, the PAC men ran away leaving their arms behind. </b><b>They also left behind the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) who thankfully rose to the occasion and succeeded in foiling the designs of the terrorists</b>.
The report said that during the security review of the terrorist attack that shook the nation on the morning of <b>July 5, PAC personnel were barred from charging their magazines as going by their track record, on several occasions they had opened unprovoked fire. Even those posted in the "Red Zone" which houses the idols of Ram lalla were not permitted to charge their magazines.</b>
The overall review meeting found that frequent shifting of PAC troopers and the multiplicity of forces in the Red Zone added to the confusion. The most glaring was the frequent changes in the duties of PAC and the local police while CRPF personnel were performing long duty hours.<b> It has now been decided that the entire Red Zone will be manned by CRPF only</b>, a top security official told The Pioneer.
<b>It was also noticed that during emergencies, CRPF and other security forces were using different wireless sets of different frequencies.</b> There was no Public Address System at the disputed site, which could have been handy in alerting security forces during the terrorist attack. It was also found that there were no automatic generator sets to maintain uninterrupted power supply in and around the disputed structure. The report noted that had the fidayeen attack taken place at night, it would have been disastrous.
Another worrying aspect was that too many official visits were taking place to keep tabs on the safety and security of the place. This tendency should be curbed to avoid impersonation and only those officers should be allowed access who really matter, the report said.
Also, there was no "Post Crisis Management Plan" after the terrorist attack had taken place and was neutralised by CRPF. There was a free for all as the Red Zone was flooded with curious on-lookers. Ideally, the place should have been isolated after the action was over. <b>There was no back-up team, which could have started checking the vehicles in the event of subversives escaping from the spot, the official added</b>.
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>The day fidayeen hit Ayodhya, PAC had rifles, no bullets </b>
Pramod Kumar Singh/ New Delhi
On July, 5, 2005 when heavily armed terrorists attacked the 'Rama Janmabhoomi Parisar' in Ayodhya, the Provincial Armed Consta-bulary (PAC)<b> deployed for the safety of the disputed structure were armed with rifles, but without ammunition</b>.
PAC is considered to be one of the better para-military forces in the country and 12 of its companies were deployed in the outer and inner security zone of Ram Janmabhoomi campus. However, <b>the fidayeen attack exposed the fragility of this force when its' personnel fled from the spot because their rifles were not loaded</b>.
The preparedness of the PAC men has come under a lot of criticism. Just two days before the Ayodhya attack, when Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Faizabad had conducted a surprise-check on July 3 to test the efficacy of the PAC personnel, he had found them "sluggish".
That was around the time when the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had alerted the State Government and the concerned agencies about the threat perception to the disputed site. The terrorist strike in Akshardham temple and Ragunath temple and recovery of explosives from a house in Varanasi in February this year were enough to suggest that Ayodhya was on the hit list of various terrorist outfits owing allegiance to the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.
According to a confidential report of the Home Ministry,<b> when the attack took place on the morning of July 5, the PAC men ran away leaving their arms behind. </b><b>They also left behind the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) who thankfully rose to the occasion and succeeded in foiling the designs of the terrorists</b>.
The report said that during the security review of the terrorist attack that shook the nation on the morning of <b>July 5, PAC personnel were barred from charging their magazines as going by their track record, on several occasions they had opened unprovoked fire. Even those posted in the "Red Zone" which houses the idols of Ram lalla were not permitted to charge their magazines.</b>
The overall review meeting found that frequent shifting of PAC troopers and the multiplicity of forces in the Red Zone added to the confusion. The most glaring was the frequent changes in the duties of PAC and the local police while CRPF personnel were performing long duty hours.<b> It has now been decided that the entire Red Zone will be manned by CRPF only</b>, a top security official told The Pioneer.
<b>It was also noticed that during emergencies, CRPF and other security forces were using different wireless sets of different frequencies.</b> There was no Public Address System at the disputed site, which could have been handy in alerting security forces during the terrorist attack. It was also found that there were no automatic generator sets to maintain uninterrupted power supply in and around the disputed structure. The report noted that had the fidayeen attack taken place at night, it would have been disastrous.
Another worrying aspect was that too many official visits were taking place to keep tabs on the safety and security of the place. This tendency should be curbed to avoid impersonation and only those officers should be allowed access who really matter, the report said.
Also, there was no "Post Crisis Management Plan" after the terrorist attack had taken place and was neutralised by CRPF. There was a free for all as the Red Zone was flooded with curious on-lookers. Ideally, the place should have been isolated after the action was over. <b>There was no back-up team, which could have started checking the vehicles in the event of subversives escaping from the spot, the official added</b>.
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